Russia Analytical Report, March 6-13, 2017
I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda
Nuclear security:
“US-Russian Space Cooperation: A Model for Nuclear Security,” Simon Saradzhyan and William Tobey, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 03.07.17: The authors, the respective directors of the Belfer Center’s Russia Matters Project and the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, write that the U.S. and Russia should look to their space programs for a model on which to base nuclear security cooperation, an issue that poses a global threat. The authors advise four steps for reestablishing U.S.-Russian cooperation in preventing nuclear terrorism: set mutually agreed goals, agree to pursue those goals in a partnership of equals, designate agencies and leaders responsible for advancing this partnership and ensure that cooperation in this area yields tangible benefits. While the U.S. and Russia have many differences in national security matters, nuclear security is an area in which cooperation is possible and necessary.
Iran and its nuclear program:
- No significant commentary.
New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:
“The Plot Against Europe: The West’s Nightmare Scenario Starts With Donald Trump’s Election—and Ends With Russian Tanks Rolling Into Estonia While NATO Looks the Other Way,” James Kirchick, Foreign Policy, 03.06.17: The author, a fellow with the Foreign Policy Initiative, imagines a day in the not-too-distant future, May 9, 2022, in which the Europe of the early 21st century is a hazy memory. In this future, Russia has occupied Estonia in a manner not unlike its 2014 occupation of Crimea, this new move facilitated by U.S. President Donald Trump’s removal of U.S. troops from the Baltic States. Ring-wing populist parties are gaining ground or even running governments across the continent, helped along by an $11 million loan given in 2015 from a Russian bank to France’s National Front party, and the EU is well on its way towards disbanding. The U.K. has withdrawn from NATO and secession, sparked by Scotland’s independence campaign, is also catching across Europe. Saakashvili is elected president of Ukraine, and an emboldened Russia launches a new offensive on the country. As the EU breaks apart, more countries begin joining “the other ‘EU,’” the Eurasian Economic Union, and advocating for a European Security Treaty Organization to replace NATO, now popularly viewed as obsolete.
NATO-Russia relations:
- No significant commentary.
Missile defense:
- No significant commentary.
Nuclear arms control:
“Russia's Missile Gamble: Is the INF Treaty Dead?” William McHenry, The National Interest, 03.09.17: The author, a researcher at the Center for a New American Security, details the reasons why Moscow is disregarding the INF Treaty. These include the threat posed to eastern Russia by Chinese missile battalions as well as Russia’s military doctrine, which sees cruise missiles as vital to modern warfare. Russia’s goal of creating discord within NATO can also be facilitated by deploying these new cruise missiles, as Germany will likely oppose “a more robust nuclear posture in central Europe.” For Russia, the benefits of violating the INF Treaty outweigh the risks, so Moscow’s reasons for doing so need to be taken into account as the U.S. creates policy to address the matter.
Counter-terrorism:
- No significant commentary.
Conflict in Syria:
“Assad Is a Long Way From Victory in Syrian Conflict: Russia and Iran Have a Costly Dilemma on Their Hands in Syria,” David Gardner, Financial Times, 03.08.17: The author, a columnist for Financial Times, writes that rebuilding Syria will come with a hefty price tag. Russian President Vladimir Putin has “brazenly” told Europe to finance Syria’s reconstruction, this confidence inspired by the unlikelihood that the Trump administration in the U.S. seeks to oust Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. However, the problem facing Russia and Iran, Assad’s major allies, is substantial. The Assad government does not have the manpower necessary to control the territory it holds, let alone reconquer the country’s eastern portion, which is necessary to the regime’s economic survival. Retaking Syria in its entirety would come at a cost for Russia and Iran, both of whom are facing economic issues of their own. Before international financial assistance can come into play, Syria needs “basic stability and agreement on power-sharing.”
“US-Russia Competition in the Middle East Is Back,” Ilan Goldenberg, Julie Smith, Foreign Policy, 03.07.17: The authors, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and the director of its strategy and statecraft program, write that Russia is attempting to reestablish itself as a major power and influence in the Middle East. As such, Washington needs to focus on three things: monitoring Russia’s moves across the Middle East, not just in Syria; cooperating with Russia where interests align in order to share the burden of stabilizing the region; making sure the U.S. is prepared and quipped to address challenges created by Moscow’s attempts to “balance against U.S. interests.” While Russia is unlikely to annex territory in the region, it does have the ability to undermine U.S. interests in the Middle East.
Cyber security:
“Russia Fills Dossiers From Hacker's Trove,” Joseph Goldstein, Michael Schwirtz, New York Times, 03.12.17: The authors, both journalists, write that Evgeniy M. Bogachev, a Russian hacker, is the FBI’s most wanted cybercriminal. Bogachev is “accused of creating a sprawling network of virus-infected computers … targeting anyone with enough money worth stealing.” One of the six people the Obama administration imposed sanctions on in December 2016, Bogachev is “more than just a criminal” for Russia. It appears that Bogachev’s cybercriminal enterprise served as a vehicle for a Russian intelligence operation, allowing the Kremlin access to confidential information just as it allowed Bogachev access to bank accounts. Russian authorities seem to have been especially interested in intelligence regarding the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, and even attempted to acquire top secret information off of computers in the U.S. While the Russian government has its own tools for cyber work, “the piggybacking on Mr. Bogachev's activities offers some clues to the breadth and creativity of Russia's espionage efforts” as the U.S. and Europe try to protect themselves against increasingly sophisticated cyberattacks. Russian intelligence agents also appear to have infiltrated the “dark web” instead of shutting down these kinds of sites in order to access the information there. While there have been attempts to establish cooperation between the FBI and Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) to stop cybercriminals, the help from Moscow “rarely seemed to materialize. After a while, agents began to worry that the Russian authorities were recruiting the very suspects that the FBI was pursuing.”
Russia’s alleged interference in U.S. elections:
“Damage Done: How Russia Hysteria Has Hurt US-Russia Relations,” Nikolas K. Gvosdev, The National Interest, 03.06.17: The author, a professor of national security studies at the U.S. Naval War College, writes that the Russia hysteria in Washington is damaging in many ways. He reminds readers that diplomats, by nature of their jobs, try to meet with representatives of other countries on a broad range of issues. As former U.S. ambassadors to Russia have warned, “America’s long-term interests are not served by attempting to suggest that contacts between American officials and Russian diplomats constitutes a treasonous or criminal act.” Russia’s influence in Eurasia and its status as a nuclear power mean that cooperation and communication between Russia and the U.S. “is prudent diplomatic activity.” The author argues that depoliticizing the investigations into the events of the last year is necessary, and may necessitate a commission of nonpartisan experts, modeled on the 9/11 Commission, to examine the events, assess how to prevent against similar ones, and create “the codification of new standards.” He also notes that damage has already been done to the U.S.-Russia relationship. The task of creating “some semblance of a normal bilateral encounter,” which was previously difficult, may now be all but impossible.
“What Putin Is up to, and Why He May Have Overplayed His Hand,” Strobe Talbott and Jessica Brandt, The Atlantic/ Brookings Institution, 03.02.17: The authors, the Brookings Institution’s president and an associate fellow, detail Russia’s attempts to undermine the United States throughout the 20th century. These efforts include: plans to steal nuclear secrets in the 1940s; financial assistance offered to Richard Nixon’s opponent in the 1968 election; fabricated intelligence in 1976 intendent to damage anti-Soviet Sen. Henry “Scoop” Jackson; and “a multi-pronged campaign to thwart” Ronald Reagan’s re-election in the 1980s. These attempts, most of them failed, pale in comparison to Russia’s 2016 efforts, spurred by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s view of Hillary Clinton “as a serial regime-changer” and Donald Trump’s vocal admiration of the Russian president and Trump’s declaration of intent to warm relations with Russia. The damage Putin wrought in 2016, the authors argue, “is likely to deepen for years to come.” However, Trump’s “high command” has a distinctly skeptical view of Russia, and might be able to persuade the U.S. president towards their line of thinking.
“Connecting Trump's Dots to Russia,” Nicholas Kristof, New York Times, 03.09.17: The author, a journalist, writes that following the first several weeks of Donald Trump’s presidency, the plot of “House of Cards” no longer seems quite as far-fetched as it once did. The author highlights “10 crucial dots” in the matter of the Trump team’s alleged collusion with Moscow to interfere in and undermine the 2016 U.S. presidential election. These include: denials by Trump and his associates of contacts with senior Russian officials; the lack of an apparent reason for these contacts; unexplained communications between a Trump Organization server and Putin-linked Alfa Bank; “repeated” and “constant” contacts between Russian intelligence and Trump officials; former MI6 agent Christopher Steele’s dossier regarding compromising videos of Trump; Trump’s “bewilderingly benign view” of Moscow; Trump associate Roger Stone’s possible advance knowledge of the information released by WikiLeaks; Paul Manafort’s long-standing ties to Russia; Donald Trump Jr.’s 2008 statement that “We see a lot of money pouring in from Russia”; and the acknowledgment from many Republicans that answers about this matter are necessary. The author posits that “something more ambiguous and less transactional” than a quid pro quo may have occurred between Trump and Putin. “Yet I wouldn't be surprised if the Trump team engaged in secret contacts and surreptitious messages, and had advance knowledge of Russia's efforts to attack the American political process. And that would be a momentous scandal.”
“Russia's Ambassador Met Trump's Team. So What?” Husain Haqqani, The Washington Post, 03.10.17: The author, Pakistan’s former ambassador to the United States, writes that “there is nothing inherently wrong with meeting a foreign ambassador.” While Russian ambassador Sergei Kislyak’s motivations are unknown, that is not the issue at hand. The question to ask is whether or not U.S. President Donald Trump’s associates “comported themselves honorably and legally.” The author writes that as an ambassador during the 2008 election cycle, he met with both Republican and Democratic nominees and many congressmen from both parties, as well as those likely to be in top government positions after the election, noting that these meetings are “totally normal for ambassadors.” While Russia’s possible interference in the U.S. election, a decision that may have been made without Kislyak’s knowledge, should be investigated, it should not “create the impression that engagement between a foreign ambassador—even one from a country with which relations are strained—and people who might hold senior positions in a future administration is inherently sinister.”
Energy exports from CIS:
- No significant commentary.
U.S.-Russian economic ties:
- No significant commentary.
U.S.-Russian relations in general:
“On Russia, Washington Should Wait,” Sergey Aleksashenko, Brookings Institution, 03.07.17: The author, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, writes that Russian President Vladimir Putin will likely be running for re-election in March 2018. While “the outcome is easy to guess,” the Kremlin would like at least 50% of Russian voters to vote for Putin, who “will likely run on a Trumpian campaign message.” Whether or not Washington decides to warm towards Russia, Putin will be able to spin it in his favor: either Putin made Russia stronger and the U.S. seeks to undermine Russia, or Putin drove the U.S. “to its knees.” The author advises that Washington should wait, showing through action and not statement that Russia is not a major foreign policy concern, thus forcing Putin to confront his domestic challenges, including Russia’s sluggish economy.
“Reducing Tensions Between Russia and NATO,” Kimberly Marten, Council on Foreign Relations, March 2017: The author, a professor of political science, makes recommendations for relieving the strain between NATO and Russia, including: reaffirming the U.S. commitment to NATO defense; sustaining and emphasizing the legitimacy of U.S. troops in Poland; publicizing NATO’s superior capabilities; creating measures to raise the costs of a Russian attack on NATO; treating Russia and its leaders “with public respect”; officially announcing that the U.S. will not seek regime change in Russia and requesting reciprocity from Moscow; publically stating that Ukraine must do much more to meet NATO membership standards; and reestablishing regional military and arms control negotiations.
