For all of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s strategic blunders (none more harmful to Russia’s long-term interests than his decision to invade Ukraine), his sustained support for a closer relationship with China stands out as a singular success story. This policy has in fact proved so successful that it will likely persist even after Putin’s eventual departure regardless of whatever changes his successor might make to repair Russia’s broken relations with the West. 

This does not mean that the United States has no leverage in this relationship. But Washington needs to decide whether it would benefit more from seeing the Russians forced into the Chinese embrace, or from tempting Russia away from China through political and economic incentives. 

It's not uncommon to think of the Sino-Russian alignment as a personal project of Putin’s and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping’s. But the roots of this project go much deeper. Moscow and Beijing have been on a generally uninterrupted positive trajectory since the mid-1980s. Aided by a shared normative understanding of global politics, strong trade ties (see tables below) and a wealth of accumulated experience of respectful—if not always friction-free—cooperation in regional and international forums, this relationship is, all things considered, quite healthy, and is likely to stay so for the foreseeable future. Indeed, occasional dissenters notwithstanding, there seems to be a broad policy consensus in China and Russia (extending far beyond the top leadership) that the current state of the relationship objectively benefits both countries. 

To understand why this relationship is so robust, it is helpful to remember that it wasn’t always so. Moscow and Beijing famously quarreled in the late 1950s. Their Communist alliance cratered amid mutual accusations of ideological heresy, and suspicions of aggressive intent. Suffice it to recall that in 1969, the two countries fought an undeclared border war. The Soviets feared that the Chinese would overwhelm their poorly defended positions in Siberia and the Far East, and hurriedly amassed forces along the border, even while hinting at the possibility of a pre-emptive nuclear strike against China. 

The Chinese, for their part, eyed their Soviet neighbors warily, and dug tunnels under Beijing. Mutual trade—once vibrant—ground to an almost complete stop. People-to-people exchanges ceased altogether. For years—decades even—China and the USSR were at each other’s throats, a fact profitably exploited by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in their skillful “triangular” diplomacy. 

Consider what has been accomplished since then. Beijing and Moscow have now resolved their territorial disputes, and the border has been demarcated. There is no evidence that the Chinese consider the territories that the Qing Empire had lost to Russia in the nineteenth century as potentially recoverable, and even if this were so, it is unclear how these territories could be recovered short of a suicidal war. 

Contrary to some uninformed opinion, there has never been a threat of Chinese migrants overwhelming Russia’s underpopulated periphery, partly because such migration is economically unattractive to the Chinese, and in part due to prohibitive administrative and cultural barriers. 

In stark contrast to the 1960s and the 1970s, the border between the two neighbors is practically undefended. The Russians downgraded their military presence in the Sino-Russian border area, for instance, by redeploying units of the Fifth Combined Arms Army to the frontline in Ukraine, leaving themselves exposed to China in a way that the Soviets would have found jarring. Such demilitarization has, however, contributed to the build-up of trust, accentuated also by the growing military-to-military contacts and joint exercises in waters as far away from China as the Mediterranean Sea, and joint patrols with long-range nuclear-capable bombers.

Russia and China have learned to work together profitably in long-derided and unarguably ineffective forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS. Even if these organizations have not accomplished much, they have nevertheless offered a platform for coordinating policy agendas and, with luck, enticing the Global South into offering a half-hearted endorsement of the same. 

Additionally, the current renaissance in Sino-Russian ties has a firm economic basis. Bilateral trade reached $245 billion in 2024. It has been growing by leaps and bounds since the Russian invasion of Ukraine (when it was about $147 billion).¹ This increase was mostly (but not exclusively) driven by Russia’s reorientation from its Western trade partners, a consequence of Western sanctions. Russia has become China’s leading supplier of energy. China has made strides as Russia’s key supplier of industrial machinery, cars and consumer electronics. 

It is unlikely that Sino-Russian trade will continue to grow at the extraordinary rate it has grown in recent years: Russia’s need for Chinese tech and consumer goods, and China’s ability to absorb Russia’s oil and gas, are not limitless. There are also technologies—including some advanced chips—that China cannot provide, and that Russia must therefore smuggle from the West. Even though trade does not preclude conflict and even wars (Sino-Soviet economic ties—which cratered in the 1960s—being a case in point), it provides the political relationship with a certain ballast and a degree of inertia that mitigate against sudden policy shifts. 

Some critics have argued that Russia has become overly dependent on China’s market, or, even China’s vassal. Such criticism is unsubstantiated. First, the fact that Russia sells oil and natural gas to China does not make it China’s “vassal” any more than selling oil and natural gas to Europe made Russia’s Europe’s “vassal.” Yes, being unduly dependent on one buyer is not in Russia’s long-term interest (clearly, it would be to Moscow’s benefit if it could also sell its resources to the Europeans). It is also true that developing a dependence on China’s electronics can be problematic (but Russia is hardly the only country that has developed such a dependence—much of the world suffers from the same predicament).

Second, China’s economic leverage—such as it is—is not the kind of leverage that Beijing can profitably use to extract political concessions. The Chinese are known to resort to economic coercion, especially against weaker partners. But there are no instances yet of Beijing attempting to coerce Russia through economic means. Beijing’s propensity to drive a hard bargain (as is evident in the moribund negotiations over the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline) is not in itself evidence of coercion. It is risky to coerce Russia, since such attempts could damage the bilaterial relationship irreparably, and China needs a good relationship with Russia no less than the other way around. Recent history of the application of sanctions against Russia (mainly by Western countries) does not offer particularly encouraging lessons as to their efficacy. 

All in all, China and Russia have managed to build a mutually profitable relationship that is, broadly, in both countries’ interest. This success is a major improvement on earlier, more confrontational periods, in Sino-Russian and Sino-Soviet relations. Both have learned from this complicated history, and are determined not to repeat past mistakes. 

Does this mean that the relationship is friction-free? No. Frictions remain. Russia jealously watches China’s moves in Central Asia and the Arctic. China is not entirely happy with the way the Russians have fought their war in Ukraine (Xi has repeatedly voiced concerns over the possibility of nuclear escalation). Russia is frustrated with China’s hard bargaining in economic talks. The Chinese aren’t too pleased about Russia’s flirtation with North Korea, long deemed by Beijing to lie within China’s sphere of influence. Such frictions are probably inevitable in any relationship. The real question is how they are managed. The Chinese and the Russians have so far managed their frictions well—much better, it should be said, than America is currently managing its own alliances (though this is indeed a very low bar). 

Russia and China have not become allies, but nor is this necessary. Alliances require commitments and reduce one’s space for maneuver. Both countries need this space. So they have come together, but not in a close embrace. And this is a strategically sensible position in this increasingly confusing, chaotic world. 

Where does all of this leave the United States? It is unlikely that the U.S. will succeed in driving a wedge between Moscow and Beijing. The commonality of interests between the two is too great to permit it. Yet it is possible that by offering political and economic incentives to Russia—for instance, by effectively giving up on Ukraine and normalizing relations with Russia—the Trump Administration could encourage the Russians to at least stay neutral in any future Sino-American confrontation. The Kremlin badly wants re-engagement, not least because it would provide Putin with greater leverage vis-à-vis Beijing. 

Yet such an American strategy will likely require unpalatable policy shifts (abandoning Ukraine) and will undoubtedly cause strain for U.S. relationships in Europe. 

The alternative would be to abandon the idea of “incentivizing” Russia and focus instead on driving Moscow further into China’s embrace on the reasonable premise that the Russians will not be happy with such a situation and may therefore consider concessions on their part to re-engage with the West. The result would be the same, but the costs to America’s interests and reputation would probably be considerably lower. 

Whatever policy it chooses to pursue, the United States must remain realistic about the extent of American leverage, understanding that Russia, never mind China, will never be America’s to win or lose, and that there are many reasons for Russia to have a good relationship with China regardless of what happens or fails to happen between these two countries and the West. 

Table data obtained by Dasha Zhukauskaite. Opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author. Photo by Alexei Danichev/Photo host agency RIA Novosti via AP.