6 Things to Know

1. On June 3, Ukraine’s long-range drones struck an oil terminal in St. Petersburg on the opening day of Russia’s annual St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), according to FT, sending plumes of smoke over the city during “an event Vladimir Putin has tried to cultivate into a showcase of a modern and prosperous country,” NYT reports. But Ukraine has not escaped injury from the air either. On June 2, Russia launched one of its heaviest barrages of the war, firing 73 missiles and 656 attack drones at Kyiv and multiple regions, killing at least 22 people and injuring more than 100 across Ukraine, including six dead in Kyiv and 16 in Dnipro. Ukraine’s air force says it downed 40–41 missiles and about 602 drones but intercepted only 11 of 33 Iskander‑M ballistic missiles and none of eight hypersonic Zircon missiles. The attack, which damaged residential buildings and infrastructure in Kyiv, Dnipro, Kamianske, Kharkiv, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia, comes as Western estimates put Russian combat deaths near 500,000 with 15,000–20,000 soldiers lost monthly.¹
2. RM’s analysis of ISW’s data for the past four weeks (May 5–June 3, 2026) indicates that Russian forces recorded a net loss of 93 square miles of Ukraine’s territory (about the size of the land area of Martha’s Vineyard), about double the 46 square miles Russia lost during the previous four-week period (April 7–May 5, 2026). In contrast, data from Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group, indicates that in the past four weeks (May 5–June 3, 2026) Russian forces made a net gain of 3 square miles (8 square kilometers).^2,3 Additionally, according to FT's analysis of DeepState data, Russian forces gained 5 square miles (14 square kilometers) of Ukrainian territory during the month of May. A source linked to Ukrainian military intelligence (DeepState) agrees, reporting that Russia gained just 14 square kilometers in May 2026 and suggesting net gains were actually negative once Ukrainian advances during the same period are included, ISW reports. If true, this would make May 2026 the first month since 2023 in which Russia lost more territory than it gained. ISW notes its own methodology differs but finds this broadly consistent with its assessment of minimal Russian progress. 
3. At this week’s SPIEF, Vladimir Putin reassured audiences that Russia’s conquest of the Donbas was proceeding apace. On June 4, at a meeting with heads of international news agencies, Putin announced that “recently, the Russian army has taken control of more than 2,400 square kilometers of territory, completely liberating the territory of the Luhansk People's Republic, more than 80% of the territory of the Donetsk People's Republic and 80% of the territory of the Zaporizhzhia region.” And on June 5, at a plenary session of the SPIEF, Putin added “Doesn't Kyiv know that, as of April 1 of this year, the LPR has been completely controlled by the Russian Federation? And in the DPR, less than 15% remains under Kyiv's control. We are moving calmly but confidently toward achieving these goals. There's no doubt we will achieve this,” Interfax reports. Note that Putin’s is at least the fourth assertion of “complete Russian control” of Luhansk since 2023. On July 1, 2025, Leonid Pashenik make the same claim. Subsequent claims were made on April 1 of this year by Russia’s Ministry of Defense, and again on April 20 by Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov.*
4. Volodymyr Zelenskyy proposed peace talks to Vladimir Putin in a rare and combative open letter on June 4. “Ukraine is ready for a full ceasefire for the duration of the negotiations,” Zelenskyy wrote. “We in Ukraine do not want a permanent war. We know very well that life without war is infinitely better. And we want to achieve that.” The letter also taunted the Russian leader over wartime setbacks, inflation and Russia’s dependence on China, and it made note of Putin’s advancing age, according to Bloomberg and NYT. For his part, Putin reportedly responded that he doesn’t “see the point” in meeting with Zelenskyy, Interfax reports. Given that Putin’s negative response was widely anticipated, Zelenskyy’s purpose in sending the open letter may have been more to counter the narrative that Ukraine is to blame for the ongoing war than to advance peace negotiations.
5. The U.S. is discussing whether to deploy nuclear weapons in additional European NATO states, in a move intended to reassure allies that reduced conventional military support does not weaken security guarantees, according to reports. U.S. officials have signaled openness to additional deployments beyond the existing six countries hosting nuclear-capable bombers, three people briefed on the discussions told the FT. One NATO country considering becoming a host is Lithuania, whose defense minister said that although the Lithuanian constitution currently prohibits hosting weapons of mass destruction on its soil, “Discussions are indeed taking place,” according to reporting by Bloomberg.
6. Ahead of Armenia’s June 7 elections, Moscow has sharply escalated pressure on Yerevan over its pro‑EU tilt. Russia has banned a wide range of Armenian exports (from fruit and vegetables to cognac, wine and Jermuk water), threatened to cut gas, fuel and diamond supplies, joined with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in demanding a referendum on choosing between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union, recalled its ambassador, and warned that adopting EU standards would lead Russia to “wind down” economic integration and require work permits for Armenians, according to reporting by Meduza. Meanwhile, NYT reports that Russia has unleashed what researchers are calling an unusually intense barrage of overt and covert influence operations. On June 5, Putin escalated Russia’s threats by explicitly comparing Armenia’s potential turn to the West to Ukraine’s in 2014 by warning that “Armenia… was going down the same path as Ukraine,” according to NYT.

5 Ideas to Explore

1. A new report by CSIS calls for a “two-war planning construct” to “deter and defeat two major powers simultaneously: China in the Indo-Pacific and Russia in Europe,” prioritizing “the Indo-Pacific first and Europe second.” The CSIS authors urge a new offset strategy built around “air-sea battle in the Indo-Pacific and air-land battle in Europe” that mixes “advanced and lower-cost unmanned systems with long-range precision strike and nuclear modernization.” The new strategy would prioritize “the Indo-Pacific first and Europe second, as well as deterring and, if necessary, defeating two major powers simultaneously with significant allied and partner involvement,” according to the report.
2. Given that the current stalemate at the front is costly for both Moscow and Kyiv, this may be “the best possible opportunity for peace” the war in Ukraine has yet offered, Michael Froman of CFR argues in a commentary entitled “A Turning Point in Ukraine.” Froman is echoed by Fareed Zakaria, who argues in WP that “in recent months, the tide has turned… in ways that make peace finally possible.” Zakaria explains how Ukraine is not “close to an easy victory,” while “Putin’s twin theories of victory… that Ukraine was weak and that the West would tire... have collapsed.” Given that and America’s leverage vis-à-vis the warring sides, “this is Trump’s opportunity” to co-broker a peace deal jointly with Europe that “deserves to be called historic,” according to Zakaria. In contrast, Angela Stent of the American Enterprise Institute does not presently appear to share Froman’s optimism. “We really haven't gotten any further in toward a negotiation,” she told PBS on June 5. Stent believes that Vladimir Putin’s decision to reject Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s recent call for direct peace talks—which the Ukrainian leader made in a letter to his Russian counterpart—is a signal that Putin “believes that Russia can still prevail.” Stent’s view of Putin’s vision for where the conflict is headed is close to Tatyana Stanovaya’s. In Putin’s view, as described by Stanovaya of CEIP and R. Politik, “The West is decaying, the United States is losing hegemony, Ukraine is falling apart, its army is disintegrating, Europe is in chaos, Russia is advancing on all fronts, victory is inevitable, the economy will hold out, the people will support [the government],” she writes in a commentary for CEIP.
3. Finland’s President Alexander Stubb argues that “Europe should talk to Putin,” proposing a phased diplomatic process. “We have to do this together with the Americans, but at the same time ask ourselves whether American foreign policy toward Russia and Ukraine is currently in Europe’s interest. If not—and in certain aspects it is not—then we must get involved. But in a coordinated way. Ideally, the first step would come from the European Union, and if that fails, from the E3, that is France, Germany, Great Britain, and if that too fails, we would have to find another format,” Stubb said in an interview with NZZ.
4. The mobilization of 300,000–500,000 troops in Russia could become a turning point in the war, Ukrainian MP Roman Kostenko warns in an interview with project "Zhovti Kedi with Yulia Borisko.” The war could also reach a turning point if Russia uses tactical nuclear weapons at the front, Kostenko claims, adding that such a scenario “cannot be ruled out.” The MP—who is the secretary of the parliament’s security, defense and intelligence committee and a member of Rada’s Holos faction—claims that Russia might employ tactical nukes “to break through the forward edge of defense.” While credible sources, such as former director of the CIA William Burns, assessed that there was a "genuine risk" that Russia might use nuclear weapons during the Russian forces’ Fall 2022 large-scale retreat, no such large-scale retreat has been recorded so far this year.*
5. Russia’s recent dispute over Internet shutdowns was not an existential crisis, but a clash between bureaucratic groups defending their interests, according to Alexandra Prokopenko of the Carnegie Endowment. The security establishment ultimately prevailed in the clash, with online restrictions “normalized” as Putin instructed the Federal Security Service and the federal government to keep key online services operating, Prokopenko writes in a commentary entitled “Russia’s Elite Conflict Over Internet Restrictions Does Not Herald Regime Collapse.” Prokopenko describes how the recent Internet blackouts angered presidential administration officials and the propaganda bloc under Alexei Gromov, who rely on the Internet and Telegram to prepare for September elections to the Russian parliament. They pushed back through leaks and by weaponizing “Putin’s own approval rating,” as government-linked pollsters abruptly reported sharp drops in that approval, Prokopenko explains.  

Find past issues in the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card archive. 

June 9, 2026, update:¹ 

Data from Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group indicates that in the past four weeks (May 12–June 9, 2026) Russian forces endured a net loss of 1 square mile. In comparison, the previous four-week period (April 14–May 12, 2026) saw Russia make a net gain of 41 square miles. In the past week (June 2–9), Russian armed forces made a net gain of 6 square miles of Ukraine’s territory, according to DeepState, an increase over the reported loss of 10 square miles the previous week (May 26–June 2, 2026). In addition, DeepState reported in its daily map updates that Russian armed forces advanced near or in eight settlements during the June 2–9, 2026, period, while Ukrainian forces were not reported by DS to have made advances in that time.² In contrast, RM’s analysis of ISW’s data for the past four weeks (May 12–June 9, 2026) indicates that Russia lost a net of 91 square miles of Ukraine’s territory, and during the past week (June 2–9, 2026), lost 10 square miles of Ukrainian territory.³

Territorial Control (figures as of June 9, 2026)⁴