I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

“Russia Steps Up as Go-Between on North Korea,” Tomoyo Ogawa, Nikkei Asian Review, 10.17.17: The author, a writer for the news outlet, argues that Moscow is setting itself up as an intermediary between the U.S. and North Korea. Moscow has been setting up high profile meetings with officials from Pyongyang, and the speaker for Russia’s upper house of parliament recently met separately with North and South Korean representatives. While Moscow had called for direct dialogue between the two, Pyongyang rejected the idea. Following this, Moscow called to resume six-party talks. Russia is also hosting a nuclear nonproliferation conference from Oct. 19, at which some expect the attendant U.S. and North Korean representatives to have some kind of contact. Russia’s recent moves, such as the opposition to the most recent round of sanctions on North Korea, signal that it wants stronger ties with North Korea, and perhaps that Moscow “hopes to turn North Korea into a diplomatic card of its own.”

NB: See also “Missile defense” section below.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:

• No significant commentary.

NATO-Russia relations:

“NATO’s Eastern Flank and Its Future Relationship With Russia,” Judy Dempsey, Carnegie Europe, 10.23.17: In this NATO-commissioned paper, Dempsey, a nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Europe, argues that strengthening NATO’s eastern flank is a work in progress. To complete the task, the alliance needs a “long overdue” comprehensive, long-term strategy towards Russia that is founded on “unity, deterrence and resilience.” NATO countries have differing opinions on the threat posed by Russia, particularly the threat of invasion into the Baltic states. The author argues that the rotation of troops in the region has “questionable deterrence value.” Meanwhile, southern NATO members feel that the alliance is not doing as much for their security as for the east, weakening the alliance’s solidarity. Logistical challenges plague the movement of forces to Europe’s east, and the notion of resiliency has failed to extend to cyber threats, leaving the alliance’s infrastructure vulnerable. The NATO-Russia Founding Act, on which NATO-Russia relations are based, is “anachronistic” in today’s geostrategic environment. Germany does not want to review the act and no other options have been presented. While the U.S. appears committed to defending NATO’s eastern flank, some alliance members remain nervous. The author recommends that NATO: agree on a Russia strategy; discuss permanently stationing troops in eastern flank countries; establish a “Military Schengen”; and revise or create a replacement for the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

“Report: NATO Has Little Confidence In Its Ability To Counter Russian Attack,” Jacob Bojesson, The National Interest, 10.22.17: The author, a writer for the Daily Caller, reports that a leaked document shows that NATO may not be able to fend off a Russian attack against its eastern flank. NATO’s “Progress Report on the Strengthened Deterrence and Defense Capability of the Alliance,” excerpts of which were published in German newspaper Der Spiegel, concludes that NATO is at a disadvantage in the event of a Russian invasion into Poland or the Baltics. Logistical issues and smaller command structures have “atrophied” NATO’s ability to respond in such an event. A 2016 report by the RAND Corporation estimates that NATO forces in the Baltics would be overrun by Russia “in as little as 36 hours.” Although NATO has reinforced its presence in Eastern Europe, a call for modernizing the alliance has been made.

“Russia Is a Bigger Threat to US Than North Korea or ISIS: Ex-NATO Commander,” Conor Gaffey, Newsweek, 10.20.17: The author, a staff writer for Newsweek, writes that former NATO commander Wesley Clark identified Russia as the greatest threat to U.S. security. This is because Russian President Vladimir Putin “still views the world in ‘Cold War terms.’” Clark argues that Russia is “working at every level” to dismantle the legitimacy of global institutions, as evidenced by its interference in the U.S. presidential election. While faithful that some members of the Trump administration will uphold the U.S. commitment to NATO, Clark is less certain of the president himself, questioning U.S. President Donald Trump’s attempts to “make nice” with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Missile defense:

“Trump's Overconfidence in US Missile Defense Could Lead to a Deadly War With North Korea,” Ankit Panda and Vipin Narang, War on the Rocks, 10.17.17: The authors, experts in political science, argue that U.S. President Donald Trump’s overconfidence in the accuracy of U.S. missile defenses risks dangerous miscalculation. Such a misperception could lead Trump to incorrectly conclude that U.S. cities might be spared from retaliation if the U.S. strikes first at North Korea. The authors note that belief in “anything close to a 97% interception rate … raises the temptation to attempt a so-called ‘splendid first strike.’” In reality, the empirical success rate of a U.S. Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) is closer to 56%. Another factor to consider is that due to geography and trajectory, the interceptors “may have to make midcourse contact over the Russian Far East,” risking nuclear war with Russia. A Russian early warning system likely “wouldn’t and probably couldn’t” account for the fact that the ballistic missile-looking GBI is not actually a ballistic missile. “Thus, as the United States attempted with mixed success to fend off nuclear attack from North Korea, it might well create a misunderstanding in Moscow that started a nuclear exchange with the world’s other nuclear superpower.”

Arms control:

“Renewing America’s Nuclear Arsenal: Options for the 21st Century,” James Doyle, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 10.23.17: The author, a specialist in nuclear weapons policy, writes that U.S. plans to spend $1 trillion on modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal have far-reaching consequences. He argues that to achieve “credible and reliable deterrence,” the U.S. does not need to “replicate its Cold War triad.” Instead, alternative structures that the author details in a new book would allow for more spending on nuclear security and conventional procurement. They also present distinct advantages for maintaining strategic stability, supporting arms control treaties, increasing American nuclear security and aiding in global non-proliferation initiatives. Additionally, they better support conventional military operations than the existing triad and are more appropriate to the modern strategic environment.

Counter-terrorism:

“U.S. Security Assistance to Central Asia: Examining Limits, Exploring Opportunities,” Mariya Omelicheva, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 487, October 2017: The author, an associate professor of political science at the University of Kansas, argues that continued U.S. aid to Central Asia will only hurt to U.S. interests “if it is not leveraged by measurable progress in host governments’ program-related achievements.” The author notes that the U.S. government spent $1.9 billion on security assistance to Central Asia between 2001 and 2016, which was aimed at increasing the professionalism of ground troops and training and equipping security personnel in counterterrorism and counter-narcotics operations. While all Central Asian states saw some improvements to their internal security forces, two major incremental trends were not addressed through these efforts: opium trafficking from Afghanistan and “authoritarianization” across the region, the author writes. Even with the Trump administration’s proposed halving of financial assistance to the region, any aid will be detrimental to U.S. national interests without stronger accountability measures. “Building state capacity without commensurate accountability, transparency, and anti-corruption expectations can easily make it possible for the region’s authoritarian governments to strengthen themselves without meaningfully combating the transnational security threats.”

Conflict in Syria:

“How the Islamic State Will Grapple With Defeat in Raqqa,” Daniel Byman, Lawfare, 10.19.17: The author, the foreign policy editor of Lawfare and a senior fellow at the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, writes that Islamic State’s defeat in Raqqa is “a devastating blow” that marks the end of its quasi-state status, but that the group should not be considered vanquished. “When the Islamic State previously fell, it revived as a stronger, more dangerous group,” the author notes. Although the group is weak locally, it is likely to gain opportunities for a resurgence in the coming years, both as an insurgent force in the Middle East and by inspiring in “lone-wolf terrorists and other sympathizers to strike the more distant West.” Moreover, the group may be able to exploit the divisions among the strange bedfellows that had been allied against it, including Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United States. While this alliance often resembled parallel actions rather than real cooperation, the shared interest served as a check on many rivalries. “Now these states can return to ignoring, if not undermining, one another.”

“Syrian Reconstruction Spells Juicy Contracts for Russian, Iranian Firms,” Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, Foreign Policy, 10.20.17: The author, a contributing writer for the publication, writes that the destruction of Syria’s infrastructure means “potentially lucrative” construction contracts soon to be handed out by Damascus. Having supported Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government, Russia and Iran will likely get most of these contracts, but firms from Brazil and China are also vying for the opportunities. In September, the U.S. and 13 other countries called for a political process to remove Assad from power before they will aid in Syria’s reconstruction. Moscow, however, has already signed nearly $1 billion worth of infrastructure and other contracts with Damascus, which has promised Moscow priority in these matters. However, Russia is not alone in enjoying Syria’s favor; Iran has also been signing lucrative contracts with Damascus, and Assad’s domestic supporters are looking to establish themselves. Syria’s rebel regions, however, will be denied reconstruction funds by Damascus as punishment for their rebellion. “Aid groups are worried that the rush to rebuild the loyalist core of postwar Syria will only cement the same kinds of divisions and abuses that have been on display during the six-year conflict.”

Cyber security:

• No significant commentary.

Elections interference:

• No significant commentary.

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Report: The US Is Not Ready for a War with Russia or China,” Zachary Keck, The National Interest, 10.20.17: The author, former managing editor of The National Interest, writes that according to a new report, while the U.S. has been preparing for conventional conflict, Russia and China have been doing something quite different. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments’ “Force Planning for the Era of Great Power Competition” concludes Russia and China have been looking for ways to achieve their ends while avoiding conventional conflicts altogether. Both Moscow and Beijing are advancing strategies that utilize “peacetime actions to achieve their strategic ends.” Moscow’s New Generation Warfare and Bejing’s Informationized Warfare both “combine nonmilitary diplomatic, information and economic actions with low-intensity gray zone military operations supported by high-end military capabilities to gain influence and territory” without moving into a major conflict. Meanwhile, the U.S. has not developed means of addressing gray zone issues, instead focusing on the kind of conventional warfare “that might never materialize.” However, preparation for high-end conflict is still necessary, as without it, Russia and China “would simply choose to escalate conflicts rather than pursue their current approaches.”

“At Valdai Putin Treats Trump Respectfully,” Angela Stent, The National Interest, 10.23.17: The author, a veteran Russia scholar and the director of the Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European studies at Georgetown University, offers her insights on the 14^th annual Valdai Club meeting in Sochi and its main event, Vladimir Putin’s speech. Putin returned to one of his recurrent themes, that “the West’s insistence on the recognition of Kosovo’s independence opened a Pandora’s Box of separatist movements,” the author writes. Putin pointed his finger at the EU and the U.S. for what happened in Ukraine, and he blamed Ukraine for the failure to implement the Minsk agreement. Asked if Russia had made any mistakes in its dealings with the West, Putin maintained that it had trusted the West too much, and the West’s mistake was that it took Russia’s trust as weakness and abused it. Still, Putin largely spared Donald Trump from his harsh critique of U.S. policy. “Indeed, President Putin went out of his way to say that Trump should be treated with respect as the legitimately elected leader of the United States and to blame Congress and the courts for obstructing his ability to implement his legislative agenda,” the author writes. “He declared Russia’s readiness to cooperate with the United States when it was ready to do so, but only under conditions of mutual respect and full equality.” Another Russian official touted positive economic developments, insisting that “Western sanctions had only cost Russia 1 percent of its GDP.” This year’s Valdai session corresponded with the centenary of the Bolshevik Revolution, and this made for one of its “most interesting” panels, in the author’s view. “When the speakers became more personal and talked about their own families’ involvement in the revolution, the full complexity and tragedy of Russia’s history was on display.” The author quotes a senior Russian official to offer the conference’s epitaph: “We only look like Europeans, but we really are different.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Are Russia, Iran Outflanking the US in Iraq?” Al-Monitor Week in Review column, 10.22.17: Although Russian President Vladimir Putin was looking to the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government to help grow Russia’s influence in the Middle East, he did not expect the recent independence referendum and its fallout. When Iraqi forces retook Kirkuk and disputed territories, Putin “moved quickly to adapt.” With Baghdad and Moscow on the verge of closer security and economic ties, “Russia will seek to lessen its exposure in the north and make clear it is ready to do oil and gas deals with Baghdad.” Moscow has also been careful to keep its relationship with Iran steady, announcing Putin’s November visit to Tehran while the crisis in Iraq unfolded. Additionally, to avoid conflict in Syria, Putin is also balancing ties with Iran and Israel.

China:

• No significant commentary. 

Ukraine:

“Extrajudicial Violence in Donbas and Its Consequences for Ukraine,” Serhiy Kudelia, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 486, October 2017: The author, a professor of political science at Baylor University, examines the causes and implications of the ongoing practice of “physical integrity rights violations” committed by state agents and affiliated paramilitaries in government-controlled Donbas. The author suggests that “persistent repressive practices against local civilians undermine the credibility of the state in that region, create additional barriers for settling the conflict and may foreshadow the broadening of the range of targets to include regime opponents.” Such actions have three main implications in the near-term:  First, the paramilitary activities “may be indicative of additional discretionary powers and greater institutional autonomy of the security service” after the Ukrainian president put a long-time loyalist in charge of the service. Second, the outbreak of the armed conflict was “partially the result of a deep legitimacy crisis of the post-Maidan Ukrainian government” and Kiev has failed to address that. Third, “the impunity of security services, transformation of paramilitaries into semi-private armies equipped with tanks and artillery, and lack of external constraints on their actions represent a major obstacle” to settling the conflict.

“How Ukraine Views Russia and the West,” Steven Pifer, Brookings Institution, 10.18.17: The author, a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, observes that attitudes in Ukraine toward Russia since the conflict in Donbas began “have hardened to a consider­able degree, and the appeal of Western institutions such as the European Union and NATO has grown.” This represents a marked shift from the period before 2014, when, following the Soviet Union’s collapse, “Ukraine and Russia maintained relations that at times were testy, but their differences largely appeared manageable.” The author attributes the change in Ukrainian attitudes to the Kremlin’s use of military force to seize Crimea and its subsequent support for armed separatism in eastern Ukraine.

“Why Does Putin Want to Control Ukraine? Ask Stalin,” Anne Applebaum, The Washington Post, 10.20.17: The author, a foreign affairs columnist, writes that Russia’s anxiety over turbulence in Kiev stems from a history of such upset nearly destabilizing Moscow. This perhaps explains some of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attitude toward Ukraine. What Kremlin officials fear most is a “mass anti-corruption protest” ending “with occupation of the dictator’s palace.” Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin made efforts to quell trouble from Ukraine through particularly harsh tactics, such as blacklisting Ukrainian towns from receiving food and goods, preventing internal migration, and sending teams of activists to confiscate “everything edible.” As a result, approximately 5 million people died of hunger from 1931 to 1934. “After the famine, Stalin launched a new wave of terror. His goal was no mystery: He wanted to crush the Ukrainian national movement and to ensure that Ukraine would never again rebel against the Soviet state.” The Soviet Union took extensive measure to conceal the truth of the famine. A 1937 census that reported too many missing people was hidden away, and journalists were pressured into keeping quiet. While “Putin’s Russia is not Stalin’s Soviet Union,” nevertheless, “the relationship between Russia and Ukraine has come full circle.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant commentary.

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“What’s Behind Ksenia Sobchak’s 'Against All' Bid for the Presidency?” Evan Gershkovich, The Moscow Times, 10.19.17: The author presents an analysis of the motives of Russian presidential candidate Ksenia Sobchak, a socialite and former reality TV presenter, turned opposition activist, who announced her candidacy last week. “Is she just the latest Kremlin stooge? Is she a spoiler candidate—someone co-opted by the Kremlin to split the opposition vote—or will she actually further the opposition’s cause?” Pundits are leaning toward the former option, saying that Sobchak can revitalize dull elections with a new face and help channel public discontent, while posing no real danger to the Kremlin.

“Pride and Prejudice: Russia Rearms Its History,” Gabriele Woidelko, Carnegie Europe, 10.20.17: The author, who directs the Russia in Europe program at the Körber Foundation in Hamburg, writes that “creating a unified, streamlined narrative about a country´s glorious and heroic past is one of the most powerful weapons widely used by authoritarian and nationalist governments” and in Russia this has been happening for the past decade. The Kremlin has “invested much effort into combining different elements of both the tsarist and Soviet past into a national history of patriotic pride, bravery and victory.” This includes rehabilitating Stalin as a successful leader in the public discourse.

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

“The Lubyanka Keeps Its Secrets: Russia and the Wallenberg Case,” Andrei Kolesnikov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 10.19.17: The author, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes about a recent Russian court decision supporting the Federal Security Service’s decision not to reveal documents that could have shed light on the death of Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg in Moscow in 1947. “The verdict,” he writes, “is ludicrous. It demonstrates a modern Russian state still refusing to come to terms with its troubling Stalinist legacy. … This isn’t a case about someone’s private life but evidence of the state abusing its own citizens and foreign nationals.” Kolesnikov laments that “Russian authorities have inherited the [Stalinist] notion that secrecy is a powerful weapon that must be defended as fiercely as the idea of ‘sovereignty.’”