6 Ideas to Explore

1. Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin are set to hold a call on the Russia-Ukraine war on March 18 as Washington seeks to broker a ceasefire deal, according to FT’s Stefania Palma. When asked what concessions¹ he would be seeking from Putin, Trump said, “I think we’ll be talking about land” and “power plants.”² In Reuters’ interpretation of Trump’s remarks, the control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is likely to feature prominently in the talks. “We’re already talking about that [with Ukraine and Russia] dividing up certain assets,” Trump said. On March 16, Steve Witkoff, one of Trump’s chief negotiators with the Kremlin, told CNN he had a “positive” meeting with Putin on March 13 and that the Russian and Ukrainian parties “are today a lot closer” in negotiations. Witkoff also disclosed in an interview with CBS that negotiations involved a large swath of territory, including a “nuclear reactor” that is supplying electricity to Ukraine, and access to ports. Asked when he thought there would be a deal, Witkoff cited Trump, who has said it would take weeks. “I don’t disagree with him,” the envoy told CNN. So far, Putin has showed no appetite for the kind of unqualified ceasefire that U.S. and Ukrainian negotiators agreed upon on March 11 in Saudi Arabia. Even before Witkoff, who participated in these talks, could take the proposal for the unconditional ceasefire to Moscow, Putin’s chief foreign policy aide Yuri Ushakov spoke against it on March 13. Speaking later that same day, Putin gave a qualified approval of the proposal, conditioning its adoption on a number of Russian demands. “We start from the position that this cessation should lead to a long-term peace and eliminate the causes of this crisis,” Putin said. “Then there arise questions over monitoring and verification,” said Putin prior to the March 13 meeting with Witkoff. Prior to the March 18 call with Trump, Putin has let Western investors sell some Russian shares in a clear overture to Trump.        
2. In contrast to the Trump team’s optimism about achieving a Russian-Ukrainian ceasefire, Thomas Graham of CFR told PBS’s Amna Nawaz that “Putin … feels under no pressure to bring this war to an early settlement” as “he thinks that he is winning on the battlefield.” “The real challenge is, you can't go into a negotiation without leverage, as Tom just said, and you can't look like you want the deal more than the other side wants it,” Andrew Weiss of CEIP told Nawaz during the dual interview. CEIP’s Andrei Baunov also sees multiple reasons why Putin will not accept a durable ceasefire. For one, “stopping the campaign now will be perceived as giving up an inevitable victory.” Putin may also be fearing that “if the war ends, so will that [wartime economic] growth—with alternative sources of growth as yet unidentified.” “The war has also become the raison d’être for the jaded Russian leader, as well as a social elevator and a source of self-esteem for a significant number of middle-aged and older Russian men,” Baunov explains. Last but not least, “an end to hostilities would deprive Putin of his life’s mission,” Baunov writes.
3. Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk region, which is coming to an end, “has been seen by some analysts as an unnecessary gamble, stretching Ukraine’s troops and leading to heavy casualties at a time when they were already struggling to defend a long front line in their own country,” Marc Santora writes in NYT. “But it provided a much-needed morale boost to Ukraine,” this veteran reporter claimed as the salient, which the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) has held in this western Russian region since last August continued to shrink. AFU’s setback in the Kursk region, which dashed Kyiv’s hopes to use the salient as leverage in negotiations, resulted from multiple factors, according to Santora’s reporting. For one, Russian forces disrupted supply lines and cut off escape routes. In addition, the recent suspension of U.S. military aid and intelligence sharing weakened Ukraine’s precision targeting. Also, Russian troops staged a surprise attack through an abandoned pipeline, causing confusion, while North Korean forces, which had improved their combat capabilities, broke Ukrainian lines near a key settlement. Our analysis of open sources indicates that AFU are clearly withdrawing from the Kursk region, with their territorial control in this western Russian province shrinking from 470 square miles at the peak of its offensive operations in the region last fall, to 30 square miles as of March 16 (a 94% decrease). As of March 17, Russian opposition OSINT group “Conflict Intelligence Team” estimated that AFU was still in control of 4–5 settlements in the Kursk region. Meanwhile, it remained unclear whether any significant numbers of Ukrainian personnel had been encircled in the Kursk salient. On March 14, Trump claimed that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF) had encircled thousands of AFU soldiers in the Kursk region, asking Putin to spare them. Responding to Trump’s plea, Putin urged the AFU personnel in the Kursk region to surrender. However, Zelenskyy and his top aides all denied that AFU forces were surrounded, and RM could not find any plausible evidence in open sources to support Trump’s claim.³ Moreover, Russian pro-war Telegram channels, such as RF MoD-associated Rybar, made no references to any major encirclement in their latest reporting on the combat in the region. Another pro-war Russian Telegram channel, Dva Mayora, acknowledged that AFU had withdrawn its experienced units from the Kursk salient, sending some novices instead. While some AFU servicemen acknowledged in interviews with NYT that the Russians managed to cause a “little panic” by sneaking up on the Ukrainian forces through a gas pipe, and that the Ukrainian forces’ retreat was “a mix of organized and chaotic,” we, nevertheless, we believe the AFU retreat⁴ will be more or less completed this week.
4. Western investors are seeking to profit from Russia as Trump pursues a rapprochement with Putin, according to Joseph Cotterill of FT. In particular, investors are turning to sanctions-proof bets on Russian bonds and the ruble to wager that a normalization of U.S.-Russian relations will send a wave of capital back into Russia’s economy, he reported. In fact, “the ruble has surged almost a third against the dollar this year on hopes of an end to the three-year conflict,” according to this emerging markets correspondent. “Some of [Trump’s] rhetoric about Russia is erratic, and this is something you have to factor in, but this is about the lifting of sanctions,” said Paul McNamara, investment director at GAM. However, even if sanctions are relaxed, Russian investors with money stuck in the country may take the opportunity to exit, while many émigrés may not come back at all, according to Roger Mark, a fixed-income analyst at investment firm Ninety One. In fact, as stated above, Putin has just allowed Western investors to sell some Russian shares ahead of his talks with Trump, FT reported.
5. Trump “doesn’t want to be associated with Ukraine in any way, basically telling them they had no cards, that it was the United States that had puffed up Ukraine and Zelenskyy himself to be a tough guy, that they were losers, you know, basically had the losing hand,” said Fiona Hill, senior director for European and Russian affairs on the National Security Council in the first Trump administration and member of Harvard's Board of Overseers, in an interview with FA. “And he was basically telling them they should sort of give it up already and also making it very clear that any undertaking or any agreement that had already been made with Zelenskyy in Ukraine by the United States by previous presidents was null and void,” Hill argued about the Oval Office dispute between Trump and Vance on one side and Zelenskyy on the other. “And where it really went wrong was when Zelenskyy was trying to remind Trump of two things. First off, in the way that Vladimir Putin operates, which Trump didn’t really want to hear. And secondly, that there were commitments already made to Ukraine and to Zelenskyy by previous presidents. And that’s when Trump essentially lost it. He basically said those people don’t count for anything. No one respected them. They were weak. They were useless. People respect me. This is with me,” Hill said.
6. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 was the proof of concept for a broader Russian test of the so-called rules-based international order, probing how far the West would go to defend that order, writes Monica Duffy Toft for FA. “The [2022] war forced Europe to consider its dependence on the United States and required U.S. leaders to reassess their appetite for foreign commitments. The collapse of the Soviet Union greatly reduced the West’s fear of another world war—a fear that had led Western leaders to tolerate Soviet spheres of influence in central and eastern Europe,” argues Toft who has taught Harvard’s Kennedy School for over a decade. “Many political leaders and analysts hoped that multilateralism and new efforts toward collective security would diminish the relevance of zero-sum geopolitical rivalries for good. But after the 2008–9 global financial crisis took a toll on Western economies, Putin consolidated power in Russia, and China’s global influence rapidly expanded, geopolitics swiftly began to revert to a more ancient, hard power–based dynamic,” she writes. According to Toft, “Larger countries are again using their advantages in military force, economic leverage, and diplomacy to secure spheres of influence—that is, geographic areas over which a state exerts economic, military, and political control without necessarily exercising formal sovereignty.”

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Iran and its nuclear program:

"Don’t Trust Russia to Mediate the Iran Nuclear Deal," Jonathan Lord, FP, 03.12.25.

• “This month, Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to mediate a new nuclear agreement between the United States and Iran after reportedly being asked to by U.S. President Donald Trump in a phone call in February.”
• “The White House should immediately abandon this unwise pursuit. Simply put, Russia’s shared interests with Iran make it an unsuitable mediator and will surely work to undermine America’s interests in the Middle East and those of America’s partners and allies. Long an arsonist in the Middle East, Washington should distrust Moscow’s attempt to don a firefighter’s helmet now.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “What China Wants From Iran Nuclear Talks," Lili Pike, FP, 03.14.25. 

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

"Ukraine and the Promise and Peril of Lawfare," Kelebogile Zvobgo, Brookings, 03.13.25.

• “If Ukraine wants Russia to be bound by international rules prohibiting war crimes, Ukraine must also be bound by these same rules.”
• “Ukrainian military and security officials are rightfully concerned about possible ICC scrutiny, as should officials in all member countries. While much focus is placed on the ICC’s power to shame and punish offenders, it also has an important responsibility to help deter serious crimes.”
• “If Ukraine doesn’t withdraw its Article 124 declaration, it opens itself up to accusations of double standards and hypocrisy on the world stage and undermines the ICC and international actors and institutions committed to accountability for perpetrators and justice for victims—in this conflict and in countless others around the world.”
• “International law ambitiously strives to constrain state behavior in the international system—that’s its promise. But the way the system is structured allows, and even tempts, some to not comply—that’s the peril. It therefore becomes the responsibility of third parties to create political conditions that make compliance preferable to noncompliance. Thus far, this has fallen short in Ukraine, leaving Kyiv to fight a war initiated under false pretenses, both on the battlefield and in the courts.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Slowly, Ukrainian Women Are Beginning to Talk About Sexual Assault in the War," Carlotta Gall and Oleksandr Chubko, NYT, 03.15.25.
• "Kharkiv: A Dispatch from Ukraine’s Bastion of Resistance,” Melinda Haring, NI, 03.14.25.
• "Assessing the OSCE Toolbox: Opportunities for a Safer Europe," Katia Glod, ELN, 03.14.25.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

"How Ukraine’s Offensive in Russia’s Kursk Region Unraveled," Marc Santora, NYT, 03.16.25. 

