Russia Analytical Report, Aug. 28-Sept. 11, 2017
I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda
Nuclear security:
“Deep US-Russia Malaise Calls for a Liaison Between Trump and Congress,” Sam Nunn and Ernest J. Moniz, The Washington Post, 09.06.17: The authors, co-chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the former U.S. Energy Secretary, write that cooperation between Congress and the Trump administration is necessary for national and global safety. Due to America’s and Russia’s shared responsibility for minimizing nuclear risk, Congress must not “hamstring” U.S. foreign policy toward Russia by making it quite so difficult to adjust sanctions. If Russia believes sanctions to be permanent, incentives for better behavior diminish. The authors recommend a liaison group like the Senate Arms Control Observer Group during the Reagan administration to work closely with the White House and receive briefings and constructive feedback. This group, appointed by leaders in Congress, would include “the chairs and ranking minority-party members of key committees from both houses of Congress.” The authors urge Moscow and Washington to recognize the necessity of addressing areas of common interest, “chief among them reducing nuclear and other military risks and preventing catastrophic terrorist attacks.”
Iran and its nuclear program:
- No significant commentary.
New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:
“Fear and Confidence in the Face of Russian War Games,” David Filipov and Michael Birnbaum, The Washington Post, 09.10.17: The authors, bureau chiefs for The Washington Post in Moscow and Brussels, respectively, write that Russia’s war games on NATO’s border begin as Russia-West relations are at near historic lows. Moscow continues to insist that the exercises will involve only 12,700 troops, just below the 13,000 troop limit that would require NATO observers to attend per international agreements. This unwillingness to host observers, according to Brussels, raises the risk of misunderstanding that could lead to escalation. Indeed, Russia’s drills with Belarus are “merely the tip of a major mobilization of Moscow’s upgraded and modernized military machine.” However, despite the scale of the exercises, Western officials, including NATO’s chief, do not see the exercises posing any imminent threat to the alliance. The authors note that the war games a reflection of Moscow’s belief that “Russia is surrounded by a hostile and aggressive force in NATO.” Additionally, the exercises show two of Moscow’s goals: to rehearse sealing off the Baltic States and denying NATO access to the Baltic Sea, and to show NATO the high cost of defending the Baltics, “thus sowing uncertainty about the viability of the alliance.”
“Zapad 2017: Should We Fear Russia’s Latest Military Dress Rehearsal?” Peter Zwack, The National Interest, 08.29.17: The author, a former U.S. defense attaché to Russia, writes that in the last three years, the Russian military has undergone a revolution on a grand scale. This revolution has led to a “revised and nuanced approach to warfare,” which has been employed in Syria, Crimea and eastern Ukraine. With fewer resources to hand, Russia was forced to focus not on attractive operational parts, as the U.S. has, but rather on the strategic whole. As a result, the Kremlin has developed “an arsenal of asymmetric ‘influencers’” ranging from cyberattacks to economic subversion to assassinations. The author identifies Moscow’s nuclear capability and the threat of its use as a key danger; however, Russia is still struggling to man a professional standing military of large numbers. The author argues that the U.S. must not be distracted by the fireworks of Zapad 2017 and focus on the development of “a pragmatic dual-track policy” toward Russia. The first track of this policy, the author stresses, is the necessity of the U.S. commitment to NATO and preserving the strength and cohesion of the alliance. The second track, strong senior defense and political connections between Washington and Moscow, is for contending with a situation in which a major accident escalates rapidly and dangerously. The author argues that while the West should be prepared for a Zapad-style “all-guns-blazing scenario,” the other, less flashy weapons at Russia’s disposal are “every bit as dangerous.”
NATO-Russia relations:
- No significant commentary.
Missile defense:
- No significant commentary.
Nuclear arms control:
- No significant commentary.
Counter-terrorism:
- No significant commentary.
Conflict in Syria:
“Even the Saudis Are Turning to Russia as Assad’s Foes Lose Heart,” Henry Meyer and Glen Carey, Bloomberg, 09.08.17: The authors, Bloomberg journalists, write that Saudi Arabia appears to have lost hope for regime change in Syria. Instead, in another blow to Syrian rebels, Saudi Arabia appears to be cooperating with Russia on a settlement that leaves Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in power for now. Last month, the Saudis hosted a meeting for Syria’s opposition factions, while Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov traveled to Saudi Arabia for talks on Sept. 10. In a distinct shift in stance, the West, along with Turkey and Saudi Arabia, has had to accept that Assad will remain in power during a transitional phase, a distinct shift in stance.
Cyber security:
- No significant commentary.
Elections interference:
“Senate’s Russia Investigators Need to Slow Down,” Susan Hennessey and Benjamin Wittes, Foreign Policy, 09.07.17: The authors, fellows at the Brookings Institution, write that Richard Burr, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, may be much further ahead than many believe him to be. Congressional investigations are meant to “develop facts on which to base legislative actions,” as well as, in this case, to inform the public about what happened in the 2016 election, and to ensure that the executive branch is not allowing “foreign efforst to interfere with the American electoral process.” While the authors believe that the investigation will require more time, they lay out the minimum requirements for a report from the committee. These requirements include accounts of: allegations of coordination between the Trump campaign and Russians; financial ties between Trump affiliates and the Kremlin; the June 2016 meeting involving Donald Trump Jr.; Jared Kushner’s attempt to create back channel communications with the Kremlin; the interaction between Michael Flynn and former Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak; coordination between non-Trump affiliated Republicans and Russian representatives; the Trump Organization’s ties to Russia over time; foreign disinformation campaigns; if significant foreign money had a role in the 2016 election; if the firing of former FBI director James Comey was an attempt at impeding investigation; and whether or not Russian operations are ongoing or expected in future U.S. elections.
“I Ran Congress' 9/11 Investigation. The Intelligence Committees Today Can't Handle Russia; If They Want a Real Autopsy, They Need More Resources,” Bob Graham, The Washington Post, 09.03.1: The author, a former U.S. Senator, writes that with the appointment of special counsel Robert Mueller, the “pressure … is off Congress” to hold the president accountable. Both the House and Senate should treat their investigations as the only and final probes into the matter, as U.S. President Donald Trump is working hard to discredit Mueller’s work. Having co-chaired the congressional inquire into 9/11, the author does not believe today’s congressional intelligence committees are up to the task before them unless Congress tackles three issues: a need for greater capacity for the committees, a need to plan “for post-Mueller scenarios” and a need to “embrace [Congress’] investigatory role with renewed urgency.” The author urges Congress to be ready for the worst-case scenario of Trump removing Mueller from his post and the constitutional crisis that would follow.
“The Trump-Russia Story Survives, Even as Evidence of Collusion Fades,” Ed Rogers, The Washington Post, 08.30.17: The author, a political consultant, writes that while stories of U.S. President Donald Trump’s Russia connections are abundant, they “contain nothing about the Trump campaign colluding with Russia.” The author argues that the media is desperate to keep the story afloat because it has too much invested in it. What appeared to be a “gathering storm of Russia collusion” now appears unlikely to harm Trump or his presidency. With little evidence of collusion on hand, is it “simply yet to be uncovered?” The author does not find this likely.
Energy exports from CIS:
- No significant commentary.
U.S.-Russian economic ties:
- No significant commentary.
U.S.-Russian relations in general:
“Misusing US Sanctions Will Sap Their Power,” Jarrett Blanc, Wall Street Journal, 08.30.17: The author, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes that the dominant place in international banking that the U.S. currently enjoys is not a fixed privilege. Regulators, banks and governments can make changes to the international financial order through time and money if Washington abuses its power. The latest round of sanctions passed by the U.S. served primarily to shift the power of lifting sanctions from the president to Congress and shows Washington’s lack of caution. From an international financial standpoint, the move looks like a shift from sanctions as a “means of achieving particular ends into permanent stigmas.” The author argues that seemingly permanent sanctions highlight “the risks of being dependent on the U.S. financial system.” Because sanctions are a useful tool far preferable to military action, the author cautions the U.S. to “not fritter them away.”
“What Trump Got Right About Foreign Policy,” Stephen M. Walt, Foreign Policy, 08.28.17: The author, a professor of international affairs, writes that U.S. President Donald Trump is not always wrong, such as in his desire for improved relations with Russia. The deterioration in relations is not one-sided, and the U.S. could use Russian help in the Middle East and with China. However, with new sanctions on Russia, better relations between Washington and Moscow are now even less likely than they were before. “Trump’s instincts on Russia were sensible, but his blunder helped betray them.” Another point in Trump’s favor is his belief that existing trade agreements need changes, and that certain features of U.S. and international trade need improvement. However, Trump has presented no workable ideas for how to fix the situation and has undercut U.S. leverage by his behavior. While Trump was correct in saying the U.S. pays too great a share in NATO, his attempts at getting Europe to do more have been ineffective. The author argues that Trump’s recognition of the death of the two-state solution for Israel and Palestine is correct, as is his criticism of American nation-building in the Middle East and Africa; however, “even when he’s right, alas, he has found a way to get it wrong.”
“Tillerson Is Working With China and Russia—Very, Very Quietly,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 09.07.17: The author, a veteran foreign correspondent-turned-columnist, writes that U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has been quietly working with Russia on Ukraine and Syria and with China on North Korea, attempting to solve and stabilize these crises. Tillerson’s approach “focuses on personal diplomacy,” working on the assumption that complicated regional issues can be solved through the U.S. managing its relationship with Chinese and Russian leaders. Tillerson is in favor of a U.N. peacekeeping mission in Ukraine, and regarding Syria, has warned that the danger to Russian interests there is Iran’s increasing power. As a counter to this, Tillerson supports the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces moving to take the lower Euphrates Valley.
“Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Policy Assessment,” U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking, EastWest Institute, 08.29.17: The authors, experts in their fields, write that the steadily growing narcotics trade in Afghanistan is one of many factors impeding the nation’s security and stability. Naroctrafficking connects drugs to political corruption and violence, regional insecurity, the shadow economy and healthcare issues. One aspect of current tensions between Russia and the U.S. is their rivalry over regions of interest. For Russia, the region-specific interests in Central Asia are: reaffirming its influence and balancing the influence of other great powers in the region; preventing crime and violence overflow across borders and into Russia; and strengthening integration networks led by Russia. At the same time, the U.S. is pursuing an agenda of its own in Afghanistan. While U.S. and Russian interests differ in the region, they are not incompatible. As such, Afghan narcotrafficking is an issue of mutual strategic concern for both Moscow and Washington.
II. Russia’s relations with other countries
Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:
“Putin Saved Assad, Will He Save Maduro?” Bill Bray, Miyako Yerick and James Gregg, The National Interest, 08.31.17: The authors, experts in geopolitical risk analysis, write that with $17 billion in loans to Venezuela over the last 10 years, Moscow has an interest in keeping Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in power. Additionally, Russia is looking at potentially acquiring 49.9% of Citgo, a move that has been deemed illegal by Venezuela’s opposition-led congress. If the acquisition did go through, it would seriously complicate Citgo’s operations in the U.S. Maduro’s ouster would also mean a loss of Russian geopolitical influence in the Americas. For Russia, supporting Maduro is “a geopolitical power play.” Looking ahead, the questions to ask are: In what ways is Russia willing to intervene to help keep Maduro in power? And if Russian involvement keeps Maduro in power, what does the Kremlin expect in return?
China:
- No significant commentary.
Ukraine:
“Russia Seeks to Close Ukraine’s Window to the West,” Jeffrey Mankoff and Jonathan Hillman, Financial Times, 09.06.17: The authors, the deputy director of the Russia and Eurasia Program and the director of the Reconnecting Asia Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, write that Russia is working hard to isolate Ukraine from the West. The recent completion of a railway bypassing Ukraine a year ahead of its scheduled completion highlights the importance of these isolating infrastructure projects. The new railway allows Russia to ship into Europe’s southeast without crossing Ukraine’s territory. Traffic along this route is expected to grow, and if Ukraine is cut off, it will miss out. The completion of the Turkish Stream and Nord Stream-2 pipelines will also mean a loss of transit fees for Ukraine, and could even pose the risk of Moscow cutting gas supplies to Ukraine in a crisis. As a result of Moscow’s actions, Kiev must strengthen its transit and trade connection to the West. The authors advise upgrading Ukraine’s large railway network, but note that any infrastructure updates will require investment, meaning “that Ukraine must get its own house in order.”
“Putin’s Peacekeepers: Beware of Russians Bearing Gifts. The West Should Engage With This Proposal but Skeptically and With Clear Conditions.” Fredrik Wesslau, European Council on Foreign Relations, 09.11.17: The author, Director of the Wider Europe Program at the European Council on Foreign Relations, writes that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent proposal for a U.N. peacekeeping force in eastern Ukraine is an attempt to spark momentum in peacemaking. The proposal, which could be a trap or could provide a means of de-escalating the conflict in Ukraine, is for nothing more than “a simple U.N. protection force—bodyguards with blue helmets” for the civilian monitoring mission in the Donbas. By proposing the plan before Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko could do so, Putin gets to both set the terms and be viewed as a peacemaker. Domestically, the move also helps Putin’s narrative ahead of the 2018 Russian presidential election. The author advises the West to ensure that the peacekeeping mission “promote de-escalation of the war and support Ukrainian sovereignty.” Russia’s behavior at the U.N. will provide greater insight as to Russia’s readiness to return to a frozen conflict; it is the West’s responsibility to create a mission that could help end the conflict in Ukraine.
Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:
- No significant commentary.
III. Russia’s domestic policies
Domestic politics, economy and energy:
“Russian Society Wants Change—But of What Nature?” Denis Volkov, Carnegie Moscow Center/Levada Center, 08.28.17: The author, a sociologist and expert at Moscow’s Levada Center, writes that while a majority of Russians say they want change in Russia, those changes are not necessarily of the sort “the democratic community likes to discuss.” In December 2016, only 35% of Russians believed that things should remain as they are. Questions posed in different ways showed that support for change could go as high as two-thirds of the population. However, “only the narrow elite and expert circles have ready formulas for change.” The majority have, at best, “murky, scattered” ideas about how to enact change. Those who support reform mainly want changes in the social sphere as opposed to the political sphere. The author notes that over 50% are ready to reelect Russian President Vladimir Putin, who enjoys an 80% approval rating. For most Russians, the primary issues of concern are economic ones. Those who want to act don’t know where to begin, leaving only three options: “fit in with the existing system; do what you have to do, and whatever will be will be; or emigrate.” This kind of public mood is not one for fostering the kind of innovation that sparks economic growth; rather, it is good for keeping to the status quo and “keeping society under control.”
Defense and aerospace:
- No significant commentary.
Security, law-enforcement and justice:
- No significant commentary.