3 Ideas to Explore

1. Ukrainian intelligence believes that Russia is gearing up for a bold assault on the southern Ukrainian city of Zaporizhzhia, which is located 30 kilometers from the front, according to a Nov. 25 story in The Economist, entitled “Ukraine’s warriors brace for a Kremlin surge in the south.” Vladimir Putin’s war machine is pushing harder and crushing Ukrainian morale.” East of Zaporizhzhia, in the Donetsk region, Russian forces are already moving faster than at any time since the early days of the invasion, according to this U.K. newspaper, whose latest daily tracking estimates that Russia has gained 739 square kilometers in the past 30 days.¹ The Economist estimates that Ukraine’s problems at the front “are worsening mainly because of manpower issues,” such as lack of personnel reinforcement and age-induced health problems of the new recruits. The DC-based Institute of the Study of War (ISW), which has no love lost for the Russian aggression, put it mildly in its latest assessment of that aggression: “Russian forces’ recent confirmed battlefield gains near Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka demonstrate that the war in Ukraine is not stalemated.” Not all agree with this estimate, however. Rod Thornton of King’s College London told the New Yorker: “It is a stalemate” because “there are advances on various fronts, but a few hundred meters or kilometers here and there.”
2. The Economist predicts that the Russian-Ukrainian war could wind down in 2025 and asks, “What might a possible deal look like?” The U.K. newspaper’s answer to its own question is that Ukraine will have to accept the loss of some territory, while Donald Trump’s return to the White House probably means that “Ukraine will not join NATO for years, if ever.” Kyiv may, however, at least get some kind of security guarantee, according to The Economist. If upon his return, Trump makes good on his promise to end the war, then supporters of Ukraine must be “careful not to let maximalist aims foreclose a durable negotiated settlement,” according to Matthew Duss of the Center for International Policy and Robert Farley of the University of Kentucky. In their commentary for FP, the two authors also argue that “the goal of a strategic failure for Russia should be dropped from public statements… Up to this point, we believe that fulsome support for Ukraine’s defense has been both morally and strategically wise. Alternative paths must now be considered,” they write, adding that “Ending the war does not mean ending international pressure to punish Russia’s treatment of the Ukrainians.”²
3. On the same day that Ukraine fired ATACMS into Russia with U.S. permission, Vladimir Putin signed off on the promised amendments to Russia’s declaratory principles of nuclear deterrence, expanding the conditions under which the Kremlin asserts the right to use nuclear weapons in what some saw as increasing risks of a nuclear war. While the original 2020 “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence” permitted Russia to use nuclear weapons “in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy,” the new version of this document says they can be used “in the event of aggression” against Russia and/or Belarus “with the use of conventional weapons, which creates a critical threat to their sovereignty and/or territorial integrity.” The 2024 edition also introduces new conditions for Russia’s transition to use of nuclear weapons, such as the use of nuclear weapons or other types of WMD by an adversary against military formations and (or) facilities of the Russian Federation located outside its territory; and the receipt of reliable data on a massive launch of air and space attack weapons (strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned, hypersonic and other aerial vehicles) and their crossing into Russia. Long-time Kremlin advisor Sergei Karaganov—who has repeatedly called for amending the basic principles—described the official changes as “almost revolutionary.” In a separate interview this week, Karaganov claimed the changes enable Russia to launch a nuclear strike in response to any attack on Russian territory.³ In the view of ex-DIA specialist Rebekah Koffler, the U.S. and Russia are already “on the escalation ladder, inching toward a nuclear war.”

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

“Russia’s Missiles Threaten a Nuclear Meltdown in Ukraine,” Paul Hockenos, FP, 11.21.24.

• “In Ukraine, a surge in military hostilities has again thrown the safety of the country’s operational nuclear plants into jeopardy.”
• “Russia’s attacks on the power grid and Ukrainian conventional power plants is negatively affecting the safety of Ukraine’s nuclear fleet,” Per Strand, director general of the Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, said. (Norway works closely with Ukrainian regulators to maintain reactor safety.) “Russia is not targeting the nuclear plants themselves but rather damaging the electric system as a whole. This causes the power in the transmission grid to fluctuate, which undermines the reactors’ security.”
• “It is clear that Russia is using the threat of a nuclear disaster as a major military lever to defeat Ukraine,” Shaun Burnie, a nuclear specialist at Greenpeace, told the Guardian. “But by undertaking the attacks, Russia is risking a nuclear catastrophe in Europe, which is comparable to Fukushima in 2011, Chernobyl in 1986, or even worse.”
• “About two-thirds of Ukraine’s supply hails from the reactors at the three nuclear plants, which does not include Zaporizhzhia in southeastern Ukraine, which is under Russian occupation. The burden on the operational sites is all the greater without Zaporizhzhia and the impairment of 90 percent of Ukraine’s thermal plants and 40 percent of its hydroelectric plants since 2022.”
• “The threat of a meltdown, experts say, stems from the stoppage of external electricity to the plants, which rely on it for their cooling systems. … If a substation that relays power to the reactor malfunctions, the plants have generators and batteries that kick in. The backup generation can cover outages for seven to 10 days.”
• “The sixth and final reactor at Zaporizhzhia, Europe’s largest nuclear station, was put into cold shutdown (nuclear fission stops) in April. … Greenpeace International said that although the six Zaporizhzhia reactors “remain on a cliff edge in terms of safety, they are at least in cold shutdown.” Since nuclear material remains in all six reactors and is still cooling, even with the complete loss of electrical power, a meltdown would not happen in just hours or days but would probably take several weeks.”

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Iran and its nuclear program:

“Iran and Russia’s Fragile Partnership. How America Can Divide Two of Its Main Adversaries,” Maria Snegovaya and Jon B. Alterman, FA, 11.25.24.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“Ukraine’s warriors brace for a Kremlin surge in the south. Vladimir Putin’s war machine is pushing harder and crushing Ukrainian morale,” The Economist, 11.24.24.

