Russia Analytical Report, April 28-May 5, 2025

3 Ideas to Explore

  1. There has been no need for Russia to resort to using nuclear weapons so far during its war against Ukraine, even though Russia was provoked to consider such use, Vladimir Putin claimed in an interview with Russian TV. “They wanted to provoke us, they wanted to make us make mistakes. Well, there was no need to use the [nuclear] weapons you just mentioned, and I hope there will be no need. We have enough forces and resources to bring what was started in 2022 to its logical conclusion with the result that Russia needs," Putin told TV journalist Pavel Zarubin. Putin considered using nuclear weapons during Ukraine’s counteroffensive in Fall 2022, with the odds of such use reaching 50-50 at the time, according to a U.S. intelligence assessment. Putin’s claim that “we have enough forces … to bring what was started in 2022 to its logical conclusion” may be an example of Russian disinformation, because as RM has estimated, Russia’s military campaign has been both very slow and costly.
  2. The U.S. would need to get involved in a European-led peacekeeping force in Ukraine that France and the U.K. have proposed, according to Wolfgang Ischinger, the former German ambassador to the United States. Without a U.S. backstop, “the next thing that could happen would be that the Russian side would test, and would claim that Ukrainians have started some kind of shooting war, and they need to respond to that,” he warned, according to Politico. “Quite frankly, that would be the end of NATO as we know it,” he said.
  3. “We want Russia and Ukraine to agree to a deal. We think we’re fairly close,” Donald Trump told NBC’s “Meet the Press.” In addition to preventing Russia from capturing all of Ukraine and saving lives, the deal would also “save a lot of money” for the U.S., according to Trump. “I do believe we’re closer with one party [to the deal], and maybe not as close with the other,” Trump said of the peace deal on May 4. Last week saw doubts grow in the U.S. on whether a peace deal can be reached. JD Vance told Fox News on May 1, there is a "very large gap" between the positions of Ukraine and Russia regarding the end of the war. Marco Rubio concurred with Vance’s assessment, acknowledging in an interview on the same day that “they're still far apart.” “I think they [Russians] need a disarmed, subjugated Ukraine, and I don’t think Trump can deliver that,” Lawrence Freedman told FT last week.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Iran and its nuclear program:

 "Putin’s Quest for Relevance: Why Russia is Offering to Mediate between the U.S. and Iran," Janko Šćepanović, PONARS Eurasia, 04.28.25. 

“Putin’s offer to mediate between the United States and Iran is driven by his desire to remain on good terms with the new U.S. president, combined with his concern about Russia’s declining prestige in the Middle East and beyond. Having allowed Assad to fall, Russia would be doubly embarrassed and suffer reputational damage if it did not appear to be supportive of the Iranians, at least diplomatically and potentially militarily. The two states recently signed a comprehensive partnership treaty, which, while not a military alliance, stipulates that the signatories will ‘strengthen cooperation in the field of security and defense,’” the author writes. “However, given the all-consuming war in Ukraine, Moscow is hardly in a position to assist Tehran except through diplomacy.”

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“Message From the Russian Military: ‘We Lost Your Son,’” Neil MacFarquhar and Milana Mazaeva, New York Times, 05.03.25.

“Russia lacks any formal, organized effort to account for legions of missing soldiers. That often leaves relatives in limbo, fending for themselves with scant government information. In Ukraine, ‘Want to Find,’ a government project to help locate Russian servicemen captured or killed there, said it had received more than 88,000 requests for information, with over 9,000 in April alone,” the authors write. “It noted that the overall number of missing is still unknown. The International Committee of the Red Cross, which tries to locate missing from both sides, whether civilians or military, has 110,000 cases submitted.”

“I couldn’t be with my father when he died in Ukraine,” Sergey Maidukov, The Boston Globe, 05.01.25.

“My father died a few weeks ago. … I wasn’t there. I couldn’t be. He drew his last breath in Donetsk—my hometown, now occupied by Russia. The front line, blazing and thundering, has divided us,” the author writes. “Those who stayed — too poor to flee, too ill to travel, or too determined to leave — are rarely seen in news reports. But they exist. … We’re often told: There’s a war on. Be grateful you lost only your home. Be grateful to the Ukrainian government. Be grateful to the American president who now seeks to end the war — perhaps at the cost of our homes, our land, and our future.” “Governments track military costs in spreadsheets,” the author writes. “But what of the human cost that doesn’t show up in ledgers? … Our homecoming demands more than an end to war. It demands recognition from politicians of the grieving, the displaced, the orphaned, the traumatized. It demands the universal condemnation of Russia’s war crimes and that Ukraine’s fate not become a footnote in geopolitical strategy.”

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“U.S. Army Plans Massive Increase in Its Use of Drones,” Michael R. Gordon, Wall Street Journal, 04.30.25.

“The U.S. Army is embarking on its largest overhaul since the end of the Cold War, with plans to equip each of its combat divisions with around 1,000 drones and to shed outmoded weapons and other equipment,” the author writes. “The plan, the product of more than a year of experimentation at this huge training range in Bavaria and other U.S. bases, draws heavily on lessons from the war in Ukraine, where small unmanned aircraft used in large numbers have transformed the battlefield. … To glean the lessons from Ukraine’s war against Russia, U.S. officers have debriefed its military personnel and consulted contractors who have worked with Kyiv’s military about their innovative use of drones.”

Military aid to Ukraine

RM’s summary of “What If America Abandons Ukraine?” Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage, Foreign Affairs, 05.10.25.

  • Trump could abruptly end U.S. support for Ukraine, despite a recently signed mineral revenue-sharing deal, which lacks security guarantees, the authors wrote.
  • Ukraine would not immediately collapse without U.S. aid, but American withdrawal could sap European resolve and unity, according to the authors.
  • European leaders might interpret U.S. disengagement as the start of a “post-American” world, prompting fear, appeasement or accommodation of Russia, the authors warned.
  • Ukraine’s military has shifted to a defensive posture, as it has exhausted its offensive capabilities and increasingly relies on foreign support, the authors noted.
  • Without U.S. intelligence and air defenses, Ukraine would face intensified missile strikes and be forced to ration ammunition, the authors wrote.
  • Russia would continue to suffer losses, but an American pullout would ease its path to territorial gains and shift the strategic burden to Europe, according to the authors.
  • A U.S. retreat could embolden Russia to intimidate or destabilize NATO’s eastern members, especially those perceived as weak or divided, the authors cautioned.
  • Europe lacks the readiness for self-defense, missing essential capabilities and political cohesion—only the U.S. can currently provide credible nuclear deterrence, the authors argued.
  • Some European countries may pursue separate deals with either Russia or the U.S., leading to fragmentation and rivalry within Europe, the authors warned.
  • “Ukraine lies indisputably at the heart of European security,” and abandoning it could trigger a broader crisis that ultimately benefits Russia, the authors concluded.

“US Should Pressure Putin to Accept Security Guarantees for Ukraine,” Editorial Board, Bloomberg, 05.01.25.

  • Bloomberg Opinion editors argue that Zelenskyy has shown notable negotiating skill, salvaging a risky strategy that initially appeared to threaten Ukraine’s military lifeline from the U.S.
  • They highlight that the original U.S. proposal under Trump contained exploitative, neocolonial terms, which Trump expected to be accepted on the spot—a misjudgment that nearly ended the defense relationship.
  • The editors note that the final deal removes those extreme demands, including U.S. legal jurisdiction over the joint fund, ownership of Ukrainian assets and exclusive rights for American companies.
  • They stress that governance of the new fund is now balanced, with a 50/50 U.S.-Ukraine structure requiring consensus for decisions and covering only future mineral extraction licenses.
  • Bloomberg Opinion points out that Ukraine successfully defended its EU ambitions, as the agreement includes a clause allowing revisions if it clashes with EU membership requirements.
  • They observe that Trump’s prior demands for Ukraine to repay U.S. military aid—at wildly inflated figures—were dropped, removing a major obstacle to a fair deal.
  • The editors see the revised deal as giving Trump political cover to resume arms transfers, with provisions allowing the U.S. to recover those costs from future fund profits—but not for 10 years, with revenue initially directed to Ukrainian reconstruction.
  • They believe Trump’s team attempted to corner Zelenskyy politically, either to provoke a rejection that would justify halting aid or to force humiliating concessions—but Zelenskyy avoided both traps.
  • Bloomberg notes that key terms are still pending in a “technical protocol,” including safeguards over jurisdiction and revenue-sharing—essential for winning Ukrainian domestic support.
  • Finally, the editors underscore that the real impact of the deal depends on future events, including how Trump chooses to interpret it in office and the outcome of any settlement with Russia—but for now, Zelenskiy has neutralized a potential crisis.

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

"Strict Experimental Regime Zone: Russian Authorities Move Forward in Resolving the Crypto Trading Dilemma," Kristine Baghdasaryan, Re:Russia, 04.25.25. 

  • “Finance Minister Anton Siluanov stated that the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank are ready to launch a cryptocurrency exchange for super-qualified investors, and that this would mark the beginning of bringing crypto operations in Russia out of the shadows.”
  • “Since the summer of last year, an experimental regime for working with cryptocurrency has been under development in Russia. ... The Central Bank still does not recognize cryptocurrencies as a means of payment, but at the same time seeks to establish a mechanism for their use in circumventing sanctions in foreign trade.”
  • “In fact, since 1 September 2024, Russia has had the legal provision for an experimental legal regime (ELR), allowing the use of cryptocurrency for settlements under foreign economic contracts. Its launch requires a separate act by the Bank of Russia, which has not yet been published. Nevertheless, according to our information, actual actions within the framework of the experimental regime are already taking place, meaning the experiment is, in all likelihood, already 'unofficially' underway.”
  • “Cryptocurrency allows the classic SWIFT infrastructure to be bypassed and has, in practice, long been used to evade sanctions. Transfers can be made directly between crypto wallets without the involvement of banks. This reduces the risk of blockages, simplifies payment logistics, and saves on commission fees. According to representatives of the Industrial Mining Association, cryptocurrency is an alternative both to SWIFT and to Russia’s System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS) when a foreign bank is unwilling to work with Russia. In this context, Stablecoins like USDT are effective due to their stable exchange rate and low fees, but they can be blocked by issuers under regulatory pressure—as seen with the sanctioned Garantex exchange.”
  • "The ELR permits cryptocurrency for cross-border settlements but prohibits domestic use. Companies must apply via banks, undergo KYC checks, and use approved platforms—likely involving Russian-mined bitcoin or stablecoins."
  • "The Central Bank proposes a ban on crypto settlements outside the ELR, signaling a push to consolidate infrastructure under state control, with mandatory KYC/AML compliance."
  • "The ELR is not just an experiment but a foundation for restructuring Russia’s crypto model—building a parallel financial system while enforcing state oversight, displacing 'grey market' players."

