3 Ideas to Explore

1. Predictably, U.S. and Russian reactions to Donald Trump’s instruction on nuclear testing¹ reflect divergent priorities and narratives. Writing in WSJ, Hudson Institute’s Rebeccah Heinrichs frames Trump’s directive to “start testing our Nuclear Weapons on an equal basis” as a justified response to what DIA has viewed as Russia’s failure to adhere with “the nuclear-testing moratorium in a manner consistent with the zero-yield standard” while also letting the New START treaty lapse. She has also urged abandoning arms-control constraints and doubling down on “full” deterrence modernization of the U.S. nuclear triad. By contrast, Heather Williams of CSIS and Erin Dumbacher of CFR emphasize technical and legal barriers that in their view make renewed explosive testing problematic. They warn that U.S. tests could end up strengthening America’s adversaries while also damaging nonproliferation norms. Russian reactions to Trump’s order center on skepticism and strategic justification. One of Russia’s most renowned arms control experts Aleksei Arbatov of IMEMO dismisses Trump’s remarks as uninformed and politically driven. Moscow-based analysts like Prokhor Tebin of Higher School of Economics and former Russian diplomats like Alexander Yakovenko warn that if Washington breaks the test moratorium, Moscow will respond in kind, per Russian leadership’s pledge to do so in what would usher in a destabilizing “second nuclear age.” Russian commentary portrays Trump’s rhetoric as confirmation of U.S. unreliability—justifying Russia’s development of such nuclear-powered systems, as Burevestnik cruise missile and underwater vehicle Poseidon that can both carry nuclear warheads. 

2. The Washington Post’s Oct. 29, 2025 investigation, entitled “Inside Trump’s Golden Dome,” paints a stark picture of Trump’s proposed nationwide missile-defense system. The article emphasizes that China and Russia are driving the largest long-range nuclear buildup since the Cold War. Yet, Moscow calls the Golden Dome “an aggressive escalation,” and Beijing warns it risks weaponizing space and undermining global arms-control regimes. The project could cost anywhere from $175 billion to $3.6 trillion and take a decade or longer, requiring 9,500 space-based interceptors just to counter ten incoming ICBMs. Critics argue such a constellation could trigger a generational arms race in space, according to the Oct. 29 article.

3. In his International Security article Marc Trachtenberg of the University of California, Los Angeles contends that the commonly accepted story of a post-WWII liberal “rules-based international order” is historically unsupported. He argues that the liberal institutions often credited with stabilizing the world actually played a limited role, and sometimes “could actually have a destabilizing effect.” If peace prevailed, it was not because liberal norms prevailed, but rather because a realistic accommodation with the Soviet Union was negotiated—grounded in acknowledging its power and interests, not liberal idealism. Trachtenberg highlights how Russia and China view “rules-based order” as U.S. imperial branding, citing Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s statement that “Rule America—that is the essence of the notorious rules-based order.” Trachtenberg asks whether “protecting and extending the rules-based order [should] be a fundamental goal not just for the United States but for the Western world as a whole.”

U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“Russia Aims to Freeze Ukraine Into Submission,” Keith Johnson, Foreign Policy, 10.29.25.  

• Johnson reports that “just ahead of winter, Russia has greatly intensified its assault on Ukraine’s energy sector, with a particular and novel focus on the country’s supply of natural gas,” aiming to leave Ukraine “in the dark and in the cold.”
• The autumn offensive is new in both “scale… drone swarms of 600 or 700 machines overwhelm air defenses” and in targeting: “for the first time in such a major way, [Russia is] trying to knock out Ukraine’s natural-gas production, storage, and distribution capabilities—not just electricity.”
• Johnson writes, “Ukraine may have lost as much as one-third of its natural gas production capabilities already,” with imports from Europe now needed “to keep the heating on and the population safe from severe suffering this winter.”
• He cites energy expert Andrian Prokip: “earlier, it was electricity. Now, in October, they actually attack everything—electricity, natural gas, fuel depots. We need gas and electricity.”
• The escalation may be “part of a calibrated escalation… meant to undermine the will and morale of the Ukrainian population,” timed after Ukraine’s own “intensified assaults… against far-flung Russian oil facilities, especially refineries and fuel depots.”
• Johnson warns Ukraine has “no easy way to enhance the air defenses” needed to protect key infrastructure, as “air defense missiles are expensive and ineffective against overwhelming swarms,” and “AI-enhanced Russian drones can also evade jamming measures and attack from angles that make interception more difficult.”
• He concludes that Russian attacks risk “sundering the eastern part of Ukraine from the western parts,” as attacks sever transmission lines and destroy a large share of eastern generation capacity, making it “increasingly little way to physically knit the two halves of the country together and prevent blackouts.”
• For military strikes on civilian targets see the next section.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

Valery Gerasimov’s remarks during an Oct. 26 visit by Vladimir Putin to the Joint Force command post, official web site of the Russian president, 10.26.25.

• “The Joint Force troops continue to carry out their assigned tasks to liberate the Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics, as well as the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions, in accordance with the objectives set for the special military operation.”
• “Today, I would like to elaborate on two directions, the first one being the area of responsibility of the Centre group of forces. Formations and military units of the 2nd and 51st armies, advancing along converging axes, have completed the encirclement of the enemy in the Krasnoarmeysk and Dimitrov areas. A large group of Ukrainian Armed Forces, comprising 31 battalions, was blocked, including units from the 25th Airborne, 79th Airborne Assault, and 68th Jaeger Brigades, as well as the 35th and 38th Marine Brigades, the 425th Separate Assault Regiment, and the 153rd and 155th Mechanized Brigades. Special recognition for performing their military tasks has been given to Russia’s 30th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 439th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 2nd Army, as well as the 9th and 110th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigades of the 51st Army, and personnel of the Rubicon Advanced Unmanned Technologies Centre units.”
• “The success of the operation to encircle the enemy was supported by comprehensive fire damage on AFU formations across the entire depth of their operational deployment, as well as isolating the combat zone to disrupt the enemy’s supply lines.”
• “At present, the Centre group’s priority is the equally important task of destroying the encircled AFU group in the Krasnoarmeysk and Dimitrov agglomeration. Second, Kupyansk is encircled in the direction of operations of the West group of forces. Meanwhile, assault units of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division of the 6th Army have executed a flanking maneuver and captured enemy crossings over Oskol River south of the city. They have blocked the Ukrainian armed forces on the left bank east of Kupyansk in cooperation with the 47th Motorized Rifle Division and the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 1st Tank Army. Units of the enemy’s 14th, 43rd, and 116th Mechanized Brigades, as well as the 1st Brigade of the Ukrainian National Guard—18 combat battalions in total—are encircled.
  In addition, formations and military units of the West group of forces continue to successfully advance in the Krasny Liman direction, with Yampol almost completely liberated.”
• “Offensive operations are also underway in other directions. Over the past two weeks, the North group of forces has successfully advanced in the southern part of Volchansk, with more than 70% of the city liberated to date.”
• “Assault units of the South group of forces have liberated Dronovka and Pleshcheyevka and continue urban warfare in Seversk and Konstantinovka. Units of the East group of forces are advancing in the Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhye regions, with six villages liberated.”
• “As part of the strategic nuclear force training exercise, combat training launches of Yars and Sineva intercontinental ballistic missiles and two Kh-102 air-launched cruise missiles were carried out, with all planned objectives achieved.”
• “Such a test [of Burevestnik] was conducted on Oct. 21. Unlike previous trials, this one featured a many-hour flight, with the missile covering 14,000 kilometers—and that is not the limit… it uses nuclear propulsion. Burevestnik’s technical characteristics generally allow for its use with assured accuracy against highly protected targets at any range. During the flight, the missile completed all prescribed vertical and horizontal maneuvers, showcasing a high capability to evade missile-defense and air-defense systems." Also see Putin’s remarks in the nuclear arms section.

Military aid to Ukraine

“Why funding Ukraine is a giant opportunity for Europe,” The Economist, 10.30.25.

• The editors write, “Ukraine is facing a savage cash crunch. Unless something changes, it will run out of money at the end of February,” as “President Donald Trump has cut America’s financial support for Ukraine” and “Russian drones smash Ukraine’s energy grid in an attempt to break its will.”
• They argue that for Europe, this is “a historic opportunity to shift the balance of power between Europe and Russia by exposing the Kremlin’s financial frailty and altering Vladimir Putin’s calculus about war and peace,” and to “speed up Europe’s efforts to establish its military and financial independence from America.”
• Europe’s “financial commitment… can expose and amplify the Kremlin’s long-term weakness.” Russian losses “double the figure for Ukraine,” while “Putin’s initial war boom has now given way to stagflation, with growth at almost zero, labour shortages, hidden bad debts, inflation of 8% and interest rates of 16.5%,” and “another half-decade of this would probably trigger an economic and banking crisis in Russia.”
• Long-term European support, they write, “would help Europe build the financial and industrial muscle it needs to defend itself,” especially with “Trump’s wobbly commitment to NATO.”
• The editors propose “a four-year commitment… would cost $390 billion, composed almost entirely of donated weapons and cash to finance Ukraine’s budget deficits,” but “the bill for Ukraine is affordable, with annual costs rising… to 0.4% of GDP,” and is “still excellent value.”
• They advocate “joint borrowing” and EU bond issuance: “for the EU to issue bonds collectively would create a bigger pool of common debt, deepening Europe’s single capital market and boosting the role of the euro as a reserve currency.”
• The Economist concludes, “Europe should take heart and recognize its own strength… Far from shying away from a financial contest with the Kremlin, Europe should embrace it—and win the war.”

“How to Get More U.S. Weapons to Ukraine,” Bart M. J. Szewczyk, Foreign Policy, 10.30.25.

• Szewczyk writes, “Europe buying U.S.-made arms for Ukraine is only second-best after direct American support, but it is better than no U.S. deliveries at all,” as “reliance is particularly stark in security, whether that concerns the defense of Ukraine or of the continent as a whole.”
• He focuses on the EU’s new 150 billion euro ($176 billion) Security Action for Europe (SAFE) fund, noting “that currently cannot be accessed by U.S. and other non-EU firms,” but argues that “opening this fund to U.S. defense companies could—if negotiated smartly—be Europe’s leverage” to unlock a $90 billion U.S. weapons package for Ukraine.
• The SAFE program “provides 150 billion euros in long-maturity loans for arms procurement by member states,” but non-EU companies “are restricted to receiving a maximum of 35% of the costs of each project” unless they complete a formal security partnership with the EU.
• “Six countries, including Japan and South Korea, have already done so,” Szewczyk notes, and “Britain and Canada are expected to conclude the negotiations… placing them in a more privileged position than the United States.”
• He argues the “Trump administration should make this deal happen and could do so with little effort,” and that “this would unleash tens of billions of additional funding for U.S. firms and could be linked to the negotiations with Ukraine over a large-scale U.S. weapons package.”
• Szewczyk acknowledges French and broader European reluctance, especially President Macron’s desire for military autonomy, but asserts that “formalizing some sort of defense cooperation with the EU… should not be a large concession for Washington.”
• He concludes, “a West based on transactionalism is a major departure from the liberal vision that underpinned a successful, decades-long partnership. But it aligns with the new political realities and could provide a good enough basis for future collaboration. Crucially, it could help sustain Europe’s security and Ukraine’s ability to fight and prevail.”

“Zelenskyy Is Winning Trump Voters Over,” Steven Moore and Colby Barrett, Wall Street Journal, 10.31.25.

• Moore and Barrett write that “support for military aid for Ukraine is surging among President Trump’s voters, due in part to a shift in President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s strategy.”
• They note that Zelenskyy’s favorability among Trump voters fell from “67%… in March 2022” to “19% by March 2025,” amid Russian disinformation and unflattering accusations, but has more than doubled in the last seven months after a change in tactics.
• “Now Mr. Zelenskyy gives interviews on ‘The Ben Shapiro Show,’ ‘Special Report with Brett Baier’ and Newsmax,” and has engaged conservative religious audiences, including hosting a prayer breakfast and an interview with Trinity Broadcasting Network.
• According to the Ukraine Freedom Project’s polling, since June there’s been a “22-point swing in support for military aid among religious conservatives and an 18-point swing among Republicans who attend church weekly,” and 78% of Republicans who like Zelenskyy also favor military aid to Ukraine.
• The authors emphasize, “What Mr. Zelenskyy didn’t say to Trump voters is as crucial as what he did.” They argue that with new messaging, “Republicans are clear on who is obstructing Mr. Trump’s diplomacy… 64% of Republican voters view Mr. Putin as the obstacle to a cease-fire. Only 13% point to Mr. Zelenskyy.”
• They report, “Ninety-two percent of Republican primary voters are concerned about Russian drone incursions into Europe… 76% are concerned that Russia or China may attack the U.S. with drones.”
• Moore and Barrett conclude that winning—and talking about winning—“with conservative media” is crucial: “When given information” about Ukrainian strikes and victories, “half of Republicans recognize Ukraine is winning, and 85% of them favor military aid to Ukraine.”

“Ukraine Drones Draw Western Tech Money,” Alistair MacDonald and Heather Somerville, Wall Street Journal, 11.03.25.

• MacDonald and Somerville write, “Foreign investment in Ukrainian drone makers and other defense technology has risen this year, driven by the prospect of battle-tested technology winning a slice of rising military spending.”
• They note, “Ukrainian startups offer the U.S. possible solutions for its shortcomings in drone technology and their UAVs often cost a fraction of the price of those made in the West.”
• The authors highlight, “Kyiv-based Swarmer raised $15 million in what the startup said was the largest investment in a Ukrainian defense-tech company since the start of the war.”
• MacDonald and Somerville explain, “European venture funds and U.S. investors are joining, while Ukraine-focused funds are raising more money as the number of deals increases rapidly.”
• They point out, “Investment comes with risks—corruption, a crowded market, and security challenges—but firms are consolidating and relocating operations to address governance issues.”
• The authors add, “Western companies like Germany’s Quantum Systems are taking stakes in Ukrainian drone makers and helping boost production, attracted by lower costs and high demand.”
• MacDonald and Somerville write, “The Pentagon and European governments are negotiating deals for Ukrainian companies to share drone technology or manufacture in other countries, betting on Ukrainian innovation despite the crowded field.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Ukraine Has a Plan for Victory. Its Allies Don’t," Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 10.29.25.
• What will it cost to make Vladimir Putin stop?” The Economist, 10.30.25

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

“Has the EU Found a Way to Use Frozen Russian Assets to Help Ukraine?” Alexander Kolyandr, Carnegie Politika, 10.21.25.

• Kolyandr writes that “Europe appears to have agreed to provide Kyiv with a ‘reparations loan’ secured by Russian assets—but is unable to implement that plan due to resistance from Belgium,” even as “western countries have frozen Russian assets… believed to be at least $335 billion.”
• The main obstacle is Russian state (central bank) assets, which “are protected by both the law and established practice,” with most “in accounts at the Euroclear depository located in Belgium.”
• Currently only the interest earned on Russian sovereign assets is transferred to Ukraine—“in 2024, the income from interest amounted to 6.9 billion euros”—but “Kyiv needs about $100 billion a year, and Trump’s return to power… has escalated the problem to a new level.”
• The EU’s proposed plan: a $140 billion “reparations loan” backed by frozen Russian assets, which Ukraine “will only pay… once Russia pays for the reparations.” Kolyandr notes, “frozen Russian assets will serve as collateral, but that will not affect property rights.”
• Beyond European legal and liability worries, he highlights the Russian response: “Russia partially froze foreign assets on its territory to stem capital outflow. Foreigners from ‘unfriendly’ countries lost the right to sell their assets in Russia.”
• Kolyandr warns, “transferring funds to Ukraine could have the unintended effect of indirectly boosting Russian military spending,” due to Russia’s ability to nationalize or redirect Western-owned assets.
• He concludes: “given the lack of funds to support Ukraine, the adoption of some sort of scheme to appropriate Russia’s assets seems all but inevitable… if these efforts fail, it will not just be Ukraine that is at risk, but the very raison d’être of the EU.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Ukraine Jumbo Loan Gives Tiny Belgium a Fright," Lionel Laurent, Bloomberg, 10.28.25.

For sanctions on the energy sector, please see section “Energy exports from CIS” below.

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

“Beyond Trump’s flip-flops on Putin, what might a Ukraine peace settlement look like?” Marc Weller, Chatham House, 10.28.25.

• Weller writes that a potential settlement centers on a ceasefire along the existing line of confrontation, leaving contested territories under Russian control but “no de jure recognition of their incorporation into Russia.”
• He notes that Ukraine would insist on “effective security guarantees” from Western states, but not necessarily NATO membership; proposals include Western military-technical presence, integrated air defense, and long-term military support, rather than direct fighting forces
• Any agreement would “require the return of abducted children, release of prisoners of war and detained civilians, reparations, and accountability for war crimes.”
• The settlement would not include formal recognition by Ukraine or third states of Russia’s annexations; “any change of territory brought about through the use of force is internationally unlawful.
• Russia demands recognition of its annexations, Ukrainian neutrality, limits on Ukraine’s military, and lifting of all sanctions—demands the West and Ukraine reject.
• Weller notes any deal on security guarantees is fraught, as Russia proposes a “mini-UN Security Council” framework with potential veto power for Moscow and its allies—“not acceptable to the West, and certainly not to Ukraine.”
• He concludes that without compromise on both territory and robust security guarantees, “an agreement will be possible only if Putin is willing to terminate the war and accept these limits.”

 ‘Putin Doesn’t Want Peace,’ Rishi Iyengar, Foreign Policy, 10.29.25.

• Iyengar interviews Estonian President Alar Karis, who says, “Putin doesn’t want to sit behind the negotiating table, and he doesn’t want peace,” urging “more sanctions, more support to Ukraine” as the only way to counter Moscow.
• Karis details persistent Russian threats against Estonia, noting “Estonia has faced more than 80 such incursions by Russia over the past two decades,” and that recent incursions across NATO states are “aimed at testing what NATO is doing… now it has been intensified.”
• On NATO response to Russian air and drone incursions, Karis says, “We reacted properly … NATO jets did their job. I think the message they should take away is: Don’t mess with us.”
• He emphasizes Estonia’s investments in defense—including drones and AI—but cautions that even with these, “only a good army for a small country is not enough. You need friends.”
• Karis expresses concern over possible U.S. force reductions in Europe, saying U.S. presence is “an important deterrent to Russia,” and warns that “if the U.S. takes away all these military capabilities from Europe… then there might be a problem.”
• The interview underscores Estonia’s historical wariness of Russia, rooted in Soviet occupation, and Karis’s view that collective defense and alliances are essential: “Everybody was busy in Europe with new security issues, so that’s why the Soviet Union occupied us… You need friends.”
• Karis concludes that Europe must continue building its own capabilities, but remains dependent on U.S. support to deter Russian aggression in the region.

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “How Donald Trump Could Still Win the Nobel Peace Prize,” Michael O’Hanlon, National Interest, 10.31.25.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“The Rules-Based International Order: A Historical Analysis,” Marc Trachtenberg, International Security, 11.01.25.

• Trachtenberg writes, “many common arguments in this area are not supported by the historical evidence,” finding that the postwar liberal order “did not in itself produce a relatively peaceful world. If there was peace, that was because a fundamental understanding with the Soviet Union was eventually worked out. And the policies that led to that understanding were not liberal ones. They were based instead on respect for the power of one’s rival and the legitimacy of its interests.”
• He notes that “Russian and Chinese officials, not surprisingly, often charged that the rhetoric about the rules-based order was just a cloak for U.S. imperialism. ‘Rule America—that is the essence of the notorious rules-based order,’ Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared.”
• Trachtenberg argues the U.S. “had not set out during and immediately after World War II to construct a liberal international order,” and that liberal institutions were “not nearly as important as many writers say they were, and… could actually have a destabilizing effect.”
• Trachtenberg concludes that, contrary to “the claim that there ‘is simply no grand ideological alternative to a liberal international order’… there were, and are, alternative approaches… based on certain traditional ideas about how policy should be conducted.”
• He points to arguments from within the U.S. (including Mearsheimer and Walt) that critique liberal internationalism—and to the voices in countries such as India “who sensed that ‘under Trump, America will no longer aim to spread its values and act as a global defender of the liberal international order.’”
• He ultimately calls for reexamining whether “protecting and extending the rules-based order” should be “a fundamental goal,” suggesting that history supports more pragmatic, multipolar strategies recognizing adversaries’ power and interests, such as the U.S.-Soviet Cold War détente.

To Agree or Not to Agree: Hawks, Doves, and Regime Type in International Rivalry and Rapprochement,” Michael A. Goldfien, International Security, 11.01.25.

• Goldfien writes that “existing scholarship emphasizes hawks’ advantages in making peace” among democracies because “hawks enjoy a credibility advantage” with the public, but notes this “focuses on electorally accountable leaders, even though most international rivalries feature at least one leader who faces no meaningful electoral check.”
• He argues that “in low electoral accountability autocracies,” credibility at home “becomes less important… than [a leader’s] motivation to cooperate internationally,” so “doves, not hawks, should be more successful peacemakers in autocracies.”
• Testing his theory on Cold War U.S.-Soviet rapprochement, Goldfien notes, “although Reagan played against type to make peace, his counterpart in the Soviet Union did not. Mikhail Gorbachev was a dove and acted like one to achieve a rapprochement with the West.”
• The article finds “doves have the political space to act on their dovish preferences” in autocracies, while “hawks are best positioned to achieve rapprochements in democracies.”
• At the negotiating table, “leaders prefer to deal with electorally unaccountable doves” because “doves engage in diplomacy more enthusiastically,” while hawks in democracies signal credibility to their electorates.
• Case studies of Reagan-Gorbachev and Begin-Sadat support the thesis: “the dovish Gorbachev and Sadat had latitude to boldly pursue cooperation by virtue of their limited electoral accountability,” while hawkish Reagan and Begin “secured support for a deal at home.”
• Goldfien concludes, “the salience of hawkish credibility depends on electoral accountability,” and his theory helps “reconcile the seeming contradiction” in cases where doves in autocracies and hawks in democracies jointly produced historic rapprochements.

“Is Europe Too Soft to Fight?” Florence Gaub and Roderick Parkes, War on the Rocks, 10.28.25.
“The belief that Europeans are too soft to fight—too coddled, too individualistic, too ‘post-heroic’—is quietly shaping policy decisions about mobilization, recruitment, and spending,” but Gaub and Parkes argue, “the problem isn’t their lack of will, but elite pessimism about it.”

• The authors contend, “‘Will to fight’ is not a fixed category. Instead, it is a social potential: something that can be cultivated or suppressed,” and warn, “If planners assume society won’t step up and design policies around that belief, they make it more likely that society will live down to expectations.”
• They cite Paul Hasluck: “people often fail to mobilize not from inherent weakness, but because they see their government doesn’t trust them to,” arguing that “publics take their cues from such policies.”
• Regarding individualism, they write: “Polls show that individualism erodes peacetime willingness to fight. Yet in war people join up precisely to defend their way of life. Constitutional freedoms like property rights intensify the motivation to fight for house and home.”
• “Populations that are disenchanted with their government are indeed reluctant to put their lives in its hands. Yet, they may also view participation in war as a way to change the system, as political leverage… society fights best when it has hopes of something new to fight for, whether Poles under Napoleon or Black Americans in World War II.”
• The authors conclude, “It is leadership, then, not latent social weakness, that sets the limits of resolve. And confidence should flow in both directions. People should trust the leaders who guide them, and leaders should trust the societies they serve.”

“Look what you made us do: How to realize a European-led NATO,” Leoni Habedank, Rafael Loss, Katrine Westgaard, European Council on Foreign Relations, 10.30.25.  

• Habedank, Loss, and Westgaard write that “America’s gradual retreat from European security under the current Trump administration is reshaping NATO’s centre of gravity,” and warn, “Europeans cannot afford for their defense to depend on America any longer.”
• They describe how at the June 2025 NATO summit, European leaders agreed to “invest 3.5% [of GDP] in core defense expenditures and another 1.5% in defense-related infrastructure and activities” by 2035, with a review due in 2029—“Europeans must use this time to make NATO… mostly European.”
• The authors caution that U.S. force reductions are likely: “Washington will reduce the size of its European contingent,” starting with “rotational deployments” and possibly “permanently deployed forces and units… still due to arrive.”
• They urge that Europeans “build a credible, deployable European force posture that leaves no gaps in NATO’s deterrence and defense plans and toolkit,” anticipating persistent “shortfalls in firepower and capacity,” and the loss of U.S. “intelligence, logistics and command functions.”
• NATO’s latest plans call for “expansion of allied ground forces from roughly 80 to 130 brigades,” with most new capabilities—“air, maritime, cyber and space components”—needing to be European-led, as well as “integration of drones” and enhanced firepower.
• The commentary urges “a phased transition of command authority from U.S. general and flag officers to Europeans (and Canadians) at major military headquarters”—including European four-stars leading NATO’s air, land, and maritime commands, and eventually even SACEUR.
• They conclude that instead of chaos and uncertainty, “a composed NATO with less America—and under European leadership—should be capable and willing to defeat and unravel the Kremlin’s warmaking potential.”

“Who Is Messing With Airplane GPS Worldwide?” Elisabeth Braw, Foreign Policy, 10.27.25.

• Braw reports “someone is interfering with aviation in the Baltic Sea region, jamming and manipulating the GPS signals that allow aircraft (and their pilots) to know where they and other planes are,” with Sweden alone registering “nearly 123,000 incidents of GPS jamming or spoofing” in four months of 2025; “more than one-quarter of flights in Swedish airspace were affected by GPS interference.”
• “Such interference also affects ships,” as well as aircraft globally: “In recent weeks, the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, the India-Pakistan border area, Myanmar, and the Black Sea have also seen constant GPS interference.”
• European Cockpit Association President Tanja Harter says, “I don’t remember having seen anything like this on this magnitude before,” and warns, “It adds complexity. You double check; you triple check,” while Zurich professor Michael Felux notes, “Having to reject nuisance alerts caused by the jamming puts a lot more workload on the pilots.”
• Braw explains that GPS spoofing “tricks the aircraft into believing that it’s somewhere else, and it shows other aircraft in incorrect locations, too,” creating serious risk: “In September 2023, an Embraer jet… nearly entered Iranian airspace by mistake.”
• She notes, “Sweden plausibly accused Russia of being behind the attacks” in the Baltic, while elsewhere, “the consensus is that while hobbyists can jam GPS, spoofing requires expertise that only nations possess.”
• She concludes that escalating interference is “a curse affecting aviation everywhere” and calls for international cooperation: “Keeping air crews and travelers… safe: That is surely one principle that most of today’s divided nations can agree on.”

“A New Era of Strongman Rulers Is Upon Us,” Erica Frantz, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, and Joseph Wright, New York Times, 10.28.25.

• Frantz, Kendall-Taylor, and Wright write, “Welcome to the new strongman era,” in which “leaders who govern by personal will instead of rules and consensus” are “shaping a world… on edge,” and warn that Trump and Xi “are… being led by men with similar political styles… more risk-taking, volatility and potential for miscalculation and conflict.”
• They write: “Their lack of domestic constraints gives them great latitude for deal-making, but it also makes any potential agreements flimsy and subject to change. Strongmen can be unreliable international partners… they face few domestic consequences for reneging on promises or abruptly changing course.”
• The piece contends, “Because strongmen are not held accountable, they do not have to make good on their word, so their threats lack credibility. Amid the bluster, their counterparts find it difficult to gauge where the red lines truly are.”
• “The consequences, at least for the next four years, are likely to be profound: more risk-taking, volatility and potential for miscalculation and conflict.” They cite, “Mr. Trump’s apparent extrajudicial killings of alleged drug smugglers in the Caribbean and his threats to attack Venezuela are in the same risk-taking vein, as are China’s brazen military actions in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait under Mr. Xi.”
• The authors warn: “Such leaders are more likely to attack independent domestic institutions like their central banks, as Mr. Trump is doing with the U.S. Federal Reserve, which threatens to stoke inflation and make it less predictable,” and point to Trump’s and Xi’s “unrestrained second term” behaviors, including “a spike in his family’s participation in deals” and Xi’s family’s amassed assets.
• They conclude, “rather than provide reassurance about the relationship between the United States and China, this week’s meeting… might represent something else: confirmation that the unpredictability and volatility of strongman rule is back.”

“Putin Courts a ‘Global Majority’ From Russia,” Stephen Sestanovich, Council on Foreign Relations, 10.27.25.

• Sestanovich writes that “no idea has a larger place in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s rhetoric than the claim that his country is shaking up the political, economic, and military hierarchy of international relations,” touting a “newly assertive ‘Global Majority’” to supplant Western leadership as he wages war in Ukraine.
• He observes this theme “gained strength from a series of high-level meetings last summer,” including the BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and Eurasian Economic Forum, where “each event highlighted Putin’s personal escape from diplomatic isolation” and Russia’s “increasing Asian tilt.”
• Yet Sestanovich points out that Putin’s vision is contradicted this fall, as “Putin himself cannot attend either of this fall’s two biggest multilateral events—the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit… [or] the Group of Twenty (G20)… The reason: his indictment for war crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC)… Putin can rail against the international order’s oppressive ‘rules,’ but his ‘Global Majority,’ it turns out, actually likes some of them.”
• Examining Russia’s economic situation, he notes the IMF “recently halved its 2025 GDP forecast for Russia,” while “energy export earnings are down; gasoline rationing is in place in many cities; and… Central Bank interest rates—still an astronomical 17%.” He concludes, “Russia’s outlook means Putin cannot aspire to leadership on economic issues, even in the energy trade.”
• Sestanovich argues Russia’s diminished leverage is evident in energy partnerships: “With its partners in the BRICS, Russia will increasingly become a price-taker in oil and gas markets. Last week’s announcement of U.S. sanctions on the biggest Russian oil companies will, at a minimum, enable India to demand still deeper discounts… while China may also continue to stall the construction of the oft-delayed Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline.”
• He highlights how APEC and the shifting global order sideline Moscow: “Every leader present at APEC will want to see whether the meeting between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping goes well;” “almost none of them look to Russia to bolster their security.”
• On Ukraine, Sestanovich writes, “The growth of Chinese power, by perpetuating interest in security relationships with the United States, has postponed the emergence of a ‘multipolar’ system from which Putin hopes to benefit. The same is even more true of his war against Ukraine.” He concludes, “Had he not launched his war in 2022, Trump’s hostility to NATO and his tariff war with the European Union would have done far more to shatter Western unity. Instead, the spectacle of a Russian army on the march has brought the United States and Europe closer together. Had he not indulged his desire for conquest, Putin would be much closer to the ‘polycentric’ world he dreams of creating.”

“To Deter Russia, Europe Needs Ukraine,” Fredrik Wesslau, Foreign Policy, 10.30.25.

• Wesslau argues, “Europe is under threat from Russia and has lost the United States as its ultimate security guarantor,” as Trump’s ambiguity and troop reductions undermine NATO’s credibility.
• He notes, “Russia is busy rearming and reconstituting its forces… it now spends around 40% of its budget on the military and aims to have an armed force of 2.38 million.”
• Wesslau states, “Ukraine should no longer be seen as merely a recipient of security aid. Ukraine has the potential to be one of the most important security providers… for the rest of Europe, especially as the United States withdraws.”
• He explains, “Today, Ukraine has the largest military force in Europe after Russia, numbering around 900,000 troops… Ukrainian troops understand Russia’s way of war and the new realities of drone warfare better than any NATO member.”
• Wesslau suggests, “A first step could be for Ukraine to become a security guarantor for the Baltic states, with an iron-clad guarantee that an attack on a Baltic state would be treated as an attack on Ukraine.”
• He proposes, “Such a pact would strengthen Ukraine’s case for NATO membership and anchor it more firmly in Europe’s security architecture, while also complicating Russian military planning.”
• Wesslau concludes, “It’s time to start discussing with Ukraine how to formalize the role it is already playing in Europe’s defense.”

“New Root Causes,” Fyodor Lukyanov, Kommersant/Russia in Global Affairs, 10.27.25. Clues from Russian Views.

• Lukyanov writes that “President Donald Trump declared he would not meet Vladimir Putin until the parameters of a deal were clarified,” and “the Russian position is the same—a meeting must be thoroughly prepared,” but the goals are different: “The White House wants a swift halt to hostilities… and then others (Europe and beyond) can deal with the rest. The Kremlin insists on eliminating the root causes of the conflict, which requires a complex, multi-component agreement. Its structure must be agreed in advance of a cease-fire.”
• On the U.S. approach, Lukyanov argues, “The military initiative is on Russia’s side, and fighting strengthens Moscow’s position at the negotiating table. Cessation of fighting weakens it. As for the broader security system, Trumpists basically show little interest in staying present in Europe. The idea is that [Europe] should take responsibility and not distract the U.S. from more important matters.”
• He highlights what he sees as the deeper causes of the conflict: “The root causes lie in how the Cold War ended, and the impulse that victory gave the West. That outcome is what Moscow wants to reconsider.”
• On NATO enlargement, Lukyanov states, “After 1991, NATO’s eastward expansion was dictated foremost by political logic. The absorption of new spaces into the Western empire was less about preparing for armed confrontation than about extending control.”
• He differentiates the current moment: “Since 2022, this has changed. The expansion of the alliance and its strengthening are motivated by a purely military logic of direct confrontation with Russia. NATO now exists for this purpose.”
• On Ukraine’s NATO bid and the war, he writes, “The accession of Finland and Sweden is qualitatively different from Croatia or even Czechia and Slovakia. All the more so with hypothetical Ukrainian membership. The ‘special military operation’ has stripped away ambiguity, making Europe’s security problem a question of military confrontation above all.”
• Discussing negotiations, Lukyanov stresses, “The situation means the state of the battlefield is nearly decisive: the sought-after immediate ceasefire is a fantasy. The root causes are now not merely historic but acutely relevant.”
• He warns that the “military-political imbalance” risks “direct confrontation between Russia and NATO,” and that all depends “on the relationship between Europe and the U.S.—how ready Washington is to manage the European theater.”
• Lukyanov’s conclusion is pessimistic: “American willingness to negotiate is unattainable. Russia’s aims are far from fulfilled. The stakes keep rising. And the issue cannot be reduced to territorial questions.”

“Contours of the New World: On Russia’s Place and Eternal Meanings,” interview with Fedor Lukyanov, Russian International Affairs Council, 10.29.25. Clues from Russian Views.

• Lukyanov reflects that the United Nations Security Council’s structure “is based on a balance from 80 years ago, and even though the world has changed beyond recognition… any reform is impossible without the consent of the permanent members,” noting that in international politics, “no one willingly gives up privileges.”
• He criticizes the assumption that international institutions like the UN can resolve security crises, observing, “The problem is not that the UN fails in its function, but that it reflects the inability of great powers to reach constructive agreement.”
• On Ukraine and other conflicts, Lukyanov states, “The UN never was an independent subject. It has always been a framework, within which rules are formulated and, more or less, observed. To consider the UN an independent force capable of stopping conflicts or compelling major states to comply is an illusion.”
• He ties Russia’s confrontation with the West to deeper identity issues: “Attempts by Russia to integrate into the Western world on [the West’s] terms, ultimately led to tensions.” He describes the situation after 1991 as “Russia seeking to embed itself into the rigid Western system… something historically unprecedented.”
• Discussing Ukraine directly, Lukyanov reflects, “Russia’s foreign policy today is focused on several priority areas—from the special military operation (SMO) to relations with the global majority… But these are secondary to the main goal: a successful conclusion of the current phase of the conflict. Once that is achieved, relations with the global majority will take on a more strategic and balanced character.”
• He argues, “Paradoxically, the key ‘blind spot’ today is the total absence of relations with the West. After the SMO and stabilization, this zone will begin to ‘light up’… Building new relations—even of a different model—with the U.S. and Europe is inevitable.”
• On the West’s efforts to engage Russia, Lukyanov points to post-Soviet illusions: “The idea was that Russia would enter the realm of ‘extended Europe’ on a special status. But Russia never before considered being part of someone else’s project, which it had not itself designed.”
• Lukyanov concludes by emphasizing the importance of perspective: “Normal, good-neighborly relations are one thing, but joining a project someone else created is different. Now, correcting this anomaly is happening—unfortunately, by force.”
• He encourages students of international relations to cultivate “a stereoscopic view, the ability to see events from many sides, understand context… and not be swept up by the campaign-style information that increasingly organizes global public life.”
• Ultimately, Lukyanov’s outlook on the Ukraine conflict implies no easy return to status quo, arguing Russia’s future relations with Ukraine and the West will necessarily be different, and that the current system, as it existed prior to 2022, “has simply ceased to exist. That is the true turning point.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “U.S.-Russia Agreement to End NATO Expansionism or Accept an Ugly Russian Victory,” George Beebe, Quincy Institute, 10.22.25. Video.
• "Europe Needs a United Response to Russia’s Hybrid War," Editorial Board, Bloomberg, 10.30.25.
• ‘Kissinger’ Review: What It Used to Mean to Make America Great, Mike Hale, New York Times, 10.27.25.
• “On ‘American Experience,’ considering the contradictions of Henry Kissinger,” Mark Feeney, The Boston Globe, 10.28.25.
• “Moscow’s Shadow Looms Over Bratislava,” Frankie Vetch, Foreign Policy, 10.31.2025.
• "The Trump doctrine: don't rely on America," Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, 10.31.25.
• For transcripts and videos of IISS’ IISS Manama Dialogue 2025’s sessions visit this link.
• “U.S. Troop Cuts On NATO’s Eastern Flank,” Oana Lungescu, RUSI, 11.03.2025.

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

"Why China and Russia Aren’t Scared of the U.S.," Hal Brands, Bloomberg, 10.29.25.

• Brands argues, “Trump has mostly wielded U.S. power against weaker actors, but is now facing greater challenges from Russia and China, which are determined to prove his toughness is bluff.”
• He notes, “Putin has made a mockery of Trump’s Ukraine peace push, intensifying attacks and demanding maximalist terms, while seeking to weaken NATO and humiliate the U.S..”
• Brands observes, “China has repeatedly responded to Trump’s tariffs with harsh retaliation, leaving Beijing confident it holds the upper hand in ongoing trade disputes.”
• He writes, “Russia and China pursue ambitious projects that directly clash with U.S. interests, showing little fear of Trump’s assertive rhetoric or threats.”
• Brands contends, “Checking their power now would require Trump to develop a longer attention span, focus on long-term strategy, and patiently build alliances—rather than seeking quick wins.”
• He adds, “Trump will also need to prioritize cooperation with U.S. allies to pressure Russia and China, rather than treating partners as targets of tough tactics.”
• Brands concludes, “For Moscow and Beijing, American political polarization makes the U.S. appear divided and less formidable, reinforcing their confidence in challenging Washington.”

“Russia's Far East Policy: Looking Beyond China,” Stephen Blank, IFRI, 08.24.10. 

• Blank writes, “Moscow’s failure to realize successful economic cooperation with Japan or meaningfully advance its interests regarding North Korea leaves it with no choice but to emphasize China as its primary partner.”
• He argues, “Russia is becoming increasingly dependent upon China, coordinating closely on Korea, the Russian Far East, and Central Asia, exposing Moscow’s inability to play the role of a great power in Asia.”
• Blank explains, “Russia’s development plans for the Far East must now be coordinated with China’s regional strategy; Medvedev has acknowledged that large-scale projects depend on Chinese investment.”
• He notes, “Rapid Chinese economic growth has widened the gap with Russia, whose recovery mostly reutilized Soviet-era capacity, while China built new productive capacity.”
• Blank observes, “China’s rising influence impedes Japanese and South Korean investment in the Russian Far East, further deepening Moscow’s reliance on Beijing.”
• He warns, “In effect, Russia’s stalled development has consigned it to being China’s ‘junior partner,’ especially as China has more leverage over North Korea.”
• Blank concludes, “Without successful development of the Russian Far East, Russia lacks both the means to effectively assert itself in Asia and to create a balance of power in Northeast Asia, leaving China the clear winner.”

“The U.S. is poised to rock Russia and China—if it holds firm,” Thomas Duesterberg, Washington Post, 10.28.25.

• Duesterberg writes that Trump’s “hard-hitting sanctions…can deliver a serious blow to the teetering Russian economy, if they’re rigorously enforced—and Trump sticks to his guns.”
• He emphasizes, “Trump’s order allows, for the first time, sanctions against buyers of Russian oil and banks that finance trade in that oil, including those in China, Hong Kong and India,” noting that “similar restrictions announced afterward by the European Union add to the impact.”
• “His new sanctions started getting results immediately. One day after they were imposed, China’s major state oil companies announced that they were pausing purchases of Russian oil.”
• “India, too, may be ready to slow its imports” as the new sanctions target refined products, and India’s Reliance Industries has “signaled it may suspend imports.”
• “The Russian economy faces severe problems… Liquidity in its sovereign wealth fund has dwindled to less than 3% of GDP, and it’s having a hard time selling bonds to cover its budget deficit.”
• Duesterberg argues that “global prices have remained moderate” due to high U.S. and Saudi production, so “even after the new sanctions were announced, both the Brent and West Texas benchmarks remain between $60 and $65 per barrel, hardly a price harmful to Western economies.”
• He concludes, “Trump has sent the strongest message yet to Xi about the costs of supporting his Russian friend for life… There are real concessions to be won. They hinge on rigorous sanctions enforcement against both Russia and the buyers of its energy exports.”

Missile defense:

“Inside Trump’s Golden Dome: A shield critics call a risky fantasy,” Christian Davenport, William Neff, and Aaron Steckelberg, Washington Post, 10.29.25.

• The reporters note that China and Russia “are already expanding their nuclear arsenals in the largest long-range weapons buildup since the Cold War. They are adding hundreds of intercontinental ballistic missiles as well as new weapons systems, including hypersonic weapons designed to speed toward U.S. cities at more 4,000 mph, according to intelligence officials.”
• Russia views Trump’s Golden Dome plan as “an aggressive escalation.” The article quotes the Chinese foreign ministry warning “it will ‘heighten the risk of turning space into a war zone and creating a space arms race and shake the international security and arms control system.’”
• The reporters detail how “the current [missile defense] system is only designed to thwart a small number of missiles from North Korea, not an attack from China or Russia.” Golden Dome’s ambition is “to protect the entire U.S. from intercontinental ballistic missiles that could be carrying multiple nuclear warheads.”
• According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, “China is on track to nearly double the number of its ICBMs by 2035 and quintuple its arsenal of cruise missiles.” The article adds, “Russia is also expanding its missile caches… and both countries are working to develop new long-range weapons systems, including hypersonic vehicles, which can maneuver and fly at speeds greater than Mach 5, making them difficult to track and target.”
• Experts cited warn that Golden Dome “could ignite an arms race in orbit that could last a generation or more,” and would require “a mind-boggling constellation” of satellites—over 9,500 interceptors in space to counter an attack of just 10 ICBMs, according to AEI’s Todd Harrison, with others estimating even higher numbers.
• The story concludes that even if fully implemented, “such a dense pattern of orbiting satellites could be vulnerable to threats from, say, a nuclear detonation in space, which would knock out many of the Golden Dome weapons as well as generating a Kessler cascade of destructive orbiting debris that could silence the entire network.”
• Without true protection against a mass Russian or Chinese missile strike, deterrence will likely remain the most important principle: “Everyone knows we're not going to be able to intercept a mass strike,” former Pentagon official Doug Loverro said. “The question we have to entertain is how many missiles do we have to defend ourselves against in order to get the nuclear saber rattling to back down?”

“How to live in our nuclear 'House of Dynamite',” Editorial Board, Washington Post, 11.03.2025.

• The editorial board notes, “Russia and the United States engaged in a round of unwelcome nuclear saber-rattling last week, coinciding with the thriller ‘A House of Dynamite’ debuting as Netflix's most watched film.”
• They highlight, “Putin claimed Russia's nuclear-powered cruise missile spent 15 hours in the air flying 8,700 miles, and heralded an underwater nuclear drone, Poseidon, that can trigger a radioactive tsunami.”
• The board observes, “President Donald Trump's uneven responses to Putin’s provocations—one well-calibrated, the other needlessly blustering—show how this high-stakes game is actually played.”
• They write, “Trump announced that he instructed the Pentagon to ‘start testing our Nuclear Weapons on an equal basis’ as Russia and China, a vague and potentially escalatory message.”
• The editorial argues, “Mutually assured destruction works. The triad of land, air, and sea-based systems is designed to deter adversaries from launching a first strike.”
• They state, “Trump was right to announce that he has given South Korea permission to build its own nuclear-powered submarines, which will strengthen deterrence against North Korea.”
• The board concludes, “Trump dreams of building an expensive ‘Golden Dome’ missile defense; even if it ultimately works half the time, this might still be a worthwhile investment if it saves cities like Chicago, because both missile defenses and deterrence can fail.”

Nuclear arms:

“The U.S. and Russia can lead the way in banning nuclear-armed drones,” Rose Gottemoeller, Financial Times, 10.30.25.

• Gottemoeller writes that “not so long ago, Vladimir Putin… called for extending the limits of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New Start) for one year beyond February 5, 2026, when it is due to go out of force,” despite having “pulled the plug on implementing the treaty in February 2023.”
• She notes that “there is an even more urgent problem… than the Chinese build-up”: the emergence of drone warfare, prompting President Zelenskyy to warn at the UN about “tens of thousands of people who know how to professionally kill using drones … who will be the first to create a simple drone carrying a nuclear warhead?”
• Gottemoeller argues, “If they [drones] are the new reality, then we have every interest in preventing them from becoming a new means to deliver nuclear weapons. Nuclear warheads on drones should be banned outright.”
• She calls for updating the old INF Treaty definitions and “including categories of drones that would be capable of carrying nuclear warheads,” since “we would be in a much better position to monitor a ban on such nuclear drones… essentially a ban on shorter- and intermediate-range nuclear missiles.”
• Gottemoeller stresses, “Nuclear weapons are maintained in a closed security system, carefully monitored and protected from mishandling or theft in every country that has them. None of them will want to see their warheads straying outside their closed security system and falling into the wrong hands.”
• She suggests, “if any sign of nuclear handling equipment or procedures appeared at a base where only conventional missiles should be, then that would be grounds for an explanation, or inspection.”
• Gottemoeller concludes, “Banning nuclear weapons on drones, whether they are shorter- and intermediate-range missiles should be a goal that every nuclear state can embrace.”

“New Start and Trump's Nuclear Test,” Rebeccah L. Heinrichs, Wall Street Journal, 10.31.25. 

• Heinrichs writes that Trump’s order to “start testing our Nuclear Weapons on an equal basis” could mean renewed explosive-yield tests or “flight tests of delivery systems,” breaking from the moratorium agreed in 1992.
• She cites intelligence concerns: “Russia probably is not adhering to the nuclear-testing moratorium in a manner consistent with the zero-yield standard,” and adds that “China and Russia are investing heavily in their nuclear programs and also behaving aggressively toward their neighbors.”
• Heinrichs argues Trump should “let the last arms-control treaty between the U.S. and Russia—the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New Start—expire in February,” and reject Putin’s offer to extend it, calling it “a thinly veiled attempt to flatter Mr. Trump’s Nobel Peace Prize aspirations.”
• According to Heinrichs, New Start is “lopsided”—“the U.S. had to reduce its deployed strategic launchers by 25%, while Russia didn’t have to make any reductions”—and failed to cover Russia’s theater nuclear weapons, which “outnumbered NATO’s by 10 to 1.”
• She notes that after Biden’s extension of New Start, Russia “stopped complying with New Start’s critical on-site verification measures,” and the State Department admitted Russia “may have exceeded the deployed warhead limit.”
• Heinrichs contends extending New Start “would make it harder to deter Russia from using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine or attacking a NATO country,” and would undermine deterrence against a rising China.
• She concludes by calling for the U.S. to “fully modernize its nuclear triad,” double the B-21 bomber fleet, accelerate deployment of the SLCM-N, and put more warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs—steps needed “to keep the peace, which is a better prize than the Nobel.”

“Can the United States Immediately Return to Nuclear Testing?” Heather Williams, CSIS, 10.30.25.

• Williams writes, “Trump’s post raises technical questions about how and if the United States could ‘immediately’ return to nuclear testing, and political considerations about the signaling behind nuclear testing and who would benefit most from a return to testing.”
• According to Williams, “For both technical and political reasons, the United States is unlikely to return to nuclear explosive testing any time soon; however, Trump’s post does point to increasing nuclear competition between the United States, Russia, and China.”
• Williams notes, “Russia ‘de-ratified’ the treaty in 2023, and the United States and China have signed but not ratified.”
• She explains, “A return to above-ground testing would receive widespread public criticism, including from many members of Congress whose constituencies and states would be directly impacted, including by second- and third-order effects.”
• Williams observes, “Underground testing would likely not be possible ‘immediately’ or even within a few months… NNSA has not requested funding for test readiness as a separate program since 2010. It’s also worth noting that the NNSA is responsible for nuclear test readiness, not the Pentagon.”
• “A 2022 Department of State compliance report accused Russia of conducting supercritical nuclear tests in violation of the zero-yield standard. Additionally, a 2019 Defense Intelligence Agency report alleged that, ‘Russia is probably not adhering to the nuclear testing moratorium in a manner consistent with the zero-yield standard,’” Williams reports.
• She adds, “Since the opening of CTBT negotiations in 1995, the United States has insisted that it is a zero-yield treaty. Whereas some extremely small nuclear tests might not produce any noticeable seismic yield, they could still produce a nuclear chain reaction that would provide data about weapons designs or the behavior of fissile material over time, albeit in violation of the CTBT.”
• Williams writes, “The United States has been able to rely on high-energy lasers and supercomputing at the national labs to confirm the safety, security, and efficacy of its nuclear arsenal without testing. Russia has taken a different path and instead replaces plutonium pits while it develops a ‘Tsar Laser,’ which has fallen behind schedule.”
• She says, “China. The United States has conducted 1,054 tests, and Russia has conducted 715. China only conducted 47 nuclear tests, both above-ground and underground. This asymmetry in test data has been a sore spot for Chinese officials who felt disadvantaged by arms control agreements.”
• At her April 2025 confirmation hearing, NNSA Administrator Brandon Williams stated, “The United States continues to observe its 1992 nuclear test moratorium; and, since 1992, has assessed that the deployed nuclear stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective without nuclear explosive testing.”
• Williams explains, “The timing of Trump’s post could be about both China and Russia, but this is all highly speculative… Trump may want to generate leverage or a strongman impression before negotiating with Xi… it might indicate that Trump wants to discuss nuclear arms control with Xi, which he has indicated in previous comments about prioritizing negotiations for ‘denuclearization’ with Russia and China.”
• She notes, “The post also comes just weeks after Putin offered to continue to observe the limits of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) if the United States reciprocated… Other than an off-handed remark by Trump that it sounded ‘like a good idea,’ there has been no official announcement from the White House on the future of New START.”
• Williams concludes, “While from a technical and political perspective a return to explosive testing of nuclear warheads does not appear to be in the United States’ interest, capitalizing and strengthening the nuclear enterprise is very much in the U.S. national interest… Washington would be worse off if states, particularly China, return to nuclear testing, which it likely would in response to U.S. test plans.”

“The War In Ukraine And The Nuclear Threat: If the USA Hesitates, the World Is At Risk,” L’Espresso, 11.03.25. Machine-Translated.

• Jake Sullivan warned, “There would be catastrophic consequences for Russia” if it used nuclear weapons in Ukraine.
• He emphasized, “This kind of warning is on the scale of sixty years ago, when Kennedy guaranteed that any ballistic missile launched from Cuba would be considered a Soviet attack on the United States.”
• Sullivan’s language of “catastrophic consequences” is noted as intentionally ambiguous, designed to “create uncertainty and strengthen deterrence.”

“Will Trump’s Nuclear Testing Order Prompt a Global Race?” Erin D. Dumbacher, CFR, 10.30.25.

• Dumbacher writes, “Trump’s announcement of resuming nuclear testing stirred concern among nuclear policy experts for its potential to break a more than three-decade moratorium and prompt a global race.”
• She explains, “Trump’s order appeared directed at Russia after Moscow announced a new nuclear-powered missile test, but China would benefit most from resumed testing as it expands and modernizes its nuclear forces.”
• Dumbacher notes, “The United States, Russia, and China have all observed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which forms a key part of the global nonproliferation regime.”
• She writes, “Testing nuclear warheads is different from testing delivery systems; the United States has relied on data and computer modeling since the 1992 moratorium to maintain arsenal safety.”
• “Former officials and experts warn that U.S. nuclear tests could lead Russia, China, and other states to resume their own testing, strengthening adversaries and undermining U.S. advantages,” Dumbacher observes.
• According to Dumbacher, “It remains unclear how the administration would fund and implement a renewed testing program, given shutdown-related staffing and resource issues at national labs.”
• She concludes, “There are ways to demonstrate U.S. strength without nuclear explosions, avoiding environmental risks and a renewed global testing race advantageous to China.”

“Visit to the Joint Force command post. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief visited a Joint Force command post, where he had a meeting with Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov and the commanders of the groups involved in the special military operation,” Kremlin.ru, 10.26.25.

• Putin: “During today’s meeting, we will review the current situation in the area of the special military operation and developments across individual operational directions… In addition, this week the Russian Armed Forces conducted an exercise involving the strategic offensive forces, with combat training launches of all three components of the Russian strategic nuclear forces as well as tests of advanced weapons systems.”
• Gerasimov: “Comrade Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Joint Force troops continue to carry out their assigned tasks to liberate the Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics, as well as the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions, in accordance with the objectives set for the special military operation.”
• Gerasimov: “As part of the strategic nuclear force training exercise, combat training launches of Yars and Sineva intercontinental ballistic missiles and two Kh-102 air-launched cruise missiles were carried out, with all planned objectives achieved.”
• Putin: “Regarding the exercise of the strategic offensive forces, we have once again confirmed the reliability of Russia’s nuclear shield. The strategic forces are fully capable of ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation and the Union State; we have already spoken on this matter. This is a fact well-known to all specialists in the military field across the globe. The so-called modernity of our Armed Forces, or rather of the nuclear deterrence forces, is at the very highest level. One can, without exaggeration, claim that it is at least on a higher level than that of all other nuclear states.”
• “Now about the recent military exercise. I would ask the Chief of the General Staff to report on one more event that I briefly mentioned in my opening remarks—namely, the test of the Burevestnik nuclear-powered unlimited-range cruise missile. I have received a report from the industry and I am aware of the assessments made by the Ministry of Defense—this is indeed a unique weapon that no other country possesses… the decisive tests have been completed.”
  • Valery Gerasimov: “Comrade Supreme Commander-in-Chief, such a test was conducted on Oct. 21. Unlike previous trials, this one featured a many-hour flight, with the missile covering 14,000 kilometers—and that is not the limit.
  • Vladimir Putin: “It is nuclear-powered, right?”
  • Valery Gerasimov: “It is indeed. It uses nuclear propulsion. Burevestnik’s technical characteristics generally allow for its use with assured accuracy against highly protected targets at any range. During the flight, the missile completed all prescribed vertical and horizontal maneuvers, showcasing a high capability to evade missile-defense and air-defense systems.”
  • Vladimir Putin: “And how long was it in the air?”
  • Valery Gerasimov: “About 15 hours.”
• Vladimir Putin: “Mr. Gerasimov, we will need to determine which class of weapons this new system belongs to, identify possible modes of employment, and begin preparing the infrastructure to base it in our Armed Forces.”

Vladimir Putin visited the P.V. Mandryka Central Military Clinical Hospital of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 10.29.25.

• “You have probably also heard: just recently, a new, extremely modern missile with unlimited range and a nuclear propulsion system was tested. It has definite advantages—we can be proud of the achievements of our scientists, specialists, engineers, and workers who made all of this happen. The advantages are that this small nuclear propulsion unit—when compared, say, with a nuclear reactor from a nuclear submarine—at the same power, is a thousand times smaller than a nuclear reactor on a submarine. A thousand times! But the most important thing is not even that—the main point is that if an ordinary nuclear reactor takes hours, days, or even weeks to start, this nuclear reactor can be launched in minutes or seconds. That’s a huge achievement.”
• “And we will be able to use this in the national economy, to solve the problem of energy supply in the Arctic in the future, as well as in our lunar program. Even now, the radiation-hardened electronics used in the Burevestnik missile are already being used in space programs, so this is a breakthrough not only in the field of strengthening the country’s defense capabilities, but also generally in science and in the economy of the future.”
• “But that’s not all; you should also know this: yesterday we carried out another test—this time of another promising system: the unmanned underwater drone Poseidon, also with a nuclear power system. For the first time, we managed not only to launch it from its carrier submarine with its initial engine, but also to start its nuclear powerplant, on which the system operated for a certain period of time.”
• “This is a huge success, because in addition to all the advantages I mentioned regarding the Burevestnik, Poseidon is also extremely compact. If Burevestnik's reactor is a thousand times smaller than a reactor on a submarine, Poseidon's is a hundred times smaller than a reactor on a submarine. But the power of Poseidon is significantly greater than even our most advanced intercontinental-range missile, Sarmat. There is nothing else like the Sarmat in the world, and although we do not yet have it on active duty, it will be soon.”
• “But Poseidon significantly exceeds Sarmat in power. And in addition, in terms of speed and the depths at which this unmanned system can travel, nothing like it exists in the world and is unlikely to appear any time soon—there are also no interception methods.”
• “It seems to me that this is important for you too: you are fighting on the front, risking your lives, and of course you think about what you are doing this for, whether the country will be able to pick up where you left off, risking your life and health while defending the Motherland; whether the country will be able to continue moving forward, strengthening its defense capabilities and, in general, growing stronger. These developments are also connected to that work.”

“Trump Doesn’t See the Difference: The U.S. President Confused Nuclear Tests with Non-Nuclear Ones,” interview with Aleksey Arbatov, kp.ru, 10.30.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

• Academic Aleksei Arbatov states, “In terms of operationally deployed nuclear weapons and strategic forces, Russia and the U.S. are roughly equal; Russia has a slight advantage in tactical nuclear weapons, so Trump is just speaking offhand.”
• Arbatov explains, “China currently has about 600 nuclear warheads, nearly ten times less than Russia or the U.S.. Even with rapid expansion, it would take China about ten years to reach parity.”
• He notes, “Russia did not propose extending the full New START treaty—only not violating the main ceilings of 700 launchers and 1,550 warheads. Trump called that ‘a good idea,’ but likely nothing more will happen.”
• Arbatov says, “If the U.S. isn’t concerned, Russia will unilaterally take measures for its own security.”
• On Trump’s nuclear testing order: “Trump might mean the Nevada test site, intended for underground tests, which are banned by the 1996 treaty observed as a moratorium by all major powers.”
• Arbatov points out, “No state—including North Korea in recent years—has conducted nuclear tests, neither underground nor elsewhere, since 2017.”
• He concludes, “For Trump, it apparently makes no difference whether it’s missile tests, torpedo tests, or nuclear warheads. His advisers should explain these are not the same.”

“Russia opens a new era of geopolitical deterrence,” Alexander Yakovenko, RIA Novosti, 10.30.35. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

• Yakovenko writes, “Putin’s announcement of successful tests of the nuclear-powered Burevestnik cruise missile and Poseidon underwater drone marks a breakthrough for Russia’s military-technical capabilities.”
• He argues, “Russia was forced to take these steps after the U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which undermined strategic stability.”
• Yakovenko highlights, “The West initially doubted the technical feasibility of atomic-powered missiles, but Burevestnik has now flown 14,000 kilometers in 15 hours, going unnoticed by no one.”
• He compares today’s situation to the Cold War and writes, “Like the USSR’s early space and atomic achievements, Russia, under Western sanctions, achieved a breakthrough with limited resources.”
• Yakovenko explains, “Russia’s latest advances strengthen both its technological and political authority, especially among countries of the Global South and East seeking independence from Western dominance.”
• He claims, “These new weapons prove any attempts to slow Russia’s development are futile and increase public awareness in Western countries about the limits of anti-Russian policies.”
• Yakovenko states, “Technologically, nuclear drones can accomplish new strategic tasks, including global patrols, challenging both current and future missile defense systems, like Trump’s ‘Golden Dome’ project.”
• He concludes, “In a time of increased geopolitical uncertainty for which the U.S. and the West are responsible, Russia’s new deterrent capabilities are more important than ever.”

“We’ll Definitely Test—But Then What?” Prokhor Tebin, Russia in Global Affairs, 11.03.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

• Tebin explains, “Trump’s blunt statement ordering immediate U.S. nuclear testing caused a media stir, but other U.S. officials gave more cautious interpretations, stressing underground or low-yield tests remain possible.”
• He notes, “Every recognized and unofficial nuclear power currently observes a moratorium on nuclear testing; the U.S. last tested in 1992, Russia in 1990, and China in 1996.”
• “The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), signed but not ratified by the U.S. and China, and de-ratified by Russia in 2023, underpins the current global testing moratorium,” writes Tebin.
• He reports, “Many U.S. officials and experts argue real nuclear testing isn’t technically required, as modern arsenals can be maintained through modeling and subcritical experiments.”
• Tebin observes, “Supporters of resumed U.S. tests claim it’s necessary for arsenal reliability or to develop new warheads, but critics counter that testing could trigger an arms race with Russia and China and undermine nonproliferation.”
• “Political and technical hurdles remain: U.S. test site readiness could take up to three years, limiting the impact of tests as a quick retaliatory measure,” he warns.
• Tebin recalls, “Russian officials maintain their own test site in readiness, vowing not to test first but to quickly follow if the U.S. does.”
• He concludes, “If the U.S. restarts nuclear testing, the CTBT regime could collapse and the world may enter a ‘second golden nuclear age’—a scenario with unpredictable and likely destabilizing consequences.”
• Tebin stresses, “Avoiding resumed nuclear testing is preferable, but it cannot be ruled out as a last-resort signal short of open conflict.”
• “The fate of nuclear testing now balances on political will, technical capability, and reactions from all major nuclear states,” Tebin writes.

“Putin crony issues ' fear of God' threat to 'instill horror' in the U.S.,” Laura Zilincanova, Amrita Carroll, Daily Express, 10.29.25.

• Karaganov declared, “Now we have a clear understanding that we can't make any deals with any Trumps in a way that would suit Russia. Therefore, we should act in accordance with our own scenario, with or without Trump, and that's it.”
• He continued, “Now, it's completely clear that we should move on to completely different tactics and strategy that consist of instilling horror and the fear of God in the European Allies of the United States and pointing out to the American elites that if they go down with the path of supporting a war against Russia, and they are fully supporting a war against Russia, we should simply explain to the Americans that our patience ran out or will soon run out, and in the future, we will be acting decisively, first, against their allies, then against their bases and their other assets.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “Strategic exercises and their goals,” Pavel Podvig, RussianForces.org, 10.27.25.
• “A House of Dynamite' gets a lot right. Experts hope that terrifies you.” Anne Branigin, Washington Post, 11.02.25.
• “I Spoil Netflix's Nuclear War Movie,” Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Wall Street Journal, 10.29.25.
• “Is a worldwide nuclear holocaust closer than ever?” Richard Overy’s review of Serhii Plokhy’s new book, The Telegraph, 10.30.25.
• "Russia's 'Poseidon' Nuclear Drone is Way Scarier Than You Think," Brandon J. Weichert, National Interest, 10.31.25.

Counterterrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

“Syria Needs a Reconstruction Plan,” Yezid Sayigh, Carnegie Endowment, 10.31.25.

• The author writes, “Syria needs an economic reconstruction program. Desperately. Yet nearly a year after the fall of dictator Bashar al-Assad, there is still no talk of putting together a comprehensive economic reconstruction plan, whether in Damascus or among the obvious international stakeholders.”
• According to Sayigh, “Without clarity and wide-based consultation on the country’s new economic framework, there is a distinct risk that the cronyism of the Assad-era economy will reappear, undermining social equity and generating political discontent, and that violence will reemerge as ‘a central mechanism for the redistribution of power and wealth among competing forces,’ as it did during the long civil war.”
• Sayigh observes, “The new Syrian authorities have announced memorandums of understanding worth $14 billion and contracts worth billions more with foreign commercial and government entities. Yet this only underlines the absence of an integrated, overall approach to economic reconstruction…”
• He warns, “Moreover, the lack of transparency when it comes to contract details, settlements with Assad-era business cronies, liquidation of Baath Party assets, and the government’s new sovereign wealth fund impedes accountability and threatens the viability of investments.”
• Sayigh argues, “The absence of a comprehensive economic reconstruction plan for Syria is paradoxical. After all, it was evident during the long, brutal war that the country would need large-scale economic reconstruction.”
• According to the author, “The cost of repairing the country’s physical infrastructure... was estimated in 2019 at $250–400 billion. Syrian Minister of Economy and Industry Mohammed Nidal al-Shaar claimed in May 2025 that ‘at least $1 trillion’ was needed to ‘reconstruct and rebuild a new Syria,’ while in August the World Bank more conservatively estimated the reconstruction bill at between $141 billion and $343 billion, with a ‘best estimate’ of $216 billion.”
• The author notes, “Little has changed in this picture since Assad’s downfall and the establishment of an interim government under President Ahmad al-Sharaa.”
• As Sayigh points out, “Contradictions are evident: Some state assets are being slated for privatization in what appears to be an erratic manner, with little transparency regarding the beneficiaries and the terms of sale, making the process vulnerable to renewed cronyism; yet state companies are also being reformed and show what the respected economic newsletter Syria Report describes as ‘renewed dynamism.’”
• Sayigh concludes, “The authorities are caught in a bind: Continuing hardship can no longer be blamed on suffocating international sanctions, but the benefits of investments in infrastructure and energy will not be felt for a long time.”

Cyber security/AI: 

“‘Digital War’—A New Reality,” Yuri Baluevsky & Ruslan Pukhov, Russia in Global Affairs, 10.29.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

• The authors argue, “A ‘drone revolution’ and, more broadly, ‘digital war’ is permanently reshaping military affairs, with swarms of increasingly small, cheap, and autonomous drones dominating the battlefield.”
• They state, “Transparency is a defining feature—surveillance, sensors, and networks are erasing the ‘fog of war’ and creating a unified global information battlespace across land, air, and space.”
• Baluevsky and Pukhov note, “This transparency, seen in Ukraine, has increased force dispersion and made covert concentration of troops nearly impossible, fundamentally changing combat doctrine.”
• “Starlink and commercial cellular networks now enable real-time, long-range control of drones and battlefield communications—including down to individual soldiers,” they write.
• The authors suggest, “Artillery and tanks—built for direct-fire confrontation—are losing relevance as drones and precision weapons allow indirect, remote strikes without line of sight.”
• They observe, “Drone warfare is driving radical restructuring of military organizations, demanding extreme force dispersion, deeper engagement ranges, and new logistics solutions.”
• “FPV drones are now the main weapon against both equipment and personnel, accounting for over 70% of Russian casualties as of early 2025,” the authors report.
• “Successful adaptation to drone warfare requires integrating drone swarms, robotics, and counter-drone measures at every level, with networked coordination,” they conclude.
• The article warns, “Mass-market drone platforms from China and the U.S. drive the war’s pace; Russia’s inability to match computing power and data networks threatens its strategic position.”
• Baluevsky and Pukhov stress, “Unless Russia invests now in computational capacity and networked systems, it risks falling irreversibly behind in digital warfare.”

Energy exports from CIS:

“Will Trump’s Sanctions Make a Dent in Russia’s Oil Exports?” Sergey Vakulenko, Carnegie Politika, 10.28.25.

• Vakulenko writes that Trump’s new sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil “attracted a lot of attention because they are the first to be introduced since Trump returned to the White House,” but argues “there was little new about the measures.”
• He notes earlier sanctions on Surgutneftegas and Gazprom Neft “did not dent oil production or export volumes for either company,” and predicts “Rosneft and Lukoil will be able to continue operating in a similar fashion, despite the U.S. restrictions.”
• Vakulenko concludes, “history shows that hitting Lukoil and Rosneft is unlikely to force Russian President Vladimir Putin to change course when it comes to the war in Ukraine, and will only have a small, temporary effect on Russian oil exports.”
• “For Putin, the war is not a pragmatic struggle that only makes sense while the costs are not too great. It is a point of principle, and the symbolic capital he hopes to earn is far more important to him than any resources expended.”
• He predicts, “India and China are unlikely to stop buying Russian oil. Both countries see the Ukraine war as a conflict to which they are not a party, and they value Russia as a supplier of relatively inexpensive crude oil.”
• Vakulenko observes that “if this is what comes to pass, it would mean Russia losing out on a few billion U.S. dollars every year, but little more than that. It’s possible this financial blow might push the Kremlin to spend a bit less on defense, which might help Ukraine. But it is not nearly enough for Putin to start thinking about changing course.”
• He does note, “in the long term, such sanctions pressure will undoubtedly end up weakening the Russian economy and undermining its ability to withstand a sustained confrontation with the West,” but also warns it “incentivizes the growth of oil markets unconnected to the Western financial system—and accelerates the trend toward de-globalization.”

“Russian Oil Under Sanctions Will Find New Ways to Flow,” Carol Ryan, Wall Street Journal, 10.25.25.

• Ryan writes, “If Iran can keep its energy exports flowing under heavy restrictions, Moscow probably can, too,” noting Brent crude only rose $5 to $66 a barrel after the latest U.S. sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil.
• She observes that the sanctions “will disrupt supply to Moscow's top energy customers, China and India,” but predicts “the long-term impact on oil prices could be mild,” as buyers are already seeking Middle Eastern alternatives.
• Ryan reports, “Sanctions should have a more immediate impact on Indian purchases of Russian oil than tariffs did,” with Reliance Industries already putting Russian imports under “recalibration.”
• China’s state-run refiners “will be cautious about handling sanctioned Russian barrels,” but private “teapot” refineries, like those that import Iranian oil, “may take riskier cargoes”; however, their ability to absorb more is limited by quotas.
• She notes, “The volume of oil now under sanctions has hit 15% of global supply,” yet “unprecedented restrictions haven't impacted supply”—Russian and Iranian exports both hit recent records, driven by a rapidly expanding “shadow fleet” and hidden ship-to-ship transfers.
• Ryan concludes Russia will likely “find ways around restrictions by setting up new supply chains… and redoubling efforts to disguise where cargoes have come from,” meaning Trump’s sanctions will “make every barrel of Russian oil harder, slower and more expensive to trade but are unlikely to cut the global oil supply.”
• She adds, “This could be a good result from Trump's point of view. Russian President Vladimir Putin gets less money to finance war in Ukraine, but consumers are spared a painful increase in energy prices.”

“Why There’s No Easy Button to End the Russia-Ukraine War. Economic carrots and sanctions aren’t powerful enough to compensate Russia for giving up its maximalist aims,” Sam Skove, Foreign Policy, 10.28.25.

• Skove writes, “U.S. President Donald Trump wants a quick resolution to the war in Ukraine. But that goal has proved elusive and is likely to remain so, in part because of how highly the Kremlin values its multiple objectives in Ukraine.
• Even after “sanctions on Russia’s top oil producers, Rosneft and Lukoil… the Kremlin… isn’t budging,” with Putin insisting Moscow would not change its negotiating stance and demanding “broader concessions as a precondition for ending the war.”
• Max Bergmann is quoted: “There’s absolutely no quick fix,” and adds, “This is about Vladimir Putin’s place in history… He wants to be Vladimir the Great. And how is he going to be Vladimir the Great if the war ends tomorrow?”
• Laura Cooper adds, “You have to understand how much Putin has invested in this war, and how much he’s invested in convincing his population that this war must be successful.”
• Andrew Peek tells Skove that while “the Russians have shown a little wiggle room on the territory piece” they’ve offered “no concessions on a security guarantee from Ukraine’s Western partners, which is a sticking point for Kyiv.”
• Skove quotes Bergmann concluding, “Neither the carrots nor sticks immediately available to Trump are likely to solve the war.”
• Cooper suggests a way forward would be more sanctions, increased military aid and “plans to boost Ukraine’s postwar military,” arguing: “The Russians have to feel like they are losing, and they also have to feel like Ukraine is succeeding.”

“The U.S. throws sand in Russia’s war machine,” Editorial Board, Financial Times, 10.26.25.

• Financial Times editors note Trump’s latest “volte-face on Ukraine,” switching from planning a summit with Putin to stiffening U.S. measures: “imposing sanctions on Russia’s largest oil companies, Rosneft and Lukoil,” a move “the Biden administration had always balked at.”
• “With further EU curbs on Russian energy they constitute a powerful blow to Moscow’s war economy,” as the U.S. has now targeted “Russia’s top four oil companies, accounting for about four-fifths of its oil exports.”
• “These measures will squeeze revenues from a sector that contributes about one-third of Russia’s state budget,” but their impact “will depend in part on how its largest oil customers, China and India, respond and how effectively the sanctions can be enforced against Russia’s… efforts to evade them using the web of front companies and shadow tankers and insurers.”
• “The threat of losing access to the dollar-based financial system… is a powerful disincentive,” with Indian and Chinese refineries “looking at curbing imports of Russian oil.”
• The EU, meanwhile, “imposed additional energy sanctions, tightening a ban on transactions by Rosneft and Gazprom Neft, and banning imports of Russian liquefied natural gas by January 2027. It is also targeting a further 117 tankers from Russia’s shadow fleet.”
• While “the new economic measures will not shift Putin’s calculus overnight… their cumulative and pernicious impact is starting to show up in stagnating Russian growth, stubborn inflation and a deteriorating fiscal situation. In a war of attrition, any step that throws more sand into the gears of an opponent’s war machine is worthwhile.”

“Putting the Oil Squeeze on Putin,” Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal, 10.24.25.

• The WSJ editors write, “President Trump sure can turn on a dime on Russia. On Wednesday he finally decided to blacklist Russian oil giants Rosneft and Lukoil, only days after he said Vladimir Putin wants peace. This is progress, but the sanctions won’t turn the war unless the Administration keeps adding to the military and economic pressure.”
• According to the editorial, “Brent oil prices popped to $66 a barrel on Thursday from about $60 earlier in the week as markets digested the potential impact of the latest U.S. and European sanctions. The goal is to limit Russian energy exports that account for about a third of the Kremlin budget and fund its military.”
• The editors note, “Chinese and Indian refineries have continued to buy Russian oil, often carried by shadow fleets and sold through intermediaries. Europe has sanctioned these fleets to little effect… President Trump earlier wavered on tightening sanctions on Russian oil because he didn’t want to spoil the mood music with Mr. Putin… He also worried about rising gas prices. But global oil markets are well-supplied.”
• According to the board, “The sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil… will bar refineries and banks that transact with them from U.S. financial markets and conducting business in dollars. The impact of the sanctions will depend on how strictly the Administration enforces them.”
• As the editorial recounts, “Four Chinese state-owned oil companies said Thursday they’ll suspend purchases of Russian seaborne oil,” though “most Chinese buyers are independent ‘teapot’ refiners… India’s major refiner, Reliance Industries, will stop importing oil under its long-term deal with Rosneft.”
• The editors conclude, “The new economic pressure on Russia is welcome, but only if it lasts. Mr. Trump has wavered between wooing and lamenting Mr. Putin, which has let the Russian continue his campaign to annihilate Ukraine… Tougher sanctions can drive up the cost of war for Mr. Putin, but they will be more powerful if they are accompanied by more weapons for Ukraine.”

“The U.S. is poised to rock Russia and China—if it holds firm,” Thomas Duesterberg, Washington Post, 10.28.25.

• Duesterberg argues that Trump’s new sanctions on Russian oil companies “can deliver a serious blow to the teetering Russian economy, if they’re rigorously enforced—and Trump sticks to his guns,” pointing out these include, “for the first time, sanctions against buyers of Russian oil and banks that finance trade in that oil, including those in China, Hong Kong and India.”
• “His new sanctions started getting results immediately. One day after they were imposed, China’s major state oil companies announced that they were pausing purchases of Russian oil,” while India’s Reliance Industries has also “signaled it may suspend imports.”
• Duesterberg notes, “The Russian economy faces severe problems. The central bank and economics minister have said that Russia is close to a recession due to the demands of the war in Ukraine. Oil and gas exports represented 32% of Moscow’s tax revenue in 2024,” and the country risks “a banking crisis.”
• Global oil prices “remain moderate,” easing U.S. concerns about domestic impact: “Even after the new sanctions were announced, both the Brent and West Texas benchmarks remain between $60 and $65 per barrel, hardly a price harmful to Western economies.”
• He urges Trump not to “give up secondary sanctions on China in exchange for a deal on, say, U.S. soybean sales,” arguing that “they hinge on rigorous sanctions enforcement against both Russia and the buyers of its energy exports.”
• “Trump has sent the strongest message yet to Xi about the costs of supporting his Russian friend for life—a message that could have a big impact on China’s ability to maintain its own growth model.”

“The Gloves Are Still On: Why Washington’s Newest Oil Sanctions Won’t Be Enough to Pressure Putin,” Clayton Seigle, CSIS, 10.31.25.

• Seigle writes, “the new sanctions probably won’t be enough to move Moscow toward compromise, as the Kremlin knows it only needs to outlast an initial commercial and marketing challenge before persistent oil trading patterns resume.”
• He argues, “China and Indian refiners have announced they’ll be turning away from Russian oil, but if past is prologue, this initial phase will be short-lived, lasting only until Moscow’s tried-and-true ‘oil laundering’ playbook is up and running.”
• Seigle writes, “Rosneft and Lukoil volumes will likely continue to reach the market, relabeled without the sanctioned company names. Oil formerly tagged as Rosneft and Lukoil will instead be sold by newly incorporated entities in Russia.”
• He writes, “Proponents of the new blocking sanctions may hope that follow-on secondary sanctions will be the real hammer to disrupt Russian flows, but under current authorities could take too long to help Ukraine.”
  • Seigle writes, “The administration’s proclivity for transactional foreign and trade policy may lead President Trump to issue waivers of the new oil sanctions to specific counterparties… in exchange for compromises on bilateral trade deals and/or access to rare earths or critical minerals.”
• He writes, “The sanctions have at least temporarily widened the discounts of Russian oil remaining on the market… the greater the discount, the less sales revenue for the Kremlin to pay for its war on Ukraine.”
• Seigle notes, “True maximum pressure could be achieved by accompanying the sanctions with a surcharge imposed on buyers of Russian oil… push Russia’s sale prices to uncompetitively high levels because buyers would need to pay the international oil price plus the surcharge.”

“How Russia Sanctions Could Affect India,” Michael Kugelman, Foreign Policy, 10.29.25.  

• Kugelman writes that India, “the world’s second-biggest importer of crude oil from Russia,” faces new pressure after “U.S. and European Union sanctions on Russian oil companies,” with refiners “expected to significantly decrease imports of Russian oil,” which recently made up 40% of India’s total crude imports.
• He explains that India’s “state-owned oil companies will take steps to ensure that none of their imports come directly from Rosneft and Lukoil,” which together “supply around 60% of India’s total oil imports from Russia.”
• Kugelman notes Reliance Industries, a private firm, had signed a major supply deal with Rosneft but now says it will “rely on [its] ‘time-tested, diversified crude sourcing strategy’”—yet “there are no immediate alternatives to Russian oil at such a cheap price point.”
• India may increase purchases from the Middle East, but “this could add significant cost,” raising the stakes for “ongoing trade talks with the United States.” Kugelman writes, “New Delhi may now try to negotiate an arrangement to import more U.S. oil at a lower price point.”
• He observes that “the Trump administration has demanded that India reduce its Russian oil imports,” and that “India has already increased oil imports from the United States in recent years,” giving New Delhi possible leverage.
• Kugelman points out the effects on India’s energy security “shouldn’t be overstated,” since coal remains dominant, but oil “accounts for nearly one-third of India’s total energy consumption,” making supply disruptions politically and economically important.
• He concludes, “The sanctions scare is a reminder for India of the risks of its heavy reliance on imported hydrocarbons,” which could “bolster those voices that have long called for New Delhi to accelerate the development of indigenous renewables.”

“Why Putin’s Energy Weapon Failed,” Dimitar Bechev, Foreign Policy, 10.29.25. 

• Bechev writes that Russia’s identity as an “energy superpower” is over, with oil and gas now “as much a vulnerability as it is an asset,” as Western sanctions, Ukrainian strikes, and EU phaseouts erode Moscow’s leverage.
• He details how Western sanctions—particularly on Rosneft and Lukoil—and coordinated measures by the U.S., EU, and UK “complicate doing business with the Russian majors as financing, insurance, and shipping costs go up.”
• “Russia’s oil profits were already falling. In the first half of 2025, revenues slumped by 17% year-on-year.” Bechev notes, adding that Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries have further forced “Russia to shift its exports from refined product to crude oil, which reduces profits” and stokes domestic gasoline shortages.
• The article recounts how Russia’s pipeline gas weapon is also fading: EU imports are down from 45% to 11%, with new legislation forcing EU companies to phase out Russian long-term contracts and LNG by 2027.
• Bechev argues that China “is no substitute for Russia’s loss of the European market,” as volumes via new pipelines will always be smaller and Beijing’s tough terms force Russia to accept “payments in yuan, tying it even closer to China.”
• He notes these trends are creating “compounding problems at home,” including rising inflation, a growing government budget squeeze, falling growth (to 1–1.3% projected for 2025–26), and stagnating investment in new fields and infrastructure.
• Bechev concludes that Russia “was unable to effectively use oil and gas as a means of coercion,” and the stable international oil market shows “consumers wield as much power as producers”—leaving Moscow with “chronic stagnation” rather than leverage.

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “Europe finally moves to ban Russian gas but potential loopholes remain,” Aura Sabadus, Atlantic Council, 10.31.25.

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Virtual roller coaster riding,” Dmitry Trenin, Kommersant, 10.27.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

• Trenin observes, “Tracking Trump’s statements is a kind of virtual roller coaster, as his remarks often contradict previous positions. Following the train of Trump’s thoughts is a fascinating hobby for Russian commentators, but one should not get carried away.”
• He comments, “Trump’s tactics swing between threats and flattery, making him at times an ally, at times an adversary. The more important question is whether there is any real strategy behind his approach.”
• Trenin says, “Trump’s strategy is aimed above all at achieving personal greatness, suppressing economic rivals, and gaining the glory of a global peacemaker. His actions are designed first and foremost around these three pillars.”
• He argues, “For Trump, peace means only an armistice, not a genuine settlement of disputes. He wants to assemble the opposing sides, declare peace from above, and then leave the responsibility for any renewed conflict to others.”
• Trenin remarks, “This peacemaker formula doesn’t work with Russia, just as Moscow’s strategy of persuading Trump about the causes of the Ukraine crisis has also failed. For Trump, only the here and now matters; history is meaningless to him.”
• He notes, “Trump is not fully independent and cannot ignore America’s European allies or domestic opposition. The U.S. political elite, regardless of party, remain almost unanimously hostile—if not outright Russophobic—toward Russia.”
• On the nuclear issue, Trenin points out that Trump’s readiness to use force is always present in the background of his threats when adversaries do not oblige his peace plans. He implies that Trump’s unpredictable rhetoric makes nuclear risk an ever-present part of diplomatic maneuvering, adding to the uncertainty in U.S.-Russia relations.

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “Is Trump losing patience with Putin over the Ukraine war?” Anatol Lieven, Steven Erlanger, Chris Weafer, Inside Story, Al Jazeera, 10.23.25. Video.
• “Venediktov, Belkovsky, Other Russian Political Analysts on U.S.-Russia Relations after Budapest Summit Canceled,” Russia Post, 10.30.25.
• “Buttressed by Courts, Voice of America Is Quiet but Not Yet Silenced,” Minho Kim, New York Times, 10.26.25.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Three and a Half Periods of Russian Life in Wartime,” Vladimir Zvonovsky and Alexander Khodykin, Re: Russia, 10.29.25.

• Zvonovsky and Khodykin write that Russian social attitudes have gone “through several stages of change, completing an almost full circle: from the crisis assessments of their material circumstances in the autumn of 2022, to the economic and consumer boom that peaked in early 2024, and then to a new downturn in the autumn of 2025.”
• The authors observe that early on, “the more resource-secure groups suffered the most,” while deprived groups felt fewer negative effects, but a short-lived “commercial war economy” later benefitted some “deprived and depressed social strata.”
• From late 2024, “social sentiment began to deteriorate once more,” and “the most deprived sections of the population again found themselves feeling the worst”—the “shift in Russia’s social structure brought about by the beneficiaries of the wartime economy proved relatively brief and unstable.”
• They explain that initially, “many Russians viewed wartime as an opportunity and a means not only for personal social revenge but also for a broader transformation of the social structure of society”—expecting more equality, new status, and social mobility.
• Surveys and economic data confirm that “income growth, optimism, and consumer activity in 2023 and early 2024 was replaced by a period of growing pessimism throughout 2025,” with rising inflation and material wellbeing dropping to “their lowest level since the beginning of the 'special military operation.'”
• Attempts by “frontline veterans” and deprived groups to turn wartime gains into lasting social status failed, while “those who held privileged positions before the conflict are now regaining them,” leading to widespread “frustration born of disappointed hopes.”
• By October 2025, the mood is grim: only 7% describe the war’s impact on daily life as positive, while 43% view it as negative. The authors conclude, “a real change in public opinion will become possible only when Russians come to see these hardships as an unjustifiably high price to pay for the continuation of the war.”

“What’s on Vladimir Putin’s reading list?” Peter Frankopan, Financial Times, 10.28.25.

• Frankopan writes that when Trump canceled his summit with Putin, he cited frustration that “every time I speak with Vladimir, I have good conversations, and then they don’t go anywhere.”
• According to Frankopan, the real source of frustration was Putin’s “rambling historical discursion spanning medieval princes such as Rurik of Novgorod and Yaroslav the Wise, along with the 17th-century Cossack chieftain Bohdan Khmelnytsky”—a pattern observers saw as a deliberate attempt to “drag the meeting out… to obfuscate by diverting attention from what a peace deal with Ukraine might look like to assessments of the past that are arcane to any but the most committed of historians.”
• Frankopan notes, “Putin likes to present himself as someone who has thought extensively about the past,” referencing his essays like “On The Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” but observes that “for all the willingness to show off his knowledge of battles and heroes, he is reluctant to acknowledge intellectual debts. Putin’s history is very much his own—shaped by his own insights.”
• Frankopan says that Putin’s accounts often echo official narratives, particularly those of Vladimir Medinsky, but avoids citing modern scholars by name and “rarely quotes” or specifically credits Russian literary giants he mentions.
• The author describes how, in an interview with Tucker Carlson, Putin insisted on “a brief historical background” that became “half an hour” and left the interviewer bewildered by the arcana and the lack of clear sources.
• Frankopan concludes, “Russian authors, artists and composers exist as a set of national assets that show that Russia is great. That, of course, is the message Putin is trying to get across to Trump—but in times of war, it is the present and future that really count.”

“Russian Dream-Idea of the 21st Century,” Sergei Karaganov and Pavel Malyutin, Russia in Global Affairs, 10.30.25.Clues from Russian Views.

• Karaganov and Malyutin argue, “We have yet to define our identity to the end,” declaring, “our roots are in the North-East, and our present and future are in the vast Eurasian-Pacific space, in a multipolar world.” They insist the “Russian idea, the Russian dream, cannot be Western—especially if we consider today’s Europe with its decaying comprador elite and the U.S. with its newest post-human moral and ideological postulates.”
• On the West, they write, “Our idea and our dream should not be anti-Western either, because that would mean continuing to move in the Western paradigm, but with a minus sign. They must be worked out independently. If a country has no ideological core, the space of its ideas and spirit is vacated for others.”
• Reflecting on Ukraine, the authors contend, “To the east of us lies a state formation in which a state ideology (albeit a harmful and counterproductive one) has been implemented. The slogan of this ideology is ‘Ukraine is not Russia’ or ‘anti-Russia.’ This ideology is one of the reasons for the fierce resistance on the other side of the front, and also a negative illustration of the effectiveness of a functioning state ideology.”
• Karaganov and Malyutin present the Ukraine conflict as a clash of defining national ideas: “Just as the Soviet Union collapsed when it lost its great idea, so now Ukraine has constructed a unifying idea by defining itself as the opposite of Russia.”
• They reject the idea that Russia should seek to become a Western-style democracy: “Russia, if it wants to survive as a giant sovereign civilization-state in its natural borders, cannot and should not be a democracy in the Western sense of the term. This is history and destiny. We can and must have strong democratic elements in the governance system, especially at the local level… but at the top, only a high measure of authoritarianism can keep the country together in times of external turbulence.”
• Regarding the war, the authors write, “The defensive strategy in the medium term is ineffective, neither on the battlefield nor in the sphere of ideas. We must not merely defend. We must accompany defense of this idea with active offense—by advancing normal human biological and social values…”
• On the European front, they cite, “In Europe, this means anti-European values, if we consider that the core values of historical Europe were Christianity, humanism, state nationalism.”
• Karaganov and Malyutin argue, “Russia is currently fulfilling a special mission, opposing Western ambitions and offering the world an alternative—a multinational, multicultural community, based not on so-called ‘conservative,’ but on genuinely human values.”
• In speaking to Russia’s ultimate goal, they write: “We are an integrating Big Eurasia and maybe, someday, capable of integrating the whole world—a northern Eurasian polyethnic people. We are open to all, but we value and protect our distinctiveness, political and spiritual sovereignty.”
• They view the conflict with Ukraine and the West as symptomatic of Russia’s larger struggle: “Russia… today is seen as a bastion of resistance to the model of the world that [liberal globalist elites] have tried to impose on humanity,” and, “One of the most important and inherent features of our identity is the defense of sovereignty at any cost.”
• In conclusion, they call for a national consolidation in response to the Ukraine conflict and global turmoil: “Now, during a global turning point, a new spiritual self-understanding is especially necessary… Only a country with its own great idea and a unifying vision can survive and lead in a turbulent world.”

Defense and aerospace:

•  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement, justice and emergencies:

• No significant developments.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Is Russia’s Influence at the United Nations on the Decline?” Janko Šćepanović, PONARS Eurasia, 10.27.25.

• Šćepanović argues that despite Russia’s perennial attachment to its UNSC veto and formal status, “the last three and a half years have seen further erosion of Russia’s influence within the organization, especially after it invaded Ukraine and was roundly condemned for it in the General Assembly.”
• Russia’s approach has shifted toward attacking the UN Secretariat—accusing it of “pro-Western bias”—because Moscow “failed to escape several rounds of resounding UNGA condemnations of its illegal actions in Ukraine” even as it shields itself with vetoes in the Security Council.
• Moscow has increasingly “sought to delegitimize and taint all traces of Western influence” at the UN, and Russian diplomats attack Secretary-General Guterres and Secretariat staff as “NATO representatives” who have “privatized” key posts, insisting on removing “the domination of Western citizens and subjects.”
• Šćepanović details Moscow’s attempts to intimidate and censor Secretariat employees, block UN investigations (e.g., into Iranian drones in Ukraine), and depict UN officials as “mouthpieces for Western propaganda and distributors of disinformation and fake news.”
• Nevertheless, Russia jealously defends its UNSC seat and inherited status, and “is unwilling to give up the inherited privilege of a permanent seat on the UNSC and lacks backing from its non-Western partners, which see the UN as central to solving the world’s problems.”
• He concludes that “despite their growing relevance,” neither BRICS nor the Shanghai Cooperation Organization are true alternatives for Moscow; most members “value the UN and seek to expand their own sway within it,” leaving Russia “hardly in a position to pursue radical change in the system” without jeopardizing its own global leverage.”

“How the Russian Orthodox Church Became a Weapon of Political Warfare,” Natalia Kopytnik, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 10.23.25.

• Kopytnik argues that the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) “has become a central pillar of the Kremlin’s political and informational warfare strategy,” shaping narratives “by fusing spirituality with nationalism” through doctrines like “Russian World (Russkiy Mir)” that justify aggression and project Moscow’s ideological reach.
• This influence is sustained by “an interconnected ecosystem of state, church, and media,” enabled by state broadcasters, “patriotic” NGOs, global cultural centers, and Kremlin-aligned oligarchs funding church assets and outreach, all coordinated to “adapt its messaging to local contexts.”
• The ROC’s foreign “missions of influence” spread pro-Kremlin views in Africa and Europe, with “ROC-linked clergy propagat[ing] anti-Western messages, framing NATO and the EU as threats to traditional Christian values,” and amplifying “pro-Kremlin movements through cultural affinity and religious symbolism.”
• Kopytnik highlights the 2019 Ukrainian autocephaly as a blow to Russian soft power, but notes that since the 2022 invasion, “the conflict over ecclesiastical allegiance transformed into an open struggle between a sovereign Ukraine and a weaponized church hierarchy,” with Ukrainian authorities prosecuting ROC-linked priests for collaboration and propaganda.
• Moscow reacts with fierce information warfare: the ROC “accuses the OCU and Constantinople of ‘schism’, portraying Ukraine’s religious independence as a Western-engineered plot to divide the Orthodox world”—weaponizing theology in service of Kremlin geopolitical aims.
• She concludes that countering this “religiously cloaked disinformation” requires “transparency over church-state funding flows, regulation of foreign-linked religious structures, and exposure of clerical actors engaged in political propaganda,” in order to defend “democratic resilience against this evolving form of ideological warfare.”

Ukraine:

“The U.S.-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund: A Six-Month Progress Assessment,” Eric Green, Carnegie Politika, 10.27.25.

• Green explains that the U.S.-Ukrainian Reconstruction Investment Fund (USURIF) “was originally conceived as part of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s ‘Victory Plan,’” but reflects “Trump’s preference for transactional diplomacy that can demonstrate tangible monetary benefits to the United States.”
• He writes, “The USURIF’s focus on Ukraine’s mineral wealth was seen by Trump as essential to redress what he regarded as an unbalanced relationship,” with the White House proposing giving the U.S. “50% of Ukraine’s mineral resources,” a draft described by analysts as akin to “the reparations imposed on Germany after World War I.”
• Green notes, “For Ukrainian officials, the main attraction of a deal was to obtain security guarantees from the United States… Zelenskyy was willing to make significant concessions… But the Trump administration was opposed to Zelenskyy’s security guarantee proposal at the time and did not want it included in the minerals deal.”
• He reports that friction over U.S. security guarantees led to a “contentious meeting between the leaders on February 28 in the Oval Office,” temporarily suspending security aid to Ukraine. A compromise was later reached, revising U.S. demands and turning USURIF into a (more) equal partnership.
• Under the final agreement, the USURIF “facilitates the creation of a partnership company” to invest in Ukraine’s natural resources and infrastructure, with both sides contributing capital and rights to invest. The fund’s list includes “fifty-five minerals… but also oil and gas projects, which can typically be developed more quickly than large mines.”
• Crucially, “the USURIF defines U.S. security assistance to Ukraine as a capital contribution… meaning future U.S. military support for Ukraine can be considered an investment into economically profitable projects rather than as charity,” which “strengthens arguments within the administration in favor of assisting Ukraine’s war effort.”
• Green concludes, “the USURIF has the potential to help integrate Ukraine into Western critical minerals supply chains and—if the agreement’s scope is expanded—contribute directly to the war effort by catalyzing investments in defense and energy.” But he warns, “Ukraine policy cannot neglect the diplomatic, security, humanitarian, and economic stakes,” or “risk prolonging the war and eroding allied cohesion.”

“Six Months Since the U.S.-Ukraine Minerals Deal Was Signed—What Now?” Gracelin Baskaran, CSIS, 10.30.25.

• Baskaran writes, “Six months ago, the United States and Ukraine formalized the U.S.-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund—often referred to as the ‘minerals deal.’ The agreement underscores the strategic alignment between Washington and Kyiv to rebuild Ukraine’s mining base as a central pillar of its post-war economic recovery and long-term industrial resilience.”
• According to Baskaran, “Ukraine’s industrial heritage is deeply rooted in the Soviet Union’s military-metallurgical complex, reflecting its longstanding importance as a hub of resource extraction, materials innovation, and strategic industrial capability.”
• She notes, “According to the former director general of the Ukrainian Geological Survey, Ukraine currently lacks a modern geological assessment. The existing data was compiled by the Soviet Union between 30 and 60 years ago, is based on outdated exploration techniques, and provides limited insight into today’s commercial realities.”
• Baskaran observes, “Following this year’s minerals deal with the United States, the government of Ukraine reelevated the mining sector as a national priority. To modernize its geological mapping capabilities, through a partnership with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Ukraine is already digitizing all Soviet-era geological archives, with 60,000 books, journals, and documents being scanned and structured into a single digital archive.”
• She writes, “Ukraine recently adopted the 2019 UN Framework Classification for Resources and Reserves, an international standard for assessing and reporting resource potential and recoverability. But because wartime conditions restrict advanced mapping methods like light detection and ranging, drilling will initially focus on areas with existing baseline data.”
• Baskaran explains, “The U.S.-Ukraine Reconstruction Fund serves as a proof of concept for a new model of strategic development finance. If the $150 million commitment from the U.S. and Ukrainian governments succeeds in mobilizing substantial private capital to help rebuild Ukraine’s industrial base—particularly in sectors that also enhance U.S. and allied critical minerals security—it could establish a transformative precedent for how the United States approaches post-conflict recovery and economic statecraft.”
• She notes, “The successful realization of the minerals component of the U.S.-Ukraine Reconstruction Fund depends on three key factors: mobilizing private capital, identifying and launching strategic projects, and investing in the enabling infrastructure and policy architecture required to sustain them.”
• As Baskaran reports, “To mark the six-month anniversary of the U.S.-Ukraine ‘minerals deal,’ the CSIS Critical Minerals Security Program convened a Chatham House–style roundtable that brought together senior U.S. and Ukrainian government officials alongside private-sector leaders to explore new investment opportunities.”
• Baskaran recommends, “Invest in reprocessing legacy mine tailings: From the 1950s until the early 1990s, Ukraine was one of the Soviet Union’s largest uranium producers and processors. Over decades of activity, Ukraine has accumulated an estimated 300,000–400,000 tons of uranium tailings, which also contain 5–10 types of rare and specialty metals.”
• She notes, “Repurpose orphaned USAID funds: Following President Trump’s Executive Order 14169 in 2025, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was dismantled, with its residual functions and funding absorbed into the Department of State as part of a broader review of foreign assistance programs.”
• Baskaran concludes, “The U.S.-Ukraine ‘minerals deal’ marks the beginning of a strategic shift in how Washington approaches post-conflict reconstruction—through investment rather than traditional aid. Six months in, Ukraine has made important strides in rebuilding its geological foundation and institutional frameworks, but realizing the fund’s full potential will require mobilizing private capital, making strategic investments, and rebuilding infrastructure.”

“The Past Putin Can’t Let Go,” Martin Fornusek, Kyiv Independent, 10.28.25.

• Radchenko says the obsession with Ukraine is “peculiar to Putin.”
• He explains, “If you look back through decades to see how Soviet and Russian leaders have drawn on history, you’ll see that while they have all done that, they did not obsess over it.
• Radchenko distinguishes, “Putin’s use of history to justify his political goals is unique in its intensity and focus on Ukraine.”
• He suggests that previous leaders “never demonstrated this level of fixation,” as seen in current Kremlin rhetoric and conduct.
• Radchenko implies this obsession plays a significant role in driving the full-scale invasion and shaping the current war.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“A Geopolitical Shift in the South Caucasus,” Zaur Shiriyev, Carnegie Endowment, 10.31.25.

• Shiriyev states, “The Trump administration didn’t create a disparate peace process, and it didn’t bring the peace, because the negotiation has already advanced mostly in bilateral format over the past two or three years, and the text of agreement was finalized in March.”
• According to Shiriyev, “the text is initialed, but also not signed yet. Why [is it] important? For context and also text. On the textual side, I think it’s important because it brings transparency. For the first time, people can actually see what was negotiated and agreed upon.”
• He observes, “the point of the text is the establishment of diplomatic relations. When it’s signed, it’s going to upgrade state relations to a new level between Azerbaijan and Armenia.”
• Shiriyev notes, “United States involvement is also important for a few reasons. It’s lowered political tensions… the United States is guaranteeing this kind of de facto ceasefire.”
• He adds, “It also improved investor confidence in both countries. As you [can] see, bond markets reflected lower perceived risk, and both countries gained some fiscal breathing room.”
• Shiriyev emphasizes, “Right now it is much more [about] improving state-to-state relations. Part of the answer to your question about what has changed after August: First of all, rhetoric has changed. Both sides are talking about peace.”
• He points out, “yesterday, Azerbaijan announced that it actually takes back its veto [of] any transit move through Azerbaijani territory, which means that Armenia can receive cargo transit from Azerbaijani territory through Azerbaijan going to Georgia and connecting to Armenia. Why is this important? Because it’s the first sign that Armenians [are] reconnecting to these regional integration projects.”
• Discussing Russia, Shiriyev says, “the Russian absence from this current peace process is one of the clear signs of just how the South Caucasus has changed. Back in 2020...Moscow had what we can call a hegemonic moment...But this dominance started to erode by the end of 2021...But it has changed after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.”
• He continues, “for Armenia, real discussion on the peace agreement started only after Russia [became] preoccupied with the invasion of Ukraine. But Moscow also tried to push its own version of the peace agreement. It was rejected mainly by Baku...the ability to play Armenia and Azerbaijan against each other… Now this tool is not working anymore, because there is much more trust, much more discussion, much more dialogue and much more contact between Azerbaijan and Armenia.”
• Shiriyev concludes, “Russia’s ability to impose itself as a sole power broker has collapsed. I don’t think that there is a way for Russia to introduce itself into the peace process. And the last element was the Trump route… right now, both Baku and Yerevan don’t want Russia to play any role, even in this transformation.”

“Putin’s new battlegrounds,” Seth Cropsey, Washington Post, 11.03.25. 

• Cropsey states, “While attention is fixed on the Baltic, Moscow has waged an information war in its backyard: Central Asia and the South Caucasus.”
• He observes, “Both Kazakhstan and Armenia are edging away from Russia, accelerated by the war in Ukraine, and now rank high on the Kremlin’s worry list.”
• Cropsey explains, “Moscow is falling back on the tools it knows best—covert influence campaigns, disinformation, destabilization and military and intelligence probing.”
• He describes, “Russian operatives have reportedly sought to stir unrest in Kazakhstan’s Russian-majority north, while in Armenia, authorities arrested a pro-Kremlin businessman in an alleged coup plot.”
• Cropsey notes, “Kazakhstan knows its military is weaker than Ukraine’s, and its 4,700-mile border is largely undefended; Putin can prepare the ground for potential moves.”
• He suggests, “Washington could anchor Western stakes in Kazakhstan with exclusive rare-earth and energy deals, and investment in Armenia’s economy and AI sector would show tangible rewards of stability.”
• Cropsey warns, “Russia’s war in Ukraine has pushed much of the post-Soviet space out of Moscow’s orbit—but the Kremlin can destabilize neighbors without firing a shot. Active U.S. engagement can harden these countries against Russian coercion.”

“The day after: Future of development aid in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova,” Sinikka Parviainen, European Leadership Network, 10.30.25.

• Parviainen writes, “Development aid is facing unprecedented challenges. Compounded by the fallout of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which redirected EU assistance toward migration management and conflict stabilization, already declining aid flows were further disrupted in 2025 by the withdrawal and restructuring of USAID programs.”
• She writes, “USAID’s sudden retreat has opened the door for other actors, most notably China and Russia, to expand their influence, often without the same commitment to transparency, human rights, or local empowerment.”
• Parviainen writes, “While the EU and its member states have historically matched the United States in terms of development aid volumes, they now appear to be following the U.S. lead in cutting aid as well. Budget constraints, shifting priorities, and the war in Ukraine have redirected resources toward defense and security, leaving less for traditional development assistance.”
• She writes, “The retreat of Western aid creates a dangerous vacuum. Russia, despite its negative image in many post-Soviet countries, may regain influence simply because there are fewer actors to counter it.”
• Parviainen writes, “China, with its no-strings-attached funding model, is increasingly attractive to non-democratic governments seeking quick financial support, for example, for infrastructure development without political oversight.”
• She writes, “The most important agency is within the societies themselves that can counter Russian propaganda ahead of elections. A prime example is the recent elections in Moldova, where a pro-EU party won despite heavy Russian propaganda.”
• Parviainen writes, “In the absence of credible metrics, many of the long-term consequences of development aid cuts will become apparent only when they are firmly entrenched.”

“Kazakhstan After the Double Shock of 2022: Political, Economic and Military Consequences,” Vera Grantseva & Rakhimbek Abdrahkmanov, IFRI, 10.28.25.

• Grantseva and Abdrahkmanov write, “The double shock of 2022—Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Kazakhstan’s own political crisis—has profoundly altered Kazakhstan’s domestic and foreign policy.”
• They state, “Kazakhstan has accelerated its multivector foreign policy, distancing slightly from Moscow while deepening ties with China, Turkey, the EU, and the U.S..”
• The authors note, “The country has increased military spending and is now reconsidering its security partnerships, wary of Russian conventional dominance in the region.”
• They point out, “Economic consequences of the shocks include disrupted energy exports and accelerated domestic reforms to reduce dependency on Russian infrastructure and markets.”
• Grantseva and Abdrahkmanov observe, “Kazakhstan is seeking to diversify its energy and transport routes, including trans-Caspian projects, to circumvent Russian bottlenecks.”
• They argue, “These reforms have encouraged cautious political opening at home, but economic and security pressures remain acute.”
• The authors conclude, “Kazakhstan’s government will need continued external engagement and domestic resilience to maintain stability and autonomy in a more volatile regional environment.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “Kazakhstan is one of the most important middle regional powers in the world today—Thomas Graham,” Kazinform, 10.31.25.

Footnotes

1. Trump wrote in Truth Social on Oct. 29: “The United States has more Nuclear Weapons than any other country. This was accomplished, including a complete update and renovation of existing weapons, during my First Term in office. Because of the tremendous destructive power, I HATED to do it, but had no choice! Russia is second, and China is a distant third, but will be even within 5 years. Because of other countries testing programs, I have instructed the Department of War to start testing our Nuclear Weapons on an equal basis. That process will begin immediately. Thank you for your attention to this matter! PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP.” However, his Energy Secretary Chris Wright then clarified that the nuclear testing ordered by President Trump will not involve nuclear explosions, but rather "noncritical" system tests of weapon components to ensure reliability and modernization. Wright emphasized Americans should not expect to see explosive tests reminiscent of the Cold War, and that the focus is on updating and verifying nuclear stockpiles rather than detonating warheads, according to New York Times.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

Photo credit: AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein.