4 Things to Know

1. Russian forces made a net gain of 31 square miles (slightly larger than the area of Manhattan Island) of Ukrainian territory in the past four weeks (June 2–30, 2026), according to RM’s analysis of data from Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group. In comparison, during the four weeks prior to that (May 5–June 2, 2026), Russia gained a net of 3 square miles, according to DeepState’s data analyzed in the latest issue of RM’s Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. In contrast, based on data from ISW, Russia gained a net of 11 square miles of Ukraine’s territory from June 2–30, 2026. ISW assessed in a statement on July 1 that Russian forces maintained a presence in 37% of the key Donbas city of Kostyantynivka. In a July 1 post of its own, DeepState acknowledged that “the enemy had successes in the area of ​​Kostyantynivka” and its July 2, 2026 map showed Russian forces continue attempts to capture this key element of Ukraine’s so-called Donbas fortress belt in a pincer movement.
2. Russia’s overnight July 1–2 assault on Kyiv was among its heaviest of the war. Ukrainian officials reported at least 18–21 people killed and more than 80–90 injured, with around 70 hospitalized. Ukraine’s Air Force said Moscow launched 74 missiles—including four Zircon, 24 Iskander ballistic, 34 Kh‑101, eight Kalibr and four Kh‑59/69—plus 496 Shahed‑type attack drones and decoys. Ukrainian air defenses said they intercepted 48 missiles and 476 drones, meaning 26 missiles and 20 drones reached targets.¹ Ukraine continues to suffer from lack of Patriot inceptors, which are the only means in the Ukrainian arsenal capable of reliably shooting down Russian ballistic missiles such as Iskanders.
3. A new Center for Strategic and International Studies study estimates that combined Russian and Ukrainian casualties, which include killed, wounded, and missing soldiers, have exceeded 2 million since the beginning of Russia’s full-fledged invasion in February 2022. According to the study, Russia is bearing the heavier toll: about 1.4 million casualties, including 450,000 killed. In contrast, Ukrainian forces have suffered somewhere between 525,000 and 625,000 casualties, with fatalities totaling somewhere between 125,000 and 150,000.² For a chronology of estimates of Russian and Ukrainian casualties see the latest issue of RM’s Russia-Ukraine War Report Card.

4. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed Russia is in talks with unspecified countries to import gasoline as domestic supplies tighten after Ukrainian drone strikes cut refinery output by about 25%. Deputy PM Alexander Novak has called imports a “key measure,” according to the Moscow Times. At the same time, Russia’s seaborne crude exports hit a wartime record in June, averaging 4.13 million barrels per day over the four weeks to June 28 as damaged refineries force more crude abroad, according to Bloomberg and Meduza.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• The Kremlin confirmed that Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chair of Russia’s Security Council, will lead a delegation to the long‑delayed funeral of Iran’s slain supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was killed in a U.S.-Israeli strike in February. Medvedev will join Foreign Ministry officials and religious leaders at ceremonies in Tehran, Mashhad, Qom and Iraq, underscoring Moscow’s deepening partnership with Tehran under a 2025 “strategic” pact short of mutual defense. Commercial flights between Russia and Iran remain suspended amid regional tensions. (MT/AFP, 07.02.26)

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

Saturday, June 27, 2026

• Russia’s intensified use of glide bombs and fiber‑optic drones is turning Kramatorsk from a relative rear “oasis” into a ruin, with central areas like Peace Square now within range. Soldiers describe Soviet‑era bombs with wings and crude guidance hitting more often than artillery and “scarier” than drones, while unjammable tethered UAVs swarm the skies. Civilians are finally leaving, medics are relocating, and analysts warn the city is being reduced to “bare earth” even though Moscow still lacks the strength to seize it. (Bloomberg, 06.27.26)
• Russia and Ukraine conducted a 7‑for‑7 civilian detainee swap, Russian ombudswoman Yana Lantratova and her Ukrainian counterpart Dmytro Lubinets said. Kyiv says the returned Ukrainians, aged 35–66, were illegally seized in 2022 in occupied areas including Bucha district, Mariupol, and parts of Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Luhansk regions. Istories notes rights groups have documented at least 8,221 cases of civilians held and tortured in some 29 Russian “torture colonies” and SIZOs as part of a systemic policy. (Istories, 06.27.26)
• Russian-occupied Crimea has shifted from “crown jewel” to liability for Vladimir Putin as sustained Ukrainian drone and missile strikes isolate the peninsula. Fuel sales to civilians are banned, rolling blackouts and water cuts are widespread, children’s camps and much of public transport are shut, and some 2,500 vehicles queued at the Kerch Bridge on Friday to leave. Analysts say Kyiv’s “logistics lockdown” is close to cutting Crimea off militarily and politically on the eve of Russia’s Duma elections. (Wall Street Journal, 06.27.26)

Monday, June 29, 2026

• Russia’s human rights commissioner Yana Lantratova told Vladimir Putin that all known residents of Kursk region detained by Ukraine during Kyiv’s 2024 cross‑border incursion have now been returned, following the latest repatriation of five people over the weekend. Regional officials say 171 residents are back, but the fate of 320 others remains unknown. Lantratova met her Ukrainian counterpart Dmytro Lubinets on June 26 to discuss POW exchanges and missing civilians. (MT/AFP, 06.29.26)

Wednesday, July 1, 2026

• Ukraine’s grid operator Ukrenergo reintroduced nationwide rolling blackouts on July 1, with cuts scheduled from 17:00 to 22:00 for both households and industry in all regions due to a sharp spike in electricity demand from extreme heat and heavy air‑conditioner use. Authorities say consumption has jumped at least 25%, compounded by planned repairs, war‑damage recovery and reduced power imports; residents are urged to limit use of powerful appliances and keep AC settings at 23–24°C. (RBC.ua, 07.01.26)
• For military strikes on civilian targets see the next section.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

• Based on data from Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group, Russian forces made a net gain of 31 square miles (slightly larger than the area of Manhattan Island) of Ukrainian territory in the past four weeks (June 2–30, 2026). In comparison, during the four weeks prior to that (May 5–June 2, 2026), Russia gained a net of 3 square miles, according to DeepState’s data. In contrast, based on data from ISW, Russia gained a net of 11 square miles of Ukraine’s territory from June 2–30, 2026, according to the latest issue of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. (RM, 07.01.26)

Friday, June 26, 2026

• On Friday, June 26, 2026 Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Ukrainian Armed Forces pushed back the Russian forces in Prymorske. (RM,07.02.26)
• Overnight on 20 June, Ukrainian forces launched strikes on Russian-controlled Crimea and the Kerch Strait crossing. Targets included air defense systems, fuel storage facilities and the three vehicle ferries. The disabling of the three ferries, while the southern land corridor to Crimea is contested, has almost certainly exacerbated mounting supply issues in Crimea. (UK MOD X Account, 06.26.26)

Saturday, June 27, 2026

• On Saturday, June 27, 2026 Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced near Hryshyne and Huliaipilske. (RM,07.02.26)
• Overnight Russian drone and guided bomb attacks on June 27 killed two civilians and wounded at least 24 in Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions, as Ukraine’s Air Force said it shot down 113 of 129 Shahed‑type drones. (RFE/RL, 06.27.26)
• Ukraine says its new FP‑5 “Flamingo” long‑range missiles hit the Titan Barrikady arms plant in Volgograd, a major military‑industrial complex producing artillery systems and launcher components for missiles including Iskander‑M, Yars, Topol‑M and Sarmat; regional governor Andrei Bocharov confirmed damage at an enterprise in Krasnooktyabrsky district, reporting one worker killed and 10–11 injured. Kyiv’s security service also said it struck an oil‑pumping facility in Russia’s Vladimir region supplying fuel to Moscow, while Russian‑installed authorities in occupied Crimea maintained a state of emergency amid rolling blackouts and fuel curbs, and Russia and Ukraine swapped 160 POWs each, bringing more than 9,500 Ukrainians home since 2022. (RFE/RL, 06.27.26; Washington Post/AP, 06.27.26; Bloomberg, 06.27.26; iStories; 06.27.26)