• “Ukrainian intelligence believes that Russia is gearing up for a bold assault on Zaporizhzhia city, 30km from the front. When exactly no one is clear, but it makes some sense. As one of three remaining centers of heavy industry in the country, the provincial capital remains crucial to Ukraine’s survival as a functioning state.”
• “[In the Donetsk region] Russia is moving faster than at any time since the early days of the invasion. Hardened by the blunders of 2022, Russian commanders have developed a grim formula that works: drones, electronic warfare, guided air-launched bombs, ruthless command, and waves of disposable infantry.”
• “Ukraine’s problems, meanwhile, are worsening mainly because of manpower issues. The army is long out of willing recruits, and its mobilization campaign is falling short, recruiting barely two-thirds of its target. A senior Ukrainian official says he is worried the situation may become irretrievable by the spring. An even bigger problem is the quality of the new recruits. “Forest”, a battalion commander with the 65th brigade, says the men being sent from army headquarters are now mostly too old or unmotivated to be useful. All but a handful are over the age of 45. “I’m being sent guys, 50 plus, with doctors’ notes telling me they are too ill to serve,” he says. “At times it feels like I’m managing a day-care center rather than a combat unit.”
• “As weak as Ukraine is, Russia can be beaten, argues “Forest”, a battalion commander with the 65th brigade The proof? An ambush in February, when his battalion singlehandedly destroyed a mechanized column of two dozen Russian vehicles. “To those who shout we’re screwed, I ask them when hasn’t Ukraine been screwed?”
• “But Ukraine’s systemic weakness is clearly taking its toll on the morale of its front-line fighters. With no hope for rotation or demobilization, some of the once most committed now wonder if a ceasefire might be the only way out. “Chechen,” the brigade officer leading the new soldiers’ training session, says he remains determined to fight to the end. “Giving away territories to these disgusting people is no guarantee it will stop.” But he admits that fewer soldiers than ever share his resolve. “It’s not even 50-50 any more, but 30-70.” Lemberg”, a battalion commander with the 118th brigade manning the south-western defenses of Zaporizhzhia province, puts the situation in even starker terms. “In 2022 I was ready to tear the Russians apart with my teeth,” he says. “In 2023, I just needed rest. This year? I almost couldn’t give a fuck.”

“Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 24, 2024,” ISW, 11.24.24.

• “Russian forces’ recent confirmed battlefield gains near Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka demonstrate that the war in Ukraine is not stalemated. The frontline in Donetsk Oblast is becoming increasingly fluid as Russian forces recently have been advancing at a significantly quicker rate than they did in the entirety of 2023.”
• “Russian advances in the Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Vuhledar, and Velyka Novosilka directions present the Russian military command with several courses of action (COAs) that the Russian command may attempt in the coming weeks and months.”
• “COA 1: Russian forces advance southwest, east, and northeast of Velyka Novosilka to envelop the settlement from its flanks, bypassing the area immediately south of Velyka Novosilka.”
• “COA 2: Russian forces advance to Andriivka (along the H15 highway and west of Kurakhove) from the south in support of Russian efforts to close the Ukrainian pockets near Kurakhove and level the frontline.”
• “COA 3: Russian forces advance west and southwest from Selydove along the Pustynka-Sontsivka line in the direction of Andriivka to collapse the Ukrainian pocket north of Kurakhove and threaten Ukrainian egress routes.”
• “The Russian military command is likely planning on how to advance into the southeasternmost part of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in support of Russia's longstanding objective to seize all of Donetsk Oblast.”
• “Elements of the Russian Central, Eastern, and Southern military districts (CMD, EMD, and SMD) are conducting simultaneous, mutually supportive offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast and have recently made relatively rapid tactical advances. The Russian military command may be learning from some battlefield mistakes after three years of war, but the extent of this learning is currently unclear.”
• “The Russian military command appears to be planning more complex operations, but Russian forces have yet to be able to restore operational maneuver to the battlefield and are instead still relying on their ability to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in the Ukrainian defensive lines to make gradual, tactical advances.”

“Russia Has Suffered Colossal Losses in Ukraine. Is Its Army Depleted?”, Anatoly Kurmanaev, NYT, 11.19.24.

• “Journalists from the independent Russian news outlet Mediazona and the BBC Russian Service have been counting Russian soldiers who have died in Ukraine since the early months of the invasion. Their methods are based on collecting and cross-checking public information such as obituaries and cemetery burials.”
• “This work has produced the most comprehensive database of confirmed Russian combat deaths: 78,000 soldiers by November, not including the Ukrainian separatists and foreigners fighting for Russia. (A similar, but less transparent, account of Ukraine’s losses found 65,000 dead soldiers by mid-November.) Mediazona’s tally is incomplete: Some soldiers leave no trace when they die. The journalists estimate that they have recorded about half of all Russian military deaths.”
• “Meduza collaborated with Mediazona and the BBC for a statistical analysis of war casualties. Their main tool is Russia’s public notary database, which contains all inheritance cases opened by the relatives of killed soldiers. … This analysis of excess mortality led the journalists to estimate Russia’s total military deaths at nearly 150,000 by the end of October.”
• “Journalists from the BBC, Mediazona and Meduza collaborated on the next task: quantifying Russia’s severe battlefield injuries. … They concluded that for every dead Russian soldier, about two more were seriously injured.”
• “Meduza estimated that Russia’s military had suffered a total of 405,000 irreplaceable losses by late October. Using a similar method, Olga Ivshina of the BBC estimated 484,000 irreplaceable Russian losses in the same period.”
• “The military intelligence agencies of Ukraine and many NATO nations produce their own estimates of Russian casualties. They all claim that Russia has lost 600,000 to 700,000 in dead and wounded soldiers as of October. These agencies do not disclose their methods. The numbers they make public usually represent the top range of their internal estimates and include light injuries.”

“The Operational and Strategic Genius of the Kursk Offensive,” Dan Cox, FPRI, 11.22.24.

