4 Ideas to Explore

1. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said after talks with the Ukrainian delegation in Florida over the weekend that there was still “much work to do” even though the negotiations were “productive,” reflecting the unresolved policy gaps between the United States and Ukraine. NYT’s Cassandra Vinograd notes that disagreements persist over issues such as whether Ukraine should withdraw from the remaining parts of Donbass, as well as whether Kyiv must give up NATO membership and reject a Western peacekeeping force. Volodymyr Zelenskyy “would not sign over the land,” according to the Ukrainian president’s closest confidant Andriy Yermak, who resigned from his post at what WSJ described as “a pivotal moment for country… with Russia advancing on the battlefield and the U.S. pressuring Kyiv to make painful concessions to end the conflict.” Other “thorny issues” that remain unresolved include “possible timetables for new [presidential] elections in Ukraine,” according to WSJ. Whether Zelenskyy agrees to concede on these issues or not, “there are cities, locations under dispute that will be in Russian hands, it is just a matter of time,” U.S. Army’s Dan Driscoll was quoted by FT as saying last week. “If we do not recognize that, then the decision to fight must weigh: how many lives are you willing to sacrifice? The deal does not get better from here, it gets worse,” he said. Tough choices lie ahead, CFR’s Thomas Graham warns, writing for The National Interest on Nov. 26, “The time for rhetoric and pretense is past… Russia will not be defeated on the battlefield. But that does not mean that Ukraine must lose. It can still preserve its sovereignty and independence, even if the war ends in a messy compromise,” Graham argues. In a Nov. 29 column for The Boston Globe, op-ed contributor Stephen Kinzer noted that a new peace plan for Ukraine had emerged and was gaining traction. “Pouring more billions into the Ukrainian quicksand will only produce more bloodshed and a worse result in the end. In this case, ugly peace is better than permanent war,” he argues.
2. In his Dec. 1, 2025, New York Times essay, Dmytro Kuleba warns that Ukraine’s struggle is being distorted by political drift and strategic wishful thinking. He highlights how “a large and growing embezzlement scandal threatens to destroy public trust in Mr. Zelenskyy’s presidency,” while a persistent manpower shortage endures because politicians are “torn between the imperative to fight the war and the temptation to start fighting the next election.” Abroad, he contends the United States seeks a quick end “regardless of whether a real peace has been achieved,” and Europe is “lagging” on rearmament, frozen assets and accession issues. Meanwhile, Russia has “scaled up production” of missiles and one‑way drones and maintained troop levels through “outsize bonuses and salaries.” Kuleba concludes starkly: “Hope cannot be a strategy,” and it is currently substituting for the weapons, sanctions and political decisions the moment requires.
3. In their Nov. 29, 2025, Wall Street Journal analysis, Ian Lovett, Marcus Walker and Nikita Nikolaienko report that Russia has seized a decisive advantage in the drone war once dominated by Ukraine. They describe a sharp shift in 2025 as Russian midrange drones—often using jam‑resistant fiber‑optic control—strike Ukrainian logistics 40–70 kilometers behind the front, collapsing the notion of a safe rear. Analysts such as Konrad Muzyka note that Ukrainian logistics and drone crews now suffer higher losses than frontline infantry, while Valerii Zaluzhnyi warns that disrupted lines of communication threaten operational coherence. In their article, entitled "Russia Gains the Upper Hand in the Drone Battle, Once Ukraine’s Forte," the authors highlight Pokrovsk, where Russian drones reportedly outnumber Ukrainian systems by up to 10:1, forcing troops to abandon vehicles and approach the front on foot. Meanwhile, Driscoll has also warned Western diplomats that Russia is now building enough missiles to amass a growing stockpile of long-range weaponry, NYT reports.
4. In his article, “Politics and War: Reality vs. Expectations,” former commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valerii Zaluzhnyi stresses military strategy is futile without a clearly defined political objective. Russia’s foremost objective, he writes, remains Ukraine itself, viewed as a gateway to Europe. He links Ukraine’s strategic difficulties to Russia’s expanding ambitions and to Ukraine’s own lack of coherent political vision, compounded by Western illusions about the conflict’s trajectory. “Perhaps the key political objective for Ukraine now is to deprive Russia of the ability to commit acts of aggression against Ukraine in the foreseeable future,” Zaluzhnyi—who is considered a strong contender if Ukraine holds presidential elections—writes.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“The Ukrainians Stuck in Russia’s New Gulag,” Jeffrey Gettleman, New York Times, 11.29.25.

• Gettleman writes, “Hundreds of Ukrainian civilians taken by Russian forces from occupied areas of Ukraine have been shunted through a constellation of Russian prisons in a new kind of gulag…They are a class of prisoners languishing incommunicado deep within the penal system of an enemy state.”
• He reports, “Ukrainian officials say they have confirmed that at least 1,700 civilians are in Russian captivity. ‘The actual number,’ U.N. investigators said in a new report, is ‘likely significantly higher’ because it is difficult to get information on many cases.”
• Gettleman details the story of Mykola Zakhozhyi, “a 37-year-old father…taken by Russian soldiers in March 2022,” recounting the torture, beatings, starvation, and psychological torment he and other Ukrainian civilians endured in Russian prisons.
• He notes, “Under international law, Mr. Zakhozhyi fell into a gray zone…Russia refuses to call the conflict a war, but rather a ‘special military operation,’ complicating matters further…Russia intentionally ‘blurs the line between P.O.W.s and civilian detainees.’”
• Gettleman explains, “Many former prisoners and human rights groups describe systematic torture and abuse, forced labor, and attempts to erase Ukrainian identity, with at least 100 civilian prisoners thought to have died in Russian captivity.”
• He observes, “Exchanges of prisoners rarely include civilians. The Ukrainian government fears that trading Russian soldiers for Ukrainian civilians would incentivize further abductions.”
• Gettleman concludes, “Even if a peace can be reached, it won’t be easy to solve the problem of Ukrainian civilians languishing in Russian jails. Their fates may remain one of the most difficult issues to resolve if Ukraine and Russia ever agree on a peace deal.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject: 

• "What Does the Ukraine Peace Proposal Mean for Abducted Children?" Katya Pavlevych, The National Interest, 11.26.25.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

Tuesday, Nov. 25, 2025

“Russia’s tiny advances in 2025 sold Putin on inevitable victory in Ukraine,” Robyn Dixon, Washington Post, 11.25.25.

• Dixon reports, “‘Russia’s slow grind in 2025 has gained it less than an additional 1 percent of Ukrainian territory at a massive cost estimated at over 200,000 troops killed and wounded. But that is enough for the Russian president, who invariably exudes confidence in victory as he tries to shape the facts on the ground.’”
• “Putin is willing to fight on despite the economic pain and stunning casualties that dwarf the losses of the United States in Iraq or the Soviet Union in Afghanistan because he senses U.S. and European weakness and Ukrainian exhaustion,” Dixon writes, citing analysts.
• Former Russian diplomat Boris Bondarev tells Dixon, “‘He’s fighting not for villages in Ukraine. He’s fighting not for territory in Ukraine… He wants the United States, first of all, and Europe to admit that Russia has its exclusive sphere of influence where the United States and Europe are forbidden to interfere.’”
• Military analyst Michael Kofman is quoted: “‘In 2025 Russia’s leadership made two bets, both of which were proven incorrect… Despite the worsening military situation, both of those bets so far proved incorrect. The question is, are they going to make them again in 2026?’”
• Dixon summarizes, “While Ukrainians are facing their worst winter of the war, with the power infrastructure in tatters after Russian bombardments, the population still appears to be defiant.”

Thursday, Nov. 27, 2025

“Octopus Adds an Additional Layer to Ukraine’s Air Defenses,” Jack Watling, RUSI, 11.27.25.

• Watling writes, “The value of the UK-Ukrainian drone interceptor is not in the characteristics of the munition, but in the process that brought it into being.”
• “Project Octopus… is a cylindrical drone with four, tail mounted propellors and a sensor in its nose. It also uses image recognition to autonomously guide itself to target in the terminal phase, significantly improving its probability of hit.”
• “Despite the delays, in combination with other UAV interceptors, Ukraine does now have a scalable solution to the Geran threat.”
• Watling cautions, “Those looking to Octopus as a one-shot solution for protecting NATO from UAVs… need to bear several additional factors in mind… cheap interceptors are very short ranged.”
• He concludes, “The real value of Octopus is… the process, which saw the UK respond in anticipation of a scaling threat to produce a technological countermeasure that was price competitive with what it was designed to defeat, and to align the industrial capacity to scale production.”

Friday, Nov. 28, 2025

“Ukraine’s first all-female drone unit joins the fight against Russia,” Siobhán O’Grady, Kostiantyn Khudov and Oksana Parafeniuk, Washington Post, 11.28.25.

• O’Grady, Khudov, and Parafeniuk report, “Nearly four years into Russia’s invasion, women here are increasingly taking on combat roles once reserved for men. Ukraine’s struggle to source personnel has forced its military to change.”
• They explain, “Daria’s crew is the first in Ukraine’s national guard to operate entirely without men…She and the four women under her command drive their own vehicle, carry their own equipment, build their own explosives and launch armed drones along the southeastern front.”
• The authors note, “When Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014, such an arrangement would have been impossible…Reforms began in 2016, and in 2022, Ukraine lifted further restrictions that had prevented women from serving in the same officer roles as men.”
• O’Grady, Khudov, and Parafeniuk observe, “Serving together as a women-only unit, the group has developed its own esprit de corps and tactics, learning to operate independently and efficiently in frontline conditions.”
  • They conclude with their commander Daria’s conviction: “‘We won’t win this war without women.’”

Saturday, Nov. 29, 2025

“Politics and War: Reality vs. Expectations,” Valeriy Zaluzhny, LIGA.net, 11.29.25. Clues from Ukrainian Views. Machine-translated.

• "Obviously, no matter how much the military command attempts to formulate a military strategy for a certain period, none of it will produce any result without political will, which is formed precisely through a political objective."
• Per " Clausewitz, the basis of his theory is that wars are generally waged for political, not military, purposes, and are driven not so much by physical as by ideological forces."
• "One evening, I ordered all directive documents received by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to be brought up to determine what political objective for the war had been defined. Or perhaps we had missed something. Because only after forming a political objective will all state actors strive to reach the outlined line on the horizon, which could then claim the status of victory. Unfortunately, at that time we had missed nothing..."
• "Today, as of the end of 2025, the war in Ukraine has been going on for twelve years. And it can be said with absolute certainty that it is increasingly taking on the features of a world war. Yes, in terms of casualties it has not yet reached the scale of a world war, but in terms of global influence and consequences, it is already on the verge of triggering its dangerous count."
• "For Russia, Ukraine as objective number one finds itself in an extremely difficult position, where a quick peace would inevitably be followed only by a crushing defeat and the loss of independence. However, as time has shown, even that could not be achieved."
• "Now it is interesting to consider whether this is a consequence of Russia’s ambitions, which may extend beyond Ukraine. Obviously, yes. All because of the lack of understanding of Russia’s political objective and the absence of Ukraine’s own political vision, which was likely based on the potential political aims of global players."
• "At the same time, as Western politicians were held captive by their own illusions, drafting rosy scenarios or indulging one another, discussing Ukraine’s reconstruction, and as their experts—together with Ukrainian ones—were sketching out future elections in Ukraine, the line of contact was steadily moving toward the Dnipro, and today—toward Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv."
• "Russia’s objective number one is Ukraine. It is Ukraine—with its agency, independence, and all its potential—that must become the gateway to Europe."
• "A politician, when defining the political objective of a war, must take into account positions on the military, social, and economic fronts, the capture of which would create favorable conditions for peace negotiations. Therefore, not only the defense of all these fronts is important, but also deliberate attacks on each such segment of the enemy must bring success, especially in a war of attrition. This must be remembered."
• "According to the logic of the same Russian war theorist Svechin, there are only two types of strategy for achieving a political objective: annihilation and attrition. ... In the course of the war, Russia switched from a strategy of annihilation to a strategy of attrition."
• "We Ukrainians, of course, want a complete victory—the collapse of the Russian Empire. But we also cannot reject the option of a long-term (for years) cessation of the war, because this is a very common historical method of ending wars. At the same time, peace—even while anticipating a future war—offers a chance for political change, for deep reforms, for full reconstruction, economic growth, and the return of citizens."
• "One can even speak of beginning to form a safe, maximally protected state through innovations and technologies. Of forming and strengthening the foundations of a just state through combating corruption and creating a fair judiciary. Of the country’s economic development, including on the basis of international economic reconstruction programs."
• "Another important aspect of forming a political objective today is security guarantees."
• "Nevertheless, perhaps the key political objective for Ukraine now is to deprive Russia of the ability to commit acts of aggression against Ukraine in the foreseeable future."
• "At the same time, it must be taken into account that Russia can pursue such intentions by choosing one of two strategies. In any case, such an act of aggression will be carried out on the military, political, and economic fronts. The tools and forms of such aggression change, but they will all serve the same political goal. If it is difficult to imagine the character of a future war, it is absolutely clear what the world must be like in which our children will live. After all, as Olena Teliha said: 'States do not stand on dynasties, but on the inner unity and strength of the people.'"

“Russia Gains the Upper Hand in the Drone Battle, Once Ukraine's Forte,” Ian Lovett, Marcus Walker, and Nikita Nikolaienko, Wall Street Journal, 11.29.25.

•  Lovett, Walker, and Nikolaienko report, “Russia's growing prowess at hitting Ukrainian supply lines with drones is the most important shift in the war in 2025…Russian drones now outnumber Ukrainian drones by as many as 10:1 in key sectors, such as the battle for Pokrovsk.”
• They note, “Russian forces are interdictiong Ukrainian supply and drone units as far as 40 to 70 kilometers (25–43 miles) behind the front line, using fiber-optic drones that can’t be jammed.”
• Konrad Muzyka, director at Rochan Consulting, remarks, “Ukrainian logistics and drone units are now suffering greater casualties than the front-line infantry, that is partly because the infantry has so few men.”
• Valeriy Zaluzhniy, former Ukrainian general and current ambassador to the UK, cautions, “Not only are lines of communication wrecked; the very idea of a secure rear is fading.”
• Lovett, Walker, and Nikolaienko write, “In Pokrovsk, Ukrainian troops say Russian drones in the area now outnumber the defenders’ by as many as 10:1. The roads are so dangerous for vehicles that Ukrainian troops are hiking the last 10 miles to the front on foot.”
• Rob Lee, senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, concludes, “The kill zone has shifted more behind Ukraine’s front line than the other way around, because Russia has improved.”
• George Barros of the Institute for the Study of War states, “Russian military learning has eclipsed Ukraine’s for midrange strikes…They are interdicting stuff 40 to 70 kilometers from the front line. Previously, for those effects, you needed to fly manned aircraft.”

Sunday, Nov. 30, 2025

“Vladimir Putin Won’t Win on the Battlefield,” Mick Ryan, Wall Street Journal, 11.30.25.

• Ryan writes, “Since January [2025], the Russian military’s territorial gains total nearly 1,900 square miles—or 0.8% of Ukraine, a poor return on investment given its at least 350,000 casualties in 10 months.”
• He explains, “Putin has squandered the opportunity to make significant gains this year. With its advantages in manpower, firepower, misinformation operations and drones, Russia should have been able to conquer more land.”
• Ryan notes, “Ukraine has thwarted their advance by striking deeper inside Russia, damaging its energy and military infrastructure. Russian forces have needed to rebalance its efforts to combat that threat as oil exports decrease and fuel shortages become more prevalent.”
• He contends, “Paltry gains today still serve [Putin’s] long-term ambition. To President Trump’s eye, moreover, they are evidence of Russia’s inevitable victory and reason enough to ‘stop the killing.’”
  • Ryan concludes, “The initial peace plan, with its heavy emphasis on Russian demands, is evidence of Mr. Putin’s skill in manipulation. He’ll need it—for on the current trajectory, Russian troops will continue to proceed at a glacial pace.”

Monday, Dec. 1, 2025

“Ukraine Is Not a War of Attrition. It Is a War of Will,” Dmytro Kuleba, New York Times, 12.01.25. Clues from Ukrainian Views.

• Kuleba writes, “Whichever multiple-point plan emerges next, the takeaway remains the same: Hope is being allowed to stand in for strategy.”
• He argues, “Victory will belong not to the side with more resources…but to the side with the stronger, more adaptive and unyielding will to win. Today, neither Ukraine nor Europe nor the United States can claim that advantage.”
• Kuleba notes, “A large and growing embezzlement scandal threatens to destroy public trust in Mr. Zelensky’s presidency” and that “Ukraine is still facing a military shortage because its politicians are torn between the imperative to fight the war and the temptation to start fighting the next election.”
• He writes, “The United States…seeks an end to the war that will allow the Trump administration to move on — regardless of whether a real peace has been achieved. Europe is lagging in implementing its rearmament agenda, unable to resolve the question of frozen Russian assets and dragging its feet on Ukraine’s accession to the European Union.”
• Kuleba observes, “Russia…has meaningfully scaled up production and use of cruise and ballistic missiles and one-way attack drones, eroding Ukraine’s drone advantage…By offering outsize bonuses and salaries, it has sustained troop numbers despite staggering casualties.”
• He concludes, “Hope cannot be a strategy. In today’s wartime politics, it is doing far too much of the work that weapons, sanctions and hard political choices should be doing instead.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “SACEUR Emphasizes Warfighting Readiness During Visit to Allied Air Command,” Allied Air Command Public Affairs Office, Allied Air Command-NATO, 11.26.25.

Military aid to Ukraine:

Friday, Nov. 28, 2025

“Lessons for Ukraine from Ancient Rome and Carthage,” Howard Chua-Eoan, Bloomberg, 11.28.25.

• Chua-Eoan writes, “‘Carthago delenda est’ — Carthage must be destroyed — was the ruthless war aim of Rome in its long, existential rivalry…After three wars, Rome finally defeated Carthage…Legend would grow that Roman soldiers not only razed the city but sowed salt into its earth so that nothing could ever grow there again.”
• He argues, “The consequences of a devastating peace are nevertheless instructive. The punishing consequences of World War I, for example, sowed the seeds of World War II.”
• Chua-Eoan notes, “The European Union still has a card it can play to avoid Ukraine being carved up according to the whims of Russia and the US,” referring to Moscow’s $300 billion in frozen assets at Euroclear.
• He cites Lionel Laurent: “A region whose gross domestic product is 10 times Russia’s is able to do more than it has so far. Lingering objections to tapping these funds…can and should be overcome.”
• Chua-Eoan warns, quoting Michael Bloomberg, “Abandoning Ukraine would set up the country as another Afghanistan…And it would undermine the liberal order the US has championed and greatly profited from since the end of World War II.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject: 

• "How to Enable Taiwan-Ukraine Defense Cooperation," Daniel Runde, The National Interest, 11.26.25.

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

Thursday, Nov. 27, 2025

“Collateral Damage: The Frozen Foreign Assets of Middle-Class Russians,” Yulia Starostina, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 11.27.25.

• Starostina writes, “Besides state assets, private assets have also been frozen, including planes, yachts, and villas belonging to individual Russians who are on sanctions lists...But another $70 billion...belongs to Russian legal entities and individuals against whom Western financial authorities have no formal claims.”
• She explains, “The waves of Western sanctions that followed [the invasion] shook the entire Russian stock market... The first wave hit brokers at Russia’s largest banks...the second hit Russia’s main securities custodian.”
• Starostina notes, “In 2022, the Russian central bank said that the asset freeze had impacted more than 5 million private investors. A frozen asset exchange program...has allowed 1.5 million investors to recover some of their assets, according to regulatory data.”
• She reports, “Despite this partial restoration of access to assets, around 3.5 million investors remain out in the cold.”
• Starostina writes, “The overwhelming majority of impacted investors (81.6 percent) lost access to relatively small sums—up to 100,000 rubles ($1,200). Just 1 percent of clients owned assets worth more than 3 million rubles (around $40,000).”
• She states, “The Nemtsov Foundation also conducted an online survey among private investors with frozen securities...one in three respondents had left Russia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.”
• Starostina concludes, “Current discussions around using frozen Russian assets to help Ukraine concern only those belonging to the central bank. There is no talk of using private investors’ assets in a similar fashion...For Russian private investors frozen out of the West, there is no sign of a thaw coming anytime soon.”

Sunday, Nov. 30, 2025

“The EU should play its Russian assets card,” Editorial Board, Financial Times, 11.30.25.

• The FT editorial board warns, “The EU has been paralyzed by its own risk aversion and legalistic arguments. Recently, it has been held hostage by Belgium, where most of the assets are held, which fears being on the hook if Russia is one day able to recoup the money.”
• They continue, “The EU’s instinct to uphold international law is well-founded. But with not just Russia but now the Trump administration trampling on international norms, however, it has to consider extraordinary steps to support Ukraine and its own security. It should proceed with plans to make €140bn available to Kyiv as an advance on Russian reparations and linked to Russia’s blocked assets, with other allies doing the same.”
• The editorial board concludes, “It is time for the EU to act. At stake is not just Ukraine’s survival but the future of European security.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject: 

• “Europe’s chance to change the war: How to make the most of the reparation loan,” Ondrej Ditrych, EU Institute for Security Studies, 11.28.25.

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

Monday, Nov. 24, 2025

“Another Attempt at Peace in Ukraine,” Walter Russell Mead, Wall Street Journal, 11.24.25.

• Mead observes, “Mr. Trump’s 28 Points (apparently reduced to 19 after U.S.-Ukraine discussions in Geneva on Sunday) were less the outline of a settlement that the U.S. intended to enforce than an effort to kick-start a stalled peace process.”
• He writes, “The West has the power to impose enough costs on Vladimir Putin to force an end to the conflict. But… the West lacks the will, the strategic clarity about the world situation and the unity of purpose to put pressure on Mr. Putin.”
• Mead asserts, “On the ground, the war of Russian aggression has devolved into a war of attrition, and Ukraine seems to be slowly but inexorably losing.”
• “If there’s one consistent theme in Mr. Trump’s foreign policy, it’s that rich and technologically advanced American allies must take primary responsibility for their own security.”
• He concludes, “Even if diplomacy brings a truce rather than an enduring peace, stopping the fighting on almost any terms looks better than prolonging a war that grows ever more desperate.”

“Don’t Call This a ‘Peace Plan,’” Christian Caryl, Foreign Policy, 11.24.25.

• Caryl writes, “Like Chamberlain, Trump seems to believe that he can impose a fait accompli on the Ukrainians that they will have no choice but to accept.”
• “Kyiv, to use Trumpian language, still has plenty of ‘cards’ at its disposal. His own drastic cuts of support to the Ukrainians have, if anything, reduced the amount of leverage that he can bring to bear.”
• According to Caryl, “It would impose drastic cuts on Ukraine’s military, diminishing its ability to fend off the next Russian invasion... It would also forever bar Ukraine from joining NATO.”
• “Most Ukraine analysts I know agree that any Ukrainian leader who tried to allow this plan to become a reality would probably face immediate removal—either by the military, a popular uprising, or both.”
• Caryl concludes, “This is not a plan for peace. It is a plan for Russian victory and Ukrainian capitulation. The spirit of 1938 has been resurrected.”

“What a Good Ukraine Peace Looks Like,” Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal, 11.24.25.

• The editors write, “The overriding goal of any peace is letting Ukraine survive as an independent nation that can determine its own future.”
• On security guarantees: “Ukraine will need guarantees of premiere Western firepower, including an arsenal of long-range weapons… that can reach into Russia and deter Mr. Putin from restarting his conquest.”
• They observe, “A credible guarantee would have to come from a complement of countries in the West, and include Western troops at least training in Ukraine. Yet the draft deal bans troops operating under NATO’s banner in Ukraine.”
• “The real fantasists are Republicans in Congress and the White House who think Mr. Putin can be coaxed into giving up his Ukraine ambitions with commercial deals and ‘cultural exchange.’ Mr. Putin thinks Ukraine belongs to Russia—full stop.”
• The board concludes, “The test of any peace agreement isn’t that the fighting stops for a time. The test is whether a deal creates the conditions for a durable peace. A false peace will plant the seeds of future bloodshed and broader threats to European and U.S. security.”

