Nobel prize on display

2024 Nobel Prize Winners on Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia: Existential Risks and an Unpredictable World

November 21, 2024

Winning a Nobel Prize in science typically requires laser-sharp focus on a narrow subject. Yet, despite being world authorities on such narrow subjects, many winners of this coveted prize excel many generalists on subjects like international relations. This is why we have decided to research and catalogue what some of this year’s winners have to say on issues pertinent to the Russia Matters project’s aims

My search has revealed that six of the winners have publicly commented on Russia and its role in international affairs. The most prolific of these have been Professors Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson, who jointly won Nobel’s Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences. The Japanese anti-nuclear activist group Nihon Hidankyo, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, has also issued statements pertaining to nuclear security and Russia’s role in this space. The group’s co-chair, Terumi Tanaka, traveled to Ukraine in 2004 to lecture on the horrors of nuclear weapons and met with Chernobyl survivors. AI pioneer Geoff Hinton, one of two winners of the Nobel Prize in Physics, has also warned of Russia’s potential to abuse AI. Han Kang, the literature prize winner, cancelled her Nobel Prize press conference partly out of anguish at Russia’s ongoing war on Ukraine.

The winners of the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine have also spoken on Russia, albeit more obliquely. Harvard Professor Mark Ruvkun has spoken of his admiration for the achievements of the early space race, including Russia’s Sputnik. UMass Professor Victor Ambros has written about his father’s escape from Soviet troops advancing into Poland in 1939 before being detained and indentured by the Germans.

The prize winners agree that defeating Russia in Ukraine is essential for world security. For instance, Acemoglu wrote in 2023 that “if Putin prevails, this will send a signal that autocratic nations can invade more democratic neighbors with impunity.” The more hawkish Johnson, meanwhile, writes that “helping Ukraine win its war against Russia is essential for European and global security.” Masako Wada, Nihon Hidankyo’s assistant secretary-general, condemns Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, which “has caused unspeakable human suffering and raised the risk of nuclear war.”

The economists also converge on the need for stringent economic sanctions to undermine the Russian war economy. Acemoglu has advocated “doubling down on economic sanctions,” and Johnson has repeatedly advocated1 halving the upper bound of the oil price cap from its present $60 limit to $30. They have also pushed for the closing of financial flows between Russia and the West. Acemoglu writes that “if the West wants to see itself on the right side of history, targeting Russia is not enough. It must clean out its own Augean stables.” Johnson goes even further, arguing that Russian funds in clearing accounts should be converted into escrow accounts and used to finance the rebuilding of Ukraine. 

All concur in their pessimism about Russia. Looking at Russian civil society, Acemoglu concludes that “it's not strong enough to be a counterweight to Putin.” Johnson’s pessimism is even longer term: “Irrespective of who controls the Kremlin next year or 20 years from now, Russia is not likely to become a stable, peace-loving democracy that respects international borders.” Robinson doubts that Russia’s actions in Ukraine can all be explained by Putin’s role: “It’s not clear to me that if Putin died of a heart attack tomorrow, this wouldn’t all continue.”

Yet the winners disagree on certain topics. One is nuclear security. Acemoglu is very concerned about nuclear proliferation. In 2022, the prize-winning economist argued that the situation is now “worse” than in the Cold War owing the lack of “checks and balances” within the Kremlin, and “every danger that there could be escalation.” Terumi and Shigemitsu Tanaka, Sueichi Kido, Toshiyuki Mimaki, and Masako Wada (all of Nihon Hindakyo) cleave to this line of thinking. Johnson, however, has appeared more skeptical of Russian nuclear saber-rattling. In 2022, he accused the Russians of using nuclear threats as propaganda and advocated that Western strategy disregard them.

AI has been another area of divergence. Acemoglu and Johnson have played down Russia’s use of AI, writing in 2023 that Russian use of AI for domestic repression has been limited. Conversely Hinton, who is notoriously pessimistic about the future of AI, has suggested that Putin may “make hyper-intelligent robots with the goal of killing Ukrainians,” although more recently he has downplayed AI’s role.

The compilation below catalogues statements made by this year’s Nobel prize winners from December 2019 to mid-November 2024. The compilation is part of Russia Matters’ “Competing Views” rubric, where we share prominent figures’ takes on issues pertaining to Russia, U.S.-Russian relations and broader U.S. policies affecting Russia. All sections may be updated with new or past statements. The quotes below are divided into categories similar to those in Russia Matters’ news and analysis digests; reflecting the most pertinent topic areas for U.S.-Russian relations broadly, and for drivers of the two countries’ policies toward one another. Entries are arranged in chronological order.

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

Daron Acemoglu

  • Acemoglu is concerned about nuclear proliferation. “This category of existential risk is being intensified by the ongoing expansion and “modernization” of existing nuclear arsenals.” (Project Syndicate, 09.16.20)
  • On Russia’s standpoint, he says “it is not a reversal to Soviet times, but there are aspects of it that are … worse … after Khrushchev, there was a sort of a recognition of [nuclear] dangers ... I don’t see those same checks and balances within the Putin leadership.” (Meduza, 04.28.22)
    • “There is going to be every danger that there could be escalation. I think there is going to be a lot of chatter around Putin’s close circle saying that this is all the fault of the Westerners who are giving weapons to Ukrainians. And we have to teach them a lesson. Again, [there’s] no other voice to tell them this is really crazy, this is really dangerous. And so it’s an unpredictable phase.”

