4 Things to Know

1. Russia’s and Ukraine’s rival ceasefire initiatives around Russia’s May 9 Victory Day collapsed under escalating strikes from both sides, but then Donald Trump intervened on May 8 to announce a three-day halt of hostilities between the two warring sides. On May 6, while Ukraine observed a unilateral “regime of silence,” Russia reportedly launched drones and missiles, killing more than 20 civilians. Then, as Moscow’s own May 8–9 truce began on May 8, Ukraine launched attack drones plus several Flamingo long‑range cruise missiles—hitting refineries in Yaroslavl and Perm, among other targets.¹ It was after these strikes that Trump intervened to announce that there will be a halt in hostilities, which will begin on May 9, when Russia celebrates the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany, and which will carry on through the weekend.
2. RM’s analysis of ISW’s data for April 7–May 5, 2026, indicates that Russian forces lost 46 square miles of Ukraine’s territory during that period (double the size of Manhattan Island), according to the latest issue of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. In contrast, during the previous four-week period (March 10–April 7, 2026), Russia registered a net gain of 17 square miles of Ukrainian territory. During the past week (April 28–May 5, 2026), Russia suffered a net loss of 21 square miles, compared to 7 square miles (net), which it lost in the preceding week (April 21–28, 2026), according to ISW data. According to DeepState, that past week of April 28–May 5, 2026, saw the Russian armed forces advance in or near nine distinct Ukrainian settlements, while the Ukrainian armed forces conducted a sweep in two settlements in that period.²
3. Russia saw the value of its oil exports jump to the highest level since the Kremlin launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, driven by rising flows and elevated prices triggered by the war in Iran, according to Bloomberg. The value of oil shipments averaged a post-invasion high of $2.42 billion a week in the period to May 3, according to this business news agency. As their export revenues surged, Russian producers paid 707.1 billion rubles ($9.5 billion) in federal oil taxes last month, the highest since October, while the government has resumed buying foreign currency and gold for its National Wealth Fund for the first time since June 2025, also according to Bloomberg. However, while energy exports revenues surged, the Central Bank of Russia revealed that GDP fell 0.5% year on year in Q1 2026, contrary to the bank’s earlier projection of 1.6% annualized growth for the period. In addition, the Kremlin-linked Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting cut its forecast of Russia’s GDP growth in 2026 to 0.5–0.7%, from an earlier estimate of 0.9%-1.33%. 
4. Ilya Remeslo, a longtime Kremlin attack lawyer, has recently stunned Moscow by publicly calling Vladimir Putin “a war criminal and a thief” and demanding his resignation. Remeslo claimed in an interview with WaPo that “part of the system is already starting to work against Putin” and that “Putin will be toppled at some moment by his own circle when he stops being convenient for them completely.” This claim that Putin’s grip on power might be threatened can be heard on opposite ends of Russia’s political spectrum. For instance, exiled Russian commentator Alexander Baunov writes for Carnegie Endowment that “Putin is losing his magic… Instead of a guarantor, he is becoming a liability.” On the other side of spectrum, pro-war Russian nationalist commentator Maxim Kalashnikov predicts that after the “transit (change of the central figure of power),” there will be “an inevitable period of chaos and instability.” Some Russia watchers in the West concur with their Russian counterparts’ proposition that the probability of Putin’s departure from power may have increased. For instance, former U.S. Ambassador John Sullivan now considers a rapid change in Russia “possible,” noting that “in Russia, they say that things don’t happen fast, but when they happen, they happen fast,” according to WSJ. According to WaPo columnist David Ignatius, however, while “there's more restlessness in Russia,” there are no “precursors of a coup” to be seen.*

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• Bellona’s latest nuclear digest highlights mounting problems in Russia’s flagship nuclear projects: Turkey’s Akkuyu plant is years behind its 2025 start date, with Rosatom’s CEO calling it stuck in a “sanctions meat grinder” as delays weaken Rosatom’s contractual leverage and push Ankara to court Candu, South Korean and Chinese alternatives, leaving the Sinop project “effectively an open project.” At home, Bellona says construction dates for Kursk II Unit 3 appear to have been quietly back‑dated, suggesting deliberate concealment of schedule slippage. (Bellona, 05.07.26)
• Former Soviet and Russian chemical defense chief Col. Gen. Stanislav Petrov, who commanded USSR chemical protection troops (1989–1991) and then became the first head of Russia’s NBC defense forces (RKhBZ) until 2001, was found dead at age 87 in his apartment in Moscow’s House on the Embankment on May 2; Russian media report he had been seriously ill and likely died by suicide, with burial set for May 8 at the federal military memorial cemetery in Mytishchi. (RBC, 05.04.26)
• Moscow’s Zamoskvoretsky District Court has ordered the pretrial detention of Stanislav Chuy, former director for shipbuilding and the Arctic at Rosatom’s “Rusatome Automated Control Systems,” in a criminal case over alleged especially large-scale bribery; security services’ interest is likely tied to his Rosatom work and follows earlier bribery arrests of Atomstroyexport vice president Nikolai Vikhansky and associated construction executives. (Nezygar Telegram account, 05.02.26)

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

Saturday, May 2, 2026

• The Iran war has given China, Russia and North Korea a live view of new U.S. capabilities such as AI-assisted precision airstrikes, but also highlighted how rapidly the U.S. has drawn down key stocks of Tomahawk cruise missiles and Patriot interceptors, with U.S. Indo-Pacific commander Adm. Samuel Paparo warning rivals are studying the battlefield impact of “small, low-cost munitions.” (Wall Street Journal, 05.02.26)

Monday, May 4, 2026

• The U.S. war with Iran has consumed up to half of America’s roughly 2,330‑round Patriot interceptor inventory and put future Patriot deliveries to Ukraine under the PURL scheme in doubt, diplomats say, even as Kyiv may need around 2,000 Patriot missiles a year and has received only about 600 over four years. With PAC‑3 MSE production under 200 per year and 42‑month lead times, Europe and new German PAC‑2 lines will struggle to fill the gap quickly. (Foreign Policy, 05.04.26) 

Thursday, May 7, 2026

• The Economist says a leaked, undated GRU proposal outlines plans to supply Iran with 5,000 short‑range fiber‑optic FPV drones, an unspecified number of long‑range satellite‑guided drones equipped with Starlink terminals, and training for operators drawn from 10,000 Iranian students in Russia and other loyal communities. The document argues such deniable aid would complicate U.S. operations in the Gulf—particularly any amphibious assault on Kharg Island or Hormuz—without overtly dragging Russia into war, and fits with broader evidence of deepening Moscow–Tehran military co‑operation and the spread of fiber‑optic drones now seen in Ukraine and in Hezbollah’s attacks on Israel. (The Economist, 05.07.26)
• A Washington Post analysis of satellite imagery finds Iranian strikes have damaged or destroyed at least 228 structures or pieces of equipment at 15 U.S. military sites across the Middle East since Feb. 28—far more than publicly acknowledged—including barracks, hangars, fuel depots, Patriot and THAAD assets, radars, and even an E‑3 Sentry and tanker aircraft. Experts say the precision attacks and high volume of one‑way drones expose gaps in U.S. base hardening and air‑defense planning, especially after U.S. forces expended roughly half of their Patriot and THAAD interceptor inventories in the war’s first weeks. (Washington Post, 05.07.26)

Friday, May 8, 2026

• Reuters says the U.S. has softened its draft U.N. Security Council resolution demanding Iran halt attacks and mining in the Strait of Hormuz by removing explicit Chapter VII language authorizing enforcement measures, but diplomats still expect China and Russia to veto it. The revised text retains tough condemnation of Iranian actions and calls for sanctions compliance, yet Moscow has already criticized it as “one‑sided” and urged the council to avoid escalation, while a Chinese veto would be politically awkward ahead of President Donald Trump’s trip to Beijing next week, where the Iran war will be a central topic. (Reuters, 05.08.26)
• A confidential CIA assessment says Iran can probably withstand Trump’s naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz for 90–120 days or longer. (Washington Post, 05.08.26)

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

Monday, May 4, 2026

• Ukraine says Russia has handed over the bodies of 375 Ukrainian military personnel and civilians who were confirmed prisoners of war, all showing signs of torture, starvation, and lack of medical care; 146 had POW status confirmed by the ICRC and 229 by other evidence, and Ukrainian authorities are documenting the cases as war crimes for the International Criminal Court. (Korrespondent.net, 05.04.26)
• A Russian ecologist told the outlet Agentstvo that petroleum from repeated Ukrainian drone strikes on Tuapse’s refinery and marine terminal has contaminated roughly 60 kilometers of Black Sea coastline, casting doubt on local officials’ promises to fully clean the main city beach and open the resort season by June 1. (Meduza, 05.04.26)

Wednesday, May 6, 2026

• A Kyiv International Institute of Sociology poll found 48% of Ukrainians support adopting whatever reforms and decisions are needed to secure Western financing—even if that requires unpopular steps and higher taxes—while 30% oppose tax hikes even at the cost of underfunding defense and social programs, and 22% are undecided. The debate comes as the EU ties a €90 billion macro‑loan to tougher tax reforms and greater domestic revenue mobilization. (Ukrainska Pravda/Eurointegration, 05.06.26)

Thursday, May 7, 2026

• The Economist reports that repeated Ukrainian drone strikes on Rosneft’s Tuapse oil hub on Russia’s Black Sea coast since April 16 have triggered one of the country’s worst recent environmental disasters, with refinery fires, burning storage tanks, “black rain” and oil spills contaminating roughly 50 km of coastline. (The Economist, 05.07.26)

Friday, May 8, 2026

• For military strikes on civilian targets see the next section.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

• RM’s analysis of ISW’s data for the past four weeks (April 7–May 5, 2026) indicates that Russian forces lost 46 square miles of Ukraine’s territory during that period (double the size of Manhattan Island), according to the latest issue of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. In contrast, during the previous four-week period (March 10–April 7, 2026), Russia registered a net gain of 17 square miles of Ukrainian territory. During the past week (April 28–May 5, 2026), Russia suffered a net loss of 21 square miles, compared to 7 square miles (net), which it lost in the preceding week (April 21–28, 2026), according to ISW data. According to DeepState, that past week of April 28–May 5, 2026, saw the Russian armed forces advance in or near nine distinct Ukrainian settlements, while the Ukrainian armed forces conducted a sweep in two settlements in that period. (RM, 05.06.26)
• Ukraine’s Joint Forces say Russia’s spring–summer offensive is already in its active phase and “is unlikely to escalate further” because Moscow is now spending, not accumulating, resources. Russian troops are using little armor—extra protection only draws “one more drone” per tank—while the front is saturated with diverse UAVs and soon “a large number” of ground robotic systems, with warm, dry weather favoring drone use. (Ukrainska Pravda, 05.07.26)
• Bloomberg counts at least 21 Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil infrastructure in April—including nine on refineries and multiple hits on ports, terminals, and pipelines—the highest monthly tally since December and enough to push Russia’s average refinery runs down to about 4.69 million barrels per day, the lowest since December 2009. The Tuapse refinery alone was forced to halt after three attacks in two weeks, causing days‑long fires, toxic “black rain,” and local environmental damage. (Bloomberg, 04.30.26)

Friday, May 1, 2026

• On May 1, Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced near Riznykivka. (RM, 05.08.26) 
• Ukrainian forces have intensified long‑range strikes on Russian oil and military infrastructure, hitting targets from the Black Sea to the Urals and degrading refinery output to its lowest level in over 15 years. ISW reports that between April 29 and May 1 Ukraine conducted a fourth strike since April 1 on the Tuapse Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai—earlier attacks destroyed at least 24 tanks, damaged four more, forced a shutdown and caused multi‑day fires—and ignited new blazes at the Permsky refinery’s AVT‑4 primary unit and the Orsknefteorgsintez refinery in Orenburg Oblast. Ukraine’s General Staff also confirmed drones struck Su‑57 fighters and Su‑34 bombers at Shagol Airfield in Chelyabinsk Oblast (about 1,676 km from the border) on April 25, and Mi‑28 and Mi‑17 helicopters at an airfield near Babky in Voronezh Oblast on April 29–30. ISW says Russian refinery throughput has fallen to around 4.69 mn bpd, the lowest since December 2009. (ISW, 05.01.26) 

Saturday, May 2, 2026

• On May 2, Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces c advanced near Berestok and Ivanopillya. (RM, 05.08.26)
• ISW estimates that Russian forces suffered a net loss of 116 square kilometers of controlled territory in Ukraine in April 2026—the first monthly net loss since Ukraine’s August 2024 incursion into Kursk—as Russian advances have steadily slowed since November 2025 under pressure from Ukrainian counterattacks, mid‑range strikes, a February 2026 block on Russian Starlink use, and new Kremlin restrictions on Telegram. Over the last six months (November 2025–April 2026), Russian troops seized about 1,443 sq km compared with 2,368 sq km in the same period a year earlier, averaging 2.9 sq km per day in the first four months of 2026 versus 9.76 sq km in early 2025. (ISW, 05.02.26)³ According to RM’s calculations for the same two six-month periods, Russia gained 2,616 square kilometers from Nov. 1, 2024, to April 29, 2025, and 1,313 square kilometers from Nov. 4, 2025, to April 28, 2026.
• Ukraine carried out 21 strikes on Russian oil infrastructure in April—including at least nine refineries—pushing refinery throughput down to about 4.69 mn barrels per day, its lowest level since 2009, by targeting plants, pipelines and Baltic export terminals such as Primorsk and Ust‑Luga. Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces chief Robert Brovdi (“Magyar”) told the BBC that no part of Russia within 1,500–2,000 km of the border is now a safe rear, claiming his drone branch (about 2% of the army) destroys roughly one‑third of all targets while losing under 1% of its personnel annually. Ukraine’s new Unmanned Systems Forces, which commands just 15 units, reported at least 36,359 Russian targets hit and 4,337 confirmed destroyed in April alone; officials say 70–80% of battlefield kills now come from FPV drones, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has told the U.K. Parliament the figure is closer to 90%. (Washington Post/AP, 05.02.26; bne IntelliNews, 05.02.26; Meduza, 05.02.26; Financial Times, 05.02.26)
• A Russian drone hit a minibus in Kherson, killing two and wounding seven before a second strike injured another driver; Russian forces also attacked port infrastructure in Odesa and claimed to have captured the village of Myropillia in Sumy region. (Washington Post/AP, 05.02.26; bne IntelliNews, 05.02.26; Meduza, 05.02.26)

Sunday, May 3, 2026

• On May 3, Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced near Andriivka-Klevtsove. (RM, 05.08.26)
• Ukraine said May 3 it had hit several Russian ships — a cruise missile carrier and three shadow fleet tankers — as both sides fired hundreds of drones in a spree that killed at least eight people. (MT/AFP, 05.03.26)
• Russia’s Defense Ministry claims air defenses downed 334 Ukrainian drones over 15 regions and occupied Crimea on the night of May 3, including 6 in Moscow oblast (where a 77‑year‑old man was killed), 59 in Leningrad region and 143 in Bryansk region, prompting temporary flight restrictions at major airports in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Pskov, Kostroma and Penza. (Meduza, 05.03.26) 
• Hezbollah’s growing use of first‑person‑view (FPV) explosive drones in Lebanon is directly drawing on tactics forged in the Russia‑Ukraine war, U.S. and Israeli officials say. The Wall Street Journal notes FPVs—small, cheap quadcopters that have “wreaked havoc in Russia and Ukraine” and now account for most battlefield casualties there—have 15 km+ range (longer with repeaters or fiber‑optic cables) and cost only hundreds of dollars each, yet are highly accurate and hard to detect. The New York Times reports Hezbollah is now flying fiber‑optic‑guided FPVs—“a technology long in use in Ukraine”—that are largely immune to GPS and radio jamming. Former Ukrainian defense minister Oleksiy Reznikov says Israel is now facing “Russian‑derived combat experience through Iranian proxies,” as Iran studies Ukraine and cooperates militarily with Moscow. (Wall Street Journal, 04.30.26; New York Times, 05.03.26)
• Peru’s Foreign Ministry says 18 Peruvians who were deceived into going to Russia and then sent to fight against Ukraine have returned home in the past two weeks, with one more due back on May 3, six arriving on May 4, and two others still awaiting repatriation under the protection of diplomats at the Peruvian Embassy in Moscow. (Meduza, 05.03.26) 

Monday, May 4, 2026

• Russia lost more territory than it gained in Ukraine in April for the first time since a Ukrainian counteroffensive in the summer of 2023, an AFP analysis of data from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) showed. Moscow ceded control of about 120 square kilometers (46 square miles) between March and April, the ISW data revealed. (MT/AFP, 05.04.26) 
• Zelenskyy said Ukrainian forces hit a Kalibr‑equipped Karakurt‑class small missile ship, a patrol boat and a “shadow fleet” tanker near Primorsk in Leningrad Oblast, damaging oil‑loading infrastructure, and struck three more shadow‑fleet tankers near Novorossiysk. ISW reports that earlier and parallel attacks have now caused over $300 mn in damage at Tuapse’s refinery and port, destroyed about 70% of Transneft’s Perm dispatch station tanks, and forced major refineries such as Kirishi (20–21 mn tons/year capacity) to halt operations after multiple crude units were hit, while Flamingo missiles reportedly flew over 1,500 km to hit the VNIIR Progress plant near Cheboksary, a key producer of GLONASS/GPS/EW‑resistant navigation components. Ukrainian drones and missiles also killed at least one person and wounded nine in Belgorod, and a drone struck a 54‑story tower about four miles from the Kremlin in a rare hit on central Moscow, underscoring deep‑rear vulnerability as Russia retaliated with 269 drones and missiles that killed at least two civilians near Odesa. (The Moscow Times/AFP, 05.03.26, 05.04.26; ISW, 05.04.26; New York Times, 05.04.26; AP/Washington Post, 05.04.26)
• Russian forces struck the town of Merefa in Ukraine’s Kharkiv region, hitting a café, about 10 homes, four shops, an auto repair shop, and two cars, killing five civilians and injuring 18 people, four of them seriously; Russian milbloggers claimed the strike was carried out with an Iskander missile. Russia’s Defense Ministry threatened a “massive retaliatory missile strike on the center of Kyiv” over what it falsely framed as Zelenskyy’s threat to hit the May 9 Victory Day parade, ISW notes, arguing the bluster reflects Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recognition that he cannot reliably shield Moscow and other deep‑rear areas from Ukrainian drones and missiles. ISW finds no evidence Zelenskyy explicitly threatened the parade, only that he said Russia “fears drones may pass over Red Square.” (ISW, 05.04.26; IStories, 05.04.26)
• The New York Times reports that Russia is drawing growing numbers of Africans into its war on Ukraine, often via sham “job” offers advertised by fly‑by‑night agencies, with contracts in Russian and coercion once they arrive; Kenyan intelligence estimates about 1,000 Kenyans have been sent to Russia and into Ukraine so far, with only 30 returning alive, and at least nine African states have reported similar cases. (New York Times, 05.04.26)

Tuesday, May 5, 2026

• On May 5, Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced near Pishchane and in Rodynske. (RM, 05.08.26)
• Reuters reports that a new Ukrainian drone attack forced Russia’s Kirishi refinery—its second‑largest, with capacity around 20 mn tons a year and roughly 7% of national throughput—to halt processing after three of four crude distillation units and several secondary units were damaged; the plant, about 800 km from Ukraine and a key diesel supplier, has been hit multiple times this year and repair timelines are unclear. Regional authorities in Chuvashia said two people were killed and dozens wounded in a Ukrainian drone attack, as Volodymyr Zelenskyy released video of F‑5 Flamingo cruise missiles striking multiple targets including the VNIIR Progress defense plant in Cheboksary, claiming the missiles flew over 1,500 km to hit a facility that produces relay protection systems, low‑voltage gear, and navigation elements for Russia’s navy, missile industry, aviation and armor. (Reuters, 05.05.26; The Moscow Times/AFP, 05.05.26; RBC.ua, 05.05.26; The Moscow Times, 05.05.26)
• On May 4–5 Russia launched one daytime Iskander‑M and 88 Shahed/Gerbera/Italmas‑type drones, then overnight added 11 more Iskander‑Ms and 164 drones, killing at least seven civilians and injuring at least 35, mainly by hitting energy infrastructure in Poltava, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kyiv oblasts. Ukrainian air defenses downed one missile and 219 drones, but nine missiles and 28 drones still struck at least 14 locations, including a “double‑tap” on first responders at a Poltava gas site that killed two rescuers and wounded at least 23.  Russian strikes on May 5 killed at least 12 people in Zaporizhzhia—hitting industrial facilities, homes, and a car repair complex—and a separate aerial bomb attack on central Kramatorsk killed five and wounded five more, according to regional officials and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. (Meduza, 05.06.26; ISW, 05.04.26)

Wednesday, May 6, 2026

• Russia launched a large air assault around May 5–6, killing at least 21–27 civilians and injuring more than 70–82 across Ukraine, while Kyiv observed a unilateral May 6 ceasefire. Strikes hit Zaporizhzhia (12 killed, 51 wounded), Kramatorsk (5 killed, ≥12 wounded) with three “bunker‑buster” bombs, Dnipro (4 killed, ≥19 wounded), and Chernihiv, while a follow‑on strike near Poltava killed two rescue workers and wounded 31, and a Shahed drone struck a kindergarten in Sumy, killing a female guard. Overnight, Russia fired 108 attack drones, two Iskander‑M ballistic missiles and one Kh‑31 missile, with Ukraine downing or suppressing 89 drones but still suffering hits in Kharkiv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia and Kyiv region; Zelenskyy said by 10:00 a.m. Russia had violated the ceasefire 1,820 times. (Wall Street Journal, RFE/RL, RBC.ua, Washington Post/AP, Istories, Meduza, ISW, 05.06.26)
• A Ukrainian drone strike on the Crimean town of Dzhankoi, home to a key military airbase, killed five people on May 7, according to Kremlin‑installed governor Sergei Aksyonov, in a broader overnight barrage where Russia claimed to have intercepted 53 Ukrainian drones over multiple regions and accused Kyiv of violating its own May 5–6 ceasefire; ISW notes the Dzhankoi strike occurred shortly before midnight on May 5, before Ukraine’s truce began. Ukrainian drones also hit the Russian city of Cheboksary, striking at least one apartment building, sparking fires and injuring multiple people, with law‑enforcement‑linked Telegram channels reporting one dead and 10–12 wounded and public transit suspended amid reports the nearby VNIIR‑Progress defense plant was targeted. On May 6, Ukraine used its homegrown F‑5 Flamingo long‑range cruise missile, along with drones, to hit the VNIIR‑Progress weapons factory—over 1,200 km from the border—which makes navigation systems for Russian missiles; local officials said two people were killed. (The Moscow Times, 05.06.26; Meduza, 05.05.26; ISW, 05.06.26; RFE/RL, 05.06.26)

Thursday, May 7, 2026

• On May 7, Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced near Horikhove and Filiya. (RM, 05.08.26)
• Russian strike waves hit Ukraine on May 7, killing more than 20 people—including at least 12 in Zaporizhzhia, four in Dnipro and five in central Kramatorsk—and injuring dozens more in broad‑daylight attacks on civilian infrastructure; Volodymyr Zelenskyy called the “absolutely cynical” barrage proof that Putin’s proposed May 9 ceasefire is about shielding a parade, not ending the war, and pointed to Ukraine’s own deep‑strike campaign, including F‑5 Flamingo missiles that flew over 1,500 km to hit targets near Cheboksary in Russia. (New York Times, 05.07.26)
• Russia said its air defenses shot down 347 Ukrainian drones overnight across 20 regions—including around Moscow—in what it called Ukraine’s second‑largest drone attack of the war, days after it ignored Kyiv’s unilateral ceasefire and on the eve of May 9 Victory Day events; nearly 100 flights at Moscow’s main airports were delayed or canceled, and authorities plan to shut down mobile internet and SMS on May 9 while warning they may launch a “mass strike on Kyiv” if the parade is disrupted. Local officials said a Ukrainian drone killed at least one person in Belgorod and that more than 120 drones hit Bryansk region overnight, injuring at least 13 and damaging apartments and vehicles, while Perm Krai’s governor reported drones striking an industrial facility in Perm amid repeated air‑raid sirens and “oil rain” after earlier hits on a Lukoil refinery and pumping station. (Washington Post/AP, 05.07.26; The Moscow Times/AFP, 05.07.26; Meduza, 05.07.26)
  • Russia’s Leningrad Oblast lies some 600 kilometers from the closest corner of Ukraine. But on April 15, its governor declared it a “frontline” region. Part of his explanation: From January through March, a total of 243 Ukrainian drones were shot down over the province, he said. (RFE/RL, 05.07.26)
  • Russia’s Defense Ministry accused Ukraine on May 7 of using Latvian airspace to launch drone attacks against civilian sites in St. Petersburg, hours after Latvia reported several drones had crossed into its territory from Russia. (MT/AFP, 05.07.26)
• Valerii Zaluzhnyi, former Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, told the Defence24 Days conference in Poland that:
  • Ukraine’s current mobilization system is still built on First and Second World War principles and must change because “the entire territory of the state and, unfortunately, the entire population becomes a combat zone,” while pushing more people to the front under drone-dense conditions only scales up casualties. He said Ukraine must move to “intelligent mobilization,” which accounts for technological change and a long war, including options such as gradually shifting some functions to private military companies and building a nationwide system with “clear deadlines for both training and service” that resembles Israel’s model of permanent readiness.  He said that without radical reform of the armed forces, reserve training, combat training, and the defense industry toward weapons that “reduce human casualties,” any talk of demobilization during a full-scale war is “nothing more than political populism,” stressing that maintaining combat capability is the key not only to survival but to any acceptable end to the war. (Ukrainska Pravda, 05.07.26)
  • Modern war has become “a war of drones,” where “artillery is no longer the god of war, [and] tanks are a thing of the past, like horses and sabers,” warning that as long as commanders cling to old doctrines, “troops will continue to suffer heavy losses in personnel.” (Ukrainska Pravda, 05.07.26)⁴
  • Russia’s strategy of inflicting “critical losses on the Armed Forces of Ukraine through its own losses” aims to force society to capitulate, and that an information campaign to “discredit the mobilization process itself” has successfully turned mobilization into “the center of conflict between the country’s population and the state authorities.” (Ukrainska Pravda, 05.07.26)

Friday, May 8, 2026

• A Kremlin-proposed cease-fire to mark Victory Day collapsed within hours, as Ukraine and Russia reported hundreds of violations a day before a scaled-down military parade in Moscow. (RFE/RL, 05.08.26) 
• Ukraine launched one of its largest drone barrages just as Russia’s unilateral May 8–9 ceasefire took effect, targeting refineries and air infrastructure from southern Russia to the Urals. Moscow claims air defenses intercepted 264 Ukrainian drones between midnight and 7 a.m., including more than 30 aimed at the capital; Mayor Sergei Sobyanin reported 27 shot down near Moscow with no casualties. Ukrainian drones hit the Yaroslavnefteorgsintez refinery in Yaroslavl, sparking a large fire, and struck Lukoil’s Permnefteorgsintez refinery and a key Transneft pumping station in Perm—over 1,500 km from Ukraine—for the third time in two weeks, igniting a crude distillation unit and damaging storage tanks. A separate strike on the regional air‑traffic control center in Rostov‑on‑Don paralyzed operations at 13+ southern airports, forcing hundreds of cancellations and delays and stranding at least 14,000 passengers. Zelenskyy said Russia simultaneously conducted over 140 strikes and 10 ground assaults, showing “not even a token attempt to cease fire.” (Bloomberg, 05.08.26; Meduza, 05.08.26; The Moscow Times/AFP, 05.08.26; The Moscow Times, 05.08.26; Ukrainska Pravda, 05.08.26)
• The Wall Street Journal’s Jillian Kay Melchior cites Ukrainian and ISW data indicating at least 136 successful strikes on Russian targets this year—42 since April 1 alone—and notes that Ukrainian firm Fire Point is ramping output of FP‑1/FP‑2 drones and Flamingo cruise missiles while repeated hits on refineries and ports have temporarily disabled roughly 40% of Russia’s oil export capacity, “the most severe oil supply disruption in the modern history of Russia.” (Wall Street Journal, 05.08.26)
• Commander‑in‑Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi said Ukrainian intelligence estimates that Russia plans to produce 7.3 million FPV drones and 7.8 million warheads for various UAVs in 2026, and is urgently deploying four new regiments, 24 battalions and 162 batteries to counter Ukrainian strike drones while thickening air defenses around Moscow and Krasnodar. He noted Russia is “copying Ukrainian solutions” in drone forces and EW, but said Ukraine’s drone units still hold the initiative, having carried out nearly 357,000 missions and destroyed over 160,700 verified targets in April alone—more Russian personnel than Moscow is managing to mobilize each month. (Ukrainska Pravda, 05.08.26)

Military aid to Ukraine: 

Monday, May 4, 2026

• EU leaders met U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer on the sidelines of the European Political Community summit in Yerevan to deepen cooperation on Ukraine, migration and trade, with a central focus on British participation in the EU’s €90 billion Ukraine loan scheme. Britain will now open formal talks on joining the EU‑led package, which would see London cover roughly €20 billion in interest costs over seven years in exchange for broad access for U.K. defense firms to Ukraine contracts, including a share of the €60 billion earmarked for military procurement (the remaining €30 billion supports Ukraine’s budget). (Financial Times, 05.04.26) 

Wednesday, May 6, 2026

• Zelenskyy is asking Western allies to speed up deliveries of air-defense systems and interceptor missiles to prepare for another winter of intense bombing that could prove to be the next critical moment in Kyiv’s battle to resist the Russian invasion. The topic came up during the Ukrainian president’s discussions with European leaders and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte at a summit meeting in Armenia’s capital, Yerevan, earlier this week, people familiar with the matter said. While the request isn’t new — Kyiv has been pressing allies to supply air defense systems continuously since Moscow’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 — it’s now more urgent, because Ukraine’s power and heating facilities have become increasingly difficult to sustain after years of Russian air strikes against civilian infrastructure. (Bloomberg, 05.06.26)
• Ukrainian drone-warfare officer Dmytro Putiata writing in The Economist argues says Ukraine now “dominates” the drone and anti‑drone fight, while Russia is lagging badly. Since late 2025, Russia has only fielded a patchy drone‑against‑drone defense and is still trying to network small radars and Skymap/Graphite‑style software. Over the past six months, Ukraine has sharply increased drone strikes 30–200 km behind the front, hitting logistics, air defenses, radars, ammo and fuel depots, with nightly attacks 80–120 km deep forcing Russia to cut fuel use, move depots back into Russia, and limit Donetsk convoys to just two trucks. Cheap Ukrainian drones (about $5,000 each) are now routinely striking high‑value assets 30–150 km from the line, including two helicopters more than 150 km away, contributing to what the author calls a “significant net reduction” in Russian firepower and an operational impasse for Moscow. (The Economist, 05.06.26)
• Norway will provide Ukraine 2.8 billion kroner (about $302.8 million) via the U.S.-run Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) program to finance the purchase of American weapons, bringing Norway’s total PURL contributions to over 12.5 billion kroner. Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre urged more European states to join in ensuring Ukraine receives critical U.S.-made equipment quickly. (Ukrainska Pravda/Eurointegration, 05.06.26)

Friday, May 8, 2026

• IntelliNews notes that Europe is financing Ukraine’s war effort largely with long‑term collective debt—most recently a €90 billion EU‑level loan that will be repaid only if Russia ever pays reparations—while Russia funds its vastly larger defense budget mostly with current tax revenue and only modest domestic borrowing. EU‑backed Ukraine commitments have reached about €283 billion, pushing Ukraine’s debt‑to‑GDP ratio above 100%, whereas Russia’s public debt is around 18% of GDP, though a Q1 2026 budget deficit of 4.6 trillion rubles and a 45% drop in oil‑and‑gas revenues show Moscow is also under growing fiscal strain. (IntelliNews, 05.08.26) 

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

Saturday, May 2, 2026

• The EU is preparing more sanctions on people and entities in Russia and Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine that the bloc deems responsible for the illegal deportation and so-called “reeducation efforts” of Ukrainian children. (RFE/RL, 05.02.26)
• Western corporate “exit” from Russia has been limited and distorted: about 11,000 foreign firms still earn profits there, and only 12% (547 of at least 4,277) publicly traded foreign companies have fully left since February 2022. Typical exits now involve roughly a 60% discount plus a 35% levy, leaving sellers with just 20–40% of book value while generating nearly $10 billion for Russia’s budget ($1.5 billion in 2023 and about $4 billion in both 2024 and early 2025). Firms that openly stayed have reportedly boosted profits by around 10%, or roughly $5 billion annually, writes Kirill Shamiev. (Kennan Institute, 05.01.26)

Monday, May 4, 2026

• A new Gruppa 7/89 survey finds 56% of Russians want Western brands to return after their post‑2022 exodus, with support surging to 84% among 18‑ to 29‑year‑olds (versus 38% of those 60+); 41% specifically want Western carmakers back, followed by media and gaming (28%), software (27%), furniture/building materials (25%), food and beverages (23%), and cosmetics (22%), while 27% oppose any return and 17% are undecided. (Meduza, 05.04.26)

Tuesday, May 5, 2026

• The British government on May 5 imposed sanctions on 35 individuals and entities accused of trafficking vulnerable migrants to fight in Ukraine and supplying critical components to Russian drone manufacturers. (MT/AFP, 05.05.26)

Wednesday, May 6, 2026

• The European Commission has warned Italy and the Venice Biennale that reopening Russia’s national pavilion could breach EU sanctions by providing services and indirect economic support to the Kremlin, since the pavilion is state‑owned and funded by Moscow, and has given organizers 30 days to explain their arrangements while threatening to cut a three‑year, €2 mn grant if the show proceeds unchanged. The Russian pavilion has returned to the Biennale for the first time since the full‑scale invasion of Ukraine, offering folk and electronic performances and free vodka but no traditional art, and will be open only to professionals for three days (May 6–8), triggering EU scrutiny, Italian inspections, and protests from Ukrainian and dissident Russian artists who say Venice is helping Moscow normalize and “whitewash” its war. (Meduza, 05.06.26; Financial Times, 05.06.26; New York Times, 05.06.26)
• Russian customs officials said they had identified “extremist literature” in a shipment of children’s books imported from Britain, according to a statement released by the St. Petersburg branch of the Federal Customs Service. (MT/AFP, 05.06.26)

Thursday, May 7, 2026

• UniCredit, one of the last major European banks with a significant presence in Russia, has signed a non‑binding accord to sell most of its Russian unit to an unnamed private investor in the United Arab Emirates as it accelerates its exit from the country. The Italian lender expects a €3–3.3 billion hit to profits—roughly a third of its 2025 net income—but says the disposal will not affect its dividend or buyback plans and should boost capital ratios. Under the preliminary deal, UniCredit will spin off its payments business for Western and non‑sanctioned clients into a separate entity it will retain, and sell the rest of its Russian operations, with completion targeted in the first half of 2027 pending regulatory and Kremlin approval. (Bloomberg, 05.07.26; The Moscow Times/AFP, 05.07.26; Wall Street Journal, 05.07.26; Financial Times, 05.07.26)
• Russia’s media regulator Roskomnadzor has filed lawsuits against some of the world’s largest video game companies for refusing to store the personal data of Russian gamers on servers inside the country, the Kommersant business newspaper reported May 7. (MT/AFP, 05.07.26)

Friday, May 8, 2026

• An EU official in Brussels said the bloc will on May 11 add “a significant number of new names” to sanctions lists targeting Russians involved in the abduction and illegal deportation of Ukrainian children, expanding an already “long list” of designated individuals. The move will coincide with a high‑level meeting of the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children, co‑chaired by the EU, Ukraine, and Canada, focused on concrete steps to bring children home and hold Russia accountable. (Ukrainska Pravda/Eurointegration, 05.08.26)

For sanctions on the energy sector, please see section “Energy exports from CIS” below.

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

Interestingly, it has transpired this week that some officials in Ukraine and Russia share the view that it might be time for the sides to make peace and sell that as a victory to their respective compatriots. First, former commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian armed forces and its current ambassador to the UK Valery Zaluzhnyi said during a Q&A in late April: “So victory, for both Russia and Ukraine, is increasingly a question of how to sell the outcome as a victory. Someone will gain territory and people and call that ‘victory’; someone will lose almost everything yet still try to sell it as ‘victory’ to their people. That’s the current problem” Then,  investigative Dossier Center has reported this week that an internal Russian presidential administration presentation declares that “you have to know when to stop. Overreach means defeat; continuing the Special Military Operation would be a Pyrrhic victory” and lays out how to “sell” the peace with Ukraine to the Russian public.

Monday, May 4, 2026

• Zelenskyy told the European Political Community summit in Yerevan that Ukrainian drones “can also strike” Moscow’s May 9 Victory Day parade and noted this year’s event will feature no heavy military equipment for the first time in many years, calling it proof Russia is “no longer as strong as before”; he urged continued sanctions on Russian oil, industry, and banks, and said this summer will force Putin to choose between escalation or diplomacy, with Europe needing a unified voice at any talks. (Kyiv Post, 05.04.26)

Tuesday, May 5, 2026

• Zelenskyy has declared a Ukrainian “regime of silence” starting at 00:00 on the night of May 5–6 in response to Russia’s unilateral announcement of a May 8–9 Victory Day ceasefire, calling Putin’s proposal “utter cynicism” and saying human life is worth more than any anniversary. He offered instead an immediate, open‑ended truce from May 6 and pledged to “mirror” Russia only if it genuinely halts fire, noting on X that “there has been no official appeal to Ukraine regarding the modality of a cessation of hostilities” and that Russia’s Defense Ministry “believes it cannot hold a parade in Moscow without Ukraine’s goodwill.” RBC‑Ukraine reports the idea of a May 8–9 ceasefire originated in a Trump–Putin call and that the Kremlin mainly wants quiet to protect a scaled‑back Red Square parade—its first in nearly 20 years without heavy hardware—while Moscow warns any Ukrainian interference would trigger a “massive missile strike” on central Kyiv and continues large missile and drone attacks that have killed Naftogaz staff, first responders and other civilians. (IStories, 05.05.26; RBC.ua, 05.05.26; Financial Times, 05.05.26; Bloomberg, 05.04.26)

Wednesday, May 6, 2026

• China’s Foreign Ministry said it “supports all efforts” to stop hostilities and create conditions for a “political settlement” of the “Ukraine crisis,” when asked about Kyiv’s proposal for a mutual ceasefire from May 6. Beijing reiterated its long‑standing call for all parties to maximize efforts toward dialogue and negotiations. (RBC.ua, 05.06.26)
• Ukraine’s chief negotiator, Rustem Umerov, is expected to travel to Miami to meet with U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff as early as this week, according to people familiar with the matter. Peace talks between Russia and Ukraine have stalled and haven’t drawn as much attention in recent weeks, eclipsed by the conflict between the U.S., Israel and Iran, that’s spiked global energy prices. Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown no signs of stepping back from territorial demands over parts of Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region that Moscow has failed to capture on the battleground in a war now in its fifth year. (Bloomberg, 05.06.26)

Thursday, May 7, 2026

• Ukraine’s chief negotiator Rustem Umerov arrived in the U.S. for meetings with President Donald Trump’s envoys in a bid to reinvigorate stalled peace talks with Russia, Zelenskyy said. “We are working to ensure that this helps bring a dignified peace closer and guarantee security,” Zelenskyy said in a post on X on May 7, adding that Kyiv is aware that its U.S. partners are in close contact with their Russian counterparts. (Bloomberg, 05.07.26)
• A late‑April Levada Center poll finds that 69% of Russians still support their armed forces’ actions in Ukraine (38% “definitely,” 31% “rather” support), down 11 points from May 2025, while opposition has risen to 21% (10% “definitely,” 11% “rather” oppose), up 8 points. Support for continuation of war increased by 3 percentage points since March 2026 to total 27%, while 62% support peace negotiations. (Levada Center, 05.07.26) 

Friday, May 8, 2026

• Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov said Moscow sees “no point” in further U.S.-mediated peace talks until Zelenskyy agrees to withdraw Ukrainian forces from all of Donbas, calling any further persuasion “a waste of time.” He claimed only “one serious step” by Kyiv—pulling back from remaining areas of Donetsk—would both halt military operations and open the way to a long‑term settlement, freezing negotiations that had reportedly resolved most technical issues before stalling over Donbas and as U.S. envoys turned to the Iran war. (Meduza, 05.08.26)
  • Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico may deliver a message from Zelenskyy to Putin during his trip to Moscow this weekend, a senior official in Bratislava said May 7. The contents of Zelenskyy’s alleged message to Putin were not made public. Fico and Zelenskyy have been in contact twice over the last week, Chovanec said. Ukraine has not commented on whether Zelenskyy asked Fico to deliver a message to the Russian leader. (MT/AFP, 05.08.26)
• European Council President António Costa said EU leaders are “preparing for potential” direct talks with Putin, at Zelenskyy’s invitation, amid frustration that U.S.-led trilateral negotiations have stalled since Trump’s Iran war began and risk sidelining Europe. Costa stressed Brussels won’t “disturb” the U.S. process and noted there is still “no sign” from Moscow of readiness for serious talks, but Ukrainian officials say they want a single European figure who can speak to Russia for all 27 states to ensure any eventual deal meets EU and Ukrainian interests. (Financial Times, 05.08.26)
• Ukraine expects envoys of Trump to visit Kyiv “at the turn of spring–summer,” Zelenskyy said after a report from National Security and Defense Council secretary Rustem Umerov on his U.S. trip, adding that talks were “substantive” and focused on scheduling visits, prisoner exchanges, and security guarantees. Zelenskyy said he hopes this time planned visits will be realized so diplomacy can be “re‑energized.” (RBC.ua, 05.08.26)
• Zelenskyy said he gave Rustem Umerov three priorities for his U.S. consultations: securing a new round of prisoner exchanges, “activating the diplomatic process,” and advancing specific security cooperation tasks with America. He noted Ukraine is in constant touch with Washington and aware of U.S. contacts with Moscow, and expects a detailed report after Umerov’s meetings. (RBC.ua, 05.08.26)

Friday, May 8, 2026

• Trump announced that Russia and Ukraine have agreed to a three-day ceasefire and a mutual release of 1,000 prisoners each, starting May 9 and coinciding with Moscow’s May 9 Victory Day celebrations. Trump said the pause, covering “all kinetic activity,” was granted at his request after talks in the U.S. between Ukrainian negotiator Rustem Umerov and Trump envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. Zelenskyy confirmed the deal, calling prisoner releases a key humanitarian priority and signing a decree temporarily excluding Red Square from Ukraine’s strike plans, while Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov said both sides coordinated the arrangement via U.S. officials. (Wall Street Journal, 05.08.26)

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

Friday, May 1, 2026

• The Pentagon will withdraw about 5,000 of roughly 36,000 U.S. troops stationed in Germany over the next 6–12 months and has canceled a previously planned long‑range missile unit deployment, moves that analysts say widen a critical capability gap in Europe’s conventional deterrent against Russia and deepen NATO worries about U.S. decisions taken without prior consultation. Around 80,000 U.S. troops will remain in Europe overall, and German leaders have reacted with relative calm, arguing that Berlin’s own recent military buildup offsets much of the impact, though local economies around bases such as Ramstein fear losses. (Financial Times, 05.01.26; New York Times, 05.06.26)

Saturday, May 2, 2026

• Washington has warned European allies that deliveries of key U.S. weapons systems will face “serious” long delays as stockpiles are drained by the Iran war, with munitions for HIMARS, NASAMS and other missiles now being triaged across regions and allied users of these systems —including Ukraine, Taiwan, Norway, Poland, Lithuania and Estonia —told to expect multi‑year slippage despite efforts to “quadruple” production. (Financial Times, 05.02.26)

Sunday, May 3, 2026

• The U.S. has cancelled a planned deployment to Germany of a long‑range missile battalion equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles (range 1,500km+), SM‑6 ballistic missiles and the Dark Eagle hypersonic system, scrapping a key “bridging” capability that was meant to cover at least a five‑year gap while Europe develops its own deep‑precision‑strike weapons; analysts warn this leaves NATO without U.S. land‑based long‑range missiles in Europe for the first time since the Cold War, while European projects such as the ELSA program and a UK‑German 2,000km‑range system are still years away. (Financial Times, 05.02.26)
• BAE Systems’ Hägglunds plant in northern Sweden has expanded production capacity for its CV90 infantry fighting vehicles by 400% since 2021 and is preparing a joint European order for about 500 CV90s that would nearly double its current 600‑vehicle backlog, with deliveries running to 2032; headcount has more than tripled to 2,600, and sales have climbed from about $200 million in 2020 to $1.1 billion in 2025. (Financial Times, 05.03.26)

Monday, May 4, 2026

• NATO’s Military Committee will meet at Chiefs of Defense level in Brussels on May 19, 2026, to review deterrence and defense posture, missions, and capability planning ahead of the Ankara summit, with Secretary General Mark Rutte joining for a political discussion. A NATO‑Ukraine Council CHODs session, also involving the EU Military Committee chair, will assess the situation along Ukraine’s front lines and global implications of Russia’s war, and coordinate continued NATO‑EU support to Kyiv. A joint CMC–SACEUR–SACT press conference will follow. (NATO, 04.28.26)
•  The New York Times describes a large‑scale “big experiment” in which about 4,000 soldiers from the U.S. Army’s 11th Airborne Division trained in Arctic Alaska to learn how to fight and survive in temperatures down to –40°C, as Washington refocuses on competition with Russia and China in the High North. The 10‑day exercise at the Yukon Training Center tested how weapons, fuel, drones and tents perform in extreme cold—and how troops from warm U.S. states cope with frostbite, fatigue and logistics—highlighting vulnerabilities such as heated tents glowing on thermal sensors and the need for more Arctic‑suited vehicles and kit compared with better‑prepared Canadian forces. (New York Times, 05.04.26) 

Tuesday, May 5, 2026

• German leaders and security analysts have reacted calmly to the Trump administration’s plan to withdraw 5,000 of roughly 35,000 U.S. troops from Germany, seeing little impact on defense given Berlin’s recent rearmament, but are more alarmed by Washington’s cancellation of a planned long‑range missile deployment and by potential local economic damage in communities dependent on U.S. bases such as Ramstein. (New York Times, 05.05.26) 

Wednesday, May 6, 2026

• Poland’s intelligence agency says it opened 69 counter-intelligence investigations into Russian (and Belarusian) espionage and sabotage in 2024–25—matching the total for 1991–2023—and has arrested 91 suspects, as Moscow shifts from ad‑hoc online recruits to more professional operatives with organized‑crime or military backgrounds. Targets have included railways, military facilities, malls, and other public venues, while cyberattacks are surging: Poland’s early‑warning system handled 5.5 million security alerts in 2025, up 18% year‑on‑year, amid growing coordination between Belarusian group UNC1151 and Russia’s APT28/29 units. (Financial Times, 05.06.26) 
• Romania’s Black Sea and Danube regions are facing frequent air-raid alerts and falling Russian drone debris, as cheap UAVs from the Ukraine war increasingly intrude into NATO airspace and test allied defenses. NATO and the EU are planning a coordinated “drone wall” along the eastern flank, but recent tests in Romania saw only 5 of 9 counter‑drone systems hit their targets, highlighting the challenge of rapidly evolving drone tech and overstretched air defenses. (New York Times, 05.06.26)

Thursday, May 7, 2026

• Romania is increasingly living with the spillover of Russia’s war as drones and debris repeatedly cross its territory, prompting rising air‑raid alerts, a 40% drop in tourism in border city Tulcea, and plans for a NATO–EU “drone wall” along the eastern flank. NATO says Russian aircraft have been intercepted at least 300 times since a new mission launched from Finland to Turkey, while recent tests at Romania’s Capu Midia range saw only 5 of 9 counter‑drone systems hit their targets, underscoring the challenge of fast‑evolving UAV threats. (New York Times, 05.07.26)

Friday, May 8, 2026

• Western intelligence officials say Russia has significantly escalated a campaign of attempted assassinations across Europe since 2022, targeting not only defectors but also Russian dissidents and pro‑Ukraine activists using cheap proxy operatives tied to organized crime and recruited online. AP documents and sources describe foiled plots against French‑based Kremlin whistleblower Vladimir Osechkin, Lithuanian activist Valdas Bartkevičius, Bashkir independence advocate Ruslan Gabbasov, a German arms CEO, a Ukrainian military official, and even an alleged 2024 attempt to kill Zelenskyy in Poland, as well as the 2024 murder in Spain of defected Russian pilot Maxim Kuzminov; officials say the operations are politically authorized and complement at least 191 acts of sabotage, arson, and disruption across Europe attributed to Moscow. (Washington Post/AP, 05.08.26)

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

Wednesday, May 6, 2026

• Despite U.S. and EU sanctions, Chinese firms are openly marketing and shipping dual‑use components—such as German‑designed Limbach L550 engines, fiber‑optic cables, chips, and lithium batteries—into Iran and Russia, feeding Shahed‑style attack drone production. U.S. officials say Chinese traders now often manufacture key parts domestically and rarely use dollars, blunting sanction leverage; Washington is trying instead to raise costs and force Tehran and Moscow toward lower‑quality Chinese substitutes, even as drone warfare increasingly rewards sheer quantity. (Wall Street Journal, 05.06.26) 

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

Sunday, May 3, 2026

• The Pentagon’s “Drone Dominance” program aims to buy 340,000 U.S.-made FPV drones by 2027 and drive the unit cost down to $2,300, but suppliers warn that breaking China’s near‑monopoly on motors and batteries—a process already backed by billions of dollars in U.S. investment—could take a decade or more. (Wall Street Journal, 05.03.26)

Counterterrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• Russia pressured Syria in mid-2024 to repay a $37 million debt for guarding oil facilities, threatening to halt funding for Syrian oil operations from June unless Damascus covered monthly costs and an extra $1.16 million for upgrading Russian positions, according to a leaked transcript of Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov’s meeting with Assad aide Mansour Azzam; World Bank data put Syria’s total energy‑sector debt to Moscow at about $1.2 billion. (IStories/OCCRP, 05.05.26)

Cyber security/AI: 

• No significant developments.

Energy exports from CIS:

Saturday, May 2, 2026

• Russia’s total seaborne crude exports have held steady around 3.5 million barrels per day in April—about 2% higher than a year earlier—despite Ukrainian strikes that helped push fuel oil exports down 34% and diesel exports 12% month-on-month, while IEA estimates Russia’s March oil and refined-product revenues at roughly $19 billion, nearly double February’s $9.75 billion. (Wall Street Journal, 05.02.26)
• Japan is set to receive its first shipment of Russian crude oil since the conflict in the Middle East disrupted global energy supplies, Japanese media reported Saturday, citing the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. While Japan largely suspended purchases of Russian oil following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, it has continued to secure intermittent supplies, most recently last summer. However, as the global economy reels from the ongoing closure of the Strait of Hormuz, Tokyo is among the governments now scrambling to secure alternative energy sources. The Japanese refiner Taiyo Oil plans to receive the cargo through the Sakhalin-2 project in Russia’s Far East, the Mainichi newspaper reported. Russia’s Gazprom is the controlling shareholder of the project, while Japanese trading houses Mitsui and Mitsubishi also retain minority stakes. (MT/AFP, 05.02.26)

Sunday, May 3, 2026

• OPEC Plus agreed to raise output in June by just 188,000 barrels a day, a largely symbolic increase meant to signal “business as usual” days after the United Arab Emirates abruptly quit the group. With much of global supply still choked by the Iran war and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, analysts say the move will have little real effect on markets. The communiqué, signed by seven core producers (Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria and Oman), made no mention of the UAE, which has complained for years that OPEC quotas unfairly capped its exports. (New York Times, 05.03.26) 

Monday, May 4, 2026

• ISW notes that Russia’s extra income from higher oil prices is unlikely to offset growing economic strains: Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said the federal budget expects only about 200 billion rubles in additional revenue, (ISW, 05.04.26)

Tuesday, May 5, 2026

• Russia saw the value of its oil exports jump to the highest since the Kremlin launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, driven by rising flows and elevated prices triggered by the war in Iran. Four-week average crude flows rose to the highest since December, gaining for a second week as the impact of earlier Ukrainian drone strikes on key export ports continues to fade. The value of shipments averaged a post-invasion high of $2.42 billion a week in the period to May 3. (Bloomberg, 05.05.26)
• Norway will reopen three North Sea gasfields—Albuskjell, Vest Ekofisk and Tommeliten Gamma—that were shut in the 1990s, aiming to restart production in 2028 and run them for about two decades. The fields, which still hold an estimated 90–120 million barrels of oil equivalent in gas and condensate, are meant to bolster long‑term supplies to Germany and the UK as Europe seeks alternatives to Russian and Middle Eastern gas. (Financial Times, 05.05.26)

Wednesday, May 6, 2026

• Russia’s state energy revenues surged in April to their highest monthly level since October 2025 as Middle East–driven oil price spikes pushed crude toward $100 a barrel, but remain sharply below last year’s levels. Bloomberg, citing Finance Ministry data, says Russian producers paid 707.1 billion rubles (about $9.5 billion) in federal oil taxes last month, with total oil and gas receipts reaching almost 856 billion rubles—a roughly 40% jump from March. Yet the Financial Times notes that energy revenues for January–April are still about 40% lower than in the same period of 2025, and April’s take is roughly 20% below a year earlier, as the Kremlin spends heavily on subsidies to refiners to cap domestic fuel prices. (Financial Times, 05.06.26; Bloomberg, 05.06.26)

Thursday, May 7, 2026

• Sweden has detained the Jin Hui, a sanctioned tanker suspected of belonging to Russia’s “shadow fleet,” after boarding it in the Baltic Sea on suspicion of sailing under a false Syrian flag and with seaworthiness deficiencies; the Chinese captain was arrested over alleged false documents. It is Sweden’s fifth such seizure in recent weeks, part of stepped‑up checks on dubious foreign vessels linked to Russian oil exports or stolen Ukrainian grain, even as Moscow’s ambassador insists the ship isn’t Russian‑flagged and had no Russians aboard. (Washington Post/AP, 05.07.26)

Friday, May 8, 2026

• Japanese refiner Idemitsu Kosan has purchased a shipment of Russian crude oil, the company told Russian state media on Friday, becoming the second firm in Japan to buy oil from Russia since the conflict in the Middle East disrupted global energy supplies. (MT/AFP, 05.08.26)

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

Monday, May 4, 2026

• Senior Democrats are rebooting National Security Action to shape a post‑Trump, post‑Biden Democratic foreign policy —on issues ranging from Israel and Iran to Russia’s war against Ukraine —and to build a staffing pipeline for 2028, with ex‑NSC official Maher Bitar as director and Jake Sullivan and Ben Rhodes back on the board. (Axios, 05.04.26) 

Tuesday, May 5, 2026

• Dimitri K. Simes, a dual U.S.–Russian citizen and former Trump adviser who hosted a political show on Russia’s Channel One, has asked a U.S. court to dismiss Biden‑era sanctions and money‑laundering charges on First Amendment grounds, arguing that prosecuting him for paid commentary on a sanctioned Russian state network is unconstitutional censorship, while legal experts say the case will test how far national‑security sanctions can reach into speech. (New York Times, 05.05.26)

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

Monday, May 4, 2026

• Moscow-based Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting (TsMAKP)cut its 2026 Russian GDP growth forecast to just 0.5–0.7% from 0.9–1.3%, warning that high global oil prices will not rescue the economy because Ukrainian drone attacks and new Western sanctions are forcing cuts to oil output and exports and have already contributed to a 0.3% GDP contraction in Q1 2026; it now expects oil and product exports this year to fall versus 2025, even as higher prices delivered 200 billion rubles in windfall budget revenue that merely offset earlier shortfalls. (Reuters, 05.04.26)
• Putin on Monday dismissed Sergei Melikov as head of the republic of Dagestan, replacing him with the outgoing chairman of the North Caucasus region’s supreme court. Fyodor Shchukin, who had led Dagestan’s Supreme Court since February 2024, was named acting head of the republic until a formal election is held. (MT/AFP, 05.04.26)

Tuesday, May 5, 2026

• Cash is making a comeback in Russia as digital payments grow more unreliable with frequent mobile internet outages the Kremlin says are aimed at countering the threat of Ukrainian drone attacks. The amount of cash in circulation jumped by about 600 billion rubles ($8 billion) in April. That’s the biggest monthly increase —excluding annual spikes in December —since September 2022, when President Vladimir Putin announced a partial mobilization for the war in Ukraine, according to Bloomberg. (Bloomberg, 05.05.26)
• A Moscow court on Monday ordered the pre-trial detention of exiled human rights veteran Lev Ponomaryov in absentia. Russian police issued a warrant for his arrest in March. Ponomaryov currently faces criminal charges for allegedly organizing the activities of an “undesirable” organization and evading his duties under Russia’s “foreign agent” law, the exiled news outlet Mediazona reported. (MT/AFP, 05.05.26)

Wednesday, May 6, 2026

• Ilya Remeslo, a longtime Kremlin attack lawyer, has recently stunned Moscow by publicly calling Vladimir Putin “a war criminal and a thief” and demanding his resignation. Remeslo claimed in an interview with the Washington Post that “part of the system is already starting to work against Putin” and that “Putin will be toppled at some moment by his own circle when he stops being convenient for them completely.” (Washington Post, 05.06.26)
• Russia has resumed buying foreign currency and gold for its National Wealth Fund for the first time since June 2025, planning purchases worth 110.3 billion rubles (about $1.5 billion) between May 8 and June 4 as surging oil prices from the Iran war boost export revenues. April mineral extraction tax receipts jumped to 917 billion rubles—more than double March—allowing the Finance Ministry to restart FX and gold operations, even though over 350 billion rubles in subsidies to refiners to cap fuel prices and repair drone‑damaged plants have already absorbed a large share of the windfall. The fund’s liquid assets stand at about 3.6 trillion rubles, down 14% since January and roughly 60% below pre‑invasion levels, but Bloomberg Economics expects it to grow by around $12 billion over the rest of 2026, giving the Kremlin more time before imposing harsher fiscal measures. (Bloomberg, 05.06.26; Istories, 05.06.26)
• A Moscow court has transferred 65% of agribusiness giant Rusagro’s shares, 29+ million rubles’ worth of seized foreign currency, more than 10.5 billion rubles in frozen funds, and multiple corporate stakes from billionaire founder Vadim Moshkovich to the state, making the $2.9‑billion ex‑senator the wealthiest Russian whose assets have been effectively nationalized. (Meduza, 05.06.26)
• A Levada Center open‑question poll in late April found 49% of Russians would vote for Vladimir Putin if a presidential election were held next Sunday, while named alternatives such as Gennady Zyuganov and Mikhail Mishustin each drew about 1% and others under 1%. Around 20% did not know whom to support, 17% said they would not vote, and about 6% were unsure if they would participate. (Levada, 05.05.26)
• In Dagestan, newly appointed acting regional head Fyodor Shchukin, the first ethnic Russian to lead the republic, dissolved the government and named Magomed Ramazanov—Putin’s deputy envoy to the North Caucasus—as acting prime minister. Analysts say the Kremlin appears to be installing a “tandem” of an ethnic Russian leader and a locally rooted prime minister to preserve the traditional balance among Dagestan’s many nationalities after floods and chronic infrastructure failures undermined former head Sergei Melikov. (The Moscow Times, 05.06.26)
• Russia’s Digital Development Ministry is planning to cut up to 15% of its staff as part of a reorganization that may see two deputy ministers, Sergei Kuchushev and Alexander Shoytov, and cybersecurity chief Yevgeny Khasin depart, while merging the cloud services department with AI/big‑data and redistributing digital‑skills functions, RBC reports. (Meduza, 05.06.26)

Thursday, May 7, 2026

• The Central Bank says GDP fell 0.5% year‑on‑year in Q1 2026 (Meduza puts the drop at 0.3%), badly missing its earlier 1.6% growth projection, amid weak business activity and declining oil and gas revenues; it now forecasts only 0.5–1.5% growth for 2026 and has held the key rate at 14.5%, warning it is “more cautious” about further cuts given inflation risks from the Iran war. The federal budget deficit hit about 4.6 trillion rubles in Q1 (2.3× Q1 2025), April oil‑and‑gas revenue rose ~40% month‑on‑month to 855.6 billion rubles but remained 21% below a year earlier, and the National Wealth Fund’s liquid assets have fallen from 9.7 trillion rubles (March 2022) to roughly 3.9 trillion (April 2026), with 8+ trillion rubles in overdue corporate debt and record‑low 2.1% unemployment indicating exhausted credit and labor capacity. (The Moscow Times, 05.07.26; MT/AFP, 05.07.26; Meduza, 05.07.26)
• The Kremlin has ruled out compensating businesses for losses caused by wartime mobile internet and SMS shutdowns, with spokesman Dmitry Peskov saying support measures are “not under consideration” and that restrictions are applied “in accordance with existing law” to ensure citizen safety. Moscow and St. Petersburg have already faced rolling outages around May 5–7 and are scheduled for further cuts on May 9 for Victory Day security. (Meduza, 05.07.26) 
  • Expected attendees include the leaders of Belarus, Malaysia, Laos, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, even as more than 20 Russian cities cancel parades or drop military hardware and Russia warns it will launch a massive missile strike on Kyiv if the event is attacked. Zelenskyy urged foreign leaders not to attend Moscow’s May 9 celebrations Meduza, 05.08.26)
  • Last year’s 80th anniversary parade featured some 11,000 servicemen and almost 200 military vehicles, with nearly 30 world leaders in attendance, including China’s Xi Jinping and Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. (MT/AFP, 05.08.26)

Friday, May 8, 2026

• The Dossier Center says Russia’s Presidential Administration has been quietly planning how to “sell” an end to the Ukraine war to the domestic audience since at least February 2026, drafting an “image of victory” narrative that recasts a compromise peace as Putin’s personal triumph over the “collective West.” A leaked presentation shown to Sergei Kiriyenko’s team warns that “overreach means defeat” and that continuing the war risks general mobilization, a full war economy, tax hikes, drone strikes deep inside Russia, and a demographic crisis. One scenario envisions Russia keeping occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk and most of Kherson–Zaporizhzhia, withdrawing from Sumy and Kharkiv, and seeing only U.S. sanctions lifted, while Zelenskyy stays in power—packaged at home as territorial, economic, and “civilizational” gains plus a controlled postwar “thaw.” (Dossier Center, 05.07.26)
• Russia’s budget gap widened to a record despite a jump in oil revenue amid heightened tensions in the Middle East. The deficit for the first four months of the year expanded to 5.9 trillion rubles ($79.5 billion), well above the full-year plan. The shortfall, equal to 2.5% of gross domestic product compared to a planned 1.6%, highlights how even surging demand for Russian crude stemming from the global energy crunch isn’t enough to ease Moscow’s fiscal pressures amid continued heavy spending on its invasion of Ukraine. (Bloomberg, 05.08.26)
• Der Spiegel reports the Kremlin has revoked already‑issued Victory Day parade credentials for all foreign media and limited access to Russian outlets only, a move Moscow denies while admitting accreditation is “very limited” and includes some international journalists. This year’s May 9 event is being drastically scaled back—no military hardware on Red Square, a delayed TV feed, and a full mobile‑internet blackout in Moscow—amid fears of Ukrainian drone attacks. (Meduza, 05.08.26)
• Russian cyber‑security entrepreneur Natalia Kasperskaya, co‑founder of Kaspersky Lab and head of the “Domestic Software” association, has privately urged the FSB’s powerful Second Service to stop blanket VPN blocking, calling the unit “totally clueless” about the internet and warning that politicized decisions with no technical basis are wrecking Russian IT. Sources told The Bell she complained that VPN crackdowns repeatedly break her InfoWatch group’s infrastructure and that “almost all” her developers must work via VPN because many key tools are inaccessible from Russian IPs, prompting her to send formal protest letters to Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and Kremlin chief of staff Anton Vaino. (Istories, 05.08.26)
• Russian historian Oleg Novoselev, known for researching Soviet‑era political repression in the Urals and working with the banned human‑rights group Memorial, has been arrested and sent to pretrial detention in Yekaterinburg on charges of “inciting or recruiting assistance in terrorist activities.” He has been added to Russia’s official list of terrorists and extremists, as authorities further clamp down on archival access and independent research into past and present state crimes. (Meduza, 05.08.26) 

Defense and aerospace:

Monday, May 4, 2026

• Russia has reportedly appointed Colonel General Aleksandr Chaiko as the new commander of its Aerospace Forces, replacing Viktor Afzalov, despite Chaiko being under EU and UK sanctions and accused by AP and Human Rights Watch of responsibility for mass killings of civilians in Bucha during Russia’s 2022 assault on Kyiv and for indiscriminate strikes on hospitals and schools in Syria. (Meduza, 05.04.26) 
• See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement, justice and emergencies:

Monday, May 4, 2026

• European intelligence and Russian investigative outlet Istories report that Vladimir Putin has sharply tightened his personal security amid fears of assassination or a coup linked to Ukraine’s long‑range drone campaign and elite infighting. The Federal Protective Service (FSO) has drastically reduced the places Putin visits; he and his family no longer stay at residences near Moscow or Valdai and he now spends weeks in upgraded bunkers, including in Krasnodar, while state media rely more on pre‑recorded footage. Visitors to the presidential administration face two‑stage checks, close staff are banned from using phones with internet or public transport, and surveillance systems have been installed in their homes. Large‑scale FSO patrols with dog units line the Moscow River and stand ready for drone attacks; periodic internet shutdowns in Moscow are also tied to his protection. After a December 2025 general’s killing in Moscow, Putin ordered FSO protection extended to 10 top generals in addition to Valery Gerasimov. (Financial Times, 05.04.26; Istories, 05.04.26) 
  • ISW notes growing evidence of enhanced personal and air-defense security for Putin and senior officials, including deployments of additional Pantsir-S1 and S-400 systems around his Valdai and Moscow residences and intensified protection after multiple assassination attempts on Russian elites, amid Ukraine’s expanding long-range drone campaign that recently struck Moscow City’s Mosfilm Tower. (ISW, 05.04.26) 
• Russia has detained Alexander Gavrilov, 55, director of the Krasnoyarsk Machine-Building Plant (“Krasmash”), a key producer of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and the Sarmat ICBM, who has been held in a pretrial detention center since late April on embezzlement charges; a local LDPR deputy claims he is suspected of taking a 3 million-ruble bribe as investigators work at the plant. (Mediazona, 05.04.26)
• Rescuers have recovered the bodies of all eight miners trapped after a coal mine collapsed in the remote Magadan region of Russia’s Far East, emergency officials confirmed Monday. (MT/AFP, 05.04.26)

Tuesday, May 5, 2026

• A court in Novosibirsk sentenced hypersonics researchers Valery Zvegintsev and Vladislav Galkin to 12.5 years in prison on treason charges, in a closed trial reportedly linked to a co‑authored gas‑dynamics article published abroad, the latest in a series of high‑profile treason cases against scientists from the Khristianovich Institute and related labs. (Meduza, 05.05.26)

Friday, May 8, 2026

• A joint investigation finds Bauman Moscow State Technical University hosts a secret “Department No. 4” inside its military training center that is overseen by GRU officers and trains cyber‑operators and saboteurs for units like Sandworm and Fancy Bear. Students are taught to write malware, conduct penetration tests, produce manipulative propaganda videos, study Western drones and special‑forces tactics, and learn espionage methods from a colonel who privately mocks top brass as “the old geezer” and a “fucking drunk” even while justifying the war as inevitable. (Meduza, 05.08.26)

   

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

Monday, May 4, 2026

• Austria has expelled three Russian Embassy staffers suspected of running an antenna-based espionage operation from diplomatic buildings in Vienna, allegedly intercepting satellite internet data from UN agencies and other international organizations there; the Russian ambassador was summoned and Vienna is now tightening espionage laws to better protect international bodies on its soil. (AP/Washington Post, 05.04.26)

Wednesday, May 6, 2026

• Switzerland’s Federal Intelligence Service says Russia is the “biggest threat to security, stability and peace in Europe,” waging a long-term hybrid confrontation against the West that is intensifying and uses sabotage, cyberattacks, prohibited intelligence activity, weapons proliferation, propaganda, and disinformation; Bern also warns Moscow is building a war economy, mass rearming, and systematically evading sanctions amid doubts about long-term U.S. security guarantees under Trump. (Euromaidan Press/Ukrainska Pravda, 05.06.26)

Thursday, May 7, 2026

• Russia told foreign governments and organizations to evacuate diplomatic staff and citizens from Kyiv, saying a retaliatory strike would be inevitable if Ukraine tried to attack Moscow during World War II Victory Day celebrations on May 9. (Bloomberg, 05.07.26)
• EU states issued over 620,000 Schengen visas to Russian citizens in 2025, up 10.2% from 2024, despite political tensions over the war in Ukraine; Russia filed more than 670,000 applications (up ~8%), with 477,000 tourist visas and most processing handled by France, Italy, and Spain. Rejection rates rose to 6.3% (from 3.2% in 2021), but total visas in 2024–25 exceeded prewar 2021 levels. (Ukrainska Pravda, 05.07.26)
• European capitals are increasingly alarmed that Norway’s long‑standing cod and fisheries pact with Russia in the Barents Sea is creating security risks, as Russian trawlers worth about $2 billion in landings to Norwegian ports last year continue operating near critical infrastructure where Moscow has mapped and probed undersea cables. EU fisheries commissioner Costas Kadis says he presses Oslo “at every opportunity” to scale back year‑round scientific, industry, and coast guard co‑operation, warning that Russia is engaged in illegal fishing, espionage, and sabotage, while Norway argues ending the deal could trigger a cod‑stock collapse. (Financial Times, 05.07.26)

Friday, May 8, 2026

• Hungary quietly expelled Russian diplomat Artur Sushkov, a 36‑year‑old third secretary in Moscow’s Budapest embassy, on May 4 after identifying him as an SVR undercover agent who had penetrated right‑wing and foreign‑policy think tanks close to Viktor Orbán’s government, VSquare reports. Hungarian counterintelligence had sought his removal months earlier, but Orbán’s cabinet delayed until after elections, fearing backlash from a Kremlin that had actively backed his re‑election campaign. (Ukrainska Pravda, 05.08.26)

Ukraine:

Friday, May 1, 2026

• More than 50% of Ukrainians consider corruption in government bodies a greater threat to Ukraine's development than Russia's military aggression, according to a study by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS)… In the current survey, KIIS repeated its question from May 2024, when respondents were directly asked which is a greater threat—corruption in government or Russia's military aggression. That is, respondents had to choose between these two challenges for the country. If respondents are asked to choose the greater threat between corruption and military aggression, 54% choose corruption. 39% of respondents consider military aggression to be the greater threat (compared to corruption). (RBC Ukraine, 05.01.26) 

Monday, May 4, 2026

• Authorities in Ukraine have conducted dozens of searches across 16 regions into current and former draft officials suspected of corruption-related offences, police said on Monday. "These operations are aimed not only at exposing isolated incidents of corruption but at the systemic cleansing of abuse from the sphere of recruitment," [the National Police] said in a statement. "The aim is to restore trust in institutions that, in wartime, perform a critically important function for the state." (Reuters, 05.04.26) 

Tuesday, May 5, 2026

• An informal web of Ukrainian volunteers, soldiers, and defense firms is quietly sharing frontline lessons and drone technology with Taiwan—despite Kyiv’s formal adherence to the “One China” policy and both sides’ economic ties to Beijing—turning Taiwan into a gateway for Chinese-made components and a testbed for Ukrainian‑inspired air, sea, and underwater drone concepts tailored to a potential Chinese invasion. (New York Times, 05.05.26)
• Ukrainian law enforcement has filed a new wartime treason charge against sitting MP Oleksandr Dubinsky, alleging that even while in pretrial detention he continued active anti‑Ukrainian propaganda in coordination with Russian interests, according to the State Bureau of Investigation and Prosecutor General’s Office. (Ukrainska Pravda, 05.05.26)
• Volodymyr Zelenskyy denounced Vladimir Putin’s proposed May 8–9 Victory Day truce as “utter cynicism,” offering instead an immediate, open-ended ceasefire from May 6 while Russia continued large missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian energy sites that killed at least five Naftogaz staff and first responders and wounded 37 in Poltava and Kharkiv. (Financial Times, 05.05.26)

Wednesday, May 6, 2026

• Hungary has returned to Ukraine’s state-owned Oschadbank the cash and gold seized from seven bank couriers in March—about $40 million, €35 million, and nine kilograms of gold—after initially claiming the funds might belong to a “Ukrainian military mafia”; Zelenskyy called the move a “constructive and civilized step.” (Meduza, 05.06.26)

Thursday, May 7, 2026

• The Kyiv Independent reports that Ukraine’s biggest corruption probe under Zelenskyy, a $100 million Energoatom kickback scheme, now directly brushes up against the president’s inner circle and could implicate him personally if allegations are confirmed. NABU tapes published by Ukrainska Pravda and MPs portray alleged ringleader Timur Mindich—Zelenskyy’s longtime business partner and Kvartal 95 co‑owner—using Energoatom funds to build luxury homes in Kozyn and boasting of influence over ex–Deputy PM Oleksiy Chernyshov, former energy minister Herman Halushchenko, ex–chief of staff Andriy Yermak, and current National Security and Defense Council secretary Rustem Umerov. One transcript references a fence between Mindich’s house and “Vova’s” house, and prosecutors say Zelenskyy phoned Halushchenko immediately after a message from Mindich, raising questions of presidential awareness that analysts say could reshape post‑war politics if corroborated. (Kyiv Independent, 05.07.26)
• Relations between Israel and Ukraine have hit a new low after Kyiv accused Israel of importing grain stolen by Russia from occupied Ukrainian territory, prompting sharp Israeli denials and EU warnings that it could sanction Israeli entities that help Moscow evade restrictions. The dispute highlights a broader rift: Israel has avoided fully siding with the West against Russia—eschewing sanctions and lethal aid to Kyiv and declining Ukrainian offers of drone-defense cooperation—while continuing to see Moscow as an indispensable actor in Syria and with Iran even as Russia and Iran tighten their own military alignment. (Washington Post, 05.07.26) 

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

Monday, May 4, 2026

• New satellite and infrared data show Turkmenistan’s famed Darvaza gas crater—the “Gates to Hell,” a decades‑old burning methane pit in the Karakum Desert—has seen flame intensity fall by more than 75% in three years, raising complex climate questions as dwindling fires may mean more raw methane, a far more potent greenhouse gas than CO₂, escapes from one of the world’s highest‑emitting gas producers. (New York Times, 05.04.26) 

Tuesday, May 5, 2026

• Armenia hosted its first EU–Armenia summit in Yerevan, signing a connectivity partnership to deepen transport, energy, and digital links and paving the way for up to €2.5 billion in EU investment, as Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan formally pursues closer ties with Brussels and distances the country from an increasingly “unreliable” Russia after Moscow’s failure to prevent Azerbaijan’s 2023 Karabakh offensive; Armenia has joined the ICC, frozen participation in the CSTO, but remains in the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union, with Putin warning it cannot belong to both the EEU and the EU. (Washington Post/AP, 05.05.26) 
  • Russia said Thursday it was “incomprehensible” that its ally Armenia had hosted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy for a European summit this week, and warned Yerevan against pursuing closer ties with the European Union. (MT/AFP, 05.07.26)

Wednesday, May 6, 2026

• Two Estonian men who deliberately crossed the frozen Lake Teploe into Russia in early 2026 to seek “international protection” have instead been jailed in Pskov pretrial detention on illegal border‑crossing charges; both appear to have mental health issues, and rights advocate Svetlana Gannushkina says prosecuting asylum seekers violates Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention. (Meduza, 05.06.26)
• Russian border guards have begun recording passport data for all travelers crossing to and from Russia via Belarus, manually entering details into spreadsheets and causing long lines; the Mayday Team rights group says guards cite orders to “constantly monitor” foreigners entering Russia and Russians leaving, further eroding Belarus’s role as a last “safe exit” for draft dodgers and dissidents. (Meduza, 05.06.26)

Thursday, May 7, 2026

• Latvia’s foreign ministry said Thursday that it summoned the acting head of Russia’s Embassy in Riga after two drones suspected of belonging to Ukraine crashed in the Baltic country earlier in the day. Latvia’s defense minister said the drones were likely Ukrainian and traveling toward Russian targets. The Russian military later accused Ukraine of using Latvian airspace to launch drone attacks against civilian sites in St. Petersburg. In a statement, Latvia’s foreign ministry rejected the allegation. “Contrary to Russia’s false public claims, [Latvia] has never granted permission to use its airspace to launch drone attacks against targets in Russia,” the ministry said in a statement. (MT/AFP, 05.08.26)

Friday, May 8, 2026

• Presidential adviser Mykhailo Podoliak said Kyiv will not take “fundamental decisions” such as dismissing National Security and Defense Council secretary Rustem Umerov based solely on leaked “Mindich tapes” published by the media, arguing that transcripts must first be authenticated and checked for context. Podoliak noted that Umerov has given a detailed response, wants law enforcement to verify how the recordings appeared and whether they are genuine, and remains, in his view, an effective negotiator with the U.S. and Middle Eastern states. (RBC.ua, 05.08.26)
• Ukraine’s foreign trade turnover reached $46.1 billion in January–April 2026, with imports of $32.2 billion and exports of just $13.9 billion, underscoring a large war‑time trade deficit driven by reliance on imported machinery, fuel and chemicals. China ($8.7 billion), Poland ($3.1 billion) and Turkey ($2.2 billion) were top import sources, while Poland, Turkey and Italy were the main export destinations. (Korrespondent.net, 05.08.26)

IV. Quotable and notable

• Harvard Professor and former Director of the Belfer Center Graham Allison (@GrahamTAllison) posted on May 6, 2026: “1/ How much additional cash is the war against Iran earning Putin’s Russia? 2/ Since the war began on February 27, Russia’s monthly oil revenues have nearly doubled from $9.75 billion to $19 billion. 3/ This means that Putin is receiving an extra $150 million dollars a day as a result of the war.” (RM, 05.08.26.)
• Dr. Fiona Hill, member of the Harvard Board of Overseers who co-authored [Britain’s 2025 strategic defense] review, told the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy that… “When you say that Russia has declared war on Europe, people think that war is actually only something kinetic in the sense of missiles flying, ballistic missiles… That is honestly a fault of the narrative about the kinds of warlike and wartime scenarios we are facing. (UK Defense Journal, 05.06.26)
• Member of the Harvard Board of Overseers Fiona Hill said Trump “is actually basically involved himself in two systems shifting, changing wars, one in Ukraine, not to a good end either. I mean, I think he's kept that conflict going, honestly, by his own interventions. We now see Ukraine in a very different phase.” (Foreign Affairs Interviews, 05.07.26)
• The Kremlin has long used… staged interactions with ordinary people to demonstrate Putin’s approachability. “A sure sign that Putin is worried about his falling approval ratings: he’s publicly kissing children again,” said Farida Rustamova, independent Vlast newsletter founder and political analyst, referring to similar instances, such as when Putin kissed a boy on the stomach in 2006, apparently in an attempt to portray the president as closer to the masses. (Wall Street Journal, 05.06.26)

Endnotes

1. Sources used: Wall Street Journal, RFE/RL, RBC.ua, Washington Post/AP, Istories, Meduza, ISW, Bloomberg, The Moscow Times, Ukrainska Pravda, 05.06.26–05.08.26.
2. According to the updates DeepState posted on its website, on April 28, Russian forces advanced near Berestok; on April 29, Russian forces advanced in Rodynske and near Nykanorivka, while Ukrainian Armed Forces conducted a sweep in Rodynske and near Vilne; on April 30, Russian forces advanced near Synkivka, Pryvillia and Andriivka-Klevtsove; on May 1, Russian forces advanced near Riznykivka; on May 2, Russian forces advanced near Berestok and Ivanopillya; on May 3, Russian forces advanced near Andriivka-Klevtsove; on May 4, there was no update; and on May 5, Russian forces advanced near Pishchane and in Rodynske.
3. ISW says it has reviewed and refined its mapping data and methodology, correcting backend artifacts that did not change the visible map geometry but did affect some calculated area figures; these fixes do not alter its previously assessed trendlines of Russia’s rate of advance. ISW now calculates monthly advances by comparing the situation on the last day of the previous month to the last day of the month in question (e.g., Dec. 31 to Jan. 31 for January gains), instead of its earlier practice of comparing the first day of a month to the first day of the next month, which inadvertently counted some following‑month advances in the earlier month’s total. (ISW, 05.02.26)
4. For one analytical take on Zaluzhnyi’s address at the Defence24Days conference, see “General Zaluzhnyi on Ukraine's Strategy of Survival, Transformation of War and Smart Mobilization Concept,” Giorgi Revishvili, Substack, 05.07.26. 

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10.00 am East Coast time on the day it was distributed.

AI was used in the production of this digest.

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute an RM editorial policy.

Slider photo: Russian servicemen march towards the Red Square prior to the Victory Day military parade rehearsal in Moscow, Monday, May 4, 2026. (AP Photo/Pavel Bednyakov)