Russia Analytical Report, June 16-23, 2025

3 Ideas to Explore

  1. After a pause, Vladimir Putin strongly condemned U.S strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities on June 23, describing the June 22 attack as a “completely unprovoked act of aggression” that is “without foundation or justification” during the public part of his meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. In his public remarks during that meeting, Putin also told Araghchi that “we are committed to supporting the Iranian people,” but chose not to disclose what form this support could take and when. When asked on the same day whether Tehran had requested military support from Moscow, Putin’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov offered no direct answer. Like Putin and Ryabkov, most non-governmental Russian commentators whose opinions RM came across when scanning Runet for hot takes on June 22–23 refrained from explicitly calling for assistance to Tehran. They refrained from doing so even though Iran has supplied thousands of attack drones Russia,1 and the two countries concluded a bilateral strategic partnership treaty. That January 2025 accord has no mutual military aid clause and does not describe the two countries as allies, but it does refer to “military” and “military-technical” cooperation2 between Moscow and Teheran. The absence of public information on whether Moscow could be providing material help to Iran has prompted some commentators to doubt if Russia is really an ally of Iran in spite of the fact that both Putin and his Iranian counterpart Masoud Pezeshkian3 have described their countries as allies. Putin—who country has recently lost two allies (Syria and, arguably, Armenia)—had to confront these doubts two days prior to the U.S. strikes. “What do you say to those who say or write that Russia is an unreliable ally because it has not joined Iran?” he was asked at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum on June 20. Putin offered the following explanation: “Those who promote such narratives about Russia's unreliability as an ally are provocateurs,” he said, citing Israel’s formidable Russian-speaking population as a “factor.” It is unclear whether the Iranians have accepted this explanation, and it is, perhaps, telling that Iran’s top diplomat Araghchi described Russians as “colleagues, friends” rather than allies while being hosted by Putin on June 23.
  2. With just a few days left before NATO’s 2025 summit, The Economist editors wondered in the headline of their June 19 leader: "Europe wants to show it’s ready for war. Would anyone show up to fight?” As a way of answering that question, this U.K. newspaper reminded its readers of a 2024 poll by Gallup, which asked citizens in 45 countries how willing they would be to take up arms in case of war. “Four of the five places with the least enthusiastic fighters globally were in Europe, including Spain, Germany and notably Italy, where just 14% of respondents said they were up for taking on a foreign foe,” according to this analysis of the poll,4 which The Economist published five days before the NATO summit is to begin. More recently, of the respondents in 12 of NATO’s European member countries questioned on behalf of ECFR in May, 37% worried that their countries would be attacked by Russia, while 56% and 53% worried about the use of nuclear weapons and WWIII, respectively.
  3. To keep Donald Trump on board at the June 24–26 NATO summit, U.S. allies have not only pledged to (eventually) increase defense spending to 5% of GDP, but also “watered down their public support for Ukrainian membership,” according to the New York Times. By closing NATO’s door to Ukraine, members of the alliance “will make it easier to negotiate a cease-fire with Russia,” according to Charles Kupchan of CFR. “Led by Washington, NATO has decided that the defense of Ukraine is not worth World War III… Accordingly, NATO should not extend a security guarantee to Ukraine,” Kupchan argues. 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

"Cutting Nuclear Nonproliferation Funding Will Undermine U.S. National Security," Corey Hinderstein, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 06.16.25.

  • “As Congress considers the president’s budget request for NNSA, the relevant committees should ask themselves what the best option is to sustain the effectiveness of U.S. nuclear deterrence and national security. A more balanced and effective approach to achieving U.S. nuclear deterrence goals could be achieved by restoring funding for crucial DNN efforts. Cutting nonproliferation funding would be lose-lose: harming programs with valuable near-term threat-reduction benefits and making deterrence less sustainable for a future with multiple nuclear-armed adversaries.”

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

 "China and North Korea: Evolving Dynamics Since the Outbreak of the War in Ukraine," Valérie Niquet, Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS), 06.18.25. 

  • “On 9 May 2025, Chinese and North Korean troops took part in the Victory Day parade in Moscow. North Korea’s presence reflected the strengthening of ties between Pyongyang and Moscow since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, while China reaffirmed its “no limits” strategic partnership with Russia in the face of the West. The apparent coordination between the three powers has reignited questions about the possible emergence of a strategic axis. Yet, Sino-North Korean relations have remained marked by deep ambivalence. And on May 9, while North Korean fighters are reportedly active alongside Russian forces, it was Xi Jinping who stood at the center of the diplomatic choreography.”
  • “Understanding the evolution of ties between Beijing and Pyongyang requires a close look at these ambiguities, the transformation of the regional strategic environment, and the shifting priorities of each actor – particularly in light of Donald Trump’s return to the White House. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to play a central role in sustaining the North Korean regime, especially through economic support. Nevertheless, Beijing adopts a cautious stance, wavering between efforts to restrain Pyongyang’s destabilizing behavior and the need to preserve a strategic bilateral relationship with geopolitical and security significance. During the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue on Asian security, President Emmanuel Macron explicitly called on the PRC to exert stronger pressure on its North Korean ally, warning that otherwise, NATO might consider greater involvement in Asia. ”
  • “At the same time, Chinese officials are watching with concern the accelerating rapprochement between North Korea and Russia, particularly in the military and technological domains. North Korea’s direct involvement in the war in Ukraine – by supplying first ammunition, then military personnel – challenges China’s strategic posture. Speculation over the potential transfer of sensitive technologies from Russia to North Korea without Beijing’s approval has further fueled mistrust. In a region already marked by volatility, with rising tensions around Taiwan and expanding U.S. alliances in Asia, China seeks to maintain strategic flexibility. ”

Iran and its nuclear program:

"Trump has opened a Pandora’s box," Edward Luce, Financial Times, 06.21.25 

  • “Netanyahu’s interests are not the same as Trump’s. Israel’s leader has made it clear he wants regime collapse in Iran. Trump wants Iran to surrender.”
  • “Whatever happens, Trump’s bombing of Iran has defined his presidency at home as well as abroad. This is Trump’s war now.”
  • “Among the ironies, Trump’s Iran strikes are being cheered on by many of the “Never Trumpers” who had been warning so starkly of Trump’s autocratic impulses. ... Another irony is Trump’s Maga allies, such as Steve Bannon, are among the biggest sceptics of this latest, and potentially most dramatic, chapter in the “forever wars” that Trump has vowed to end.”
  • “Without consulting Congress, and in probable contravention of international law, Trump has taken a fateful gamble. Whether he has fully digested this fact or not, he is now committed to seeing this through to the end. Iran and Israel will have at least as big a say as Trump in deciding when and how that happens.”

"America’s War With Iran: What Comes After U.S. Strikes," Ilan Goldenberg, Foreign Affairs, 06.21.25.

  • With the U.S. strike on Iran, “the war Israel launched against Iran over a week ago has entered a new phase,” according to the author.
  • "The regime still has the guns and there is no ground force coming to invade Iran and topple the Islamic Republic," according to the author.
  • “In the coming days or weeks, Iran may be forced to accept terms favorable to Israel, and the United States and the war may quickly end. But the track record of American military interventions in the Middle East and the nature of war over human history shows that American involvement comes with tremendous risk. The best and most durable option for the United States all along was to pursue a diplomatic deal that verifiably restrained Iran’s nuclear program. Unfortunately, after the events of today, that option is much less likely," according to the author.

"RUSI Experts React to US Strikes on Iran's Nuclear Facilities," Matthew Savill, Burcu Ozcelik and Darya Dolzikova, RUSI, 06.22.25 

  • Dr. Burcu Ozcelik: “Tehran’s next move may determine whether this war expands—or ends in uneasy, albeit possibly temporary, restraint.”
  • Matthew Savill: “The fundamental reality remains that military action alone can only roll back the program by degrees, not eliminate it fully.”
  • Darya Dolzikova: “The latest round of strikes and the fact that the U.S. has—for the first time—carried out direct attacks on Iranian territory may very well result in a decision in Tehran that the only option they have for an effective nuclear deterrent is to produce a nuclear weapons capability.”

“With fateful decision, Trump gambles his presidency on war,”  Michael Birnbaum Natalie Allison, Washington Post, 06.22.25.

  • “If Iran is sufficiently weakened that it cannot meaningfully retaliate, Trump will have delivered a blow against a longtime adversary that will send a message to China, Russia and other global rivals that he will not shy from using military power when necessary. But if Iran does not agree to peace on Trump's terms, the president's vow that ‘there are many targets left’ opened the door to a much deeper and potentially longer conflict. Already, that prospect is angering some members of his political base.”

“With Military Strike His Predecessors Avoided, Trump Takes a Huge Gamble,” David E. Sanger, New York Times, 06.22.25.

  • Trump “is betting that the United States can repel whatever retaliation Iran’s leadership orders against more than 40,000 American troops spread over bases throughout the region. All are within range of Tehran’s missile fleet, even after eight days of relentless attacks by Israel. And he is betting that he can deter a vastly debilitated Iran from using its familiar techniques—terrorism, hostage-taking and cyberattacks—as a more indirect line of attack to wreak revenge. ... Today, North Korea has 60 or more nuclear weapons by some intelligence estimates, an arsenal that probably makes it too powerful to attack. That, Iran may conclude, is the only pathway to keep larger, hostile powers at bay”

"Trump’s step into the dark: America’s gamble in Iran makes the world a more dangerous place," Editorial Board, Financial Times, 06.22.25 

  • “The US president has calculated that Iran’s weakness and Israel’s success present a unique opportunity to strike Iran. Perhaps perturbed by suggestions that he does not follow through on his threats, and frustrated by the failures of his peacemaking efforts in Ukraine and the Middle East, he saw a quick win by associating himself with Netanyahu’s mission. But he has also taken a huge gamble, stunning his own isolationist base, and setting the Middle East up for more instability and crisis.”

“Russians React to Strikes on Iran: Condemn US, Welcome Its Diversion From Ukraine, No Concrete Help to Iran,” Simon Saradzhyan, Russia Matters, 06.23.25.

  • “Having taken a pause in his comments on Iran after the U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities on June 22, Russian President Vladimir Putin weighed in on June 23 to describe the strikes as a ‘completely unprovoked act of aggression against Iran’ that is ‘without foundation or justification’ during the public part of his meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi that day. In his public remarks during that meeting, Putin also told Araghchi that “we are committed to supporting the Iranian people through our continued efforts,” but chose not to elaborate on what that support could be and how it might be rendered.”
  • “When asked that same day whether Tehran had requested military support from Moscow, Putin’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov offered no direct answer. … Ryabkov’s ministry was actually the first Russian government agency to criticize the June 22 strikes by the U.S. … stating that ‘Russia strongly condemns’ them. Some other Russian officials who offered their hot takes on the strikes warned of increased risks of a World War III (e.g. Leonid Slutsky of the State Duma) and of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (e.g. Konstantin Kosachev of the Russian Senate). Others (e.g. Dmitry Medvedev) welcomed the diversion of Washington’s attention from the Ukraine crisis to the Iran crisis and claimed Iran’s nuclear program will rebound and continue.”
  • “Interestingly, most Russian commentators whose opinions I came across when scanning Runet for hot takes on June 22-23, refrained from calling for assistance to Tehran … even though Iran has supplied large quantities of attack drones for Russia’s campaign against Ukraine. Putin and his Iranian counterpart described their countries as allies last year and the two signed a bilateral strategic partnership treaty.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject in the aftermath of the U.S. strikes:

"Imitation of Power: Director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies Ruslan Pukhov on the Origins of the Crisis in Iran’s Defense Policy," Ruslan Pukhov, Kommersant, 06.18.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

  • "The very first days of the Iran-Israel war vividly demonstrated the deep crisis of Iran's defense policy and defense development. The reasons for this crisis are obvious and make the entire story quite instructive. The core of the crisis lies in subordinating foreign and defense policy not to practical but to illusory ideocratic goals, for the realization of which Iran lacks (and will never have) sufficient economic, military, and technological resources. Instead of genuinely expanding its influence (which it did not achieve), Iran largely engaged in simulating such influence. Moreover, this imitation suited both the Iranian ruling elite — allowing them to sell this as 'great power status' to Iran's 'deep people' — and the many implementers of this policy within Iran, primarily, of course, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)."
  • "From the very beginning of the military conflict, Iran in many respects turned out to be an archaic 'paper tiger.' This does not necessarily mean it is doomed to complete defeat in a confrontation with Israel or even the United States — backward and archaic societies have repeatedly demonstrated a high degree of resilience in such situations throughout history. However, from the standpoint of its long-term national interests, Iran urgently needs a fundamental reorientation of its foreign and defense policy — bringing this policy in line with its real interests, capabilities, and resources. An important element of this, apparently, should be a good-faith abandonment of the suitcase without a handle in the form of Iran's nuclear program."

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject prior to the U.S. strikes:

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

"Ukraine’s New Theory of Victory Should be Strategic Neutralization," Andriy Zagorodnyuk, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 06.18.25. 

  • “At its core, strategic neutralization seeks to create cross-domain operational paralysis. Russia may continue to fight, but its forces will fail to achieve their objectives, and its strategic capabilities will be systematically disrupted. Ukraine would not need to “win” by conventional definitions but rather ensure that Russia can no longer impose outcomes through war.”
  • “Strategic neutralization will require a more adaptive, capable, and forward-looking force. This means Ukraine’s defense institutions must commit to rapid, wartime adaptation—even amid daily pressures and resource constraints. To sustain that transformation, Ukraine may need to create structures to manage change at the organizational level; for example, a dedicated entity in the Ukrainian armed forces, potentially named the Future Command, could be tasked with driving innovation and reform over time without pulling leaders away from immediate operational demands. ”
  • “Strategic neutralization is not a peace plan but a strategy for sustained resistance and long-term success under conditions of permanent hostility. It offers a way to survive, adapt, and prevail without illusions—by ensuring that Russia’s war, no matter how prolonged, remains operationally pointless. If Russia cannot win, its leaders will eventually have to ask whether it is worth continuing to fight. That is where Ukraine’s theory of victory begins. ”
  • “Strategic neutralization will not be a static condition but a dynamic contest. Even when Russia suffers a functional defeat in one domain, it will continue to innovate, adapt, and search for alternative ways to regain momentum. The Kremlin’s strategic persistence ensures that any paralysis is temporary unless actively maintained. For this reason, Ukraine—together with its allies—must not only defend against Russian moves but also continuously shape the operational environment, staying ahead through proactive disruption, not reactive containment. Maintaining the initiative is essential: Russia must be the one forced to adapt, absorb pressure, and defend—not Ukraine.”

“First Ukraine, Now Israel: Drone Smuggling Is Potent New War Weapon,” Lara Jakes, New York Times, 06.14.25.

  • “Small, difficult to detect and able to pack a powerful punch, attack drones have become a formidable weapon in modern warfare. But when launched from deep inside enemy territory — as in Iran and in Russia this month — their impact is all the more devastating.”
  • “That was the case two weeks ago, when more than 40 Russian war planes were hit by a swarm of 117 drones that Ukraine had secretly planted near military bases in Russia months earlier. Some were thousands of miles from Ukraine. It was also the case in Iran, which lost missiles, interceptors and air defense systems that were destroyed on Friday by drones and other weapons that Israeli intelligence operatives had smuggled in earlier.”
  • “But at the heart of all three military missions — in Lebanon, Russia and now Iran — is the painstaking and often fruitless effort of intelligence gathering. Such operations can take years and are fraught with danger.”
  • “‘At the end of the day, the drones are just instruments, and the way they can be used comes down to your sophistication and your creativity,’ said Farzan Sabet, an analyst of Iran and weapons systems at the Geneva Graduate Institute in Switzerland. ‘So it’s a natural evolution — this is just a taste of what’s to come.’”
  • “Drones may become an especially attractive weapon in covert operations, Mr. Sabet said, if they can be smuggled into enemy territory in parts and over time, making them even more difficult to detect.”
  • “As drone warfare evolves, so will ways to counter it. That could include both low-tech solutions, like shielding military equipment and other targets with hardened covers, or more advanced systems that shoot down drones, either with a weapon or by jamming them.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Military aid to Ukraine:

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

"Don’t Count on Trump to Abandon Zelensky," Ivan Timofeev, MK.ru/RIAC, 06.18.25 Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated. (RIAC is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

  • “Negotiations do not always lead to solutions. The war party continues to dominate in Ukraine. It still has the support of the EU, the UK and other smaller players. The US also continues to provide assistance to Kyiv, albeit in somewhat smaller amounts.”
  • “Even if the negotiations bring some more significant results, big questions will immediately arise about the sustainability of the commitments. We remember the lessons of the Minsk agreements well.”
  • “Over the past three years, Ukraine has become much more dependent on the US and its allies. And in a memorable conversation in the Oval Office, Trump clearly showed this. Ukraine is trying to maneuver. But the fact of its growing dependence cannot be avoided. We do not need to simplify reality with the terms ‘vassal-suzerain’ or ‘puppet-puppeteer.’ This is good for the show. Reality is more complex. But Ukraine, which is fighting for sovereignty, has significantly lost it over the past three years.”
  • “Trump really threatened Zelensky to stop aid. But this was done rather to indicate who is leading and who is being led. Washington is in no hurry to curtail aid. It may be reduced, but I would not assume that Kyiv will suddenly be abandoned.”
  • “We have returned to the logic of 18th century diplomacy, when wars were interrupted by truces only to flare up again after a certain time. In the 20th century, everything was different - fundamental wars ended with the complete destruction of the enemy. It seems to me that the 20th century is already behind us. But let's see.”

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:5

"Europe wants to show it’s ready for war. Would anyone show up to fight?," The Economist, 06.19.25 

  • “Polling that asks people how they would behave in case of an invasion ought to send shivers down the spines of Europe’s drill sergeants. Last year a Gallup survey asked citizens in 45 countries how willing they would be to take up arms in case of war. Four of the five places with the least enthusiastic fighters globally were in Europe, including Spain, Germany and notably Italy, where just 14% of respondents said they were up for taking on a foreign foe.”
  • “Given Russia’s snail-paced advances since it launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, countries over a thousand kilometers away from today’s front lines may not feel the chill wind of the Kremlin. But even in Poland, which shares a border with Ukraine (and with the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad), fewer than half of respondents say they would fight in a war involving their country. In a separate poll taken before the invasion, 23% of Lithuanian men said they would rather flee abroad than fend off an attack. Citizens asked to stand up and be counted are giving a resounding shrug instead.”

“Can NATO Keep it Together?,” Kori Schake, Angela Stent, Franz-Stefan Gady, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Liana Fix, Fabian Hoffmann, Minna Alander, Gabrielius Landsbergis, and C. Raja Mohan, Foreign Policy, 06.20.25.

  • Expert commentary in advance of this week’s NATO summit at the Hague, June 24–25:
    • [Kori Schake]: “Two months ago, I suggested that NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte… postpone next week’s summit in The Hague. I genuinely feared that the Trump team’s animus toward the United States’ closest friends had become so intense that it would lead to a disastrous meeting. But I underestimated a core strategic asset of the alliance: its ability to find ways to finesse deep disagreement among members.”
    • [Angela Stent]: “[T]he main challenge for NATO’s European members (and Canada and Turkey) will be devising an effective strategy for deterring future Russian aggression even if the most powerful member of the alliance disagrees that Russia has to be contained.”
    • [Franz-Stefan Gady]: “Europe’s enduring dependency on U.S. military capabilities is not an accidental flaw but a fundamental feature of the trans-Atlantic security architecture. Since the inception of NATO in the late 1940s, the United States has served as the primary integrator—the strategic glue that sustains the cohesion of Europe’s collective defense.”
    • [Anders Fogh Rasmussen]: “Europe built its post-Cold War prosperity on cheap energy from Russia, cheap goods from China, and cheap security from the United States. As we know by now, that model no longer works. Against this backdrop, Europe’s longstanding intransigence on rearmament and military readiness is no longer just an embarrassment. It is an emergency.”
    • [Liana Fix]: “Although European publics accept the need for greater defense spending, a new target of 5% of GDP… will require most European countries to make painful trade-offs… This will provide fertile ground for pro-Russian populists… to make a tempting offer to voters: If the U.S. might not come to Europe’s defense anyway, why spend all that money on the military instead of giving in to some of Moscow’s demands?”
    • [Fabian Hoffmann]: “Every leader attending next week’s NATO summit should be perfectly clear on one thing: Russia is preparing for war with the alliance. Russia’s theory of victory likely involves an attack that aims to split or paralyze the alliance.”
    • [Minna Alander]: “Given the uncertainty about future U.S. commitment to the trans-Atlantic alliance… the Nordic countries, Baltic states, and Poland are preparing for the worst… NATO’s most exposed members are also ahead of the rest of Europe in terms of investing in their own defense, one of the main topics at next week’s summit.”
    • [Gabrielius Landsbergis]: “What if, as Sun Tzu advised, Russia is already trying to “win first and then go to war”? Moscow has normalized the idea that shadowy attacks are just part of life in Europe. Ten years ago, a single incident—like the Skripal poisoning—caused a major uproar… Today, when an undersea cable is cut, civilian airliners are jammed, or explosives almost made it onto a German cargo plane, the incident is met with a weary sigh: It’s happening again.”
    • [C. Raja Mohan]: “The two world wars resulted in the United States becom[ing] the dominant security actor in both Europe and Asia. Rather than wring their hands at Washington’s departure, Europe and Asia should join arms to stabilize the Eurasian balance of power. Some of those conversations could start in The Hague.”

“NATO Is Encountering Hurdles as It Attempts to Appease Trump,” Steven Erlanger and Lara Jakes, New York Times, 06.21.25.

  • “As [NATO] leaders prepare to meet for the annual forum starting on Tuesday, U.S. allies have watered down their public support for Ukrainian membership and drafted a policy communiqué as short as five paragraphs to keep the American leader on board. The meeting itself, in The Hague, will open and close in under two days—a timeline designed to keep it devoid of drama.”
    • ''No one wants to say no to Trump,'' said Mujtaba Rahman, who analyzes Europe for the Eurasia Group. Asked on Wednesday whether the Iran-Israel war would prompt him to skip the meeting, Mr. Trump told reporters that he still planned to attend.
      • “In any case, his influence is certain to loom over the gathering. It has already driven an effort by NATO's secretary general, Mark Rutte, to increase military spending by each of the alliance's 32 members to meet a figure suggested by Mr. Trump. He has demanded it be raised to 5% of each country's gross domestic product, up from the current level of 2%. Mr. Rutte has proposed widening the definition of military spending to help meet that objective. The new benchmark would include 3.5% of G.D.P. on core defense spending—weapons, capabilities, troops—and the rest on what NATO calls ''defense and security-related investment, including in infrastructure and resilience.''

"Close NATO’s Door to Ukraine: Years of Empty Promises Have Not Helped Kyiv or Fostered Peace," Charles Kupchan, Foreign Affairs, 06.20.25.

  • “Taking membership off the table will make it easier to negotiate a cease-fire with Russia, whose legitimate objections to Ukraine’s entry into NATO partially motivated its invasion in 2022… Pretending otherwise only encourages Kyiv to futilely push for membership, weakening the Ukrainian leadership when it inevitably falls short,” the author writes.
  • “Closing the door on Ukraine will allow Kyiv and its supporters to get on with the task of making other plans for providing the country the security it needs and deserves,” the author writes.
  • “Ending Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership would not only make it easier to negotiate a cease-fire, it would also be to shoot straight with Kyiv instead of continuing to make promises that will likely never be fulfilled,” according to the author.
  • “Led by Washington, NATO has decided that the defense of Ukraine is not worth World War III... Accordingly, NATO should not extend a security guarantee to Ukraine once the war ends, thereby obligating the alliance to go to war with Russia should it again invade,” the author writes.
  • “Trump… should employ his trademark willingness to say out loud what others are thinking but not dare say, and acknowledge a simple truth: NATO membership for Ukraine is unattainable.... He should make it clear that his administration is ready to provide Ukraine the help it needs to defend itself, but that when it comes to the country’s accession to NATO, the door is now closed,” the author writes.

"Weathering the Storm: The Hague Summit and the Future of NATO," Liana Fix and Rebecca Lissner, Council on Foreign Relations, 06.17.25. 

  • “President Donald Trump’s personal unpredictability notwithstanding, the United States and Europe have to develop a new transatlantic security bargain as the main threat for the United States will be in the Indo-Pacific region. This means transitioning to a European-led NATO, without creating capability or deterrence gaps in the interim. Europe has little choice but to invest in growing its defense capabilities and to muster the political will and domestic support for such efforts.
  • In the short term:
    • European NATO allies should manage the downside risks for the summit in The Hague by drawing up confidential and detailed contingency plans for potential diplomatic ruptures.
    • European NATO allies should commit to 5% defense spending over the next decade, split into 3.5% of direct defense spending and 1.5% of indirect defense spending.
    • In the final NATO communiqué, European NATO allies should aim for generality and avoid statements on Ukraine and Russia that run counter to previous communiqués.
    • NATO allies should consider replacing the 2026 leaders’ summit, scheduled to be held in Turkey, with lower-level gatherings, if relations with the United States remain contentious.
  • In the long term:
    • Europeans should invest in self-defense and build a political case at home for higher defense spending focused on security, economic growth, and innovation, rather than placating Trump.
    • European NATO allies should develop formats and venues outside NATO that allow them to discuss the future of European defense without the United States and to prepare for the worst-case scenario of U.S. withdrawal. The E3+1 (France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Poland) format could be the nucleus of a future European-led NATO.
    • Europeans should conceive of Ukraine as an integral member of Europe’s future security architecture and integrate Ukraine and Ukraine’s defense industry into EU and NATO initiatives.”

“The End of the Long American Century,” Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., Foreign Affairs, 06.02.25.

  • “President Donald Trump… began his second term by brandishing American hard power, threatening Denmark over the control of Greenland, and suggesting he would take back the Panama Canal. He successfully wielded threats of punitive tariffs to coerce Canada, Colombia, and Mexico on immigration issues. He withdrew from the Paris climate accords and the World Health Organization.”
  • “In doing all this, Trump can act from a position of strength… His positions are consistent with an argument we made almost 50 years ago: that asymmetric interdependence confers an advantage on the less dependent actor in a relationship. Trump laments the United States’ significant trade deficit with China, but he also seems to understand that this imbalance gives Washington tremendous leverage over Beijing.”
  • “Order rests on a stable distribution of power among states, norms that influence and legitimize the conduct of states and other actors, and institutions that help underpin it.”
  • “Unfortunately, the myopic focus of the second Trump administration, which is obsessed with coercive hard power linked to trade asymmetries and sanctions, is likely to erode rather than strengthen the U.S.-led international order. Trump has focused so much on the costs of free-riding by allies that he neglects the fact that the United States gets to drive the bus—and thus pick the destination and the route. Trump does not seem to grasp how American strength lies in interdependence. Instead of making America great again, he is making a tragic bet on weakness.” 

"Europe’s Two‑Front War: Putin, Trump, and the Future of NATO," Gideon Rose and Erik Jones, Foreign Affairs, 06.23.25. 

  • “If Trump continues on his current track and European countries fail to coalesce, the alliance’s toxic codependence will only get worse,” the authors warn. “Token or divided European rearmament efforts would not provide for continent-wide security needs or deter future Russian aggression,” they warn. “Financial and economic interdependence would still tie the United States to European security, but Washington would be increasingly unwilling to pay for it,” according to the authors. “China’s attempts to take advantage of this dispute by deepening its presence in Europe would be a constant source of tension. Power vacuums would emerge in the Middle East and Africa,” the authors predict. “NATO summits have rarely been considered exciting critical junctures when history could be seen going down one path rather than another. This year is different. What happens at the alliance’s June meeting and after will cap a season—or cap an era,” the authors conclude. 

"A road map to rebalance the NATO alliance," Editorial Board, Financial Times, 06.23.25. 

  • “European collective security rests on several assumptions that can no longer be taken for granted.”
    • “The first is that the U.S. will continue to provide the mainstay of European defense efforts.”
    • “A second assumption is the sanctity of NATO’s mutual defense guarantee.”
    • “The third is that the U.S. recognizes the threat Russia poses to Europe’s security and hence to America’s interests.”
  • “Europeans hope that by agreeing to invest heavily in defense they can persuade Trump to unequivocally commit to a rebalanced Nato, where the U.S. plays a reduced but nonetheless critical role. They may not succeed. But they have no viable alternative and will emerge less dependent on America in the process.” 

“NATO’s call to arms: Time to muscle up ‘at the speed of fear,’” Lee Hockstader, The Washington Post, 06.20.25.

  • “Europe, a top British defense strategist told me, needs to re-arm ‘at the speed of fear.’ With a handful of exceptions, most of NATO’s European leaders have gotten the memo that Russia, far from being depleted by the bloodbath in Ukraine, is now a country remade, reoriented and revved up for a state of permanent warfare.”
  • “That is the backdrop as NATO prepares for its annual summit next week at The Hague, where it is expected to adopt an annual spending goal of 5% of GDP on defense and related infrastructure—a target most of member states will struggle over years to meet. About one-third of the alliance’s members don’t even hit the current minimum of 2%; some that do, including France and Britain, are grappling with severely squeezed public finances.”
  • “Rutte’s prescription is that the alliance should be prepared to defend its own territory from Russian aggression within five years, including by boosting its air and missile defense by 400%. Others across the continent think the timeline is even shorter.”
  • “To achieve his [Putin’s] aim—unmasking the alliance as a paper tiger … [it] would be enough to take a bite out of one of the three tiny Balts—Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia—and bet that Washington wouldn’t respond with boots on the ground or a sustained missile air assault. With Trump in the White House, that’s a bet Putin might be willing to make.”

“Why Putin Still Fights,” Lawrence D. Freedman, Foreign Affairs, 06.19.25. 

  • The author argues that “Putin has multiple possible reasons for resisting a cease-fire. First, no issue is more important to him than Ukraine. Ensuring that the country can never be truly independent of Russia is essential to his legacy. Additionally, he does not believe the war to be unwinnable. Despite the grindingly slow progress of Russian forces over the last 18 months, he calculates that Russia’s overall superiority in strength will eventually prove decisive, and that in the end, Ukraine will simply be overwhelmed by Russian power. He also likely views a cease-fire along the current line of contact as inherently unstable.”
  • “The experience of this war, however, underlines the difficulty of getting political leaders to acknowledge failure when their forces have yet to be defeated in the field and when there is no obvious compromise deal waiting to be negotiated. Neither side has a clear-cut route to victory. That is what it means to be in a forever war,” according to the author.
  • The author continues to believe that “Although it may be hard to imagine a military defeat for Russia, it is possible to imagine a shift in Ukraine’s favor. If Moscow becomes convinced, contrary to its current expectations, that time is not on its side, perhaps that might yet cause it to wonder whether the moment has come to cut its losses.”

"How to arm a pacifist: Lessons from Ukraine for the EU’s defense," Dmytro Kuleba, European Council on Foreign Relations, 06.19.25. Clues from Ukrainian Views.

  • “The success of the EU’s rearmament hinges on its leaders learning lessons from Ukraine.
  • “They will have to direct their efforts towards three problems that strike at the very heart of the union: time (or lack thereof), regulation and relevance.’
  • “Time relates to the urgency with which Europe has to take responsibility for its own defense.”
  • “Regulation involves the EU creatively adapting its rules so it can integrate Europe’s defense industrial ecosystem (and thus accelerate its rearmament).”
  • “Relevance is the imperative not only to prepare for a future war, but for the warfare of the future (and thus be ready to respond quickly whatever the future holds).”
  • “At every step, European leaders will have to ensure voters across the continent know military might is not a luxury—it is a prerequisite for the EU’s model of peace and prosperity.”

Meeting with heads of international news agencies. Vladimir Putin held a meeting with heads of the world’s leading news agencies, Kremlin.ru, 06.19.25. Clues from Russian Views.

  • “I mentioned that some of my family members are learning Chinese, I was referring to my granddaughter, who has a nanny from Beijing. She speaks fluent Chinese with her. But back in the early 2000s, even before any significant and prominent events, my daughter decided she wanted to learn Chinese—simply out of her own interest… I can say that interest in learning the Chinese language is growing in Russia… 51,000 Chinese young people are studying in Russia, and approximately 25,000 Russians are studying in China.”
  • “We can see that society is consolidating around the national political leadership despite the complex internal political processes in Iran, which we are aware of, so there is no need to talk about this in detail. This happens almost always and almost everywhere, and Iran is no exception. This is the first point. A second and very important point, which everyone is talking about, and so I will only repeat what we know and hear all the time, is that nothing has happened to Iran’s underground facilities. I believe that in this context it would be correct to join forces to put an end to hostilities and to find a way for the conflicting sides to come to an agreement, so as to ensure both the nuclear interests of Iran, including in the sphere of nuclear energy and other peaceful uses of nuclear power, as well as Israel’s interests regarding the unconditional security of the Jewish state. This is an extremely delicate issue that calls for extremely careful actions. However, I believe that a solution can be found.”
    • “Overall, we could work with Iran, taking into account its plans to continue using and further developing non-military nuclear technologies, in particular in agriculture, medicine and so on, which are not related to nuclear energy, but we could also work with it in the sphere of nuclear energy itself. What makes me think so? The reason is that there is a sufficiently high level of trust between our countries. We have very good relations with Iran. We could continue this work and ensure Iran’s interests in this sphere.”
    • “I will not go into detail now, because there are many nuances we have discussed with both Israel and the United States. We have also sent certain signals to our Iranian friends. In general, Iran’s interests in the field of non-military nuclear energy can be ensured and Israel’s security concerns can be lifted at the same time. I believe that such solutions exist. We have put them forth to all our partners, as I have said, including the United States and Israel, as well as Iran. We are not trying to impose anything on anyone. We are simply articulating our perspective on a potential solution. However, the choice rests with the political leadership of these countries, primarily Iran and Israel.”
  • “We do not view NATO’s rearmament as a threat to the Russian Federation. Our security is fully self-reliant, and we are continuously enhancing both our Armed Forces and our overall defense capabilities. Whatever actions NATO takes inevitably pose certain risks, but we will effectively counter any threats that may emerge; there is no doubt about that. In this context, efforts to rearm or raise military spending to 5% of GDP by NATO member countries are meaningless. That is the first point. Second, and this is an unfortunate but well-founded observation: for centuries, the notion of a threat from Russia has periodically resurfaced in the West. Western elites have long found it convenient to invoke this perceived threat as a tool for shaping domestic policy. By pointing to an imagined danger from the East, they could justify extracting more funds from taxpayers and deflect blame for their own economic mistakes. If we take a moment to look through the pages of history, we will see that this narrative has been repeatedly revived time and again.”
  • “[Trump] has also repeatedly stated that ‘if I were President, this war would have never happened.’ I believe he is correct here as well. ”
  • “We must find a solution that will not only end the current conflict but also create the conditions necessary to prevent such situations from recurring in the long-term historical perspective.”
  • “So, the point is that we are ready to hold talks. By the way, I said I was ready to sit down and talk with anyone, including Zelensky. That is not a big deal. If the Ukrainian state entrusts someone with conducting talks, fine, let it be Zelensky. That does not really matter. What really matters is who is going to sign the document?... What is the legal aspect? According to Ukraine’s constitution, the President is elected for a five-year term. There is no mechanism for extending presidential powers, not even under martial law. It clearly states so, go ahead and read it carefully: under martial law, only the powers of parliament, the Rada, can be extended. It says elections shall not be held under martial law. That is true. But does it say anywhere that the President’s powers can be extended. Nowhere. That is it.”
  • “[When asked: If tomorrow Israel—with or without U.S. assistance—were to assassinate Khamenei, what would be your reaction, Russia’s response, and your immediate actions?] I do not wish to even discuss this.”
  • “You know, we once proposed to our Iranian partners cooperation in air defense systems. At the time, our partners showed limited interest, and the matter concluded there. Regarding the Strategic Partnership Treaty you mentioned, it contains no clauses pertaining to defense cooperation… our Iranian friends have not made such requests of us. Therefore, there is effectively nothing to discuss. ”
  • “You see, the staffing level for the main forces within the Ukrainian Armed Forces is at 47%, while assault units face an even greater shortage of troops. What can they do? What’s next? It is not a matter of whether Western countries supply weapons or not. While this is an important factor, if your troops are understaffed and have less than 50% of service personnel they need, it means that these units are simply ineffective and unfit for military action… What lies ahead for them? This is why we have been saying that we are willing to sit down and start talking—we agree to do this.”

"Trump’s European revolution," Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, European Council on Foreign Relations, 06.23.25. 