• “Current analysis of the recent offensive conducted by Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region of Russia is incomplete at best and misguided at worst. Most of the pundits are focused on speculating whether the recent offensive will anger American politicians, lead to an eventual victory, or halt the Russian offensive in eastern Ukraine. Dealing with the anger of American politicians first, it is unlikely that Ukraine conducted this counteroffensive in a vacuum. American politicians were likely aware of the operation.”
• “Dealing with the next question, speculating on whether one operation will “tip the scales” fits into the American culture of viewing events, wars, and almost everything as a black-and-white or win-lose dichotomy. Finally, the attack on Russia was not intended to halt the main Russian offensive in Pokrovsk. At most, this attack was aimed at drawing troops from the Russian attack on Kharkiv, which, being one of the largest population centers in Ukraine, would represent a major loss for Ukraine, should it fall into Russian hands.”
• “This essay examines the situation by looking at the Kursk campaign holistically and through the intersection of military operations and strategy. This intersection is often referred to as the area where operational art occurs. By examining the Kursk offensive holistically, this approach does not fall into the rut of determining winners and losers.”
• “The evidence shows a great deal of cleverness and foresight in developing the Kursk battle plan. The West should support this new propensity in the system as it puts Vladimir Putin and his military planning staff on the horns of multiple dilemmas. The Kursk offensive exposed many deficiencies and vulnerabilities in the Russian offensive as the war approached the third-year mark.”
• “It is factually incorrect to assert there was no effect on the Russian offensive in eastern Ukraine. Russia redeployed thirty thousand troops to stop the advancement of the Ukrainian forces into Russia. Whether this puts the Russian offensive at risk remains to be seen, but it does not matter as much as some think. Russia continues to take unsustainable losses, and the Kursk offensive has accelerated that trend.”
• “They have already taken an additional 6,600 casualties and lost 70 tanks because the Ukrainian military infiltrated Russia. Putin panicked and made yet another strategic mistake by telling his own people that the Ukrainian forces would be dislodged from Kursk by October 1 of this year. Putin is desperate. Every day beyond October 1 that the Ukrainian forces remain in Russia, Putin is losing political credibility.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Making the Most of Ukraine’s Freedom to Strike Russia," Jack Watling, RUSI, 11.19.24.
• "Putin Would Rather North Koreans Die in Ukraine Than Russian Women," Mariya Y. Omelicheva, NI, 11.24.24.
• "North Koreans Are Not Russia’s Only Foreign Fighters in Ukraine," Kristiina Silvan, NI, 11.18.24.

Military aid to Ukraine

“Firing American missiles at Russia won’t change Ukraine’s fortunes,” The Economist, 11.18.24.

• “The name of the weapon, designed in the late 1980s, was both an acronym—Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS)—and, when said aloud, an exhortation—“attack ’ems.” But Ukraine could not, in fact, attack ’em—at least not inside Russia, not until November 17th, when American news outlets reported that Joe Biden, America’s president, had changed course and given Ukraine permission to use the advanced long-range missiles on Russian soil.”
• “Mr. Biden’s decision now leaves three significant questions.”
  • “One is the extent of his reversal. Reports have suggested that Ukraine, at least initially, will only be permitted to use ATACMS in Kursk province, where Ukraine has seized territory that Russia is now battling to reclaim.”
  • “The second question is whether Britain and France will now follow suit and allow Ukraine to use their own advanced cruise missiles—known as Storm Shadow and SCALP respectively—inside Russia.⁴ The decision might also put pressure on Olaf Scholz, Germany’s chancellor, to reconsider his own refusal to provide Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine.”
    • “The third and most consequential issue is how Mr. Putin will choose to respond. America was throwing “oil to the fire”, said a spokesman for the Kremlin. “If such a Mr. Biden may be hoping that Mr. Putin will not respond aggressively in order to keep open the prospect of cutting a deal with Mr. Trump next year. The president-elect reportedly told Mr. Putin on a phone call that he should not escalate the war. If that is true—the Kremlin denies that the phone call took place—then both Mr. Biden and Mr. Trump will have had their answer in the skies above Ukraine in the early hours of November 17th: the largest air attacks since last year, crippling Ukraine’s power grid and killing a reported 18 people.”

“New Missiles Won’t Change Ukraine’s Broken War Math,” Jennifer Kavanagh, FP, 11.21.24.

• “When U.S. President Joe Biden greenlit Ukraine’s use of longer-range, U.S.-provided missiles known as ATACMS to strike targets deep inside Russia this week, he crossed what Russia has deemed a red line. The decision came after months of pressure from Kyiv, European allies, and Ukraine-supporting members of the U.S. Congress who blamed Biden’s foot-dragging for Ukraine’s cascading losses.”
• “Biden’s gambit will fail for the same reason his broader Ukraine policy has: It ignores the conflict’s basic math. Given limits on U.S. stockpiles and defense production and Ukraine’s manpower constraints—all readily apparent from the war’s outset—there has never been a sustainable way for Washington to fuel its partner to total victory over Russia.”
• “The math of the conflict was never on Kyiv’s side. As Trump prepares to assume office, he should adopt a strategy that corrects the insolvency of Biden’s approach. Some, including members of Congress and of Trump’s emerging national security team, have argued that the best way to get Russian President Vladimir Putin to agree to negotiations is to raise the pressure on Russia, by taking the “handcuffs” off Ukraine. But the United States cannot surge the weapons needed for such a scheme, and even if it could, Ukraine does not have the manpower to take advantage of them.”
• “Instead, the next administration should push Ukraine to adopt a defense-only strategy. This approach would focus all of Ukraine’s and Washington’s resources on protecting the country’s remaining territory, with the ultimate aim of stopping Russian advances and opening space for diplomacy. Rather than expending effort trying to fend off Russian and North Korean forces in Kursk or conducting strikes inside Russia or behind Russian lines in Ukraine, Kyiv would instead prioritize exclusively defensive investments and operations.”

“As Ukraine Fires U.S. Missiles, Putin Sends West a Message,” Anton Troianovski, NYT, 11.22.24.

