4 Ideas to Explore

1. The prospect of Ukraine in NATO is an invitation for Russia to continue its war against Ukraine, which the latter is losing, according to Rumer of CEIP. Rather than continue along this path, which would eventually leave Ukraine no choice but to accept Putin’s terms, Ukrainians should embrace an alternative path: “[O]ffer Putin a compromise to satisfy some, but not all, of his conditions and enable him to claim victory while preserving Ukraine as a sovereign state,” Rumer writes in an article for CFR. Ukraine’s long-term neutrality could be part of that compromise, according to Rumer. “Neutrality or nonalignment should not keep it from maintaining trained, highly capable and well-equipped armed forces,” Rumer argues.
2. “How do you help President Zelenskyy and Ukraine sustain enough leverage to ensure that those negotiations are not just on Putin's terms?” CIA’s Burns asked himself during his interview with NPR’s Kelly. “I think the best leverage is… to sustain support for Zelenskyy's Ukraine, help the Ukrainians to hold the line on the battlefield and in the process to puncture Putin's hubris and make clear that time is not necessarily on his side at the cost to Russia are going to rise as well,” Burns said in his answer.
3. The members of Trump’s team and of key European governments who think a European force should be deployed in Ukraine after the fighting there ends should think again, according to RAND’s Charap. “A deployment of European forces to Ukraine will inevitably entangle the Americans,” Charap warns in a commentary for FT. “If Russia were to violate a ceasefire and attack this European force, the pressure for Washington to intervene would be overwhelming,” Charap predicts.
4. In the waning days of Biden’s presidency, his administration imposed what a duo of Russian experts described as the “toughest sanctions yet on Russian oil,” targeting, among other entities, two of Russia’s top five oil companies: Surgutneftegaz and Gazprom Neft. That may seem like a big deal, but in reality, sanctions against these two companies will only have “a short-term impact on Russian oil exports” because they contribute less than half of the entire volume of oil exported from Russia, according to Prokopenko and Kolyandr. In contrast, “sanctions against the tankers could be more significant,” the two analysts write in their commentary for The Bell. Overall, the Jan. 10 sanctions will “drive up costs, reducing profits and overall oil revenues, which remains hugely important for the Russian budget,” Prokopenko and Kolyandr write. They will also weaken the ruble, and fuel inflation, according to the duo. 

NB: Next week’s Russia Analytical Report will appear on Tuesday, Jan. 21, instead of Monday, Jan. 20, because of the U.S. Martin Luther King, Jr. Day holiday.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.¹

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:²

"Battles Rage Inside Russia, With Waves of Tanks, Drones and North Koreans," Marc Santora, Liubov Sholudko and Finbarr O’Reilly, NYT, 01.13.25. 

• “The fighting, in the Kursk region of Russia, has taken on a layer of significance for the territory’s potential to play a role in any cease-fire negotiations. Facing the prospect of an unpredictable new U.S. president — who has vowed to end the war swiftly, without clarifying the terms — Ukraine hopes to use Russian territory as a bargaining chip. Russia, relying on North Korean reinforcements, hopes to knock that territory out of Ukraine’s grasp.”
• “The situation worsened significantly when the North Koreans started arriving,” said Jr. Sgt. Oleksii, 30, a platoon leader. “They are pressuring our fronts en masse, finding weak points and breaking through them.”
• “Russia, with the help of an estimated 12,000 North Koreans, has retaken about half of the territory it lost over the summer. Its assaults over the past week have further eaten into the territory held by Ukraine. But Ukrainian forces have also gone on the attack in recent days, seeking to secure an area west of Sudzha, a small town in Russia about six miles from the border that has become the anchor for Ukrainian forces, which seized about 200 square miles in August. The Russians have largely thwarted the assault, but fighting goes on and the situation remains unpredictable, soldiers said.”
  • “With its incursion, Ukraine aims to create a buffer zone to protect hundreds of thousands of civilians in the city of Sumy, less than 20 miles from the border with Russia. Ukraine also wants to ease pressure on the eastern front by drawing Russians back onto their own land.”
  • “Some military analysts have cautioned that Ukraine’s Kursk campaign could leave its forces increasingly stretched and losing ground in its own eastern Donbas region.”
  • “Many soldiers fighting in Kursk believe that the painful losses in eastern Ukraine would have been even worse without their campaign. “We have to understand the Russians use their most elite soldiers and best reserves in this area,” said Capt. Oleksandr Shyrshyn, 30, a battalion commander in the 47th Mechanized Brigade. “Considering what they could be doing in other parts of Ukraine, it is good.”
• “Capt. Shyrshyn acknowledged the decline in Ukrainian morale over nearly three years of war, but said most soldiers still understood why they must fight. “Stopping will mean our death, that’s all,” he said.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Russia is being set aflame by hundreds of arson attacks," The Economist, 01.12.25. 

Military aid to Ukraine: 

“Dollars and Sense: America’s Interest in a Ukrainian Victory,” Elaine McCusker, Frederick W. Kagan and Richard Sims, AEI, 01.09.25.

• “Supporting Ukraine to victory against Russia is in the best interest of the United States.”
• “A world in which Russia prevails would be more dangerous and more expensive for America—requiring an estimated increase of $808 billion in defense spending over five years.”
• “Alternatively, an increased and accelerated multinational commitment to Ukraine and conclusion of the war in the near term would result in a vibrant and free Ukraine with a newly modernized and battle-tested military and a thriving industrial base, which would help stabilize Europe.”
• “Stability in Europe may also improve conditions in the Middle East and Pacific as the Axis of Aggression sees a resolute alliance that is both willing and capable of using a wide range of deterrence options combined with decisive, rapid response to contingencies.”

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

"Russia’s Hidden War Debt," Craig Kennedy, Substack, 01.11.25. 

1. “The Russian state has been pursuing a two-track strategy to cover its mounting war costs, supplementing its highly scrutinized defense budget expenditures with funding from an off-budget defense financing scheme that is similar in scale, but has been overlooked by analysts;”
2. “Unlike its federal defense budget expenditures, which remain at sustainable levels, Russia’s off-budget funding scheme is proving much more problematic to sustain;”
3. “This now poses a funding dilemma for Moscow that could weigh on its war calculus, while providing Ukraine and its allies valuable, new negotiating leverage; this report details ways to exploit Moscow’s growing financial vulnerability.”

• “Ukraine and its allies can exploit Moscow’s funding dilemma by taking two measures:”
  • “Quietly voice confidence that Western resources can outmatch Russian resources in a war of attrition, backing up that message with a renewed package of funding and arms along with stepped up sanctions enforcement—following up on the January 10, 2025 ratcheting up of energy sanctions.”
  • “State robustly and categorically that sanctions relief is entirely off the table in any ceasefire negotiations and will only be considered as part of a comprehensive peace settlement—including reparations—that is negotiated and approved by Ukraine.”

“Time is not on Russia’s side, argues Finland’s foreign minister. Elina Valtonen calls for a lower oil-price cap and tougher measures against Russia’s shadow fleet,” The Economist, 01.08.25.

• “Contrary to Vladimir Putin’s narrative, and some people’s belief, sanctions do work. Even when they do not prevent certain goods and technologies from entering or—in the case of oil and gas—leaving Russia, they certainly make logistics more cumbersome. That increases costs.”
• “Owing to a low birth rate, high mortality and an exodus of Russians who oppose Mr. Putin or just want a better life elsewhere, Russia’s population is shrinking, ageing and losing its best talent. The senseless war in Ukraine, with hundreds of thousands of casualties, is not helping.”
• “In 2024 Russia’s GDP grew by around 3.5%. This relatively strong performance came almost exclusively from sectors directly related to the war. Most forecasters expect barely any growth in 2025 as Russia runs out of labor and other resources. Despite all this, Russia can maintain the current level of military production, even if it means cutting back on everything else.”
• “The ruble has weakened significantly and would be on the floor were it not for central-bank support through emergency buying and capital-control mechanisms.”
• “With the economic outlook so bleak, time is not on Russia’s side.”
• “So far Mr. Putin has prioritized his war against Ukraine over the welfare of his own people. To achieve just and lasting peace in Ukraine, he must be made to understand that the cost of his illegal campaign is getting too high, even for his tolerance.”
  • “To this end, we need to increase the economic pressure on Russia and reduce the possibilities for dodging sanctions, including the use of a shadow fleet. Russia uses rusting, non-insured tankers to covertly carry Russian oil around the world, undermining the EU and G7 oil-price cap on Russian crude and petroleum products.”
  • “Several measures for limiting the use of the hazardous fleet are in the works.”
  • “Across Europe, decoupling from Russian energy is well under way.”
  • “America and their partners must continue supporting Ukraine militarily and economically.”
• “The war is far from lost. With determined support from its partners, Ukraine will get through this winter in a position to enter peace talks on its own terms and timeline. Ukraine’s international partners need to keep up their joint measures until Russia starts to engage with the world in a peaceful manner, respecting the UN Charter and international law.”

"Alternative Globalization: Will Russia Become the Flagship of a Coalition of Economic Disorder?" Vladislav Inozemtsev, Re: Russia, 01.08.25.³ Clues from Russian Views.

• “The introduction of extensive sanctions against the Russian economy, not supported by many non-Western countries, has turned Russia into the center and driving force of 'alternative' globalization. This does not imply Russia’s leadership within BRICS or among the Global South – on the contrary, its role there has become marginalized. However, Russia is transforming into a global laboratory for resistance against sanction pressures.”
• “A dangerous consequence of this transformation is the emergence of an economic model characterized by widespread violations of intellectual property rights, opaque foreign trade reliant on its own infrastructure, and the use of unconventional forms of international settlements.”
• “Whereas at the beginning of the 21st century the main driving force behind ‘alternative’ globalization was criminal associations and networks, today they have been replaced by rogue states. These states are coalescing into a global coalition that opposes the principles of globalization that previously shaped its course.”
• “The Kremlin sees opportunities to institutionalize this model to fulfill its geopolitical ambitions, attempting to position itself as a leader of an economic world rejected by the West.”
• “It is unlikely that the West will be able to overcome this resistance by force. To return to the era of liberal globalization, a new approach to the global periphery must be found – one that can entice it as effectively as was done forty years ago.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "The Impact of Sanctions and Alliances on Russian Military Capabilities," Oliver Ruth, RUSI, 01.10.25.
• "Russian Assets Are Europe’s Trump Card," Adrian Karatnycky, FP, 01.08.25. 

Ukraine-related negotiations:⁴

"Neutrality: An Alternative to Ukraine’s Membership in NATO," Eugene Rumer, CFR, 01.07.25. 

• “It has become widely accepted that Ukraine is losing the war with Russia. ... As the war’s three-year mark approaches, Ukraine simply cannot overcome Russia’s structural advantages—people, economy, and land—even with help from its Western partners.”
• “The question now is how to get Russia to agree to a cease-fire and negotiate an end to a war it is currently winning. The prospect of long-term Ukrainian neutrality after the war could bring Russia to the table.”
• “Coupled with the false but firmly held narrative in the Russian security establishment that NATO broke its promise not to expand the alliance to the east, the prospect of Ukraine in NATO is an invitation for Russia to continue its murderous campaign.”
• “That leaves Ukraine two paths forward. The first is the path that Ukraine is on now—a slow, grinding, and open-ended fight with the growing risk of a major breakthrough by the Russian army that would then leave them no choice but to accept Putin’s terms for negotiations. The other path is to offer Putin a compromise to satisfy some, but not all, of his conditions and enable him to claim victory while preserving Ukraine as a sovereign state...The prospect of long-term Ukrainian neutrality after the war could bring Russia to the table.”
• “Ukraine could develop its own blueprint for security policy. Neutrality or nonalignment should not keep it from maintaining trained, highly capable, and well-equipped armed forces backed by a large pool of trained reservists.”
• “NATO allies have to recognize that their new frontier—the Iron Curtain, the inner German border, the East-West divide—runs from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea and along the border between Ukraine and Russia.”
• “The standoff with Russia will require NATO to mobilize its resources in ways that it has not done, even during the Cold War. Support for Ukraine needs to be an integral part of this effort. Ukraine’s and the West’s ability to succeed in this new Cold War will be the true indicator of victory in the hot war that is being waged now.”

"Think twice before committing to European boots on the ground in Ukraine," Samuel Charap, FT, 01.13.25. 

• “Despite all the differences between president-elect Donald Trump’s team and key European governments, both sides seem to agree on the merits of at least one policy: deploying a European force to Ukraine after the fighting there ends. ... But the idea of putting European boots on the ground in Ukraine is deeply problematic.”
  • “For a start, there is significant confusion about what those boots would be meant to accomplish.”
  • “The Kremlin is likely to demand that Ukraine give a commitment not to host foreign forces on its territory as part of any settlement.”
  • “A deployment of European forces to Ukraine will inevitably entangle the Americans.”
    • “Perhaps most importantly, if Russia were to violate a ceasefire and attack this European force, the pressure for Washington to intervene would be overwhelming. A shooting war between Russia and US allies in Europe in which the Americans sat on the sidelines is difficult to imagine. And if that were to happen, the blow to Nato’s credibility would probably be fatal. Leaders on both sides of the Atlantic should think twice before they potentially put the alliance in such an untenable position.”

"Trump may get Russia and Ukraine to the table. Then what?" George Beebe, Responsible Statecraft, 01.13.25. 

• “A wide range of issues will require detailed negotiation, but three principles will be key to his success:”
  1. “Put American Interests First. The Biden administration has, from the invasion’s start, insisted that it is up to Ukraine to decide if and when to seek an end to the war. It has offered tactical advice but deferred to Kyiv on setting strategy. This has proved to be a recipe for unending conflict that is devastating Ukraine and perversely incentivizing Kyiv to draw the United States more directly into the war.”
  2. “Broaden the Problem. Part of the reason that Biden has deferred to Kyiv was a widely shared belief in Washington that the war is a bilateral matter between Russia and Ukraine, and that the key to any peace settlement was to maximize Ukraine’s leverage on the battlefield. That assumption was fundamentally flawed. It failed to understand that Russia’s enormous numerical advantages in population and military production meant Ukraine’s military was bound to weaken over time in a war of attrition, even with robust Western support. And it failed to recognize that the United States has long been able to negotiate from a position of strength if it viewed the war through a wider lens.”
  3. “Play the China Card. Recognizing that the war has deepened Russia’s dependence on China, the Biden administration pressed the Chinese to arm-twist Putin into ending the invasion, dangling the prospect of new sanctions if Beijing refused. But Beijing’s ambivalence toward the war was never going to translate into picking sides, and Biden’s with-us-or-against-us approach missed an opportunity to explore the subtleties in China’s calls for settling the war.”
• “The path toward peace in Ukraine will be arduous. Russia is deeply distrustful of American intentions and has profound doubts that Trump can wrangle the Washington establishment into support for any settlement. But with diplomatic skill and a dollop of luck, Trump could achieve what until recently seemed all but impossible: an independent Ukraine securely embedded in the EU; a Europe better able to deter and counterbalance Russia with its own resources; and a Russia and China that are less united in their hostility toward Washington. That vision is well worth pursuing, even if the odds of failure are significant.”

"Donald Trump pushes back Ukraine war deadline in sign of support for Kyiv," Henry Foy, Max Seddon and Amy Kazmin, FT, 01.09.25. 

• “US president-elect Donald Trump has pushed back his campaign pledge to end the war in Ukraine in “24 hours” to several months, in a shift European partners have interpreted as a sign that his administration will not immediately abandon support for Kyiv.”
• “Trump ... suggested that “six months” was a more realistic target to end the war. His appointee as special envoy for the war in Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, told Fox News on Wednesday that the aim was to stop the conflict in “100 days.”
• “European leaders and officials have been making the case to Trump and his team that continued US military aid is needed to put Kyiv in a stronger position for peace talks and help bring Moscow to the negotiating table, nearly three years after Russia launched its full-scale invasion.”
• “Putin’s main goal in any talks was to create new security agreements that would ensure Ukraine never joins Nato and that the US-led military alliance pulls back from some of its eastern deployments, according to a former senior Kremlin official and another person who has discussed this with the Russian president.”
• “He wants to change the rules of the international order so there are no threats to Russia. He is very worried about how the world will look after the war,” the former senior Kremlin official said. “Trump wants to roll back Nato anyway. The world is changing, anything can happen.”

"Attempt at a Deal: What Negotiations to End the Conflict in Ukraine Could Look Like," Vladimir Frolov, Forbes.ru, 01.09.25.^ Clues from Russian Views.

• “There is a chance for negotiations to begin. ... The problem is that there is almost nothing to negotiate about yet. Not only is there no concept of possible agreements, but even a shared understanding of the subject of negotiations is absent.”
• “Washington and Kyiv talk about resolving the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, while Moscow seeks to resolve the global conflict between Russia and the West, where Ukraine is merely one of the storylines.”
• “Trump would prefer a quick deal, while Moscow is inclined toward prolonged negotiations on a new international order of equal security.”
• “The U.S. wants to discuss a "freeze of the conflict along the line of contact." Ukraine aims for a "just peace" with Western security guarantees.”
• “Russia is determined to achieve a final settlement, but only on the basis of addressing the root causes of the conflict, which it perceives as NATO expansion, the creation of military threats to Russia in Europe and Ukraine, Western support for the "Kyiv regime," and the infringement of the rights of Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine "in historically Russian territories."
• “And, of course, Moscow insists on the recognition of four new regions as part of Russia.”
• “Thus, negotiations under the "Trump plan" will not lead to a quick ceasefire but could continue throughout 2025 against the backdrop of ongoing hostilities until the parties decide that stopping is more beneficial than continuing.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "A Rapid Ceasefire in Ukraine Could Lead Donald Trump into a Russian Trap," Orysia Lutsevych, Chatham House, 01.09.25.
• "Russia’s Economic Dilemmas Give Trump Important Leverage in Negotiations on Ukraine. But Will He Use It?" David Lubin, Chatham House, 01.09.25.
• “A Deal with Russia at Ukraine’s Expense Will Not Bring Peace," Olena Snigyr, FPRI, 01.10.25.
• "The Ukraine War Cannot End With A Russian Crimea," Kaush Arha, George Scutaru and Justina Budginaite-Froehly, NI, 01.09.25. 

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Transcript: NPR's full conversation with CIA Director William Burns,” Mary Louise Kelly, NPR, 01.10.25. 

• “I certainly have in my long experience dealing with and interacting with Putin. I mean, I think, you know, he's not a big believer in the better angels of the human spirit by both professional training and experience. He's a big believer in control and intimidation. He's deeply suspicious of people around him and always looking for vulnerabilities that he can take advantage of.”
• “The issue, I think, is going to be how do you help President Zelenskyy and Ukraine sustain enough leverage to ensure that those negotiations are not just on Putin's terms. And how do you continue to inflict costs on Russia so that Putin understands that time is not necessarily on his side, which is what I think he believes today?”
• “Putin is someone who gets even. And I think Prigozhin had crossed a pretty significant line when he led a mutiny that had gotten two-thirds of the way up the highway from Rostov in southern Russia toward Moscow before he was stopped. And I think Putin was determined to demonstrate that, you know, he wasn't going to allow that.”
• “The other fascinating thing about that episode, though, is if you remember the 30-minute video that the Prigozhin did the morning of the mutiny, on Telegram, to a lot of Russians watched. It was the most scathing indictment of Putin's rationale for war in Ukraine that I've seen from anyone. He essentially said it was a war of choice, that there was no threat from Ukraine to Russia ahead of time. He said that the generalship on the Russian side was deeply uneven and incompetent, and thirdly, said it was the corruption at the heart of Putin's Russia that help explain a lot of the missteps that were made.”
• “I think the truth is that as Russians begin to think through the consequences of this war, 700,000 killed and wounded, which is 10 times what the Soviets lost in Afghanistan in a decade of war. The fact that Putin has rebuilt the Russian defense industrial base, but he's done that at the expense, you know, of the medium term future of the Russian economy with inflation rising again. So, you know, I think Russians are going to have a lot of questions about, you know, the cost.”
• “Well, I think the leverage is very straightforward. He [Putin]  is not a sentimentalist. Right now, he judges that he has the upper hand on the battlefield. You know, I've been to Ukraine 14 times during the course of the war. The last time I was there last month, just before Christmas, was another of the missile and drone strikes on Kyiv that he's launched. And so he believes he can grind down the Ukrainians. I think the best leverage is, as I mentioned before, it's to sustain support for Zelenskyy's Ukraine, help the Ukrainians to hold the line on the battlefield and in the process to can, to puncture Putin's hubris and make clear that time is not necessarily on his side at the cost to Russia are going to rise as well. I think that's, you know, the best basis that I can imagine for negotiations.”
• “[Ukrainians] face a huge manpower challenge. Russia is a country four times the size of Ukraine, so it's difficult for the Ukrainians to deal with that. It's not a question of their courage or tenacity, which I don't doubt for a minute. But, you know, that manpower disadvantage is, is, is something that Putin's taking advantage of.”
• “We continue to focus, along with others in the U.S. government, you know, on the ISIS threat in Iraq and Syria, and over the last few years have, you know, had successful strikes against ISIS some years in that part of the world, too.”
• “This is one of those moments of, I think, revolutionary change on the international landscape with intense major power competition with China and with Russia, but also a revolution in technology unlike anything we've seen since the Industrial Revolution. What that means, for us at CIA and has meant over the last four years, is that we have to begin to revolutionize the practice of intelligence.”
• “What we focus on China and technology while we continue to deal with continuing responsibilities on counterterrorism, wars in Ukraine and the Middle East.”

U.S. President Joe Biden’s speech at the Department of State, 01.13.25. Summarized by RM staff.

• “I've said many times, we are at an inflection point. The post Cold-War era is over. A new era has begun. In these four years, we faced crises, we've been tested, we've come through those tests, stronger in my view, than we entered those tests. This is a fierce competition underway. The future of the global economy, technology, human values and so much else. Right now, in my view, thanks to our administration, the United States is winning the world-wide competition.”
• “Compared to four years ago, America is stronger, our alliances are stronger, our adversaries and competitors are weaker. ... NATO is more capable than it's ever been.”
• “When Putin invaded, he thought he'd conquer Kyiv in a matter of days. The truth is, since that war began I'm the only one that stood in the center of Kyiv, not him.”
• “We helped Ukrainians to stop Putin. Putin has failed to achieve any of his strategic objectives. ... There is more to do. We can’t walk away... What happens to Ukraine matters to them [Asian nations] as well.”
• “Now Russia is struggling to replace [what it has lost on the battlefield] ... the ruble is under enormous pressure.”
• “As I saw it, when Putin launched his invasion, I had two jobs — one to rally the world to defend Ukraine, and the other is to avoid war between two nuclear powers. We did both those things. Today, Ukraine is still a free, independent country, with a potential, a potential for a bright future.”
• “According to the latest predictions, on China's current course they will never surpass us -- period.”
• “There is nothing our adversaries [Xi and Putin] would like more [than for the U.S. to have remain bogged down in Afghanistan].”
• “[The U.S. should continue to pursue] a just peace for Ukraine.”

"A User’s Guide to ‘Who Lost Ukraine?’" Stephen M. Walt, FP, 01.08.25.

• “No one knows exactly how or when Russia’s war in Ukraine will end, but the terms are likely to be disappointing to Kyiv and its Western supporters. If that happens, the next phase will feature a nasty debate over who was responsible.”
• “There’s no need to wait for th[e] war of ideas to erupt because some of the competing positions are already out there and others are easy to anticipate.”
  • “Argument #1: It was a mistake for Ukraine to give up its nuclear weapons.”
  • “Argument #2: Inviting Ukraine to join NATO was a huge strategic blunder.”
  • “Argument #3: NATO didn’t expand fast enough.”
  • “Argument #4: The West failed to negotiate seriously in 2021.”
  • “Argument #5: Ukraine and Russia both lost because they didn’t end the war quickly.”
  • “Argument #6: Ukraine was stabbed in the back.”
  • “Argument #7: It was Kyiv’s fault.”
  • “Argument #8: It’s realpolitik, baby. Russians from Putin on down see the war as part of a relentless U.S.-led effort to keep Russia weak, but I suspect there are some in the West who believe Ukraine was simply a pawn that was sacrificed to ensnare Russia in a long and costly war.”
  • “Argument #9: When all else fails, blame Trump.”
• “A healthy and fair-minded debate on what went right and wrong in Ukraine would help us learn the right lessons and do better in the future, but learning the right lessons from past failures is never guaranteed. Regular readers of this column already know which of these various arguments I find most convincing, but my goal here is not to pin the blame on anyone. For now, just clip this column, and get ready to keep score as fingers are pointed and the dust-kicking begins.”

"Trump Is Facing a Catastrophic Defeat in Ukraine," Robert Kagan, The Atlantic, 01.07.25. 

• “When Trump said during his campaign that he could end the war in 24 hours, he presumably believed what most observers believed: that Putin needed a respite, that he was prepared to offer peace in exchange for territory, and that a deal would include some kind of security guarantee for whatever remained of Ukraine. Because Trump’s peace proposal at the time was regarded as such a bad deal for Kyiv, most assumed Putin would welcome it. Little did they know that the deal was not remotely bad enough for Putin to accept. So now Trump is in the position of having promised a peace deal that he cannot possibly get without forcing Putin to recalculate.”
• “No, in order to change Putin’s calculations, Trump would have to do exactly what he has not wanted to do so far: He would have to renew aid to the Ukrainians immediately, and in sufficient quantity and quality to change the trajectory on the battlefield. He would also have to indicate convincingly that he was prepared to continue providing aid until Putin either acquiesced to a reasonable deal or faced the collapse of his army. Such actions by Trump would change the timelines sufficiently to give Putin cause for concern. Short of that, the Russian president has no reason to talk about peace terms. He need only wait for Ukraine’s collapse.”
• “If Trump fails to support Ukraine, he faces the unpalatable prospect of presiding over a major strategic defeat. Historically, that has never been good for a leader’s political standing. Jimmy Carter looked weak when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, which was of far less strategic significance than Ukraine. Henry Kissinger, despite his Nobel Prize, was drummed out of the Republican Party in the mid-1970s in no small part because of America’s failure in Vietnam and the perception that the Soviet Union was on the march during his time in office. Joe Biden ended an unpopular war in Afghanistan, only to pay a political price for doing so. Barack Obama, who moved to increase American forces in Afghanistan, never paid a political price for extending the war. Biden paid that price in part because the exit from Afghanistan was, to say the least, messy. The fall of Ukraine will be far messier—and better televised. Trump has created and cherished an aura of power and toughness, but that can quickly vanish. When the fall of Ukraine comes, it will be hard to spin as anything but a defeat for the United States, and for its president.”
• “This was not what Trump had in mind when he said he could get a peace deal in Ukraine. He no doubt envisioned being lauded as the statesman who persuaded Putin to make a deal, saving the world from the horrors of another endless war. His power and prestige would be enhanced. He would be a winner. His plans do not include being rebuffed, rolled over, and by most of the world’s judgment, defeated. Whether Trump can figure out where the path he is presently following will lead him is a test of his instincts. He is not on the path to glory. And unless he switches quickly, his choice will determine much more than the future of Ukraine.”

"Putin’s Victory Will Be a Hollow One," Rajan Menon, Foreign Policy, 01.13.25. 

• “From its outset, Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine had two objectives. The first was to annex as much Ukrainian territory as possible... The invasion’s second, larger purpose was to use these gains to absorb Ukraine into Russia’s sphere of influence and transform the European balance of power.”
• “Despite the Russian army’s advances in 2024, there is no scenario in which Russian President Vladimir Putin achieves either objective. Though Russia will likely hive off at least one-fifth of Ukrainian territory and perhaps retain it forever, what remains of Ukraine will not be bound to Russia. Putin’s invasion thus will likely yield a military success—one well short of his declared territorial objectives—but not a strategic one.”
• “The irony is that Putin’s war has led to NATO expansion and increased defense spending in Europe.”
• “The European Union may lack the will and unity to rapidly achieve military self-sufficiency, but it does have greater military-relevant resources than Russia—such as a population more than three times larger, a GDP roughly nine times bigger, technological capabilities incomparably more advanced, and a world-class defense industry—that are now being mobilized like never before.”
• “Russia’s army has suffered some 700,000 casualties, including what’s estimated to be between 79,000 and 120,000 deaths. Add to that the economic costs of the war, which the Pentagon estimated last February to be up to $211 billion. .. Russia’s losses in military equipment have also been staggering.”
• “Putin’s war has exposed the hollowness of Russia’s claim to be a military superpower, its nuclear arsenal aside.”
• “Given China’s growing economic and military power, there is no doubt which country will have the upper hand in the Beijing-Moscow alignment.”
• “Even though Russia may achieve a military victory over Ukraine by virtue of the territory it will likely gain, Putin’s war will have failed to secure preponderant influence in Ukraine and a stronger long-term position in Europe, leaving Russia worse off in the long run both internally and externally.”

“How to Win the New Cold War. To Compete With China, Trump Should Learn From Reagan,” Niall Ferguson, FA, January/February 2025.

“The looming Eurasian menace,” Hal Brands, WP, 01.09.24

• “The most dangerous geopolitical phenomenon of our era isn't any single crisis, conflict or competitor. It is the growing web of ties that bind America's Eurasian foes.”
• “All the epic clashes of the 20th century — World War I, World War II, the Cold War — were contests between autocracies seeking vast Eurasian empires and the global coalitions that fought to turn them back.”
• “A country or coalition that mastered Eurasia would become a global menace, for it would possess the power to make even the most distant democracies insecure.”
• “China and Russia announced their 'no limits' strategic partnership just before Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.”
• “An autocratic peace within Eurasia encourages violent meddling around its margins.”
• “If the United States once served as the arsenal of democracy, a modern-day arsenal of autocracy is now taking shape.”
• “The United States has a post-Cold War military in a pre-world war world.”
• “Closer ties among U.S. adversaries raise the odds that a war that starts in one place will spill into others.”
• “Asia-Pacific powers such as Japan and South Korea have aided Ukraine, because they see its war with Russia as a test of strength between the democratic world and Eurasian autocracies.”
• “It is essential to strengthen the ramparts of an embattled international order and, eventually, help America prevail in the grand Eurasian struggle that is once more underway.”

"Russia Is Stepping Up Its Covert War Beyond Ukraine," Bart Schuurman, FP, 01.10.25.

• “Based on an overview of Russian operations in the physical domain, excluding most cyber operations, Leiden University’s research highlights how Moscow is increasingly escalating beyond its long-standing campaigns of espionage and digital disruption. Even using a conservative metric for attribution, Russian operations against Europe have surged from 6 in 2022 to 13 in 2023 and 44 in 2024.”
  • “Most of these incidents involve preparations for sabotage. Targets have ranged from critical undersea energy and communications infrastructure in the North and Baltic seas to military bases, warehouses, and armaments plants.”
  • “Another common Russian tactic has been influence operations that target European politicians to erode political support for Ukraine, both at the European Union and national levels. A key example is the Voice of Europe scandal, which centered on a radical news site that became a tool for the Kremlin to platform Russia-friendly content and funnel money to pro-Russian politicians in various European countries.”
  • “Alongside these more sophisticated measures, there have been numerous acts of vandalism seemingly designed to sow confusion and disrupt daily life. This suggests a dual operational approach, combining actions carried out by opportunistic criminals recruited via platforms like Telegram with plots by operatives linked to state agencies such as the GRU.”
• “To shore up Europe’s security, a more assertive posture toward Russian operations is needed. The Finnish authorities’ decision to board and detain a cargo ship suspected of damaging an undersea cable last December and NATO’s decision to strengthen its naval presence in the Baltic Sea are positive signs in this regard. More fundamentally, Europe needs to define its own red lines in response to Moscow’s provocations... A publicly communicated commitment to retaliate against sabotage, supported by a credible threat, could provide deterrent capabilities that are currently lacking.”
• “As part of this more assertive posture, Europe will need to invest in strengthening its intelligence services—both to maximize their ability to deal with the heightened Russian threat and to maintain a high level of counterterrorism capability toward nonstate extremists, such as the Islamic State. In the longer term, Europe must finally make serious and concerted efforts to reinvigorate its own armament industry, which is crucial to maintaining an ability to supply Ukraine regardless of U.S. foreign-policy priorities, as well as autonomously safeguarding the security on which the continent’s prosperity ultimately depends. None of this will come about easily, especially in a continent infamous for its inability to organize its own collective security. But the stakes are high and extend beyond the need to support Ukraine and ward off future Russian aggression. Essentially, the question is whether Europe’s liberal democracies can withstand the pressures of autocratic revanchism, or whether their ideals will falter under an inability to safeguard them through military means.”

"Why Biden’s Foreign Policy Fell Short," Kori Schake, FP, 01.07.25. 

• “The central failure of Biden’s foreign policy: the expansive chasm between brave pronouncements and what the administration was actually willing to risk or commit to achieve its goals.”
• “Nowhere is the gap between objective and risk more evident or damaging than Ukraine. Biden officials repeatedly said the United States would support Ukraine “as long as it takes,” committing more than $100 billion in assistance, but they provided that assistance more slowly than needed, without consideration of the costs in blood and momentum from their fear of escalation. Their hesitance to commit to Ukraine regaining its internationally recognized territory even produced the unusual circumstance of America’s European allies initiating transfers of weapons that Washington had hesitated on providing. Only then was the Biden administration reluctantly shamed into matching the courage of smaller, more at-risk allies.”
• “The administration wasn’t wrong to be cautious early in the Russian invasion; its fearfulness of a regional war becoming a world war was justified. But its approach to telegraphing that fearfulness emboldened Moscow and other adversaries to adopt strategies that threatened escalation, as Russia did recently in amending its nuclear doctrine when the United States finally allowed Ukraine to employ ATACMS missiles against targets inside Russia. And despite numerous Russian threats and red lines as Western support expanded, the war has not widened beyond Ukraine or escalated to nuclear weapons use. That suggests a greater appreciation in Moscow than in Washington of the fundamental power equation favoring the United States and its allies. Yet the Biden administration remained overly cautious to such an extent that it has not only prevented Ukraine’s success but also reduced U.S. support for continuing to aid Ukraine.”
• “The commitment of at least 10,000 North Korean soldiers to Russia’s war in Ukraine provoked such alarm among allies in both Europe and Asia that the administration finally had to respond. Biden declared Pyongyang’s behavior “dangerous and destabilizing” and said something must be done, but he didn’t do anything beyond ineffectually encouraging China to restrain North Korea and claiming that he would now belatedly allow Ukraine to begin using some U.S. weapons at their effective ranges—but only in the vicinity of one part of the battle, once again telegraphing Washington’s anxieties to the aggressor. Deterrence doesn’t work that way. Instead of creating uncertainty and fear in its adversaries about how the United States would use its strength to prevent or penalize their malign actions, the Biden administration projected the constraints it put on U.S. behavior.”

"Joe Biden’s Disappearing Legacy," Richard Haass, Project Syndicate, 01.13.25.

• “Biden’s biggest foreign-policy accomplishment was undoubtedly Ukraine. While the administration ultimately could not prevent Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion, it made unprecedented, creative use of intelligence to warn Ukraine and the world. It also settled wisely on an indirect strategy, in which the United States and its NATO partners provided Ukraine the means to defend itself while avoiding direct military involvement, which could have triggered a larger – or even nuclear – war.”
• “The policy largely succeeded. Nearly three years after the war began, Putin has failed to achieve his aims, despite the disparity in military strength and population. Indeed, Ukraine has fought the Russian military to a near standstill and maintained its independence. The policy was not perfect. It too often erred on the side of caution in providing Ukraine advanced weapons systems or allowing them to be used in a manner most likely to affect Russian action. Similarly, framing the war as one between the forces of democracy and authoritarianism got in the way of building a broad international coalition to oppose Russian aggression and support sanctions.”
• “The Biden team also failed to articulate achievable war aims. Fearful of being accused of selling out a partner and compromising in the face of aggression, the administration deferred to Ukraine, which until late 2024 insisted on recovering all its lost territory dating back to 2014, a position that, while understandable, was not realistic militarily. Allowing objectives to be defined in terms that could not be met played into the hands of opponents of aid to Ukraine.”

"The Expectation of a Miracle and Murphy's Law: On World Politics in 2025," Andrei Kortunov, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 01.12.25.^ Clues from Russian Views.

• “When applied to international affairs, Murphy's law does not at all mean that in the coming year 2025 we must necessarily expect widespread bloody wars, a new Great Depression, unprecedented natural cataclysms and man-made disasters, a repetition of the COVID-19 pandemic in an even more dangerous format, a global flood, or in general nuclear Armageddon.”
• “The Third World War will most likely not start in 2025, but achieving a just and stable peace in Europe and the Middle East is unlikely.”
• “In total, up to a quarter of a million people may die in numerous armed conflicts on the planet over the course of a year, at least 3 million will most likely become refugees, and the total worldwide military expenditures will, without a doubt, set a new historical record, increasing by another 100–150 billion dollars At the same time, the chances of resuming in 2025 any negotiations on arms control—nuclear or conventional—are practically zero.”
• “The global economy, most likely, will not enter… [a] new recession and will demonstrate impressive growth in the range from 2.7 to 4% with a decrease in inflation to 3.5% from almost 6% in 2024. But trade wars, unilateral sanctions and other actions that undermine the unity and stability of this economy will continue.”
• “The system of UN bodies will not end its existence. But the activity of the Security Council will, as before, remain partially paralyzed.”
• “In 2025, the complete collapse of the modern system of international law will not occur, but its basic principles will be violated more and more often.”
• “The main problem of 2025… is that the historically predetermined retreat of the collective West as the main architect, builder and guarantor of the stability of the modern world order is going much faster than the readiness of new power centers to assume the main responsibility for the future world order.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Conflicts to Watch in 2025," Paul B. Stares, CFR, January 2025.
• "Competing Visions of Restraint," Miranda Priebe, John M. Schuessler, Bryan Rooney and Jasen J. Castillo, RAND, 11.19.24.
• "How should Trump deal with Putin? Escalate," Josh Rogin, WP, 01.10.25.
• "A Trump diplomacy for Europe," Nigel Gould-Davies, IISS, 01.09.25.
• "Can America’s Allies Save America’s Alliances?" Robin Niblett, FA, 01.07.25.
• "Trump’s Reckless Greenland Comments Are Not a Joke," Thomas L. Friedman, NYT, 01.13.25.
• "The Mayhem of Russia’s 'Research' Fleet," Nurlan Aliyev, RUSI, 01.07.25. 

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Nuclear arms:

“Scenarios for the Future of U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability and Arms Control: Results from a Track II Dialogue,” Samuel Charap, John J. Drennan and Julia Masterson, RAND, 01.09.25.

• “As broader disagreements between Moscow and Washington in 2024 threaten to do away with the remnants of an arms control regime that once underpinned strategic stability between the two nuclear powers, the future of bilateral strategic stability is highly uncertain.”
• “The U.S. and Russian experts brought together for this project agreed that the gamut of possible outcomes over the next five to ten years is broad. The U.S.-Russia relationship could deteriorate to the brink of a direct clash, or it could stabilize significantly, making conflict a remote prospect. However, a steady decline without significant calamity or improvement was seen as the most likely course of events. Neither side expected their respective governments to desist in activities that the other views and describes as destabilizing.”
• “The group also agreed that even in the most dire scenario, the United States and Russia can take steps to mitigate risk. The assembled experts established a menu of arms control options to manage strategic competition and reduce the risk of crisis for each of the three scenarios, including the worst-case future. It is up to political leaders on both sides to open the menu and choose among the options. Doing so is less challenging during comparatively peaceful periods. However, the most dangerous moments can also produce arms control breakthroughs. The stakes in this bilateral relationship are too high to let matters spiral completely out of control.”
• “This document and the Track II dialogue that produced it represent a joint analytical effort by nongovernmental specialists from two countries whose governments have effectively disavowed almost all joint efforts on the first track (i.e., between officials). The very fact that the group reached an analytical consensus on these important issues is perhaps as equally important as the content of the scenarios and related measures.”
• “All of the participants openly acknowledged the severity of the divide between the countries—and they did not set out to bridge that divide. By accepting the persistence of that divide but looking beyond the present, the participants were able to find common ground.”
• “The group admittedly decided on scenario-building and options development because they recognized it would be impossible—even for them at the Track II level—to find consensus on prescriptions to address present disputes. And even if they did, there is no appetite in the capitals to hear such prescriptions. Nonetheless, that this document represents a joint effort of Russian and U.S. arms control specialists is significant and hopefully can provide input for governments in the future, even if that future is more tense than today.”

"In Russia’s perceived war with the West, arms control is collateral damage," Nicholas Lokker, ELN, 01.13.25. 

• “While Russian disinterest in arms control seems to be increasingly entrenched, certain developments could change this in the future. Economic factors, such as a lack of resources stemming from sanctions and exhaustion from its war against Ukraine, could lead Russia to refrain from ambitious modernization or numerical expansion of its arsenal. Nicholas Lokker.”
• “Nevertheless, the United States and its NATO allies must, for the foreseeable future, be prepared for the absence of arms control with Russia, including the various dangers associated with that absence. This may mean pursuing more modest efforts to reduce risk and increase predictability in the interim, including transparency and verification measures that do not require active cooperation from Moscow.”
• “And while the West should remain open to a renewed willingness to engage in arms control by Russia, it should not seek a new agreement at any price. There is a particular risk that this could occur after Donald Trump returns to the White House next January, given his apparent sympathy for key Russian demands to renegotiate the European security architecture, including a potential freeze on discussions surrounding Ukrainian accession to NATO membership. Yet Russia’s linkage of arms control with these issues does not mean the West should respond in kind—and Trump would do well to remember that no deal is often better than a bad deal.”
• “The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defense, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.”

"Navigating the Fog: An Interview with Professor Sergei A. Karaganov," Tariq Marzbaan and Nora Hoppe, Al Mayadeen English, 12.09.24. Clues from Russian Views.

• “[When asked what might be Russia’s response to use of ATACMS:] This is a provocation, which should and could be answered very directly. Of course, by an avalanche of attacks on high-value targets in Ukraine. And there already are good targets in Romania and Poland, with the threat of a second or third wave, using nuclear weapons.”
• “Russia already sent a powerful signal by a live testing of the new hypersonic multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle, the "Oreshnik" missile, against military-industrial targets in Ukraine. If the West does not stop its aggression, missiles will be tested against targets supporting the Kiev regime.. he total payload of the "Oreshnik" missile with six nuclear warheads is close to one megaton. But, I repeat, God forbid… I hope Western elites could sober up before that.”
• “Non-nuclear deterrents could be used and should be used. But the main thing is to restore nuclear deterrence, the fear of a nuclear holocaust—a holocaust in the grand sense of the word. And for that, we have all to think about nuclear weapons seriously and about the war seriously.”
• “But I hope that a fear of nuclear weapons and deterrence would be restored without the use of nuclear weapons—beforehand. If we do not restore this fear, the world is virtually doomed to a Third World War and a massive use of these and other weapons, destroying existing civilizations and taking away hundreds of millions of lives.”
• “If a war with NATO starts, it will immediately become nuclear. And Europe (outside of Russia) would be largely finished.”
• “The strengthening of nuclear deterrence in Russian policies has two aims: One is to win the war in Ukraine, without sacrificing too many of our best men; and, second, to prevent a Third World War.”
• “I think that the United States could be channeled to retreat into a position of a "normal great power", one of the four future leaders of the new world order of 20 years from now. European elites, who have completely lost their strategic mind and common sense should be, for the time being, just pushed aside.”
• “We have become the pinnacle of, or maybe the hard core, strategic linchpin of influence for the Global South. We call it the "Global Majority".”
• “We're working on several subjects, one of them is on a new ideology for Russia.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see: 

• "Under Trump, More Countries Could Get Nukes," Andreas Kluth, Bloomberg, 01.08.25.

Counterterrorism:⁵

"Don’t Underestimate the Enduring Power of ISIS," Jessica Stern, NYT, 01.09.25. 

• “No single solution exists for preventing terrorist attacks. But actions can be taken to reduce their impact, as well as their frequency. For cases like New Orleans, prevention is critical.”
• “Perpetrators of targeted violence often “leak” their intentions ahead of time to family, friends, social media and even to the authorities, creating the opportunity for communities to step in to help people who are at risk. One approach to preventing violence like the attack in New Orleans builds on public health models that aim to reduce the rates of suicide, domestic violence and drunken driving. For it to prevent terrorist attacks, the authorities have to educate the public about the importance of bystander reporting and “off ramps” from violent radicalization.”
• “The New Orleans attack serves as a grim reminder that the ISIS digital caliphate is still able to transform personal crises into public tragedy. The alarming reality is that many other people remain vulnerable to similar paths of radicalization.”

Conflict in Syria:

“The Coming Fight for Syria,” Rob Geist Pinfold, RUSI, 01.07.25. 

• “Russia and Iran are down, but not out in Syria. Supporting Assad was always a means to more important ends for both these powers. This is exemplified by Russia’s bases in Syria’s Tartus and Hmeimim. The former is a naval base that gives Russia its only access to the Mediterranean Sea. The latter serves as part of Moscow’s supply line for its forces and allies in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, all of which have recently adopted pro-Russian stances. Iran, in turn, maintained its unlikely friendship with the secular Assad regime primarily because it needed a land bridge to Hezbollah. Tehran values Hezbollah over Assad because the former has long held disproportionate influence over Lebanon and supposedly acts as a deterrent against Israel attacking Iran. While Assad has fled, Iran’s long-established and intricate network of weapons and drug smugglers has stayed put. Similarly, Russia hopes to keep its bases.”
• “The revolution against Assad was Syrian-led. Likewise, Syria is a Russo-Iranian protectorate no more. But that does not mean that Syria is free from foreign control, nor is it united. Instead, it is transitioning from Russian and Iranian hegemony to being ‘in play.’ Turkey and HTS are currently on top, but they do not hold a monopoly on power. Multiple internal and external players have divergent and often competing interests inside the country. Everyone talks of Syrian unity, but beneath this rhetoric they all have their own, distinct visions for the country.”

Cyber security/AI: 

"Russia’s AI Is Smart Enough to Shut Up," Thomas Kent, WSJ, 01.08.25. 

• “Russia’s top-rated virtual assistant Alice’s answers on many topics are similar to those offered by Western artificial-intelligence engines. But when questions turn political, its responses are often guarded, suggesting a fundamental problem for authoritarian countries seeking to compete with democratic nations in generative AI.”
• “Authoritarian states can still use AI to churn out huge volumes of false content for the web. But guaranteeing ideologically correct responses to free-form questions on any subject is a much greater challenge technically and commercially. Users interested in sensitive subjects will quickly identify agents that are hesitant to discuss them and switch to other AI sources.”
• “Still, the continued dominance of content reflecting democratic attitudes and facts depends on two factors: the survival of enough credible mainstream news and information outlets to keep creating that content, and major publications agreeing to let AI companies use their material. Even AI agents with the greatest freedom to seek and analyze knowledge will be at peril if false information dominates the information pool they are allowed to access.”

Energy exports from CIS:

"Russia’s oil sector reels from US sanctions," Alexandra Prokopenko and Alexander Kolyandr, The Bell, 01.10.25. 

• “The US imposes toughest sanctions yet on Russian oil. Ten days before the end of Joe Biden’s presidency, the White House imposed its toughest sanctions on Russian oil. Two of Russia’s five biggest oil companies—Surgutneftegaz and Gazprom Neft—went on the blacklist, along with Sovcomflot, the largest transporter of Russian oil, insurance companies Ingosstrakh and Alfastrakhovaniye, and more than 240 vessels. This package, combined with a further half-billion dollars of military aid for Kyiv, is intended to strengthen Ukraine’s negotiating position ahead of Donald Trump’s inauguration.”
  • “This raft of restrictions from the outgoing Biden administration was expected to be powerful; Biden no longer has to worry about his political decisions pushing up gas prices for U.S. motorists.”
• “For the first time since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Washington has imposed direct sanctions against some of Russia’s top five oil companies.”
  • “Surgutneftegaz and Gazprom Neft, ranked third and fourth in Russia for oil extraction, along with dozens of subsidiaries as well as personal sanctions against Vladimir Bogdanov and Alexander Dyukov, heads of Surgutneftegaz and Gazprom Neft respectively;”
  • “Up to now the U.S. has stopped short of direct sanctions against Russian oil, concerned about pushing up gas prices and inflation. In 2022, when sanctions were first discussed, the U.S. and Europe disagreed on how to reduce Russia’s energy revenues. Taxes make up a large share of European fuel prices, so they are less susceptible to global market fluctuations. However, Europe is more reliant on Russian crude, which led to the half-hearted introduction of a price cap of $60 per barrel on Russian oil. Up to now, that has not been enormously effective, as we discussed in detail here.”
  • “The heads of other energy companies: Alexei Likhachev of Rosatom, Vadim Vorobyov of Lukoil, Nail Maganov of Tatneft, Zarubezhneft’s Sergei Kudryashov and also Yusuf Alekperov, son of Lukoil’s co-owner Vagit Alekperov;”
  • “Insurance companies Ingosstrakh and Alfastrakhovanie;”
  • “Shipping company Sovcomflot, the biggest carrier of Russian oil;”
  • “183 vessels believed to be part of the “shadow fleet” that transports Russian oil;”
  • “About 20 foreign trading companies that are selling Russian oil;”
  • “Dozens of officials in Russia’s Energy Ministry.”
• “Putting Surgutneftegaz and Gazprom Neft on the sanctions list sounds like a big deal. However, sanctions against these two will only have a short-term impact on Russian exports. In total, Surgutneftegaz and Gazprom Neft contribute less than half of the entire volume of oil exported in Russia, making it possible to create schemes whereby their oil is exported via other companies.”
• “Sanctions against the tankers could be more significant. About 7% of the global tanker fleet is now on the U.S. sanctions list… For Russia, the loss of 183 tankers is a big blow. Now, these ships can only carry sanctioned oil, and only to ports that are unconcerned about secondary U.S. sanctions.”
• “China looks likely to observe the U.S. restrictions.”
• “How will this affect the Russian economy?”
  • These sanctions will not remove Russian oil from the market, nor will they reduce exports. But they will drive up costs, reducing profits and overall oil revenues, which remains hugely important for the Russian budget. They will also weaken the ruble, and fuel inflation. This will be painful for Russia’s slowing economy, and may become a bargaining chip in peace negotiations in Ukraine.” 

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "US imposes the most extreme sanctions on Russian oil to date," Ben Aris, bne IntelliNews (Substack), 01.13.25.
• "How to Exorcise Russia’s Ghost Fleet," Benjamin Jensen, CSIS, 01.07.25. 

Climate change:

• "Trump Has a Fighting Chance to Prevent Arctic Meltdown—He Should Take It," Durwood J. Zaelke and Paul Bledsoe, BAS, 01.08.25.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“America’s Polarization and the Challenges of Confronting Russia,” Gordon M. Friedrichs, RM, 01.09.25.

• “Decades of political and social polarization have produced a highly unsettled American electorate with a deep distrust in democratic institutions.”
• “This polarization, which refers to a state in which the opinions, feelings, behaviors or interests of a group or society become more bimodal and the two modes move further apart, is not merely reshaping domestic politics, it undermines the United States’ capacity to act as a stabilizing force in global affairs as a result.”
• “Polarization, therefore, represents not just an internal challenge but a structural constraint with profound implications for American foreign policy, particularly toward Russia, where consistent U.S. engagement is critical for the maintenance of international security and the rule of law.”
• “These tendencies exacerbate the challenges posed by polarization and undermine the United States’ ability to project consistent and credible leadership on the global stage. Nowhere is this more evident than in the legislative struggles over recent U.S. policy toward Russia and Ukraine, where partisan divisions have hampered timely and coherent responses to Russian aggression.”
• “Key manifestations of this disruption include:
  • “Weakened Legislative Oversight: Polarization erodes bipartisan consensus, diminishing Congress’ ability to exercise effective oversight of presidential foreign policy decisions.”
  • “Weaponization of Foreign Policy: Partisan rivalries transform foreign policy into a tool for domestic political gain, exemplified by Trump’s pressure on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to investigate political opponents.”
  • “Skewed Audience Costs: Public preferences, increasingly shaped by partisan identities, undermine the constraints that once ensured strategic and consistent foreign policy choices.”
  • “Fragile Commitments: The lack of legislative consensus undermines the ability of the U.S. to enter and sustain binding international agreements, weakening its credibility as a global leader.”
• “Polarization weakens the United States’ ability to form and sustain coalitions, undermining multilateral efforts to address global challenges such as climate change, human rights abuses and international trade. Adversaries like Russia and China are likely to exploit these weaknesses, leveraging America’s internal divisions to advance their own strategic objectives. The long-term consequences could include a diminished liberal international order and a world increasingly shaped by authoritarian norms.”

"America Gets a Taste of Glasnost," Vladimir Kontorovich and Eugene Kontorovich, WSJ, 01.09.25.

• “To read the American press in recent months is to encounter a feeling reminiscent of the Soviet Union in 1988. At that time, the Communist Party was in the middle of Mikhail Gorbachev’s campaign of glasnost, or “openness.” As the authorities relaxed controls on information, previously unmentionable stories of the regime’s crimes and deceits poured off the printing presses. So it seems now in the U.S., as journalists publish what many have known but feared to say for years.”
• “Glasnost contributed to the demise of the Soviet system and laid the foundation for Russia’s free media environment. Yet over time Vladimir Putin rebuilt constraints, allowing him to jail journalists and kill political opponents. Let us remain vigilant as we enjoy our own period of openness—and not think ourselves incapable of falling back into a period of censorship and silence.”

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

"Putin’s Booming War Economy Poised for Soft, Bumpy Landing," Bloomberg, 01.08.25. 

• “A relatively good period for the Russian economy, which was based on previously accumulated resources, is over,” said Oleg Vyugin, an economist and former top central bank official. “High inflation eats away at all that seemingly short-lived success.”
• “The central bank is forecasting a sharp decline in growth in 2025 to as low as 0.5%, down from an estimated 3.5%–4% last year, and sees inflation returning to its 4% target only in 2026. While the Economy Ministry’s outlook is more rosy at 2.5% growth this year, Putin said last month that a cooling economy was part of the government’s plan as it aims to “stabilize” inflation.”
• “Two thirds of Russians remain confident in the future, according to a December poll by the Moscow-based Levada Center. Consumer sentiment, while down from its wartime peak earlier this year, remains higher than at any point during 2022.”
• “The two biggest hardships in the economy—inflation and high borrowing costs—are forecast to decline this year. The central bank projects inflation at 4.5%–5% by year end, and the key rate at an average of 17%–20% for 2025.”
• “Even as constrained investment is likely to lead to several quarters with small increases in output, “there is no reason to expect a recession,” said Nikita Kulagin, the head of macroeconomic analysis at Sovcombank.”
• “Not everyone is so sanguine. “The risk of a recession is also the highest in the last three years,” said Sofya Donets, an economist at T-Investments. “In some quarters, growth may be negative next year. For now, our main forecast is still growth by the end of next year, slightly below 1%.”

"Russia’s war economy is a house of cards," Martin Sandbu, FT, 01.12.25. 

• “The reality is that the financial underpinnings of Russia’s war economy increasingly look like a house of cards—so much so that senior members of the governing elite are publicly expressing concern. They include Sergei Chemezov, chief executive of state defense giant Rostec, who warned that expensive credit was killing his weapons export business, and Elvira Nabiullina, head of the central bank.”
  • “This pair know better than many people in the west, who have been taken in by numbers indicating steady growth, low unemployment and rising wages. But any economy on a full mobilization footing can produce such outcomes: this is basic Keynesianism. The real test is how already employed resources—rather than idle ones—are being shifted away from their previous uses and into the needs of war. A state has three methods to achieve this: borrowing, inflation and expropriation.”
    • “A new report by Russia analyst and former banker Craig Kennedy highlights the huge growth in Russian corporate debt. It has soared by 71% since 2022 and dwarfs new household and government borrowing… In essence, Russia is engaged in massive money printing, outsourced so that it does not show up on the public balance sheet.”
• “Something else has to give, and that something else includes businesses that cannot operate profitably when borrowing costs exceed 20%.”
• “Given Russians’ experience of suddenly worthless deposits, fears of a repeat could easily trigger self-fulfilling runs. That would destroy not just banks’ but the government’s legitimacy. Putin, in short, does not have time on his side.”
• “Putin’s obsession is the sudden collapse of power. That, as he must be realizing, is the risk his war economics has set in motion. Making it recede, by increasing access to external resources through sanctions relief, will be his goal in any diplomacy. The west must convince him that this will not happen. That, and only that, will force Putin to choose between his assault on Ukraine and his grip on power at home.”

“‘We expected the war to end’ How Russian political elites feel about the full-scale invasion of Ukraine dragging into 2025," Meduza, 01.09.25. Clues from Russian Views.

• “Many among the Russian “elite” are disappointed that Moscow’s war against Ukraine didn’t end in 2024. As Meduza’s source in the Russian government put it, “The main emotion is disappointment. We expected the war to end, for the fighting to end. Fatigue has been the main feeling for a long time. We’re already tired of waiting, even. It feels like you’re going deeper and deeper every day. We also expected some kind of lifting of sanctions in exchange for peace. Now, they’re inflicting more and more pain.”
• “The state of the Russian economy indeed became a “point of tension” by the end of 2024, Meduza’s sources said. Big business spoke openly about its dissatisfaction with the Central Bank’s high key rate. In the words of a Russian consultant who works with both the Putin administration and big businesses: “For now, the majority [of companies] are surviving somehow, everyone is putting on a brave face. Some are even growing. But this is happening due to the cannibalization of the assets of departing foreign companies, the weak ones. But everyone understands this won’t last forever. It definitely won’t get better going forward.”
• “Meduza’s sources agree that “hopes for a quick peace” and the easing of sanctions faded after Ukraine launched its incursion into Russia’s Kursk region in August 2024. However, the source in the Russian government, one of the people close to Putin’s administration, and a lawmaker from United Russia all admitted that the war very well could have dragged on into 2025, even if the Ukrainian army hadn’t embarked on this offensive.”
• “… [T]wo sources close to Putin’s domestic policy team said that despite the “war fatigue,” ending the conflict in 2025 could be a “potential crisis” for officials in the presidential administration. “To put it bluntly, it’s [currently] clear what everything revolves around. [If] the SVO ends, what happens next? [You’d] need to tell people what will happen tomorrow, why it’s hard right now, when things will get easier, and how. And no one knows the answers [to those questions],” one of them explained.”
• “With or without a “new agenda,” public opinion polls show that the majority of Russians are in favor of starting negotiations, signing a peace deal, and ending the war with Ukraine. Even data from Veber—the polling arm of ANO Dialog, a pro-Kremlin “nonprofit” that runs PR and disinformation campaigns for the Russian Defense Ministry—shows that two-thirds of Russians were dissatisfied with the results of 2024.”

“Do Russians Really Support the War in Ukraine?" Keith Gessen, The New Yorker, 01.13.25.

• “In the summer and fall of 2023, three researchers from a small Russian collective called the Public Sociology Laboratory, or P.S. Lab, travelled to three different regions across Russia, to find out what people thought about the war in Ukraine. A university lecturer whom I’ll call Masha went to Sverdlovsk Oblast, at the eastern edge of the Ural Mountains… The researchers stayed in these regions for about a month, talking to as many people as possible.”
• “Since the beginning of the war, there have been fierce debates among Russian scholars, and Russians themselves, over the nature and extent of support for it. One point of contention has been the polling data. , the Levada Center, has, since February 27, 2022, been asking Russians once a month whether they “personally support the actions of Russian military forces in Ukraine.” Each time, a very large proportion of respondents—between seventy and eighty%—say they either “definitely” or mostly support them.”
• “Critics of Levada argue that the very framing of the question… that does not allow people to call the conflict a “war,” is a major problem. Another is the nature of attempting to poll people in an authoritarian state. “If you’re in Russia, and some stranger comes to your door asking questions, you’ve obviously got a mental illness if you’re telling them anything,” the British ethnographer Jeremy Morris, who has studied Russia for two decades, told me. But more than that, he said, even well-conducted polls were too crude for a situation as complicated as this one. “Polling data is fine for ‘Are you going to vote the Democrats or are you going to vote the Republicans?’ It’s about a onetime decision that is close to the present… But, when it comes to horribly complex, painful things like a war, it’s not useful.”
• “In the first set of post-invasion interviews, the P.S. Lab researchers confirmed their suspicion that, instead of demonstrating broad war support, as per Levada, Russians fell into three distinct groups: a small, core group of committed war supporters (around ten to fifteen% of the respondents); a similarly small group of committed war opponents; and a third, much larger group that was undecided or fell in between the two extremes. P.S. Lab’s second report… showed that the war-supporting and opposing groups had remained mostly stable (though some opponents had left the country), but the middle group was beginning to rationalize Russia’s actions.”
• “To [Masha], people’s contradictory reactions were an outcome of their disengagement. In order to oppose the war, she said, you have to believe that you have some say in it—that you could vote out of power the people who started it or at least express your dissatisfaction by voting for someone else. “But people in Russia do not believe in democracy—not because they want to live in a dictatorship but because they simply don’t believe that democracy exists,” Masha said.”
• “Kirill Rogov, a political scientist now based in Vienna and the editor of Re: Russia, said that he found P.S. Lab’s reports electrifying. “We always think that public opinion surveys are supposed to say how many Russians are for the war and how many are against it,” he said. “Sixty-five% are for it, thirty% are against it… But here we see that, inside most people, there is that same division. They’re sixty% for the war, and thirty% against… And we see in these portraits how people wobble inside themselves.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "How Government Policies are Weakening the Stability of the Russian Economy," Yuri Danilov, Russia.Post, 01.10.25.
• "He [Arkady Volozh] Built Russia’s Biggest Tech Company. Now He’s Starting Over—Without Putin," Mark Bergen, Bloomberg, 01.10.25.

Defense and aerospace:

•  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

“As Russia Seeks Influence in Africa, Former Students Play Central Role," Rachel Chason, WP, 01.09.25. 

• “During the Cold War, the Soviet Union had far less than the West to offer in development aid. So one of the main ways the Soviets gained influence was through grants for students, said Ulf Laessing, the Mali-based head of the Sahel Program at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.”
• “From the 1960s through the 1990s, thousands of students from Burkina Faso (which was known as Upper Volta until 1984) studied in the Soviet Union and later Russia before returning home.”
• “Across West Africa, including in Mali, former students have acted as “mediators” between Russia and their nations, Laessing said. And with Russia’s military capabilities dealt a blow by the toppling of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, Laessing added, its soft power efforts, including ramping back up scholarships and language programs, could become even more important to Putin as he pursues global influence.”

Ukraine:

"Ukraine’s Existential Culture War," Ian Buruma, Project Syndicate, 01.07.25.

• To those who espouse universal humanism, banning great works of art associated with an enemy country is never a good idea, given its narrowing, provincializing effect. But in the case of Ukraine, this kind of cultural chauvinism is essential to resisting Russia’s forced embrace.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 Disaster,” Tatiana Stanovaya, R. Politik Bulletin No. 1 (153), 01.13.25.

• “It would be mistaken to interpret Putin’s stance on the shooting down of the Azerbaijan Airlines plane as a deliberate anti-Baku position. The fact that he called Aliyev and offered an apology—albeit without fully accepting responsibility —can be seen as a conciliatory gesture. Moreover, an eventual agreement to pay compensation to Azerbaijan and the families of the victims should not be ruled out, but only discreetly and in a way that avoids any public criticism of regional Russian officials, particularly the Chechen leadership. Russia’s increasing tensions with Armenia could also help Moscow to maintain pragmatic, if not warm, relations with Azerbaijan. From a Russian perspective, however, it is alarming that Baku appears to be seeking escalation despite the “existential circumstances” caused by the ongoing war and Putin’s rare personal apology.”
• “Some observers believe Baku is looking for a pretext to launch a military campaign against Armenia, which could place Russia in an awkward position. Moscow is unlikely to support Armenia militarily but will also be reluctant to encourage Azerbaijan. A dismissive stance could alienate Russia’s “patriotic sphere,” which would view any such development as evidence of Russia’s waning influence in the post-Soviet space. Additionally, Aliyev’s closer alignment with Turkey adds another layer of complexity. Following Turkey’s significant breakthrough in Syria, Ankara may aspire to play a larger role in the South Caucasus, further shifting the regional balance of power away from Russia.”

“The Energy Crisis In Moldova,” Tatiana Stanovaya, R. Politik Bulletin No. 1 (153), 01.13.24.

• “Despite Moscow’s levers of influence in Moldova, it faces significant limitations. In 2003, Chisinau refused to sign Russia’s plan for settling the Transnistrian conflict not only due to pressure from the West, but also because of Moldova’s pro-Western electorate.”
• “The pro-European segment of Moldovan society has consistently outperformed the supporters of closer ties with Russia in the domestic political arena—it is important to note that no opposition movement to the ruling party can win while only relying on the pro-Russian electorate.”
• “Any attempt to reverse Moldova’s pro-European course or resolve the Transnistrian conflict on terms favorable to the Kremlin would almost certainly trigger large-scale protests. Such unrest is unlikely to produce outcomes desirable to Moscow. As such, there is a core vulnerability in Russia’s policy: it relies on incrementally marginalized, peripheral politicians who are disconnected from mainstream Moldovan public life and unable to compete with the significant pro-European segment of society. A similar miscalculation fueled the events of late 2013–early 2014 in Ukraine, sparking a revolution that ultimately triggered the fall of the Yanukovych regime, the Russian annexation of Crimea, the Donbas conflict and, eventually, the full-scale invasion in 2022.”
• Moscow is now looking to exploit Moldovan society's vulnerabilities, many of which have been aggravated by its own policies.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Transnistria’s Energy Crisis Could Backfire on Moscow," Vladimir Solovyov, CEIP, 01.11.25.

Footnotes

1. Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian is scheduled to visit Russia on Jan. 17 to hold talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin and other high-ranking officials to sign the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement, further solidifying the ties between the two nations, according to Teheran Times.
2. On Jan. 12, Russian forces were reported to be heading toward Ukraine’s Dnipro region. Russian forces pushing up from the south are now heading west of Pokrovsk and are just under 7 kilometers from taking the highway leading to the Dnipropetrovsk region. On Jan. 12,  Russia’s ministry of defense announced the capture of the Yantarnoye settlement in the Donetsk region. The next major town inside Dnipropetrovsk is Pavlograd, a major Ukrainian military base. The region also includes Dnipro, Ukraine’s fourth-largest city. (FT, 01.12.25)
3. The following is Re:Russia’s summary of Inozemtsev’s commentary.
4. When Levada asked Russians in December whether military action should be continued in Ukraine or whether negotiations should be launched, 37% of respondents opted for the former, while 54% opted for the latter. In comparison, 57% favored peace talks in November, while 35% favored continuation of war that month. The share of Russians who support Russia’s war in Ukraine decreased slightly from 77% to 76% in November-December, according to Levada.
5. For a prescient warning that the threat of attacks by terrorist groups, such as ISIS, is increasing, see "The Terrorism Warning Lights Are Blinking Red Again," Graham Allison and Michael J. Morell, FA ,06.10.24. 

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 11:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

^ Machine-translated.

Slider photo by Oleg Petrasiuk/Ukraine's 24th Mechanised Brigade via AP.