  • “New ECFR polling suggests that Donald Trump is transforming political and geopolitical identities not only in the U.S., but also in Europe.
  • Trump’s second presidency is recasting the European far-right as the continental vanguard of a transnational revolutionary project, and mainstream parties as the new European sovereigntists.
  • It is also transforming geopolitical attitudes and accelerating the shift from a European peace project to a war project.
  • Many Europeans support increased military spending, conscription, independent nuclear deterrents, and defending Ukraine even if the U.S. abandons it.
  • However, they also doubt that Europe can achieve strategic autonomy fast enough and are therefore inclined to hedge. Conscription is less popular among the young; support for Ukraine may reflect reluctance to confront Russia directly; many hope America will return after Trump.”
  • “Our thesis is that Europeans’ apparently sanguine expectations about the future of the transatlantic relationship are rooted not in trust in American benevolence, but rather mistrust of their continent’s own capabilities. And that their public support for Ukraine is better explained as an emergency policy to replace American boots-on-the-ground in Europe with the fighting power of the Ukrainian army than as pure solidarity with the victims of Russian aggression.”

Generally, in your daily life, how worried are you about the following potential events?

Very worried or somewhat worried, in %

EventDKEEFRDEHUITPLPTROESCHUK
EU falling apart111721242425326540552516
NATO falling apart232926322426476647492826
Your country attacked by Russia175228371927655454471927
Use of nuclear weapons344545554558648562765545
Major European war (beyond Ukraine)325341504145657759694436
Third world war324545504550658259734540

Survey Results: Worries About Potential Events (May 2025)

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

"China has become the most important enabler of Russia’s war machine: It has crossed the line into providing lethal aid," The Economist, 06.20.25 

  • “China is the most important—perhaps decisive—enabler of Russia’s war machine. ”
  • “Western officials tell The Economist that China has been providing various forms of support to Russia since 2023, including critical components of weaponry and civilian drones.
  • “Chinese arms are far less vital to Russia than Chinese components and tools. ”
  • “The Economic Security Council of Ukraine, a research group, notes that in 2023-24 China became the leading supplier of industrial equipment to Russia, accounting for 80-90% of imported machine tools—many of which were of Western origin.”
  • “What does China get in return? Valuable lessons, for a start. Western officials say that Russia and China ‘continue to explore sharing Western technology captured on the battlefield in Ukraine.’”
  • “None of this is to suggest that the Sino-Russian relationship is a happy one. Parts of the Russian elite, including people in its security apparatus, worry about their country’s growing reliance on China.” 

Missile defense:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Nuclear arms:

Vladimir Putin’s "Meeting with graduates of higher military schools," Kremlin.ru, 06.23.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

  • “The current international situation is changing dynamically. We see how the situation in the Middle East has sharply worsened. Extra-regional powers are also being drawn into the conflict. All this is bringing the world to a very dangerous point.”
  • “We cannot help but be concerned that a number of Western politicians continue to hatch plans to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia—their history has taught them nothing, they continue to send weapons and money to the current Kyiv regime, provide military-technical and intelligence support, essentially as direct participants in the conflict.”
  • “We also know that at the next NATO summit they plan to announce the start of a large-scale program to further increase the capabilities of the alliance.”
  • “Justifying their plans, the alliance leadership again repeats about some kind of threat from Russia, about some kind of possible invasion of Europe by us. They came up with this horror story for themselves and repeat it from year to year…”
  • “The urgent task remains to increase the combat capabilities of all types of the Armed Forces and branches of the armed forces. Thus, in connection with the increased role of unmanned aerial vehicles in modern conflicts, a new branch of the armed forces is being formed—the troops of unmanned systems.”
  • “We will pay special attention here to our nuclear triad. Thus, modern Yars systems will be delivered to the Strategic Missile Forces, and the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces will be replenished with modernized Tu-160M ​​missile carriers this year.”
  • “In addition, serial production of the latest medium-range missile system Oreshnik, which has proven itself very well in combat conditions, is being launched. And the Navy will include new ships and submarines equipped with the latest generation of high-precision weapons.”

“Europe’s Nuclear Deterrent: The Here and Now,” Lawrence Freedman, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 06.13.25.

  • “Nuclear strategy is all about providing a deterrent effect sufficient to avoid the most dire scenarios, and that can be achieved without significant changes to either declaratory policy or force structures.”
  • “In early 2025, the role of British and French nuclear forces was pushed to the fore in discussions about how to ensure Ukrainian security following a U.S.-brokered peace deal. This issue became bound up with more general concerns about the status of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The first question was whether the U.S. would provide a ‘backstop’ should a force led by the United Kingdom and France seek to provide a form of security guarantee to Ukraine. This led to a second question: if the U.S. would not provide a backstop, what might that indicate about the readiness of the U.S. to live up to its Article 5 obligations in the event of a Russian push against NATO countries in a future war? This in turn led to a third question: with growing doubts about the U.S. commitment to European security, could the British and French provide a substitute nuclear shield?”
  • “The most important policy conclusion is that far more must be done in the conventional sphere. Nuclear capabilities should not be considered in isolation, but as part of a wider effort by all European countries to strengthen conventional defenses and pose a range of non-nuclear threats to Russia, including from long-range conventional precision-strike systems. The UK and French nuclear forces cannot be a full substitute for those of the U.S., and hopefully they will not need to be. They can still pose a serious risk factor that a Russian leader could not ignore.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Counterterrorism:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Conflict in Syria:

"As the New Syrian Regime Gains Legitimacy, It Is Pushing Russia Out," Nikita Smagin, Carnegie Politika, 06.17.25.

  • “The new Syrian authorities are rapidly moving toward international recognition, and not just among their regional neighbors. Keen to limit the influence in Syria of the previous regime’s allies Iran and Russia, even the United States and the European Union have lifted most of the sanctions earlier imposed on Damascus. The normalization of relations with the West could cancel out the remaining arguments in favor of cooperation with Moscow for new Syrian leader Ahmad al-Sharaa and his entourage. The growing number of incidents at its military bases indicates that Russia is already being gradually squeezed out of Syria.”
  • “It was clear from the very beginning that the Islamist al-Sharaa, who overthrew Bashar al-Assad, would not be an international pariah… The real breakthrough for the new Syrian government, however, was U.S. President Donald Trump’s tour of the Middle East, during which he met with al-Sharaa in Saudi Arabia. Trump not only shook hands with a man who until recently had a $10 million U.S. bounty on his head, but also announced his intention to lift sanctions against Damascus.”
  • “The Syrian authorities are already gradually curtailing their interaction with Russia. At the start of 2025, Damascus canceled a management contract for the port of Tartus that had been signed with Moscow back in 2019. In May, Syria found a replacement: Dubai Ports World, which agreed to invest $800 million in the facility. Another recent example is Syria’s decision to stop printing its national currency in Russia.”
  • “Al-Sharaa has shown himself to be a pragmatic leader, so there is no reason to expect Damascus to exhibit excessive haste in ending its cooperation with Russia. But it will be increasingly difficult for Moscow to maintain its presence in Syria.”

Cyber security/AI: 

"Russia’s Information Confrontation Doctrine in Practice (2014–Present): Intent, Evolution and Implications," Julia Voo and Virpratap Vikram Singh, IISS, 06.16.25. 

  • “This paper outlines how Russia has leveraged its information confrontation doctrine (ICD)—encompassing cyber capabilities, propaganda, psychological operations and strategic messaging—to shape both its domestic environment and the international order to serve its long-term goal of great power restoration, which includes a revision of the European security order.”
    • Strategic intent: The ICD serves Russia’s overarching goal of reclaiming its great power status, including revising the European security order on terms that would see the withdrawal of U.S. military presence and commitment from the continent. This aspiration guides Russia’s foreign, military and information strategies aimed at reversing post-Cold War geopolitical setbacks and securing its position in a multipolar world order.
    • Integrated multi-domain strategy.
    • Domestic control and regime stability.
    • Regional influence and strategic intimidation.
    • Western destabilization.
    • Global outreach and hybrid engagement.
    • Adaptive and evolving capability.

Energy exports from CIS:

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Climate change:

"Outsized Climate Change Will Shape Russian Politics," Richard Arnold, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 06.17.25. 

  • “Russia is warming 2.7 times faster than the global average due to positive feedback loops resulting from Russia’s distinct geography, with alarming consequences for Arctic infrastructure and regional ecosystems.”
  • “Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin have shifted from skepticism about climate change to an official concern, but have failed to effectively implement environmental policy despite pledging carbon neutrality by 2060.”
  • “Regional governments and civil society in areas such as Yakutia, Buryatia, and Tuva are increasingly strained by climate-induced disasters, while local environmental protests are emerging as a potential but suppressed outlet for discontent under Kremlin control.”

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Science and Conservation in the Bering Strait Region: Past Achievements and Current Status,” Margaret Williams, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 06.17.25. 

  • “Over the last three decades, a spirit of cooperation characterized scientific research and environmental protection efforts across the circumpolar Arctic. In particular, the Bering Strait region became an area of active cooperation between both U.S. and Russian government agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), researchers and academic institutions, Indigenous Peoples organizations, and coastal residents, who worked across geographic and institutional boundaries to understand and respond to Arctic change.
  • Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 abruptly forced hundreds of science and conservation initiatives to halt. Western governments, including the United States, directed employees of government agencies to curtail contact with Russian colleagues. Many universities and NGOs followed suit. Three years on, much of that work involving Russian experts and institutions has not resumed.
  • As the Trump administration revises the United States’ relationship with Russia, the potential for more communication between the two countries may offer an opportunity for renewed cooperation in the Bering Strait region. A review of the previous accomplishments and benefits of bilateral work may provide a foundation on which to build should tensions continue to subside.”

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

Vladimir Putin’s remarks at “Plenary session of St. Petersburg International Economic Forum,” Kremlin.ru, 06.20.25.[6]

  • In his remarks Putin identified the following five main directions of structural changes in the Russian economy:
    • "a change in the nature of employment and consumption structure"
    • "a new quality of the investment climate"
    • “Russia’s economy must become more technologically advanced"
    • "a new quality of foreign trade: both exports and imports"
    • "fundamental changes… in the field of defense and security… the fifth direction of structural transformation of the economy"
  • “Despite a challenging international landscape, Russia’s GDP has been demonstrating an annual growth rate of over 4% over the past two years, which is above the global average… In 2023, Russia’s non-oil-and-gas GDP increased by 7.2%, followed by an additional 4.9%, or almost five%, in 2024. These are solid figures exceeding the overall GDP growth rates… in other words, commodities no longer play a defining role in Russia’s economic growth patterns.”
  • “Over the past two years, the top performing industries have included agricultural production, manufacturing in general, the construction industry, logistics, services, finance and the IT sector.”
  • “Russia is the world’s fourth largest and Europe’s number one economy in terms of GDP” Putin failed to specify that Russia is No. 4 if GDP is measured in terms of purchasing power parity.
  • “Annual inflation has already dropped to single-digit levels below 10%. As of June 16, it stood at 9.6%.”
  • “In the first four months of this year, Russia’s GDP increased by 1.5% year-on-year, including 1.9% growth in April alone. At the same time, some experts point to risks of stagnation or even recession.”
  • “We must create conditions for increasing the economic activity of citizens… this is about transitioning to an economy of high wages, not due to a labor shortage forcing entrepreneurs to raise salaries and lure workers, but based on improving job quality and increasing labor productivity.”
    • “Over the past four years, the number of employed people in Russia has grown by 2.4 million. Since October of last year, the national unemployment rate has stabilized at approximately 2.3%.”
    • “In the field of information and communications, employment has now increased by 353,000 people—up 29.7%; in manufacturing—up 10.2%. Meanwhile, the number of workers in trade, for example, has decreased by 170,000—that’s down 3%. These are gradual, yet very significant and important trends reflecting structural, qualitative changes.”
    • “We have achieved the lowest level of poverty in the history of the Russian Federation. By the end of last year, it stood at 7.2%... In 2000, the poverty rate in Russia was 29%, with 42.3 million people living in—let’s be honest—a humiliating situation; by the end of 2024, that figure is no longer 29%, but 7.2%, and no longer 42.3 million people—it's 10.5 million.”
    • “Economic efficiency in ensuring security and addressing defense-related tasks. Clear examples include the introduction of surveillance and monitoring systems using artificial intelligence, which has significantly reduced the number of violations, for instance, in Moscow, as well as the use of inexpensive unmanned aerial vehicles that have become an effective means of destroying expensive military equipment.”
  • “As for the reliability and unreliability of Russia as an ally. It has already been said here that we must show a certain solidarity—and that is true. But in each case, any conflicts are still quite unique. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that almost two million people live in Israel—immigrants from the former Soviet Union and the Russian Federation, it is almost a Russian-speaking country today. We, of course, always take this factor into account in modern Russian history… we maintain contact with Israel as well as with our friends in Iran. We do have certain proposals involving Russia. I must emphasize that we are by no means positioning ourselves as intermediaries. We are merely putting forward ideas. Should these ideas prove to be appealing to both countries, we will be simply pleased.”
  • "I have already said that Russians and Ukrainians are one people. In this sense, all of Ukraine is ours. There is such an old rule. Wherever the foot of a Russian soldier steps, that is ours."
  • "They [the Ukrainian Armed Forces] got into our Kursk region, committed crimes. We drove them out. And now we are forced to create a security zone along the border," Putin said. "We do not have the task of taking Sumy. But in principle, I do not rule it out."
  • [When asked if Ukraine could “drop a dirty bomb’ on Russia:] “Firstly, it would be a colossal mistake on the part of [Ukrainian authorities…]. Perhaps it would be their last mistake. Because in our nuclear doctrine—both common sense and the practice of our actions—they always say that we always respond to all threats that are created for us, in a mirror-like manner. We always respond and always in a mirror-like manner. Therefore, our response will be very harsh and, most likely, catastrophic for both [Ukrainian authorities…] and, unfortunately, for Ukraine itself. I hope that they will never come to this.”

"The Role of the Military in Russian Politics," Dmitry Gorenburg, Russia.Post (CNA & Harvard University), 06.20.25. 

  • “Russian political leaders have maintained clear civilian control over the armed forces. The military leadership has generally deferred to the civilian elite when it comes to major foreign policy decisions that may require the use of military force.”
  • “Though the recent general trend in Russia is weakening the political role of the military, there are a few factors that may help to strengthen it…
    • First, while the replacement of poorly performing commanders is likely to weaken cohesion in the short term, the promotion of more competent military leaders will strengthen the capabilities of military leadership over time.
    • A second, related factor is the possibility that veterans of the Russia-Ukraine war could organize and become politically active, much like Afghan War veterans in the early 1990s.
    • “Third, the military leadership has been developing connections with Russian Orthodox Church leaders.”
  • “For now, these factors are unlikely to overcome the Russian military’s aversion to involvement in politics and the institutional barriers that the state has deliberately put in place to prevent that. However, they may strengthen the military’s potential as a political force, should circumstances push it toward political involvement. ”
  • “As the FSB takes on a greater role in overseeing the Russian military under [defense minister Andrey] Belousov, the military may, in the event of a regime transition, seize the opportunity to push back against control by the FSB and other security services—especially if such a transition weakens the security services’ broader position within the Russian political system.”

 "War as Social Elevator: The Socioeconomic Impact of Russian Military Keynesianism," Marlène Laruelle, IFRI (Institut français des relations internationales), 06.19.25.

  • “While the military Keynesianism implemented by the Russian authorities in 2022 to cope with the war effort in Ukraine has succeeded in keeping the Russian economy afloat, it has also transformed society. Regardless of the country’s economic future and political developments, the changes brought about by the war will leave their mark on Russian society for years to come. An entire generation of men and families will have been shaped by the experience of the front and the financial and symbolic recognition that came with it.
  • “This monetization of service to the fatherland, which some have called the “economics of death,” or “deathonomics”—because it gives greater value to a soldier who has died at the front than to his labor—has paradoxically enabled peripheral Russia to access public spending on a scale unseen since the fall of the Soviet Union. Yet this has not profoundly altered post-Soviet social stratification. Three years after the start of the war, the socioeconomic benefits that military Keynesianism has brought to the poorest strata of Russian society seem to have reached their limits. The wealthy and well-off strata have largely avoided the front line thanks to the large-scale enlistment of poorer members of society, resulting in the indirect legitimation of each group’s fixed social role in contemporary Russia.”
  • “Furthermore, maintaining the cost of this social spending will remain a challenge for the Russian economy and for the new regional balance that has emerged from it. The regions that have gained from the conflict due to the presence of the military-industrial complex on their soil have no interest in seeing the public financial windfall come to an end, and are hoping that a Cold War approach will be retained, where military spending will continue to take priority, even when there is no ongoing military conflict. The regions that have provided the most men, and which are therefore suffering demographically from high combat mortality rates, might also be penalized by the loss of income reinvested by soldiers’ families if the generous salaries paid to contract soldiers were to come to an end. Ethnic resentment in the republics and regions that have sent men from their minority groups to the front is also a possibility.”

“Two friends wrote a gay romance—and had to flee Russia,” Sophia Nguyen, The Washington Post, 06.20.25.

  • “‘Pioneer Summer’ became a bestseller in Russia and has now been translated into six languages, with four more forthcoming… It also sparked a backlash that forced the co-authors to flee the country amid a governmental crackdown on LGBTQ literature that continues today.”
  • “Though a 2013 ban on ‘gay propaganda’ for minors had restricted the circulation of queer literature in Russia, the story was warmly received when the authors [Elena Malisova and Kateryna Sylvanova] posted it on Facebook in 2017. Word spread on social media, and readers clamoring for a physical edition urged them to find a publisher.”
  • “They submitted ‘Pioneer Summer’ to Popcorn Books… An initial print run of 12,000 copies, released in late 2021, sold out within days.”
  • “In February 2022, as the audience for ‘Pioneer Summer’ grew, Russia invaded Ukraine. Right-wing nationalist rhetoric surged; pro-Putin media figures and politicians caught wind of the book and publicly vilified the co-authors and Popcorn Books, even though the publisher had complied with the 2013 law, wrapping ‘Pioneer Summer’ in plastic and labeling it with an 18+ sticker.”
  • “The memory of the Soviet Union and its pioneer camps was sacred, and people were scandalized by the notion that young, gay people might have attended them. [Sylvanova] and Malisova began receiving death threats on social media; videos about them were broadcast on state television. After one particularly influential blogger, Zakhar Prilepin, posted about the book and called for the publisher to be burned down, they knew they had to leave.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Defense and aerospace:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

“The axis of weaponized antisemitism: Russia, China, North Korea and Iran,” Michal Cotler-Wunsh, The Washington Post, 06.17.25.

  • “There are many ties that bind Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. Oil, arms and food bring them together; stoking global antisemitism is a useful tool in a divide-and-conquer strategy.”
  • “Understanding how illiberal regimes stoke antisemitism in the West has taken on a fresh urgency with the pace of dangerous or deadly antisemitic incidents in the United States picking up.”
  • “As Jonathan Sacks, former chief rabbi of the United Kingdom, who died in 2020, noted, "Antisemitism is the world's most reliable early-warning sign of a major threat to freedom, humanity and the dignity of difference."

Ukraine:

“Washington has had it with Andriy Yermak,” Amy Mackinnon and Jamie Dettmer, Politico, 06.19.25.

  • “Amid the pitched political battles that have engulfed Washington over Ukraine, there is one rare point of bipartisan consensus: Everyone has had it with Andriy Yermak, chief of staff to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The second most powerful man in Ukraine, Yermak has been a particularly frustrating interlocutor for the Trump administration, according to 10 people familiar with his interactions.”
  • “Yermak’s behavior, many fear, is increasingly threatening the already fraught relationship between Ukraine and the Trump administration at a critical juncture with Kyiv reliant on U.S. support to defend against Russia’s ongoing attacks. Biden administration officials were also frustrated by Yermak, but they were largely able to compartmentalize their exasperation… The Trump administration is not feeling as accommodating.”
  • “People familiar with Kyiv’s relationship with its most important partner characterized Yermak’s interactions with both administrations as tense and difficult. They said that Yermak, a former movie producer, still struggles to navigate the corridors of power in Washington almost six years since he rose to become Zelenskyy’s closest aide.”
  • “He thought, for example, that the critical minerals agreement was so important for Trump that it would gain Ukraine the security guarantees in exchange for it,” said a second person familiar with the trip, referring to a joint investment fund that is expected to give the U.S. access to Ukraine’s vast mineral deposits. The person described the notion as “ludicrous.”
  • “Yermak’s behavior may only embolden voices in the Republican party and Trump allies who are keen to see an end to U.S. support for Ukraine, the second person familiar with the visit argued. “All the people here who want to withdraw and abandon Ukraine are thrilled to have Yermak around,” the person said.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:


Footnotes

  1. Putin twice referred to Iran as Russia’s ally in remarks in October 2024, while Pezeshkian did the same in July 2024. At the same time, however, October 2024 saw Iran’s ambassador in Armenia, Mehdi Sobhan, declare with regard to Iran and Russia: ”We are not allies.”
  2. "Military-technical cooperation" is a term Russian government agencies use to describe supplies of arms, among other things, from Russia to other countries (and vice versa).
  3. Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian and Vladimir Putin are both reportedly planning to be in Minsk this week.
  4. The poll also found that 47% of respondents in EU countries were unwilling to fight for their country in a war involving that country, while 32% were willing to do so.
  5. As NATO leaders prepare to meet for the annual forum starting on June 24, U.S. allies have watered down their public support for Ukrainian membership and drafted a policy communiqué as short as five paragraphs to keep the American leader on board. The meeting itself, in The Hague, will open and close in under two days—a timeline designed to keep it devoid of drama. (New York Times, 06.21.25)
  6. The session was also attended by President of the Republic of Indonesia Prabowo Subianto, National Security Advisor, Commander of the Royal Guard of the Kingdom of Bahrain Nasser bin Hamad Al Khalifa, Vice Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China Ding Xuexiang, and Deputy President of the Republic of South Africa Paul Mashatile.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

Slider photo by AP Photo/David Smith.

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