• “Ukrainian forces have pulled almost entirely out of the Kursk region of Russia, ending an offensive that had stunned the Kremlin last summer with its speed and audacity. Ukrainian soldiers at the front described a retreat that was organized in places and chaotic in others, as Russian forces stormed through their lines and forced them back to a sliver of land along the border.”
• “At the height of the offensive, Ukrainian forces controlled some 500 square miles of Russian territory. By Sunday, they were clinging to barely 30 square miles along the Russia-Ukraine border, according to Pasi Paroinen, a military analyst with the Finland-based Black Bird Group. “The end of the battle is coming,” Mr. Paroinen said in a phone interview.”
• “The Kursk operation was seen by some analysts as an unnecessary gamble, stretching Ukraine’s troops and leading to heavy casualties at a time when they were already struggling to defend a long front line in their own country. But it provided a much-needed morale boost to Ukraine.”
• “The reversal of Ukraine’s fortunes in Kursk did not come down to any one factor. Russian forces pounded Ukraine’s supply lines and began to cut off escape routes. North Korean troops brought in by Moscow, who faltered at first, improved their combat capabilities. And at a crucial moment, U.S. support — including intelligence sharing — was put on hold.”
• “Ukraine’s hold in Kursk was already in danger when the Trump administration announced the suspension of military aid and intelligence sharing on March 3.The sudden loss of American intelligence for precise targeting compounded the difficulties, according to Andrii, the Ukrainian intelligence officer. ...”
  • “Then on March 8, Russian troops made a breakthrough, sneaking behind Ukrainian lines by walking for miles through a disused gas pipeline to stage a surprise attack.While the exact number of Russian troops involved and the success of the attack was impossible to independently confirm, “it caused enough confusion and havoc behind Ukrainian lines that it likely triggered them to start withdrawing,” said Mr. Paroinen from Black Bird Group, which analyzes satellite imagery and social media content from the battlefield. The Russians “outplayed us a bit,” Andrii said. “There was a little panic.”
  • “At around the same time, North Korean troops were helping lead an assault that broke through Ukrainian lines south of the small village of Kurylivka, further constraining Kyiv’s ability to supply its troops.”
• “On March 10, the order was issued for some units to withdraw from Sudzha, three Ukrainian soldiers and commanders said. Three days later, Russia’s Defense Ministry said it had regained full control of Sudzha. On Saturday, it claimed its forces had retaken two villages outside the town.”
• “Now, Ukrainian soldiers say, they are determined to stop the Russians from pushing toward Sumy.”

"Unprecedented Losses Increasing the Chances of New Mobilization in Russia," Sergei Shelin, Russia.Post/MT, 03.12.25. 

• “Since the beginning of the war, Vladimir Putin has kept changing who is to bear the brunt of the Russian losses: first, it was regular army soldiers and Donbas separatist proxies; then, convicts and mobilized men; and now, mercenaries.”
• “The more Russians dead, the less shocking each new update on causalities becomes. Lists of the dead (which are hardly exhaustive), published on the third anniversary of the war by Mediazona and the BBC Russian service, already run to 95,000 names.”
• “The total number of casualties on the Russian side is estimated at 167,000-235,000 (according to military analysts cited by the BBC) and 165,000 (Mediazona and Meduza, based on probate registry data).”
• “If we add the roughly 23,000 proxies killed from the parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions occupied by Russia from 2014 (as estimated by the BBC) and take into account those killed in January-February 2025, the total losses of the Russian side now number at least 200,000. This is the estimated upper bound of the Russian force that invaded Ukraine three years ago.”
• “With almost no convicts left and mercenaries and money lacking, a second wave of mobilization – a brutal but proven measure – is returning to the agenda. Almost 11,000 dead mobilized soldiers have been identified by name. In reality, it may be double that, which would be a tenth of all those killed on the Russian side and a fifteenth of the 300,000 plus who were called up in autumn 2022.”
• “If we compare the first wave of Russian mobilization with the draft in the US during the Vietnam War, with the US population at that time being 1.4 times the Russian population today, eight times more Americans were drafted (more than 2 million), of whom every fortieth fell (over 50,000). Far fewer Russians were mobilized in 2022, but their probability of dying was much higher. If a second wave of mobilization takes place, the statistics hardly look set to improve.”
• “It's a safe assumption that a second wave will not hit the pampered and regime-loyal capitals very hard. Nor will it hit the destitute provinces, which supply the bulk of the kontraktniki. Thus, the main burden will fall on moderately prosperous industrial regions, both Russian and non-Russian in terms of ethnic makeup. Broad and compulsory conscription will mean, for them, fundamentally deeper involvement in the war than before.”
• “The likelihood of panic in response to Kremlin initiatives is always higher than the likelihood of organized protest against them. Yet the regime has not been dragging its feet on mobilization for more than two years for nothing. Antiwar unrest cannot be completely excluded. The subjects are tired of the “special military operation,” and they, albeit timidly, hope that Russia will bring it to a quick, victorious end and not keep throwing fuel on the fire. The price of the second wave will be higher than the first.”
• “In any case, the acute lack of men for the front line is forcing Putin to choose: take a risk and carry out another mobilization or agree to pause the war.”

“What if Ukraine decides to fight on without America?” Alec Russell, Ben Hall and Christopher Miller, FT, 03.13.25. 

• “Many Ukrainians are desperate for an end to the war, yet there is little confidence that the preliminary talks between US and Ukrainian officials will lead to a durable peace. For now, the expectation is that the war has to continue.”
• “Yes, with each day in each year it gets harder to wage war,” says the MP Merezhko. “We are tired. But I immediately tell myself that if I surrender it’s not going to improve my situation. And this is true about Ukraine. If we surrender it will not improve our situation. It will make it much worse.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "With Forced Withdrawal, Russia Takes Away Ukraine's Kursk Cards," Ian Proud, Responsible Statecraft, 03.17.25.
• "Ukraine’s Embrace of Drone Warfare Has Paid Off," The Economist, 03.12.25. 

Military aid to Ukraine:

"Trump Fails to Dampen Public Support for Ukraine," Shibley Telhami, Brookings, 03.14.25.

• “Last summer, our American public opinion poll showed that Americans supported Ukraine over Russia by a wide margin: 62% to 2%. Taken a week after the fateful White House meeting between President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and a few days after the White House announced it was suspending aid to Ukraine, our latest poll shows roughly the same results: 59% of Americans say they sympathize more with Ukraine while 2% say they sympathize more with Russia. And only a little more than a third (35%) say they support Trump’s decision to suspend aid to Ukraine. These are among the findings of the latest round of the University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll. The survey was fielded by SSRS on its Opinion Panel Omnibus platform from March 7-9, 2025, among a sample of 1,004 respondents. The margin of error is +/-3.7% at the 95% confidence level. The data were weighted to represent the target population of U.S. adults ages 18 or older.”
• “Here are five key takeaways:”
  • “First, the Trump-Zelenskyy meeting, Trump’s suspension of aid to Ukraine, and the White House’s friendly tone toward Russian President Vladimir Putin have failed to make a dent in the strong American public sympathy with Ukraine.”
  • “Second, only about a third (35%) of Americans say they support Trump’s decision to suspend aid for Ukraine, while 48% oppose it and 17% say they don’t know. The partisan divide was notable: 67% of Republicans backed the suspension while 21% opposed it, compared to 7% of Democrats who supported it and 81% who opposed it.”
  • “Third, Americans rate Trump and Vice President JD Vance’s behavior during their public White House meeting as more “inappropriate” than “appropriate.” In contrast, they rate Zelenskyy’s behavior as more appropriate than inappropriate.”
  • “Fourth, Americans rank all three leaders as being more ineffective than effective in advancing the interests of their respective countries.”
  • “Fifth, more Americans say that the public White House meeting with the Ukrainian president made them more sympathetic to Ukraine (31%, including 11% of Republicans and 57% of Democrats) than less sympathetic (19%, including 42% of Republicans and 2% of Democrats). Thirty-three percent say the meeting did not impact their attitudes (including 33% of Republicans and 31% of Democrats).”

"Ukraine Needs US Weapons But It Needs Intelligence More," James Stavridis, Bloomberg, 03.13.25.

• “I’m heartened by the White House’s decision to restart intelligence cooperation with the Ukrainians. It is hard to overstate how damaging cutting it off even for a few days has been, and Ukrainians have died as a result. Let’s hope the US keeps up the flow of information, intelligence and imagery, despite Putin’s unacceptable conditions for any ceasefire. Getting to a meaningful halt in the fighting and eventual peace deal will require the Ukrainians to keep punching above their weight. They can’t do that with a blindfold on.”

 For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Here’s How Much Aid the United States Has Sent Ukraine," Jonathan Masters and Will Merrow, CFR, 03.11.25.
• “Why the EU’s plan for Ukraine is to turn it into a porcupine,” Henry Foy, FT, 03.14.25.
• "How to Save Ukraine," Can Kasapoglu and Peter Rough, NI, 03.14.25. 

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

“There’s no money to be made in Russia,” Elina Ribakova, FT, 03.11.25.

• “Recent discussions in the US focus on potential opportunities for American companies in Russia in the event that relations between the two countries normalize. However, Russia now faces stagnation. And sanctions relief could be short-lived if the US administration changes in four years’ time, while state takeovers of companies and threats to investor rights underscore that investing in the country entails significant risks and uncertain rewards.”
• “Economic growth in Russia now depends on war-related sectors, while the rest of its economy remains stagnant. It’s difficult to imagine Russia allowing the US into its defense industrial base. And even there, growth has stalled recently due to high borrowing costs, labor shortages and the collapse of profitable exports. Russia is eager to sell energy to Europe, but it’s unclear how the US can assist.”
• “There’s no guarantee that, if the Democrats return to office in the US in four years’ time, sanctions won’t be fully reinstated, leading to billions in losses once again. Compliance officers and shareholders have long memories, making it difficult for companies to present a return-to-Russia plan after a recent multibillion-dollar write-off. The same challenge applies to US asset managers … Additionally, Russia’s countersanctions mean that re-entering the market requires permission from Vladimir Putin.”
• “China has limited itself to exports, with most investment projects remaining on hold. This could be due to the reluctance to cross red lines imposed by US sanctions, although Chinese companies cite Russia’s complex administrative framework and the absence of the rule of law as major obstacles to investment.”
• “While some companies may slow their departures, and the smartest may use the US-Russia thaw to finalize their exit deals, it is unlikely that there will be a rush of American companies entering Russia. At most we might see a few attempts to operate on the sidelines, supporting Russia’s ailing oil and gas industry or selling to Russian consumers. For the moment, Russia remains a risky oil investment play.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “Putin lets western investors sell some Russian shares ahead of Trump talks,” Joseph Cotterill and Daria Mosolova, FT, 03.17.25.

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

“Donald Trump plans Tuesday talks with Vladimir Putin on Russia-Ukraine war,” Stefania Palma, FT, 03.16.25.

• “Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin are set to hold a call about the Russia-Ukraine war on Tuesday, the US president said, as Washington seeks to broker a ceasefire deal.”
• “I’ll be speaking to President Putin Tuesday. A lot of work’s been done over the weekend,” Trump told reporters on board Air Force One late on Sunday night. “We’re doing pretty well, I think, with Russia. We’ll see if we have something to announce by Tuesday.”  When asked what concessions he would be seeking from Putin, Trump said “I think we’ll be talking about land” and “power plants”. “I think we have a lot of it already discussed very much by both sides,” Trump said. “We’re already talking about that [ with Ukraine and Russia] dividing up certain assets.”
• “Trump’s comments come after the US and its G7 partners on Friday warned Moscow that they could expand sanctions and use frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine, as the White House seeks to win over Putin to the ceasefire proposal.”
• “On Sunday Steve Witkoff, US envoy to the Middle East, told CNN he had a “positive” meeting with Putin and that the Russian and Ukrainian parties “are today a lot closer” in negotiations. Witkoff said he had witnessed improvements in ceasefire negotiations after the two sides were previously “miles apart”.”
• “Following talks in Saudi Arabia led by US national security adviser Mike Waltz and US secretary of state Marco Rubio as well as Witkoff’s “equally positive” meeting with Putin, “we’ve narrowed the differences between them and now we’re sitting at the table”, he added.”
• “Witkoff told CBS that negotiations were complex, involving multiple angles and a large swath of territory, including a “main area of confrontation” in the Kursk region, a nuclear reactor supplying electricity to Ukraine and access to ports.  “There’s so many elements to the implementation of a ceasefire here,” Witkoff said, adding that it “involves how to get people to not be fighting with each other over a 2,000-kilometre border”.”
• “He also seemed to dismiss a statement made by French President Emmanuel Macron, who argued that Russia “does not seem to be sincerely seeking peace”.”
• “Asked when he thought there would be a deal, Witkoff cited Trump, who has said it would take weeks. “I don’t disagree with him,” the envoy told CNN.” 

“Experts analyze Ukraine ceasefire negotiations and what Putin wants from the U.S.,” Amna Nawaz, PBS News, 03.13.25.

• “[Amna Nawaz (AN) interviews Thomas Graham (TG) and Andrew Weiss (AW)]. Thomas Graham served on the National Security Council staff during the George W. Bush administration and at the state and Defense Departments. He's now a distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. And Andrew Weiss is a former State Department official who served in the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations. He's now the vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.”
• “AN: Andrew, I will start with you. You heard President Putin say he's open to proposals to stop the cease-fire, but he has questions. What's your read on what he's doing here? Does he actually want a cease-fire?”
  • “AW: I think Vladimir Putin is going out of his way not to taunt the West, he's trying to look reasonable. He's trying to avoid irritating Donald Trump, who's obviously invested his own personal prestige in trying to bring about the cease-fire. But Vladimir Putin is in an uncomfortable position. He's essentially been wrong-footed by the diplomacy that we saw in Saudi Arabia earlier this week. And now he's the one who looks like he doesn't want peace. He's the one who wants to impose conditions on any cease-fire.”
• “AN: Thomas Graham, what's your take on this? We should note you were in Moscow recently. So how are you decoding what President Putin had to say?”
  • “TG: Well, I pretty much agree with what Andrew has just said. Putin is under—feels under no pressure to bring this war to an early settlement. He has his demands. He thinks that he is winning on the battlefield… So he's prepared to drag these out with discussions about his conditions. The only thing that gives him pause is that he does want to develop a broader relationship with the United States.”
  • “So the question in his mind is, how far can he push President Trump? How far can he resist an early settlement to this conflict and still maintain the possibility of a much broader working relationship with the United States?”
• “AN: Andrew, what's your take on this? Does Putin want more of a reset like we have heard from the Trump administration they want with Russia? Does Russia want the same with the U.S. in terms of relations?”
  • “AW: We don't know for sure what Vladimir Putin's thinking. And I'm not going to try to do any mind reading here. But we do know what the U.S. president is thinking. And he's been remarkably consistent going back to his first moments as a candidate in 2016. He has portrayed U.S.-Russia relations as an end in themselves. He thinks that getting along with Russia can be an end in itself.”
  • “And then the justification for that shifts over time. Right now, the Russians are suggesting maybe they won't work as closely with China. Maybe they can help the United States deal with Iran's nuclear weapons program. I'm abundantly skeptical that there's a "there" there. But the opportunities that the Russians are dangling in front of the new administration look captivating to the team that's in place.”
• “AN: Thomas, what's your take on that, especially with a view towards China and how Russia is viewing that right now?”
  • “TG: Well, there are a couple of up points to make here. First is that Russia thinks of itself as a great power and it wants to be validated as a great power. And despite the very good relationships they have with China, the fact is, in the Kremlin's mind, there's only one country that can really validate them as a great power. And that's the United States. And talking to the United States is important in and of itself.”
  • “Second, I do think that Putin does have a broader strategy here. Opening up relations with the United States, developing more constructive relations does give him greater leverage in his relationship with China. Iran, and some of the other countries that he's relied on in the past. It doesn't mean he's going to break with these countries, but he would like to balance the relationship more in Russia's favor than the current Sino-Russia relationship is at the moment.”
• “AN: So, Thomas, given all of that and knowing that Ukraine wants to see some security guarantees here, is this an opportunity for the U.S. to push harder for Russia to take more actions or to get—offer more security guarantees to Ukraine?”
  • “TG: Yes, I think absolutely. The United States does have leverage, and it's not so much in the sanctions and tariffs that President Trump has talked about. It is in unity with the West. It is in unity with the Ukrainians. And it is, in a sense, playing on that desire that the Russians have to maintain a broader relationship, and using that some way in the negotiations to get Putin to make concessions and also to get Putin to agree to allow the West, the United States to provide some serious security guarantees to Ukraine going forward.”
• “AN: Andrew, do you see this leading to a cease-fire and to some long-term deal in the wars?”
  • “Andrew Weiss: Donald Trump seems determined to bring about some form of a cease-fire within his first 100 days, and that 100-day mark is reached on April 29. So, he's in a tearing hurry. I think he's eager to meet one-on-one with President Putin in coming weeks. The real challenge is, you can't go into a negotiation without leverage, as Tom just said, and you can't look like you want the deal more than the other side wants it.”
  • “And so, instead of throwing cold water on this extensive relationship that the United States has with Ukraine and with Europe, the United States should be trying to find ways to demonstrate to Putin that he can't wait us out and that the longer this war goes on, the worse it's going to be for him.”
  • “It's not clear yet that the administration has figured out that they—as Tom said, they can exploit that leverage and they can also enable Ukraine's lethality to hold at risk things inside Russia that Putin cares very much about.”

“Ukraine Peace Is Not at Hand,” Holman W. Jenkins Jr., WSJ, 03.15.25. 

• “My guess now is that no deal can satisfy both the Moscow and Kyiv governments even if both capitals could benefit from a formal stop to the fighting. The next wrangle for Mr. Trump, then, will be over a division of labor with Europe to keep Ukraine afloat and maintain military pressure on Moscow.”
• “The simple solution: The U.S. will continue to supply weapons and intelligence but European taxpayers and Ukrainian minerals will be mobilized so Mr. Trump can say the U.S. is getting paid just the way Mexico was supposed to pay for the wall.”

“Would a Peace Deal in Ukraine Last?” G. John Ikenberry and Harold James, FA, 03.12.24.

"Document Prepared for Kremlin Outlines Hard-Line Negotiating Stance," Catherine Belton and Robyn Dixon, WP, 03.12.25. 

• “Russia should work to weaken the U.S. negotiating position on Ukraine by stoking tensions between the Trump administration and other countries while pushing ahead with Moscow’s efforts to dismantle the Ukrainian state, according to a document prepared for the Kremlin. The document, written in February by an influential Moscow-based think tank close to Russia’s FSB, lays out Russia’s maximalist demands for any end to the conflict in Ukraine. It dismisses Trump’s preliminary plans for a peace deal within 100 days as “impossible to realize” and says that “a peaceful resolution of the Ukraine crisis cannot happen before 2026.”
• “The document also rejects any plan to dispatch peacekeepers to Ukraine. It also calls for a further carve-up through the creation of a buffer zone in Ukraine’s northeast on the border with Russian regions such as Bryansk and Belgorod, as well as a demilitarized zone in southern Ukraine near Crimea. The latter would affect the Odesa region.”
• “The document, which was obtained by a European intelligence service, lays out ways in which Russia could boost its negotiating position by exacerbating tensions between the United States and both China and the European Union, and by proposing U.S. access to Russian minerals, including in the territories it occupies in Ukraine. The document proposes that Russia agree not to station its Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Belarus, on the border with the European Union, while in return the United States would agree not to place new missile systems on the continent.”
• “The document also dismisses any potential political concessions by Ukraine—such as Kyiv’s rejection of NATO membership and the holding of elections in which pro-Russian parties would be allowed to participate—as not being far-reaching enough. “In reality, the current Kyiv regime cannot be changed from inside the country. Its complete dismantling is needed,” it says.”

"Ukraine Enters a Perilous Phase of Fighting and Talking With No Assured End in Sight," Chatham House, 03.12.25. 

• “Thinking ahead, if Zelenskyy refuses Russia’s future terms but the US accepts them, there is every possibility that President Trump re-imposes the US pause of security and intelligence assistance to force Zelenskyy to comply.”
• “These cycles of talking while fighting could persist for some time. Even if the prospects of the 30-day ceasefire proposal improve, a putative start-date for the ceasefire could also be some time away and a subject itself for negotiation. US–Ukraine relations have improved for now, but a convincing path to peace is still far from clear.”

"What Incentives Are There for Russia to Agree to a Ceasefire in Ukraine?" Alexander Baunov, Carnegie Politika, 03.13.25. Clues from Russian Views.

• “After initial setbacks and uncertainty, Russia is now increasing its advantage on the battlefield, and is ahead of Ukraine and its allies in terms of weapons production. In Russia, a consensus has emerged in the militaristic segment of the elite and society that Ukraine cannot hold out for much longer.”
  • “Stopping the campaign now will be perceived as giving up an inevitable victory. Putin himself has said repeatedly—including recently—that Russia was only a few months short of victory in World War I when the Bolshevik government withdrew the country from the war on disastrous terms. The main thing now, therefore, is to avoid repeating that mistake and to see it through to the end.”
  • “Then there are economic and domestic political factors for Moscow to take into account. Russia has boasted extensively of its economic growth under sanctions, presenting it as a kind of passive economic miracle: a story of normal life and industrial growth under unprecedented economic pressure that will go down in history. Since that growth stems in part from putting Russia’s economy on a wartime footing, it inevitably gives rise to fears that if the war ends, so will that growth—with alternative sources of growth as yet unidentified.”
  • “The war has also become the raison d’être for the jaded Russian leader, as well as a social elevator and a source of self-esteem for a significant number of middle-aged and older Russian men. ... An end to hostilities would deprive Putin of his life’s mission. Such a loss could only be mitigated by securing a certain set of inflated Russian demands.”
• “Russia could conduct protracted negotiations on the terms of the ceasefire, while varying the intensity of its assault on the battlefield in the meantime. If the fighting simmers down, such a state of affairs may suit both Trump and Putin.”
• “Trump has few options to counter either a Russian rejection or protracted feigned compliance. The most effective method will be the carrot rather than the stick: the temptation of a major deal. Before Trump’s election victory, Ukraine was the main front and focal point of Russia’s efforts to rewrite the outcome of the Cold War. Trump has the power to turn Ukraine into a concrete example of a much broader reversal of that outcome. But whether or not he is willing to pay that price for peace between Russia and Ukraine remains to be seen.”

"Three Years of Conflict: Results for Ukraine," Ivan Timofeev, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), 03.11.25. Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• “The failure of negotiations between Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump has been perceived by many as a pivotal moment that “broke the mold.” Indeed, over the past three years, Washington’s unconditional and large-scale assistance to Kiev has become the norm. The US has provided the bulk of arms supplies, financial injections, and support in communications and intelligence. Long before the Special Military Operation, the US spearheaded Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations. To a significant extent, modern Ukraine as a political project owes its existence to America. Particularly resonant was the public reprimand delivered by the US President and Vice President to the Ukrainian leader in the Oval Office. Although the end of the military conflict with Russia remains uncertain, the events in the White House provide an opportunity to reflect on the results of the past three years and earlier stages of Ukraine’s post-Soviet history. These results can be framed as a balance of gains and losses.”
• “Ukraine may face the need to break the pattern entirely by seeking a resolution to the conflict with Russia. However, such a move is currently unthinkable within the context of the past three years and the broader period since 2014. Domestically, it would risk accusations of treason, sanctions, and repression. The image of Russia as an eternal enemy is deeply ingrained in Ukrainian media and public consciousness. The role of a martyr shielding the West has become a comfortable narrative. Three years of conflict, even without propaganda, have left deep scars on a human level. Continuing the confrontation, even in a Cold War-style stalemate, appears logical and convenient. The desire for revenge has become a cornerstone of national identity, fueling nationalism.”
• “However, if Ukraine fails to find a way out of the conflict, even after enduring significant damage and losses, it risks further erosion of its sovereignty. The country could become permanently entrenched as a tool in the hands of external forces, with little room for independent foreign policy or meaningful geopolitical maneuver. The stakes are high, and the path forward remains fraught with challenges.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Can Ukraine and Russia Reach a Lasting Peace?" Ben Hall and Max Seddon, FT, 03.12.25.
• "The Hope of a Ceasefire in Ukraine," Editorial Board, FT, 03.12.25.
• "Trump’s Rhetoric Gets Results," Matthew Kroenig, FP, 03.12.25.
• “The Strategic Logic Against a Ukraine Ceasefire,” James Holmes, NI, 03.14.25.
• "Finally, a Ceasefire in Ukraine Is on the Table," Jessica Karl, Bloomberg, 03.11.25.
• "Putin's Faced Some Tough US Presidents. Not This One," Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 03.11.25.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“In Trump's new world order, strongmen dominate and might makes right,” David Ignatius, WP, 03.12.25. 

• “The best assessment of Trump's strategic "vision" that I've seen comes from Alex Younger, a former head of the British intelligence service known as MI6. He said in a Feb. 21 interview on BBC's "Newsnight" that "we are in a new era where, by and large, international relations aren't going to be determined by rules and multilateral institutions. They're going to be determined by strong men and deals."
• “Younger likened Trump's strong-arm diplomacy to the 1945 Yalta Conference, in which the dominant wartime leaders—President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill—carved up Europe without regard for the desires of smaller nations. "That's the world we're going into, for a whole set of reasons, and I don't think we're going back to the one we had before," Younger argued.”
• “The obvious example of this neo-Yalta mentality is the way Trump has conducted the preliminary phase of Ukraine peace negotiations. He has muscled a weak Ukrainian president in Volodymyr Zelensky ("You don't have the cards") to accommodate what he sees as the interests of the power players: the United States and Russia. In pursuing this peace agreement, he proclaims that "China can help," too.”
• “Trump seems to envision a new balance of power with three poles: the United States plus Russia and China, whose leaders he sees as kindred spirits. The rest of the world, including the United States' oldest allies, must fend for itself.”
• “What has astonished the world is how quickly Trump has reversed the United States' long-standing commitments.”
• “Trump may be making a big mistake with his disdain for Europe—which seems to be finding its voice after decades of passively following in Washington's wake.”
• “Trump's global economic strategy is better defined than his foreign policy goals but no less destabilizing.”
• “Lawrence H. Summers, a Harvard professor and one of the world's most influential economists, argued this week that Trump's tariff-driven economic strategy is "completely counterproductive." Noting the sharp fall in financial markets, he wrote on X: "We are getting the worst of both worlds—concerns about inflation and an economic downturn and more uncertainty about the future and that slows everything down."
• “Here's what Trump doesn't seem to understand: The American story is certainly about "undaunted courage," as author Stephen Ambrose titled his book about the great explorers Meriwether Lewis and William Clark. But it's also about moral values such as generosity, tolerance and hope. Those are the qualities that have inspired the world to follow American leadership.”

“The Return of Spheres of Influence: Will Negotiations Over Ukraine Be a New Yalta Conference That Carves Up the World?,” Monica Duffy Toft, FA, 03.13.25.

“Why John Mearsheimer Thinks Donald Trump Is Right on Ukraine. And that the West has misunderstood Vladimir Putin,” Isaac Chotiner, New Yorker, 03.11.25. 

• “[When asked: How well do you think Trump has been dealing with the issue of Russia and Ukraine?] I basically agree with what he’s doing. I think it makes good strategic sense to shut the war down immediately. I also think it’s the morally correct thing to do. And, although Trump has not done it in the smoothest way possible, I think he is on the right path and hopefully will succeed.”
• “[When asked: What is the right path?] He has to cut a deal with the Russians, and that means accepting the key terms that the Russians have laid on the table. One is that Ukraine has to be a genuinely neutral country. It can’t be in NATO and can’t have Western security guarantees. Two, it’s going to have to give up a significant slice of territory in eastern Ukraine. And three, it’s going to have to demilitarize to the point that it is not an offensive military threat to Russia. Trump has to accept those conditions and work out a deal with the Russians. But then comes the hard part, which is getting the Europeans and especially the Ukrainians to agree.”
• “I think it’s imperative, from a Ukrainian point of view, to settle this one quickly, before the Russians capture much more territory and it’s impossible to dislodge them from that territory.”
• “They can’t have a security guarantee and they simply have to accept that fact. A security guarantee is basically de-facto membership in NATO, and the Russians won’t accept that. Is this a tragic situation for Ukraine? The answer is yes. But what is the alternative?”
• “Will Putin attack Ukraine in the future? I do not believe he will. I think the last thing Putin would want once he settles this war is to start another war.”
• “In 2014, I said he [Putin] would not go after the rest of Ukraine. But the situation changed after 2014, and, in particular, it changed after Joe Biden moved into the White House. Biden was a superhawk on Ukraine. He began to arm Ukraine at a greater rate than his predecessor did. And the end result, not surprisingly, was that thirteen months after he moved into the White House, he got a war… We forced Putin to launch a preventive war to stop Ukraine from becoming a member of NATO.”
• “[Putin] believes that Ukraine in NATO is an existential threat, and the equivalent of declaring war on Russia.”
• “There’s no evidence we could point to that Putin was bent on conquering Ukraine and integrating it into a greater Russia [When asked “He is trying to do it now.”] No, he’s not. He’s not trying to conquer all of Ukraine. There’s no evidence of that. And, by the way, almost immediately after he invaded, in February, 2022, he reached out to the Ukrainian side with peace dealers and said, Let’s have negotiations.”
• “I think Ukraine in NATO was a threat to Russia. The Russians were not arguing that Ukraine by itself was a threat. It was Ukraine in NATO. As someone who believes in the Monroe Doctrine and does not want a great power in the Western Hemisphere, I agree with Putin’s logic.”
• “For me, the imperialist argument today asserts that Putin was trying to conquer Ukraine so that he could incorporate it into a greater Russia. He was then going to take countries farther east and, if anything, not only make greater Russia bigger but reëstablish the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe. And I don’t think that argument is correct.”

“‘That Is a Five-Alarm Fire’: Jake Sullivan on the Past and Future of U.S. Foreign Policy,” Aaron David Miller, CEIP, 03.13.25.

• “[Aaron David Miller (ADM) interviews Jake Sullivan (JS), former National Security Adviser,  HKS Professor and Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs affiliate.] ADM: In this multipolar world with our own domestic house in a fair amount of turmoil, how do you create addition—in terms of people who are willing to associate with you—rather than subtraction?”
  • “JS: It’s very difficult to answer that question… [b]ut what I can say is the hand we passed on to the Trump administration when we left on Jan. 20 was a hand that involved a growing and dynamic transatlantic alliance, with us adding to NATO two important and capable partners who became allies, Finland and Sweden. It involved a deepening relationship with our Asian allies that we were working with not just on hard security issues, but on technology, on clean energy, on infrastructure, and on so much else. It involved a deepening relationship with India, the world’s largest democracy, if an imperfect democracy. It involved new relationships with countries like Vietnam and Angola.”
  • “All of that was built around the basic idea that the United States could bring a value proposition to the world in terms of our capacity to help mobilize countries to solve problems. What I have been struck by is instead of trying to carry forward the momentum of addition, they are pursuing a policy of subtraction, starting with the transatlantic alliance, but also even closer to home, with Canada. That is a source of real concern.”
• “ADM: … You have said that when facing a hard policy decision with imperfect people and imperfect information dealing with imperfect choices, you’re going to get imperfect results. You’re looking now at the new administration from outside and you have a set of core beliefs and values. Would you still apply the same standard and forbearance to this administration?”
  • “JS: … Obviously there’s a difference between people struggling with difficult circumstances and doing their best, and engaging in wildly destructive behavior that is at odds with my view of the national interest and our core national character. I can’t treat those two things alike. But on the other hand it has been less than eight weeks since I walked out of the White House for the last time.”
  • “[That said,] I have to say that what we have seen over these seven weeks, both domestically and on the international stage, is of enormous concern. The arrow seems to be pointing in the wrong direction on fundamental things: how we treat our friends and allies; adopting a zero-sum mindset where winning necessarily means crushing others, including our closest friends; and abandoning the notion that the United States can deliver for the American people but also support the broader common interest. These are things that I do speak out about, but I do so with a sense of caution. We don’t know how the story will be written on Ukraine, China, the Middle East, or other significant issues.”

"We Face a Long 'Treatment' of Europe, Which We Will Begin With Ukraine," Interview with Sergey Karaganov, Ukraina.ru/Russia in Global Affairs, 03.14.25.^ Clues from Russian Views. (Russia in Global Affairs is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• “[When asked if there were anyone in Ukraine that Russia could negotiate a deal with] No, it's pointless. Firstly, they are incapable of negotiating, secondly, the elite of a defeated state will not be able to do this, thirdly, this is an elite that is absolutely dependent on external players.”
• “You can only talk with the United States - harshly and clearly. We started doing this, although belatedly, when we took a course on increasing nuclear deterrence (I was also a little involved in this), after which the Americans slowly began to crawl away from active participation in the conflict. Now this leads to the next steps. We need to withdraw the United States of America from this conflict, providing them with an honorable exit, not an Afghan one, and then deal with Europe, which has gone wild and for the third time in the last hundred years is dragging itself and the world towards a world war.”
• “The United States saw that it is impossible to win the war in Ukraine without playing out nuclear weapons.”
• “We need to see this through to the end… so that it [Europe] never raises its head again. I hope this can be done without nuclear weapons.”
• “We need to stop Europe, force it to admit defeat in one way or another. To do this, the first step must be the defeat of the Kyiv regime. Then - the re-education of Ukrainian society, which has become infected with the terrible infection of super-nationalism, bordering on Nazism, and then - through defeat, as it was in World War II, the re-education of European societies.”
• “We need to ensure that the Americans leave for the position of a simple great power, not a globalist one, and in no case lose the large capital that we have accumulated over the years in relations with China and other countries of the world majority.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “NATO’s race against Russia to rearm,” The Economist, 03.13.25.
• “Is Russia a catalyst for EU defense? Ester Sabatino IISS, 03.14.25.
• “The U.S. betrays Ukraine,” Jeff Jacoby, BG, 03.16.25.
• "As Trump and Putin Menace Europe, I Say This: Vive le Churchillo-Gaullisme!" Timothy Garton Ash, ECFR, 03.17.25.
• "A War of Values With Russia," Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Project Syndicate, 03.11.25.
• “A Great Unravelling is Underway,” Thomas L. Friedman, NYT, 03.11.25.
• “Russia Is Only Winning Inside Trump’s Head,” Alexey Kovalev, FP, 03.10.25. Clues from Russian Views.
• "Russia's Military Build-Up at Lake Ladoga: NATO Needs More Intermediate-Range Weapons to Defend the Baltic Region," Helge Adrians, SWP Berlin, 02.27.25. In German.

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

"Can Trump Channel Nixon to Turn Russia Against China?" Temur Umarov, Carnegie Politika, 03.14.25.

• “Any attempt to set China and Russia against one another will most likely end up having the opposite effect. In Moscow, Trump is seen as an anomaly for the U.S. establishment from whom it might be possible to extract some short-term gains, but around whom it would be foolish to plan a long-term foreign policy shift. In both Moscow and Beijing, Trump’s actions are seen as proof that it’s impossible to come to any agreement with Western leaders who are fixated on their own short-term electoral cycles: in four years, when his term expires, Trump will no longer be president—but Putin and Xi still intend to be in office.”
• “The only reason Trump appears to have enjoyed some success in his bid to build ties with Moscow in recent weeks is because he started from such a low point. One phone call with Putin is seen as a breakthrough. However, with time, the contrast with his predecessor, Joe Biden, will become less obvious—and there will be fewer easy wins.”
• “Trump is driven by his business instincts, not the search for geopolitical advantage. These instincts suggest Russia would agree to make strategic concessions (like giving up its relationship with China) for significant economic gains. If that is what U.S. officials are expecting, though, they are deeply misguided. It would seem they have forgotten that Putin was prepared to sacrifice Russia’s economic development upon the altar of its geopolitical ambitions when he launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.”
• “The Kremlin will likely play along with Trump: at a minimum, increased interest from Washington strengthens Moscow’s position vis-à-vis Beijing. But it’s extremely unlikely Moscow will make any serious concessions. However hard he may try, Trump will not be able to pull off the same strategy with Russia that Nixon managed with China.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "The War in Ukraine Is Influencing How Taiwanese Think About Conflict," Austin Horng-En Wang, Brookings, 03.13.25.
• "Key Takeaways from China’s Two Sessions in 2025," Asia Society, 03.11.25. 

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Nuclear arms:

"How Trump Could Win, and Deserve, a Nobel Peace Prize," Andreas Kluth, Bloomberg, 03.11.25.

• “In his first term, Trump tried and failed to launch trilateral talks among the U.S., Russia and China about capping or even reducing nuclear weapons.”
• “The risk of nuclear war is rising… because countries are also tweaking the types of nukes they have and the strategies for using them. Russia in particular is building more “tactical” or “theater” weapons; it has an edge of about 10-1 over the U.S. in that category, which is not covered by New START. The U.S. is also considering giving these limited nukes a greater role again.”
• “Once you factor in the risk of miscalculation by someone somewhere under pressure, or the imponderable role of artificial intelligence in nuclear decision-making, it becomes clear that the world is entering the greatest danger since the Cuban Missile Crisis.”
• “Trump, despite all the chaos he’s causing in international affairs, understands that peril. Moreover, his worldview, which is anathema to international law and multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, happens to be well-suited to nuclear realities.”
• “Trump and his counterparts, Vladimir Putin in Russia and Xi Jinping in China, need to agree on a format. Trump wants Yalta-like talks among this trio. Russia prefers talks among all five nations designated by the Non-Proliferation Treaty as legitimate nuclear powers, including France and the UK. Some day, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel (which has never officially declared its arsenal) must be brought in as well.”
• “Either way, talks there must be, and Trump claims that Putin and Xi, whose autocratic style he admires, are open to the idea. “We’d like to see denuclearization,” he said, because that would be “an unbelievable thing for the planet.” The planet is not what usually takes priority in his America First worldview, but he would be right. If Trump succeeds, he deserves that Nobel Peace Prize, even if he might have to share it.”

"The Latest Russian Missile Is Bad News for NATO," Decker Eveleth, FP, 03.17.25.

• “In a televised interview last December, Putin remarked that with the Oreshnik, Russia was “practically on the edge of having no need to use nuclear weapons.”
• “The Oreshnik is also almost certainly capable of being armed with nuclear warheads, and many experts have focused analysis primarily on these capabilities and the role that the missile plays in Putin’s nuclear signaling. But relatively little has been said about the Oreshnik’s conventional capabilities and how it might enable a change in Russia’s targeting strategy in a potential future war with NATO.”
• “In a conflict where forces are dispersed over large areas, as is the case in Ukraine, an expensive missile like the Oreshnik is a poor choice. But the Oreshnik makes perfect sense for attacking dense targets like air bases, where its conventional submunitions can deal significant damage.”
• “Russia’s nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) could certainly make short work of NATO air bases. But when it comes to conventional weapons, Russia’s experience in Ukraine has revealed problems with attacking strategic sites with its existing missiles. Russian missiles that are armed with unitary conventional warheads have failed to disable key Ukrainian air bases and other facilities due to a combination of low accuracy and successful Ukrainian air defenses. The Oreshnik helps solve this problem.”
• “The good news is the Oreshnik’s conventional capabilities will give Russia more non-nuclear options, theoretically lessening the risk that the Kremlin would contemplate using nuclear weapons early in a conflict. The bad news is the Oreshnik’s non-nuclear capacities mean Russia will have more options to significantly disrupt NATO operations at the conventional level.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “Europe thinks the unthinkable on a nuclear bomb,” The Economist, 03.12.25. 
• "France Should Join NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements to Strengthen European Deterrence," Marion Messmer and Julia Cournoyer, Chatham House, 03.12.25.
• "The French Nuclear Deterrent in a Changing Strategic Environment," Emmanuelle Maitre, FRS, 03.11.25.
• "Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2025: Federation of American Scientists Reveals Latest Facts on Beijing’s Nuclear Buildup," Federation of American Scientists, 03.12.25. 

Counterterrorism:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Conflict in Syria:

"The U.S. and Russia Come Together on Syria," Eldar Mamedov, American Institute/Quincy Institute, 03.11.25.

• “The fact that the U.S. and Russia now seem ready to cooperate on Syria is an early indication that the easing of tensions—initiated by President Donald Trump’s call to his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin—is already paying off. As Almut Rochowanski of the Quincy Institute observed on X, “When you have the beginnings of détente, institutions like the Security Council get defrosted and are all of a sudden functional again.”
• “This is a major shift, the importance of which far transcends Syria. If the thaw between the U.S. and Russia continues, it could open a diplomatic space for dealing with conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza and other problems like Iran’s nuclear program. Trump and Rubio are on the right track.”

Cyber security/AI: 

"How to Tame Artificial Intelligence?" Andrey Kortunov, RIAC, 03.12.25.^ Clues from Russian Views. (RIAC is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• “Plain logic and common sense suggest that the only truly decisive battle over artificial intelligence (AI) today is between the United States and China. Current geopolitical dynamics mean that in this historical divide, the “collective West” will inevitably side with the United States, while a very large part of the rest of the international community will inevitably side with China.”
• “However, this clearly schematic and deliberately simplified black-and-white picture of the future of high technology may turn out to be very far from the emerging reality. It is enough to look at the remarkable results of the Paris AI Action Summit, which took place in February 2024 in the French capital. In Paris, the European Union managed to find a mutually acceptable compromise with the Global South, India was able to overcome its frictions with China, and only the United States and the United Kingdom chose to challenge the emerging global consensus on AI. The future will tell how the burgeoning transatlantic debate will or will not be resolved. However, it is clear that the disagreements that emerged in Paris go far beyond the field of AI, reflecting much deeper political, social, and even civilizational differences between the “Anglo-Saxon” and “Continental European” worlds, which are increasingly difficult to subsume into a single Western civilization. Nevertheless, the many challenges of AI governance cannot wait for leaders on both sides of the Atlantic to sort out their differences and find common ground. Global AI governance must move forward, with or without the participation of the U.S. and UK governments if that is not possible at the moment.”
• “AI technologies are undoubtedly of global importance. They have the potential to dramatically improve the lives of people around the world over the next few decades, and they are also capable of creating problems that humanity has not faced in its entire previous history. If anyone today still needs arguments justifying the urgent need to reach a new level of global governance, then the common task of taming artificial intelligence is one such argument.”

Energy exports from CIS:

"How Much Oil Does Russia Have Left? Is the Government's Optimism Justified?" Mikhail Krutikhin, MT, 03.13.25.^ Clues from Russian Views. 

• “The Ministry of Natural Resources’ statements that the country’s oil reserves will last for more than 64 years do not cause doubts among professionals, but rather outrage.”
• “Here is the opinion of Anatoly Brekhuntsov, director of the Geodata scientific and technical center, on the state statistical data on the size of hydrocarbon reserves in Russia: “The figures for reserves are very seriously overstated ... The big figures make big officials dizzy, saying: why spend money on geology if we have so much of everything?” Brekhuntsov recalled that there have been no new discoveries for a long time. “Almost all gas production now comes from fields discovered in the 1960s and early 1970s.”
• “The Director of Geological Exploration at Petrogeko, Alexander Sokolov, also spoke … about the discrepancy between government estimates of the oil industry's resource base and the actual state of affairs. He called the production targets outlined in the government's new Energy Strategy "incorrect and false." Russia has been experiencing a natural depletion of its mineral resource base for half a century, Sokolov stated, and four-fifths of all oil production in the country comes from fields discovered in the 1960s.”
• “The last inventory of reserves took place in 2019: the Ministry of Economic Development announced the size of profitable oil reserves at 8.6 billion tons, including all categories up to hypothetical ones, Sokolov recalled: "Not 28 billion, as they are announcing now, and not 35 billion."
• “The concerns that industry experts have expressed at all recent meetings of professionals are justified. Companies are increasingly shutting down production projects that, according to government reserves estimates, contain millions of tons of technically recoverable oil because lifting it from the ground is becoming commercially unprofitable.”

"Trump’s Nord Stream 2 Gambit Puts Europe’s Energy Future Back in Putin’s Grip," Maurizio Geri, NI, 03.14.25.

• “Germany, the sole gateway for Nord Stream gas, has made it clear it wants no part of Russian energy. Yet Trump seems dead set on strong-arming Europe into sacrificing its energy future—all under the pretense of securing an elusive peace in Ukraine... But Trump ignores the reality that European energy purchases have long bankrolled Russia’s war machine—a fact he only brings forward to bash Europe for supposedly not doing enough.”
• “If Europe follows Trump’s lead, it will stumble back into the pre-war energy trap, once again at the mercy of the Kremlin. Every euro spent on Russian gas will fuel the next war, the next invasion, the next act of sabotage. And when Putin strikes again, Europe will have even less leverage and no excuses left for its naivety.”
• “Europe stands at a pivotal moment. It can take the easy road—succumbing to diplomatic pressure, reopening its doors to Russian energy, and gambling on a costly yet fragile peace. Or it can commit to real security by reinforcing its energy independence, strengthening its economy, and safeguarding its future. Europe must choose resilience over appeasement because if it stumbles back into dependence, the next military crisis won’t be far behind.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Gas Temptation: The Return of Nord Stream May Be Just the First Step in the Gas Mega-Alliance That Trump Is Trying to Use to Entice Putin," Re: Russia, 03.13.25.

Climate change:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

“Investors seek to profit from Russia as Trump pursues rapprochement,” Josph Cotterill, FT, 03.16.25.

• “Investors are turning to sanctions-proof bets on Russian bonds and the rouble to wager that Donald Trump’s rapprochement with Vladimir Putin will send a wave of capital back into Russia’s economy.”
• “Hedge funds and brokers have been scoping out how to trade Russian assets that have been shunned by the west but which they believe could rally sharply if the US president relaxes sanctions as part of a deal to broker a ceasefire in Russia’s war against Ukraine, investors and traders said.”
• “The rouble has surged almost a third against the dollar this year on hopes of an end to the three-year conflict. But investors say the market is looking beyond this to a possible wider rollback of sanctions. “Some of [Trump’s] rhetoric about Russia is erratic, and this is something you have to factor in, but this is about the lifting of sanctions,” said Paul McNamara, investment director at GAM.”
• “While it remains difficult for western funds to bet directly on Russian assets, some are hunting for bonds of Russian companies that were considered almost worthless following the 2022 full invasion of Ukraine but which are now being marked up in some investors’ internal valuations. “There is definitely some excitement, predominantly in the hedge fund community,” said Roger Mark, fixed-income analyst at investment firm Ninety One.”
• “Since 2022, sanctions have prohibited trading in Russian sovereign debt, and many corporate issuers from the country cannot find banks or intermediaries to handle payments to creditors. Trading rubles directly, meanwhile, is very difficult because of sanctions on Russian lenders and western banks’ internal rules. International rouble trading volumes are barely $50mn a week, compared with billions of dollars before the war.”
• “Some banks and brokers are offering wagers on moves in the rouble that are settled in dollars, so investors can avoid direct exposure to the country. These so-called non-deliverable forwards (NDFs) are often used to trade currencies that are hard to source outside their home countries, such as those of Nigeria or Egypt.”
• “Russia’s central bank raised interest rates as import costs surged and labor shortages mounted, particularly as the Kremlin began a crash program of war production. The rouble trade is a bet that this dynamic will reverse, particularly if Russians who fled the country in fear of being mobilized come back with savings they stashed in Georgia, Armenia and other nearby nations.”
• “The trade still has huge risks, for instance in the event that the US instead tightens sanctions if Moscow rejects the ceasefire terms. Even if sanctions are relaxed, Russian investors with money stuck in the country may take the opportunity to exit while many émigrés may not come back at all, Ninety One’s Mark said.”
• “Direct exposure to the Russian market will be limited for the time being for western investors due to the restrictions of the Central Bank of Russia,” said one fund manager based outside the west. These investors “should have to find a trustworthy partner from a neutral jurisdiction to get their ticket back to the Russian market”.”

"Global Investors Make a Risky Bet on Russia’s Return to Markets," Bloomberg News, 03.12.25.

• “Traders at one London brokerage have been scouring the financial world in recent weeks for an asset almost untouchable for the past three years: Russian debt. They have been racing to find owners of dollar-denominated bonds issued by Gazprom to meet demand from Middle Eastern family offices.”
• “They quickly found the Russian energy behemoth’s bondholders were either unwilling to sell or demanding significantly higher prices, according to two traders who spoke on condition that neither they nor the firm were identified because of the sensitivity of the transactions. This combination of limited supply and growing demand helped to drive down yields on dollar and euro-denominated Russian bonds by about five percentage points in February, one of the traders estimated.”
• “The transactions—revealed here for the first time—are among the clearest indications yet that investors are quietly betting that U.S. President Donald Trump’s overtures to Moscow for a deal to end the war in Ukraine will eventually translate into Russia’s return to the global financial markets. The buyers are wagering that the deeply discounted securities could soar in value if the sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine in 2022 are lifted.”
• “There’s an aggressive search for securities of Russian issuers around the world,” said Evgeny Kogan, a Moscow-based investment banker who runs his own advisory firm. “Investors in general are asking how quickly they can enter the Russian market.”

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“A New Deal With Moscow?” Walter Russell Mead, WSJ, 03.10.25.

• “From Team Trump's perspective, a pragmatic understanding with Russia, even if the handshake takes place over the bleeding corpse of Ukraine, is part of a strategy to reset the balance of power worldwide. It could pull Russia away from China and enlist Russian help in getting Iran to accept a serious nuclear agreement.”
• “It is tempting but wrong to attack this strategy primarily on moral grounds. Curbing Beijing's rise without risking a war between the U.S. and China is both a great and a deeply moral goal.”
• “The more relevant question is about effectiveness. How likely are the results of this strategy to justify its extremely high upfront costs? The outlook here is mixed.”
• “The question isn't whether Mr. Putin will accept Mr. Trump's generous opening moves. He will take all he is given. The question is what comes next. Will both Russia and the U.S. honor Mr. Trump's proposed grand bargain? Will these sweeping concessions produce the results Mr. Trump hopes they will?”
• “The Kremlin will see any agreements with Mr. Trump as a temporary truce rather than a permanent peace. That limits the value of a deal. Moscow won't accept permanent restraints on its behavior in exchange for temporary promises from Washington.”
• “Meanwhile, a bargain with Russia may pose more problems than benefits for the MAGA movement in years to come. If Russia fails to honor the bargain scrupulously, as is likely, American opinion is likely to turn against a failed bargain, as happened with the Yalta agreements. And if the deal succeeds in restoring American power as detente did, the political pressure in the U.S. to return to a more ideologically assertive foreign policy will intensify—as happened in the Ford, Carter and Reagan years.”

"What happens when so much national security expertise is tossed aside?" David Ignatius, WP, 03.16.25. 

• “A potentially dangerous feature of President Donald Trump's drive to revamp the Justice Department is that it has stripped away many of the FBI and Justice officials with the most experience in protecting the nation against foreign terrorist and intelligence threats.”
• “The new administration has been focused on removing those who supposedly "weaponized" the government against Trump in the past, rather than mobilizing to deal with future perils. The FBI is beginning to fill some empty national security slots as part of a broad reorganization plan reported Saturday by the New York Times. The new appointees get good marks from former colleagues, but it's too early to assess how much they will bolster national security efforts.”
• “At the Justice Department, most top leaders of the national security division have departed - through resignation, reassignment or dismissal… The wipeout at the FBI has been even greater.”
• “A hidden danger is that FBI agents will steer clear of issues that could be career-killers. Investigations of Russian espionage, public corruption, classified documents and other hot-button topics could offend current or future FBI leaders, so ambitious agents may avoid them. Inevitably, that will lead to a loss of morale and aggressiveness. The FBI's counterintelligence staff was already struggling to field enough agents to perform surveillance and investigations, several FBI experts told me.”
• “Meanwhile, the need for aggressive counterintelligence operations will only grow as Trump resets relations with Russia. Regaining contact with Russia might be politically sensible, but it probably will bring dozens more Russians to their embassy in Washington and other facilities in the United States - creating a surveillance headache. In recent years, the FBI has been able to vet Russia's list of applicants for diplomatic visas to weed out spies. It isn't clear whether the agency's capacity to do such vetting in the future will be as effective.”

“Former Aide Reveals How Vladimir Putin Played Donald Trump Like A Fiddle On Phone Call,” Lee Moran, Huffpost, 03.14.25.

• “Fiona Hill, a former senior National Security Council official and expert on European and Russian affairs, has revealed new insights into President Donald Trump’s previous interactions with Russian President Vladimir Putin—and how she believes Putin actually mocked Trump during their exchanges. In a lengthy interview with Foreign Affairs released Thursday, Hill described Trump as unprepared for meetings with his Russian counterpart and overly fixated on personal interactions rather than diplomatic strategy. Hill, who served Trump during his first term and testified during his first impeachment for attempting to extort Ukraine, pointed to one incident in particular as evidence.”
• “The very first time I was in one of the phone calls with Putin, I was listening very carefully to the Russian, because the interpreters don’t always capture everything, they don’t capture the nuances, particularly when it’s the Russian interpreter who’s translating into a language that’s also not their native language, all kinds of things are missing,” she remembered. Trump, who for years has expressed his admiration for Putin and has recently parroted Russian talking points in his bid to broker a peace deal to end Russia’s invasion of neighboring Ukraine, described the exchange as “great,” she said.”
• “But Hill recalled thinking that it really wasn’t. “There was all kinds of menace in what Putin had said, he chooses his words very carefully,” she explained. “Many times when Putin and Trump are interacting, Putin’s actually making fun of him,” she continued. “It’s just it’s completely lost in the translation. I can give lots of episodes of this, or he’s goading him and urging him on to something, because he’s trying to see how he’ll react and the translation smooths over all that. That context is absolutely missing. And he doesn’t do a readout afterwards.”
• “All of this is amateur hour,” added Hill, who is now a senior foreign policy fellow on the U.S. and Europe at Washington-based think tank Brookings.”

“Comrade Trump: Why he’s acting exactly like a Russian asset would,” Edward Lucas, FP, 03.10.25.

• “Name one thing that U.S. President Donald Trump has done since taking office that the Kremlin did not like. Crickets.”
• “I agree that Trump’s past conduct is highly questionable—circumstantial evidence of Russian mischief abounds. He would certainly fail even the most basic check for a security clearance. But actually running him as an agent? Can you really imagine Trump turning up on time for a clandestine meeting? Remembering where the dead drop is? Filing reports? Using a code book properly? Keeping secrets? Obeying orders? His chaotic, petulant mindset would be a case officer’s nightmare.”
• “The more likely and simpler explanation is that Trump is just what he seems: a Vladimir Putin fanboy—and wildly greedy to boot. He may be an asset to Russia but is not in the formal sense a Russian asset. He admires the Russian president-for-life’s strongman style and the way his regime allows insiders (and Putin himself) to turn power into wealth.”

"A New 'Reset' in U.S.-Russia Relations: Prospects," Zhao Huasheng, Valdai Club, 03.14.25. and "The Mysterious 'Grand Deal' Between Trump and Russia," Zhao Huasheng, Valdai Club, 03.17.25. Clues from Chinese Views. Machine-translated from Russian. (The Valdai Club is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• “Despite widespread expectations of a change in U.S.-Russia relations with Trump’s return to power, the shift has been far more dramatic and rapid than anyone could have imagined.”
• “What are the prospects for U.S.-Russia relations this time? Will the two countries repeat the cycle of past failures or break out of this seemingly fatal impasse?”
• “The conflict between Russia and Ukraine is the first and most important obstacle to U.S.-Russia relations now developing smoothly and sustainably.”
• “The conflict between Russia and Ukraine is the first and most important obstacle. It continues to pose serious obstacles to U.S.-Russia relations. The core problem is the mismatch between Trump’s goals and Russia’s goals. Trump is eager to quickly end the war and make a peace deal on any terms so that he can fully focus on his mission to “Make America Great Again.” Otherwise, his four-year term risks being consumed by this conflict.”
• “If Russia maintains its uncompromising position, and Trump perceives this as the main obstacle to a peace agreement, he may direct his frustration at Russia, increase military support for Ukraine, and impose even tougher sanctions. Trump and members of his cabinet have already made this clear. Such actions will inevitably hinder the normalization of relations between the United States and Russia.”
• “Trump's personality is unpredictable, the stability and continuity of his policies are not guaranteed.”

"Clouds Have Gathered Over the City, or How Trump and Musk Once Again Delighted Putin," Andrey Malgin, MT, 03.17.25.^ Clues from Russian Views. 

• “Formally, the destruction of Radio Liberty/Free Europe and Voice of America is explained by the reduction of state spending and the state apparatus. Elon Musk, just two weeks after Trump's inauguration, said that the new U.S. administration must definitely close the radio stations Radio Liberty and Voice of America, since no one listens to them, and about $1 billion a year is spent on their operation”
• “For many employees of Radio Liberty, the destruction of their place of work will be a real catastrophe. These are Russian citizens, often with families, without money, without permanent housing, and now without a work permit and a permanent income. None of them can return to Russia: they have tainted themselves by collaborating with an “undesirable organization,” and in these times this is a 100% criminal offense.”
• “I remember how my collaboration with Radio Liberty began. It was perestroika, they even stopped jamming the radio station. Nevertheless, Vladimir Voynovich, who called me with an offer to air one of my samizdat texts, was extremely cautious: “Do you mind if it is broadcast you know where?” • [Putin] patiently waited 25 years and finally lived to see a kindred spirit elected president in America.”
• “[Putin] patiently waited 25 years and finally lived to see a kindred spirit elected president in America.”

“Steve Witkoff on Russia and Ukraine,” Dasha Zhukauskaite and RM Staff, RM, 03.12.25.

• “Steve Witkoff, a New York real estate magnate and long-time associate of U.S. President Donald Trump, was initially appointed to serve as Trump’s special envoy for the Middle East. However, his portfolio has expanded, and now prominently features U.S.-Russia relations, and specifically, ending the war in Ukraine. “Witkoff is an animal. He’s a tough New York real estate guy,” a source close to Trump told The Telegraph when describing why and how Witkoff has ended up in such a high-profile role with Russia.”
• “Indeed, despite his lack of prior formal diplomatic experience and Russia’s absence from his official job description, Witkoff managed to secure the release of American Marc Fogel from Russian custody in mid-February in exchange for a Russian cryptocurrency kingpin. During his visit to Moscow to win that release, Witkoff was also granted an audience with Russian President Vladimir Putin, with the two reportedly discussing the Russian-Ukrainian war and other issues on the bilateral agenda for over three hours. With Trump’s official envoy for the Ukraine-Russia conflict, Keith Kellogg, essentially sidelined, Witkoff also joined White House national security adviser Mike Waltz and Secretary of State Marco Rubio for initial talks with Russian officials in Saudi Arabia about ending the Ukraine war on Feb. 18.”
• “In his comments on the war, Witkoff has echoed Trump in arguing the conflict as having been partly "provoked," citing factors like discussions of NATO expansion, and he believes that a resolution to the conflict requires concessions from both Kyiv and Moscow. He says his primary stated objective is to end the "carnage," advocating for a temporary ceasefire—a proposal Ukraine agreed to after talks March 11 in Saudi Arabia—as an initial step toward a broader peace agreement. Witkoff expresses optimism in his public statements, highlighting positive dialogue with both Russian and Ukrainian representatives. Furthermore, he anticipates significant U.S.-Russia economic cooperation after a peace settlement. At the same time Witkoff—who is expected to meet Putin in Russia again this week—has pushed back against the idea that Ukraine is excluded from talks.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “What Does Trump See in Putin? A Conversation with Fiona Hill,” (podcast), FA, 03.13.25.⁵
• "Why Dissolving RFE/RL and VoA is a Major Geopolitical Blunder," Marek Magierowski and Slawomir Debski, NI, 03.17.25.
• "My Flight From Putin: A Q&A With Russian Journalist Elena Kostyuchenko on the Ukraine War, Putin’s Repressive Policies, and Her Exile at Harvard," The Boston Globe, 03.16.25. 

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“No, Russia isn’t about to run out of money,” Alexandra Prokopenko and Alexander Kolyandr, The Bell, 03.15.25. 

• “One of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s trump cards in ceasefire talks is his stated willingness to keep fighting the war in Ukraine until the West offers him the right terms. But has Russia got the money to sustain the fighting? One key measure of Russia’s ability to continue its war effort is the amount of cash in its rainy day National Welfare Fund (NWF). The liquid part of the fund is currently at its lowest level since 2019, having halved over three years of war.”
• “The liquid part of the NWF (i.e. its resources in yuan, gold, and rubles) was worth 3.39 trillion rubles ($39 billion) on March 1. That is less than half the level of before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine when the NWF’s liquid funds stood at 8.8 trillion rubles ($102 billion).”
• “The steady fall has led to predictions about the imminent exhaustion of Russia’s war chest, and the subsequent bankruptcy of the Russian state. However, without denying the increased risks that are facing the Russian economy, it’s not reasonable to talk about a crisis based on data from the NWF alone.”
• “Russia’s 2025 budget was calculated assuming an average price of $70 for a barrel of Urals crude and 96.5 rubles to the dollar exchange rate, generating some 11 trillion rubles in oil-and-gas revenues, of which about 1.8 trillion would be additional income destined for the NWF. The current oil price is $60 and the exchange rate is 86 rubles to the dollar, which, if it stays at that level, means a shortfall of about 2 trillion rubles. In that case, the NWF won’t be replenished at all.”
• “But even if the government chooses to go ahead and invest 1 trillion rubles (as was planned in the budget), there will still be significant liquidity left in the NWF. Indeed, even if the entire NWF was spent it would not mean the Russian economy was bankrupt—the budget deficit could easily be covered by borrowing.”

"Russia’s Economic Growth Model Amid the Crisis in Ukraine," Alexander A. Dynkin, Observer Research Foundation, 03.17.25. Clues from Russian Views.

• “Despite a brief period of GDP decline by 1.% in 2022 on account of Western sanctions, Russia’s economy grew by an estimated 4.1% in 2023 and 2024. This exceeded the growth rates witnessed in the European Union (EU) and the United States (U.S.). During these years, Russia faced a cascade of more than 16,000 financial, trade, sectorial, logistical, personal and other punitive sanctions, unprecedented in world history. Moreover, financial assets abroad were frozen/stolen, and export pipelines were physically attacked.”
• “The Russian economy’s resilience in the face of external shocks can be explained by three reasons: 1) the result of 30 years of market reforms; 2) accumulation over these years of heavy experience in stress-resistant and anti-shock strategies; and 3) miscalculations of the West in its ability to isolate Russia’s economy.”
• “The Russian economy, by most indicators, including the level of consumption in 2023, has returned to the level of the end of 2021. The main economic problems of the Russian Federation remain labor shortage (at full employment) and closed export markets. According to the latest estimates of the World Bank, Russia has become one of the five largest economies in the world in terms of GDP in purchasing power parity. This result is attributed not only to the abovementioned factors, but also to the fact that for a long time, the depreciation of the ruble has been significantly outpacing the price growth. Therefore, the equivalent value of the consumer basket of goods in dollar terms has declined.”
• “By 2025, Russia's supply-side economy will have reached a sustainable trajectory. The task of the current year is to eliminate imperfections of this model, including inflation (9.5% in 2024), labor market constraints (unemployment 2.3% in 2024), and high budget expenditures.”
• “It can be stated that the Russian economy, having successfully navigated the COVID-19 crisis, was well-prepared for the shock from the sanctions of 2022.”
• “Russia could manage, not without certain difficulties, to increase defense production and at the same time maintain and even improve the living standards of the population.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “Russia’s economy risk freezing over,” The Bell, 03.14.25.
• "Russia’s economy would struggle to cope with peace," Pierre Briancon, Reuters, 03.17.25.
• "Putin’s Irrational "Putin in Kursk: The Meaning of Political Theatre," Kadri Liik, ECFR, 03-2025.
• "Three Parties and a Swing Group: How Russians View Scenarios for the End of the War," Re: Russia, 03.06.25.
• “Demographic Policies Are Doomed to Fail," Andrey Pertsev, Carnegie Politika, 03.11.25.
• "Annals of War: The Silencing of Russian Art," Joshua Yaffa, New Yorker, 03.13.25.

Defense and aerospace:

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Military Mobilization in Russia’s Regions: From Protests to Submission," Jean-François Ratelle and Marat Iliyasov, PONARS Eurasia, 03.10.25. 
• See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• "Ukraine's Other Bargaining Chip," Rahm Emanuel, WP, 03.12.25.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Ukraine:

“Is Zelensky a disliked dictator or a popular hero?” The Economist, 03.12.25. 

• “A new telephone poll by Ipsos of 1,000 Ukrainians, commissioned by The Economist, shows that he commands overwhelming support in the wake of his falling-out with Trumpland. More than seven in ten Ukrainians now say they approve of Mr. Zelensky’s work. Eight in ten say he is still Ukraine’s legitimate president, and reject the idea of elections while fighting continues. Over seven in ten still trust him to lead negotiations. Even more striking, the poll suggests that Mr. Zelensky would win an election if one were held today, with Valery Zaluzhny, his popular former top general, in distant second place.”
• “Our poll was conducted in the week following the White House showdown, a period that saw America withdraw first military aid and then offensive intelligence-sharing. (Both were restored after the latest talks in Saudi Arabia.) Despite the deteriorating outlook, it shows Ukrainians in a mood at least as stubborn as their president’s, favoring maximalist military aims that seem unachievable given Ukraine’s resources. A huge majority (74%) favor fighting on even without American support. A clear majority (59% v 21%) say they believe Ukraine can still win on the battlefield, in contrast to American officials such as Marco Rubio, the secretary of state, who say it cannot. A similar majority rejects any ceasefire until the West gives Ukraine military guarantees—the very situation that seems to be developing after the talks in Saudi Arabia.”
• “Those talks covered possible Ukrainian concessions for peace. The data show Mr. Zelensky’s public is reluctant to concede much. Of Russia’s probable demands, only renouncing Ukraine’s aspiration to join NATO has net support: with 38% for and 37% against, a difference that is within the margin of error. Just 6% of Ukrainians would be willing to recognize Russian territorial gains since the full-scale invasion in 2022, though more might concede Crimea and the parts of eastern Ukraine which Russia seized in 2014 (11% and 27% respectively). Fully 80% oppose shrinking Ukraine’s armed forces, another probable Russian demand. A similar margin rejects drafting younger soldiers (70% v 17%), which might appear inconsistent with the resolve to keep fighting. Some Western officials have urged Ukraine to lower the draft age. But that remains very unpopular–except among men of pension age.”
• “The poll finds that 72% of Ukrainians strongly or somewhat approve of their president’s job-performance; Mr. Trump is at 46%, according to The Economist’s tracker.”
• “Far from giving Mr. Zelensky a dignified way to leave office, an election would probably keep him in power, the poll suggests. The war has put competitive politics in Ukraine on hold, so the numbers are theoretical; they would shift in a real campaign. But they suggest Mr. Zelensky would get many more first-round votes than his closest potential rival, Mr. Zaluzhny (46% v 31%).”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Even as Russia's Shadow Deepens, Belarus Maintains Its Balancing Act," Francesca Ebel, WP, 03.16.25.
• "Russian Influence Operations in Georgia: A Threat to Democracy and Regional Stability," Ambassador Vasil (Dato) Sikharulidze, FPRI, 03.13.25.
• “Current ruling partner in Armenia is unreliable from Russia’s perspective—Dmitry Trenin,” Alpha News, 03.10.25.

Footnotes

1. The Trump administration is also considering recognizing Ukraine’s Crimea region as Russian territory as part of any future agreement to end Moscow’s war on Kyiv, two people familiar with the matter told Semafor.
2. Power plants and nuclear reactors are among the bargaining chips which pro-Kremlin commentator Sergei Markov claims are part of a draft peace document, which he alleges has been leaked in the U.S., but which we could not find.
3. That the Ukrainian leadership were preparing to put a spin on AFU’s retreat followed from Zelenskyy’s and Syrskyi’s announcements last week that the priority for the command of AFU in that region was to save lives of soldiers.
4. Here is a timeline of recent territorial control changes in the Kursk region:

• Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group, which has close ties to AFU,  reported in its Telegram channel and interactive map that on 03.15.25 Russian forces seized Sudzha and Rubanshchyna in the Kursk region.
• Citing Black Bird Group, NYT claimed on 03.16.27 that by that date AFU “were clinging to barely 30 square miles along the Russia-Ukraine border” in the Kursk region.
• Russian pro-war Rybar Telegram channel, which is close to RF MoD, confirmed in a 03.16.25 report that the Ukrainian forces were still fighting in the Kursk region.
• Rybar indirectly acknowledged presence of Ukrainian armed forces inside the Kursk region in a 03.17.25 dispatch. According to Rybar, Russia had only four villages to recapture in the Kursk region as of that date.
• Russian opposition’s Conflict Intelligence Group claimed in its Telegram channel on 03.17.25 that Ukrainian forces still held two small pockets of territory inside the Kursk region.  The longest side of these two pockets, in which about 4-5 small settlements are located, is 8 km, according to CIG’s claim illustrated by a DeepState map.

5. This issue of RAR will be updated to include a summary of this podcast when the transcript becomes available from CFR.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

^Machine-translated.

Slider photo by Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP.