Russia Analytical Report, Nov. 20-27, 2017
I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda
Nuclear security:
- No significant commentary.
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:
- No significant commentary.
Iran and its nuclear program:
- No significant commentary.
New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:
- No significant commentary.
NATO-Russia relations:
- No significant commentary.
Missile defense:
- No significant commentary.
Nuclear arms control:
“Trump and the Nuclear Button,” The Washington Post, Editorial Board, 11.25.17: The editorial argues that U.S. President Donald Trump “could make the world safer” in one particular way. This could be accomplished through “the Cold War procedure, in effect in the United States and Russia, of keeping land- and sea-based nuclear missiles on launch-ready alert. ... This is a holdover from the era of mutual assured destruction that could be modified in tandem by the United States and Russia, a smart, pragmatic move to ease off the hair-trigger alerts, which pose a threat of miscalculation and catastrophe. The nuclear weapons would still retain their awesome destructive power; they would remain a potent deterrent.”
Counter-terrorism:
- No significant commentary.
Conflict in Syria:
“What Is Russia Up To in the Middle East?” Dmitri Trenin, Polity, 2017: The author, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, in his new book argues that the “Middle East is … as good a model as any for twenty-first-century power games changing the global balance.” Russia, previously “preoccupied with the former imperial borderlands and largely absent from the rest of the world … has signaled that it is returning to the global stage as a major independent geopolitical player” through its presence in the Middle East. “The Middle East is very much part of the greater Eurasian neighborhood, where Moscow seeks to build a system of international relations no longer dominated by the U.S. and not to be overshadowed by a single ‘local’ hegemon, China.” However, in order to be competitive in Eurasia, “Russian leaders need to finally come up with a model of economic development that works.”
“Rex Tillerson’s Secret Survival Weapon,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 11.21.17: The author, a veteran foreign correspondent-turned-columnist, writes that U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s survival in the Trump administration hinges on “one secret survival weapon.” Tillerson is “running a three-legged race, figuratively speaking, alongside Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis … Trump may not be a soul mate of his secretary of state, but he’s not going to pick a fight with Mattis.” Tillerson appears to have Trump’s support on working with China on the North Korea crisis, and the two “also share the unpopular but probably inescapable view that the United States must work with Russia to stabilize Syria. … Putin has emerged as a dominant force in Syria, and he wants to play the peacemaker there now, but he doesn’t hold all the cards. U.S. allies control big swaths of Syrian territory, and they’re the missing pieces of Putin’s peace process.”
Cyber security:
- No significant commentary.
Elections interference:
“US Suspicions Build Up Putin, His Critics Say,” Andrew Higgins, New York Times, 11.25.17: The author, a Moscow correspondent for The New York Times, writes that some of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “biggest foes in Russia, notably pro-Western liberals … are now joining a chorus of protest over America's fixation with Moscow's meddling in its political affairs.” Putin’s critics fear that this fixation “reinforces a narrative put forth tirelessly by the state-controlled Russian news media … Putin is portrayed as an ever-victorious master strategist who has led Russia—an economic, military and demographic weakling compared with the United States—from triumph to triumph on the world stage. …they complain that the United States consistently inflates Mr. Putin's impact and portrays his government as far more unified and effective than it really is, cementing his legacy and making him harder to challenge at home. Ultimately, they say, Americans are using Russia as a scapegoat to explain the deep political discord in the United States.”
Energy exports from CIS:
“Google Is Filtering News For The Wrong Reason. If The Standard Is Corporate Safety, Democracy Has a Problem,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 11.22.17: The author, a columnist and veteran Russia watcher, writes that Google is “working to engineer RT and Sputnik, the Russian propaganda channels, out of the Google News aggregator. ... I'm not going to claim RT and Sputnik are real news media (in fact, I've argued they're not). But do I want Google to ‘engineer it out’ of news searches or the Google News aggregation service? Absolutely not, and I want my fringe and alternative websites, too, regardless of their political coloring. … Google will downgrade any kind of content that can cause a backlash against it. That's important to understand even if you don't want to see alt-right, alt-left, pro-Russian, pro-Iran or any other biased ‘news stories.’ What you do want can end up being censored, too, if Google's finely tuned corporate nose smells complications.”
U.S.-Russian economic ties:
- No significant commentary.
U.S.-Russian relations in general:
“What I Learned About the Russian-American Relationship Last Week. Things Are Not as Bad as They Were During the Cold War, but They’re the Worst They Have Been Since the Cold War Ended,” Daniel W. Drezner, The Washington Post, 11.21.17: The author, a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, discusses his takeaways from the Fletcher School’s recent conference on U.S.-Russia relations. “1. Talking is good, but academics should not be the only ones doing the talking. When official relations between two countries are frozen, sometimes nonofficial elites will attempt to jump-start a dialogue. This is called Track II diplomacy; Track I is official diplomacy. 2. Neither country is monolithic, but the United States is more divided right now. 3. No one in power in Moscow or Washington is a strategic genius. … Putin had been too clever by half in intervening in the 2016 election as U.S. intelligence agencies said he did. In taking such ham-handed steps, Putin has all but made it impossible for Trump to have the political leeway to do anything Putin wants.”
“The Real Winner in America's Russia Crisis Is China,” Leon Hadar, The National Interest, 11.20.17: The author, a senior analyst with consulting firm Wikistrat, writes that “today’s Russian global-propaganda apparatus isn’t much more effective” than it was during the Soviet era. “If the Russians were indeed engaged in a propaganda campaign, it proved overall to be very inept and amateurish. … But don’t tell that to the Washington elites who, through media reports and a government investigation, have continued trying to convince themselves and the rest of us that Russia, in collusion with Trump campaign officials, was responsible for Clinton’s election loss.” The author argues that this “continuing American obsession with Russia, like the never-ending military interventions in the Middle East, plays directly into Chinese hands and makes it less likely that Washington would be able to develop an effective strategy to deal with China, including through ad-hoc cooperation with Moscow.”
II. Russia’s relations with other countries
Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:
- No significant commentary.
China:
- No significant commentary.
Ukraine:
“Ukraine Four Years After the Euromaidan,” Kostiantyn Fedorenko, Wilson Center, 11.21.17: The author, a member of the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation’s political science department, writes that Ukraine has “changed in many ways” in the last four years, but there is a difference of opinion on whether these changes have been positive or negative. “In macroeconomic terms, Ukraine did achieve stabilization and a return to growth. At the same time, international experts surveyed by Carnegie Europe noted a lack of definitive reforms in the country and lack of action in tackling the prevalent corruption.” Today, Ukrainian citizens “enjoy visa-free travel with the Schengen zone countries, a free trade area with the EU has been established and the economy is no longer facing a realistic threat of defaulting.” In terms of reform implementation, “Ukraine performed best … when it faced precise demands from the EU and the IMF.” However, “without proper external incentives, reform processes in Ukraine have stalled. Moreover, in some cases, progressive reforms were later undermined. … The problem is, Ukraine has to change much faster than it is. … The only way to change this situation is to have the Ukrainian government pressed both by active citizens and by its international partners.”
“Putin’s Proposal for Ukraine Is Another Trap for Trump,” Josh Rogin, The Washington Post, 11.26.17: The author, a columnist for the Global Opinions section of The Washington Post, argues that in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin “is repeating his strategy in Syria, which was to engage in Kabuki diplomacy with the United States to buy time to consolidate battlefield gains he has no intention of giving up. ... If Putin’s goal is to stay in Ukraine and keep the country destabilized, prevent it from joining European institutions and maintain control over a buffer zone, he will never agree to a peacekeeping mission that meets Ukraine or Western conditions.” Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump on Nov. 21 discussed “a lasting peace in Ukraine.” The author advises Trump to “pursue that peace, but not on Putin’s terms.”
“Ukrainians Are Unsatisfied With Their Revolution. Maybe They’re Right,” Anne Applebaum, The Washington Post, 11.24.17: The author, a columnist for the paper, writes that Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has “achieved more in the past four years than all of the country’s previous post-Soviet leaders achieved over two decades. ... After a long, disastrous recession, growth is finally picking up, with a lot of activity in the tech industry. … But anti-corruption activists and opposition politicians aren’t satisfied … They want their leaders to break more loudly and clearly with the past. They want anti-corruption institutions that result in actual convictions. They want an end to infighting between different law enforcement agencies. They complain that the interior police, falling into bad habits, still harass opponents.”
Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:
III. Russia’s domestic policies
Domestic politics, economy and energy:
“Putin’s Populism Trap,” Julia Gurganus, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 11.21.17: The author, a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, discusses the options for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reelection campaign platform. “Putin could burnish his image as the ‘security president,’ which would require continued aggressive posturing in the foreign policy realm—risky at a time when U.S.-Russian relations are poor and U.S. foreign policy is unpredictable. … Putin could rebrand himself, once again, as ‘Russia’s modernizer,’ but that approach is unwelcome by the elites who want to preserve the status quo. The populist approach beckons, but it will not work for Putin anymore. Putin as ‘populist 2.0’ smacks of hypocrisy and could further stoke the dissatisfaction that Navalny has tried to tap into.”
Defense and aerospace:
- No significant commentary.
Security, law-enforcement and justice:
- No significant commentary.