The Russia-Ukraine War Report Card, Jan. 22, 2025

The Russia-Ukraine War Report Card, Jan. 22, 2025

Find past issues in the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card archive

Jan. 22 update: Net territorial change in the past month: Russia +178 square miles of Ukrainian territory (an area roughly equivalent to 7 1/2 Manhattan islands.) Ukraine still controls 177 square miles of Russian territory in Kursk oblast (down 3 square miles from last week).

Who’s Gaining and Who’s Losing What?

Territorial Control

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donbaskurskPokrovsk

 

Report Card*

Change in Russia’s control of Ukrainian territory.1

(Based on data from the Institute for the Study of War.)

  • Since Feb. 24, 2022:
    • Russia: +26,933 square miles. 12% of Ukraine. (Area roughly equivalent to the U.S. states of Massachusetts, Vermont and New Hampshire combined).
  • Total area of all Ukrainian territory Russia presently controls, including Crimea and parts of Donbas Russia had seized prior to the full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022:
    • Russia: +43,558 square miles. 19% of Ukraine. (Area roughly equivalent to the state of Ohio).2
  • In past month (Dec. 18, 2024–Jan. 21, 2025): Russia gained 178 square miles. Area roughly equivalent to 7 1/2 Manhattan islands.
  • In past week: Russia gained 34 square miles, the equivalent of roughly 1 1/2 Manhattan islands.

 

Russian net territorial control in Ukraine by month: February 2022–December 2024. (Also based on data from the Institute for the Study of War.)

wrc monthly

 

Military casualties

  • Russia: More than 700,000 killed or injured, according to a January 2025 estimate by  Lloyd Austin and Antony Blinken.3 48,000 missing.
  • Ukraine: 400,000 killed or injured, according to the January 2025 estimate by Austin and Blinken.4 35,000 missing.

Civilian fatalities

Military vehicles and equipment5

  • Russia: 20,027 lost. 
    • Tanks and armored vehicles: 11,599.
    • Aircraft: 286.
    • Naval vessels: 22.
  • Ukraine: 7,609 lost. 
    • Tanks and armored vehicles: 3,778.
    • Aircraft: 173.
    • Naval vessels: 35.

Citizens displaced

  • Russia: 800,000 emigrated for economic or political reasons, 0.6% of Russian population.
  • Ukraine: 10.2 million displaced Ukrainians, 23% of Ukrainian pre-invasion population of 44 million.
    • Internally displaced: 3.7 million.
    • International refugees: 6.5 million.

Economic impact6

  • Russia’s economic growth: 5.6% GDP since 2022 (through 2024)
  • 1.4% GDP growth forecast for 2025.
    • Budget deficit: 2.1% of GDP.
    • Russian ruble: 0.01005 U.S. dollars. -15% since invasion.
    • 3-year bond yield: 17.42%
  • Ukraine’s negative economic growth: -22.6% GDP since 2022 (through 2024)
    • 2.5% GDP growth forecast for 2025.
    • Budget deficit: 20.4% of GDP, excluding grants.
    • Ukrainian hryvnia: 0.0237 U.S. dollars. -28% since invasion.
    • 3-year bond yield: 25.1%

Infrastructure

  • Russia: A journalistic investigation estimated in March 2024 that Ukrainian strikes had rendered facilities which accounted for 1/6th of the production of gasoline and diesel fuels in Russia non-operational.
  • Ukraine: 64%, or 36 out of 56 GW electricity generating capacity destroyed or occupied, Ukraine relies for 2/3rds of its electricity generation on three functioning Soviet-era NPPs, which it still controls.

Popular support7

  • Russia: 54% support peace negotiations.
  • Ukraine: 35% support peace negotiations.

Other criteria which may be even more important (about which we continue to search for reliable indicators):

  • Ammunition supply
  • Foreign military aid
  • Force generation
  • Military leadership
  • Training
  • Morale
  • Control of strategic locations
  • Information war: with U.S./Europe; with world.

 

Footnotes

  1. This issue of the war report card has been amended to specify that our measurements of changes in Russia's territorial control include Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia's armed forces and its proxies since 2014.
  2. Russia Matters has been reporting the distance from the Russia-Ukraine war frontline to Pokrovsk from the frontline to Pokrovsk city center (currently 3.44 miles). We have decided to change this practice and report the distance from the current frontline (updated weekly) to the outer city boundary (currently 1.01 miles).
  3. According to Donald Trump’s January 2025 estimate, 1 million Russian soldiers have been killed.
  4. According to Trump’s January 2025 estimate, 700,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed.
  5. Oryx, “Attack On Europe: Documenting Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” Oryx (blog), https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html; “The Military Balance 2022,” IISS, https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2022; Oryx, “List Of Aircraft Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-aircraft-losses-during-2022.html; Oryx, “List Of Naval Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-naval-losses-during-2022.html
  6. International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Russian estimates. “Russia and Ukraine 3-Year Bond Yield,” Investing.com, https://www.investing.com/rates-bonds/russia-3-year-bond-yield; World Bank Group, “Europe and Central Asia Economic Update,” https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/94bdc078-9c64-4833-992a-fda7b3d1a640/content; World Bank, “Russian Federation MPO,” https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/d5f32ef28464d01f195827b7e020a3e8-0500022021/related/mpo-rus.pdf; Investing.com, “Russia 3-Year Bond Yield,” https://www.investing.com/rates-bonds/russia-3-year-bond-yield; World Bank, “The World Bank in Ukraine,” https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ukraine/overview#3; https://www.exchange-rates.org/exchange-rate-history/rub-usd-2024-11-01.
  7. Levada Center, “Conflict with Ukraine in November 2024,” Dec. 4, 2022, https://www.levada.ru/2024/12/04/konflikt-s-ukrainoj-v-noyabre-2024-goda-vnimanie-podderzhka-otnoshenie-k-peregovoram-trudnosti-i-uspehi-svo-stolknovenie-rossii-i-nato-primenenie-yadernogo-oruzhiya/; Razumkov Center, “Support among citizens for Ukraine's accession to the EU and NATO. Attitude to foreign countries. Attitude to peace talks (September, 2024),” https://razumkov.org.ua/en/sociology/press-releases/support-among-citizens-for-ukraine-s-accession-to-the-eu-and-nato-attitude-to-foreign-countries-attitude-to-peace-talks-september-2024.

*Originally produced by Kate Davidson, a researcher with the Avoiding Great Power War Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Since December 2024 produced by RM staff and researcher with Belfer Center’s Avoiding Great Power War Project Quinn Urich.