• “In many ways, President Vladimir V. Putin seems to be winning. Russian forces are pushing ahead in Ukraine. President-elect Donald J. Trump is returning to the White House. War fatigue is spreading across Europe. North Korean troops have boosted the ranks of his army.”
• “And yet on Thursday, Mr. Putin appeared weary, threatened and newly aggrieved as he took his bellicose threats against his Western adversaries to a new level. Even with the prospect of a friendlier American administration around the corner, he has found himself struggling anew to confront perhaps the biggest failure of his war: Russia's inability to deter the West from providing colossal amounts of military aid to Ukraine.”
• “As a result, Mr. Putin is bringing Russia closer to a direct conflict with the United States than at any point in decades. He announced Thursday evening that Russia had struck Ukraine with a new intermediate-range missile, one with nuclear capabilities, using a televised speech to cast the West as an aggressor that left Moscow with no choice but to respond. On Friday, Mr. Putin told a meeting of military leaders that Russia would continue using and begin regular production of the new missile.”
• “Two months from now, Mr. Trump's second presidency could give Mr. Putin the chance to strike a peace deal with Ukraine that he could portray as a victory. But until then, people who study the Kremlin say, Mr. Putin is intent on driving home the chilling message that America risks nuclear war as it expands its support for Kyiv.”

“Ukraine’s ATACMS: What Will the U.S. Missiles Mean for the War?,” Max Boot, CFR, 11.18.24.

• “With little more than two months left in office, President Joe Biden has belatedly heeded Ukraine’s pleas and reportedly allowed the use of American-provided Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) inside Russia. This comes a little more than a week after another post-election decision to allow a small number of U.S. defense contractors to fix U.S.-made weapons systems inside Ukraine, rather than forcing Ukrainians to take their weapons to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries for repair. All of this calls to mind the anonymous quip… that Americans can always be counted on to do the right thing, but only after exhausting all the other options.”
• “This has, in fact, virtually been the credo of the Biden administration when it comes to Ukraine. Biden has given Ukrainians access to almost all the weapons they have asked for—including Abrams heavy tanks, Bradley armored fighting vehicles, Patriot air-defense batteries, High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), and, most recently, F-16 fighter jets—but only after agonizing and drawn-out deliberations during which Ukraine has paid a substantial price in land and lives for not having had the weapons systems earlier. This caution made sense in the early stage of the war, which began with Russia’s unprovoked invasion on February 24, 2022, when there were legitimate fears that Russian President Vladimir Putin could use nuclear weapons to make up for the battlefield reverses suffered by his conventional forces.”
• “But that danger point passed in the fall of 2022 when Putin did not go nuclear despite suffering substantial defeats in the Kharkiv and Kherson provinces. Ukraine now finds itself on the defensive and losing ground in the eastern Donbas region at the fastest rate since 2022. Russian troops are inching toward the key city of Pokrovsk, a major logistics and transportation hub that anchors the Ukrainian defense of the east, albeit at staggering cost.”
• “The United Kingdom chief of defense staff, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, recently said that October was the costliest month for Russian forces of the entire war, with Russia losing an average of 1,500 soldiers killed or wounded every single day. Overall, Radakin estimated that Russia has lost 700,000 killed or wounded since the start of the fighting. But Russia has ramped up recruiting to keep up with its losses, and now its forces have been augmented by 10,000 North Korean troops as part of an offensive meant to drive the Ukrainians from the Russian Kursk region.”
• “It is the involvement of the North Koreans that evidently prompted Biden to reconsider his prohibition on Ukraine using ATACMS against targets inside Russia. Some U.S. Defense Department officials argued against the ATACMS decision on the grounds that Russia had already moved many of its aircraft out of their range and that the Ukrainians did not have enough ATACMS to change the course of the war. (Some estimates put the total number possessed by Kyiv at less than fifty.) But the Institute for the Study of War, a Washington think tank, has identified hundreds of significant Russian military targets within 190 miles of the border with Ukraine.”
• “Unfortunately, time could be running out for U.S. aid to Ukraine. President-Elect Donald Trump takes office on January 20. Many in Trump’s camp appear eager to cut off aid to Ukraine. But doing so would make likely a Russian victory that would be a major strategic setback for the United States and an embarrassment to Trump.”

“Trump's Churchillian Option for Peace in Ukraine,” Margus Tsahkna, WSJ, 11.20.24.

• “President-elect Donald Trump has a historic opportunity in Russia's war against Ukraine. If he repeats the errors of 1938 -- when Neville Chamberlain appeased another imperialist dictator -- he'll leave America weakened and poorer and its enemies emboldened. But Mr. Trump could instead act with the strength and courage of Winston Churchill, ushering in a just, lasting peace that cows the enemies of the U.S. worldwide.”
• “A clear victory for Ukraine and defeat for Russia would prove that the U.S. and its allies are strong enough to counter military and diplomatic challenges worldwide.”
• “If we succeed in Ukraine, we will face the rest of the challenges from a position of strength. If the West fails and lets Ukraine slip away, we will still face the same list of challenges, but from a much weaker position.”
• “Though the hand-wringing from pundits would make you think otherwise, we currently have the upper hand over Moscow. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization represents nearly one billion people and the West has an economy at least 20 times as large as Russia's.”
• “Ukrainians have proved they can defend themselves, but we must give them the opportunity to do so by ramping up sufficient military support and lifting restrictions on how Ukraine can use the aid provided. The message to Mr. Putin must be loud and clear: It is impossible for him to meet his aims on the battlefield. He will have to turn to an agreement.”
• “The only path to peace is for Russia to withdraw from Ukraine and remain within its borders, with Moscow's defeat made bluntly clear. Mr. Trump has a chance to be the one who brings a just peace to Europe. I hope he takes it.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “Joe Biden’s overdue missile consent for Ukraine,” Editorial Board, FT, 11.19.24.
• "ATACMS Missiles and Ukraine: What Will Donald Trump Do?" Mark N. Katz, NI, 11.22.24.
• “Biden’s Parting Gift to Ukraine Could Also Help Trump,” Serge Schmemann, NYT, 11.18.24.

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

"Can the Digital Ruble Shield Russia From Western Sanctions?" Alexandra Prokopenko, Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, 10.17.24.

• “In recent years, central banks in several major countries, including Russia and the United States, have been exploring the creation of digital assets, commonly known as central bank digital currencies (CBDCs).”
• “Russian policy discussions about the creation of a digital ruble center on its potential utility for facilitating international trade and mitigating the impact of sanctions. The advantages for Russia of CBDCs, including enhanced cross-border payment capabilities and reduced transaction costs, are fairly straightforward. They could provide Russia with alternatives to traditional payment systems like SWIFT that it lost access to as a result of Western economic sanctions introduced in the wake of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022.”
• “The digital ruble project initiated by the Russian central bank in 2020 has progressed rapidly, with real-world testing involving several commercial banks and clients now under way. Positioned as a retail CBDC, the digital ruble is intended to integrate seamlessly into everyday transactions. However, several important challenges persist, ranging from public skepticism toward CBDCs and concerns over state surveillance to integration costs for banks and the difficulties of aligning the digital ruble with international CBDC standards.”
• “More broadly, Russia’s CBDC efforts face competition from countries like China, which has made more progress in testing a CBDC and its associated infrastructure. China has also made more strides in fostering international collaboration. That state of affairs may ultimately increase Russia’s overall dependence on China. Meanwhile, Russia is trying to galvanize efforts within the BRICS group of countries to promote CBDC usage and alternative ways of making cross-border payments. The potential success of Russia and China in this field does not pose an immediate threat to either the dominance of the U.S. dollar or the viability of the existing Western sanctions regime, but it does pave the way for gradual yet significant changes to the global financial system as we know it.”

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

“Trump may be right about Ukraine’s endgame,” Alec Russell, FT, 11.21.24.

• “People close to Michael Waltz, the congressman who is Trump’s pick as national security adviser, and others among the president-elect’s foreign policy team, have talked of a version of the Korean Line of Control as a credible scenario, with agreed temporary borders. The critical questions are how to enforce such a deal — and of course how to bring Russian President Vladimir Putin to the table, given the fighting has tilted in his favor.”
• “As for the policing of a deal, Trump’s confidants are adamant he would not deploy a single American soldier. The go-to solution of the 1990s, a force of UN blue helmets, is also out of the question given the impasse on the Security Council. This leaves Europe, whether via Nato, but without US forces, or a bespoke European force. It’s where European potential leverage comes into play.”
• “There remains a nightmare scenario for Ukraine in which Trump pushes for a shabby deal on Putin’s terms. But Europe’s leaders are cautiously optimistic that Trump is listening to them and does not want to be the president who stood by as Russia over-ran Ukraine. “Trump wants to solve it but not at any cost,” says a senior European official. “It cannot be a capitulation of Ukraine,” or a debacle on the lines of Afghanistan four years ago.”
• “And so the thinking is that Trump could sign off on security guarantees — albeit short of a commitment to Ukraine’s membership of Nato. One idea floated in his circle is a pledge to step back into the fray if Putin breaks the terms of a deal.”
• “All this is predicated on the idea that Putin can be brought to heel. On the face of it, the potential of the war to escalate looks more worrying than ever. The Biden administration’s decision to let Ukraine use long-range missiles against targets in Russia, prompted Russia’s firing of an ICBM against Ukraine for the first time since its full-scale invasion in February 2022. But the west’s missile decision also underlines the catchphrase of the moment for Ukraine and its allies: “peace through strength.”
• “Waltz told me in September that there are ... ways of pressuring Moscow, including by unleashing cheap American oil on to the markets to weaken the oil-dependent Russian economy. Carrots will also matter, as well as the stick.”

“Fighting in Ukraine could wind down in 2025. What might a possible deal look like?” The Economist, 11.20.24.

• “As Ukraine’s citizens shiver through a third winter in which power and heating plants are targets for Russian missiles and drones, there is but one cause for hope: that 2025 could be the year in which the fighting largely comes to an end. Both sides are close to exhaustion, and the backers of each would prefer the conflict to wind down. In Washington this will be a priority for Donald Trump’s new administration.”
• “What might a possible deal look like? Ukraine will have to accept the loss of some of its territory. The 7% that Russia seized in its first invasion in 2014 (the Crimea and eastern Donbas) is surely unrecoverable. Any settlement will probably also involve Russia holding on to some or most of the additional 11% that it now controls since the 2022 invasion. In return, Ukraine must have solid security guarantees, the ideal one being full membership of NATO. That would probably constitute an acceptable solution in Kyiv, painful though it will be for Ukraine to swallow.”
• “With Mr. Trump back in power, however, it seems probable that Ukraine will not join NATO for years, if ever; but it might still at least get some form of security guarantee. At any rate, it does at least now seem highly probable that discussions will start in 2025, and when they do the fighting could sharply ratchet down, even to a ceasefire. That is what happened in 2014 (though that ceasefire never wholly held). While talks grind on, a semi-frozen conflict might arise. Imperfect, yes, but much better than the way things are now.”

“The Russia-Ukraine War in 2030,” Happymon Jacob, FP, 11.20.24.

• “Consider this scenario for the Russia-Ukraine war in the year 2030: As much as U.S. President Donald Trump or other third parties tried to force a final settlement and lasting peace, they only succeeded in getting the two sides to agree to a series of measures to manage their war. With neither Moscow nor Kyiv accepting each other’s war aims—and with neither side strong enough to decisively defeat the other—the two countries are mired in a low-intensity but continued conflict with occasional, limited skirmishes. A complete end to the fighting is nowhere in sight.”
• “The scenario of a managed war requires Russia and Ukraine to agree to a series of concessions. These include agreements to designate specific areas—such as nuclear facilities, heavily populated civilian areas, and food storage sites—as permanent cease-fire zones; establish permanent humanitarian corridors for safe passage of civilians and aid workers; exchange prisoners; establish communication channels between military commanders to manage incidents and prevent escalation; and create protocols for de-escalating incidents.”
  • “This state of affairs—a low-intensity conflict and a patchwork of agreements—is a function of several factors. For one, neither side is powerful enough to defeat the other.”
  • “Second, there is no Western appetite for going all in.”
  • “And finally, neither side has strong incentives—even under outside pressure—to terminate the war or reach a final settlement, making a managed stalemate the least bad outcome.”
• “The scenario of managed conflict would be a partial victory for Ukraine, even if the country has lost close to 20 percent of its territory to Russia since 2014.”
• “While Ukraine has lost a considerable amount of territory to Russia, it is a much more determined and cohesive nation with a far more consolidated non-Russian identity than ever before in its history. It has one of the strongest and most versatile militaries in Europe, battle-hardened and adept at using a range of weapon systems produced by a thriving modern defense industry.”
• “The Russia of 2030, on the other hand, is battle-weakened and geopolitically isolated, staring at severe demographic challenges, debilitating sanctions, and declining energy prices. The war has made Russia a much-diminished power, with the economy in bad shape due to vast defense spending and severe Western sanctions. Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has been unable to achieve his goal of returning Ukraine to Moscow’s orbit, faces growing domestic pressure to end the war.”

“It’s Time for Ukraine to Make the Best Peace It Can. U.S. policymakers can help shape a deal that preserves national security,” Matthew Duss, and Robert Farley, FP, 11.21.24.

• “Ukraine will need to make extremely difficult decisions about what, precisely, it values. There is little serious debate that Ukraine will need to exchange territory for peace. The important question is what else Ukraine will need to concede.”
• “The goal of a strategic failure for Russia should be dropped from public statements. Insistence that Russia accept and acknowledge its failure undermines diplomatic efforts to end the war, which will need to offer Russia at least some public theory of victory, as repulsive as that idea may be to any who have witnessed—let alone endured—the savagery of the war Putin started. The damage that Russia has inflicted upon itself is plain and undeniable in any case.”
• “If Trump makes good on his promise to end the war, supporters of Ukraine must be clear about the principles at stake and be careful not to let maximalist aims foreclose a durable negotiated settlement. We say this with the knowledge of what conceding Ukrainian territory to permanent Russian control could mean, and has already meant, for Ukrainians in those territories.”
• “Ending the war does not mean ending international pressure to punish Russia’s treatment of those populations, which includes the horrific policy of kidnapping Ukrainian children and placing them with Russian families. Bringing an end to this war’s costly and destructive military component could create greater space for attention to those crimes. Up to this point, we believe that fulsome support for Ukraine’s defense has been both morally and strategically wise. Alternative paths must now be considered.”

“Trump wants a deal on Ukraine. But a bad deal is worse than none,” Editorial Board, WP, 11.23.24.

• “Ukraine's European backers have shown signs of war-weariness and might be more amenable to a settlement. But the danger for Ukraine is that in his interest to strike a quick deal, Mr. Trump might settle for a bad one. A truce that ratifies Ukraine's de facto dismemberment and leaves Ukrainians feeling disillusioned and betrayed by their Western backers would reward Mr. Putin's aggression and encourage him to commit more of it.”
• “Not only Mr. Putin. An abandonment of Ukraine - or a deal that leaves Ukraine untenably territorially diminished - would signal to dictators around the world that Western resolve comes with an expiration date. Imagine how Chinese President Xi Jinping would take a Western retreat from Ukraine as he contemplates taking Taiwan or the atolls and shoals in the oil-rich South China Sea. It's not too soon to wonder - and worry - whether North Korea's Kim Jong Un regards his army's mission against Ukraine as preparation for a military move of his own on the Korean Peninsula.”
• “A Ukraine left with a chunk of its eastern territory under Russian occupation is tantamount to a defeat - for Ukraine and for the West. During the presidential campaign, Mr. Trump made much of the Biden administration's precipitous and ill-planned withdrawal from Afghanistan, which Mr. Trump said signaled to the world American weakness. An abandonment of Ukraine, after nearly three years of what has been a unified American and European front, would send the same sort of signal. And if it comes as a result of Mr. Trump's negotiated deal, the onus will be on him. He won't have Mr. Biden to blame anymore.”

“The Only Way to Achieve Lasting Peace in Ukraine,” Eugene Finkel, FP,⁵ 11.22.24.

• “What most Ukrainians want, passionately, is to be left alone by Russia...to be treated as a nation that has the right to an independent existence.”
• “The Russian obsession with Ukraine is driven by two factors: identity and security (both national security and the security of Russia’s autocratic regime).”
• “To ensure that future Russian rulers do not intend to destroy Ukraine; Ukraine’s centrality to both Russian national identity and the Kremlin’s security perceptions will have to change.”
• “Laying the groundwork for a change in Russian attitudes should therefore start in history textbooks...Russian students might learn to respect Ukraine’s distinct nationhood.”
• “By 2022, for the first time in its long history, the population of Ukraine was not deeply divided from within, and this cohesion was crucial to the successful defense of the country.”
• “The number of foreigners learning Ukrainian has skyrocketed, and museums and cultural institutions across the globe no longer automatically label artists born in what is now Ukraine as 'Russian.'”
• “The war is also an opportunity to strengthen Ukraine’s inclusive identity and create a pantheon of new heroes who fought for Ukrainian independence.”
• “Only through deep internal change will Russia’s intent to destroy Ukraine be consigned to painful history and never again be policy.”
• “What Ukraine can do is maintain its unity by wholeheartedly embracing democracy and prioritizing a unique, inclusive civic national identity over exclusionary and radical alternatives.”
• “The West—while unable to dictate how Russians and Ukrainians should structure their societies, national identities, and foreign relations—can help contain Russia, shore up Ukrainian democracy, and give Kyiv the tools it needs to protect itself.”

“Q&A: How Trump Could Change the Trajectory of the War in Ukraine,” Isaac Chotimer, The New Yorker, 11.19.24.

