I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:

“How the KGB Started a War,” Ronen Bergman, New York Times, 06.08.17: The author, a senior correspondent for military and intelligence affairs at Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth, writes that the Soviet Union’s 1967 attempt to reshape the balance of power in the Middle East sheds light on “the mind-set of the people who grew up in the KGB and run Russia today.” In 1967, an Israeli patriot codenamed Orange had been acting as a double agent between Israel and the Soviet Union, feeding the Soviets fake information and harmless information. When the Soviets noticed war preparations in Israel in June 1967, Israel’s domestic intelligence agency, the Shin Bet, decided to have their double agents feed accurate information to the KGB in an attempt to prevent war. However, the KGB's previous actions “had already put Israel and its neighbors on a path to war.” On May 13, 1967, the Kremlin had told the visiting deputy president of Egypt that Israel was preparing to attack Syria, and Moscow expected Egypt to defend Syria. In reality, none of the Middle Eastern countries involved wanted war. This modus operandi, called Active Measures by the KGB, “aimed at exerting useful influence on aspects of interest in the political life of a target country, including its foreign policy; misleading the adversary; undermining and weakening the adversary's positions.” Through the dissemination of false information, Moscow had hoped to increase Egyptian and Syrian dependence on the Soviet Union and further involve Egypt in Middle Eastern affairs. As a result of the false information, Egypt moved its army and closed off Israeli access to the Red Sea. The Soviet Union believed Israel would not strike, and that the U.S. would dissuade Israel from any such notions. However, the U.S. Secretary of Defense had given the head of the Mossad “a flashing green light” for a pre-emptive attack, and a series of Israeli victories followed. As a result, the balance of power in the Middle East did shift—but not in the way the Soviet Union had desired. “Israel had become the regional power and a more significant ally for the United States; Syria and Egypt were humiliated. American arms had won a knockout over the Soviets' weaponry and military doctrines.” Today, Russia appears to be playing from the same handbook, where Active Measures is a “legitimate means of closing the gap between Russia and the West, and increasing Moscow's influence across the globe—including in the Middle East. The difference between June 1967 and today is that now they seem to be doing pretty well.”

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant commentary.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

•  No significant commentary.

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant commentary.

Cyber security:

• No significant commentary.

Russia’s alleged interference in U.S. elections:

“Putin’s Campaign of Personal Revenge Against the United States,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 06.06.17: The author, a foreign-affairs columnist for the paper, writes about “the murky world of Russian intelligence.” According to investigative journalist Andrei Soldatov, “tactical moves,” not broad strategy, are behind Russia’s big events. These tactical moves also reflect Russian President Vladimir Putin’s interests, such as his personal dislike of Hillary Clinton. Following the release of the Panama Papers, the Russian intelligence operation kicked into high gear. Soldatov “speculates that the Russian leader ‘wanted to do something about it, to teach a lesson.’” The author notes that for ex-KGB officer Putin, “nothing in the information arena is accidental,” citing Putin’s recent interview with NBC’s Megyn Kelly. Rather than use Russian security or intelligence channels to conduct cyberattacks, Russian intelligence “taps a network of private hackers.” The author notes that Russians see all information as potential disinformation and find claims of indepedence by American media "as bogus.” The author argues that Russia is not “a demonic, all-powerful presence,” but rather “a sophisticated, increasingly modern country.” However, Putin’s background as a former intelligence officer provides him with “a very particular lens” through which to view the world.

“Jared Kushner’s Not-So-Secret Channel to Putin,” Evelyn Farkas, New York Times, 06.08.17: The author, a former a deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia, writes that talking to the head of a Russian bank or oil company is “effectively talking to the Kremlin.” Unlike in “developed capitalist democracies,” Russian energy, financial and media companies are mostly state-owned. The author argues that this is important when looking at the case of Jared Kushner. Due to the close ties big Russian banks have to the Kremlin, Kushner’s December meeting with Sergei Gorkov, head of Vnesheconom bank, or VEB, is “worthy of deeper scrutiny.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Russia and China Are Bulking Up in the US’s Backyard. Putin and Xi Are Working to Win Over Small, Poor Countries With Promises of Aid, Military Support and Investment, Even As Trump Scales Back,” Ezra Fieser, Bloomberg, 06.05.17: The author, a Bloomberg correspondent based in the Caribbean, writes that Russia is beginning its return to the Caribbean basin. In May, Cuba received a shipment of oil from Russia that would “keep the communist island running for three months.” Other signs of return include the expansion of economic ties, giving out aid in the Caribbean and across Central America, the construction of a satellite-tracking station and even the possibility of reopened Soviet-era military bases. China has also been busy in the region, having “poured $6 billion into the area since 2012.” China has also been attempting to cut ties between Taiwan and the countries of the Caribbean basin. While the U.S. has been the dominant economic force in the area and the largest source of foreign investment, Trump’s proposed budget cuts aid to the region by nearly 40%. Meanwhile, Russia has begun supplying aid and China has been investing in key infrastructure projects.

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Taking a New Look at Nuclear Peace,” Sergey Karaganov, Russia in Global Affairs, 06.06.17: The author, Dean of the School of World Economics and International Relations at the National Research University–Higher School of Economics, writes that the use of nuclear weapons is “unspeakable evil.” However, “their existence saved the world during the Cold War and is saving it now” in the midst of rapid geopolitical and continued technological change. The author argues that as a result of this, the world is now living in “a prewar atmosphere” and will continue to do so for some time. While nuclear deterrence may be a solution to this state, it needs to be enhanced through strengthened international strategic stability. The author offers his own definition and breakdown of nuclear deterrence. Strategic deterrence (deterrence I) is convincing a potential enemy of the inevitability of “unacceptable damage” if it were to launch a nuclear strike. Extended deterrence (deterrence II) guarantees a “nuclear umbrella” to one’s allies, “pledging to strike back at the ‘aggressor’” if the allies lose a conventional war. Russia, too, subscribes to the belief that nuclear weapons may be used if allies are attacked. Deterrence III is a country’s readiness “to use nuclear weapons if its territory is attacked by general purpose forces alone but their attack threatens … ‘the very existence of the state.’” Deterrence IV is the belief of military strategists and societies that armed conflict involving nuclear powers is unacceptable. Deterrence V is the curbing of the conventional arms race, while deterrence VI “leads to democratization of international relations.” Deterrence VII is the civilizing effect, which goes along with deterrence VIII, self-deterrence. Conceptually, as a new international order develops, deterrence would need to be preserved and maintained, and all nuclear powers “should start a dialogue on how to strengthen international strategic stability.” The author argues that this move should be led by the U.S., China and Russia as a “new Concert of Nations” more stable than the old and based on not just “moral principles and the balance of power, but also mutual nuclear deterrence.”

“Macron’s Grand Gesture Toward Russia Might Just Pay Off,” Tatyana Stanovaya, Carnegie Moscow Center, 06.06.17: The author, director of the analytical department of the Center of Political Technologies in Moscow, writes that French President Emmanuel Macron’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Versailles on May 29, 2017 was “supremely tense and incredibly productive.” Macron managed to both chastise Russian disinformation and move forward in bilateral relations with Russia. The author argues that through this “frank criticism,” Macron used Moscow as a way to demonstrate his new foreign policy approach. For Russia, this was a moment to show the West that it “can and should conduct dialogue with Russia.” Russia would like to renew the kind of mutually beneficial relationship it had with France under former president Jacques Chirac (1995-2007). Today, Putin wants greater pressure from Paris on Kiev to implement the Minsk agreements and to see France join the Russia-headed anti-ISIS coalition “as a junior partner.” Additionally, “Paris has reportedly invited Moscow to set up a working group and take practical measures to establish cooperation in the fight against terrorism.” This would help France become Moscow’s key Western partner. Macron has also suggested a resumption of the “Normandy format” talks on Ukraine. Gains for Russia include an end to France’s policy of containment and “Macron’s public decision not to moralize on the most sensitive subject for Russia, human rights.” While it may appear fragile, the groundwork for Franco-Russian cooperation has been laid.

China:

• No significant commentary. 

Ukraine:

• No significant commentary.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant commentary.

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“When Propaganda Backfires: Why Russia’s Politicization Is Unavoidable,” Andrey Arkhangelskiy, Moscow Carnegie Center, 06.08.17: The author, a journalist with the Kommersant newspaper, writes that Russian authorities have themselves sparked the politicization of society by encouraging the Russian public “to have an opinion on international politics” in 2014. While the tactical outcomes of Russia’s annexation of Crimea were predictable, the strategic results were not. The author argues that the events of 2014 normalized politics in the mass consciousness, meaning that the same people who cheered the annexation of Crimea are now the ones at mass anti-corruption rallies. The same propaganda that supported Russian action in Ukraine stirred Russia’s political instincts. For example, the detail needed to vilify the Ukrainian, French and American political systems showed ordinary Russians “the complexity of an authentic political system.” Propaganda is also designed to inform people that they are not witnesses, but rather creators of history, making “ordinary people feel that they are players on the geopolitical stage.” The Kremlin, however, did not anticipate that urging Russians to be active in international politics would spark interest in domestic politics. As a result, “totality is no longer the norm.” “There is a discrepancy between today’s real practices—the authoritarian modus operandi—and the formally democratic society established by the Constitution. This gap is the real source of politics in modern Russia.” The author argues that politicization in Russia has become unavoidable and will define Russia’s near future.

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.