Sunday, June 28, 2026

• On Sunday, June 28, 2026 Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces completely occupied Hulyaypole and advanced near the town. (RM,07.02.26)
• Ukraine extended its “long range sanctions” campaign with overnight drone strikes that set fire to the Slavyansk‑na‑Kuban refinery in Russia’s Krasnodar region and “reached” the Slavneft‑YANOS plant in Yaroslavl; Krasnodar governor Veniamin Kondratyev reported one dead, one wounded, damage to power and gas lines, and several houses hit, while Russia’s Defense Ministry said it intercepted 142–213 Ukrainian drones and eight missiles across more than a dozen regions, including Moscow, as Ukrainian air defenses claimed to down 125 drones and seven missiles. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the refineries are key suppliers—including to occupied Crimea—and Bloomberg notes Russian gasoline prices jumped 3% in a week, the biggest rise in at least 20 years, amid mounting refinery outages; Vladimir Putin for the first time acknowledged a “certain deficit” of fuel linked to such strikes but insisted they have “absolutely no effect” on the front and framed them as attempts to split Russian society and force talks “on terms advantageous” to Kyiv. (Washington Post/AP, 06.28.26; MT/AFP, 06.28.26; Bloomberg, 06.28.26)
• Putin has begun cautiously acknowledging the impact of Ukraine’s long-range strikes, calling the period “difficult” and accusing Kyiv of “terrorist attacks” on energy infrastructure while reassuring Russians that the Kremlin is “responding to all problems” and will meet social obligations. ISW notes he carefully avoided mentioning nationwide gasoline shortages directly but sought to project stability and competence, signaling awareness of mounting economic pain without admitting how badly the strikes and sanctions are straining Russia’s economy and war effort. (ISW, 06.28.26)
• Speaking to the United Russia party congress, Vladimir Putin claimed the West “cannot win on the battlefield,” insisted Russia has the resources and will to resist outside pressure, and alleged Ukrainian forces are retreating along the entire front. ISW says the speech is the latest effort to portray Russian victory as inevitable and to pressure Ukraine and the West toward concessions, even as Russia’s battlefield performance has deteriorated through 2026 and its ability to achieve maximalist aims militarily is increasingly in doubt. (ISW, 06.28.26)

Monday, June 29, 2026

• On Monday, June 29, 2026 Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced near Zakitne. (RM, 07.02.26)
• ISW says Putin is making “greatly exaggerated” claims of Russian advances that don’t match geolocated evidence, especially around the Donetsk “fortress belt.” He told interviewer Pavel Zarubin that Russian forces are rapidly advancing, are within 8–9 km of Sloviansk and 4 km of Kramatorsk, and control 96% of Kostyantynivka. ISW’s mapping suggests Russian presence is limited: about 4.3% of Lyman, nearly 37% of Kostyantynivka, and distances of roughly 19 km to Sloviansk and 14 km to Kramatorsk, with many gains being shallow infiltrations rather than secured terrain. (ISW, 06.29.26)
• Russian missile and drone strikes on June 29 killed at least 8 civilians and wounded around 35–40 across Ukraine, including five dead and 29 injured in Dnipro, three killed when a drone hit a minibus in Zaporizhzhia, and additional deaths in Sumy and other regions; hot weather and damage left parts of eight oblasts without power. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called them “horrific attacks,” noting more than 16,000 Ukrainian civilians have been killed since the full‑scale invasion began and renewing appeals for European anti‑ballistic defenses so “people need greater protection from such horrific attacks.” (Washington Post, 06.29.26; Washington Post/AP, 06.29.26)
• Vladimir Putin acknowledged a nationwide “fuel supply squeeze” after Ukrainian strikes on refineries, terminals and pipelines, citing “problems for drivers and for businesses,” queues at gas stations and shortages of “the right grade of gasoline,” as at least 17 regions impose mandatory fuel-sale limits and many others report shortfalls; he described the situation as a “certain shortage” but “not critical,” said priorities are faster repairs, boosting imports, and “quickly and substantially” ramping up air-defense production, and confirmed a full diesel export ban is under discussion while insisting refinery hits have “absolutely no effect” on the front and rejecting reported Ukrainian proposals to mutually limit deep strikes. (MT/AFP, 06.29.26; RFE/RL, 06.29.26; Meduza, 06.29.26; Bloomberg, 06.29.26)
• Meduza’s survey of open sources finds Ukrainian drones have hit nearly every major Russian oil refinery, including key Rosneft, Lukoil, Gazprom Neft and Tatneft facilities from Moscow and St. Petersburg to Tyumen and Tuapse. The only large plants not yet struck are Gazprom Neft’s Omsk refinery and the Angarsk Petrochemical Company in Irkutsk region. The pattern underscores how Kyiv’s long‑range campaign has systematically targeted Russia’s refining backbone, driving production down and contributing to nationwide fuel shortages. (Meduza, 06.29.26)
• Ukraine’s Air Force reported that from the evening of June 29 to the morning of June 30, Russian forces launched 154 attack drones of various types, of which 138 were shot down or jammed. Thirteen strike UAVs hit 10 locations, with debris falling in two more. Drones were launched from Kursk and Oryol as well as occupied Donetsk and Hvardiiske (Crimea), and were countered by aviation, SAMs, electronic‑warfare and mobile fire groups. (Ukrainska Pravda, 06.30.26)
• Aleksey Vasilyev, Russian military commentator argues Ukraine’s new FP‑5 “Flamingo” cruise missile is proving far less effective than advertised. Citing Ukrainian open‑source data, he says of 39 documented launches over nearly a year, 29 were intercepted, four missed, and only six hit precisely, with the June 27 Titan‑Barrikady strike in Volgograd (three hits from five missiles) the main success. He contends engines are scarce and costly, production is limited, and mass FPV‑style “drone spam” or cheaper ballistic systems are a better concept. (Spbnews78, 06.29.26)

Tuesday, June 30, 2026

• On Tuesday, June 30, 2026 Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced in Kalenyki, Illinivka, and near Novooleksandrivka and Ivanopillia. (RM,07.02.26)
• Overnight Ukrainian drone attacks across Russia killed at least three people, including a six‑month‑old baby in Moscow region, an elderly woman in Tver and a man in Belgorod, regional officials said, as Russia’s Defense Ministry claimed air defenses intercepted 419 drones over multiple regions and Crimea and briefly closed Moscow’s airports; at the same time, Ukrainian UAVs have struck Russia’s Dubna and Vladimir space communications centers three times in two weeks, critically damaging antennas and equipment at sites that handle secure satellite links for Russia’s leadership and military, which analysts say could slow satellite imagery downloads, disrupt high‑bandwidth command links and force Moscow to buy more imagery from abroad, giving Kyiv “a bit of an edge.” (MT/AFP, 06.30.26; Istories, 06.30.26)
• Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Russia has already shifted its self‑imposed deadline to capture Donetsk region 15 times since 2022 and now aims for December 31, 2026, after repeatedly missing earlier dates such as March 31 and May 9, 2022, and multiple deadlines in 2023–25. He warned that if Moscow refuses to end the war, it will again have to “postpone this final date,” and urged Russians “arguing in gasoline lines” to consider what awaits them next. (RBC.ua, 06.30.26)
• Ukrainian Commander in Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi said Russia is considering several new northern offensive options, including a thrust toward Kyiv via Belarus, but assessed the most likely scenario as an attack from Russia’s Bryansk region into Chernihiv oblast aimed at stretching the front and forcing Ukraine to redeploy troops from key active sectors. He said Vladimir Putin has ordered the General Staff to examine multiple plans, but added he doubts Belarus’s leadership will again allow its territory to be used as a launchpad, so Ukrainian forces are preparing primarily for a northern incursion directly from Russia. (Strana.ua, 06.30.26; RBC.ua, 06.30.26)
• Ukrainian military observer Bohdan Miroshnykov says the situation for Kyiv’s forces east of Sloviansk is becoming “increasingly difficult,” warning that units near Kryva Luka–Zakytne are effectively trapped “with a river on one side and the enemy on the other,” logistics cut, and that without reinforcement and orderly withdrawal from Ray‑Oleksandrivka Ukraine risks a rapid retreat to the Sloviansk TPP at Mykolaivka and then potential evacuation of the entire Sloviansk–Kramatorsk agglomeration. (Strana.ua, 06.30.26)
• Ukrainian investigators are examining three main versions in the death of Colonel Volodymyr Kononnikov, commander of the 154th Separate Mechanized Brigade, found with a gunshot wound to the left temple in Zaporizhzhia region on June 28: suicide, intentional homicide, and negligent handling of a weapon. (Ukrainska Pravda, 06.30.26)

