I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:

• No significant commentary.

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant commentary.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

“How Congressional Republicans Are Trying to Undermine US-Russia Relations,” Kingston Reif and Tom Countryman, The Washington Post, 08.18.17: The authors, experts in arms control, write that building a new U.S. missile that is noncompliant with the INF Treaty, a move some Republicans are urging the Pentagon to make, “would be a gift to Putin.” Both the Senate and House have included provisions in their most recent defense authorizations bills to develop “a new road-mobile ground-launched cruise missile” with an INF-violating range. While the already approved House bill calls for a conventional missile, the Senate’s version, up for debate in September, authorizes a nuclear-capable missile. The authors argue that while research and development is technically allowed by the INF treaty, this move lays the groundwork for the U.S. to violate the treaty. Additionally, it would take attention away from Russia’s violation, and free Moscow to deploy numerous noncompliant missiles. A new missile has not been requested by the Pentagon, nor has any European country offered to host it. The move could also sow division among NATO countries, as the alliance does not support the creation of a new missile. The authors urge Washington to work with its European allies, preserve existing arms control treaties and ensure that any blame for the collapse of the INF Treaty lands squarely at Russia’s feet.

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant commentary.

Cyber security:

“In Ukraine, a Malware Expert Who Could Blow the Whistle on Russian Hacking,” Andrew E. Kramer, Andrew Higgins, New York Times, 08.16.17: The authors, New York Times reporters based in Moscow, write that many keys to Russia’s government hacking operations lie in Ukraine. One hacker, a man known only as “Profexer,” turned himself in early this year according to the Ukrainian police after U.S. intelligence “publicly identified a program he had written as one tool used in the hacking of the Democratic National Committee.” Profexer has now become a witness for the FBI, making him the first known living witness in the investigation into the DNC hacking. The idea that Moscow may have obtained malware for its cyberattack on the U.S. in Ukraine points not to Kremlin employees writing code and orchestrating attacks during business hours, but to “a far looser enterprise that draws on talent and hacking tools wherever they can be found.” Additionally, the Russian government hacking groups known as Advanced Persistent Threat 28 (APT 28) or Fancy Bear and its twin Cozy Bear appear to be largely centers “for organization and financing,” outsourcing most coding work and the like to “private and often crime-tainted vendors.” Ukraine also appears to be a testing ground for certain kinds of hacks, like the use of malware to take down infrastructure.

Elections interference:

“Russia’s Election Meddling Backfired—Big-Time,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 08.17.17: The author, a veteran foreign correspondent-turned-columnist, writes that Russia’s election meddling “has brought a string of adverse unintended consequences for Moscow.” With Europe on alert, the U.S. angry and quagmires in Ukraine and Syria, Russia’s geopolitical ambitions appear to be more out of reach than they were this time last year. Moscow’s active measures initiated global moves away from the Kremlin’s goals. One of the Kremlin’s few achievements is that Putin’s popularity with U.S. Republicans has increased. The author argues that Putin “overreached,” fueled by “dislike of Clinton and enthusiasm for Trump,” and failed to keep covert action covert.

“Getting America and Russia Back to Normal,” Robert Legvold, The National Interest, September-October 2017: The author, a professor emeritus of political science at Columbia University, writes that as the world’s greatest nuclear powers, Russia and the U.S. must stabilize their relationship. However, there are three problems in the way that have “merged into a massive tangle” neither side knows how to undo: Congress will not allow for reconciliation; Moscow appears unprepared to do its part; and Russia’s meddling in the 2016 election and the likelihood of future meddling. While it may be dramatic to call Russia “the greatest threat to American democracy,” that is nonetheless how Russia is perceived by much of Congress, senior American intelligence officials and the media. The newly passed sanctions will punish Russia for its actions, but they are unlikely to change Moscow’s behavior, as evidenced by the various other actions Russia has been sanctioned for. The author argues that “Russia’s capacity and readiness to interfere in U.S. elections to a degree once unimaginable obviously constitute a critical new factor in the relationship and, unless addressed, will keep U.S.-Russian relations at a dead end far into the future.” The prospect of a future Russian cyberattack leading to escalation should “underscore the urgency of the two sides sitting down and working out red lines and how they are to be enforced.” The author advises that the two sides follow the criteria for negotiating all key security issues, and suggests the U.S. objective be “to preclude the use of cyber resources to harm the U.S. voting system.” Both sides can either recognize the severity of the problem of Russian election interference and take the first steps towards conflict resolution, “or change nothing, each carrying on as now and all eventually paying the price.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“America and Russia: Same Old, Same Old,” Angela Stent, The National Interest, September-October 2017: The author, director of the Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies at Georgetown University, writes that while every incoming U.S. president for the last twenty-five years has believed he can improve relations with Russia, the problems in the U.S.-Russia go deeper than interpersonal relationships between leaders. “Washington and Moscow have very different ideas about what a productive relationship would look like.” Putin’s goal is for the U.S. to “treat Russia as though it were the Soviet Union,” a fully sovereign great power on par with the U.S. and part of “a new tripartite Yalta system” with the U.S. and China. Russia and the U.S. do share some, if not many, common interests. Both bear the responsibility of being a nuclear superpower and both agree that terrorism is a shared threat. However, with little economic involvement in Russia, the U.S. has “fewer stakeholders” to advocate for better relations. Ukraine is another roadblock. The author argues that the two countries can work together in Syria, on the situation in North Korea and can begin a conversation on rules for the cyber sphere. At best, the two countries can hope for a limited partnership.

“America and Russia: Back to Basics,” Graham Allison, The National Interest, September-October 2017: The author, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard Kennedy School and former director of Harvard's Belfer Center, writes that Trump’s best bet for improving the U.S.-Russia relationship is to return to “Cold War fundamentals.” Both sides share an interest in avoiding nuclear war. In the case of miscalculation leading to nuclear war, “America would lose.” If reckless behavior from Moscow caused a nuclear war, “moralists might seek consolation in blaming them,” but Washington would still lose. Russia is America’s “insufferable but inescapable Siamese twin” thanks to technology. While the blame for the recent deterioration in relations mostly falls on Putin, “the bottom line for Americans is whether they are safer now than eight years ago.” The author asks if Washington’s actions and reactions to Moscow in recent years have made the relationship between the two better or worse.

“America and Russia: Time to Come Clean,” Dov S. Zakheim, The National Interest, September-October 2017: The author, a former Under Secretary of Defense, writes that while the U.S. and Russia are clashing over a variety of issues, they also share numerous common interests, from combating terrorism to nonproliferation. The first step towards cooperation in these areas of shared interest, the author advises, is for U.S. President Donald Trump to condemn Russia’s 2016 election interference and for Russian President Vladimir Putin to acknowledge the interference and promise to not repeat it, even if it is an empty promise. Clarity regarding Washington’s goals in Syria would allow the U.S. to work together there with Moscow. If Washington steps back from pushing for regime change in Syria, then Moscow must pressure Iran into withdrawing its militias from Syria. While there are fewer opportunities for cooperation in Ukraine, the U.S. could trade a promise to veto Ukraine’s membership in NATO for Russian withdrawal of troops from eastern Ukraine and the caseation of support to separatists. Washington should also be clear that Russia’s violations of the INF Treaty will be met with continued build-up of U.S. forces in Europe.

“The Path to US-Russia Cooperation,” Zalmay Khalilzad, The National Interest, September-October 2017: The author, a counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, writes that there is still hope for a better U.S.-Russia relationship. This “cautious optimism” rests on three assumptions: U.S. President Donald Trump’s continues to want to engage with Russia; Putin begins to provide clarity on what he wants from the U.S. to begin cooperation; and that the Trump administration can formulate a functioning Russia strategy. This strategy would need to have the following themes: “investigate and deter”; “establish a regional balance of power and compete”; and “negotiate and cooperate.”

“Stop Poking the Russian Bear,” Robert W. Merry, National Interest, September-October 2017: The author, editor of the American Conservative, writes that U.S. President Donald Trump’s Russia initiative appears to be dead. Trump “looks hapless” on the Russia issue, with new sanctions on Russia being imposed regardless of his desires. The West’s involvement in Ukraine looks likely to continue, as will NATO expansion. The author argues that it is hard to see where these actions will lead, “short of actual hostilities.”

“Is a US-Russia Reset Possible?” Eric Edelman, The National Interest,  September-October 2017: The author, a counselor at CSBA and the Hertog distinguished practitioner in residence at SAIS, writes that past attempts at a U.S.-Russia reset failed due to the failure of reform in Russia in the 1990s. Instead of becoming part of the liberal international order, “Russia became a revisionist state whose fundamental orientation limited the scope for successful engagement with Moscow.” This, argues the author, is why U.S. President Donald Trump’s reset attempt will likely fail—a good thing, as acquiescing to Moscow’s present demands would be a sacrifice of U.S. interests. Even before Russia’s election meddling, resolving the issues in Ukraine and Syria would have been a difficult task. “For a president whose son apparently sought damaging kompromat on his opponent during the election campaign, it is simply beyond reach.”

“Why Some US Ex-Spies Don’t Buy the Russia Story,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 08.10.17: The author, a columnist for the paper, writes that the Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS) has found that an insider, not a hacker of any nationality, was responsible for taking at least some of the Democratic National Committee files leaked last year. In 2003, the group, which includes former National Security Agency staffers with a good deal of technical expertise, protested “the way intelligence was bent to accuse Iraq of producing weapons of mass destruction.” Today, however, its findings are being shunned by mainstream publications, and instead only aired by outlets easily accused of being distributors of Russian disinformation. VIPS has suggested that following Julian Assange’s announcement that he would release the Hillary Clinton-related emails, “the DNC rushed to fabricate evidence that it had been hacked by Russia to defuse any potential WikiLeaks disclosures.” Guccifer 2.0, later linked to Russia, was used by the DNC to release mostly harmless data. This theory is based on the forensic findings of independent researchers. One found that the speed at which Guccifer’s files were copied is nearly impossible over the internet, but entirely possible if one were just copying to a thumb drive. However, another former intelligence professional who examined the evidence “pointed out that these findings don't necessarily refute that Guccifer's material constitute the spoils of a hack.” The author argues that by fully buying in to the idea that Donald Trump’s victory was a Russian operation “may be an Iraq-sized mistake, leading to a dangerous failure to recognize that Donald Trump's victory was an American phenomenon.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Looking Out Five Years: Who Will Decide Russian Foreign Policy?” Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 08.17.17: The author, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes that Russia’s foreign policy, security and defense issues are decided by Russian President Vladimir Putin, who is assisted by a group of senior aides, the Security Council of the Russian Federation (SCRF). These aides are neither colleagues nor peers. Since 2014, the role of the security community has increased dramatically. The worldview it presents is one of “never-ending struggle for dominance and influence among a few powerful countries,” and its antipathy for the U.S. is deeply ingrained. The defense community’s influence has increased along with the tensions between the U.S. and Russia. The high approval rating for proactive foreign policy has benefited the industrial, security and defense communities. Russian patriotism also unites almost the entire political elite. The business community, on the other hand, is quieter and concerned with the “economic disruption” caused by international disputes. “Ordinary Russian people, despite their many grievances against the authorities, have shown no inclination to move against the existing order.” This status-quo will likely continue until the end of the 2020s. “The present regime will not necessarily be succeeded by a more liberal, Western-friendly one; and, indeed, the odds are stacked against that outcome.”

China:

“China vs. America: Managing the Next Clash of Civilizations,” Graham Allison, Foreign Affairs, 08.15.17: The author, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard Kennedy School and former director of Harvard's Belfer Center, writes that the shift between an established power, like the U.S., and a rising power, such as China, is caused by Thucydides’ trap. The risks of conflict between the U.S. and China are further exacerbated by “civilizational incompatibility” between the two. This is further aggravated by each country’s “extreme superiority complex,” and their philosophical differences can be seen in the government of each country. One example is the Chinese’s “expansive sense of time,” stemming from a history spanning five thousand years. The biggest hurdle comes from clashing senses of world order. While the U.S. seeks an international rule of law, China’s “treatment of its own citizens provides the script for its relations with weaker neighbors abroad.” The author notes that America last encountered “high Thucydidean risks” during the Cold War. Then, U.S., Soviet and Chinese leaders learned that their counterparts could compromise when it served their interests. “The better the Trump administration understands how Beijing sees China’s role in the world and the country’s core interests, the better prepared it will be to negotiate.”

Ukraine:

“Kremlin Envoy Played Central Role in Eastern Ukraine; Vladislav Surkov Has Encouraged and Managed Pro-Russia Separatists, According to Former Rebel Leaders and Western and Ukrainian Officials,” James Marson, Wall Street Journal, 08.20.17: The author, the Wall Street Journal’s Deputy Bureau Chief in Moscow, writes that Vladislav Surkov, a top aide to Russian President Vladimir Putin, has played a major role in providing Kremlin support to the separatists in Ukraine’s east. Surkov has been involved with the separatists since early 2014 and has been described as the “babysitter” of the movement. While Russia presents the conflict as a civil war, many believe that “Moscow really wants to trade peace in Ukraine for assurances Kiev won't get too close to the West” and for the easing of sanctions for Russia’s actions in Ukraine. As long as Moscow does not have what it wants, it keeps the low-intensity conflict in Ukraine’s east going, which “keeps Kiev’s pro-Western government off balance.” Now, Washington is considering sending antitank missiles and others arms to Ukraine, an action Moscow has condemned. In March 2014, small protests in Ukraine’s east began out of fear that Ukraine’s new government was seeking to destroy Russian culture in Ukraine. Surkov began to reach out to the local organizers and in May 2014, advisers from Moscow arrived to work with the insurgents, which “some locals perceived … as a takeover by the Kremlin, coordinated by Mr. Surkov.” Surkov’s role then became more decisive, “molding the leadership and structure to bring it under Moscow’s control.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant commentary.

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Many Russians Aren’t Protesting Against Putin — They Want His Help,” by Alfred B. Evans, Jr., The Washington Post, 08.21.17: The author, a professor emeritus of political science, writes that media has created the impression of protests in Russia calling for democracy and the transformation of the Kremlin. In reality, most protests are about “the defense of the ownership and use of small-scale private property.” From farmers protesting land grabbing to truckers protesting a new road tax, the protestors in the streets of Moscow are not so often calling for Putin’s removal as they are for his help in solving their problems.

“Is Chechnya Taking Over Russia? “ Ekaterina Sokirianskaia,  New York Times, 08.17.17: The author, a former North Caucasus project director for the International Crisis Group, writes that Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov is amassing growing popularity. Treated as royalty by this inner circle, Kadyrov’s “macho nationalism,” conservative ideology and the significance he places on traditional values vividly reflect Russian President Vladimir Putin’s third term in office. However, there are tensions between the two. Where Kadyrov is ambitious and young, Putin is “experienced but fatigued.” While conflict over Chechnya is possible, the highly personalized bond between Putin and Kadyrov will likely only strengthen in the face of civil unrest in Russia.

Defense and aerospace:

“Russia in the Global Arms Market. Stagnation in a Changing Market Landscape,” Sergey Denisentsev, CSIS, 08.18.17: The author, a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, writes that after the U.S., Russia is the second-largest arms supplier in the world. These arms exports are a vital part of Russia’s economy, made even more so if one removes energy exports. However, Russia’s rapid arms export growth has now turned to stagnation. Looking ahead, factors to keep an eye on include: the completion of next-generation arms; the price of oil; expansion into new areas of the arms market; new kinds of cooperation and joint weapons development programs with allies; and “Russia's defense industry losing self-sufficiency.”

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.