The Russia-Ukraine War Report Card, Dec. 18, 2024

The Russia-Ukraine War Report Card, Dec. 18, 2024 

Find past issues in the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card archive

Dec. 18 update: Russia within 5 miles of Pokrovsk. Net territorial change in the past month: Russia +204 square miles, the equivalent of the city of Colorado Springs, Colorado. Russia has regained 60% of the territory Ukraine captured in its incursion into Russia’s Kursk region. Ukraine currently controls 191 of the 470 square miles it occupied in that region as of mid-September 2024, the equivalent of the city of San Jose, Calif.

Who’s Gaining and Who’s Losing What?

Territorial Control

 

Report Card*

Change in Russia's control of Ukrainian territory1

  • Since Feb. 24, 2022:
    • Russia: +26,755 square miles. 11% of Ukraine. (Area roughly equivalent to the U.S. states of Massachusetts, Vermont and New Hampshire combined).
  • Total area of all Ukrainian territory Russia presently controls, including Crimea and parts of Donbas Russia had seized prior to the full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022:
    • Russia: +43,380 square miles. 18.61% of Ukraine. Area roughly equivalent to the states of Massachusetts, Maryland and Hawaii combined.
  • In past month (Nov. 20, 2024–Dec. 18, 2024): Russia gained 204 square miles. Area roughly equivalent to the the city of Colorado Springs, Colorado.
  • In past week: Russia gained 28 square miles.
  • In past two months:
    • Ukraine suffered a net loss of 189 square miles.  Area equivalent to the city of San Jose, California.

Russian net territorial control in Ukraine by month: February 2022–November 2024. (Based on data from the Institute for the Study of War.)

Russian aerial attacks and Ukrainian interceptions2

  • Since Sept 2022:
    • Russia launched:
      • 14,700 drones
      • 301 ballistic missiles
      • 3,153 cruise missiles
    • Ukraine intercepted:
      • 11,066 drones
      • 46 ballistic missiles
      • 2,234 cruise missiles
  • In Nov 2024:
    • Russia launched:
      • 2,516 drones
      • 19 ballistic missiles
      • 237 cruise missiles
    • Ukraine intercepted:
      • 1,361 drones
      • 4 ballistic missiles
      • 197 cruise missiles

Military casualties

Civilian fatalities

Military vehicles and equipment3

  • Russia: 19,535 lost. 
    • Tanks and armored vehicles: 11,275.
    • Aircraft: 286.
    • Naval vessels: 22.
  • Ukraine: 7,282 lost. 
    • Tanks and armored vehicles: 3,567.
    • Aircraft: 173.
    • Naval vessels: 35.

Citizens displaced

  • Russia: 800,000 emigrated for economic or political reasons, 0.6% of Russian population.
  • Ukraine: 10.2 million displaced Ukrainians, 23% of Ukrainian pre-invasion population of 44 million.
    • Internally displaced: 3.7 million.
    • International refugees: 6.5 million.

Economic impact4

  • Russia: 5.6% GDP since 2022 (through 2024)
    • 3.2% GDP forecast for 2024.
    • Budget deficit: 2.1% of GDP.
    • Russian ruble: 0.009653 U.S. dollars. -19% since invasion.
    • 3-year bond yield: 17.42%
  • Ukraine: -22.6% GDP since 2022 (through 2024)
    • 3.2% GDP forecast for 2024.
    • Budget deficit: 20.4% of GDP, excluding grants.
    • Ukrainian hryvnia: 0.02395 U.S. dollars. -27% since invasion.
    • 3-year bond yield: 23.1%

Infrastructure

  • Russia: No significant damage.
  • Ukraine: 64%, or 36 out of 56 GW electricity generating capacity destroyed or occupied.

Popular support5

  • Russia: 57% support peace negotiations.
  • Ukraine: 35% support peace negotiations.

Other criteria which may be even more important (about which we continue to search for reliable indicators):

  • Ammunition supply
  • Foreign military aid
  • Force generation
  • Military leadership
  • Training
  • Morale
  • Control of strategic locations
  • Information war: with U.S./Europe; with world.

Footnotes

  1. This issue of the war report card has been amended to specify that our measurements of changes in Russia's territorial control include Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia's armed forces and its proxies since 2014.
  2. Jensen, Benjamin and Yasir Atalan, “Russian Firepower Strike Tracker: Analyzing Missile Attacks in Ukraine,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 17, 2024, https://www.csis.org/programs/futures-lab/projects/russian-firepower-strike-tracker-analyzing-missile-attacks-ukraine?f%5B0%5D=content_type%3Aarticle&f%5B1%5D=content_type%3Areport Note that due to limitations associated with refreshing of attack  and intercept data, this section of the scorecard is updated once a month.
  3. Oryx, “Attack On Europe: Documenting Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” Oryx (blog), https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html; “The Military Balance 2022,” IISS, https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2022; Oryx, “List Of Aircraft Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-aircraft-losses-during-2022.html; Oryx, “List Of Naval Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-naval-losses-during-2022.html
  4. International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Russian estimates. “Russia and Ukraine 3-Year Bond Yield,” Investing.com, https://www.investing.com/rates-bonds/russia-3-year-bond-yield; World Bank Group, “Europe and Central Asia Economic Update,” https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/94bdc078-9c64-4833-992a-fda7b3d1a640/content; World Bank, “Russian Federation MPO,” https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/d5f32ef28464d01f195827b7e020a3e8-0500022021/related/mpo-rus.pdf; Investing.com, “Russia 3-Year Bond Yield,” https://www.investing.com/rates-bonds/russia-3-year-bond-yield; World Bank, “The World Bank in Ukraine,” https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ukraine/overview#3; https://www.exchange-rates.org/exchange-rate-history/rub-usd-2024-11-01.
  5. Levada Center, “Conflict with Ukraine in November 2024,” Dec. 4, 2022, https://www.levada.ru/2024/12/04/konflikt-s-ukrainoj-v-noyabre-2024-goda-vnimanie-podderzhka-otnoshenie-k-peregovoram-trudnosti-i-uspehi-svo-stolknovenie-rossii-i-nato-primenenie-yadernogo-oruzhiya/; Razumkov Center, “Support among citizens for Ukraine's accession to the EU and NATO. Attitude to foreign countries. Attitude to peace talks (September, 2024),” https://razumkov.org.ua/en/sociology/press-releases/support-among-citizens-for-ukraine-s-accession-to-the-eu-and-nato-attitude-to-foreign-countries-attitude-to-peace-talks-september-2024.

*Originally produced by Kate Davidson, a researcher with the Avoiding Great Power War Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Since December 2024 produced by RM staff and Belfer Center research assistant Quinn Urich.