• “To talk about the war, I recently spoke by phone with Rod Thornton, an associate professor in the defense-studies department at King’s College London, and an expert on the Russian military, who has lived in both Moscow and Kyiv.”
• “Chotimer: How would you define where the war is right now? Thornton: It is a stalemate.⁶ Yes, there are advances on various fronts, but a few hundred meters or kilometers here and there. The only big advance was made by the Ukrainian side into Kursk Oblast back in August. And that is what the Russians are now trying to sort out, as it were, using the North Korean troops.”
• “Chotimer: The question now is not about whether [Ukraine] will have to give up territory but how to make sure than any peace holds. Thornton: Well, in practice, it’s very hard to say—just like it’s hard to say what might happen with Trump—but the idea is that he comes down on both sides and says, “Right, let’s hold the line,” i.e., the front lines where they are now. That will be, I think, Trump’s mantra… In many ways, both sides, Putin and Zelensky, might be amenable to what Trump suggests because of the war weariness in both countries.”
• “Chotimer: … How [can] Ukraine have any confidence that, after a deal is agreed to, Russia won’t just try and take more territory in six months, or whenever? Thornton: Trump would say to Putin, Accept this, or otherwise we will do X… Trump will tell Putin, Do not use any more aggression. And Putin will listen to Trump.”
• “Chotimer: If no deal is reached and American aid stops—military aid, financial aid—do you think the war would essentially be lost for Ukraine? Thornton: Yes, because think about something like artillery shells. On the front, something like ten thousand artillery shells are being fired a day, right? That’s a lot. Now, where do those shells come from? They mostly come from the United States. The war at the front line is an artillery war. You do simple things like cut off the supply of artillery shells to Ukraine, and what does the Ukrainian military do? It’s got nowhere to go. It can’t defend itself.”
  • “So Trump has that leverage, that power to, in essence, end the war. And the Europeans, as I said, yes, they can do bits and pieces, but they haven’t got the clout, the financial or military clout, to help Ukraine in a way that the United States can. The Europeans can’t step in if the American help is pulled. It’s that simple. Zelensky is very much at the beck and call of whatever Trump wants.”
• “Chotimer: If we do have a situation where there’s some sort of peace deal… and there’s some sort of security guarantee, but it is essentially based just on Putin’s word, that seems like an incredible fragile situation that could be broken at any time. Thornton: … Trump will do something, offer Putin some sort of olive branch… But you said “peace deal.” There won’t be a peace deal. There’ll be a ceasefire. And you’ll get what’s also appeared in other parts of the former Soviet Union, the kind of frozen conflicts like in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia. It will be a frozen conflict in Ukraine, and it will be frozen until one of the parties sees some sort of benefit in unfreezing it.”

“Ukraine and Russia Can Find Peace with a DMZ,” James Stavridis, Bloomberg, 11.20.24.

• “During the election campaign, former and future President Donald Trump said he would stop the war in Ukraine in 24 hours. While that seems highly unlikely, it is clear that the new administration is extremely skeptical of continuing significant US military aid to Kyiv. Trump and his vice president, JD Vance, have talked about pushing both sides to the negotiating table early in 2025.”
• “This isn’t hopeless: The chances of both sides being willing to negotiate next year are increasing. Russian President Vladimir Putin insists he is willing to grind away indefinitely, but mounting personnel losses will make that difficult. Roughly 200,000 young Russian men have been killed in action, with probably double that number seriously wounded.”
• “Ukraine also faces significant manpower problems — but even more dire is the possibility of declining aid from the US and perhaps the European Union. President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s appeals have an increasing tone of desperation, and nothing in the national security appointments of Team Trump will likely encourage Kyiv’s sense of security. Even Marco Rubio, Trump’s choice for secretary of state, has abandoned his longtime support for Kyiv. Over time, the odds are against the Ukrainians on the battlefield.”
• “So the question becomes what sort of deal might be acceptable, if not attractive, to both sides? And who would help bring the parties to the table? Actually, those North Korean troops bring to mind a potential model for compromise: the demilitarized zone that has kept the peace on the Korean Peninsula for seven decades.”
• “Let’s use that geography as a starting point for compromise. Putin won’t return Crimea and the four provinces, which have a high percentage of ethnic Russians. Zelenskiy will hate this and protest it, but the military realities of Russian occupation are fixed. What you see is probably what you will get, whether you’re in Kyiv or Moscow.”
• “Assuming that is the rough land calculus, the next step is to create a meaningful cease-fire by forging a demilitarized zone between territory held by each side. Here the Korean War provides a reasonable precedent: create a strip, perhaps 5-10 miles wide, and have the opposing parties patrol it, just as the North Koreans and South Koreans have faced each other for 70 years. Or, perhaps better but less likely, there could be a neutral force of United Nations peacekeepers from Latin America or Africa.”

“Most Ukrainians now want an end to the war,” The Economist, 11.20.24.

• “As [Russian forces’] advance grinds on, war fatigue among Ukrainians is deepening. Surveys published on November 19th and 20th by Gallup, a pollster, show that 52% of Ukrainians now support negotiating an end to the war as soon as possible, a sharp rise from just 27% a year ago. The share of those determined to fight “until victory” has dropped from 63% in 2023 to 38%. Even Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, has shifted tone: he recently expressed hope for a diplomatic resolution next year. That reflects a change in rhetoric since the re-election of Donald Trump in America, who has promised to bring the war to an end within 24 hours.”
• “The surveys, conducted in August and October 2024, show that support for continued resistance against Russia has fallen in every part of Ukraine (see maps). In Kyiv, the capital, Gallup data show that support has dropped by 39 percentage points since 2022; in eastern regions close to the front line the figure is even starker: just 27% of respondents now favor pressing on, compared with 63% who want the war to end. Roughly half of those who favor talks are open to territorial concessions—Russia has seized 19% of Ukraine’s land since 2014. Less than 40% of them oppose ceding any land. (The pollsters did not ask which areas or how much land should be given up.)”
• “What explains this fatigue? The immense human and economic toll of the war no doubt weighs heavily on Ukrainians. But growing disillusionment with the West, and what support Ukraine can expect, might also play a role. The Gallup data show that the share of Ukrainians who think their country will join NATO within the next decade dropped from 69% in 2023 to 51% in 2024.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Can Trump Get a Deal on Ukraine?", Lawrence Freedman, Substack, 11.19.24.
• "Trump’s Best Hope for Peace Is to Support Ukraine," Tatyana Deryugina, Anastassia Fedyk, Yuriy Gorodnichenko and Ilona Sologoub, PS, 11.22.24.
• "Ukraine Wary of Western Disunity Ahead of Possible Russia Peace Talks," Katherine Spencer, Atlantic Council, 11.21.24.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations

"What Putin Wants from the Ukraine Conflict," Arkady Moshes, NI, 11.24.24.

