Find past issues in the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card archive. 

April 8 update: Russian gained 113 square miles of Ukraine’s territory (about 1 Nantucket island) in the past month, though its overall pace of advance declined this week. Last week's gain of 47 square miles (March 25–April 1) was followed April 2–8 by a gain of only 29 square miles. Ukraine is holding strong defensively, though a full Ukrainian victory is unlikely, as is a collapse, according to NATO SACEUR Gen. Christopher Cavoli’s April 3 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Who’s Gaining and Who’s Losing What?

Territorial Control (figures as of April 8, 2025)

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Report Card*

Change in Russia’s control of Ukrainian territory.

(Based on data from the Institute for the Study of War.)

• Since Feb. 24, 2022:
  • Russia: +27,273 square miles. 12% of Ukraine. (Area roughly equivalent to half the size of New York state).¹
• Total area of all Ukrainian territory Russia presently controls, including Crimea and parts of Donbas Russia had seized prior to the full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022:
  • Russia: +43,898 square miles. 19% of Ukraine. (Area roughly equivalent to the U.S. state of Ohio.)
• In past month (March 11–April 8, 2025): Russia gained 113 square miles.²
• In past week: Russia gained 29 square miles—nearly half the previous week’s rate—the equivalent of about 1 Manhattan island.
  • This week Ukraine again continued its fighting withdrawal from Kursk, giving up control of only a single square mile of territory there. At the same time, both Ukrainian and Russian sources confirmed that Ukrainian forces were operating in the neighboring Belgorod region of Russia this week.³

Russian net territorial control in Ukraine by month: February 2022–March 2025. (Also based on data from the Institute for the Study of War.)

Military casualties  

Russia: More than 790,000 killed or injured, according to an April 2025 estimate.⁴ 48,000 missing.

• Ukraine: 400,000 killed or injured, according to a January 2025 estimate.⁵ 35,000 missing.

Civilian fatalities

• Russia:  652 killed.⁶
• Ukraine:  12,654 killed.

Military vehicles and equipment⁷

• Russia: 21,071 lost.
  • Tanks and armored vehicles: 12,299.
  • Aircraft: 305.
  • Naval vessels: 22.⁸
• Ukraine: 8,479 lost.
  • Tanks and armored vehicles: 4,300.
  • Aircraft: 183.
  • Naval vessels: 35.⁹

Citizens displaced

• Russia:
  • 800,000 left Russia for economic or political reasons, 0.6% of Russian population.
  • 112,000 were displaced in Russia’s Kursk region during Ukraine’s incursion in August 2024-March 2025.
• Ukraine: 10.2 million displaced Ukrainians, 23% of Ukrainian pre-invasion population of 44 million.
  • Internally displaced: 3.7 million.
  • International refugees: 6.5 million.

Economic impact¹⁰

• Russia’s economic growth: 5.6% GDP since 2022 (through 2024)
  • 1.6% GDP growth forecast for 2025.
  • Budget deficit in 2024: 1.7% of GDP.
  • Russian ruble: 0.01165 U.S. dollars. -2% since invasion
  • 3-year bond yield: 16.7%.
• Ukraine’s economic growth (negative): -22.6% GDP since 2022 (through 2024)
  • 2.5% GDP growth forecast for 2025.
  • Budget deficit in 2024: 20.4% of GDP, excluding grants.
  • Ukrainian hryvnia: 0.02436 U.S. dollars. -26% since invasion.
  • 3-year bond yield: 24.6%

Infrastructure

• Russia:
  • A journalistic investigation estimated in March 2024 that Ukrainian strikes had rendered facilities which accounted for 1/6^th of the production of gasoline and diesel fuels in Russia non-operational.
  • A journalistic investigation estimated in March 2025 that Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s energy sector have caused at least 60 billion rubles ($714 million) in damage.
• Ukraine:
  • Ukraine's extensive transmission infrastructure has suffered severe damage in the war, with capacity falling from 56 GW to an estimated 9 GW by the end of 2024.
  • Some 64%, or 36 out of Ukraine’s 25 GW electricity generating capacity destroyed or occupied as of 2024.
  • Ukraine had lost 80% of its thermal capacity due to Russian attacks as of September 2024.
  • Ukraine relied for 2/3rds of its electricity generation on three functioning Soviet-era NPPs, which it still controls, as of 2024.

Popular support

• Russia: 58% support peace negotiations.
• Ukraine: 51% support peace negotiations.

Other criteria which may be even more important (about which we continue to search for reliable indicators):

• Ammunition supply
• Foreign military aid
• Force generation
• Military leadership
• Training
• Morale
• Control of strategic locations
• Information war: with U.S./Europe; with world.

Footnotes

1. According to Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group’s map, as of April 8, 2025, Russian forces occupied a total 112,522 square kilometers of Ukrainian land (43,445 square miles), which constituted 18.6% of Ukrainian territory.
2. In the past 30 days, Russian forces made a gain of 216 square kilometers (83 square miles), according to a April 8, 2025 estimate by the Economist.
3. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Ukraine’s commander in chief, Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyi claimed this week that the Ukrainian forces were operating in Russia’s Belgorod region. A number of Russian sources, including pro-war Telegram channels WarGonzo and Severny Veter confirmed the presence of Ukrainian forces in that western Russian region as of April 9, 2025.
4. This estimate appeared in NATO SACEUR Gen. Christopher Cavoli’s April 2025 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee. According to Donald Trump’s January 2025 estimate, 1 million Russian soldiers have been killed.
5. According to Trump’s January 2025 estimate, 700,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed.
6. This estimate was given by Russia’s Investigative Committee in March 2025.
7. Oryx, “Attack On Europe: Documenting Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” Oryx (blog), https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html; “The Military Balance 2022,” IISS, https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2022; Oryx, “List Of Aircraft Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-aircraft-losses-during-2022.html; Oryx, “List Of Naval Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-naval-losses-during-2022.html.
8. Not being updated as of 2025.
9. Not being updated as of 2025.
10. International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Russian estimates. “Russia and Ukraine 3-Year Bond Yield,” Investing.com, https://www.investing.com/rates-bonds/russia-3-year-bond-yield; World Bank Group, “Europe and Central Asia Economic Update,” https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/94bdc078-9c64-4833-992a-fda7b3d1a640/content; World Bank, “Russian Federation MPO,” https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/d5f32ef28464d01f195827b7e020a3e8-0500022021/related/mpo-rus.pdf; Trading Economics, “Russia 3-Year Bond Yield,”  https://tradingeconomics.com/ruge3y:gov ; World Bank, “The World Bank in Ukraine,” https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ukraine/overview#3; https://www.exchange-rates.org/exchange-rate-history/rub-usd-2024-11-01.

*This card is being produced by RM staff and Belfer Center Avoiding Great Power War Project researcher Quinn Urich. 

AI-generated image created with the assistance of ChatGPT (OpenAI, 2025).