Legislators in Networks: Corruption, Clientelism, and Law-Making in Ukraine
Join the NYU Jordan Center in conversation with Columbia University's Dr. Anastasiia Vlasenko for a talk on Ukrainian legislation and politics
How do legislative networks affect politics? This project examines the effect of lawmaking activities in the Ukrainian parliament on corruption, political survival, and lawmaking activities. In addition to conventional party and fraction ties, Ukrainian legislators tend to form networks through unelected parliamentary staff where personal legislative assistants serve as human links between members of parliament. Dr. Vlasenko suggests that a higher number of legislator’s ties within such networks is associated with increased returns to office through participation in corruption schemes, better chances of reelection, and higher frequency of legislative co-sponsorship. This effect of legislative networks exists due to proliferation of clientelist relations aided by Ukrainian oligarchs. The study implies that rent-seeking and vote-buying behavior is made possible by low levels of accountability and transparency which are typical for countries with weak democratic institutions.