Simon Johnson

  • Johnson is skeptical of Russian nuclear propaganda. “What exactly is the G7 supposed to do? [In response to Russian atrocities] … Should we wait until [Putin] goes completely mad and uses nuclear weapons – a move that his propagandists have been foreshadowing for months?” (Project Syndicate, 07.04.22)

Sueichi Kido (secretary general, Nihon Hidankyo)

  • “The atomic bomb is a weapon of inhumanity and of absolute evil, with which human beings cannot exist…now people of Ukraine and the world are horrified by Russian President [Vladimir] Putin’s threat to use nuclear weapons in the current war.” (Progressive Hub, 06.21.22)
  • “With the threat of nuclear weapons being used increasing after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, we cannot stop the hibakusha’s [Japanese atomic bomb survivors] movement.” (The Japan News, 11.12.24)

Toshiyuki Mimaki (co-chair, Nihon Hidankyo)

  • Mimaki, an 81-year-old Hiroshima survivor, argued in October 2024 that “It has been said that because of nuclear weapons, the world maintains peace. But nuclear weapons can be used by terrorists. For example, if Russia uses them against Ukraine, Israel against Gaza, it won’t end there. Politicians should know these things.” (NPR, 10.11.24)

Terumi Tanaka (co-chair, Nihon Hidankyo)

  • In February 2022, Tanaka said: “It is unforgivable that he [Putin] is using nuclear weapons as a tool to threaten others.” (The Asahi Shimbun, 02.26.22)
  • In a June 2022 op-ed, Tanaka condemned Putin’s nuclear brinkmanship and called on world leaders to prevent Russia from using nuclear weapons. “If Putin orders the use of nuclear weapons and they are indeed used, one of the countries opposing Russia would be in a situation of having to use nuclear weapons in retaliation. If no nuclear retaliation were to take place, this would itself be denying deterrence. Even an initial use of tactical nuclear weapons, with a smaller scale of destruction and killing, would still be nuclear weapons. Any first use of a nuclear weapon could easily lead to a nuclear war on a global scale. So, I call upon the leaders of the nuclear weapon states to make efforts to prevent Russia from using these weapons. And, to then resolve to abolish nuclear weapons immediately.” (Newsweek, 06.05.22)
  • After Nihon Hidankyo received the Nobel Prize, Tanaka wrote: “With the war between Russia and Ukraine, and the war in the Middle East, I think the risk of nuclear weapons being used has increased greatly, and I personally have a premonition that a nuclear war will break out in the not-too-distant future.” (Swissinfo, 10.11.24)

Masako Wada (assistant secretary-general, Nihon Hidankyo)

  • In August 2022, Wada was co-signatory from a statement by hibakusha slamming Russia for its continued opposition to final resolution proposals at the review conference for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, as well as its invasion of Ukraine (The Asahi Shimbun, 08.30.22)
    • Wada warned in the same statement that “new hibakusha [nuclear victims] may be created.” (The Chugoku Shimbun, 08.07.22)
  • “The world is currently moving backwards on nuclear disarmament. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused unspeakable human suffering and raised the risk of nuclear war.” (Nobel Prize, 10.11.24)

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

  • No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

  • No significant commentary.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

Daron Acemoglu

  • Acemoglu is hopeful about Ukrainian reconstruction: “Rebuilding Ukraine will absolutely be a top priority, and success will require not only pouring resources into the country, but also building better institutions. On that front, I think there are reasons to be hopeful.” (Project Syndicate, 05.10.22)
    • “Even before the Russian invasion, Ukrainian democracy was on a positive trajectory, with Ukrainian youth, especially in major cities, among the most politically active and pro-democratic groups in the West. The war has united Ukrainians and deepened their commitment to freedom and democracy. I expect this to translate into a post-war consensus on the need to build institutions that are capable of delivering justice, controlling corruption, and creating a level playing field for new investments in technologies.”

Simon Johnson

  • “It is easy to see who is losing the most from the Russian invasion of Ukraine: Ukrainian civilians, victims of war crimes and missile terror, and the millions around the world for whom food is now more expensive, because Russia has until recently been blocking Ukrainian grain shipments through the Black Sea (and launching strikes on Ukrainian ports even after agreeing to a ceasefire).” (Project Syndicate, 04.02.22)
  • In encouraging action on Russian oil revenues in July 2022, Johnson wrote: “Enough Ukrainian children have already died … So, why not stop buying Russian oil now? ... Should we wait a year, or five, or a decade until the cumulative deaths of Ukrainian civilians are finally deemed enough?” (Project Syndicate, 07.04.22)
    • “Why, then, is the world unwilling to take such measures immediately under current conditions, when Putin’s forces are targeting and killing unarmed civilians on a massive scale? The list of atrocities is already long and appalling: the dead and tortured in Bucha, the bridge at Irpin, the railway station in Kramatorsk, the maternity hospital and theater (clearly marked as sheltering children) in Mariupol, and most recently the missile attack on a shopping mall in Kremenchug?”
  • “The parallels with Hitler’s expansion strategy are growing stronger by the day. In the face of advancing Ukrainian forces, Russia’s president orders his forces to fire missiles and artillery indiscriminately at civilian populations. Wherever his troops are pushed back, further evidence of war crimes and mass murder is found.” (Project Syndicate, 10.03.22)
  • “Russian atrocities and belligerent escalation mean that the U.S. and the European Union as well as their allies now want Ukraine to win — and then to rebuild, as much as possible, the lives, homes and economic activities that have been destroyed.” (West Central Tribune, 10.13.22)
  • Russia’s war is “killing and wounding tens of thousands of civilians.” Robinson views Russia’s killing of civilians as deliberate targeting: “The Kremlin is clearly targeting civilians and essential infrastructure.” (Project Syndicate, 04.02.24)

Terumi Tanaka (co-chair, Nihon Hidankyo)

  • In March 2022, Tanaka, along with Shigemitsu Tanaka and Sueichi Kido, co-signed a letter with fellow hibakusha condemning the invasion of Ukraine. “We are outraged and horrified to learn of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. President Putin’s decision is a dangerous act that could lead humanity to ruin. His attitude of willingness to use nuclear weapons and even to fight a nuclear war is unacceptable to humanity. … We earnestly call on President Putin to put aside his personal ambitions, recover his humanity, and immediately stop the invasion of Ukraine.” (Ne.jp, 03.04.22)
    • The signatories added that “if [Russia] were to use nuclear weapons, it would be fully accountable for the enormous damage that would result.”
  • “It is said that Russia's President Vladimir Putin is a committed Christian and that he believes that what is doing now in Ukraine is acting in his role as a messenger of God. ‘You would certainly be punished by the God you believe in.’ This is what I would tell Putin.” (Newsweek, 06.05.22)

Han Kang

  • Kang declined to host a press conference to celebrate her win in October 2024. Her father, speaking on her behalf, said: “With the wars raging between Russia and Ukraine, Israel and Palestine, with deaths being reported every day, she could not hold a celebratory press conference.” (The Korea Herald, 10.11.24)

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

Daron Acemoglu

  • Acemoglu broadly aligns with Biden Administration policy on Ukraine. “I think the No-Fly Zone would have been too dangerous. I think sending the most advanced American equipment directly to Ukraine might have been too provocative.” (Meduza, 04.28.22)
  • Writing jointly with Simon Johnson, Acemoglu has opined that Ukraine must not lose the war. If it does, “this will send a powerful signal – encouraging or discouraging – to anyone attempting to become democratic, especially if they live within striking distance of well-armed autocracies such as China, Russia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Such signals will be read carefully throughout Asia, but also in Latin America, Africa, and even Europe itself.” (CEPR, 02.24.23)
    • “Think what happens if Putin prevails. This will send a signal that autocratic nations can invade more democratic neighbors with impunity. The incentive for autocrats to acquire nuclear weapons will also increase, because this obviously allows them to get away with more.”
    • “What technology will be invented or adopted in China, India, Latin America, and Africa, who will benefit, and how will attempts to create more democracies affect global security? Will there be a further emergence of aggressive autocrats, using AI from China, drones from Iran, and mercenaries from Russia? Much of this will be determined on the battlefields of Ukraine.”

Simon Johnson

  • “In some quarters of Europe, the desire to give Putin at least part of what he wants remains, on the assumption that he would then stop and economic relations could return to some semblance of what they were before...[this] will not stop Putin, who has designs on the Baltic countries, Poland and probably others.” (Project Syndicate, 10.03.22)
  • In October 2022, Johnson denounced OPEC’s decision to reduce oil production quotas, which pushed up the price of Russian oil. Johnson argued that doing so was “thoroughly wrongheaded. The likelihood of Russian defeat in Ukraine, increasing daily with Ukrainian advances, will change the global picture for oil considerably, and OPEC members need to decide whose side they are on for what comes next.” (West Central Tribune, 10.13.22)
    • In the same article, he predicted Russian defeat was close at hand. “If OPEC’s leaders were paying attention, they would see that Russian forces are in the process of being defeated in several regions in the air and on the ground. The Ukrainians have more drones, better armor, longer-range artillery and higher morale. Russian forces are greatly depleted and increasingly in danger of becoming trapped and overwhelmed on multiple fronts.”
  • “Helping Ukraine win its war against Russia is essential for European and global security.” (Project Syndicate, 02.01.23)
    • Johnson imagines a scenario where Russia “wins” and keeps the territory it has seized. “This would strengthen President Vladimir Putin’s grip on power and embolden him to expand Russia’s borders again. After all, that is what happened after the lame Western reaction to his land grab in 2014, when he occupied Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine.”
  • Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has upended the peace consensus built following the Second World War. “It was widely agreed that European countries would no longer invade each other…By launching a war of aggression, Russia flagrantly violated that understanding.” (Project Syndicate, 04.02.24)

James A. Robinson

  • Robinson ascribes Russia’s underperformance in Ukraine to corruption. “The authoritarian regime has worked by allowing for enormous amounts of corruption, misallocation of resources, and financial extraction by politically connected elites, which has undermined the military capability in ways that were not anticipated or understood.” (Novaya Gazeta, 06.29.23)

Military aid to Ukraine: 

Simon Johnson

  • Johnson sees Western support as crucial for Ukraine. “To stop Russian aggression…defeat on the battlefield [is essential] … Russia began with some battlefield advantages, including in tanks and artillery. The Ukrainians fought off the initial assaults with Western weapons…as well as judicious use of their existing Soviet-era armaments… The recent promise of advanced battle tanks is a major step in the right direction. The signal is that NATO will provide enough support for Ukraine to push Russia out, however long that takes.” (Project Syndicate, 02.01.23)
    • Johnson views a Trump presidency as a positive thing for Russia. “Some people on Russian propaganda channels already refer to former President Donald Trump as “Our Trump,” presumably because of perceived support received in the past. These same people will be delighted if Trump’s Republican House acolytes manage to subvert the current U.S. effort to support Ukraine.” (Project Syndicate, 02.01.23)
  • Johnson opposed the suspension of economic and military aid to Ukraine. In October 2023, he wrote: “By declining to include funding for Ukraine as part of the recent deal to avert a government shutdown, the U.S. Congress sent a signal of encouragement to Russian President Vladimir Putin… To turn the tide back in favor of Ukraine, Congress needs to restore funding.” (Project Syndicate, 10.04.23)

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

Daron Acemoglu

  • Acemoglu is unabashedly pro-sanctions. Speaking in April 2022, he said, “Economic sanctions, I think, are more effective and more likely to be perceived as just a type of great power rivalry that the Soviets and Americans and NATO were engaged in before the fall of the Soviet Union. So I think that’s why doubling down on the economic sanctions does makes sense.” (Meduza, 04.28.22)

Simon Johnson

  • In defending the oil price cap idea, Johnson wrote in July 2022: “If you don’t like the G-7’s plan for a price cap, now is a good time to put forward your own recommendations. And in that plan, please be sure to indicate how many Ukrainians you think need to die before Putin is finally stopped.” (Project Syndicate, 07.04.22)
  • Johnson is explicit about what sanctions are designed to achieve: “The goal is to cause a financial crisis that will severely impede the Kremlin’s ability to run a wartime economy.” (Project Syndicate, 11.30.22)
  • Johnson proposed a tightening of the compliance measures to enforce the oil price cap in October 2023. This included putting pressure on shippers and insurers, setting up maritime tollbooths at crucial chokepoints that Russian tankers have to traverse. Under this plan, ships would be charged a fee for crossing – the difference between the world market price and the price cap. They would be refunded this extra fee if they could prove they only paid $60 for the oil they were shipping. (Project Syndicate, 10.04.23)
    • Johnson also supports the use of secondary sanctions on carriers of Russian oil.
    • Johnson also proposed extended this to Iran, since trade sanctions on Iranian oil, by taking it off the market, were pushing up the price of Russian oil in turn. Price caps rather than embargos would end the constriction of supply that had raised the prices so high. (WP, 10.18.23)
    • Johnson repeated this opinion in February 2024 (Project Syndicate, 04.02.24)
  • In February 2024, Johnson wrote: “The overriding imperative for the West must be to make this war as costly as possible for Russia. Western export controls are needed to deprive Russia of critical technology and make life harder for its people, and are an essential complement to Western financial sanctions and the G-7 oil price cap. The West can and must close Putin’s silk road. That will require extending Western sanctions to prevent re-export from Central Asia and the Caucasus to Russia.” (Project Syndicate, 02.29.24)
    • It is unclear here whether Johnson advocates the introduction of secondary sanctions. In October 2023, he advocated their implementation against international shippers of Russian oil above the price cap.
  • Johnson criticizes Western politicians’ unwillingness to apply tougher sanctions on Russia as inviting Russian and Chinese expansionism. “There is a deeper weakness – politicians’ unwillingness to do anything that would impose economic costs on their own citizens. This is not lost on Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Unless the West toughens up soon, it should expect a lot more trouble.” (Project Syndicate, 04.02.24)
  • Johnson argues that the sanctions imposed in 2014 were far too weak and “Putin seems to have perceived this slap on the wrist as permitting – if not implicitly encouraging – further aggression.” (Project Syndicate, 04.02.24)
  • On the decisions of some Western companies to remain in Russia: “This immoral attitude is helping to destabilize the world.” (Project Syndicate, 04.02.24)

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

Shigemitsu Tanaka (co-chair, Nihon Hidankyo)

  • Tanaka wrote to then-German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock in December 2022, saying “as Russia proceeds with its war of aggression in Ukraine, your pleas for peace hold increased significance.” He did not advocate a particular stance on war negotiations. (The Mainichi, 12.4.22)

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

Daron Acemoglu

  • Acemoglu is worried about conflict escalation between Russia and the West. He wrote in 2022: “There is going to be every danger that there could be escalation. I think there is going to be a lot of chatter around Putin’s close circle saying that this is all the fault of the Westerners who are giving weapons to Ukrainians. And we have to teach them a lesson. Again, [there’s] no other voice to tell them this is really crazy, this is really dangerous.” (Meduza, 04.28.22)
  • Writing jointly with Simon Johnson, Acemoglu judged that “The defining geopolitical competition for this century is between people who support democracy…and autocrats.” (CEPR, 02.24.23)

Simon Johnson

  • Russia is constantly testing the threshold of escalation with Europe. “What if an oil refinery catches fire? What if there is an ‘accident’ at a nuclear power plant? Putin wants to know how European leaders will respond – reckoning that they will most likely do nothing for fear of more direct military conflict with Russia. Once Putin finds the right pressure points, he will escalate further – aiming to cut off Ukraine’s supply of weapons and financial support.” (Project Syndicate, 10.03.22)
  • The goal of Putin and Xi in creating BRICS is “to build a group that can stand up to Western influence and create the foundation for an alternative international order.” (Project Syndicate, 04.02.24)
  • Russia’s aim is explicitly revisionist and threatens the post-Second World War peaceful consensus. “If Russia’s effort to revise the post-Cold War geopolitical order is bearing fruit, the West has only itself to blame.” (Project Syndicate, 04.02.24)

Russia-China relations

Daron Acemoglu

  • Commenting on the expansion of BRICS in 2023, Acemoglu wrote of a China-Russia axis: “The world does not need more countries to fall under Chinese and Russian influence, or to align against the United States; rather, it needs a genuinely independent third grouping to provide a counterweight against both the China-Russia axis and US power.” (Project Syndicate, 08.31.23)
  • Writing jointly with Simon Johnson, Acemoglu opines that China is partially responsible for Ukrainian deaths because of its close links with Russia. “China is currently a major source of re-supply to the Russian military, including for jetfighters that are used indiscriminately to kill Ukrainian civilians.” (CEPR, 02.24.23)

Simon Johnson

  • China is indispensable to Russia’s war in Ukraine: “Without Xi’s continued diplomatic and trade support, Putin’s regime could not survive…by continuing to trade with China, as if nothing were happening, the West is implicitly allowing Putin’s illegal invasion of Ukraine to continue.” (Project Syndicate, 04.02.24)

Nuclear arms:

Daron Acemoglu

  • See Nuclear safety and security section.

Simon Johnson

  • See Nuclear safety and security section.

Counterterrorism:

  • No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

Daron Acemoglu

  • Speaking on Turkey’s occupation of Kurdish areas of northern Syria in 2019, Acemoglu played down the disruption this might cause. “I think the biggest threats that we are facing right now are Islamic State terrorists getting free or getting a toehold in that area, or the Syrian and the Russian army now completely controlling that strip, or at least much of that strip. I think none of those are good for the future of the Middle East, and they’re not really good for the security of the West.” (Conversations with Tyler, 12.04.19)
  • “[Russia] instills fear in every part of the world. Russian intervention in Syria was a show of force at some level…I think the more the West is viewed as completely giving in to Russia it will increase the confidence of the ruling clique around Putin. And I think that was exactly the lessons that they drew from Syria. Rusia can do anything it wants, and the West is too weak and too afraid to interfere.” (Meduza, 04.28.22)

Cyber security/AI:

Daron Acemoglu

  • Writing on authoritarian surveillance, Acemoglu downplayed AI’s role in Russian state repression. “AI technologies are less important to Russian censorship efforts…[although] their role has recently grown as well.” ("Power and Progress"2023)
  • Acemoglu is generally anti-crypto. “As far as I can see, cryptocurrencies are helping only Russia. So now we can add ‘helping a truly evil regime’ to cryptocurrencies’ rap sheet, right under ‘boosting carbon emissions’ and ‘facilitating crime.’” (Project Syndicate, 05.10.22)

Geoff Hinton

  • Hinton sees the risks of AI as being mainly political. “I think the main issue here, well, one of the main issues is the political systems we have. So I'm not confident that President Putin is going to use AI in ways that help people.” (CBS Morning, 03.25.23)
  • While interviewing with the BBC, Hinton declared that he regretted his work on AI. AI could find its way into the hands of bad actors, which would be a “nightmare scenario. You can imagine some bad actor like Putin decided to give robots the ability to create their own sub-goals.” (BBC, 05.02.23)
    • He has also said: “We know that a lot of the people who wants these [artificial intelligence] tools are bad actors like Putin or DeSantis…Don’t think for a moment that Putin wouldn’t make hyper-intelligent robots with the goal of killing Ukrainians. He wouldn’t hesitate.” (MIT Technology Review, 05.02.23)
  • Delivering the Romanes Lecture at the University of Oxford in February 2024, Hinton predicted that Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping and Donald Trump want to use AI for “manipulating electorates and waging wars. They will make it do very bad things and they may or may [not] go too far and it may take over.” (AI Business, 02.22.24)
  • On AI conventions and international proliferation, Hinton says: “Putin isn’t using [AI-driven autonomous weapons] in Ukraine, and they haven’t been used much, so basically, the conventions worked.” (Bloomberg, 10.25.24)

Simon Johnson

  • Referencing competition to develop more powerful artificial intelligence, Johnson believes that “the latest phase of Great Power competition…is much more about technology than it is about trade.” (Project Syndicate, 09.05.23)

Elections interference:

  • No significant commentary.

Energy exports:

Daron Acemoglu

  • In May 2022, Acemoglu supported ending all energy imports from Russia. (Project Syndicate, 05.10.22)
  • Acemoglu thinks Russia will not become irrelevant overnight because many countries will continue to use gas during the energy transition. “I don’t think we can think of the next ten years as the period where suddenly the Russian political economy will change because oil and gas revenues will be much less — unless again, it’s through sanctions.” (Meduza, 04.28.22)

Simon Johnson

  • Due to Russian unreliability, “no one in Europe should want to rely on Russian energy supplies for decades, or perhaps for as long as the world uses fossil fuels.” (Project Syndicate, 08.02.22)
  • Johnson believes Russia is behind the Nord Stream pipeline explosion was the work of Russia. “Putin is testing the limits of what his regime can get away with.” (Project Syndicate, 10.03.22)
  • Johnson criticizes Russia as an unreliable energy exporter. “Russia has self-embargoed its natural gas, which was flowing through pipelines to Europe. By cutting off these supplies and driving up prices, Russia has demonstrated that it cannot be trusted as a trading partner.” (Project Syndicate, 02.01.23)
  • In July 2023, Johnson argued in favor of a complete ban on fuel imports from refineries that also process Russian crude. (Project Syndicate, 07.03.23)
  • Johnson contends that energy importers within BRICS (e.g. South Africa) have different interests to Russia, an energy exporter. Putin’s foreign policy has also proven to be very disruptive for global energy markets. (Project Syndicate, 09.05.23)
  • Johnson also advocates drastically lowering the oil price cap first imposed on Russian oil exports in December 2022 from the original $60/barrel. In October 2022, he advocated $35. (Project Syndicate, 10.03.22)
  • Recently, Johnson has shifting to arguing for stricter enforcement of existing rules on the price cap and greater oil price transparency, rather than lowering the cap to $30. “For such a large, economically important commodity, we have surprisingly low visibility into the prices that are paid. This seems problematic given the importance of stopping Russia’s aggression against Ukraine (and potentially others)…In our view, Europe and the U.S. should step up their enforcement of the oil price cap. (CEPR, 02.23.24)

Climate change:

Daron Acemoglu

  • “On the issue of climate change, national solutions are simply insufficient… there is no choice but to formulate global solutions through multilateral institutions.” (Project Syndicate, 09.16.20)
  • “Russia is doing almost nothing, claiming that its forests, tundra, and swamps will absorb enough carbon to render it carbon neutral by 2060.” (Project Syndicate, 11.11.21)
    • In criticizing U.S. fossil fuel subsidies for large corporate emitters, Acemoglu criticized Russia for being an even worse offender.
  • In a co-authored paper, Acemoglu has written: “Transitioning to cleaner, non-fossil sources of energy is an imperative for humanity to reduce and reverse damages from global temperature rises, which are now set to exceed the target of 1.5◦C above preindustrial times established at the Paris Agreement.” (MIT Economics, 08.24.23)

Simon Johnson

  • In criticizing OPEC for allegedly helping the Kremlin by lowering oil production, Johnson wrote: “There is already a global movement away from fossil fuels, because of the climate change crisis. Another pressing reason to reduce our dependence on oil is to undermine producers [i.e., Russia], who still have power to destabilize the world economy and finance war crimes.” (West Central Tribune, 10.13.22)

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

Daron Acemoglu

  • Acemoglu is in favor of harsher controls on oligarchs’ money transfer to the West. In March 2022, he wrote: “It is reasonable to assume that Putin’s ability to establish a personalist autocracy would have been substantially curtailed if Russian elites had not had these golden trap doors to the West. (Project Syndicate, 03.08.22)

    • “If the West wants to see itself on the right side of history, targeting Russia is not enough. It must clean out its own Augean stables.”

  • Acemoglu supports shutting down oligarchic financial from Russia to the West as he believes it removes the incentive for those elites to push for reform at home. “I also genuinely believe that Putin would not be where he is today – having turned Russia into a mafia state controlled by former KGB lackeys – had it not been for the largesse that the West has shown to current and past Russian oligarchs.” (Project Syndicate, 05.10.22)

Simon Johnson

  • Johnson advocates transferring frozen Russian assets to Ukraine. “States have already crossed the Rubicon with their massive freezing of Russia’s funds…And as long as the dollar and the euro remain politically coordinated…asset holders will continue to rely on dollar or euro accounts. (Foreign Affairs, 04.19.22)

    • Johnson also advocates turning the accounts that store Russian funds into escrow accounts, with spending approved per transaction by the banks.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

Daron Acemoglu

  • See sections Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations, Energy exports and Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally.

Simon Johnson

  • See sections Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations, Energy exports and Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally.

James A. Robinson 

  • See sections Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations, Energy exports and Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally.

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

Daron Acemoglu

  • Acemoglu believes that Putin’s regime is a kleptocracy: “Putin’s power is based on a deal between an autocrat and oligarchs. The autocrat rules the country however he wants and enriches his allies, who make huge fortunes from the country’s natural resources or through regime-sanctioned monopolies.” (Project Syndicate, 03.08.22)

  • In a hypothetical sense, Acemoglu would support the creation of a larger private sector in post. “I think a very important part [of an ideal post-war transformation in Russia] would be to have a more independent roots for economic activity, for a larger segment of the private sector, so that civil society dynamics can be more autonomous.” (Meduza, 04.28.22)
  • Acemoglu ascribed the war in Ukraine in part to Russian domestic conditions and Putin’s centralization of power. “Russia actually, unfortunately, was already failing before the war… [because Putin is] isolated and surrounded by yes-men and becoming more and more drawn into his own propaganda…. there are also no voices to tell him things that are going to be disastrous for himself and for Russia.” (Meduza, 04.28.22)

    • He is pessimistic about the prospects for Russian civil society. “State control is always very, very strong. And you see the murders of journalists, or politicians, or former dissidents, wherever they are — in London or in Moscow. Those are very symbolic gestures. Those are about silencing the civil society…I would certainly not say that Russian civil society is doomed to insignificance. But right now, it's not strong enough to be a counterweight to Putin.”

  • Speaking in May 2022, Acemoglu was hopeful that domestic discontent would eventually destabilize Putin’s regime. “His regime will get weaker, not least because its ideological basis is being challenged. Russians might be facing Soviet-style repression, but these are not Soviet times. With only a VPN – and, to some extent, even without one – they can access information from all over the world. Many have personal contacts in Ukraine and even in the West. Opinions will shift over time.” (Project Syndicate, 05.10.22)

  • Acemoglu assesses that Vladimir Putin “uses propaganda to effectively control Russian society and to mobilize more than enough popular support.” (CEPA, 02.24.23)

  • Acemoglu believes in deep historical and cultural explanations for the failure of democracy in Russia. His idea, summarized by Robinson, is that the failure of the Enlightenment in Russia meant that no such civil society existed in Russia as in the lands further west. “He said that what I have to understand is that the Enlightenment never got to Russia. He had some very deep sort of cultural argument about Russia and people’s image of society, which diverged radically from post-Enlightenment Western society.” (Novaya Gazeta, 06.29.23)

Simon Johnson

  • In April 2022, Johnson wrote: “Big defeat looms on the economic front. The pre-invasion Russian economy was based on energy exports – oil, gas, and coal, in that order of importance – supported by foreign direct investment and a flow of people and ideas that had deepened greatly over the past three decades. All of this is fading fast. Western companies are pulling out their skilled people and technology. Sanctions on coal exports are beginning to bite. And now the Russians are starting a self-destructive confrontation with Europe by weaponizing its exports of natural gas.” (Project Syndicate, 08.02.22)
  • Russia’s war economy is dependent on Europe. “Putin’s invasion of Ukraine costs about €1 billion ($980 million) per day to run, which is roughly what Russia receives from selling fossil fuels to Europe….as consumers and producers…they continue to send Putin the hard currency he needs” to continue the war. (Project Syndicate, 10.03.22)
  • Johnson is extremely pessimistic about the future prospects of cooperation with Russia. “Irrespective of who controls the Kremlin next year or 20 years from now, Russia is not likely to become a stable, peace-loving democracy that respects international borders.” (Project Syndicate, 07.03.23)

James A. Robinson

  • Robinson believes that the Russia’s tortuous route to democracy lies in deep history. “If you go back to the 19th century, east of the Elbe, you had much more intense serfdom. You didn’t have a civil society because you had serfdom until the middle of the 19th century in the Russian Empire, in the Habsburg lands. That collapsed much earlier in the West…I think you can see that the type of civil society that created Solidarity doesn’t seem to exist in Russia.” (Novaya Gazeta, 06.29.23)
  • In terms of corruption, Robinson sees Putin’s state as virtually Soviet. “It’s not clear to me, based on what I know, that the logic today is so different from when Putin was a Soviet guy in the 1980s.” (Novaya Gazeta, 06.29.23)
  • Robinson agrees that Putin is living in an information bubble. “You have a classic example of a very personalized dictatorship: Putin surrounds himself with yes-people who tell him what they think he wants to hear, so he doesn’t really get good information.” (Novaya Gazeta, 06.29.23)
  • Robinson acknowledges the Russian elite’s longing to be a great power and embarrassment at the fall of the USSR. “That loss seems to have been very visceral on Putin and these people who were powerful in the Soviet system. So part of this war in Ukraine, obviously, is recovering the idea that Russia is this powerful, big country.” (Novaya Gazeta, 06.29.23)
  • He questions the extent of popular support for the war in Ukraine within Russian society. “It’s very difficult for me to know exactly to what extent Russians are really behind this project, of course. There’s so much control over the media, which suggests that there are a lot of people who are really opposed to this. Putin has to control them, he has to shut them up, he has to harass them, and he has to arrest them. But it’s difficult to get the balance: is it 20% of people who really bought into this? Or is it 30%? Is it 50%?” (Novaya Gazeta, 06.29.23)
  • Robinson is pessimistic about Russia’s long-term prospect for reform. “It’s not clear to me that if Putin died of a heart attack tomorrow, this wouldn’t all continue. It’s a very optimistic narrative that this is all about him.” (Novaya Gazeta, 06.29.23)
  • Robinson does not believe the future is authoritarian. “I don’t think the Chinese model can continue. If you look at other authoritarian regimes, like Iran or Russia, they are incredibly weak economically and technologically. The economy cannot flourish in an authoritarian regime." (El País, 10.22.24)

Defense and aerospace:

Simon Johnson

  • Writing in October 2022, Johnson predicted Russian defeat was imminent, and in particular, that “Russian industry is incapable of equipping [Russian] forces effectively in the near term.” (West Central Tribune, 10.13.22)

James A. Robinson

  • Robinson ascribes the Russian army’s underperformance to systemic and endemic corruption. “What looks like corruption is a way of managing power. I would say that what looks like corruption in Russia under Putin is actually how he manages people, how he gives them resources and makes them dependent on him. It makes the state incredibly weak. And the military incompetence of Russia is an example of that. It undermined the capability and resources of the military.” (Novaya Gazeta, 06.29.23)

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

Daron Acemoglu

  • For Russia to be truly reformed, the security services need to be deconstructed and delegitimized. “I think certainly what comes out of this process is a complete delegitimization of the security apparatus and the current oligarchy in Putin’s entourage…if the current Russian institutions become delegitimized in the eyes of the middle class, then I think there’s every danger and possibility [for lasting change].” (Meduza, 04.28.22)

    • Russian security services dominate society in Acemoglu’s view: “I think the KGB or the security services is much more important for the Russian story than Russian culture, in my mind.”
  • Acemoglu views state repression in Russia as being among the most severe in the world. “Being a civil society activist right now in Russia is very, very dangerous. It's one of the most dangerous places to be a civil society activist in the world.” (Meduza, 04.28.22)

James A. Robinson

  • Part of Robinson’s explanation for Russia’s failure to transition from extractive to inclusive institutions is the role of Russia’s security services. “The security forces, of which Putin was a member, were somehow never dismantled. [Former President of Russia Boris] Yeltsin never had the power or the inclination to dismantle this deep state. And they bided their time… that created a sort of political basis for Putin to re-establish this kind of authoritarianism.” (Novaya Gazeta, 06.29.23)

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

Daron Acemoglu

  • Acemoglu thinks Russian leaders are emboldened by appeasing or conciliatory attitudes by foreign leaders. “[Russia] instills fear in every part of the world. Russian intervention in Syria was a show of force at some level. So the question is, how do you negotiate that? I think the more the West is viewed as completely giving in to Russia it will increase the confidence of the ruling clique around Putin. And I think that was exactly the lessons that they drew from Syria. Russia can do anything it wants, and the West is too weak and too afraid to interfere.” (Meduza, 04.28.22)

Simon Johnson

  • BRICS is just a proxy for Russian and Chinese influence. “An 11-strong BRICS+ could be more representative of the world’s emerging economies… Yet, in many ways, the announced enlargement represents a major lost opportunity. The world does not need more countries to fall under Chinese and Russian influence.” (Project Syndicate, 08.31.23)
  • Johnson is skeptical of BRICS’s potential as a multinational bloc. “The extent of common interest among its members should not be exaggerated…[since] any group that include oil and gases producers…and energy importers has a fundamental fault line.” Johnson is also skeptical about BRICS replacing the dollar: “you cannot replace something with nothing.” He concludes that “any alliance with Russia is obviously fraught with dangers…Russia’s leadership looks unstable and unpredictable.” (Project Syndicate, 09.04.23)
  • North Korea and Iran are working closely together with Russia. “North Korea, Iran, and other aggressive autocratic regimes and organizations are allying themselves ever more closely with Russia. Now the world must confront a “cartel of aggression” that has common interests, deepening trade relations, and shared methods of repression.” (Project Syndicate, 04.02.24)

James A. Robinson

  • In June 2023, Robinson postulated that Russia’s revisionism vis-à-vis Ukraine would give “incentives to differentiate” from authoritarian regimes and undermine Putin’s capacity to build international coalitions. (Novaya Gazeta, 06.29.23)

Ukraine:

Daron Acemoglu

  • Writing on pre-2022 Ukraine, Acemoglu and Robinson said corruption in Ukraine was due to the persistence of “extractive institutions” that discourage investment and innovation necessary for long-term growth. This happened because the transition was “hijacked by oligarchs and the remnants of the KGB.” (Marketwatch, 10.15.19)
    • Acemoglu was nonetheless optimistic about Ukraine’s future. “Ukraine is home to a young, politically engaged population, as we saw in the Orange Revolution of 2004-2005 and in the Maidan Revolution of 2014.”

Simon Johnson

  • “Russia aims to [destroy]… Ukraine not only with missile strikes and atrocities against civilians, but also by destroying the country’s economy. Its goal is not just Ukraine’s physical destruction, it is also to grind down the country’s hopes.” (Foreign Affairs, 04.19.22)
    • Johnson proposes a bold plan of rebuilding, akin to the Marshall Plan, using frozen Russian assets.
    • “The aid should be quick but conditional, with terms that make sure the assistance is well spent and that Ukraine makes further progress in fighting corruption. The aid should help Ukraine align its regulatory and legal environment to EU standards, promote trade, and attract foreign direct investment. The sources and uses of funding must be closely coordinated with donors and recipients to minimize waste and delays. This will require a new, freestanding EU-related agency.”
    • Johnson views Ukraine’s EU accession as essential: “The coalition [rebuilding Ukraine] should also tightly link massive reconstruction with Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, an institution that can help it overcome past governance challenges and better adapt its economy to the future.”

James A. Robinson

  • Robinson believes the war has been a formative process for Ukraine and will make it a more democratic place. “It will push Ukraine in a much more democratic and inclusive direction, it seems to me, and hopefully will have the same consequences in other parts of Eastern Europe, like Hungary, where people may be re-evaluating the way things have gone in the past decade or so.” (Novaya Gazeta, 06.29.23)
  • Robinson is impressed by Ukrainian attempts to combat corruption. “There’s all sorts of interesting things going on in Ukraine in terms of identity creation, culture, and institutional strengthening. For example, look at this obsession now with making sure that aid is not used corruptly…[this] is going to lead to profound institutional strengthening, it seems to me.” (Novaya Gazeta, 06.29.23)

Other post-Soviet republics:

Daron Acemoglu

  • Commenting on Armenia’s decision to join the Eurasian Customs Union, Acemoglu wrote that “Some say Armenia’s economy is doomed to fail due to its geographical position…to be blamed, however, are corruption, ruthless politicians and weak institutions.” (PR Newswire Europe, 11.24.13)

Simon Johnson

  • Johnson criticized Western inaction on preventing parallel imports of dual-use and critical goods to Russia through Central Asia and the Caucasus in February 2024. Johnson judged that re-export of Western goods was particularly rampant in Armenia, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. (Project Syndicate, 02.29.24)
    • He recognizes Kazakhstan as an exception.

Footnotes

  1. Project Syndicate, 11.30.22; Project Syndicate, 05.09.23; Project Syndicate, 02.29.24; Project Syndicate, 04.02.24.
Author

Chris Conway

Chris Conway is a student associate with Russia Matters.

The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of the individuals quoted. Photo by Osama Shukir Muhammed Amin FRCP(Glasg) shared under a CC BY-SA 4.0 license.