“Dealing With Russia and Drawing Red Lines,” Steven Pifer, Russia Matters, 03.09.17: The author, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, writes that “a solid relationship” between the U.S. and Russia needs red lines. These red lines are “about deterrence,” a precaution to keep Moscow “from making a costly miscalculation.” NATO security is the first red line, and increased U.S. and NATO presence in the Baltics will “put in place a robust tripwire.” Another red line involves nuclear security. This red line needs to rein in Putin’s loose talk regarding possible nuclear use, making it clear that “any use of a nuclear weapon, no matter how small or discriminate, would open a Pandora’s box full of unpredictable and nasty consequences.” U.S. President Donald Trump also needs to stress Washington’s expectations that Moscow will adhere to existing arms control treaties. While Ukraine is a more difficult matter in which to draw red lines, it can be made clear that increased Russian aggression in the region will spark increased U.S. military aid to Ukraine. Red lines will put Washington “in a better position to engage Moscow.”
II. Russia’s relations with other countries
Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:
- No significant commentary.
China:
- No significant commentary.
Ukraine:
“Why Ukraine Is Facing Its Biggest Test in the Fight Against Corruption,” Maxim Eristavi, The Washington Post, 03.07.17: The author, a nonresident research fellow with the Atlantic Council, writes that the arrest of Ukrainian Fiscal Service head Roman Nasirov is “the most important development in Ukraine since the 2014 revolution.” With extreme corruption in Ukraine and in particular in the country’s Fiscal Service branch, Nasirov’s case is the biggest and only major anti-corruption case in the country’s history. He is the first high-ranking government official to face these kinds of charges. Following the Maidan revolution, Nasirov, a member of the old regime, was given an important post in the new government. The author explains that following the post-revolutionary elections, reform ground to a half because “no one has managed to ‘drain the swamp.’” As a result, figures from the established system “failed to transcend the inherited rules of the game” and “stubbornly persisted in running things the way they have been run for most of the past 25 years.” “Nasirov, in short, is a living symbol of the distortions of the current system,” but the recent surge of activism offers hope for the future.
“Western Sanctions: Helping the Russian Leadership Ride out Recession,” Philip Hanson, Chatham House, 03.10.17: The author, an associate fellow at Chatham House, writes that the sanctions on Russia most likely to be relaxed are the “sectoral sanctions,” related to the Kremlin’s support of insurgents in the Donbas. There, “the issues are fuzzier so there may be more room for negotiation.” Full implementation of Minsk II would ease those sanctions, but “In practice, full implementation would require a miracle.” For Russia, the primary economic costs involve “the blocking of Western finance to Russian banks and non-bank companies,” while for the West, it is the loss of European exports. Political benefits and costs of sanctions are trickier to pin down, but they have bolstered the “narrative of Russia as a besieged fortress.”
“Minsk II’s Future Looks Bleak, but What’s the Alternative?” Steven Pifer, Brookings, 03.10.17: The author, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, writes that Russia “has the power and influence” to implement Minsk II, but there is little evidence to show that the Kremlin wants that. If Russia took steps to fulfill the agreement’s first three provisions, it “could make things difficult for Kiev,” as hardened attitudes towards Minsk II could make getting the necessary votes for implementation difficult. This would also allow Moscow to shift the blame for Minsk II’s failure onto Kiev. Moscow has not made this move for two possible reasons: if Kiev did deliver on its end of the agreement, “peace would take hold” or developments in the West in the near future may change things in the U.S. or EU “without concessions on [Putin’s] part.” While Ukrainian’s frustration with Minsk II is understandable, “no viable alternative is on the table.” If Ukraine abandons the agreement, it would likely speed up the relaxation of EU sanctions on Russia and may leave Ukraine alone in facing Russia in the Donbas.
Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:
- No significant commentary.
III. Russia’s domestic policies
Domestic politics, economy and energy:
- No significant commentary.
Defense and aerospace:
- No significant commentary.
Security, law-enforcement and justice:
- No significant commentary.