Russia Analytical Report, Jan. 21-27, 2025

3 Ideas to Explore

  1. “We want to see if we can denuclearize, and I think that’s very possible. And I can tell you that President Putin wanted to do it,” Donald Trump told the World Economic Forum. China can help negotiate “denuclearization,” which is to be done together with the U.S. and Russia, according to Trump’s vision that he shared with the WEF’s participants on Jan. 23. The following day saw Putin respond by claiming that “we may have quite a few common points with the current [U.S.] administration, and we could jointly look for solutions to the key issues of today, including strategic stability.”1 As for China, it “has generally refused in public even to consider arms control, [but] Chinese officials signaled privately in the past month that their arms-control phobia might be easing,” according to David Ignatius of WP. Trump’s call at the WEF may be a signal that he could abandon his predecessor’s instance that the U.S. and Russia negotiate nuclear arms control separately from other topics on the bilateral agenda, according to David Sanger and Anton Troianovski of NYT. “Putin has argued… that any talks on limiting nuclear arms should also cover the war in Ukraine. The Biden administration had refused to mix the two… But Mr. Trump seems open to a broader negotiation,” the duo writes.
  2. When asked if a peace agreement could be reached between Russia and Ukraine by next year’s World Economic Forum, Trump told this year’s WEF: “You’re going to have to ask Russia. Ukraine is ready to—to make a deal.” To make Moscow more amenable to putting an end to the Russian-Ukrainian war, OPEC should lower oil prices while the U.S. could impose additional punitive measures on Russia’s imports from the U.S.,2 Trump told the WEF via a video-link on Jan. 23. The following day saw Putin claim Trump could press Kyiv into talks with Moscow, using aid as leverage.
  3. Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said that if Europe is “serious about providing an effective deterrent” against a renewed Russian aggression after a hypothetical peace deal, then 200,000 troops will be needed, at a “minimum,” according to John Paul Rathbone. “How realistic is Zelenskyy’s figure? Not at all. That is far more than the number of troops that took part in the D-Day landings of the second world war,” FT’s defense correspondent reminds us. In the absence of a peace deal, Russia is winning as its “much larger population and more effective recruitment have allowed it to replace losses more effectively,” Stefan Gady, a Vienna-based military analyst, told NYT.3 In contrast, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe Christopher Cavoli is not worried  that “Ukraine could suddenly lose,” in part because Russia lacks sufficient manpower and other resources for a big breakthrough in his assessment, the Kyiv Independent reported.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

“North Koreans have been fighting in the Kursk region for more than a month. [Here is] what is known about them,” iStories, 01.23.25.^ 

  • "How many fighters from the DPRK are fighting for Russia? About 12,000 North Korean military personnel were transferred to Russia; such estimates were given by the intelligence services of South Korea and Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The South Korean service claims that four brigades went to Russia, including soldiers of the 11th Army Corps, known as the Assault Corps. "This is a very combat-ready unit with a rather formidable reputation. This is special forces," Fyodor Tertitsky, a lecturer at the University of Koryo in Seoul, a specialist in the DPRK army, explained to "Important Stories.""
  • "During several weeks of fighting, the losses of the North Koreans, according to the same estimates of the intelligence services of South Korea and Zelenskyy, amounted to 3,000 to 4,000 people killed and wounded. If the current rate of losses is maintained, all fighters from the DPRK will be wounded or killed by mid-April, writes the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). A high-ranking American military [source] expects replenishment from North Korea in the next two months."
  • "Fighters from the DPRK are in many ways superior to the Russian military: they are young, physically well-trained, disciplined, ideologically charged and skillfully handle small arms. "They have everything to be good infantrymen," says a representative of the Air Assault Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Conscript service in the DPRK lasts 10 years, so the fighters who came to fight in Russia probably have more experience and skills than Russian recruits, who are thrown into battle after minimal training. North Korean fighters are better equipped than Russian ones, says a serviceman of the special forces regiment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine fighting in the Kursk region."

Iran and its nuclear program:

"Interpreting the 20-year military pact between Russia & Iran," Michael Corbin, Responsible Statecraft, 01.23.25. 

  • On January 17, Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Iranian counterpart Masoud Pezeshkian signed an historic 20-year strategic agreement that a Reuters report later said “is likely to worry the West.”
  • In it, the two countries agreed to boost cooperation in security services, military drills, port visits and joint officer training. They pledged not to allow their territory to be used in any military action against the other, or help anyone to attack the other, and would cooperate to counter outside military threats.
  • The partnership comes at a time when Moscow and Tehran’s influence in the region has been diminished due to developments in Syria and the Middle East. For example, in responding to a question regarding Assad’s fall, Trump wrote in December on social media platform Truth Social that “Russia and Iran are in a weakened state right now, one because of Ukraine and a bad economy, the other because of Israel and its fighting success.”
  • Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Moscow has aggressively cultivated closer ties with Iran and other nations considered hostile towards the U.S. to counter assertions of its weakness and loss of influence. For example, it already has strategic pacts with North Korea and close ally Belarus, as well as a partnership agreement with China. Whether these strategic pacts will serve as a deterrent to future conflict, whether military or economic, with the United States or its allies, remains to be seen.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“My family’s painful decision to flee Ukraine," Sergey Maidukov, The Boston Globe, 01.25.25. 

  • We had chosen to leave, unwilling to endure another winter like the catastrophic one in 2023 when relentless attacks on infrastructure left us without electricity, water, or functioning elevators. Life in a Kyiv high-rise building in such conditions was harrowing, an existence stripped of normalcy and riddled with quiet despair.
  • I’m past conscription age, yet I wrestle with guilt for leaving while my son and son-in-law remain in Kyiv. They haven’t been summoned to the front yet, but that shadow looms. One of my nephews, a soldier, lost his legs in a mortar attack; his mother has been unable to find him among the living or dead. Another nephew fights on the front lines, defending the nation’s right to exist, while I am abroad with my wife, daughter, and granddaughter.
  • My son insists that victory is essential and scoffs at any talk of truce. “We must fight until the end,’’ he keeps saying in spite of the fact that Ukraine is 28 times smaller and much weaker than its bloodthirsty neighbor. His sentiment is echoed by 4 in 10 Ukrainians, while the rest express deep weariness with the war, often concerned they will be labeled traitors.
  • More than 700,000 Ukrainian men have left the country, attempting to avoid military service. In reality, the number is likely higher. Between 6 million and 10 million Ukrainians have sought refuge abroad, many of them young mothers shepherding children. … These women want to protect their children from growing up in a besieged fortress. For many, Ukraine no longer feels like home, and even peace cannot change that.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“Ukraine Is Losing Fewer Soldiers Than Russia — But It’s Still Losing the War," Anatoly Kurmanaev and Constant Méheut, NYT, 01.23.25. 

  • The war of attrition between Russia and Ukraine is killing soldiers at a pace unseen in Europe since World War II. Ukrainian artillery fire, explosive drones and mines are killing Russian troops, as they repeatedly charge across the no-man’s land. As Ukrainian positions are exposed, they are suffering heavy casualties inflicted from afar by Russian drones, shells and glide bombs.
  • Russia is still winning. Its much larger population and more effective recruitment have allowed it to replace losses more effectively, and to gradually push forward, said Franz-Stefan Gady, a Vienna-based military analyst. “The fat man grows thinner. But the thin man dies,” Mr. Gady said.
  • Lostarmour estimates that more than 100,000 Ukrainian soldiers had died by December, in total. Russian researchers and journalists … estimate that Russia had suffered more than 150,000 battlefield deaths through the end of November.
  • The independent war correspondent Yurii Butusov announced to his 1.2 million YouTube subscribers that sources inside Ukrainian Armed Forces’s headquarters told him that 105,000 soldiers have been “irreversibly lost,” including 70,000 killed and 35,000 missing. That’s far more than the 43,000 soldiers that President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed had been killed as of Dec. 8.
  • Combining the estimates, with their caveats and shortcomings, analysts conclude that Russia loses slightly fewer than two soldiers to death and severe injury for every Ukrainian fighter who suffers the same fate. This ratio has not allowed Ukraine to overcome Russia’s population and recruitment advantages. At current trends, Ukraine is losing a larger share of its smaller army. There are currently more than 400,000 Russians facing about 250,000 Ukrainians on the front line, and the gap between the armies is growing, according to the military analyst familiar with Western assessments.
  • Russia is losing more men. But every Ukrainian casualty edges the Kremlin closer to victory.

Military aid to Ukraine:

“Russia lacks manpower for major breakthrough in Ukraine, top NATO general [Christopher Cavoli] says,” Boldizsar Gyori, Kyiv Independent, 01.21.25. 

  • Russia lacks sufficient forces for a big breakthrough in Ukraine, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Christopher Cavoli, said during a discussion on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos on Jan. 21.
  • "I'm not worried that Ukraine could suddenly lose. I don't see the potential for a massive (Russian) breakthrough," Cavoli said. "And this is not a political but a military vision. It's got to do with both sides, the effective defenses that the Ukrainians have been putting in, but also the difficulty that the Russian side has in generating significant offensive forces to be able to exploit a potential breakthrough."
  • Despite Russian advances, Cavoli said Russia's slow and incremental push is "exhausting" for Moscow's forces. "After all, there is a reason why Russia brought thousands and thousands of soldiers from North Korea," he added, referring to the 12,000-strong North Korean contingent dispatched to Kursk Oblast.
  • "I think we're going to continue to see this tension between the desire to attack and the lack of manpower on the part of the Russians. I think that will largely define the conflict and force the Russians to use more weapons of deterrence, as we've seen them do in recent years."
  • The general also said that though it remains unclear whether the U.S. will continue providing military aid packages under the Trump administration, he pointed to the "very significant uplift in European aid" provided to Ukraine.

"Will Europe put ‘boots on the ground’ in Ukraine?" John Paul Rathbone, FT, 01.23.25. 

  • It is an open secret that western special forces are present in Ukraine as “sneakers on the ground”. So far, though, there is no mass deployment of western “boots on the ground”. That may be about to change. Donald Trump’s return to the White House reignited interest in the idea, first floated a year ago by French President Emmanuel Macron.
  • On-off talks have resumed about how western troops, specifically European forces, could help sustain the ceasefire that Trump hopes to broker with Moscow. Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said that if Europe is serious about providing an effective deterrent, 200,000 troops will be needed, at a “minimum”. How realistic is Zelenskyy’s figure? Not at all. That is far more than the number of troops that took part in the D-Day landings of the second world war.
  • Ukrainian officials believe that between 40,000 and 50,000 foreign troops operating as a security force across the 1,000km frontline could be feasible, according to people involved in the discussions between Kyiv and its western partners.
  • Talks are, meanwhile, under way among European allies, with British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer and Nato secretary-general Mark Rutte expected to discuss the issue at an “informal retreat” hosted by the EU on February 3.
  • So far, only the Baltic states have signaled support for the idea, as long as it is a broader mission with other allies.
  • The mission would have three aims: to reassure Ukraine it has western support; deter Russia from attacking again; and show the US that Europe is committed to guaranteeing Ukraine’s security.

"America must continue to arm Ukraine — without U.S. taxpayer dollars," Jack Keane and Marc A. Thiessen, WP, 01.23.25. 

  • Last year, Romania took out a $920 million FMF direct loan to carry out a major military modernization program, including purchases of U.S. defense equipment such as Abrams tanks and co-production of Abrams tank ammunition. Congress also approved $2 billion in FMF loans for Taiwan, which it will have to repay over a 12-year period.
  • Ukraine can do the same. So as not to transfer costs to the U.S. taxpayer, the structure of such an agreement can be negotiated so that Ukraine guarantees these loans with its substantial natural resources.
  • Ukraine should be more than willing to enter into a loan agreement to purchase U.S. weapons, because it creates a sustainable model for long-term defense cooperation and creates a lasting U.S. interest in Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence. American taxpayers get repaid only if Ukraine survives as a free, stable and prosperous nation.
  • Its resources can be developed for the benefit of both countries only if Trump succeeds in negotiating a resolution to the conflict. It is hard to mine for minerals or develop offshore oil and natural gas under enemy fire.
  • Why has this not been done already? Answer: a lack of imagination in the Biden White House coupled with European intransigence. For years, Belgium was h weapons made by American workers — without requiring U.S. taxpayers to bear the cost.

"Peace in Ukraine Needn't Mean Russian Victory," David Shimer, WSJ, 01.22.25. 

  • There are clear, straightforward, nonpartisan reasons why the U.S. should keep up its military aid for Ukraine.
    • First, Ukraine is an effective partner that is degrading the Russian military and, in the process, strengthening its position for a future negotiation.
    • Second, with U.S. help, Ukraine can push Russia to engage in meaningful negotiations
    • Third, helping Ukraine succeed remains fundamentally in America’s national-security interest.
  • Ukraine can enter a future negotiation with strength and reach an acceptable outcome to this war, but only if the U.S. continues to support the Ukrainian military and apply economic pressure on Russia. Now is the time to finish the job.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

“There’s only one way to end the war in Ukraine,” Anatol Lieven and Ted Snider, Spectator, 01.23.25.

  • If the new president wants the war in Ukraine to end, American diplomats may have to open talks with Russia on issues much wider than Ukraine. Russia’s problem, after all, is not just with Ukraine, but with the West. Is there a deal that will make Russia, Ukraine, the US, Europe and the rest of the world, happy?
  • One alternative to formal Nato membership – in fact, to membership of any military alliance – would be having a large, well-armed ‘peacekeeping’ force provided by European countries and based in Ukraine. … In practice though, this would be a Nato operation in all but name, since all the contributing states would come from Nato. The Russian government has therefore made clear that they will reject this idea.
    • Key European states have already ruled out participation in such a force – unless the Russians agree to it, which they will not do.
  • Another option that has been discussed is the so-called ‘Israeli model’, or heavily-armed neutrality – for Israel, although armed and strongly supported by the US and other western countries, is not a US or Nato ally. This might be acceptable to Russia if the weapons supplied to the West were defensive … but in Russia, Ukraine is facing a vastly more formidable adversary than any that Israel has ever faced.
  • In the end however, the only truly strong guarantee of peace in Ukraine and between Russia and the West will be a new security architecture that over time reduces fear and distrust between them.
    • Russia proposed a treaty along these lines to the US two months before launching the invasion of Ukraine. Some of its provisions were clearly unacceptable, but others made good sense.

“Q&A: What Trump 2.0 Means for Ukraine and the World,” Isaac Chotimer, The New Yorker, 01.21.25.

  • [Isaac Chotimer, IC] recently spoke by phone with Stephen Wertheim [SW], a senior fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  • IC: For people like you who have had concerns about the shape of the American commitment to Ukraine, what is your hope about what a new Presidency could usher in? SW: This is not a prediction, but it’s an opportunity to lift the taboo that unfortunately arose quickly after Russia’s full-scale invasion, on seeking a diplomatic settlement to the war, and hopefully to resolve the conflict within a short amount of time.
  • IC: You mentioned the somewhat “unconditional” support that Biden offered Ukraine. But many Ukrainians and some critics of the White House would say that Biden’s support didn’t go far enough: he ruled out deploying American troops or making any direct attacks on Russia. SW: The better word, I think, at least publicly, is “deferential.” The Biden Administration has had a publicly deferential approach to Ukraine when it comes to matters of war aims and war termination.
  • IC: [Trump] may not have a clear vision, but I can’t imagine him ever saying that he really likes his Western European allies. I can’t imagine him ever speaking well of NATO. I do wonder about the strength of any peace deal in which the U.S. President making it has no credibility. Ukraine is going to need a security guarantee, but we know there’s no way Trump wants to offer security guarantees, nor would he be fully trustworthy on any security guarantees that were on offer.

"At the Table or on the Menu? A European Four-Point Plan for Ukraine," Justyna Gotkowska, CEIP, 01.21.25. 

  • If Europeans want to have a say on the continent’s postwar security, their four-point proposal should include strategy, more military support, a plan for troop deployments after the ceasefire, and the restructuring of U.S. military presence in Europe.
    • First, there should be no preconditions to freezing the frontlines
    • Second, more European military support to Ukraine is essential.
    • Third, the European plan must include Western boots on the ground, ideally leading to Ukraine’s NATO membership in the future.
    • Fourth, the plan should include adjusting U.S. military presence in Europe.. In view of the drastically changed security situation in Europe there is no rationale for U.S. operational units—around 35,000 troops—to remain in Germany and not be stationed in Poland, which currently hosts 6,000-7,000 U.S. troops, the Baltic states, and possibly Finland and Romania.

“Donald Trump's '100 Day' Ukraine Peace Plan Leaked: Report,” Maya Mehrara, Newsweek, 01.27.25. 

  • A news outlet has leaked U.S. President Donald Trump's alleged plan to end the Russia-Ukraine war in 100 days, which the office of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has said is false. On Sunday, Strana, a Ukrainian outlet, published details of the purported plan to end the war in a few months, writing that it had been discussed in "political and diplomatic circles" in Ukraine. Newsweek was unable to independently verify whether the details of the plan were accurate.... Zelensky's office has denied that the peace plan is legitimate. Andriy Yermak, the head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, wrote on Telegram that the 100-day peace plan reported by the media did not "exist in reality." He added that such reports often disguised allegations spread by Russians.
  • Trump's alleged 100-day plan to end the war in Ukraine includes conducting a phone call with Putin in late January or early February, meeting with both Putin and Zelensky in February or March, and declaring a ceasefire along the front lines by Easter, which falls on April 20 this year.
  • In declaring a ceasefire, Ukrainian troops would also be withdrawn from Kursk, and an International Peace Conference would commence its work to forge an agreement between Russia and Ukraine to end the war, to be mediated by other global powers. A declaration on the agreed parameters for ending the war would be released by May 9, after which Kyiv would be asked not to extend martial law or mobilize.
  • The proposed parameters of the agreement to end the war include barring Ukraine from becoming a member of NATO and declaring neutrality, Kyiv becoming a part of the EU by 2030, and the EU facilitating postwar reconstruction. 

"Swap Bullets for Money," interview with Fyodor Lukyanov, KP/Russia in Global Affairs, 01.26.25.^ Clues from Russian Views. (Russia in Global Affairs is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

  • The most important thing is how he [Trump] differs fundamentally from Biden. Biden believed that this was a major conflict, a strategic one, on which America's place and future in the world depended. The balance of power, the confrontation between American democracy and countries that do not support it. Trump is completely alien to all of this. He does not understand at all why the United States got involved. His priorities for the United States are China, new relations with Europe (new in terms of material costs, so that the United States spends less, the Europeans more). He is interested in the Western Hemisphere, the Arctic, and so on. He considers these tasks important. Space, the development of artificial intelligence, this is what he pays a lot of attention to. And this Ukraine is incomprehensible to him, he does not need it. It only distracts him and America from important issues.
  • So far, there is a feeling that Trump simply wants to stop the conflict. No serious agreements. Just stop along the front lines. And then let Europe figure out what to do with it.
  • [When asked: What will happen if Russia does convince Trump to sit down and discuss the terms of global security? Is a second Yalta, a new redivision of the world, realistic?] We should not aim for redivision of the world. And in general, we need to forget about the model that we all have in our heads: the Great Powers sat down, drew up a line, came to an agreement, and shock hands. Nothing works like that anymore.
  • Russia will not sign a truce for the sake of a truce. Therefore, during the negotiations, we will need to reduce our positions. 

"Ahead Of The Big Talk; Game Over: Video Game Industry Under Pressure; New US Sanctions: Biden's Parting Shot," Tatiana Stanovaya, R. Politik Bulletin No. 2 (154) 2025, 01.28.25. Clues from Russian Views.

  • Trump’s inauguration and subsequent statements (along with those of his team) have confirmed the worst-case expectations for Moscow that were being considered within Russian foreign policy circles. It is believed that there is little chance that Moscow and Washington will reach a deal on Ukraine. New sanctions are expected and the war will likely continue.
  • Putin has nevertheless taken a slightly different approach, adopting a more conciliatory — even ingratiating — tone aimed at appeasing Trump. This strategy seeks to boost Trump’s desire to oppose domestic hawks and the “deep state”, while encouraging him to initiate substantial strategic talks with Russia.
  • Putin is counting on personal meetings, during which he believes he may be able to influence Trump’s understanding of the conflict and create an opportunity to address what he sees as the “root cause” of the war. This likely includes revisiting Russia’s December 2021 proposals, which were effectively presented as an ultimatum two months before the war began.
  • Trump’s initial rhetoric on the war in Ukraine have been received negatively within Russia’s professional foreign policy community and among the patriotic camp, further complicating the optics for Putin as he prepares for anticipated talks.
  • The first meeting between the two leaders will likely focus on setting the agenda and logistics for future discussions. The choice of location is already emerging as a separate issue.
  • Once Putin gains a clearer understanding of his options and room for maneuver, he will decide who will be formally authorized to discuss Ukraine with the Americans. The “infrastructure” of the talks will be handled by Sergey Ryabkov and Alexei Grushko.

Post by Vladimir Pastukhov, Telegram, 01.23.25.^ Clues from Russian Views.

  • Trump's tactics in the long approaches to negotiations on the end of the war in Ukraine resemble the tactics of a squid, which in difficult situations releases ink and hides itself inside a dark cloud. Judging by what Trump managed to say during the first days of his new term, he does not yet know what to do with it (the war in Ukraine), and therefore hides behind an ink cloud consisting of dozens of statements contradicting each other, the main goal of which is not to create a sense of security for any of the participants in the conflict. Orienting yourself now to these statements is like looking for a squid in dark water.
  • Practically no one has any illusions that Trump is not at all interested in Ukraine as Ukraine and, if it were his will, he would hand it over to Putin with an additional payment, counting the benefit from the difference with budget expenditures for the continuation of the war. But, fortunately for Ukraine, it worries Trump as a precedent (China is carefully watching how everything ends, and may repeat it too) and as a point of vulnerability in the upcoming elections to the Congress and the Senate, where the Ukrainian question may pop up in the most unpleasant wording for him ( "weak" Trump lost Ukraine to Putin). Therefore, Trump has his own "red lines" in negotiations with Putin. Trump is ready to divide Ukraine, but not very ready to give it away entirely.

"How could the Russia-Ukraine war end? Four possible scenarios," Anthony Loyd, The Times of London, 01.24.25. 

  • Scenario 1: Defeat 

    The first scenario is the worst. Should Russia choose to proceed with the war and shun negotiations then, if severed from US support, Ukraine may eventually be broken and militarily defeated.

  • Scenario 2: Bad peace Almost as bad as the first possible outcome is the second in which, absent a negotiated deal or US support, Ukraine folds and is forced to sue from a position of weakness for a bad peace deal that sees the country partitioned and a quisling government established in Kyiv: a victory for Russia, and a clear defeat for Ukraine and its western allies. No Nobel prize for Trump here.
  • Scenario 3: Ceasefire The third involves a ceasefire. If part of a transitory phase, leading to a final settlement, a peace deal and a real conclusion to the war, then it could lead to regional stability and the survival of Ukraine, ring-fenced by security and economic guarantees.
  • Scenario 4: Negotiated settlement The fourth possible outcome, and the crucible of Ukrainian hope, would involve the US empowering Ukraine’s hand so that it could participate in peace talks from a position of strength, resulting in a deal ensuring Ukraine has a sovereign and economically viable future, with security guarantees protecting it from further Russian threat.
  • Nevertheless, in Ukraine’s bleakest winter of war two certainties remain.
    • First, without America’s support Ukraine has no chance of ever reaching a position whereby it can negotiate a peace deal from a position of strength.
    • Second, the lasting definition of victory or defeat at war’s end will not lie with territorial concession and the loss of Donbas soil, but instead in whose sphere of alliance, the West’s or the Kremlin’s, Ukraine shall find itself after the last bullet is fired.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Remarks By President Trump at the World Economic Forum,” White House, 01.23.25. 

  • One thing — very important — I really would like to be able to meet with President Putin soon and get that war end — ended, and — and that’s not from the standpoint of economy or anything else.  It’s from the standpoint of millions of lives are being wasted.
  • Our efforts to secure a peace settlement between Russia and Ukraine are now, hopefully, underway. It’s so important to get that done...  It’s time to end it
  • Hopefully, China can help us stop the war with, in particular, Russia-Ukraine. And they have a great deal of power over that situation, and we’ll work with them
  • I’m also going to ask Saudi Arabia and OPEC to bring down the cost of oil. If the price came down, the Russia-Ukraine war would end immediately. Right now, the price is high enough that that war will continue. You got to bring down the oil price; you’re going to end that war. They should have done it long ago. They’re very responsible, actually, to a certain extent, for what’s taking place—millions of lives are being lost.
  • [ When asked if there will be a peace agreement with Ukraine and Russia by next year’s gathering in Davos] Well, you’re going to have to ask Russia. Ukraine is ready to — to make a deal.
  • This Russian-Ukrainian war that should have never started. If I were president, it would never have started. This is a war that should have never, ever been started. And—and it wasn’t started during my—there was never even talk about it. I knew that it was the apple of President Putin’s eye, but I also knew that there was no way he was going in, and he wasn’t going to go in. 

"On a global stage, an imperial Trump offers some positive surprises," David Ignatius, WP, 01.24.25. 

  • The most intriguing aspect of Trump's presentation [via video link at Davos] was that atop his imperial decrees was a demand for peace - starting with the war in Ukraine, which he rightly called a "killing field." He jawboned China and Russia to join in halting the conflict. And beyond that, he urged a new era of nuclear disarmament. Mirabile dictu, as the Romans would have exclaimed. Wonderful to relate.
  • A new "golden age" had arrived, he began, repeating the opening phrase of his inaugural address, and then he started issuing diktats to frame the new global order. He instructed Saudi Arabia to increase oil production and also, "because we've been very good to them," to give America a $1 trillion investment tribute.
  • Even as Trump plays his China card, he said he plans "to meet with President Putin soon and get that war ended." Many analysts, including me, have worried that Trump would accede to Vladimir Putin's demands on Ukraine. But at least initially, he's taking a harder stand, threatening tariffs against Russia's weak economy if it doesn't make concessions. "
  • Trump's biggest Davos surprise was the call for nuclear disarmament - and a revelation that he had begun this effort in his first term. "I can tell you that President Putin wanted to do it," he said, and "China would have come along." Trump and his team repeatedly and publicly called for trilateral nuclear arms control talks with Russia and China (e .g.) during his first presidency, so not clear how surprising this latest call is.
  • This, again, might be a Trumpian fantasy, because in past years China has generally refused in public even to consider arms control. But Chinese officials signaled privately in the past month that their arms-control phobia might be easing. As Trump rightly said Thursday, a three-way denuclearization pact would be "an unbelievable thing for the planet."

Meghan O'Sullivan’s quoted: "In quotes: How leaders at Davos 2025 view Trump's comeback," World Economic Forum, 01.24.25.4

  • Trump's biggest priority in the Middle East now, according to Meghan O'Sullivan, the Director at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, would be the normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel.
  • "This he sees as unfinished business from his first administration when you had the Abraham Accords," she says, referring to his foreign policy achievement involving a series of normalization deals signed in 2020 by Israel and Bahrain, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates. "It will be extremely hard to have that normalization without a better outcome in Gaza. And that's going to be another reason why there will be focus on Gaza by the Trump administration." And there’s Iran, "where the ambition would be much larger" for a deal that spans the country’s behavior in the region.
  • She also remains optimistic about improvements in the US-China relationship where President Trump could take his "personal relationship with Xi Jinping and try to change it into something different."

“The Limits of the Madman Theory: How Trump’s Unpredictability Could Hurt His Foreign Policy,” Roseanne McManus, FA, 01.24.25.

“Pete Hegseth, New Defense Secretary, Outlines Pentagon’s Priorities,” Eric Schmitt, NYT, 01.25.25. 

  • Pete Hegseth, newly sworn-in as President Trump’s defense secretary, issued his set of priorities for the department on Saturday, saying that the Pentagon will “put America first, and we will never back down.”
    • First, he said he intends to “revive the warrior ethos and restore trust in our military.” Many military specialists question the need, arguing that the armed forces have been focused on waging war for years.
    • Second, Mr. Hegseth emphasized the strengthening of the nation’s industrial base — which ramped up after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine nearly three years ago — and streamlining the military’s cumbersome processes for buying new weapons.
    • Finally, he said the Pentagon would “re-establish deterrence by defending our homeland” and working with allies in the Indo-Pacific region to confront a rising military threat from China. 

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Missile defense:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Nuclear arms:

"Why Russia’s Nuclear Forces Are No Longer Being Updated," Maxim Starchak, CEIP, 01.23.25. 

  • According to the Defense Ministry, Russia’s strategic nuclear forces are 95% updated—just as in the year before. Previously, they were being modernized 25% faster than the Russian military as a whole. But now, amid wartime conditions, the defense industry’s priorities have shifted toward conventional forces, while sanctions and additional civilian burdens placed on military factories have also contributed to a drastic slowdown in the creation of strategic weapons.
  • Another development of 2024 was that it became clear once and for all that neither Ukraine nor NATO would be scared by tales of new Russian strategic weapons. In the current confrontation, medium-range missiles are in any case far more useful. So now the attention of the Russian leadership and the resources of the military-industrial complex will be focused on the Oreshnik and Putin’s other pet missile projects, leaving the Russian leader to try to frighten the West with the prospect of growing missile capability in Europe and a new arms race.

“Russia must help overthrow Western Europe’s dangerous political elites,” Sergei Karaganov, Profil/RT, 01.27.25. Clues from Russian Views. (RT is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

  • Any outcome of the Ukraine conflict framed as a ‘compromise’ would be celebrated in the West as a victory and perceived as a failure by Russia. This must be avoided at all costs.
    • First, Russia must openly confront Western Europe’s historical culpability.
    • Second, Russia must emphasize the inevitability of nuclear escalation in any conflict between NATO and Russia. This message is essential not only to limit an arms race but also to underscore the futility of stockpiling conventional weapons that will be rendered irrelevant in a nuclear confrontation. NATO’s leaders must understand that they cannot avoid the consequences of their actions.
    • Third, we must continue advancing on the battlefield, destroying the enemy’s forces with relentless precision.
    • Fourth, Russia must communicate to the Americans that their continued escalation of the Ukraine conflict will lead to catastrophic consequences. Should they persist, we will cross the nuclear Rubicon, targeting their allies and bases worldwide. Any non-nuclear response will provoke a nuclear strike on American soil. This clarity will force Washington to reconsider its reckless policies.
    • Fifth, we must strengthen our military capabilities while continuing to adjust our nuclear doctrine. If diplomacy fails, we must escalate decisively, demonstrating our readiness to use advanced weapons to defend Russia’s sovereignty and interests. While new technologies such as the Oreshnik missile system enhance our capabilities, they are no substitute for nuclear weapons, which remain the ultimate guarantor of our security.
    • Finally, Russia must offer the United States a dignified exit from its self-inflicted Ukrainian disaster. 

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

Counterterrorism:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Conflict in Syria:

Cyber security/AI: 

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Energy exports from CIS:

Climate change:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“As Trump and Putin Circle Each Other, an Agenda Beyond Ukraine Emerges,” David E. Sanger and Anton Troianovski, NYT, 01.27.25. 

  • President Trump and Vladimir V. Putin, whose relationship was always the subject of mystery and psychodrama in the first Trump term, are at it again. But it is not a simple re-run. Mr. Trump was unusually harsh in his rhetoric last week, saying Mr. Putin was “destroying Russia,” and threatening sanctions and tariffs on the country if it doesn’t come to the negotiating table—a fairly empty threat given the tiny amount of trade between the U.S. and Russia these days.
  • Calculating and understated as ever, Mr. Putin has responded with flattery, agreeing with Mr. Trump that Russia would not have invaded Ukraine had Mr. Trump been president three years ago. He repeated that he was ready to sit down and negotiate over the fate of Europe, superpower to superpower, leader to leader. So far they have not spoken, though Mr. Trump told reporters on Air Force. As they prepare the ground for that first conversation, they are sending signals that they want to negotiate about more than just Ukraine—a war that, in Mr. Putin’s telling, is only one of the arenas in which the West is waging its own fight against Russia.
  • The last, tentative arms control talks were ended shortly before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Mr. Putin has argued since then that any talks on limiting nuclear arms should also cover the war in Ukraine. The Biden administration had refused to mix the two, fearing that Mr. Putin’s real goal was to trade limits on its nuclear arsenal for the territory he had captured in Ukraine and other concessions. But Mr. Trump seems open to a broader negotiation, which is exactly what Mr. Putin would like, because it could enable him to make that trade-off.

Vladimir Putin’s “Answers to questions from journalist Pavel Zarubin,” Kremlin.ru, 01.24.25. 

  • My first point is that Russia has never turned down contacts with the U.S. administration, and it is not our fault that the previous administration chose not to establish such contacts. I have always had business-like, strictly business-like, but at the same time pragmatic and trust-based, I would say, relationships with the current President of the United States. I cannot but agree with him that if he had been President, if his victory had not been stolen from him in 2020, then maybe there would not have been the Ukraine crisis that broke out in 2022.
  • The current Kyiv regime appears quite content to receive hundreds of billions from its benefactors and—excuse me for using this homely phrase—to pig out on this money like there is no tomorrow..
  • Overall, we may have quite a few common points with the current administration and we could jointly look for solutions to the key issues of today, including strategic stability and the economy, by the way. Why? Just because we are among the world’s largest producers of, let’s say, oil; the United States is the leading producer followed by Saudi Arabia and Russia.
  • By the way, in this sense, I doubt that the current U.S. President, Mr. Trump—to reiterate, we worked together when he was president the first time—will make any decisions, even though we hear words about the possibility of imposing more sanctions on Russia, I still doubt that he will make decisions that will be bad for the U.S. economy. He is not just a smart person, but he is also a pragmatic person. And I have a hard time picturing him make decisions that will cause harm to the U.S. economy.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“The Cold War Putin Wants: Why Russia Seeks to Change, Not End, the Conflict in Ukraine,” Andrei Kolesnikov, FA, 01.23.25.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

Defense and aerospace:

  • See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Ukraine:

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

"The Belarus ‘election’ raises the question: When will Lukashenka step down?" Ryhor Astapenia, Chatham House, 01.27.25. 

  • On Sunday, Aliaksandr Lukashenka ‘won’ his seventh term in office in a rigged election, extending his 30-year reign by another five years. Still ‘only’ 70, this makes him one of the longest-serving heads of state in the world.
  • Over the last three years, Lukashenka has reconfigured the country’s political system to secure his future. That includes creating an additional new role for himself: chairman of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly, a position from which he plans to wield power after stepping down as president.
  • It seems that the Kremlin is poised to be the primary beneficiary of Lukashenka’s departure. Belarus-West relations are at a consistent low, while Russia wields immense economic and military influence within the country.
  • Although many factors influencing the power transition remain unknown—not least the timing and method of Lukashenka’s departure—the West lacks leverage in the process… if the West hopes to actively leverage Lukashenka’s departure, it would need to take steps that deviate from current policy.
  • First, it must identify potential tactical allies in Minsk, potential stakeholders of a post-Lukashenka regime who view Russia as a threat, determine how to support them, and begin doing so.
  • Second, it should talk with the regime, conditionally, of course, negotiating to end repression and release political prisoners. 

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

Footnotes

  1. Putin has earlier praised Trump for speaking of the “necessity of doing everything possible to avert a third world war,” while his press secretary Dmitry Peskov claimed that it is necessary to resume arms control negotiations with Washington “as soon as possible.”

  2. One may wonder just how impactful Donald Trump’s Jan. 22 threat to impose “taxes, tariffs and sanctions on anything being sold by Russia to the United States” if Vladimir Putin doesn't agree to a "deal" on/with Ukraine might prove to be? When thinking how to answer that question, one should factor in that U.S imports from the world’s most sanctioned country have already declined by 90%, from $29.6 billion in the last full year prior to Russia’s re-invasion of Ukraine (2021), to $2.88 billion in 2024, according to the U.S. census bureau. So, will Putin soften his negotiating position vis-a-vis Ukraine for the sake of $2.88 billion, which roughly accounted for 1% of Russia's exports in 2024?

  3. For estimates of casualties and other quantitative assessments of various aspects of the Russian-Ukrainian war, see The Russia-Ukraine War Report Card, Jan. 22, 2025
  4. For more on Meghan O'Sullivan’s remarks at WEF, see: "The Future of Energy Transition: Decoding the Agenda at DAVOS 2025,” Freddie Ponton, 21st Century Wire, 01.22.25.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 9:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

^ Machine-translated.

Slider photo by Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP.

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