On April 23, Russia Matters’ student associates Chris Conway and Dasha Zhukauskaite interviewed Ian Bremmer, president and founder of Eurasia Group, and currently a senior fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, to learn his views on potential outcomes of the Russian-Ukraine war, “Reverse Nixon” and Russia’s role in a potential deal on Iran’s nuclear program.

In his answers, Bremmer warned that any new ceasefire in that war would be fragile. With deep mistrust on both sides and no path to a stable peace, he emphasized that a peace agreement following a ceasefire is also likely far off, and that weak security guarantees for Ukraine could invite further Russian aggression. 

On the idea of a “Reverse Nixon,” drawing Russia away from China, Bremmer was highly skeptical. The China-Russia partnership, he argued, is not susceptible to disruption by leaders with brief tenure, as in the United States. Because neither Vladimir Putin nor Xi Jinping can be forced to step down, Bremmer noted, their Russia-China partnership remains “a generational project,” rooted in shared opposition to U.S.-led "Western" dominance. China is therefore not concerned about Trump-Putin outreach, remaining confident in its enduring “no limits” alliance with Moscow.

Addressing Iran, Bremmer challenged the narrative of a conservative shift, noting growing elite support for U.S. talks. While Russia is almost certain to assist technically in a future deal, Iran aims to keep Moscow from mediating as much as possible, fearing betrayal in exchange for Ukraine-related concessions.

See below for the full interview.

RM: When do you expect the armed phase of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict to end, and how?

IB: A ceasefire is possible this year, though it is going to take more pressure from the U.S., especially being more aggressive with Putin, to get it done. With Russia and Ukraine fundamentally at odds over a settlement and their leaders deeply mistrustful of the other, any ceasefire is going to be fragile. That also means that a peace agreement that formally ends the war is very far off, adding to danger that a truce eventually would collapse.

RM: Danish and German intelligence have shared their estimates that Russia may attack a European NATO country within five years. Do you share these concerns? If yes, when and how would you expect an attack?

IB: Putin’s talk of NATO and the “collective West” as a threat would not stop in the event of peace in Ukraine—it’s become part of Putin’s domestic political message. Russia is arguably the biggest revisionist state, and antipathy toward Western institutions like NATO and the EU is a part of that. So the danger of a broader security crisis from Russia will continue, and NATO states in Europe to develop responses to that threat. Setting aside a conventional war, Russian cyber and sabotage operations against European states will almost certainly continue.

RM: Do you view the proposed European Rearmament Bank and multinational peacekeeping force as viable means of enforcing a ceasefire or establishing deterrence against further Russian aggression outside Ukraine?

IB: These are two very different instruments, serving different goals. The Rearmament bank (which is currently at the ideas stage and will take time to be established after member states decide to build it) is meant to mobilize public and private money to speed up Europe's drive toward greater military independence, and to make it more sustainable. In the long term, such an instrument can become one element of Europe's new security landscape, one building block of deterrence. For the outcome of the Ukraine war it will likely remain irrelevant as it will probably only come into existence after that war ends. 

The so-called re-assurance force is also just an idea for now, and whether it will ever come to pass is uncertain. However, the signaling that a group of European nations is serious about fielding such a force is relevant from a deterrence standpoint. It tells Russia, the United States and Ukraine that those Europeans consider Ukraine's fate crucial to their own security and that they are willing to incur costs for it. That might not be a game-changing deterrent, but it is a relevant factor that all sides need to factor in. Europe's continued support for Ukraine, whether through aid or by means of such a force, is a contributing factor to Putin's inability to impose a one-sided ceasefire or truce on the Ukrainians.

In other words: what matters is the political will behind the re-assurance force. That makes it a relevant declaration of intent by some Europeans about their joint security without the U.S.

RM: Considering both the growing disillusionment with NATO and the perceived challenges of Ukraine’s accession, what could viable security guarantees for Ukraine look like?

IB: Ukraine will look for something NATO-like in a security guarantee from Europe, including the potential for troops in the country. Trump’s shift of U.S. policy toward Ukraine and European security means that Europe will be important to any security guarantee. But, Kyiv may not entirely give up on the idea that U.S. security assistance, even as a backstop to Europe, is critical.

RM: Is the idea of a “reverse Nixon,” increasingly attributed to the approach of Trump et al, possible or viable in the current geopolitical climate?

IB: Trump has entertained the misguided notion that a full rapprochement with Putin could prompt Moscow to decisively distance itself from Beijing—a kind of "reverse Nixon." The Nixon strategy had worked because there was already an existing Sino-Soviet split, whereas no fissure exists between China and Russia today for Trump to leverage. Furthermore, there is little that a four-year U.S. president, who is still constrained by checks and balances, could offer that would compel Putin to jeopardize his long-term strategic alignment with Xi. The Russia-China partnership represents a generational project for both nations, deeply rooted in shared geopolitical interests and especially in mutual opposition to U.S. dominance.

RM: Is China alarmed by Trump and Putin's imminent rapprochement, and if so, can this possibly be exploited to secure a more beneficial outcome for Ukraine and Europe more widely?

IB: China is not alarmed, because there is no “imminent rapprochement” between Trump and Putin. Trump’s goal in currying favor with Putin is to secure the legacy of a ceasefire in Ukraine, and he can easily take a more aggressive stance against Putin if the latter does not cooperate. Most recently, Trump has threatened to impose further sanctions on Russia if Moscow refuses to come to the negotiation table. Xi, on his part, is confident in his long standing “bromance” with Putin, having affirmed their “no limits” partnership in a call this February on the anniversary of Russia’s invasion. Russia is also dependent on China both economically and militarily and will not pivot away from its strongest ally to appease a mercurial and highly unreliable U.S. president. China’s overall positioning on the Ukraine war is to publicly support peace endeavors while leading from behind, and so will not put serious diplomatic pressure on Russia to negotiate. It will be hard for Europe to depend on more substantive support from China to end the war in Ukraine.

RM: Given recent developments in Canada, how might current U.S. foreign policy influence domestic political dynamics in Europe? Specifically, should we anticipate further growth or decline of the European right, which has recently gained traction?

IB: Trump's foreign policy has greatly diminished U.S. soft power in Europe, even on the far right. While being associated with Trump and Musk was very broadly an asset for Europe's far right just a few months ago, this is now only the case in small hardline pockets.

This serves as a reminder that nationalists, even if they share some intellectual underpinnings, find it hard to create international solidarity across borders. The main factors driving the rise of the far right in Europe are home-made and have very little to do with Trumpism in the United States.

RM: With Iran shifting toward more conservative policies—particularly in its dealings with the West as seen by cadre shuffling of reformers—alongside regional security challenges and increased uranium stockpiling, is Russia a viable intermediary for U.S.-Iran negotiations, as suggested by Peskov?

IB: I would push back on the first point. Yes, Pezeshkian was forced to yield to hardliner pressure earlier this year, firing his VP Javad Zarif and allowing hardliners in parliament to impeach his economics minister. But the swing toward supporting talks with the U.S.—which now enjoys a broad consensus among Iran's elite, with the hardliners in opposition but relatively quiescent—suggests Pezeshkian has space to pursue his most important priority: securing sanctions relief for Iran's economy. Rather than moving in a more conservative position, the elite consensus in Iran is now more closely aligned with Pezeshkian and other moderates. Whether that lasts depends in large part on the course of talks with the United States. 

On the second point: Russia is likely to play a role in any deal the United States and Iran end up making, if a deal is possible. Under the original nuclear deal in 2015, Russia assisted with the reduction in Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium and other elements on the technical side. If a new deal was struck, it's likely Russia would serve a similar role. But Iran doesn't want Russia involved as a mediator, for one big reason: Tehran is suspicious Russia will use a deal with Iran as a bargaining chip with the United States, selling out Iran in order to get a better deal in Ukraine. While Iran looks to Russia for support, they want to keep this a bilateral arrangement with the United States, rather than letting Russia exert influence over the course of negotiations.

RM: What are the key factors that contribute to the decline of nations, and how is demographic decline—particularly aging populations and low birth rates—shaping this process in the 21st century? Which countries or alliances, such as Russia and the European Union, appear most vulnerable to these dynamics, and how might this influence the global balance of power in the coming decades?

IB: All the usual structural factors that go into determining the relative balance of power play a role. That includes demographics, economics, and resource scarcity but also—more critically in the 21st century—technology, human capital, and institutions. the external environment and geopolitical neighborhood matter, too. and don’t underestimate the importance of more contingent, domestic challenges like political polarization, dysfunction, social division, and distrust. I’ve recently been citing historian Arnold Toynbee a lot, who famously said civilizations die of suicide, not murder. I think that’s exactly right. 

Don’t get me wrong, demographic decline is a serious challenge for much of the industrialized world, especially China, but I’m not convinced it’s either inexorable or existential. There are tools to manage it. In fact, it’s unclear whether there’s any adverse structural trend that can’t be overcome given the tech transformation that’s coming. The countries that are most vulnerable are those whose social fabrics and institutions are being weakened from within.

Ian Bremmer is the author of eleven books, including several New York Times bestsellers, and played a key role in introducing political risk analysis to financial markets as a distinct field. He also serves as a foreign affairs columnist and editor at large for Time magazine, and hosts GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, a weekly global affairs show broadcast on U.S. public television.

The opinions expressed in this interview are solely those of the individual quoted.

Photo by AP Photo/Eric Risberg.