Tuesday, Nov. 25, 2025

“A 15-Point Plan to Get to a Ukrainian-Russian Settlement,” Ryan Evans, War on the Rocks, 11.25.25.

• Evans writes, “It would be much more effective to have a list of principles for negotiation that each side must agree to before real negotiations can actually proceed.”
• He argues, “This framework is meant to sketch how the United States could structure talks that are militarily realistic, politically survivable for both parties, and at least defensible to its own allies and public.”
• “Russia will only take negotiations seriously when the alternative looks worse… it is a matter of compellence — of convincing Moscow that continuing the war will hurt it more than entering into a legitimate settlement,” Evans writes.
• “If Washington rushes to front-load concessions simply to entice Moscow to the table, it will confuse inducement with unilateral concession and undermine the very compellence that gives diplomacy a chance to work.”
• Evans concludes, “International diplomacy in war is often about confronting tragic tradeoffs between justice, security, and the lives that can still be saved.”

“Zelensky has clearly read ‘The Art of the Deal,’” Editorial Board, Washington Post, 11.25.25.

• The board notes, “It seemed like [Trump] was ready to abandon Ukraine with a 28-point peace plan highly favorable to Russia, but the Ukrainians understood the gambit and acted accordingly.”
• “Ukraine’s NATO aspirations, a long way off even without Russia’s objections, were no longer automatically vetoed. And Ukraine is working to fill in the blanks on poorly-worded security guarantees.”
• They observe, “Negotiations are unsatisfying, as they implicitly reward Putin for his aggression. The reality is that Ukraine is losing ground, and more of the same from Russia would mean much more suffering for Ukrainians this winter.”
• “Ukraine’s people are incredibly resilient and ready for the looming hardship. The country’s overstretched and outnumbered forces continue to hold the front line, extracting staggering casualties from the enemy for every additional square mile he captures.”
• The editors warn, “But there’s nothing wrong with talking – so long as American negotiators never forget who is really to blame for this awful conflict.”

“‘Breakthrough Unlikely in Near Future’: Russia Reacts to New US Peace Push in Ukraine,” RussiaPost Digest, 11.25.25.

• Sergei Oznobishchev, head of military-political research and analysis at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), states, “If Russia believes this plan will eliminate the root causes of the Ukraine conflict, then it will be [considered] acceptable…We need to return to our foundations and build a European security system, and this is a major, separate issue that must be addressed.”
• Igor Istomin, chair of the department of applied international studies at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), argues, “This plan still fails to resolve the fundamental contradictions within the European security architecture. Tensions will remain, in part because the infrastructure of NATO and the EU is oriented toward deterring Russia, a course that is extremely difficult to reverse.”
• Vadim Kozyulin, head researcher at the Center for Global Studies and International Relations at the Russian Diplomatic Academy, comments, “From Russia’s perspective, the plan looks realistic, whereas for the EU and Ukraine it is completely unacceptable. But it will probably take further fighting to make this plan acceptable to both sides.”
• Valery Garbuzov, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, warns, “If Ukraine signs something under pressure, it will do so through gritted teeth. When states act in this manner…revanchist forces emerge seeking to reclaim what has been lost. So-called ‘Versailles syndrome.’”

“Ukraine: Between a Rock and a Hard Place,” Gwendolyn Sasse, Carnegie Europe, 11.25.25.

• Sasse writes, “Ukraine finds itself in an impossible position, faced with a twenty-eight point plan presented in the form of a U.S. ultimatum. Kyiv must somehow continue cooperating with Washington in order not to lose American support…knowing that it remains unable to adopt basic parts of an agreement that would prove unacceptable at home.”
• She explains, “As originally drafted, the plan is primarily a Russian wish list, which goes so far as to order NATO to formally rule out future membership for Ukraine. This would effectively give the Russian president a veto over the alliance’s actions. Many other points are left vague, in particular the ones addressing security commitments.”
• Sasse notes, “By removing references to NATO, however, the critical issue of security guarantees and the EU’s role in providing them also seems to have been parked. Even with a potential U.S. backstop, there was nothing in the original twenty-eight points about how and by whom the demilitarized zone would be secured. Without an agreement on this, any plan is meaningless.”
• She observes, “Alarmingly for both Ukraine and Europe, the United States is also trying to turn the end of the war into a business opportunity. Washington is demanding a share of the frozen Russian assets via a complicated investment procedure from which it would reap 50 percent of the profit.”
• Sasse argues, “A clear majority of Ukrainians still opposes territorial concessions to Russia. Any negotiated outcome must be put to a referendum in Ukraine. Agreeing to all of Moscow’s demands will therefore be impossible for people who have paid such a high price in this war.”
• She writes, “It is evident that durable and secure peace for Ukraine cannot be negotiated in a matter of days, and the Thanksgiving Day ultimatum cannot hold. The key question is how determined the U.S. administration is to arrive at something Trump can call peace.”
• Sasse concludes, “Amidst all the uncertainty, one thing is clear: It will fall upon Ukraine and the EU to manage the fallout of an ill-conceived plan that is not acceptable to ordinary Ukrainians and leaves the door wide open to a renewed attack by Russia.”

“Could Russia Agree to the Latest Ukraine Peace Plan?” Alexander Baunov, Carnegie Politika, 11.25.25.

• Baunov writes, “On November 21, the full text of a twenty-eight-point draft peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine surfaced... The draft plan was quickly denounced by many as pro-Russian—and indeed, the similarities with Russia’s long-standing demands were plain for all to see.”
• He notes, “Putin did acknowledge the plan as his brainchild—but only partially… He said Russia had received U.S. proposals before the Alaska meeting, along with a request to ‘show flexibility.’”
• Baunov explains, “Russia most likely understands flexibility as being prepared to relinquish its claims to territory in the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions to which it lays claim but has not yet occupied, and to withdraw troops from Ukrainian regions to which Russia does not yet lay claim.”
• He observes, “Trump demanded that the Ukrainian leader sign the plan by Thanksgiving on November 27… Over the weekend, the U.S. and Ukrainian delegations said that they had held ‘constructive’ and ‘highly productive’ consultations in Switzerland, refining and updating the plan.”
• Baunov relates, “European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen issued a statement…‘First, borders cannot be changed by force. Second, as a sovereign nation there cannot be limitation on Ukraine’s armed forces that would leave the country vulnerable to future attack… Third, the centrality of the European Union in securing peace for Ukraine must be fully reflected.’”
• He argues, “It’s unlikely that the EU means it still expects to see a return to Ukraine’s borders as established upon its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Rather, it is refusing to translate the factual recognition of seized territory into a legal and internationally binding framework.”
• Baunov concludes, “Putin is communicating that he’s offering Ukraine and the West a choice: not between different versions of peace, but between achieving the goals of the war through military force alone, or by complementing that force with negotiations, which would result in fewer deaths.”

“Can Trump Deliver Putin?” Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Wall Street Journal, 11.25.25.

• Jenkins asks, “Can Mr. Trump deliver Vladimir Putin? Probably not. Mr. Putin might bite if a deal really delivered him control of Ukraine but here's betting he'll balk at an outcome that merely inaugurates a postwar period inside Russia dominated by the never-ending discovery by his people that the war left Russia worse off.”
• He notes, “Even if it bore fruit, a Ukraine deal under the Trump aegis wouldn't go to the Senate for ratification. His thumbprints would be all over it, making it all the easier for his successor, Ukraine and Europe to write their own script over his.”
• “The picture of Russia emerging triumphant and legitimized from such a deal is, ahem, at variance with reality. The Putin regime faces challenges that the Ukraine aftermath will only heighten, starting with an exploitative China.”
• Jenkins writes, “Mr. Trump began the necessary job of transferring to networks of regional allies more of the responsibility for global deterrence. (Ukraine is a model here.)”
• He concludes, “He prefers a shiny outcome today to a long-term goal tomorrow, especially if it's a shiny outcome that also involves money going into his family's pockets.”

“Politics & Ideas: Ukraine and the Off-Point Peace Plan,” William A. Galston, Wall Street Journal, 11.25.25.

• Galston notes, “The plan evoked consternation in Ukraine and outrage in Europe -- an indication that neither had been directly involved in its formulation.”
• “Under the terms of the original 28-point plan… Ukraine would be forced to pull back its troops from the parts of the Donetsk region it currently controls, and this territory would be internationally recognized as belonging to the Russian Federation. This provision would give international legitimacy to a naked land grab.”
• He argues, “No sovereign nation can be asked to forfeit the military forces it deems necessary to defend itself. But the plan would require Ukraine to cap its armed forces at an arbitrary level that wouldn't suffice to deter or resist future aggression.”
• “Another provision would require Ukraine to enshrine in its constitution that it won't join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization… a permanent prohibition against Ukrainian membership would foreclose a step that may become necessary.”
• Galston concludes, “We should all hope the changes will create a more peaceful future, not just a pause between stages of Russian aggression. Mr. Trump would do well to remember that British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain didn't win the Nobel Peace Prize for the Munich Agreement.”

Wednesday, Nov. 26, 2025

"Ending the Ukraine War Means Facing Hard Choices," Thomas Graham, The National Interest, 11.26.25.

• Graham writes, “President Donald Trump’s original 28-point peace plan was poorly drafted, internally contradictory, and so flagrantly tilted in Russia’s favor as to amount to an attempt to force Ukraine’s capitulation.”
• He argues, “It is undeniable that Ukraine needs peace as soon as possible. The war is exhausting its manpower and devastating its economy…even in a just cause, there are limits beyond which further resistance is no longer feasible.”
• Graham contends, “Ukraine and its supporters need to focus on what they can reasonably hope to achieve in a near-term settlement. This war will not end in a just peace…But even in an ugly peace, Ukraine can preserve what is essential to its future: its sovereignty and independence. Doing so will require hard choices on critical issues, including territory, security guarantees, and reconstruction.”
• He explains, “The war will most likely end with a ceasefire along the line of contact…The imperative is to stop Russia’s westward advance…To stop him, the West will have to step up its support for Ukraine. So far, there are a few indications that it will.”
• Graham notes, “It is time to abandon rhetoric about Ukraine’s NATO membership. If one thing has become clear since the end of the Cold War, it is that NATO as an organization and individual allies are not prepared to risk war with Russia to defend Ukraine.”
• He observes, “Reconstruction will require vast sums. In 2025, the World Bank estimated the cost at more than half a trillion dollars. Russia’s frozen assets in the West—estimated as some $300 billion—will only cover part of that cost. The rest will have to come from the West, and perhaps China or the Gulf states.”
• Graham concludes, “Tough choices lie ahead; the time for rhetoric and pretense is past…Russia will not be defeated on the battlefield. But that does not mean that Ukraine must lose. It can still preserve its sovereignty and independence, even if the war ends in a messy compromise.”

“Trump chose just the wrong moment to play hardball with Ukraine,” Jim Geraghty, Washington Post, 11.26.25.

• Geraghty writes, “All over Russia, there are signs of an economy creaking and cracking under the pressure of the war. Russia's fossil fuel export revenues are now the lowest since the start of the war.”
• “Can Russia still afford to fight a bloody war in Ukraine? Yes, for now — but with each passing month, the financial squeeze gets worse.”
• He notes, “It’s understandable that Trump, who once pledged to end the war in one day, is getting impatient. But the Thanksgiving ultimatum, even if now relaxed, suggested Trump and his team were declaring that the days of a U.S.-supported Ukrainian resistance were coming to an end.”
• On Zelensky and Ukraine’s dilemma: “Zelensky and the Ukrainians may well feel they don't have any choice but to try for the best deal they can get, and at minimum convince Trump that they're not the obstacle to peace.”
• Geraghty concludes, “Shouldn't the Ukrainians decide when the Ukrainians should stop fighting?”

“How to avoid an unjust peace in Ukraine,” The Economist, 11.26.25.

• The Economist argues, “The original plan pretended to be about peace, but in reality paved the way to the next war by hampering Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, rewarding Vladimir Putin’s aggression and setting up sanctions relief and investment that would provide Russia with the cash to rearm.”
• The article notes, “Talks continue. Encouragingly, the Americans have relaxed a deadline of Thanksgiving and backed away from a reported threat to deprive Ukraine of American intelligence and weapons if Volodymyr Zelensky does not sign a deal.”
• The Economist cautions, “Each step towards an agreement that could offer Ukraine the foundation of a secure future will…provoke fresh objections from Russia. If no plan can be contrived that is acceptable to both sides, even under American pressure, then the fighting will continue.”
• The piece observes, “Ukraine lacks men and weapons—Russia is making more drones and can breach its air defenses. Europe, with an economy ten times bigger than Russia’s, could help solve this by a generous, multi-year commitment of money… but cannot seem to turn words into actions.”
• The Economist concludes, “If Europe continues to work on Brussels time, help will come too late to save Ukraine.”

Thursday, Nov. 27, 2025

“Ukraine may be a step closer to peace, or to destruction,” The Economist, 11.27.25.

• The Economist reports, “On November 19th reports emerged of a secret Russian-American ‘peace plan’, one that looked to Ukrainians like a demand for capitulation… The process is tilted against Ukraine: talks aim at reconciling Russian demands with Ukrainian concessions. And the Kremlin is likely to get the final word.”
• According to sources, “The talks in Geneva removed the worst features of the original 28-point plan… The new 19-point version eases limits on Ukraine’s army… removes an amnesty for war crimes and any reference to America getting some of Russia’s frozen assets.”
• The article notes, “‘This isn’t another round of what we saw before,’ says a Western diplomat in Kyiv… Those close to the talks speak of ‘serious progress’ bringing some Ukrainian and Russian positions together,” but “no one imagines Vladimir Putin will agree to it.”
• The Economist cautions that “Ukraine is running out of soldiers. Russian investment in mass-producing drones is paying off… New weapons in the pipeline threaten to make eastern cities like Kharkiv and Dnipro uninhabitable. Russia may be poor at conquering, but it excels at destruction.”
• The Economist concludes, “The path has become very narrow…. Avoid a blow-up with Trump. Keep the weapons flowing, paid for by Europe. And then wait, in the hope that the Kremlin reaches the point where it thinks the war becomes unsustainable.”

“‘We Are Going to Have to Fight Three Wars’”, David French, New York Times, 11.27.25.

• French writes, “The original 28-point peace plan…paved the way to the next war by hampering Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, rewarding Vladimir Putin’s aggression and setting up sanctions relief and investment that would provide Russia with the cash to rearm.”
• According to French, “Russia has almost certainly suffered more than a million total casualties in the war so far…Its new recruits are lower in quality, and desertion is a problem,” yet Russian offensive tactics “work for incremental advances, but there’s no feasible way…for Russia to shatter Ukrainian lines.”
• French stresses, “Trump’s initial plan yielded all of the Donbas to Russia…and tried to force Ukraine to accept a cap of 600,000 military personnel, a number substantially smaller than its current force…Russia has more than 1.3 million active duty troops.”
• He cautions, “Any peace agreement now has to be evaluated on the basis of a single key question — can Ukraine remain free after the shooting stops?…If Trump uses the considerable economic, military and diplomatic power of the United States to coerce Ukraine into risking its independence, a cease-fire wouldn’t be a diplomatic achievement — it would be a national shame.”
• French concludes, “Ukraine might be too weak to retake the Donbas, but more than three years of war have taught us that Russia isn’t strong enough to take Ukraine…It would be an intolerable and catastrophic failure if the Trump administration delivers Putin a victory through diplomacy that he could not achieve in war.”

“Witkoff Is a Credulous Amateur. Ukraine Needs Him to Be Useful,” Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 11.27.25.

• Champion writes, “Steve Witkoff has not been acting, in any sense, as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine. He has instead been negotiating with his Russian counterparts to achieve what both sides want, at the expense of Ukraine and Europe.”
• According to Champion, “Witkoff coached the Kremlin on how to undermine Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s visit to the White House,” advising how to “flatter” Trump and shift momentum away from pressing Russia for concessions.
• Champion asserts, “A further leaked call…confirms how the Kremlin saw Witkoff’s overture. It was to them an opportunity, delivered out of the blue, to restate Russia’s maximum goals and put those into an informal paper the Americans would hopefully adopt as their own.”
• He warns, “Witkoff’s approach has created a dangerous kind of circus around diplomacy to end the war, and his plan has been seen as an opportunity for the Kremlin to restate its maximum goals.”
• Champion argues, “The plan’s 600,000 cap for the size of Ukraine’s armed forces should not be allowed to block the road to peace, so long as it’s clear that figure includes only active duty personnel and not reserves.”
• He writes, “The critical issue of territory is also a deal breaker for Russia: It is hard to envisage Putin stopping the war so long as he is still advancing on the battlefield, and so long as he does not get all of the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces.”
• Champion adds, “Any Ukrainian withdrawal from its fortress defenses in the Donbas can only occur in the context of detailed provisions to secure this demilitarized zone and the entire front line against a further Russian attack,” including “introducing a significant international force along the line of contact.”
• He insists, “There can also be no requirement of Ukrainian or international ‘recognition’ for Russian occupied territories, nor any imposition of early elections.”
• Champion maintains, “Russia cannot receive back the more than $300 billion in frozen central bank funds that Ukraine’s allies have been holding...until there has been a ruling on reparations, let alone split the profits with the US.”
• He concludes, “The real revelation from Witkoff’s dealings with the Kremlin is that he neither knows nor cares what it would take for any deal he negotiates to ensure that the war ends for good and Ukraine emerges…a sovereign nation.”
• Champion urges, “If Trump can assign others who do understand to carry the talks forward, they may yet produce the peace deal that the US president says he wants.”

Friday, Nov. 28, 2025

“Donald Trump’s ‘Peacemaking’ Method: Side with the Bully,” Paul R. Pillar, The National Interest, 11.28.25.

• Pillar writes, “President Donald Trump’s public yearning for a Nobel Peace Prize has led him to stretch beyond recognition the meaning of the terms ‘peace agreement’ and ‘mediation.’ He claims credit for anything that can possibly be portrayed as a move from war toward peace, and to which he has had any connection, however tenuous.”
• He argues, “The pattern is to take the side of the militarily dominant power while mostly ignoring the interests of the other party to the conflict. Trump evidently sees facilitation and encouragement of the strong completing its objective of crushing the weak as the quickest way to get to the end of a war, and something he can portray as ‘peace.’”
• Pillar contends, “The recently constructed 28-point ‘peace plan’ to end the Russia-Ukraine war...is about as one-sided as the Gaza plan. It reflects no Ukrainian involvement. Witkoff and a Russian official wrote it. Trump has given Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky a short-deadline ultimatum to accept the plan or else lose US aid.”
• He observes, “The key substantive provisions in the plan would require Ukraine to cede even more territory, in the Donetsk region, than Russia has been able to conquer...The plan places limits on the size of Ukrainian armed forces and on its freedom to join alliances or host foreign forces, but places no comparable limits on Russia.”
• Pillar warns, “A settlement imposed on Ukraine will leave resentment and instability in Ukraine. And it is unrealistic to expect lasting peace after the partial achievement of war objectives in Ukraine by a Russian president whose goal is to seize or subjugate all of Ukraine.”
• He emphasizes, “There are also larger demonstration effects to consider, including a further breakdown of norms against the use of armed force. Acceptance of Russian gains in Ukraine represents a reward for an act of naked aggression, carried out when nobody was attacking or threatening to attack Russia.”
• Pillar concludes, “Donald Trump gives no indication of having thought about such things. His personal, short-term desire to chalk up anything he can label, validly or otherwise, as a peace agreement will leave behind him a less peaceful world.”

“Ukraine’s Catch-22 moment,” Franz-Stefan Gady, Financial Times, 11.28.25.

• Gady writes, “Ukraine now faces its own Catch-22: Russia insists that Kyiv’s forces withdraw from all parts of Donetsk they currently hold … Kyiv is sane to reject a plan demanding surrender without resistance — but by continuing to fight, the struggle risks becoming futile as the military outlook darkens.”
• He explains, “If Ukraine continues resisting, worsening battlefield dynamics by 2026 could allow Russia to seize all of Donbas (or even more), eliminating a key obstacle to a ceasefire and leaving Ukraine with the same end result, just on worse terms.”
• Gady argues, “Peace settlements usually work only when both sides can trust one another, or when a powerful enforcer makes violations prohibitively costly. When enforcement is weak, ‘successor wars’ are likely. Today, the US and Europe lack unified will or capacity to guarantee Ukraine’s future security.”
• He emphasizes, “Security guarantees have failed before … Without ironclad commitments — backed by European boots on the ground, not just promises — Kyiv risks surrendering territory today only for Moscow to strike again when conditions are ripe.”
• Gady concludes, “Ukraine’s choices could boil down to ‘bad now, or possibly worse later’ … Sometimes, the cruel logic of war means that bitter compromise is the only way out — even if you know just how far it falls short.”

“New Peace Push Offers Clues to Fundamental Question: What Does Putin Want?” Matthew Luxmoore, Wall Street Journal, 11.28.25.

• Luxmoore concludes, “Putin is hoping to clinch a grand geopolitical bargain that secures his control over Ukraine—dealing with the U.S. over the heads of European and Ukrainian officials. Sergey Radchenko…compares the current moment with the post-World War II period when Joseph Stalin, in Yalta, sought U.S. agreement to divide Europe into spheres of influence.” 

“Russia‒Ukraine: turbulent diplomacy,” Nigel Gould-Davies, IISS, 11.28.25.

• Gould-Davies writes, “The 28-point peace plan—emerging from talks between Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev, US special envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner—was replete with contradictions, ambiguities and errors that betrayed a lack of legal or diplomatic expertise.”
• He notes, “The terms heavily favored Moscow. Russia would gain Ukrainian land…regain full access to the global economy…and enjoy an amnesty for war crimes…Ukraine would face restrictions on the size of its military and receive no credible security guarantees.”
• Gould-Davies observes, “Two questions reportedly remain unresolved and await decisions at the highest level: territory and security guarantees. These have always been the key issues.
• He argues, “America’s volatile diplomacy undermines the credibility of any security commitments…Ukraine cannot be confident that a president who imposes an unfavorable peace would later risk war on its behalf should Russia violate the terms.”
• Gould-Davies asserts, “The war will only end if weakness compels either combatant, or both, to shift their position. If Ukraine faces irreversible collapse, it might…agree to a peace that averts immediate disaster at the cost of permanent vulnerability.”
• He notes, “Europe’s weakness has been painfully exposed. Its posture is one of reactive dependence rather than strategic autonomy. Despite being the main source of Ukraine’s economic and military support, it is marginal to the diplomacy of the war.”

Saturday, Nov. 29, 2025

“A peace plan for Ukraine: Painful, imperfect — and inevitable,” Stephen Kinzer, The Boston Globe, 11.29.25.

• Kinzer writes, “A new peace plan for Ukraine has emerged. President Trump has endorsed it, Russia has tentatively accepted it, and Ukraine is negotiating to soften its terms. It has set off an explosion of protest. Critics say it goes too far in accommodating Russian interests and may even have been drafted by Russians.”
• He observes, “Russia, with its vastly greater military power, is winning slow and steady victories at a high cost financially and in casualties. Meanwhile, much of Ukraine has been devastated as millions have been killed, maimed, or displaced.”
• Kinzer explains, “Although Trump’s plan is still being refined, its outlines are clear. Russia would hold some form of control, and perhaps even full sovereignty, over demilitarized Russian-speaking regions in what is now eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainian army would be capped at 600,000…No foreign troops, other than neutral peacekeepers, would be allowed in any part of Ukraine…It would not join the US-dominated NATO military alliance.”
• He argues, “A guarantee that Ukraine will not join NATO is an absolute requirement if Russia is to halt its advance...Critics of Trump’s proposal have long argued that barring Ukraine from NATO would be succumbing to Russian pressure…This is disingenuous. Russia wants a relationship with Ukraine like ours with Mexico and Canada: Ukraine can be independent… but it may not partner militarily with enemies of its big-power neighbor.”
• Kinzer concludes, “Pouring more billions into the Ukrainian quicksand will only produce more bloodshed and a worse result in the end. In this case, ugly peace is better than permanent war.”

“‘Putin’s whole life revolves around war – he’s manipulating Trump and doesn’t want peace,’ ex-US aide warns,” Sam Kiley, The Independent, 11.29.25.

• Kiley reports Fiona Hill, former US national security adviser and Russia expert, as saying, “Vladimir Putin knows exactly how to manipulate Donald Trump and has no intention of stopping the war in Ukraine despite the US president’s calls for peace.”
• Hill explains, “His [Putin’s] whole economy, his whole society, his whole politics, his whole preservation of self revolves around having this war go on.”
• She describes how “Putin uses flattery to stroke Mr Trump’s ego while continuing to do as he pleases in Ukraine,” and notes that Putin can mock Trump to his face, relying on language barriers to cover his teasing.
• Hill gives an example of Putin joking to Trump in Osaka about Israel being named after Trump, saying, “They’d got the point that basically, he [Trump] was being trolled.”
• She dismisses rumors of Trump being blackmailed by Moscow. “He’s an open book – we’ve all got something on Trump!” and instead argues, “Trump likes Putin because he sees the authoritarian Russian leader as an equal. And their relationship brings the US president prestige.”
• Hill concludes, “It is a man crush. It’s because Putin’s the badass. He’s what Trump would like to be… Putin realizes he is a man with a very fragile ego, and that it’s somebody that can be manipulated in that way.”
• Hill warns that Putin’s strategy remains one of prolonging the war and manipulating relationships with Western leaders to Russia’s advantage. 

“Dan Driscoll, the unlikely Ukraine envoy with his eye on the Pentagon,” Steff Chávez, Financial Times, 11.29.25.

• “Driscoll had been expected to visit Ukraine on a drone-focused trip in December, but the White House asked him to kick off peace negotiations, according to a US official.”
• “Trump ‘appreciates’ Driscoll’s ‘efforts to gather input from both the Russians and the Ukrainians,’ says White House deputy press secretary Anna Kelly. But his ‘opportunity to also discuss a peace plan arrived out of convenience,’ a second US official says.”
• “Ukrainian first deputy foreign minister Sergiy Kyslytsya says Driscoll ‘was very active, engaging, willing to listen.’ But conversations in Kyiv were not entirely smooth. A top European official describes the tone of Driscoll’s meeting with European ambassadors and western officials as ‘nauseating.’”
• “European officials asked Driscoll whether the US saw accountability for Russia’s war crimes as an essential part of the plan. He deflected, much to their chagrin. Echoing Vance, Driscoll said: ‘There are cities, locations under dispute that will be in Russian hands, it is just a matter of time. If we do not recognize that, then the decision to fight must weigh: how many lives are you willing to sacrifice? The deal does not get better from here, it gets worse.’”¹

“Make Money Not War: Trump’s Real Plan for Peace in Ukraine,” Drew Hinshaw, Benoit Faucon, Rebecca Ballhaus, Thomas Grove, Joe Parkinson and Annie Ng, Wall Street Journal, 11.29.25.

• “In October, President Zelensky flew to Washington, hoping to secure long-range, U.S.-made Tomahawk cruise missiles. His military wanted to cripple Russian refineries, pushing Moscow to negotiate on better terms.”
• “By the time Zelensky arrived, Trump had spoken to Putin a day earlier and decided not to offer the Tomahawks. Instead, Witkoff encouraged Ukrainian officials to try another tack: What good was a handful of missiles going to accomplish? Instead, he encouraged Ukraine to ask Trump for a 10-year tariff exemption. It would supercharge their economy, he said. ‘I'm in the deal settlement business. That's why I'm here,’ he told the Journal. ‘We keep on knocking at the door and coming up with ideas.’"

Sunday, Nov. 30, 2025.

“Rubio Says ‘Much Work’ to Be Done After Talks With Ukrainian Officials,” Cassandra Vinograd, New York Times, 11.30.25.

• Vinograd reports, “Secretary of State Marco Rubio emerged from talks with Ukrainian officials in Florida on Sunday to say that there was still ‘much work to do’ on a proposal to end the war with Russia.”
• Rubio stated, “It is important that the talks have a constructive dynamic and that all issues were discussed openly and with a clear focus on ensuring Ukraine’s sovereignty and national interests.”
• She notes, “Missing from the Ukrainian group was Andriy Yermak, President Volodymyr Zelensky’s right-hand man and chief of staff who resigned on Friday amid a corruption investigation. Mr. Yermak had served as lead negotiator in recent talks with American officials.”
• Vinograd writes, “Neither Mr. Rubio nor Rustem Umerov, who led the Ukrainian delegation after Mr. Yermak’s resignation, revealed details of the discussions, although both described the talks as productive… Steve Witkoff, a special envoy for President Trump, plans to travel to Moscow on Monday to meet President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, according to a U.S. official.”
• Rubio described the talks as “productive,” but emphasized, “There is still much work to do, and agreement is not yet within reach.”
• She explains, “Last week, Mr. Yermak negotiated to soften a draft proposal to end the war from the Trump administration, whose 28 points largely reflected Russian demands. These included withdrawing from territory in eastern Ukraine, forgoing NATO membership and ruling out a postwar Western peacekeeping force for Ukraine.”
• Vinograd concludes, “His [Yermak’s] departure helped ease worries in Ukraine that Russia or the United States might use the $100 million embezzlement scandal as leverage to push Kyiv to make painful concessions in talks.”

“Land and security are the main sticking points as Russia and Ukraine mull Trump's peace proposal,” Dasha Litvinova and Isobel Koshiw, Washington Post (AP), 11.30.25

• Litvinova and Koshiw report, “Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said the revised plan could be ‘workable.’ Russian President Vladimir Putin called it a possible ‘basis’ for a future peace agreement. Trump said Sunday ‘there’s a good chance we can make a deal.’”
• They write, “Ukrainian officials met with U.S. President Donald Trump’s representatives Sunday…Washington officials are expected in Moscow for more peace talks this week.”
• “Putin implied last week that he will fight as long as it takes to achieve his goals, saying that he will stop only when Ukrainian troops withdraw from all four Ukrainian regions that Russia illegally annexed in 2022 and still doesn’t fully control. ‘If they don’t withdraw, we’ll achieve this by force. That’s all,’ he said.”
• The authors note, “One of the Ukrainian negotiators… told The Associated Press… Ukraine’s president wanted to discuss the territory issue with Trump directly. Yermak then told The Atlantic… Zelenskyy would not sign over the land.”
• They observe, “The diplomacy set in motion by Trump’s peace plan ‘painfully exposed’ Europe’s weakness, Nigel Gould-Davies of the International Institute for Strategic Studies wrote in a recent commentary…Europe…has done little more than offer amendments to America’s draft peace plan.”

Monday, Dec. 1, 2025

“Reader live chat: U.S. foreign policy after Thanksgiving; Ukraine, Russia, Trump,” David Ignatius, Washington Post, 12.01.25. 

• Ignatius writes, “Trump's first term was disrupted by President Zelensky. Trump's demand for politically useful information in exchange for weapons led to Trump's first impeachment, so I guess he blames that on Zelensky. A more basic fact is that Ukraine is one of those smaller countries whose fate doesn't seem important to Trump. He's in the ‘big guy's club.’ It's a strange failing.”
• “Trump seems to lack that moral empathy for Kyiv. Can't explain it, but it's an intangible factor in what's happening now,” Ignatius says, reflecting on how past U.S. presidents historically defended small nations from aggression.
• On Europe’s current predicament, Ignatius notes, “Europe is trying hard to convince Trump not to give away the store—and it's their store!”
• He argues that the only factor that may sway Trump is political self-interest: “The most persuasive factor for Trump should be that a bad deal will blow up in his face—become ‘his Afghanistan’—and ruin the rest of his presidency.”
• Ignatius warns that the current U.S. negotiating team lacks significant intelligence or national security expertise, with “Kushner and Rubio [having] some diplomatic negotiating experience but they aren't foreign policy professionals. Witkoff, zip.”
• On the overall negotiating stance: “The administration's core fallacy seems to me to be the idea that there's a pot of gold at the end of the Russian rainbow…This is almost certainly an illusion. Europe is vastly more important to the United States economically than Russia.”
• “European countries are proving more robust in challenging Russian aggression than is the U.S. under Trump. Who's the paper tiger???” Ignatius asks, emphasizing the shifting balance of resolve between Europe and America.
• Summing up the future of Ukraine negotiations, Ignatius is blunt: “If Ukraine is excluded from negotiations and Trump tries to impose a peace settlement against their will, it won't work. But from what I hear, the administration is trying to listen to Ukrainian concerns. The problem will come when Russia says no to a fair deal—and says it will fight on to victory. What then?”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “Ukraine Peace Talks Intensify,” CFR Editors, CFR, 12.01.25.
• “Fiona Hill: Witkoff coaching the Russians will be no surprise to Trump,” Telegraph, 11.27.25.
• “Unfinished Plan for Peace in Ukraine: A Provision-by-Provision Analysis,” Mark F. Cancian and Maria Snegovaya, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 11.24.25.
• “House Republicans Slam Witkoff Over Handling of Russia-Ukraine Talks,” Rachel Oswald, Foreign Policy, 11.26.25.
• “Europe Fears It Can’t Catch Up in Great Power Competition,” Laurence Norman, Wall Street Journal, 11.27.25.
• "Who Wants to End a War Just to Start a New One?" Jessica Karl, Bloomberg, 11.24.25.
• "In War and Peace, US Must Stand With Ukraine," Michael R. Bloomberg, Bloomberg, 11.26.25.
• "The Women Leaders podcast: Bad plans come unstuck," Ilana Bet-El, Hanna Shelest and Iryna Krasnoshtan, European Leadership Network (ELN), 11.28.25.
• "A misguided 'peace plan' and its consequences," Patrick Keller and Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), 11.25.25. (In German.)
• "A European Peace Plan for Ukraine," Stefan Meister, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)/Internationale Politik Quarterly, 12.01.25.
• "What Do Security Guarantees for Ukraine Mean?" Andreas Umland, The National Interest, 11.30.25.
• "The next day," Valdislav Inozemtsev, The Moscow Times, 11.26.25.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

Tuesday, Nov. 25, 2025

“NATO’s top commander to Defence24: We have a plan for Kaliningrad,” Mariusz Marszałkowski, Defence24, 11.25.25.

• General Alexus G. Grynkewich, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), states, “We know what actions to take regarding the Kaliningrad Oblast. We have plans prepared.”
• Grynkewich highlights increased hybrid threats in Europe, including sabotage on Polish railways and recurrent unidentified drone incidents, remarking, “We still have the war in Ukraine. We are observing and supporting President Trump’s objective of bringing that war to an end. However, we are aware… Russia will continue to pose a threat to our NATO allies and we must be prepared for everything that may result from that.”
• He describes the Alliance’s approach: “We have learned a great deal by observing the conflict in Ukraine and seeing how Western weapons systems from various manufacturers perform in that environment…We are constantly taking action so that we retain the advantage.”
• Grynkewich says, “In light of the drone incursions… we pay attention to the experiences Ukrainians have shared with us. We test and integrate those experiences and technologies within NATO… new systems become part of, among other things, our Operation Eastern Sentry, which aims to provide adequate protection on the eastern flank.”
• On logistics and NATO readiness, Grynkewich notes, “We have recently conducted several large exercises in which we placed heavy emphasis on logistics…The Baltic Sea is essential. If you want to move large quantities of goods to the Baltic states, the Baltic Sea is the most efficient way—and we will certainly make use of it, including during crises.”
• He adds, “Military professionals will never say we are as ready as we would like to be… But if we had to fight tonight, we are ready. Absolutely.”
• Regarding airport infrastructure, Grynkewich concludes, “Centralization brings efficiency, but in a conflict you must be prepared to disperse and have the ability to operate in a distributed manner. We can have a main plan, but we need several contingency plans ready at any time. That builds the resilience of our system as a whole.”

“Moscow’s Offshore Menace: How the Shadow Fleet Enables Russia’s Hybrid Warfare in Europe,” Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, Foreign Affairs, 11.25.25.

• Soldatov and Borogan write, “It is increasingly clear that the seas around Europe have become a central arena of Russia’s pressure campaign against the continent.”
• They note, “Russia does not appear to be launching drones from its own territory. Instead, it appears to be relying on its so-called shadow fleet, the hundreds of Russian-controlled third-party boats that are used to evade sanctions and that often navigate waters around Europe.”
• “French President Emmanuel Macron said that France could not rule out a connection between the ship and the drone attacks, although definite proof has not yet surfaced.”
• According to the authors, “For the Kremlin, such a strategy can draw on long experience: going back to the Soviet era, Moscow has used ships as a key part of its intelligence operations in Europe and elsewhere.”
• Soldatov and Borogan conclude, “To truly address the threat, Europeans must recognize that the fleet is already destabilizing their countries and some day might serve to support and even provide a launch point for offensive operations in Europe.”

Wednesday, Nov. 26, 2025

“Crunchtime for Europe on Ukraine,” Katrin Bennhold, New York Times, 11.26.25.

• Bennhold writes, “President Trump’s peace plan is forcing the continent to confront some hard choices about military power.”
• On European military capacity: “Europe’s biggest and richest democracies spent much of the last three decades enjoying the peace dividend… Military budgets shrank. Troop and tank numbers dwindled.”
• “On average, fewer than one-third of E.U. citizens say they are willing to fight for their country in a war. (The same poll found that 41% of Americans said they were willing, and 76% of Indians said they would fight.)”
• She observes, “A flurry of behind-the-scenes European diplomacy, led by Germany, France and Britain, appears to have been effective in dialing back the pro-Russian aspects of Trump’s peace plan.”
• Bennhold cautions, “European rhetoric on the war has been high-minded throughout—and Zelenskyy has counted on that steadiness. We’ll see soon enough what that counts for at the bargaining table.”

“Facing Russian Threat, Europe Debates How to Rearm,” Patricia Cohen, New York Times, 11.26.25.

• Cohen writes, “The threat has put intense pressure on countries across the continent and in Britain to quickly expand the ranks of full-time soldiers and reservists that shrank during the post-Cold War peace. Yet the question of how to recruit hundreds of thousands of service members is prompting fierce and soul-searching debates.”
• “Particularly when, on average, fewer than one-third of European Union citizens said they were willing to fight for their country in a war, according to a Gallup poll in 2024, more than two years after Russia invaded Ukraine.”
• On solutions, Cohen reports, “Croatia… restored conscription… Poland… aims to more than double its army, to 500,000… Denmark… extended its draft to include women and prolong the service period… France announced plans to roll out an optional military service program…”
• “Most European armies struggle to both meet their recruitment targets and retain trained personnel, as well as generate a sufficient reserve,” she quotes the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
• Cohen concludes, “But any plan to solve the problem, it noted, depends on political will and popular support.”

“Germany’s Secret Plan for War With Russia,” Bertrand Benoit, Wall Street Journal, 11.26.25.

• Benoit reports, “Operation Plan Germany, the 1,200 page-long classified document drafted behind the nondescript walls of the Julius Leber Barracks… details how as many as 800,000 German, U.S. and other NATO troops would be ferried eastward toward the front line.”
• He writes, “The plan is the clearest manifestation to date of what its authors call an ‘all-of-society’ approach to war,” blending military and civilian realms and requiring the private sector and infrastructure to support rapid mobilization.
• According to Benoit, “German officials have said they expect Russia will be ready and willing to attack NATO in 2029,” but a possible Ukraine ceasefire could free up Russian resources for an earlier move against NATO.
• The article notes, “Lessons from field exercises…exposed flaws too: The land couldn’t accommodate all the vehicles,” and outdated infrastructure/peacetime laws present serious obstacles to military mobility and defense.
• Benoit concludes, “Given the steep rise in sabotage, cyberattacks and airspace intrusions, the difference between peace and war is looking increasingly fuzzy…‘We’re not at war, but we no longer live in peacetime.’”

Thursday, Nov. 27, 2025

“If the fighting ends in Ukraine, the infighting in Europe will begin,” The Economist, 11.27.25 

• The Economist observes, “Nearly four years of fighting… have given Europe, often a fractious continent, the closest thing to national unity it has ever known,” but warns that “when war ends, watch out for the effects of the great de-galvanization.”
• The article argues, “For countries on the eastern flank… a ceasefire in Ukraine would stir as much anxiety as relief,” as they fear Russia could threaten them next while western European countries would “crave normality” and cuts to defense spending.
• According to The Economist, “one of the objectives of the mooted peace… is to allow Russia back into the fold in some way,” with early drafts calling for a return to the G8 and the dropping of sanctions—moves likely to divide Europe further.
• The piece warns that “sympathy for Ukraine at war may not carry over to Ukraine at peace,” raising the prospect of tension over refugee returns, reconstruction aid, and the EU accession process, especially amid fresh corruption scandals.
• Finally, The Economist cautions that “the most wrenching disagreement will come around how to deal with America,” as Europe’s hot-war-era unity may unravel with debates about weaning off U.S. security guarantees and the reliability of the transatlantic alliance.

Sunday, Nov. 30, 2025

“NATO considers being ‘more aggressive’ against Russia’s hybrid warfare”, Richard Milne, Financial Times, 11.30.25.

• Milne writes, “NATO is considering being ‘more aggressive’ in responding to Russia’s cyber attacks, sabotage and airspace violations, according to the alliance’s most senior military officer, Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone.”
• Admiral Dragone, chair of NATO’s military committee, says, “We are studying everything… On cyber, we are kind of reactive. Being more aggressive or being proactive instead of reactive is something that we are thinking about.”
• He notes, “Some diplomats, especially from eastern European countries, have urged NATO to stop being merely reactive and hit back,” especially in the cyber domain, where “many countries have offensive capabilities.”
• Dragone states, “A ‘pre-emptive strike’ could be considered a ‘defensive action,’ but added: ‘It is further away from our normal way of thinking and behavior.’”
• Dragone points to the success of the Baltic Sentry mission: “From the beginning of Baltic Sentry, nothing has happened. So this means that this deterrence is working.”
• Finland’s foreign minister, Elina Valtonen, acknowledges legal challenges: “Yes, and that’s a problem,” she says, with regard to Russian vessels committing sabotage in international waters.
• Dragone concludes, “How deterrence is achieved—through retaliation, through pre-emptive strike—this is something we have to analyze deeply because there could be in the future even more pressure on this.”

Monday, Dec. 1, 2025

“Trump, Xi, Putin and the strongman race,” Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, 12.01.25.

• Rachman writes, “Trump’s return to the Oval Office has signaled a revival of the strongman style in global politics. Bilateral meetings between powerful, headstrong leaders increasingly shape the international agenda. Multilateral summits… are dwindling in significance.”
• He notes, “Putin finds it hard to travel these days. But that has not stopped him from enjoying a few set-piece summits this year… It is clear that he can no longer claim to lead one of the world’s most powerful nations. After almost four years of war, Russia’s army is still struggling… (and) its economy is dependent on the kindness of China.”
• Rachman explains, “Trump and Xi, by contrast, lead nations with the economic might to back up their strongman swagger. Despite his relentless campaign to win a Nobel Peace Prize, the U.S. leader has also shown himself willing to use military force.”
• He observes, “Xi, by contrast, is ending 2025 looking stronger than for some time… (and) has almost complete control over his country’s legislature, legal system and media… But he continues to purge political and military leaders at an extraordinary rate.”
• Rachman concludes, “Whatever Trump may think, a president surrounded by terrified subordinates is not a healthy sign for any country.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Deterring ­Russia from Military Aggression Against Europe’s NATO Allies," Karl-Heinz Kamp, Kristi Raik and Carolina Vendil Pallin, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), 11.25.25.
• “50 years ago, he saw a startling document in the JFK file. Where is it now?,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 11.28.25.

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

‘Where Trump Sees Deals, Russia and China See a Chance to Disrupt U.S. Alliances’, Jason Douglas, Chun Han Wong, Bertrand Benoit, Wall Street Journal, 11.27.25.

• Douglas, Wong, and Benoit report, “Russia is seeking to exploit Trump’s desire to halt the war in Ukraine and strike business deals with Moscow by shaping a peace plan that meets many of its strategic objectives, including winning chunks of Ukrainian territory and closing off any hope Kyiv had of joining NATO”
• According to a transcript, U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff told Putin aide Yuri Ushakov, “The president will give me a lot of space and discretion to get to the deal,” revealing the Trump administration’s openness to Russian input on the Ukraine peace process.
• The authors note, “European governments and Kyiv’s supporters in Congress were taken aback last week by a 28-point plan for peace in Ukraine that appeared to reflect many of Russia’s objectives”
• They write, “Moscow and Beijing see opportunity in Trump’s single-minded focus on striking short-term bargains for both capitals to advance long-held goals, analysts say,” aiming “to undermine U.S. leadership in both Europe and Asia.”

"The Global Alignment Index: Tracking Support for U.S., Chinese, and Russian Leadership," Gregory B. Poling and Andreyka Natalegawa, CSIS, 11.25.25.

• Poling and Natalegawa write, “The Global Alignment Index… scores individual countries on their relative alignment with the United States and China, and with the United States and Russia, in each year from 2008 to 2024. These scores are constructed using UN voting behavior and Gallup public opinion surveys.”
• They find, “Contrary to claims of declining U.S. influence relative to China in Southeast Asia and the BRICS, both had, on average, become more aligned with the United States over the last 16 years…In nearly half of the subsequent 16 years, the U.S.-China Alignment Score for Southeast Asia has fallen between -0.5 and 0.5—effectively a dead heat.”
• The authors state, “Public and regime alignment tend to move in the same direction over time, though public opinion is slower to change year-over-year… Southeast Asian and BRICS publics are, on average, considerably more aligned with the United States than their governments.”
• They observe, “Trade volumes have little impact on—and may even negatively affect—alignment. Both Southeast Asia and the BRICS have grown far more dependent on bilateral trade with China than with the United States, but those countries have, on average, grown less aligned with China over that time.”
• Poling and Natalegawa note, “The effect of changes in U.S. administrations is much clearer than that of individual events… Alignment with the United States decreased considerably during the first Trump administration before recovering nearly to the levels of Obama 2.0 during Joe Biden’s presidency.
• The authors find, “The impact of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine coincided with a substantial increase in alignment with the United States over Russia, and to a lesser degree over China. In fact, 2022 was the high-water mark for Southeast Asian and BRICS alignment with the United States over the period studied.”
• Poling and Natalegawa argue, “BRICS membership has not moved the members into greater alignment with China or Russia. That could change with the new members, but there is no evidence to support that yet.”

“Why Russia and China Are Sitting Out Venezuela's Clash With Trump,” Kejal Vyas and James T. Areddy, Wall Street Journal, 11.29.25.

• Vyas and Areddy write, “Russia, China, Cuba, Iran and other anti-American powers are offering little more than words of support for Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro as he faces a U.S. military buildup that President Trump has said is aimed at forcing his ouster. Like Iran when it came under military attack from Israel and the U.S., Venezuela is finding its authoritarian allies on the sidelines of conflict.”
• They note, “Both Russia and China face challenges that temper their interest in Venezuela’s security concerns. For Moscow, it is the cost of its grinding war with Ukraine and for Beijing it is a weak economy that limits its generosity.”
• The authors report, “Last weekend, two oil tankers identified by the European Union as having transported banned Russian oil arrived in Venezuela with light crude and naphtha. Venezuela badly needs those products to produce fuel and pump its own heavier oil for export to China.”
• Vyas and Areddy write, “China calls [Venezuela] an ‘all-weather’ partner—a recipient of more than $30 billion in major arms from China since 2000, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. But China’s economic honeymoon with Caracas was short lived, and now relies almost entirely on Venezuela crude exports to satisfy its debt arrears.”
• They conclude with a quote from Vladimir Rouvinski, international relations professor at Icesi University in Colombia: “‘Russia isn’t going to help Maduro beyond what they’ve already done.’”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• Podcast: “Graham Allison on the Risks of a U.S.-China War,” Tracy Alloway and Joe Weisenthal, Bloomberg, 11.27.25.
• “Karaganov is rushing the development of Siberia: China is not a long-term ally,” Anatoly Lapin, Polit Navigator, 11.28.25.
• "CRINK in 10 Charts," Brian Hart, Bonny Lin, Maria Snegovaya, and Mona Yacoubian, CSIS, 11.24.25.
• "Is China Preparing a Ukraine-Style Plan for Taiwan?" Karishma Vaswani, Bloomberg, 11.30.25.

Missile defense:

•  No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

“How Are Modern Technologies Affecting Nuclear Risks?,” Carnegie Corporation of New York, 10.29.25.

• Wilfred Chan argues, “The world’s nuclear arsenal has decreased sharply from a Cold War peak of 70,300 weapons to an estimated 12,241 today, according to a 2025 study by the Federation of American Scientists conducted with support from Carnegie Corporation of New York. But researchers see new risks as emerging technologies inject uncertainty and vulnerabilities into established understandings of nuclear security.”
• James McKeon, a program officer at Carnegie, warns, “Our concern is that we don’t know how incorporating AI systems is going to complicate things in ways we can’t predict… we need further analysis to better understand the information we do have.”
• Julia Berghofer, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Leadership Network, observes, “A significant limiting factor is the widespread lack of interdisciplinary literacy among nuclear experts… it is still unusual for nuclear experts to have a strong technical background or an AI/machine learning background, and vice versa.”
• Daniel Kroth, Senior Researcher at the Center for AI Risk Management and Alignment, argues, “How decision-makers react to new technologies…is determined by their perception of these new technologies… Understanding these factors will be key to understanding and avoiding new nuclear dangers.”
• Xiaodon Liang, Senior Policy Analyst at the Arms Control Association, points out, “Ensuring that solutions are not only effective, but also intelligible to and auditable by appropriate authorities, is an additional challenge.”
• Kingston Reif, Senior International/Defense Researcher at RAND Corporation, states, “Rapid advances in technology now challenge these pillars [of deterrence]… Policymakers require a better understanding of whether, and if so how, emerging technologies could complement or potentially substitute for the role played by nuclear weapons.”
• Tom Weis, Associate Professor at Rhode Island School of Design, and Alice Saltini, Non-Resident Expert at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, emphasize that “frontier ‘reasoning’ AI models are widely misunderstood…Verification and validation remain immature so laboratory performance fails in safety-critical settings. When integrated into decision loops, they can amplify automation bias, compress timelines, and produce cascading failures in high-stakes environments.”

“Answers to Russian Media Questions [After CSTO Summit],” Vladimir Putin, Kremlin, 11.27.25.

• Putin stated, “After Donald Trump raised the possibility of the United States resuming nuclear weapon tests, I gave instructions to our agencies and special services to study the feasibility of similar tests in Russia.”
• He explained, “I have instructed our experts to collect additional information on American activities, analyze it, and prepare recommendations for our next steps.”
• Putin added, “One of the proposals we received is to cooperate with the American administration on all issues concerning strategic stability, and we are ready to consider this together.”
• In response to a journalist’s question, Putin said, “If the nuclear testing topic comes up in the upcoming negotiations in Moscow, we will certainly raise it; even if it doesn’t, we will bring up the issue ourselves. Preparing for actual nuclear weapon tests takes time, and we cannot risk a situation where the U.S. completes a test while we are still preparing.”
• Discussing the U.S.-proposed peace plan for Ukraine, Putin said, “There was no draft treaty, but rather a list of issues to be discussed. We agree that this list can form the basis for possible future agreements, though certain points require extensive further discussion.”
• Addressing Western media leaks about U.S.-Russia discussions, Putin suggested, “Several parties in the West want to see an end to the war quickly, even if it means requiring concessions from Ukraine, because they recognize that the frontline is close to collapsing.”
• On the status of the Donbas, Putin said, “We continue to receive proposals to halt hostilities only upon Ukraine’s withdrawal from its occupied territories. If this does not happen, we will achieve this outcome by military means.”
• Putin asserted, “In my opinion, the Ukrainian leadership made a fundamental and strategic mistake when it was too afraid to hold presidential elections, and as a result, the president lost his legitimate status.”
• He added, “At this stage, it is pointless to sign documents with the current Ukrainian authorities. What matters is recognition of our decisions by the main international actors.”
• Putin explained, “For Russia, it is essential that territorial changes be recognized by key international players. Otherwise, a Ukrainian attempt to regain control would not be treated as aggression against Russia, which has serious consequences.”
• On Russian military operations in Ukraine, Putin claimed, “Our forces are advancing along all directions, and the tempo of their advance is significantly increasing. Ukraine’s losses and its personnel deficit are both growing.”
• Responding to questions about de facto versus de jure recognition of territorial changes, Putin concluded, “This is precisely one of the key topics to be discussed in our negotiations with the American side.”

Vladimir Putin’s “Meeting with participants of the 5th Congress of Young Scientists,” Kremlin.ru, 12.01.25.

• “What do we know? We know that, despite all the efforts of states in these areas, everything still becomes the property of all humanity. Starting with gunpowder, which was once invented in China, and no matter how hard the authorities at the time tried to suppress it, everyone still came into possession of it. The same applies to the most destructive weapons—nuclear missiles. Everyone now knows that the inventors of nuclear weapons almost deliberately shared this information with each other in order to create a balance in the world and thereby guarantee the stable development of various countries among themselves, creating conditions in which no one would dare use these destructive, terrifyingly powerful weapons.”

“Lessons From Los Alamos: America Has the Most To Lose From Restarting Nuclear Testing,” Siegfried Hecker, Foreign Affairs, 11.26.25.

• Hecker writes, “But a return to testing at this time would likely benefit U.S. adversaries more than it would the United States. Worse still, it might rekindle an even greater and broader arms race than in the first few decades of the Cold War.”
• “Resumption of full-scale nuclear testing… would provide even greater benefit to China and Russia… It would also help in fielding the greatly expanded nuclear arsenal that [China] is developing now.”
• He warns, “My greatest concern about resuming full-scale nuclear testing is that it will fuel another dangerous arms race at a time when global tensions among the great powers are high.”
• “Instead of suggesting an immediate return to nuclear testing, then, Trump should focus on returning to arms control measures to ensure strategic stability with Russia and with China.”
• Hecker concludes, “The bottom line is that even though the United States could derive important benefits from resumed nuclear testing, it would lose more than it stands to gain.”

“Stepping back from the brink: How the UK could help lead the world away from the nuclear precipice,” Steve Barwick, European Leadership Network, 11.25.25. 

• Steve Barwick warns, “The world today stands closer to nuclear catastrophe than at any point since the end of the Cold War. Conflicts involving nuclear-armed states… could all too easily escalate to a nuclear confrontation. Meanwhile, key arms control treaties have collapsed, and most nuclear powers… are modernizing their nuclear arsenals.”
• Barwick argues, “The so-called ‘nuclear taboo’—a shared global understanding that nuclear weapons are not legitimate tools of warfare—is eroding. For example, President Vladimir Putin’s threats to use nuclear weapons during the Russia-Ukraine war reintroduced nuclear brinkmanship into mainstream political discourse.”
• Barwick notes that “the collapse of key nuclear arms control agreements between the U.S. and Russia… has removed a vital guardrail” and that new tactical nuclear weapons are being developed and tested by both Moscow and Washington.
• Steve Barwick suggests, “Now is the time for Russia to agree to a ceasefire and take part in good-faith negotiations to end the war in Ukraine…Russia and the U.S. should refrain from deploying [tactical nuclear weapons] and instead negotiate a legally binding treaty to eliminate them.”
• Barwick recommends four steps for the UK: reject nuclear sharing and prioritize transparency; reinvigorate global diplomacy; adopt a no-first-use policy; and engage with the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as an observer.
• Barwick observes, “The year 2026 will be critical. It marks both the scheduled expiry of New START… and the next NPT Review Conference.”
• Barwick concludes, “The message is unambiguous: continuing along the path of rearmament and confrontation invites catastrophe. The UK… has a rare opportunity to steer policy toward restraint and away from the futile pursuit of ‘nuclear advantage.’”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject: 

• “Has Putin launched the second nuclear arms race?,” Serhii Plokhy, The Week, November 2025.
• “Ukraine: Europe is Bringing the World to Precipice of Nuclear War with Russia (Dr. Dmitri Trenin),” podcast, 11.29.25.

Counterterrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security/AI: 

• No significant developments.

Energy exports from CIS:

“Eighteenth and nineteenth EU packages: Escalation of energy sanctions,” Ivan Timofeev, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), 11.28.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• Timofeev writes, “The distinctive feature of the nineteenth package was an escalation of secondary sanctions against partners of the Russian energy sector in friendly countries. This trend could continue in the future.”
• He notes, “Since July 2025, there has been a trend of escalating secondary sanctions against Russia’s partners in the energy sector,” and adds, “in the eighteenth package, entities in third countries involved in transporting Russian oil were subjected to blocking sanctions.”
• Timofeev emphasizes, “A more notable escalation step of the last two packages can be seen in sanctions against buyers of Russian oil. In the eighteenth package, Indian company Nayara Energy was blocked. The nineteenth package targeted the Chinese refinery Shandong Yulong Petrochemical and ChinaOil.”
• He observes, “So far, secondary sanctions against Chinese and Indian companies, as well as U.S. secondary tariffs, have barely registered as major events in Delhi’s and Beijing’s relations with Western capitals.”
• Timofeev concludes, “Further escalation regarding the Russian energy sector should be expected. The contest between ‘shell and armor’ on the economic field continues.”

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

• No significant developments.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “What Happens to Russia’s Ethnic Minorities After the War?,” David Kirichenko and Alexander J. Motyl, Foreign Policy, 11.28.25.
• "Wartime debts drag Russian businesses down," Alexander Kolyandr and Alexandra Prokopenko, The Bell, 11.29.25.

Defense and aerospace:

“Interview of Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov for the program ‘Military Acceptance,’” Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11.30.25.

• Lavrov states, “The challenges facing the Russian arms export system are the same as for any of our exports: sanctions and attempts to justify them by the need to punish Russia for its ‘behavior’ in Ukraine. In reality, this is dishonest and uncompetitive struggle.”
• He argues, “This is yet another example of how the West has demonstrated its total inability to reach agreements… The globalization rules championed by Western countries for decades—free markets, fair competition, presumption of innocence—have all been discarded as soon as the West realized it was losing.”
• Lavrov asserts, “Sanctions against our defense sector started long before the special military operation. We know how to counteract this, since the vast majority of non-Western countries do not want to ‘keep dancing to this tune’ indefinitely. Those who sincerely want mutually beneficial deals can always find financial and logistical chains—even now.”
• He says, “Our arms are seen as absolutely competitive and carry the aura of fighting colonialism. The Kalashnikov is a symbol of decolonization; African countries remember how their grandfathers and fathers achieved independence with Soviet weapons and assistance.”
• Lavrov stresses, “Today, in even more advanced technological conditions, we are not lagging in this ‘race.’ Our products are part of Russia’s international reputation and a material foundation for our foreign policy.”
• He adds, “We will always work in a coordinated way to promote the tasks set by President Putin, defending Russia’s legitimate interests on the international stage.”
• Lavrov concludes, “I have no doubt this is—and will remain—a source of pride and a key part of our position in global affairs.”

“About the Great Russian Military Theorist A.A. Svechin, His Life, Legacy, and Contribution to Victory in the Great Patriotic War,” Andrei Kokoshin, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), 11.27.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• Kokoshin writes, “A.A. Svechin (1878–1938) was a towering figure in Russian military theory, whose strategic insights were instrumental in shaping Soviet victory in World War II.”
• He reports, “Svechin fought in the Russo-Japanese and First World Wars, rose through the ranks, and became a leading staff officer, educator, and theorist in the Red Army.”
• Kokoshin emphasizes, “Svechin’s magisterial work ‘Strategy’ (1926, 1927) remains foundational for military researchers, praised for its structure, depth of analysis, and focus on the integration of political and military strategy.”
• He explains, “Svechin pioneered ‘operational art’ as the crucial link between strategy and tactics, influencing Soviet command doctrine and the training of the WWII generation of commanders.”
• Kokoshin notes, “Svechin was critical of dogmatism, stressing the need for intellectual honesty, a multidisciplinary approach, and the study of economic, social, and cultural factors in military science.”
• He observes, “Despite his achievements, Svechin was persecuted during the purges, but later rehabilitated; his works and legacy were revived in modern Russian scholarship.”
• Kokoshin concludes, “Svechin’s ideas on strategic defense, ‘integral command,’ and permanent mobilization not only shaped Soviet preparations for World War II, but remain relevant to contemporary military thought and leadership.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject: 

• "The Age of the Mercenary Is Here to Stay," Amar Singh Bhandal, The National Interest, 11.27.25. (about the Wagner Group)

See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement, justice and emergencies:

• No significant developments.

   

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Will Modi Cozy Up to Putin?” Sumit Ganguly, Foreign Policy, 11.25.25.

• Ganguly notes, “Given this precipitous decline [in U.S.-India relations], it is not entirely surprising that India is seemingly open to rejuvenating its partnership with Russia.”
• He explains, “Putin’s interest in India is mostly instrumental. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has repeatedly expressed misgivings about India’s participation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. It is reasonable to assume that Russia is dangling a series of defense deals and other commercial ventures with India to widen the rift that has emerged in U.S.-India relations.”
• Ganguly cautions, “Indian policymakers are no doubt aware that Russia hasn’t always been the most reliable partner… even though Putin may come to New Delhi with promises of much-needed advanced weaponry, his ability to make good on them is in question.”
• “Nor for that matter is Russia a reliable and consistent diplomatic partner. Because of its growing estrangement with the Western world, Russia is increasingly dependent on China, India’s long-term adversary (a status that, despite recent bonhomie, is unlikely to change).”
• He concludes, “Turning its back on Washington at this moment won’t serve New Delhi’s long-term interests, and cozying up to Moscow won’t fix its diplomatic woes.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject: 

• "What to Expect from Vladimir Putin’s India Visit," Harsh V. Pant and Aleksei Zakharov, Observer Research Foundation, 12.01.25.
• “Russia-Türkiye Ties Falter Amid Stresses of Ukraine War,” Ruslan Suleymanov, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 11.26.25.

Ukraine:

“Ukraine Corruption and U.S. Interests,” Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal, 11.28.25.

• The board writes, “Another corruption scandal is roiling Ukraine, and there’s no denying corruption exists there as it does in most of the former Soviet states. The question is whether this should override U.S. strategic interests in supporting Ukraine, especially if there are reasonable safeguards against the theft of U.S. assistance.”
• The WSJ editors point out, “A probe focused on senior officials is paradoxically a sign that Kyiv is getting better at fighting corruption. In 2024 Ukraine ranked 105 among 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, up from 144th in 2013.”
• The board notes, “The Energoatom scheme allegedly drove up electricity prices as contractors tried to cover kickback costs. Russia continues to attack Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, and another question is whether the graft meant fewer defenses at some sites. In both scenarios Ukrainians are the victims—but there’s no suggestion that Western funds were embezzled.”
• They emphasize, “As of this month the criminal investigative arm of the Defense Department Office of the Inspector General has reported no instances of corruption involving U.S. support for Ukraine.
• The board concludes, “Corruption deserves to be policed and punished. But U.S. support for Ukraine deserves to be judged by overall American interests, and the highest interest is national security.”

“War, peace, and corruption in embattled Ukraine,” Mariana Budjeryn, Brookings Institution, 11.26.25.

• Budjeryn writes, “On Nov. 10, 2025, the National Anticorruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and Specialized Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) unveiled a massive corruption scheme in Ukraine’s energy sector, involving embezzlement and laundering of at least $100 million. The scheme is centered on Energoatom…which runs the country’s four nuclear power plants with 15 nuclear reactors.”
• She reports, “Ominously, the scheme involves individuals with close connections to the Office of the President and to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy personally,” including businessman Timur Mindich and multiple top officials; seven people have been indicted for embezzlement, bribery, and illicit enrichment so far.
• Budjeryn explains, “The money from kickbacks was channeled and laundered through a back office run by Mindich’s friend and business partner Oleksandr Tsukerman,” with other individuals helping to move the funds and some suspects fleeing the country.
• She notes, “The Mindich scheme is just the tip of the corruption iceberg. Some of the suspects… have had connections to Andriy Derkach, the former Ukrainian politician and one-time president of Energoatom… reported to have run a network of Russian agents in Ukraine.”
• Budjeryn observes, “Amidst the scandal, Zelenskyy condemned corruption and called for cooperation with the NABU investigation… On Nov. 17, Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko announced a comprehensive audit and ‘reloading’ of the entire energy sector.”
• She argues, “Despite these measures, public distrust of the Office of the President remains high… By keeping Andriy Yermak as chief-of-staff and lead negotiator in Geneva, Zelenskyy has undermined his legitimacy at home and credibility abroad at a time of existential crisis.”
• Budjeryn concludes, “The silver lining… is that the country’s anti-corruption institutions are doing exactly what they have been established to do… both the war with Russia and the war on systemic corruption are expressions of Ukrainians’ stubborn refusal to surrender their freedom and dignity.”

“Ukraine must change how it is governed, writes a former adviser,” Alexander Rodnyansky, The Economist, 11.25.25.

• Rodnyansky argues, “The Energoatom affair… has become a test of whether Ukraine’s leadership can reform the system it built, or if that system has turned into one of the Kremlin’s most valuable assets.”
• “The cabinet has been treated less as an independent center of policymaking than as an administrative extension of the presidential office. Loyalty has trumped competence.”
• He observes, “Corruption scandals will almost certainly continue to develop, with more tapes, names and resignations. The president will denounce accusations, remove a few expendable figures, invoke national dignity and accuse his critics of undermining unity.”
• “For Ukraine’s partners, the taboo question now is not whether corruption is pervasive, but whether the current leadership is still part of the solution, or has become part of the problem.”
• Rodnyansky concludes, “Whether that time is used to overhaul a compromised system, or simply to extend the life of a long-running political series, will determine not only the quality of any eventual peace, 

“Ukraine's inspiring democratic resilience,” Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 11.28.25.

• The editorial board writes, “The resignation on Friday of Andriy Yermak, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s most trusted and powerful lieutenant, should hearten supporters of Ukraine. While Yermak’s departure is likely to unsettle the government…  that turbulence will be short-lived.”
• They observe, “Democracy is making a comeback in the war-weary country, and that’s a good thing. Martial law, imposed immediately after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, has allowed Ukraine to keep fighting—but at a cost, including no elections. In the pursuit of streamlined decision-making, Zelenskyy has concentrated power around himself. Yermak personified that.”
• The board notes, “Yermak resigned after anti-corruption officials raided his home early Friday. But whether he was personally involved is of secondary importance. Even before President Donald Trump’s 28-point ‘peace plan’ became public, members of the opposition in parliament, as well as members of Zelenskyy’s own party, began to demand Yermak step aside and Zelenskyy form a more transparent national unity government.”
• They explain, “The harsh terms of Trump’s initial plan shocked Ukrainian society, and Zelenskyy dug in, telling members of his parliamentary faction that he would not fire anyone. A week later, his calculus has changed. After Yermak’s fall, Zelenskyy announced a ‘reset’ in his office. By broadening his wartime government to include fewer loyalists, Zelenskyy could reclaim some lost credibility.”
• The editorial concludes, “In truth, his ouster is evidence of resiliency and maturity that should hearten the Trump administration. Friday’s news shows Zelenskyy’s willingness to sideline even his closest aide to do what’s best for his country in its fight for national survival.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject: 

• “In Firing His No. 2, Zelenskyy Loses Both a Negotiator and an Enforcer,” Andrew E. Kramer, New York Times, 11.29.25.
• “Volodymyr Zelenskyy loses brother-in-arms [Yermak] in Kyiv power shift,” Christopher Miller and Fabrice Deprez, Financial Times, 11.29.25.
• “Ukraine’s chief of staff [Yermak] falls to a scandal,” The Economist, 11.28.25.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Central Asia in Transition: New Regionalism, Geopolitical Realignment, and the Post-Carbon Future,” Vadim Grishin, PONARS Eurasia, 11.25.25.

• Grishin writes, “Central Asia’s evolving political and economic trajectory has disrupted this dismissive narrative, revealing that the states’ policy approaches are neither linear nor uniform, but increasingly adaptive, contested, and shaped by national priorities and redefining regional dynamics.”
• “Beijing has prioritized infrastructure development designed to strategically connect China with European markets, often by deliberately bypassing Russian territory to reduce dependence and assert greater control over trade flows.”
• Grishin states, “No single state, internally or externally, dominates the region: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan remain influential but not supreme; meanwhile, Russia, China, the EU, the United States, Turkey, India, and the Gulf states all matter but lack overriding control.”
• He adds, “A just and orderly energy transition requires national reform plus regional cooperation, namely, scaling renewables, modernizing grids, cutting emissions (especially methane), and strengthening institutions.”
• Grishin concludes, “If Central Asian leaders can align national interests with joint action—especially on water, energy, transport, and climate resilience—the region will move from the periphery of Eurasian politics to become an oasis of stability and connectivity in a turbulent world.”

“CSTO summit,” Vladimir Putin, Kremlin, 11.27.25.

• Putin emphasized, “Russia will assume the CSTO chairmanship on January 1, 2026… Its motto will be Collective Security in a Multipolar World: Common Goal, Shared Responsibility.”
• He assured, “Russia will do everything necessary to maintain continuity in the main spheres of interaction within the CSTO, developing cooperation between our countries based on the principles of true alliance, friendship and good neighborliness, respect and consideration for each other’s interests, and mutual assistance and support.”
• Putin stated, “The CSTO reliably guarantees security and stability in the Eurasian space while protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its member states.”
   He proposed, “holding an international expert forum on the creation of an equal and indivisible security architecture in Eurasia before the 2026 CSTO summit in Moscow.”
   Putin declared, “Russia will continue to work closely with its allies in all areas related to strengthening the CSTO’s military capabilities, focusing its efforts on reinforcing the combat readiness of national forces and improving the command and control of the collective forces.”
• He announced, “We propose launching a large-scale program to supply the collective forces with modern Russian weapons and military equipment, which have proven their effectiveness in military operations on the ground.”
   Putin said, “Special attention should be paid to the development of the organization’s air force and air defense system,” and announced joint training and exercises involving these capabilities.
• He identified peacekeeping force deployment mechanisms and military technology R&D as major priorities during Russia’s chairmanship, including “deepening collaboration among defense industry enterprises.”
• Putin highlighted, “Russia will also actively facilitate the introduction of the latest advancements in military medicine for use by the collective forces," and pledged support for public health and biosecurity measures.
• He said, “During our chairmanship, we plan to start working together on the new CSTO counter-terrorism strategy,” and also committed to continued anti-extremism and anti-terror operations.
• Putin stressed, “Among the most important priorities … I would also like to highlight information security. The Russian side is committed to close cooperation with its allies in preventing the spread of radical ideas among young people.
• Putin concluded, “It would also be advisable to focus on developing inter-parliamentary cooperation to harmonize the national legislation of the organization’s member states,” and said Russia would work to “improve the efficiency” and “flexible adaptation” of CSTO Secretariat and Joint Staff.

Footnotes

1. The U.S. Army secretary, Daniel P. Driscoll, warned in a briefing to Western diplomats that Russia is now producing enough missiles to build up a substantial stockpile, presenting a growing threat not only to Ukraine but potentially to other European countries. Driscoll used the Russian missile buildup to press for a quick peace deal, even if unfavorable to Ukraine, as the Trump administration continues to argue that Russia holds the battlefield advantage. Ukrainian and Western analysts confirm that Russia’s arms production has surged in 2025, enabling it to fire record numbers of missiles while still stockpiling hundreds more. The shift in Russian missile strategy has prompted concern that Ukraine could eventually run out of interceptors to defend major cities such as Kyiv. (New York Times, 11.28.25)

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

Slider photo: Secretary of State Marco Rubio, left, and Rustem Umerov, Secretary of the National Security of Ukraine talk to the media Sunday, Nov. 30, 2025, in Hallandale Beach, Fla. (AP Photo/Terry Renna)