“The full transcript: President Donald Trump interviewed by 'Meet the Press' moderator Kristen Welker,” NBC News, 05.04.25.

  • [When asked: “The secretary of state told me this is a very critical week. Are you any closer to reaching a peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia?”] “I hope so. ... I do believe we’re closer with one party, and maybe not as close with the other. But we’ll have to see. I’d like to not say which one we’re closer to. But we did do a deal for the American people that was good. We were able to get rare earth, you know?”
  • “This is a horrible, horrible war. And I get to see shots of soldiers through, you know, satellite that are so, just so, terrible. 5,000 soldiers are being, look 5,000 soldiers a week on average are dying. They’re not American soldiers. But I want to solve the problem. They’re Russian soldiers, and they’re Ukrainian soldiers. And if I can save 5,000 souls, I just love doing it.”
  • [When asked: “Your close ally, Se. Lindsey Graham, has a sanctions bill against Russia. If you get to that point, Mr. President, where you’re prepared to walk away, will you support—will you sign that sanctions bill?”] “Well, it depends on whether or not Russia is behaving toward coming to a peace. We want a peace deal. We want Russia and Ukraine to agree to a deal. We think we’re fairly close, and we’re going to save a lot of people from being killed. Going to save a lot of money, too. Because we’re spending money like—you know, Europe is spending a third of the money that we’re spending. And it’s more important for Europe than it is for us. Biden had no control. He just sent money over there willy-nilly, nobody had any idea what was happening, why they were doing it, why they were sending it. And it was massive amounts of money.”
  • “[W]hat Russia wants is all of Ukraine. And if I didn’t get involved, they would be fighting right now for all of Ukraine. Russia doesn’t want the strip that they have now; Russia wants all of Ukraine. And if it weren’t me, they would keep going.”
  • [On Greenland:] “Do you know, we have Russian boats and we have Chinese boats, gun ships all over the place—aircraft carriers, gun ships—going up and down the coast of Greenland. We need that to be protected.”

"Trump, Ukraine, and the Limits of Presidential Peacemaking," Timothy Naftali, Foreign Affairs, 05.02.25. 

  • “Trump’s initiative appears less a neutral mediation of a third-party dispute than a means to achieve a diminished U.S. commitment to Ukrainian sovereignty and curry favor with Moscow,” according to the author. “Instead of looking for sources of compromise on both sides and then narrowing the areas of disagreement, Trump has preemptively endorsed the main Russian interpretation of the war—that modern Ukraine included territories that rightfully belonged to Russia, that Kyiv is a more provocative regional player than Moscow, and that Moscow’s efforts at regional peace have been undermined by NATO overreach,” according to the author. The author also notes that “Trump has also sought to delegitimize the effort of his predecessor, Joe Biden, to assemble and lead a Western coalition to support Ukraine’s defense, suggesting that the American people were somehow duped and now deserve repayment.”
  • The author warns that “Despite Trump’s apparently cordial conversation with Zelensky at the Vatican on the margins of Pope Francis’s funeral last week, and the minerals deal that soon followed, a photograph of Putin and Zelensky shaking hands on the White House lawn is unlikely.” “The prospect that Trump’s negotiations will earn him the Nobel he so publicly covets seems highly remote. To the extent that the president cares about Putin’s next steps in Europe, he should bear in mind a lesson from the least known of these three cases: the appetites of imperialists grow with the eating,” the author concludes.

“Transcript: Are we any closer to peace in Ukraine? Gideon Rachman talks to Sir Lawrence Freedman,” Financial Times, 05.01.25.

Lawrence Freedman:

  • “The basic thing is Ukraine is expected to accept, at least de facto, that the Russians have what they have and that they’re not gonna get it back in the near future and that they’re gonna be members of NATO. And both of those conditions are clearly problematic for Ukraine, but they’re not new and they’re not surprising. And really, as soon as Zelenskyy accepted the comprehensive ceasefire — which he did in March — then that implied accepting that for the moment, they’re not gonna get their territory back.”
  • “Americans are not expecting the disarmament of Ukraine. They seem to be allowing some sort of security assurances and European presence in Ukraine to guarantee a ceasefire. They’re not expecting to hand over those bits of Ukraine that the Ukrainians still hold that the Russians insist are theirs ... So while it’s frustrating for the Ukrainians, especially this idea that the US might recognize the annexation of Crimea but not apparently anything else, it’s really frustrating for Russia too. It’s not what they want, which is why it all may be coming to an end.”
  • “But I just think it’s difficult for the Russians to accept the territory alone. I think they need a disarmed, subjugated Ukraine, and I don’t think Trump can deliver that.”
  • “On the sanctions point, whatever the Americans say, as we saw when the Russians were demanding some sanctions relief on the Black Sea, the Americans can’t deliver this without the Europeans.”
  • “[R]eally, since the autumn of 2022, there haven’t been very many successful offensives, not on the Ukrainian side, not the Russian side.”
  • “I think the Ukrainians will carry on fighting, come what may, and I think the Europeans will do what they can, but, you know, the Ukrainians over the past year have done better than many expected in holding the Russians off. You have to recognize that Ukraine now produces most of its own ammunition and so on, it produces all its drones and so on. It’s less dependent than before, but for the heavy-end stuff and certainly for intelligence it does need the US.”

“America and Ukraine agree on a minerals deal, a good omen for the peace process,” The Economist, 04.29.25.

  • “Ukrainian sources say Mr. Zelensky used his 15 minutes [with Trump in the Vatican] to deliver a simple message: Ukraine is ready for an unconditional ceasefire, Russia is not, and Mr. Trump should not abandon a peace that only he can deliver.”
  • “The Russian response has been underwhelming. An American official says the White House is unimpressed by Mr. Putin’s latest proposal of a three-day ceasefire around Russia’s Victory Day on May 9th ... The Ukrainians have [also] rejected the offer of the limited ceasefire, and appeared to delight in the clarity of their position. ‘If Russia truly wants peace, it must cease fire immediately,’ wrote foreign minister Andriy Sibiha in a social-media post. ‘Why wait until May 8th?’”
  • “The Ukrainians understand that it will be hard for Mr. Trump to push legal recognition of Crimea past Congress without their agreement. One Western official expressed hope a ceasefire deal might be produced as early as this week.”
  • “Russia has also moved its red lines somewhat, publicly accepting the idea of direct negotiations with the Zelensky administration.”
  • “There is no sign that the American president is ready to follow through on threats to turn the heat up on the Russians. History suggests that a conversation between the two strongmen might well put things back on track for the Kremlin.”

"How Trump Can Save His Ukraine Policy," Stephen Sestanovich, Foreign Policy, 05.01.25. 

  • “Listening to Zelensky and Putin over the last three months should have shown Trump that there is next to no chance of a comprehensive settlement that both sides can accept and that secures a durable peace,” according to the author.
  • “That a full settlement of the war is out of reach means Trump and his negotiators have to work within the confines of the obvious next best alternative: an end to hostilities that punts the big unresolved issues to some sort of open-ended ‘peace process’ (in which they may not ever be resolved),” according to the author.

"Ukraine is caught up in Trump’s Ostpolitik," Ivan Krastev, Financial Times, 05.02.25. 

  • "Where Trump is wrong is to see the war in Ukraine primarily as a land dispute of little significance beyond Europe. Downgrading the geostrategic importance of the conflict is his major break with the policy of the previous administration."
  • "By brandishing praise on Putin, adopting his narrative on the war and selling the peace deal as a gift for possible presentation on Moscow’s May 9 Victory Day celebration, Trump hopes to bring Russia to compromise. But the latest signals coming from Moscow indicate that Putin is not looking for compromise — he is looking for victory."
  • "It is plausible to argue that America’s Ostpolitik is as much the result of Washington’s changing geopolitical priorities as it is one of Trump’s wild improvisations."
  • "The current state of affairs signals one thing for Europe. The historical period that started with the reunification of Germany ends with the partition of Ukraine."

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

The Russian Military Moves That Have Europe on Edge,” Thomas Grove, Wall Street Journal, 04.27.25.

  • “Some 100 miles east of its border with Finland, in the Russian city of Petrozavodsk, military engineers are expanding army bases where the Kremlin plans to create a new army headquarters to oversee tens of thousands of troops over the next several years. Those soldiers, many now serving on the front lines in Ukraine, are intended to be the backbone of a Russian military preparing to face off with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, according to Western military and intelligence officials. The Kremlin is expanding military recruitment, bolstering weapons production and upgrading railroad lines in border areas.”
    • “Military experts inside Russia, characterize the activity along the Finnish border as part of the Kremlin's preparation for potential conflict with NATO. "When the troops are back [from Ukraine], they will be looking over the border at a country they consider an adversary," said Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies. "The logic of the last decade shows we're expecting some conflict with NATO."
    • “If you ask how soon the Russian military could conduct a limited operation against Baltic states, the answer could be quite soon," said Michael Kofman, senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a Washington think tank. Baltic officials, he said, are "looking at a two to three year timeline after the war. If the benchmark is a large-scale war, presumably with NATO, the timeline could be more like seven to 10 years, depending on the scenario."

"The U.S. Can’t Handle a War," Mackenzie Eaglen and Brady Africk, New York Times, 05.01.25. 

  • “The United States possesses the world’s most advanced military equipment, and quality matters immensely in combat. But quantity gets a say, too. And from ships to shells to soldiers, the U.S. military lacks the personnel and matériel it needs to fight a major war. America’s armed forces, with a naval fleet roughly half the size it was in 1987 alongside an increasingly smaller and older fleet of combat aircraft, are equipped only for short, sharp, high-intensity conflicts.”
  • “There is no magic number of dollars that the United States should be spending on defense, but the resources we have now are not enough to meet the simultaneous challenges posed by China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and terror groups across the globe. The further our defense capabilities fall behind the risks we face, the more costly it will be to catch up. How did this happen? Over the past few decades Washington has traded a larger, more durable military force for one that is high-tech but brittle.”
  • “Yet modern wars have evolved to require both advanced systems and sheer volume of 20th-century staple munitions, such as artillery shells and missiles. Ukraine is using up to 15,000 artillery shells a day in its fight against Russia’s invasion. The United States produces only 40,000 shells each month. The United States is also short on advanced munitions, such as precision-guided missiles. When America helped defend Israel from Iranian attacks late last year, our warships used a year’s worth of SM-3 interceptor missile production in a single night.”
  • “A big reason behind America’s shallow stocks of ammunition is the lack of demand from the main buyer: the U.S. government. Unless the government shows that it wants to buy more, defense companies will never produce more.”
  • Beyond having enough firepower in war, the military needs people to fire weapons. Recruiting has remained a consistent challenge for America’s armed forces, which are stretched thin across the globe. All the enhancements in producing the ammunition, ships and planes will be useless without a trained force to wield them. To improve recruiting numbers for our military, we should make life better for those who serve. No service member should face delayed medical care or be housed in unsafe conditions.”

[Wolfgang Ischinger:] "Europe going it alone in Ukraine could be ‘the end of NATO as we know it,’" Robbie Gramer, Politico, 05.05.25. 

  • Wolfgang Ischinger, the former German ambassador to the United States, said he would “totally warn against a military hardware presence of European NATO troops in Ukraine” without U.S. involvement. The U.K. and France have proposed in recent months to create a Europe-led peacekeeping force in Ukraine to help end the three-year war with Russia. “I don’t think that the Russians would ever, ever agree to that under any circumstances. But even if they agreed, I think we would need to insist that the United States is really involved in this,” he said in an interview with POLITICO.
  • Without a U.S. backstop, “the next thing that could happen would be that the Russian side would test, and would claim that Ukrainians have started some kind of shooting war, and they need to respond to that,” he said. “And therefore the Europeans in Ukraine would possibly be shot at, and would need to reply, to engage without the United States on their side,” he said. “Quite frankly, that would be the end of NATO as we know it.” “I don’t think it’s a good idea to allow Russia to split us up, and that would really be the de facto end of NATO,” he added.

“It Took 100 Days to Sever America From the World,” Ben Rhodes, New York Times, 04.27.25.

  • “The ideologues driving Mr. Trump’s agenda defend their actions by pointing to the excesses of American foreign policy, globalization and migration,” the author writes. “Our intention should be to return to the world as a different country. That requires something that Americans have not always done well: listening. We have much to learn. And ironically, we now have more in common with people in other countries living under corruption, autocracy and oligarchy.” The author argues that “the United States will never be a normal country, if there is such a thing. Like China and Russia, it is too big, too shaped by a revolutionary and imperial past, too rived by traumas that it has inflicted and absorbed.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

"Xi Jinping’s Moscow visit highlights China’s strategic vulnerabilities," Patricia M. Kim, Brookings Institution, 05.05.25. 

  • “As Russian tanks roll through Red Square for Victory Day on May 9, Chinese President Xi Jinping will stand alongside Russian President Vladimir Putin—a jarring image for a country that claims to be a force for global stability.”
  • “By visibly aligning with Putin while Russia wages a war of aggression against Ukraine, Beijing reinforces suspicions that it is willing to side with revisionist powers over defending international norms.”
  • “So why is Xi taking the risk? The answer lies in strategic necessity. As competition with the United States intensifies, Beijing views Moscow as an essential, if risky, partner.”
  • “Beijing’s ideal outcome is a Russia strong enough to push back against the West, but weak enough to remain securely in China’s orbit.”

"China, Russia and the Remaking of the Eurasian Supercontinent," book review by James Crabtree, Financial Times, 05.03.25. 

  • “Amid the usual bluster, the most remarkable lines in Donald Trump’s second inaugural address were about geography. “The United States will once again consider itself a growing nation,” the president said back in January. America would now be a country that “expands our territory… and carries our flag into new and beautiful horizons.” “Many did not take seriously Trump’s ruminating about retaking the Panama Canal or annexing Canada or Greenland. Yet the longer he has done so, the clearer it has become that his instincts involve an odd mixture of geographic expansion and isolationism.”
  • “Three new books offer a useful guide to these developments, each grappling with a revisiting of earlier eras in which the fundamentals of location shaped global affairs. All three underline the fact that Trump’s musings are part of a larger contest. The risk of autocratic dominance of Eurasia—the supercontinent that stretches from the Atlantic to the Pacific — is clearly rising in a moment of renewed co-operation between China and Russia, while an increasingly autocratic US lacks a clear strategy to respond.”
  • “In The Eurasian Century, American historian Hal Brands makes a bold argument about the central place of the Eurasian landmass during the 20th century’s geopolitical battles, while suggesting a similar contest is now under way in the 21st. Former Australian ambassador to China Geoff Raby has a narrower lens in Great Game On, examining what he calls “Core Eurasia” and the changing balance between Russian and Chinese power. Finally comes Tides of Fortune by Zack Cooper, a respected think-tank researcher in Washington. Drawing on historical case studies, Cooper builds a compelling theory of how great powers behave as they rise and fall, with lessons for the current US-China contest.”

Missile defense:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Nuclear arms:

“Perfect vs. Good in Ukraine,” Holman W. Jenkins, Wall Street Journal, 04.30.25.

“Mr. Putin in the war's opening days blatantly suggested that any NATO interference would be met with a nuclear response because Mr. Putin knew he could do nothing to save his army on the roads of Ukraine if NATO sent in its F-35s. Even the Biden administration likely guessed there was a 99.99% chance Mr. Putin was bluffing. Mr. Putin would back down if NATO threatened destruction of his army.” World War III wouldn't have happened. In every way the outcome might have bought the world another generation of deterrence, peace and stability. But no U.S. president would have taken the risk. Voters wouldn't have supported it. For reasons explored systematically by the field of behavioral economics, humans are programmed by nature to play it safer than a clinical weighing of risks and benefits says they should.”

“Putin said that nuclear weapons were not needed in the conflict in Ukraine,” RBC with a quote from the Bell, 05.05.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

  • “The use of nuclear weapons was not needed during the conflict in Ukraine, Putin said, expressing hope that it would not be needed.
  • “Russia has enough resources even without nuclear weapons to achieve the goals of the military operation in Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin said in an interview with VGTRK journalist Pavel Zarubin.”
  • “They wanted to provoke us, they wanted to make us make mistakes. Well, there was no need to use the [nuclear] weapons you just mentioned, and I hope there will be no need. We have enough forces and resources to bring what was started in 2022 to its logical conclusion with the result that Russia needs," he said.
  • In the interview, the Russian president also said that reconciliation with Ukraine is inevitable, Vesti reports. “It seems to me that this is inevitable, despite all the tragedy that we are experiencing now… It is a matter of time,” the Russian president believes.

“Ex-CIA chief: We gave Ukraine enough weapons to bleed, not to win. Ralph Goff, a former chief of operations at the agency, says Biden’s White House did not give Kyiv the weapons to drive out Russia for fear of nuclear war,” Larisa Brown, The Times, 05.02.25.

  • America’s “deliberate strategy [has been] to give Ukraine the arms it needed to fight — but not enough to defeat Putin’s army, because of fears the Russian leader would use nuclear weapons if he got close to losing,” according to Goff.
  • Goff added: “[They] allowed themselves to be bamboozled by Vladimir Putin and his nuclear-sabre rattling. So they gave the Ukrainians this weaponry but they never gave them enough to win. They only gave them enough to bleed.”

“A New and Very Dangerous Nuclear World, Alexander Goltz, Russia.Post, 05.02.25. Clues from Russian Views.

  • “The Russian leadership has decided finally to blow up the system of treaties between Moscow and Washington on strategic nuclear weapons that was established over the past half-century. When a Kommersant correspondent recently lamented that the sides had no time left to work out a new treaty to replace the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which expires in February 2026, the Russian foreign minister responded: “what for?”
  • “Apparently, the Kremlin is really set on abandoning any form of control of nuclear weapons. Given the available information, “extended nuclear deterrence” has finally crystallized as the basis of Moscow’s strategic approach. It, according to analysts close to the Kremlin, boils down to Russia leveraging the threat of using weapons of mass destruction to make other countries agree to Russia’s terms for resolving any conflict.”
  • “Naturally, as the system of control of nuclear weapons weakens, the danger of their use rises, both globally and regionally. This could end in the end of humanity.
    But maybe we will get lucky and in a few years the leading nuclear powers will recognize the danger, as they did after the Cuban missile crisis. Then they will take on the painstaking task of rebuilding the system they are so carelessly destroying today. In the meantime, welcome to the new nuclear world. It is very dangerous.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Counterterrorism:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Conflict in Syria:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Cyber security/AI: 

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Energy exports from CIS:

“Tapped Out: It is Time to Revisit Oil Sanctions on Russia,” Tom Keatinge, RUSI, 05.01.25.

  • Keatinge criticizes the G7’s current price cap policy, arguing that it has not only failed to restrict Russian income but also enabled a dangerous shadow fleet to emerge outside standard regulatory controls.
  • Keatinge warns of the environmental and market risks posed by this unregulated shipping, including the potential for maritime accidents and erosion of global oversight mechanisms.
  • He argues that a more effective strategy must target Russia’s access to oil money directly, urging stepped-down global purchases and expanded financial sanctions that immobilize revenue—ultimately to fund Ukraine’s reconstruction rather than Russia’s war.

Climate change:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

"Trump and Gorbachev: Will the U.S. Suffer the Fate of the USSR?" Ivan Timofeev, Russian International Affairs Council, 04.30.25. Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

  • “Could the United States meet the same fate as the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev era? At present, this appears improbable. Unlike the USSR, America enjoys a considerable margin of safety—and not simply by virtue of its vast geography and economic heft. After all, the Soviet Union was equally formidable in scale. The distinction lies in structural resilience: the U.S. benefits from adaptable institutions, a dynamic private sector, and (thus far) a political culture capable of navigating internal strife without systemic disintegration. The American system is capable of producing Trump. But it can also swing quite successfully in the opposite direction without significant risk to its own basic foundations.”
  • “In addition, Gorbachev at a certain stage became a hostage to his own peacemaker philosophy. At critical moments, it prevented him from toughening and taking action. With Trump, it’s exactly the opposite. He is already a “bad guy” for many of his allies. This means that he has no comparable limitations in terms of tough measures. Taking advantage of the U.S.’s margin of safety, Trump can afford to experiment. U.S. allies, in all likelihood, will have to be not only bystanders, but also test subjects.”

“America’s Failure on Ukraine-Russia is a Team Effort,” Gary Kasparov, The Next Move, 04.30.25.

  • “… President Trump and his allies are putting on an unflattering reenactment of the 1930s that is one-part Chamberlain, one-part Stalin. All of this is culminating in a so-called “peace plan” that freezes the frontlines and makes millions of Ukrainians permanent hostages of a genocidal Russian military dictatorship.”
  • “Trump’s Ukraine-Russia policy is an extreme reaction to a multi-system failure decades in the making. That story begins under the first President Bush when the Soviet Union still existed—albeit mostly on paper… It’s not that George Bush, or his secretary of state and close advisor, Jim Baker, lacked the foresight to know that the Soviet Union was not long for this world. What they exhibited was fear—a fear of risks, of upsetting the geopolitical status quo, of rocking the boat too much.”
  • “Bush’s fear of disruption has proven resilient and bipartisan. Americans saw it on display during the last administration. President Joe Biden repeatedly affirmed that the United States would stand with Ukraine in its war against Russia “for as long as it takes”—to which I, and many others, often responded: for as long as it takes to do what, exactly?” The consistent message should always have been an unequivocal endorsement of Ukrainian victory and Russian defeat.”
  • “I count fear and negligence among several vices on display in American policy toward Ukraine and Russia in the thirty-some years leading up to the second Trump administration. The Trump administration’s current moves on Russia and Ukraine are malicious, not simply misguided. They are unlikely to course correct because they are certain that their course is indeed correct…
  • “Trump’s critics have properly identified the president as a useful idiot (or worse) for the Russians. But if we are to avoid repeating past mistakes, then we must also recognize that a weak policy that’s pro-Ukraine in name is not much better than a confidently pro-Russian policy. The ongoing betrayal of Ukraine is Trump’s sin, but reaching this terrible juncture was a team effort with support from Democrats and Republicans alike.”

“Here’s Why Trump’s Foreign Policy is Calculated, NOT Chaotic,” Dmitry Trenin, The 4th Media, 05.03.25.

  • “Trump is not dismantling the foundations of the American state or society. On the contrary, he seeks to restore the pre-globalist republic that the liberal elite long ago diverted onto a utopian internationalist path. In this sense, Trump is not a revolutionary, but a counterrevolutionary—an ideological revisionist determined to reverse the excesses of the liberal era.” 

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

"Can Official Russian Statistics Be Trusted?" Arnold Khachaturov, Carnegie Politika, 04.29.25. 

  • The author argues that “Much criticism of Russian statistics is quite justified: official figures demonstrably contain various forms of manipulation”
  • However, “Official Russian statistics still aren’t going anywhere, despite the rapid development of digital methods and the emergence of alternative data sources. The state alone is privy to many goings-on within the country: a natural monopoly with which every researcher must contend,” according to the author.
  • Yet, the author argues “The good news is that even bad or distorted data can be useful, provided we understand exactly how they are flawed. Because of this, researchers can still assess the scale of ballot-stuffing in elections or the actual coronavirus death rate.”

 "A Planned Economy in Modern Russia? It Didn't Work Last Time and Won't Work Today," Tatyana Rybakova, The Moscow Times, 05.02.25. Clues from Russian Views. 

  • “Thirteen leading industry associations representing food retailers, producers, processors and consumer advocates wrote to Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, requesting that the state not regulate food prices. The fact of this letter’s existence shows that the government is close to making a decision. If Moscow ignores these businesses and experts, propaganda channels across the country will say that the government is taking care of the Russian people, stopping the price bacchanalia unleashed by greedy merchants.”
  • “Imagine what will happen when officials order farmers to sell their goods at a low mandatory price, without any schemes to reduce their initial costs. I do not want to scare you, but even if we do not reach the stage where the government starts requisitioning grain, nobody in Russia will escape the consequences of a planned economy.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Defense and aerospace:

  •  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Russian Mercenary and Paramilitary Groups in Africa. Examining Changes and Impacts Since the Wagner Rebellion,” Ryan Bauer et al, RAND, 05.01.25.

  • "Russian mercenaries have a clear presence in six African countries."
  • "Despite the creation of the Africa Corps (an entity created after Wagner’s failed 2023 rebellion, intended to resume Wagner’s efforts in Africa), the Wagner Group’s structure and brand continue to be used in several countries to sustain existing operations. This structure can vary depending on the country."
  • "Rather than addressing security issues and building defense capacity for countries in which they operate, Russian mercenaries seek to exploit and profit off insecurity."
  • "The security situations in countries employing Russian mercenaries are worsening. The number of attacks and fatalities committed by militant Islamist groups has increased significantly since Russian mercenaries have replaced United Nations and West African security forces."
  • "An analysis of public sentiment shows that those in several African countries hold more negative than positive views of Russian mercenaries."
  • "Russian mercenary activities not only affect the countries that employ them, but they also affect surrounding countries. Both mercenary-perpetrated violence and illicit economic activity are not constrained by borders and have affected entire regions."

Ukraine:

 "A deal that gives something to both sides, for now," Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 05.01.25. 

  • The “new minerals agreement between the United States and Ukraine, coming just two months after the Oval Office blowup between President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, gives America a stake in Ukraine's sovereignty and independence,” according to WP editors. “And, compared with the deal Trump originally proposed, it is fairer to Ukraine,” according to the editors.
  • However, “The question now is whether the deal will bring real economic benefits to either side in the coming decade or beyond,” WP editors write. “One challenge is to figure out where Ukraine's minerals are” and it is “Also unclear is whether these minerals can be mined inexpensively enough to compete with China.”
  • “Ukraine's parliament is expected to ratify the agreement. Then the United States will have an economic interest in Ukraine's future as an independent and sovereign country. This should clarify America's interests as Trump continues to negotiate peace with Russian President Vladimir Putin,” the WP editors write.

"How Volodymyr Zelenskyy lured Donald Trump with Ukraine’s minerals," Christopher Miller and James Politi, Financial Times, 05.01.25. 

  • “It was an idea Volodymyr Zelenskyy thought would stir Donald Trump’s interest in backing Ukraine: an offer for the US to gain special access to his country’s abundant natural resources. A few days [after President Trump’s inauguration Scott] Bessent stepped off an overnight train in Kyiv with a draft proposal granting the US ownership of 50 per cent of the rights to Ukraine’s rare earths and critical minerals—with no commitment to future military or financial assistance. Zelenskyy had an hour’s notice of the document and saw it ahead of his meeting with Bessent only thanks to the U.S. ambassador in Kyiv, Bridget Brink, who dashed across the capital with a copy. She briefed him on its contents, which had yet to be translated into his native language, warning Bessent expected him to sign it before he returned to Washington.”
  • “But Zelenskyy is a politician who does not take well to ultimatums. During their meeting, the raised voices of Zelenskyy and Bessent could be heard through the heavy, gilded doors. “He was very angry,” a Ukrainian official who stood nearby said of the president. When they emerged, Zelenskyy said he would not sign at that time. “It is not in our interests today… not in the interests of sovereign Ukraine,” he said. His main concern was the total lack of security guarantees.”
  • “Talks eventually resumed. Ukrainian officials were ready to sign the revised terms after the US dropped demands for a potential $500bn payday… Zelenskyy headed to Washington to close the agreement, with a signing ceremony planned. Trump shook Zelenskyy’s hand… [and] the meeting started well… But within minutes the conversation devolved into a shouting match, with Trump accusing Zelenskyy of “gambling with World War Three.”
  • “Despite the setbacks, negotiators pressed on. A virtual signing of a memorandum of intent on April 18 laid the groundwork for renewed talks. Then Trump and Zelenskyy met in Rome. Trump told NewsNation of the Vatican meeting: “I was telling [Zelenskyy] that it’s a very good thing if we can produce a deal and you sign it, because Russia is much bigger and much stronger.”
  • “By Monday [April 28,] officials said they had reached a compromise: Washington had dropped its demand to factor in only past aid as part of the US contribution. Negotiations extended into the evening. Ukraine’s Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal convened an emergency cabinet meeting in Kyiv to authorize Svyrydenko to proceed without parliament’s approval. Shortly after, the deal was completed.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

"A narrow window: How Europeans can still halt Georgia’s authoritarian turn," Tefta Kelmendi, European Council on Foreign Relations, 05.01.25. 

  • As Georgia teeters on the brink of authoritarianism, Europe’s fractured resolve risks ceding the south Caucasus to Russian and Chinese influence. A coalition of France, Germany and Poland, together with Britain, could salvage its democracy and stability, according to the author.
  • “A renewed and high-level European engagement in Georgia would demonstrate that the EU is serious about defending its values and interests in the region—not ceding ground to authoritarian influence,” , according to the author. “ If successful, it would bolster the EU’s broader ambitions in the Black Sea by strengthening its economic and security position in the region, as well as help dim Russian and Chinese influence efforts. For Georgians, it would be a powerful affirmation that Europe stands with their democratic aspirations and remains a committed force for defending democracy in its neighborhood,” according to the author.

"Russia Abandons Its Own, or the Story of One Ally," Sergei Konyashin, Republic.ru, 05.01.25. Machine-translated.

  • “The International Court in The Hague refused to defend Ruben Vardanyan. The April 25, 2025 decision put an end to Armenia’s difficult efforts to seek justice for the former state minister of Artsakh and 15 other Armenian prisoners in Azerbaijan. Betrayed by Moscow, Vardanyan—once the living embodiment of the Russian-Armenian brotherhood—has been left completely alone to face his fate. Now, his struggle is not for freedom, but for the right to remain human in a world where loyalty and honor have long been devalued.”
  • “While the Russians lose allies, the Azerbaijanis, drunk on victory, fail to notice the dangerous consolidation of authoritarianism in their own country, the Armenians are licking their wounds, and Russia’s other allies are hastily—and not always successfully—rebuilding the architecture of their own security.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

 

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

Slider photo by Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP/File.

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