Wednesday, July 1, 2026

• On Wednesday, July 1, 2026 Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces captured (RM,07.02.26)
• ISW reports that Russian forces have infiltrated or advanced into about 37% of Kostyantynivka, achieving over three-quarters of those gains in June 2026. However, many positions remain insecure and not fully consolidated. Russia has committed at least one combined arms army, one army corps, and elements of several other formations to this main spring–summer offensive effort. ISW judges that Russia may keep making tactical gains but is unlikely to achieve a rapid breakthrough of Ukraine’s broader “Fortress Belt.” In a July 1 post, DeepState acknowledged that the “the enemy had successes in the area” of ​​Kostyantynivka and Hulyaipol in the second half of June. (RM. 07.01.26,ISW, 07.01.26)
• Russia’s spring–summer 2026 offensive has so far failed to achieve operationally significant gains, with Russian forces advancing or infiltrating only 30.42 sq km in June 2026 (about 1.01 sq km per day), compared with 481.25 sq km (16.04 sq km per day) in June 2025. From January–June 2026 they gained just 622.60 sq km, or 28.43% of what they took in the same period of 2025, according to ISW (ISW, 07.01.26)
• Ukraine struck Russia’s giant Ufa refinery—over 1,000 km from the border—for the second time in a week and hit a missile‑components/defense electronics plant in Penza, part of near‑daily long‑range attacks on energy and military industry that Western officials say are slowing Russian advances by crippling logistics and contributing to a nationwide fuel crisis. Penza’s governor said drones hit two industrial plants, injuring two people and damaging power lines and a building, while Ukrainian channels claimed strikes on the Mayak factory and the Penza Research Institute of Electromechanical Instruments; Zelenskyy called the operations a “just response,” even as Ukrainian officials reported three civilians killed in Kherson and Dnipropetrovsk and Russian authorities said two civilians died and 14 were wounded in Belgorod region during Ukrainian drone attacks that set vehicles and buildings ablaze. (Washington Post/AP, 07.01.26; MT/AFP, 07.01.26; Meduza, 07.01.26)
  • Bloomberg’s analysis finds that missile alerts have been issued this year in Russian regions containing over 70% of the population, as Ukraine’s Flamingo and Neptune cruise missiles extend its reach far beyond the border. Omsk, the Urals, Volga cities like Samara, and northwest regions such as Novgorod and Pskov have all sounded alarms, while repeated strikes have hit the Ufa refinery and Penza defense plants. Analysts say Ukraine’s long‑range strikes are damaging Russia’s war industry, economy and sense of domestic security. (Bloomberg, 07.01.26)
  • Ukrainian drone and missile strikes on refineries have plunged Russia into a nationwide summer fuel crisis, with about a third of refining capacity offline, gasoline output down 17–25%, rationing in over half of regions, long queues at stations and even portable toilets set up in Siberia’s Irkutsk. Analysts say repairs will take months and some plants may not be worth fixing before a ceasefire, while Putin insists shortages are “temporary” despite admitting “problems persist for both motorists and businesses.” (Washington Post/AP, 07.01.26)
  • Ukraine intensified its intermediate- and long-range strike campaign in June 2026, conducting at least 303 intermediate-range strikes in occupied Ukraine, up from 210 in May. (ISW, 07.01.26)
  • Ukrainian drone and missile strikes that have knocked out up to 28% of Russia’s refining capacity, including Moscow’s main refinery, have created a “physical lack of fuel,” turning the campaign into a serious political crisis for Vladimir Putin, WSJ reports. Analyst Sergey Vakulenko estimates more than a quarter of refining was offline by June 20, while long lines, rationing, and price spikes have spread across Russia, underscoring how Ukraine’s growing strike capacity has brought the war home to ordinary Russians. (Wall Street Journal, 06.30.26)
• The road bridge located in Russia-occupied settlement of Hranitne in Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast got destroyed as a result of Ukrainian drone strikes. Its structure has totally collapsed due to impacts presumably of FP-2 middle-range OWA-UAVs. The bridge lies on the strategic H20 highway linking Russia-occupied cities of Mariupol and Donetsk in eastern Ukraine. (Status-6 X Account, 07.01.26)
• At least four civilians were killed and dozens injured in Russian attacks on Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, local authorities said. Two people died and 37 were wounded in Zaporizhzhia and its outskirts after Russian forces struck 48 settlements; in Kherson, a drone hit a city minibus, killing two and injuring six. Ukraine’s military reported Russia launched 130 drones and one ballistic missile overnight into July 1. (Istories, 07.01.26)
• Ukrainian General Staff data indicate Russia suffered 39,490 casualties in June 2026—about 1,298 per square kilometer gained, over 19 times the June 2025 rate. Reported Russian equipment losses also surged year-on-year, including fuel vehicles and tanks (up 3.8-fold), drones (13.3-fold), and artillery systems (1.65-fold). ISW assesses that Ukrainian intermediate-range strikes are heavily degrading Russian logistics and combat power, raising doubts about Russia’s ability to sustain its current offensive tempo. (ISW, 07.01.26)

Thursday, July 2, 2026

• On Thursday, July 2, 2026 Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Ukrainian armed forces pushed back the Russian forces in Plavni. (RM,07.02.26)
• A CSIS study concludes that Russia’s territorial control in Ukraine shrank in spring 2026, as its forces lost more ground than they gained in April and May—a net loss of roughly 400 square kilometers and their first monthly net setbacks since August 2024—while combined Russian and Ukrainian casualties surpassed two million, including an estimated 525,000–625,000 Ukrainian casualties and 125,000–150,000 Ukrainian deaths. The study says Russia’s ground offensive has largely stalled, with average advances of only about 50 meters per day around Kostiantynivka, 70 meters near Pokrovsk, and 90 meters near Sloviansk (CSIS, 07.01.26)
• Russia’s overnight July 1–2 assault on Kyiv was among its heaviest of the war. Ukraine’s Air Force said Moscow launched 74 missiles—including four Zircon, 24 Iskander ballistic, 34 Kh‑101, eight Kalibr and four Kh‑59/69—plus 496 Shahed‑type attack drones and decoys. Air defenses intercepted 48 missiles and 476 drones, meaning 26 missiles and 20 drones reached targets. Ukrainian officials reported at least 18–21 people killed and more than 80–90 injured, with around 70 hospitalized. Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko said “at least 20 residential buildings were struck directly” and that nearly 100 buildings across the capital sustained damage, including markets, hotels and a nine‑story block where multiple floors collapsed. The barrage underscored Russia’s ability to inflict mass casualties with missiles even as Ukraine’s interception rates against drones remain high, and came amid continued Russian use of ballistic systems that Kyiv can only reliably counter with scarce Patriot‑class interceptors. (Meduza, 07.02.26; Financial Times, 07.02.26; New York Times, 07.02.26)
  • According to the Ukrainian Air Force, only 4 3M22 Tsirkon hypersonic missiles were used during the large-scale aerial attack on Kyiv last night, with the majority of those ~30 ground-based missile systems launched being Iskander-M (and S-400) ballistic missiles. (Status-6 X Account, 07.02.26)
• Bloomberg reported on July 2 that “Russia indicated that Ukraine may have used a long-range ballistic missile in combat for the first time.” The claim comes as Ukrainian firm Fire Point prepares flight tests of its FP‑9 ballistic system, advertised with an 850 km range; if confirmed, this would mark a new stage in Kyiv’s domestically produced long‑range strike capabilities beyond drones and cruise missiles. (Bloomberg, 07.02.26) Ukraine inherited Tochka short-range ballistic missiles from the Soviet arsenals and reportedly used them against Russian forces in the first weeks of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 at least three times. Ukraine launched three more of these missiles against Russan forces in June 2022. More recently, Ukraine was reported to have largely depleted its inventory of these Soviet-era ballistic missiles as of last month.
• Ukraine said its drones struck Lukoil’s Nizhny Novgorod refinery in Kstovo overnight July 2, claiming a fire on site; Governor Gleb Nikitin reported one person killed and four injured, with “non‑critical” damage to an industrial facility and homes from falling debris. Russian MoD said air defenses downed 327 Ukrainian drones over 18 regions, Crimea and the Azov–Black Sea area, but Istories and local channels published images of damage at the plant and a nearby residential building. (Istories, 07.02.26)
• A new Center for Strategic and International Studies study estimates that more than 2 million Russian and Ukrainian troops have been killed or wounded since Russia’s full‑scale invasion began, with Russia bearing the heavier toll: about 1.4 million Russian casualties, including roughly 450,000 killed. In contrast, Ukrainian forces have suffered somewhere between 525,000 and 625,000 casualties (killed, wounded, and missing) and between 125,000 and 150,000 fatalities between February 2022 and June 2026. (New York Times, 07.02.26; CSIS, 07.01.26)
• Russian recruiters are increasingly resorting to coercion to fill ranks for the Ukraine war, with RFE/RL documenting cases in Penza and other regions where men are grabbed off streets or from homes, taken to enlistment offices, and pressured or beaten into signing contracts. Relatives describe “kidnappings” and door‑to‑door raids; rights lawyers say arbitrary detentions now occur “throughout the country” as authorities try to avoid another politically explosive mass mobilization while casualties and desertions mount. (RFE/RL, 07.02.26)

Military aid to Ukraine:

Tuesday, June 30, 2026

• The European Commission disbursed €3.9 billion to Ukraine as the first defense tranche of a €90 billion EU loan package, with the full initial €6 billion earmarked for purchasing Ukrainian‑made drones. Brussels said payments were delayed while it verified drone supply contracts and stressed that future tranches will also fund ammunition, missiles, and air‑defense systems. The broader package allocates €30 billion to Ukraine’s budget and €60 billion for defense support in 2026–27. (Ukrainska Pravda, 06.30.26)
• Ukraine and Sweden signed a “historic” agreement for Kyiv to purchase 16 Saab Gripen E fighter jets, along with associated equipment, technical assistance and support. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the deal will strengthen Ukraine’s combat aviation, while Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov added that, under preliminary arrangements, Ukraine’s Air Force is expected to receive the first 16 Gripen C/D aircraft in early 2027. (RBC.ua, 06.30.26)
• Polish defense minister Władysław Kosiniak‑Kamysz said Warsaw has refused to hand over six to eight MiG‑29 jets it had planned to retire after Ukraine failed to deliver promised battlefield drone know‑how under a quid‑pro‑quo deal. “There will be no MiGs for Ukraine because there are no drones—or rather, no drone capabilities—for Poland,” he said, also warning that “Ukraine will not join the European Union with Bandera,” in reference to the controversial UPA honorific. (Meduza, 06.30.26)

Wednesday, July 1, 2026

• Denmark announced an additional 4.4 billion kroner ($670 million) in military aid for Ukraine, bringing its total support to just under 80 billion kroner. The new package includes ammunition and weapons donations and will also finance about 1.3 billion kroner of procurement in Ukraine’s own defense industry, which Copenhagen says is vital as the war drags on and Europe seeks to bolster its collective security. (Bloomberg, 07.01.26)

Thursday, July 2, 2026

• Ukraine’s ambassador to NATO, Alona Hetmanchuk, said the alliance now coordinates more than 80% of all military aid deliveries to Ukraine through its NSATU cell in Wiesbaden, including lethal assistance. NSATU consolidates Kyiv’s needs, matches them with allies’ stocks, runs training abroad, and oversees logistics hubs in Poland (and planned hubs in Romania and Slovakia). She added that 90–92% of Patriot interceptors now reach Ukraine via the European PURL purchasing scheme. (European Pravda, 07.02.26; Ukrainska Pravda, 07.02.26)
• German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said the war in Ukraine has entered a “potentially decisive phase” and urged Europe not to slow financial support, stressing Kyiv now most needs funding to scale domestic weapons production. Berlin has pledged €300 million to the Czech ammunition initiative and Rheinmetall has signed a tens‑of‑millions‑euro contract to supply artillery shells to Ukraine by Q1 2027. (RBC.ua, 07.02.26)

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

Friday, June 26, 2026

• Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna urged Europe to show “strategic patience” and increase pressure on Russia as Ukrainian long‑range strikes and Russian manpower losses mount, saying the “critical point is coming closer” even if the war’s end is uncertain. Speaking at the Gdańsk recovery conference, he said “Europe and Ukraine is the same side,” called for more support to Kyiv, and highlighted upcoming EU sanctions aimed at further cutting Russian oil‑and‑gas and “shadow fleet” revenues, arguing “sanctions are working, but we are not still yet there.” (Bloomberg, 06.26.26)

Monday, June 29, 2026

• European aluminum producers are urging Brussels to close a loophole that lets banned Russian primary aluminum enter the EU via third countries, undermining sanctions and undercutting local smelters. They want a “smelt and cast” origin rule requiring importers to prove where metal was originally produced, not just where it was processed, noting the U.S., Canada and Mexico already do this. Industry group European Aluminum says Russia earned nearly $10 billion from aluminum exports last year and often sells at an 11% discount to EU prices. (Financial Times, 06.29.26)
• Nearly one in five aircraft operated by Russia’s 11 largest airlines is grounded this summer, double the normal rate, Kommersant calculated. Of 673 planes that carry over 90% of passengers, 130 (19.3%) are not flying. Aeroflot’s group has ~10% of its 349 jets grounded, considered “normal,” but other carriers have about a third of their fleets sidelined, with S7 worst hit (33 of 104, mostly due to engine issues). Experts say prolonged maintenance under sanctions is the main cause and warn the situation may worsen as jets age. (Meduza, 06.29.26)

Tuesday, June 30, 2026

• The European Commission denied media claims it is preparing a blanket ban on Schengen tourist visas for Russians, saying current work under the 21st sanctions package focuses on “targeted measures” to address security risks from individuals who fought in Ukraine or served in the Russian military after Feb. 24, 2022. Officials noted Italy and France have raised concerns that the draft entry‑ban language could, in practice, morph into a de facto ban on all Russians, given the difficulty of verifying who has participated in the war. (Meduza, 06.30.26)
• A super‑yacht linked to Vladimir Putin—formerly known as Graceful, now reportedly renamed Kosatka—was spotted sailing past Denmark toward Istanbul on June 29, accompanied by a Russian destroyer and patrol boat, Danish broadcaster DR and tracking site MarineTraffic reported. The 82‑meter vessel, valued at up to $120 million and under U.S. sanctions since 2022, had kept its AIS transponder off since August 2022 and was previously seen near Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg. (Meduza, 06.30.26)

Thursday, July 2, 2026

• On a visit to Dublin, Volodymyr Zelenskyy urged the EU to sanction Russia-owned Aughinish Alumina in Ireland, warning that any alumina reaching Russia supports its war effort. Irish prime minister Micheál Martin pledged that output from the plant, owned by Rusal, would not aid Moscow and said a national investigation into its exports, much of which reportedly go to Russia, is nearing completion. The issue is highly sensitive as Ireland begins its EU presidency. (Financial Times, 07.02.26)
• Russia’s antitrust watchdog warned Apple that defaulting iPhones and iPads to a non‑Russian search engine and failing to preinstall mandated Russian apps such as the Max messenger and RuStore creates “discriminatory conditions” for domestic developers. Apple has until July 15 to comply or face a fine of up to 4 billion rubles (about $52 million). The move follows Apple’s removal of multiple VK‑linked apps from the App Store, which Moscow called politically motivated. (Meduza, 07.01.26)

For sanctions on the energy sector, please see section “Energy exports from CIS” below.

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

Friday, June 26, 2026

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is blaming the United States for the absence of a written deal from the August 2025 Alaska summit, arguing that if Russia accepted U.S. proposals, then to say “there was no agreement seems rather unsubtle.” ISW notes his comments are meant to preserve the Kremlin’s narrative of “Anchorage understandings” and paint Washington as the spoiler, even though Secretary of State Marco Rubio has stated no agreement was reached and the meeting ended without a joint statement or even the planned dinner and press conference. (ISW, 06.26.26)

Monday, June 29, 2026

• Putin and senior officials continue to restate Russia’s maximalist war aims, ISW notes. Putin said Russia’s main objective is the “final seizure of Donbas and Novorossiya” and vowed to do “everything” to achieve it, while spokesman Dmitry Peskov cited Putin’s June 2024 MFA speech demanding Ukraine withdraw from all remaining territory in four regions and abandon NATO aspirations—terms tantamount to capitulation. Duma defense deputy Alexei Zhuravlyov went further, saying Russia can only be secure when Ukraine “ceases to exist.” (ISW, 06.29.26)
• Vladimir Putin has tacitly accepted that the August 2025 Alaska summit with the U.S. produced no binding deal, stating in a June 28 interview that “no agreements” were signed and only U.S. proposals were discussed. By stressing his readiness to resume talks on that basis, he’s trying to push Washington back to an August 2025 baseline that ignores Ukraine’s subsequent territorial gains and successful long‑range strike campaigns that have forced Russia onto the defensive. (ISW, 06.29.26)
• Putin has implicitly rejected two recent Ukrainian ceasefire proposals: a mutual halt on long‑range strikes, and limiting active combat to the four partially occupied regions Russia claims to have annexed (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia). He dismissed them as an attempt to “save” Ukraine by easing manpower shortages, and said Russia is “not interested in granting such salvation,” reinforcing a pattern of Kyiv offering de‑escalation steps that Moscow refuses. (ISW, 06.29.26)
  • However, Economist journalist Oliver Carroll notes that Vladimir Putin has now effectively confirmed earlier reporting that a two‑stage ceasefire plan is being discussed: first halting long‑range strikes, then limiting active combat to the four partially occupied oblasts (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia), though Putin currently presents that second stage as a purely Ukrainian idea. The Economist reported in mid‑June that informal talks with Russia had resumed, with daily contacts between Kyiv and Donald Trump’s team and one proposal envisioning a phased ceasefire: initially restricting hostilities to a 50–70 km belt either side of the front line, followed by a broader deal. (Oliver Carroll on X, 06.30.26; The Economist, 06.18.26)

Tuesday, June 30, 2026

• In recent days, three top Russian officials accused the White House of not honoring the Alaska agreement. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov even speculated that the summit was a U.S. “ploy to buy time to rearm the Kyiv regime.” Secretary of State Marco Rubio, however, pushed back. “If there had been an agreement, we would have had an end of the war,” Rubio told reporters. “Russia wants the entirety of Donetsk to be turned over to them, among some other things,” he said, explaining Russia’s demand for more Ukrainian territory. After days of back-and-forth, Putin conceded the point, saying on Sunday that “there were indeed no agreements reached in Anchorage.” (Washington Post, 06.30. 26)
• A May survey by the Kyiv-based Institute for Conflict Studies and Analysis of Russia found 81% of Russians now support ending the war “as early as tomorrow,” the highest level since 2022, while those wanting to fight on until “complete victory” fell to 9%. The war has again become Russians’ top concern (33%), ahead of low wages and high prices, and many link peace with improving their financial situation. Most respondents also opposed mobile‑internet blocks and Telegram “whitelists.” (Meduza, 06.30.26)
• Searches on Yandex for “when will the special military operation end” hit a record 137,000 in the week of June 22–28, the highest level since the invasion began in February 2022, according to Mozhem Obiasnit and confirmed by Meduza. Interest in the query has risen for two straight weeks, with about 13% of searches coming from Moscow and St. Petersburg, as Ukrainian drone strikes on refineries and cities deepen Russia’s fuel crisis and bring the war home. (Meduza, 06.30.26)

Wednesday, July 1, 2026

• Despite battlefield gains and an expanded long‑range strike campaign, only 24% of Ukrainians in the Gallup survey say the country should keep fighting until victory, while 66% believe it should seek to negotiate an end to the war as soon as possible, figures largely unchanged from a year ago; the poll did not ask what terms respondents would accept. (Kyiv Post/Gallup, 07.01.26)

Thursday, July 2, 2026

• Ukraine’s expanded campaign of drone and missile strikes inside Russia—hitting refineries, Moscow and military infrastructure—has increased pressure on Vladimir Putin but not shifted his resolve to continue the war. Despite growing public frustration, economic strain and rising casualties, analysts say Putin appears determined to dig in, betting Ukraine’s manpower problems will eventually force its collapse. (New York Times, 07.02.26)

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

Saturday, June 27, 2026

• NATO’s deputy commander in Europe, Air Chief Marshal John Stringer, says the July 7–8 Ankara summit must deliver more than words: allies should commit to higher defense spending, concrete capability pledges, and visible unity behind Ukraine at a time of “turbulence” over U.S. policy, Iran, and Russia. He warned that NATO’s credibility is at stake, stressing that Britain and other members need “credible paths” to 3.5% of GDP on defense and must match their “thought leadership” with real forces and resources. (Washington Post/AP, 06.27.26)

Monday, June 29, 2026

• Estonian foreign minister Margus Tsahkna said stray Ukrainian drones landing on NATO territory are an acceptable risk given the damage Kyiv is inflicting on Russian refineries and bases, calling such incidents “not happy” but insisting, “we are not saying to Ukraine to stop it. This is hitting the lifeline of Putin.” He warned that recent EU feelers toward Moscow are “a very dangerous path,” arguing Putin wants to use Europe as a “mediator” to win time and dilute support for Ukraine. (Financial Times, 06.29.26)

Tuesday, June 30, 2026

• Sweden’s military intelligence chief Thomas Nilsson said Russia will remain a threat to its neighbors “long after” Vladimir Putin, calling the confrontation “deep, structural and enduring” with “no way back,” and arguing that despite economic strain and manipulated data there is no near‑term threat to regime stability given the destruction of political opposition and enduring public support for “great power” ambitions; he warned that Moscow is planning larger force structures “from northern Finland all the way down” NATO’s eastern flank that are mostly on paper while the Ukraine war continues, but that Sweden expects Russia to rebuild and eventually execute these plans, meaning the military threat will persist beyond any eventual ceasefire. (Ukrainska Pravda/Bloomberg, 06.30.26; Bloomberg, 06.30.26)
• Germany and the Netherlands have created a new joint command center in Valga, Estonia, where the First German‑Dutch Corps has taken over parts of NATO’s eastern‑flank defense from Multinational Corps Northeast. The HQ will lead exercises, preparations and, in a crisis, ground defense of Estonia and Latvia. U.S. General Christopher Donahue praised the move as Europe taking on more responsibility; Germany is also building a permanent 5,000‑strong brigade in Lithuania. (Bloomberg, 06.30.26)

Wednesday, July 1, 2026

• NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte said European militaries are already “backfilling” gaps created by recent U.S. reductions to NATO’s response force and that non‑U.S. allies have added $250 billion in extra defense spending over the past two years. He argued this rearmament is correcting a burden‑sharing “problem since Eisenhower” and urged defense firms to boost output rather than prices, saying Europe and Canada now have a $300 billion order book for U.S. arms, sustaining about 195,000 American defense jobs. (Financial Times, 07.01.26; Financial Times, 07.01.26)

Thursday, July 2, 2026

• A new International Institute for Strategic Studies report says Russia conducted a 19‑month drone campaign that sent 144 low‑cost UAVs over sensitive sites in a dozen NATO countries plus Ireland between August 2024 and February 2026, including bases hosting U.S. nuclear bombs, a French SSBN facility and key nuclear and military infrastructure. The study concludes Moscow likely used “shadow fleet” oil tankers as launch or relay platforms to probe and map air‑defense gaps and exploit legal and rules‑of‑engagement weaknesses; it describes Europe’s response as “uneven” and notes that once states began boarding suspect tankers, the incursions “all but vanished,” urging NATO and the EU to tighten maritime controls and modernize air‑defense and legal frameworks against such threats. (Financial Times, 07.02.26; (Bloomberg, 07.02.26; New York Times, 07.02.26)
• German prosecutors have charged a Ukrainian army officer, identified as Serhii K., with leading the 2022 sabotage of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines between Russia and Germany. He is accused of commanding a dive team that planted explosives from a chartered yacht, in an operation allegedly commissioned by Ukrainian officials to cut a major source of Russian gas revenue after the invasion. Extradited from Italy, he faces war crimes and related charges in a Hamburg court. (New York Times, 07.02.26)

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

• China and Russia conducted their 11th joint strategic air patrol on June 27, flying bombers over the Sea of Japan, East China Sea and western Pacific, Beijing’s Defense Ministry said. The mission, the first since December 2025 and following Vladimir Putin’s May visit to China, was billed as demonstrating both countries’ “determination and capability” to safeguard regional peace and stability, underscoring deepening military coordination amid heightened tensions with the West. (Bloomberg, 06.27.26)
• China’s covert training of Russian troops last year, including a three‑week course on radiological, chemical and biological warfare in Beijing, was personally approved by Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and involved at least four Russian and Chinese generals, Reuters reports, citing European officials and classified Russian documents. Around 200 Russian personnel were reportedly trained at PLA facilities in November 2025, some later deploying to Ukraine, deepening European concerns over China’s role as a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war. (Reuters, 07.01.26)

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

• Russia’s Foreign Ministry condemned Finland’s decision to repeal its legislative ban on importing and deploying nuclear weapons as evidence of “blind Russophobia” and a sign Helsinki is now a “compliant tool” of NATO’s nuclear ambitions. Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said the move “creates genuine threats” to Russian security and will require unspecified “political and military‑technical” countermeasures, urging Finns to question whether their leaders have actually made the country safer. (Russian MFA, 06.29.26)

Counterterrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security/AI: 

• Mobile malware infections in Russia surged 70% in the first half of 2026 versus a year earlier, driven largely by Android users sideloading apps via APKs after Western app stores became inaccessible, Kommersant reports. The Mamont banking trojan now accounts for about 15% of infections, with roughly 1.5% of Russian Android devices—about 1.5 million phones—compromised. Criminals push fake “bank” or “update” apps and even bogus AI tools via links in messaging apps and search results. (Meduza, 06.30.26)
• The U.S. State Department is offering up to $10 million for information identifying or locating members of two Russian hacking groups linked to the FSB and military intelligence that allegedly compromised thousands of Signal and WhatsApp accounts via phishing, targeting U.S. government and national‑security officials, NATO diplomats, investigative journalists, security experts and NGO workers on Russia and Ukraine. The reward is offered under the “Rewards for Justice” program. (Korrespondent/The Moscow Times, 06.30.26)

Energy exports from CIS:

Saturday, June 27, 2026

• Russian jet-fuel imports from Belarus surged to 5,170 tons in May—almost four times May 2025 levels—with another 2,600 tons delivered in the first 10 days of June, as Ukraine’s strikes crippled the Moscow Kapotnya refinery, which produced about 1.4 million of Russia’s 11.4 million tons of aviation fuel last year. Moscow has imposed a temporary jet‑fuel export ban, and airline Azimut warns shortages are so acute that many flights “lose all economic rationale.” (Meduza, 06.27.26)
• Russian officials are trying to project economic stability despite nationwide fuel shortages, ISW notes. Deputy PM Alexander Novak claimed reserves are “sufficient” and blamed a 20–30% spike in domestic demand, while floating a temporary diesel‑export ban. At the same time, Vladimir Putin extended through Dec. 31, 2027, his decree banning exports at G7/EU price‑cap levels, even as Ukrainian strikes since March have driven a 30% drop in oil‑and‑gas revenues year‑on‑year and deepened shortages across Russia and occupied Ukraine. (ISW, 06.26.26)
• Ukraine’s intensifying long‑range strikes are deepening unease inside Russia, hitting refineries, arms plants and key electronics facilities while triggering fuel shortages and market jitters, the Washington Post reports. Gasoline output fell 25% in one week in June, dozens of regions have imposed rationing, and Rosneft chief Igor Sechin privately called the refinery damage “unprecedented.” Russia’s federal deficit has already hit 6 trillion rubles—well above the full‑year target—as officials mull more borrowing and even “mobilizing” private savings. One ex‑official described a “state of total uncertainty.” (Washington Post, 06.27.26)

Tuesday, June 30, 2026

• Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed Russia is in talks with unspecified countries to import gasoline as domestic supplies tighten after Ukrainian drone strikes cut refinery output by about 25%. He said imports would proceed if prices are acceptable. Deputy PM Alexander Novak has called imports a “key measure” and the Duma has passed tax changes to subsidize foreign fuel purchases, even as rationing spreads across Russia and annexed Crimea at the height of the travel and harvest seasons. (MT/AFP, 06.30.26)
• Russia’s crude exports have surged to a record four‑week average of 4.13 million barrels per day to June 28, Bloomberg tracking shows, pushing seaborne volumes about a third above their mid‑April low and leading to a buildup of unsold cargoes near Egypt and Singapore. The rise likely reflects crude diverted from damaged refineries after Ukrainian strikes. But prices for Russian grades have tumbled—Baltic cargoes are worth about half their early‑May level—driving Moscow’s oil earnings to their lowest since March. (Bloomberg, 06.30.26)

Wednesday, July 1, 2026

• Wholesale prices for Belarusian AI‑92 gasoline delivered into Russia have risen 1.8‑fold since early May and 6% in the last week alone, to 127,000 rubles per ton, as Moscow leans on Minsk to ease its fuel crisis, Kommersant reports. Exchange sales of Belarusian gasoline reached nearly 80,000 tons between June 1–26, versus minimal volumes a year ago, but analysts say Belarusian refineries have limited capacity and can only modestly support Russia’s wider market. (Meduza, 07.01.26)
• Russia’s seaborne crude exports hit a wartime record in June, averaging 4.13 million barrels per day over the four weeks to June 28—about 780,000 bpd above Q1 levels—as damaged refineries force more crude abroad, Bloomberg data show. But Urals prices have tumbled with global benchmarks, leaving weekly foreign‑currency export revenues at just $1.9 billion, the lowest since March, and creating a record 133 million‑barrel buildup of Russian oil at sea, with tankers idling off Egypt and Singapore. (Meduza, 07.01.26)
• Russia has begun seaborne imports of gasoline from India to ease nationwide shortages caused by Ukrainian strikes on refineries, with at least 60,000 tons already dispatched and plans to import about 400,000 tons a month from several countries including Belarus, Reuters reports. Fuel rationing, long queues and record price rises have hit regions across Russia; Moscow has also passed tax changes to subsidize fuel imports pegged to Indian delivery costs. (Reuters, 07.01.26)

Thursday, July 2, 2026

• Georgia’s only oil refinery, Kulevi on the Black Sea, says it will stop processing Russian crude by August–September 2026 to avoid EU sanctions. Owner Black Sea Petroleum, which handled 650,000 tons of crude in H1, plans to switch to supplies from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan and expand cooperation with U.S. firm Honeywell, hoping non‑Russian feedstock will “open doors to high‑margin markets” in the EU. Brussels had earlier threatened to sanction the plant under its 20th Russia package. (MT/AFP, 07.02.26)
• Rosstat data show Russian gasoline prices rose 1.6% and diesel 2.2% nationwide in the week of June 23–29, to an average 72.38 rubles per liter, with AI‑92 at 68.76 and AI‑95 at 74.38. Prices spiked 30% in occupied Sevastopol, while Moscow and its region saw small declines. The increases come amid a severe fuel crisis from Ukrainian strikes on refineries. After reports that the government had quietly dropped fuel data from its statistical work plan, Rosstat insisted it would continue publishing full price series. (Meduza, 07.02.26)
• Russia’s gasoline shortage is spilling into Central Asia, where countries rely heavily on Russian imports. Kyrgyzstan has appealed to Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and others for help; Uzbekistan’s AI‑92 price has jumped ~11.8% since early June, while Kazakhstan has banned certain rail exports and tightened border crossings to once per day to prevent smuggling. Around 90% of Russian regions now report rationing or disruptions after Ukrainian drone strikes crippled refineries. (Bloomberg, 07.02.26)
  • Kyrgyzstan has asked Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Belarus and Russia to help stabilize fuel supplies as Russia’s refinery‑driven crisis ripples into Central Asia. Bishkek says reserves are “sufficient,” but traders report AI‑95 shortages and only 30–45 days of AI‑92 left; Uzbekistan’s AI‑92 prices are up nearly 12% since early June, and Kazakhstan has tightened export and border controls. Kyrgyzstan gets about 90% of its gasoline from Russia. (Meduza, 07.02.26)

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

Thursday, July 2, 2026

• Russia’s first U.S.-Russia hockey game since the 2022 invasion, held in Moscow, was billed as a sign of warming ties after Trump-Putin talks but highlighted the limits of any thaw. The business-linked match, featuring decorated Russian stars and mostly retired U.S. players, took place behind closed doors and fell far short of the professional spectacle once discussed. Despite strong commercial interest, U.S. sanctions remain and deeper economic cooperation is stalled without a Ukraine settlement. (Financial Times, 07.02.26)

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

Sunday, June 28, 2026

• United Russia’s top five candidates for the 2026 Duma elections are all hardline Putin loyalists: Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov; Yunarmia General Staff chief Vladislav Golovin; Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin; Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova‑Belova, wanted by the ICC over child deportations; and pro‑war milblogger Yevgeny Poddubny. ISW notes the slate emphasizes “strong patriotism” and defense of sovereignty, signaling that Kremlin‑approved war hawks and propagandists are being elevated as model figures for Russians to emulate. (ISW, 06.28.26)

Monday, June 29, 2026

• At its Moscow congress, United Russia rolled out a campaign poster declaring, “Being for Putin is the bare minimum,” with “United Russia—the party of the president” as a secondary slogan and the pro‑war “Z” symbol embedded in the word “za” (“for”). It is the first time since 2007 the ruling party has explicitly branded itself as Putin’s party; in recent years he kept formal distance while Dmitry Medvedev chaired it. Internal guidance for the 2026 campaign had flagged “Putin’s party” messaging as possible, but only “after approval,” which the new poster suggests has now been granted. (Meduza, 06.29.26)

Tuesday, June 30, 2026

• Vladimir Putin has formally tied himself to United Russia ahead of September’s parliamentary elections, with the party campaigning under posters declaring “Being for Putin is the basic minimum” and calling itself “the party of the president” for the first time since 2007. The shift comes as fuel rationing, internet blackouts and Ukrainian drone strikes sap morale and trust in Putin has fallen to 69%, its lowest since 2022, according to Kremlin‑friendly pollster FOM. (Financial Times, 06.30.26)
• A court in Orenburg handed the first known prison sentences under Russia’s 2023 designation of the “international LGBT movement” as extremist, jailing the owner, administrator and art director of a nightclub for up to seven years for allegedly promoting “nontraditional sexual orientation.” The case marks an escalation from earlier fines and suspended terms, as the Kremlin intensifies its “traditional values” campaign with harsher penalties for LGBT‑related speech and businesses. (Bloomberg, 06.30.26)
• Sberbank CEO Herman Gref warned that Russia’s economy “cannot survive long” with the Central Bank’s current 14.25% key interest rate, telling shareholders the economy is already “overcooled” and that non‑macro factors like the fuel crisis are driving prices higher. His remarks contrast with Deputy Governor Alexei Zabotkin’s assertion earlier in June that there were no signs of overcooling; the Central Bank will update its forecast and review the rate again on July 24. (Meduza, 06.30.26)

Wednesday, July 1, 2026

• Russia’s manufacturing PMI edged back into expansion in June for the first time in more than a year, rising to 50.3 from 48.8 in May, S&P Global reported. Output grew at its fastest pace since January 2025 and new orders stabilized after 12 months of decline, but export demand remained weak, jobs continued to be cut, and business confidence stayed below average amid logistics disruptions and import challenges tied to the Middle East conflict. (Moscow Times/Reuters, 07.01.26)
• Russian pollsters FOM and VTsIOM have recorded declining approval for Vladimir Putin in spring 2026; FOM’s late‑June survey put trust in Putin at 69%, the lowest since the full‑scale invasion began. (Meduza, 07.01.26; Meduza, 07.01.26)
• Confidence in Russia’s institutions is slipping: Gallup reports trust in the Russian military has fallen to 66% from 80% in 2022, while confidence in the government dropped to 53% from 66% over the same period, even as the Kremlin continues to tighten domestic control and censor critical voices. (Kyiv Post/Gallup, 07.01.26)
• A new Gallup survey finds Russians are more pessimistic about their economy than at any time in 20 years, with 60% saying conditions in their city or area are getting worse, only 27% seeing improvement and 9% no change, even before this month’s sharp fuel shortages triggered by Ukrainian strikes on refineries. (Kyiv Post/Gallup, 07.01.26)
• Asked about living standards, 56% of Russians told Gallup they are worsening, compared with 29% who say they are improving and 14% who see no change, underscoring mounting strain on households after four years of full‑scale war and recent gasoline shortages across many regions. (Kyiv Post/Gallup, 07.01.26)

Thursday, July 2, 2026

• At a Central Bank forum, Governor Elvira Nabiullina defended Russia’s high 14.25% key rate, blaming “non‑market” state‑subsidized lending for pushing up borrowing costs and warning that cutting rates with high inflation risks “stagflation.” She said the share of preferential corporate and mortgage loans has soared, with state‑related credits now totaling 19 trillion rubles (about 25% of corporate lending). Sberbank chief Herman Gref again urged a rate cut, arguing the economy is in “technical stagnation,” but Nabiullina rejected experimenting “on our country.” (Istories, 07.02.26)
• For the first time since 2007, Ramzan Kadyrov’s name is absent from United Russia’s State Duma candidate list for Chechnya; the regional slate is headed by other deputies and loyal officials, while ally Adam Delimkhanov will run in the single‑mandate district. Kadyrov also skipped the June 28 party congress, renewing speculation about his health amid recurring reports of serious illness. (Meduza, 07.01.26)

Defense and aerospace:

•  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement, justice and emergencies:

• Russia’s terrorist and extremist financing blacklist now includes 465 minors aged 14–17, with a further 298 people added as teenagers during the war who turned 18 while under prosecution, according to rights group Pervy Otdel. Rosfinmonitoring has added 695 adolescents since 2024—28 times more than in 2019–21—and even two 14‑year‑olds born in 2012. Many face terrorism charges for online jokes, anti‑war remarks or alleged provocations by security services; listed individuals have their bank accounts blocked and are limited to withdrawing about 27,000 rubles per month. (Istories, 07.01.26)

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

Saturday, June 27, 2026

• The European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe have adopted parallel resolutions on “transnational repression,” explicitly naming Russia and urging states to protect exiled journalists, activists, and relatives from measures such as Interpol abuse, bank freezes, and denial of consular services or passports. Proposals include EU‑wide monitoring, easier “gray passports” for those stranded without documents, guaranteed basic banking access, and expulsion of diplomats implicated in such repression, though implementation will depend on national governments. (Meduza, 06.27.26)
• Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić told a mass rally in Belgrade that these are his “last days and weeks” as head of state and pledged to resign and call early presidential and parliamentary elections, ahead of his term’s scheduled end in 2027. The move follows more than a year of large student‑led protests over corruption and a deadly railway‑station roof collapse in Novi Sad, and comes amid scandals and stalled EU accession. (RFE/RL, 06.27.26)
  • Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, a Trump ally, says he will resign “in the next three to four months” and may seek to return as prime minister after snap elections, in a move analysts liken to Vladimir Putin’s 2008–12 role swap to circumvent term limits. Facing large student‑led protests over corruption and stalled growth, Vučić has hinted his SNS party will ask him to lead the government, allowing him to retain de facto power despite the presidency’s largely ceremonial role. (Financial Times, 06.30.26)

Tuesday, June 30, 2026

• Poland’s Internal Security Agency detained and deported nine Ukrainian and two Belarusian nationals accused of running a Russian‑funded influence operation that paid Ukrainian refugees to join anti‑Kyiv protests. Authorities say since autumn 2025 the group organized demonstrations in multiple cities, exploiting corruption scandals and other grievances to “erode public trust” in the Ukrainian government, with funding traced back to Russia. (Meduza, 06.30.26)

Wednesday, July 1, 2026

• Russia has closed seven railway border checkpoints with Finland, Estonia and Latvia as of July 1, halting passenger, vehicle and cargo traffic through those crossings, according to a government decree. Five of the shuttered points are on the Finnish border, leaving Finland with no open rail links to Russia; one crossing each remains open via Estonia (Ivangorod) and Latvia (Sebezh). No reason or reopening timeline was given. (MT/AFP, 07.01.26)

Thursday, July 2, 2026

• The Russian Embassy in Sweden said two drones landed on its grounds in Stockholm, one dropping a container of red paint and another carrying what it described as a “simulated improvised explosive device.” Calling the incidents a “brazen attempt to intimidate staff” and part of a “systematic” pattern, the embassy vowed they would “not work.” Swedish authorities had not publicly commented at time of reporting. (Meduza, 07.02.26)

Ukraine:

Monday, June 29, 2026

• Due to extreme heat, emergency power cuts have begun in parts of Ukraine, with at least Khmelnytskyi and Rivne regions introducing unplanned outages, local utilities and officials said. Regional grid operators reported “accidental” shutdowns as high temperatures overloaded lines and equipment; Rivne’s governor said abnormal heat is straining the system and that repair crews are working in reinforced mode. National operator Ukrenergo had warned that heat above 30°C combined with major strikes could trigger multi‑hour summer blackouts. (RBC.ua, 06.29.26)
• Mykola Tyshchenko, a controversial lawmaker expelled from President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s party, has been charged with soliciting a bribe worth more than $1 million, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) said on June 29. Tyshchenko was also charged with money laundering and lying in his asset declaration. Specifically, he laundered Hr 12.6 million ($280,000) through a sham gift agreement with his ex-wife. (Kyiv Independent, 06.29.26)
• Current Time reported on June 29, 2026, that the full 150 million hryvnia bail for former Ukrainian energy and justice minister Herman Halushchenko, a key suspect in the “Midas” corruption case at state company Energoatom, was covered by several private firms. One owner had previously appeared in a NABU case over alleged bribes to Ukrainian Railways officials, raising fresh questions about opaque business–political networks around senior Ukrainian officials. (Current Time, 06.29.26)
• Ukraine’s National Anti‑Corruption Bureau announced bribery, money‑laundering and false‑declaration charges against sitting MP Mykola Tyshchenko. Investigators allege he demanded over $1 million in August 2023 from a person he believed linked to illegal call centers, laundered 12.6 million hryvnias via a sham “gift” from his ex‑wife, and then declared the fictitious income. He is suspected under articles on large‑scale bribery, legalization of illicit funds, and false asset declarations. (RBC.ua, 06.29.26)

Tuesday, June 30, 2026

• Polish Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak‑Kamysz warned that Poland will not agree to Ukraine’s EU accession if Kyiv continues to honor OUN‑UPA figures such as Stepan Bandera, saying “With Bandera, Ukraine will not enter the European Union” and that EU cooperation cannot be built on symbols that “cause pain and spread lies” about neighboring states. (RBC.ua, 06.30.26)
• A bomb exploded in the lobby of a Monaco apartment building on June 29, seriously injuring 58‑year‑old Ukrainian‑born businessman Vadym Yermolaiev—under Ukrainian sanctions for alleged business activity in occupied Crimea—and a woman, plus a 13‑year‑old linked to them. CCTV showed an unidentified man leave a bag before the blast; Monaco’s prosecutor ruled out terrorism and is treating it as a targeted attack. (Meduza, 06.30.26)
  • Monaco investigators increasingly suspect Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) was behind the June 29 bombing that gravely injured sanctioned Ukrainian‑born businessman Vadym Yermolaiev, viewing it more as a “warning” than a clear murder attempt, Le Figaro reports. The bomb, left in a bag outside his building, exploded as Yermolaiev, a woman and a 13‑year‑old arrived, badly injuring the woman—described as his partner—and prompting a manhunt for the suspected courier who fled toward Italy. (Meduza, 06.30.26)
• On June 30, 2026, Obozrevatel reported that prosecutors in Ivano-Frankivsk uncovered a construction-permit bribery scheme in which the city’s chief architect Ihor Musylovskyi, the director of the municipal “Architectural and Planning Bureau-IF” Hryhorii Kachan, and an intermediary allegedly demanded $6,000–$8,000 per permit for reconstruction projects. At least three bribe episodes totaling about $26,000 were documented; suspects face criminal charges, some remain in custody or under bail, and key officials have been suspended pending further investigation. (Obozrevatel, 06.30.26)
• Ukraine has told the International Maritime Organization that Russia’s “shadow fleet” tankers can be considered military assets because they are “critical to the generation of budget revenues” funding Moscow’s war, arguing Kyiv is legally justified in striking such vessels. In a June 26 letter, Deputy PM Oleksiy Kuleba noted Ukraine has hit about a dozen sanctioned tankers, while Russia has attacked at least 59 merchant ships, and said Moscow’s LNG carrier Arctic Metagaz was a legitimate target despite Russian claims of “terrorism.” (Financial Times, 06.30.26)

Wednesday, July 1, 2026

• Former commander-in-chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi told President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that he would run for president if elections are held this fall, according to Ukrainska Pravda sources cited by Meduza. Zaluzhnyi had been summoned from London shortly before British Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced his resignation. At the end of the meeting, the president reportedly asked the former commander-in-chief directly whether, if elections were held in the fall, he would run. And, according to Ukrainska Pravda’s sources, he received an unambiguous answer: “Yes. I will.” Zelenskyy had been prepared to discuss virtually any government post with Zaluzhnyi, sources told Ukrainska Pravda, but after that answer he stopped making offers. (Meduza, 07.01.26)
• In Ukraine, approval of “the job performance of the leadership of the United States” has collapsed to just 7%, with 79% disapproving—the steepest five‑year fall in U.S. approval Gallup has recorded in any country in two decades of polling across more than 140 states, amid frustration over delayed and conditional aid. (Kyiv Post/Gallup, 07.01.26)

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

Monday, June 29, 2026

• Kazakhstan’s president Kassym‑Jomart Tokayev is deepening ties with Washington under Donald Trump as part of a “multivector” strategy to balance Russia and China, securing at least 29 deals worth more than $17 billion with U.S. firms in critical minerals, AI, rail, and satellite internet. Trump has dropped democracy rhetoric in favor of transactional deals, while Tokayev—who recently tightened his own powers—has praised him as “sent by heaven” and joined U.S.-backed initiatives such as the Abraham Accords, betting that closer U.S. ties will bolster Kazakhstan’s autonomy. (New York Times, 06.29.26)

IV. Quotable and notable:

• No significant developments.

Endnotes

1. Sources used: Meduza, 07.02.26; Financial Times, 07.02.26; New York Times, 07.02.26.
2. Sources used: New York Times, 07.02.26; CSIS, 07.01.26.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10.00 am East Coast time on the day it was distributed.

AI agents were used in production of this digest.

Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute an RM editorial policy.

Slider photo: A woman stands at the site of a Russian missile strike that hit a residential building in Kyiv, Ukraine, Thursday, July 2, 2026. (AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky)