Recent news reports claim that Saudi Arabia persuaded Russia not to arm the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen with cruise missiles. If so, this “Saudi channel” may be an important means for restraining Russian behavior in the Middle East which Washington might be able to make use of on other occasions. But did Riyadh really succeed at this? Because if it did not, then hopes that may have developed in Washington about how Riyadh can moderate Moscow’s behavior on issues of vital interest to the U.S. and its allies may prove illusory.

Some of the reporting in the American media on the question of Saudi influence on Russia’s decision-making has relied heavily on unnamed U.S. government sources. And these sources gave differing accounts, thus leading to uncertainty as to whether it was primarily Saudi influence that dissuaded the Russians, or something else.

This can be seen by examining three recent news stories in the Western media about Saudi Arabia, Russia and the Houthis which the authors interviewed U.S. government officials for. (I rely on these three articles because my monitoring of Western media has led me to conclude that they have become the preferred sources for other articles written in the mainstream Western media on this question of Saudi influence.)

In a story published on June 28, 2024, in Middle East Eye by Sean Mathews, the summary line just below the headline stated boldly that, “U.S. intelligence claims Russian President Vladimir Putin asked Saudi Arabia permission to arm Yemen’s Houthis with cruise missiles.”

The text of the article, though, suggests that the Saudis expressed their opposition to a Russian plan to arm the Houthis, not that Putin sought permission from Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (often referred to just by his initials, MBS) to do so. “Putin has considered providing Houthi rebel fighters with anti-ship cruise missiles, a senior U.S. official told [Middle East Eye], citing intelligence.” Mathews then noted that the crown prince “intervened to stop Putin from providing the Houthis with missiles,” and then cited “the senior U.S. official” as stating that “Putin engaged Mohammed bin Salman who requested them [Russia] not to pursue the arrangement.” In other words, it wasn’t Putin who asked MBS’s permission to arm the Houthis, but MBS who asked Putin not to arm them. (It should be noted that it is editors, not authors, who generally write headlines and summary introductions.)

A few weeks later in The Wall Street Journal, Michael R. Gordon and Lara Seligman raised the possibility that the U.S. might have had a role in this: “The administration's diplomatic effort to head off Moscow’s transfer of missiles to Yemen involves using a third country to try to persuade...Putin not to join Iran in providing the weapons to the Houthis, according to U.S. officials, who declined to identify the country.”

Later in their article, Gordon and Seligman noted that, “Middle East Eye, a London-based news site, reported last month that Russia has previously considered providing antiship cruise missiles to the Houthis but was talked out of doing so by the Saudis.” But in the very next sentence, Gordon and Seligman wrote, “Since then, U.S. officials have seen continuing indications that Putin might yet provide the missiles.” In other words, the “U.S. officials” (plural) whom Gordon and Seligman spoke with would not confirm either that Saudi Arabia was the “third country” that sought to dissuade Russia from arming the Houthis, or that whoever succeeded at this effort would remain so. Adding further confusion, they later wrote, “The nature of the intelligence pointing to a possible Russian move to arm the Houthis is unclear”—thus casting doubt on whether Russia had sought to arm the Houthis at all.

The third article, published Aug. 2, 2024, by Natasha Bertrand and Katie Bo Lillis on the CNN website, was entitled, “Russia pulled back weapons shipment to Houthis amid U.S. and Saudi pressure.” Their reporting was based on “multiple sources familiar with the matter” who described how, “Russia was preparing to deliver missiles and other military equipment to the Houthi rebels in Yemen late last month but pulled back at the last minute amid a flurry of behind-the-scenes efforts by the United States and Saudi Arabia to stop it.” According to Bertrand and Lillis, the Saudis “warned Russia against arming one of their biggest adversaries upon learning of the plans.” Further, they wrote that the U.S. had “separately asked the Saudis to help convince Moscow not to pursue the effort, two of the sources said.” In other words, while the U.S. asked the Saudis to ask the Russians not to arm the Houthis, it is not clear whether the Saudis did so at America’s behest.

Adding further confusion, they also wrote, “It remains unclear to the U.S. intelligence community whether Saudi Arabia’s pushback was the key to Russia abandoning its plan to arm the Houthis, or whether it was just one of a number of factors that led Russian President Vladimir Putin to change his mind, the sources said.”

Taken together, the text (not the headlines) of the three articles (the authors of which interviewed U.S. government officials for) cast doubt on how much of an impact, if any, the Saudis had in dissuading Russia to arm the Houthis (that is if Russia—whose leader recently threatened to supply missiles to third countries so that they could target the U.S. and its allies—did consider sending missiles to this group, but chose not to). I want to emphasize that I am not questioning the reporting skills of any of the five journalists mentioned here. I believe that each of them accurately reported the information that they received from the U.S. officials whom they interviewed. Indeed, it is the very accuracy of their reporting on what they were told that raises questions about what influence Saudi Arabia really has on Russia.

Did the Russians consider sending arms to the Houthis? If so, then did the Saudis actually persuade them not to do so? Or did the Russians let the Saudis think that they succeeded in persuading Moscow not to do something that they weren’t actually going to do then anyway, but still might do? Or did the Saudis want to show the value of their cooperation with Moscow (which Washington doesn’t like) by claiming that they succeeded in dissuading Moscow from arming the Houthis? 

If the Saudis did indeed persuade the Russians not to arm the Houthis, then Riyadh has made a strong case that its good relations with Moscow, while uncomfortable to Washington, should be valued by the U.S. as a means for moderating Russian behavior—and that continued good Saudi relations with Moscow may lead to other such successes, at least in the Middle East. By contrast, if Moscow merely let Riyadh believe that MBS persuaded Putin not to do something that Putin did not really want to do anyway, then Putin could benefit if this leads to reduced U.S. pressure on the Kingdom to not cooperate as much as it does with Moscow. In other words: Putin benefits if the U.S. doesn’t oppose Saudi cooperation with Russia because Washington unrealistically thinks the Saudis can moderate Putin’s behavior. Finally, if Riyadh has claimed credit for influencing Moscow not to arm the Houthis when its diplomacy played no role in affecting Putin’s decision-making, then this might be a case of Riyadh exaggerating its ability to restrain Russian behavior that will prove illusory if, as some of those interviewed suggested, Moscow later goes ahead and arms the Houthis.

The only thing that does seem certain is that while Saudi Arabia may have the potential to moderate Russian behavior in ways that benefit America and the West, its ability to do so has not been clearly demonstrated by this affair.

Mark N. Katz is a professor emeritus at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government, a global fellow at the Wilson Center, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Photo by Kremlin.ru shared under a Creative Commons 4.0 license.