2019 

• The 2019 report portrayed China and Russia as the “greatest espionage and cyber attack threats.” 
• The report assessed that China remains “the most active strategic competitor responsible for cyber espionage against the U.S. Government, corporations, and allies” and that “it is improving its cyber attack capabilities and altering information online, shaping Chinese views and potentially the views of U.S. citizens.” 
• The report also assessed that Russia “poses a cyber espionage, influence, and attack threat” and specifically mentions Russian operations against the United States and Ukraine. 

• The 2021 report offered a slightly different characterization of China, assessing that it “presents a prolific and effective cyber-espionage threat, possesses substantial cyber-attack capabilities, and presents a growing influence threat” and that “China can launch cyber attacks that, at a minimum, can cause localized, temporary disruptions to critical infrastructure within the United States.” It further argues that “China leads the world in applying surveillance systems and censorship to monitor its population and repress dissent, particularly among ethnic minorities, such as the Uyghurs.”
• The report assessed that “Russia will remain a top cyber threat as it refines and employs its espionage, influence, and attack capabilities. Russia continues to target critical infrastructure, including underwater cables and industrial control systems, in the United States and in allied and partner countries.” 

2019 

• The 2019 report assessed that “Russia’s social media efforts will continue to focus on aggravating social and racial tensions, undermining trust in authorities, and criticizing perceived anti-Russia politicians. Moscow may employ additional influence toolkits—such as spreading disinformation, conducting hack-and-leak operations, or manipulating data—in a more targeted fashion to influence U.S. policy, actions, and elections.” 
• On China, the report assessed that “Beijing already controls the information environment inside China, and it is expanding its ability to shape information and discourse relating to China abroad” and that it is “capable of using cyber attacks against systems in the United States to censor or suppress viewpoints it deems politically sensitive.” 

• The 2021 report offers much stronger language on Russia, arguing that it “presents one of the most serious intelligence threats to the United States.” The report also definitively states that “Moscow conducted influence operations against U.S. elections in 2016, 2018, and 2020.” 
• The 2021 report offers a similar assessment of China’s influence and interference operations, assessing that it “will continue expanding its global intelligence footprint to better support its growing political, economic, and security interests around the world, increasingly challenging the United States’ alliances and partnerships.” 

2019 

• The 2019 report assessed that “Russia will remain the most capable WMD adversary through 2019 and beyond, developing new strategic and nonstrategic weapons systems.”  
• The report also assessed that “China will continue to expand and diversify its WMD capabilities” which are “intended to ensure the viability of China’s strategic deterrent by providing a second-strike capability and a way to overcome missile defenses.” 

• Just as in 2019, the 2021 report assessed that “Russia will remain the largest and most capable WMD rival to the United States for the foreseeable future as it expands and modernizes its nuclear weapons capabilities and increases the capabilities of its strategic and nonstrategic weapons.” The report adds that “Russia also remains a nuclear-material security concern, despite improvements to physical security at Russian nuclear sites since the 1990s.”  
• Report assessed that China will “continue the most rapid expansion and platform diversification of its nuclear arsenal in its history” but that “Beijing is not interested in arms control agreements that restrict its modernization plans and will not agree to substantive negotiations that lock in U.S. or Russian nuclear advantages.”  

2019 

2021 

• The 2019 report stated that “Russia and China will continue to be the leading state intelligence threats to U.S. interests, based on their services’ capabilities, intent, and broad operational scopes.” Specifically, the report judged that “Russia’s intelligence services will target the United States, seeking to collect intelligence, erode U.S. democracy, undermine U.S. national policies and foreign relationships, and increase Moscow’s global position and influence” and that “China’s intelligence services will exploit the openness of American society, especially academia and the scientific community, using a variety of means.” 

• The 2021 report does not have a section that discusses counterintelligence. 

2019 

2021 

• The 2019 report assessed that “many foreign leaders, including Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, view strong indigenous science and technology capabilities as key to their country’s sovereignty, economic outlook, and national power.” Technologies mentioned include artificial intelligence and autonomy, information and communications, biotechnology, materials and manufacturing. 

• The 2021 report made a similar assessment about the role of technology in promoting Chinese and Russian policy goals. 
• Specifically, the report assessed that “China stands out as the primary strategic competitor to the U.S. because it has a well-resourced and comprehensive strategy to acquire and use technology to advance its national goals” and that it is focused on technologies it sees as critical to its military and economic future. 
• The report further stated that “Moscow also views the development of advanced S&T [science and technology] as a national security priority and seeks to preserve its technological sovereignty.” 

2019 

2021 

• The 2019 report assessed that “China and Russia will field new counterspace weapons intended to target U.S. and allied space capabilities.” It further assessed that “China and Russia are training and equipping their military space forces and fielding new antisatellite (ASAT) weapons to hold U.S. and allied space services at risk, even as they push for international agreements on the non-weaponization of space.” The report highlighted China’s “operational ground-based ASAT missile intended to target low-Earth-orbit satellites” and Russia’s development of a “similar ground-launched ASAT missile system for targeting low-Earth orbit that is likely to be operational within the next several years.” 

• The 2021 report judged that “Beijing is working to match or exceed U.S. capabilities in space to gain the military, economic, and prestige benefits that Washington has accrued from space leadership.” The report also judged that a Chinese space station in low Earth orbit will be “operational between 2022 and 2024” and that “counterspace operations will be integral to potential military campaigns by the PLA, and China has counterspace weapons capabilities intended to target U.S. and allied satellites.” 
• The report offered a new characterization of Russia as a “key space competitor, maintaining a large network of reconnaissance, communications, and navigation satellites.” The report also assessed that “Russia continues to train its military space elements and field new antisatellite … weapons to disrupt and degrade U.S. and allied space capabilities.” 

2019 

2021 

• The 2019 report assessed that “China’s economic growth is likely to slow in 2019” and that “since 2017, Beijing has been largely focused on stemming risks in China’s financial system, reducing bank credit growth to the lowest rate in a decade, while trying to bolster growth by cutting taxes, calling on banks to lend to private firms, and requiring local governments to plan measures to sustain employment.” 

• Overall discussions about economic challenges in the 2021 report are in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. 

2019 

2021 

• The 2019 report offers no discussion of Russia or China relative to global health or pandemics. 

• Discussions of global health in the 2021 report are focused on the COVID-19 pandemic, assessing that “some governments, such as China and Russia, are using offers of medical supplies and vaccines to try to boost their geopolitical standing.” 

2019 

2021 

• The 2019 report stated that “since 2017, Chinese authorities have detained hundreds of thousands and possibly millions of Turkic Muslim Uighurs in extrajudicial detainment centers.” 

• The 2021 report did not have a specific section on religious freedom. Discussion of China’s treatment of Uyghurs (new spelling in report) is within China’s cyber section and says that “China leads the world in applying surveillance systems and censorship to monitor its population and repress dissent, particularly among ethnic minorities, such as the Uyghurs.” 

2019 

2021 

• The 2019 report assessed that “diminishing Arctic sea ice may increase competition—particularly with Russia and China—over access to sea routes and natural resources.” 

• The 2021 report made a similar assessment, further elaborating that “Arctic Sea ice minimum coverage reached its second lowest level on record in 2020, highlighting the increasing accessibility of resources and sea lanes in a region where competition is ratcheting up among the United States, China, and Russia.” 

2019 

2021 

• The 2019 report assessed that “China and Russia are more aligned than at any point since the mid-1950s, and the relationship is likely to strengthen in the coming year as some of their interests and threat perceptions converge, particularly regarding perceived U.S. unilateralism and interventionism and Western promotion of democratic values and human rights.” The report mentioned that China and Russia will use international bodies, such as the United Nations, “to shape global rules and standards to their benefit and present a counterweight to the United States and other Western countries.” 

• The 2021 report offered a weaker characterization of the Russia-China relationship than it did in 2019, but it still noted that China is “increasing cooperation with Russia on areas of complementary interest includ[ing] defense and economic cooperation” and that “Russia probably will continue to expand its global military, intelligence, security, commercial, and energy footprint and build partnerships with U.S. allies and adversaries alike— most notably Russia’s growing strategic cooperation with China—to achieve its objectives.” 

2019 

2021 

• The 2019 report assessed that, at home, “China is deepening its authoritarian turn under President Xi Jinping, and the resulting hardening of Chinese politics and governance probably will make it more difficult for the leadership to recognize and correct policy errors, including in relations with the United States and our allies and partners.” Abroad, “China’s leaders will try to extend the country’s global economic, political, and military reach while using China’s military capabilities and overseas infrastructure and energy investments under the Belt and Road Initiative to diminish U.S. influence. However, Beijing is likely to face political pushback from host governments in many locations, and the overall threat to U.S. and partner interests will depend on the size, locations, and offensive military capabilities of the eventual Chinese presence.” 

• The 2021 report assessed that “the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will continue its whole-of-government efforts to spread China’s influence, undercut that of the United States, drive wedges between Washington and its allies and partners, and foster new international norms that favor the authoritarian Chinese system,” but that China will still “seek tactical opportunities to reduce tensions with Washington when such opportunities suit their interests.” Compared to the 2019 report, the 2021 report offers less insight into China’s internal political reforms (e.g., the elimination of presidential term limits). 

2019 

• The 2019 report assessed that “[i]n the wake of Washington’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, China is promoting a unified stance with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in defense of multilateralism and the WTO reform process, while also fostering a shared perception of U.S. freedom of navigation operations through Chinese-claimed waters in the South China Sea as threats to regional stability.” It also noted that “China is currying favor with numerous Pacific Island nations through bribery, infrastructure investments, and diplomatic engagement with local leaders while intervening in Burma— including by shielding Burma from UNSC sanctions in response to the humanitarian crisis and alleged ethnic cleansing in Rakhine State.” 
• The report assessed that “Russia, too, has been increasing its diplomatic and military cultivation of Southeast Asian partners, some of which have been receptive to Moscow as a power capable of diluting China’s nascent hegemony and helping them diversify their hedging options.” 

• The 2021 report offered less of a discussion of China’s role in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, but noted that “In the South China Sea, Beijing will continue to intimidate rival claimants and will use growing numbers of air, naval, and maritime law enforcement platforms to signal to Southeast Asian countries that China has effective control over contested areas. China is similarly pressuring Japan over contested areas in the East China Sea.” The 2021 report made no mention of Russia’s involvement in Southeast Asia, the Pacific or Asia in general. 

2019 

2021 

• The 2019 report made no general mention of Russia or China and their role in the Middle East. 

• The 2021 report assessed that “conflicts that have simmered may flare, particularly if Russia, Turkey, and other countries intervene, increasing the risk of escalations and miscalculations,” and that “Moscow is using its involvement in Syria and Libya to increase its clout, undercut U.S. leadership, present itself as an indispensable mediator, and gain military access rights and economic opportunities.” 

2019 

2021 

• The 2019 report made no mention of Russia’s role in Libya. 

• The 2021 report judged that “Egypt, Russia, the UAE, and Turkey are likely to continue financial and military support to their respective proxies. A potential flashpoint will be whether Russia and Turkey abide by the cease-fire, brokered by the U.N. in October 2020, which calls for the departure of foreign forces.” 

2019 

2021 

• The 2019 report stated that “Russia’s delivery of the SA-20c SAM system in 2016 provided Iran with its most advanced long-range air defense system.” 

• The 2021 report makes no mention of Russia-Iran relations. 

2019 

2021 

• The 2019 report assessed that “Russia and Iran probably will attempt to further entrench themselves in Syria” by securing “rights to postwar contracts to rebuild Syria’s battered infrastructure and industry in exchange for sustained military and economic support.” 

• The 2021 report assessed that “President Bashar al-Assad is firmly in control of the core of Syria, but he will struggle to reestablish control over the entire country against residual insurgency, including reinforced Turkish forces, Islamic extremists, and opposition in Idlib Province. Assad will stall meaningful negotiations and rely on the support of Russia and Iran.” 

2019 

2021 

• The 2019 report assessed that “relations between India and China [are] to remain tense,” and that “Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi held an informal summit in April 2018 to defuse tension and normalize relations, but they did not address border issues.” 

• The assessment of India-China tensions remains the same, adding that “China’s occupation since May 2020 of contested border areas is the most serious escalation in decades and led to the first lethal border clash between the two countries since 1975.” 

2019 

2021 

• The 2019 report assessed that “The Russian economy’s slow growth and most Russians’ disapproval of government officials’ performance will foster a more challenging political environment for the Kremlin, although its centralized power structure and the resonance of anti-American themes will buoy Putin, sustaining his push for international stature and challenging U.S. global leadership.” 

• Notably absent from the 2021 report is an assessment of Russia’s internal political environment. 

2019 

2021 

• The 2019 report assessed that “Russia’s efforts to expand its global military, commercial, and energy footprint and build partnerships with U.S. allies and adversaries alike are likely to pose increasing challenges. Moscow will continue to emphasize its strategic relationship with Beijing, while also pursuing a higher profile in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America.” The report also assessed that “Moscow will continue pursuing a range of objectives to expand its reach, including undermining the U.S.-led liberal international order, dividing Western political and security institutions, demonstrating Russia’s ability to shape global issues, and bolstering Putin’s domestic legitimacy.” 

• The 2021 report offers a similar assessment to the 2019 report, noting that “Moscow will continue to employ a variety of tactics this year meant to undermine U.S. influence, develop new international norms and partnerships, divide Western countries and weaken Western alliances, and demonstrate Russia’s ability to shape global events as a major player in a new multipolar international order.” It adds that Russia will “seek opportunities for pragmatic cooperation with Washington on its own terms, and … Russia does not want a direct conflict with U.S. forces.” 

2019 

2021 

• The 2019 report stated that “after decades of increased spending to support modernization, Russia’s defense budget is decreasing to about 3.8 percent of GDP in 2019, from a peak of about 5.4 percent in 2016. Because of momentum in military acquisitions, we judge that the budget is normalizing to pre-peak spending levels.” The report also stated that “Russia will continue to modernize the entire military but particularly will make progress in its air defense, submarine, and electronic warfare capabilities.” 

• On general defense spending, the 2021 report offered a similar outlook to the 2019 report, stating that “despite flat or even declining defense spending, Russia will emphasize new weapons that present increased threats to the United States and regional actors while continuing its foreign military engagements, conducting training exercises, and incorporating lessons from its involvement in Syria and Ukraine.” The 2021 report makes new mention of private military and security companies, which “extend Moscow’s military reach at low cost, allowing Russia to disavow its involvement and distance itself from battlefield casualties. These proxy forces, however, often fail to achieve Moscow’s strategic goals because of their limited tactical proficiency.” 

2019 

2021 

• The 2019 report assessed that “[t]he Kremlin will seek to maintain and, where possible, expand its influence throughout the former Soviet Union countries, which it asserts are within its sphere of influence.” It discusses Russia’s “military, political, and economic destabilization campaign against Ukraine,” efforts by the ruling coalition in Moldova to “limit Russian influence,” and how “tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region remains a potential source for a large-scale military conflict that might draw in Russia.” 

• The 2021 report does not have a dedicated section that discusses Russia’s relationship with its neighbors and other former Soviet states. However, the report assesses that “in the former Soviet Union, Moscow is well positioned to increase its role in the Caucasus, intervene in Belarus if it deems necessary, and continue destabilization efforts against Ukraine while settlement talks remain stalled and low-level fighting continues.” 

2019 

2021 

• The 2019 report argued that “Russia and China are likely to intensify efforts to build influence in Europe at the expense of U.S. interests, benefiting from the economic fragility of some countries, transatlantic disagreements, and a probable strong showing by anti-establishment parties in the European Parliament elections in late May 2019. Some member states favor a softening of Russian sanctions and probably will resist efforts to tighten investment screening.” 

• The 2021 report does not have a dedicated “Europe” section, nor does it explicitly discuss Russia and China’s role in the region. 

2019 

2021 

• The 2019 report stated that “the Western Balkans almost certainly will remain at some risk of low-level violence and possibly open military conflict throughout 2019. Russia will seek to exploit ethnic tensions and high levels of corruption to hinder the ability of countries in this region to move toward the EU and NATO.” 

• The 2021 report made no mention of Russian influence efforts in the Balkans. 

2019 

2021 

• The 2019 report assessed that as “several countries and regions in Sub-Saharan Africa are likely to face significant security, counterterrorism, democratization, economic, and humanitarian challenges,” African countries will increase their “outreach and cooperation with external actors—such as China and Russia.” 

• The 2021 report offered no overarching assessment on Russia or China’s affairs in Africa. 

2019 

2021 

• The 2019 report judged that the “violence and the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan are likely to persist this year” and that “Sudan also will strengthen ties to other partners—including Russia and Turkey—in an effort to diversify its partnerships and improve its economic situation.” 

• The 2021 report did not make specific mention of Russia’s involvement in Sudan. 

2019 

2021 

• The 2019 report judged that “China and Russia will pursue efforts to gain economic and security influence in the region.” 

• The 2021 report provided more detail about Russia’s activity in the region, noting that it has “expanded its engagement with Venezuela, supported Cuba, and used arms sales and energy agreements to try to expand access to markets and natural resources in Latin America, in part to offset some of the effects of sanctions.”