I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

“Have We Forgotten the Cold War? Nuclear Threat More Real Than Ever,” William J. Perry, The Hill, 04.25.17: The author, a former U.S. Secretary of Defense, writes that the danger of the Cold War, that nuclear catastrophe could destroy civilization at any moment, appears to have been forgotten. Relations between Russia and the U.S. are as tense as during the Cold War, and both countries are once again building up their nuclear arsenals. The author believes that previously “we avoided that catastrophe as much by good luck as by good management,” but today’s hostilities are once again putting us at risk of miscalculation. Another, higher risk is that of accidental nuclear war resulting from a false alarm experienced by the U.S. missile attack warning system. In addition, we also face the risk of “a nuclear attack by a terror group.” Enough fissile material to fill a shoebox would give a terrorist group the capability to improvise a nuclear device with “the power of the Hiroshima bomb.” The “danger of a regional nuclear war” is also growing. “Our policies are totally inadequate for dealing with these existential dangers. It should be the highest priority for this administration to develop policies that recognize this new reality, and then to devise new, robust programs that can mitigate them.”

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:

• No significant commentary.

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant commentary.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

• No significant commentary.

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

“Mattis and Trump: The Odd Couple That Works,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 04.25.17: The author, a foreign-affairs columnist for the paper, writes that U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis is “unflappable” where U.S. President Donald Trump is “mercurial and inexperienced.” Mattis, who believes in the need for “a strong State Department voice,” is closely linked to U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. The author points to the April 2017 U.S. missile strikes on a Syrian airfield as an example of the national security process working well, and notes as an example of diplomatic and military interplay the strategy for taking Raqqa, the Islamic State’s self-proclaimed capital in Syria. As attacks on previously forbidden targets such as children, churches and hospitals continue, Mattis notes that the perpetrators must be held accountable. “But how? A hidden drama of these first 100 days has been the interaction between the foreign policy team and a White House that’s just beginning to think about how to use U.S. power in a dangerous world.”

Cyber security:

• No significant commentary.

Russia’s alleged interference in U.S. elections:

“Keep Your Eyes on Russia,” The Boston Globe, 04.29.17: This editorial notes that “there’s too much smoke to ignore the possibility of fire” regarding U.S. President Donald Trump’s possible knowledge of Russian meddling in the U.S. election. While Russia may have exploited U.S. vulnerability to misinformation and manipulation, “American created it.” Paranoia has become the norm for American politics as facts are continually attacked. Crimes committed during the 2016 campaign “must be punished,” regardless of how far up the chain of command they go.

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“The Fragmentation of the Global Economy and US-Russia Relations,” Rawi Abdelal & Igor Makarov, Working Group On The Future Of U.S.-Russia Relations, April 2017: The authors, Rawi Abdelal of Harvard Business School and Igor Makarov of Moscow’s Higher School of Economics, write that the global economy’s deceleration is likely to strain the current system of global governance. Divisions grow more obvious: income inequality within nations continues to grow starker, as does the divide between countries “with relatively low household savings rates, high rates of household consumption and large current-account deficits … and those nations with high savings rates, modest domestic consumption and current-account surpluses.” BRICS countries' economies are also likely in long-term deceleration, and “regionalization of value chains” across Europe and North America is more likely. Unlike the regionalization following World War I, however, the modern world remains interconnected by information. The end of the second era of globalization also coincides with an American step back from global leadership, seen in the Trump administration’s promise of “America First.” Russia’s skepticism regarding globalization should not be surprising, as the country’s participation in the world economy has been largely one-sided. The differing responses Russia and the U.S. have had to “a deglobalizing world” leave limited options for cooperation, and sanctions could prove to be a lasting irritant to the relationship. 

“Who Really Influences Policy in Moscow?” Nikolas K. Gvosdev, The National Interest, 04.24.17: The author, a professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, writes that a Russian think tank, the Institute of Strategic Studies, reportedly created two memos providing strategies “for how Moscow might influence” the 2016 U.S. election to benefit Russian national interests. The author notes “two cleavages” in the U.S. community of Russia experts asked for analysis on these documents: does the think tank have influence in the Kremlin and, more importantly, does Russia have the right to influence U.S. elections? He notes that Russia’s meddling in the U.S. election should have begun a conversation regarding “the vitality and resilience of American institutions” that has yet to materialize. Even if U.S. President Donald Trump still desires improved relations with Moscow, “he faces tremendous resistance.” Barring a major crisis, the author does not see any circumstance that could lead to improving relations.

“Russia and America Don’t Need Each Other as Enemies,” Paul Saunders, Russia Matters, 04.27.17: The author, director of the Center for the National Interest, writes that influential groups in both the U.S. and Russia believe “the other nation needs their own country as an enemy to justify its (the other nation’s) conduct” and that this belief is both dangerous and mistaken. The danger, he argues, is that if Moscow “needs” Washington in the role of enemy, “or vice versa, then governments and officials are relieved of any responsibility for past decisions that may have alienated the other party,” as well as current and future decisions. Instead of wrangling with the hard choices and “unsatisfying compromises” of policy-making, they can hew to an oversimplified sense of inevitability “that … hard-wires confrontation into the U.S.-Russia relationship without requiring a debate” about whether or not the two countries should consider each other enemies and what this choice could cost them. He goes on to explain some of the differences in political systems that propagate the misconceptions and offers a few counterweights to the arguments of those who say the other side needs theirs as an enemy.

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“In His Own Words: Vladimir Putin’s Foreign Policy Analyzed,” Stephen Benedict Dyson and Matthew J. Parent, War on the Rocks, 04.26.17: The authors, an associate professor of political science and a PhD candidate in political science, write that Russian President Vladimir Putin has presented a puzzle for U.S. leaders since he has been in power. The authors took “a big data approach” to understanding Putin by analyzing every word he “has ever said” on major foreign policy issues, via operational code analysis. Their results showed that Putin is “a fairly mainstream world leader” on most foreign policy issues. By comparing Putin’s rhetoric with that of great power leaders like Barack Obama and Xi Jinping alongside that of “leaders of rogue states”—Saddam Hussein, Bashar al-Assad—Putin sounds like the leaders of great powers, excepting “his obsession with control.” Possibly shaped by Putin’s personal experience seeing the fall of the Soviet Union, he speaks “about his own and Russia’s control over events to an extent rarely seen.” The authors posit that avoiding a “paralysis of Russian power,” like that in the final years of the Soviet Union, “is the central motivation of Putin’s international strategy.” Putin is, according to the authors, not so much a chess player as “a shameless opportunist.” In addition, his hostile rhetoric regarding NATO is a fairly recent change. The authors note the following policy implications: Putin has acted mostly “as the rational leader of great power” and that his foreign policy approach varies widely depending on the issue, lending credence to the idea of cooperating with Putin where possible. They also note that due to the importance of control, “disintegration of order and threats to his own power are red-lines for Putin.”

“Finland Seeks Continued US-Russian Cooperation in the Arctic,” Kenneth Yalowitz and Stacy Closson, The National Interest, 04.26.17: The authors, a retired U.S. Ambassador and a visiting fellow at Helsinki’s Aleksanteri Institute, write that the Arctic remains one of the few areas where cooperation with Russia is still viewed as possible. Finland assumes chairmanship of the Arctic Council, and its views of Russia are different from that of the U.S. Historically, Finland has faced two military conflicts with the Soviet Union and shares “an 830-mile land border with Russia.” The Nordic country manages to maintain both a positive relationship with Russia and an EU membership. Finland and Russia are also strongly connected via economics, and participate in many “multinational organizations at the state and substate level” due to their geography. However, Finland is also pragmatic, supporting EU policies on Russia like sanctions and “NATO activates in the Baltic Sea region.” The shift from U.S. to Finnish Arctic policy “should be smooth and consistent.” Keeping tensions out of the Arctic is vital, as cooperation in the Arctic is “exceptional in these times.”

China:

“A China-Russia Alliance?” Lyle J. Goldstein, The National Interest, 04.25.17: The author, an associate professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College, writes that the possibility of a China-Russia alliance against the U.S. in armed conflict is “dark, yet still rarely discussed.” While neither China nor Russia could handle a “high-intensity, long-duration war” against the U.S., together they could present a challenge. The author discusses a 2017 article in Chinese Foreign Policy, “Make an Alliance with China? Russian National Interests and the Likelihood of a China-Russia Alliance.” While the article notes that such a strategy could be transformative, it mostly argues that an alliance is not necessary. The move could be seen as an aggressive, not defensive, step, and both China and Russia benefit greatly from cooperation with the U.S. and Europe. Maintaining high levels of cooperation between Russia and China is important, but the article also notes that U.S. pressure has “not yet” become so great as to necessitate an alliance.

Ukraine:

• No significant commentary.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant commentary.

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Russia Can’t Tell the Difference Between Jehovah’s Witnesses and al-Qaeda,” The Washington Post, 04.28.17: This editorial highlights the discord between the Russian Federation Constitution’s promise of freedom of religion to all and the recent ruling by Russia’s supreme court that Jehovah’s Witnesses are an extremist group. The Christian denomination, which rejects violence, has 170,000 members in 395 branches, and has been added to the same list as al-Qaida and the Islamic State. The editorial notes that the Witnesses’ belief in God “as the only true leader … may be one reason they are in the Kremlin’s sights.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.