• “There are two fundamental sets of arguments that likely drive Putin’s thinking.”
  • “The first one is that Russia has preserved, and in some areas even increased, its capacity to wage war, including a war of attrition.”
  • “The second line of argumentation is that Putin needs to achieve an unquestionable victory not only over Ukraine but, by extension, also over the West.”
• “There are four components that the Kremlin wants to secure, namely:”
  • “1) Western recognition of Russia’s territorial expansion, including Crimea.”
  • “2) Economic sanctions against Russia should be lifted.”
  • “3) Frozen assets should be returned.”
  • “4) A de facto Russian veto on major issues of European security, such as NATO enlargement.”
• “If the West wants to change Putin’s calculus, it must demonstrate that it is not going to purchase another period of comfort for itself at Ukraine’s expense. Instead, it should make Moscow understand that the name of the game is anything but Western surrender.” 

"Europe Has Run Out of Time: With Trump's Return, the Continent Must Take Charge of Its Own Security—and Quickly," Norbert Röttgen, FA, 11.24.24.

“A Military Strategy for Negotiations in Ukraine," Mark F. Cancian, CSIS, 11.22.24. 

• “With talks of negotiations emerging, the United States needs a clear military strategy that supports the process and ensures Kyiv negotiates from a position of strength. This strategy should build on the recent, partial removal of long-range strike restrictions and drop outdated restrictions that limit weapons transfers that could actually save the U.S. taxpayer money and support continued economic growth.”
  • “First, there is a need to align weapons release authorities with the battlefield reality of the ongoing, multi-front, Russian ground offensive in Kursk and Eastern Ukraine.”
  • “Second, Ukraine offers an opportunity for the Trump administration to test key aspects of its policy agenda: (1) creating a smaller, more efficient government, (2) countering China and Iran, and (3) getting allies and partners to pay more for their fair share for common security interests.”
  • “Third, the Trump team can use the existing multinational capability coalitions—which are predominantly led by European partners—to create a more equitable balance of support for Ukraine that actually creates American jobs.”
• “A more inward-looking United States still needs a military that has the capability and capacity to make authoritarians in Moscow, Tehran, Pyongyang, and Beijing think twice.”

“Europe's transatlantic trepidation,” David Ignatius, WP, 11.22.24. 

• “Europe's leading spokesman in discussions with Trump, several officials told me, is likely to be Mark Rutte, a former Dutch prime minister who is the new secretary general of NATO. Rutte has been described as a "Trump whisperer," in part because he assuaged the then-president after a 2018 tirade about NATO by agreeing that Trump was right to demand that alliance members spend more on defense.”
• “Rutte is expected to travel to Mar-a-Lago soon to discuss strategy for the Ukraine peace negotiations that Trump has said he wants, officials told me. Rutte's message will be that Trump's interests and Europe's are both served by a "just and lasting peace," one that doesn't reward Russian aggression and can provide durable security guarantees for Ukraine, the senior German predicted.”
• “A bad deal would hurt Trump as much as Europe, Rutte and others are likely to advise: "Be aware that you have to solve Ukraine in a way that doesn't come back to haunt you during your term," is how the German official described the message to Trump. A condition of any successful peace agreement is that "this war will never happen again," because Ukraine's security will be protected, Europeans will argue.”
• “Europe knows it needs Trump. France and Germany, the traditional anchors of the European Union, are weak politically and financially. A menacing Russia is at the door. Trump is the leader of a frazzled transatlantic alliance, whether he likes it or not. The gut-check question is how he will work with Europe to stop the current conflict in Ukraine - and avoid another round.”

"Merkel Reflects on Putin's Intimidation Tactics and Trump's Fascination with Autocrats," Katrin Bennhold, NYT, 11.22.24.

• “The new book by former Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany dismisses Mr. Putin as ''someone who was always on guard not to be treated badly, and always ready to dish out punishment, including power games with a dog and making others wait,'' a reference to her own fear of dogs, which he manipulated famously at one meeting in 2007, by bringing in a large black Labrador. ''You could find all this childish, reprehensible, you could shake your head at it,'' she writes. ''But that didn't make Russia disappear from the map.'' Russia, she says, ''with its nuclear arsenal, exists'' and remains ''an indispensable geopolitical factor.''
• “Ms. Merkel writes that she saw no way to protect Ukraine or Georgia from Russian aggression in the period between the membership action plan and actual membership, which took five years with previous Central European candidates. During that time, they would not benefit from the NATO treaty's security guarantees.”
• “It would be ''an illusion,'' she writes, to assume that Ukraine's and Georgia's action-plan status ''would have protected them from Putin's aggression, that this status would have been such a deterrent that Putin would have passively accepted these developments.''
• “Then, she asks, would NATO have intervened with troops? And could she have asked Germany's Parliament, which must approve all military deployments overseas, to sign off on German military participation in such a campaign? ''In 2008?'' she asks. ''If so, with what consequences?''
• “Mr. Putin, she recalls, told her later: ''You will not be chancellor forever. And then they will become NATO members. And I want to prevent that.''
• “As she flew home, she says, she was glad that NATO had avoided a big public fight. ''But at the same time, it became obvious that we in NATO had no common strategy for dealing with Russia'' -- which many argue remains true to this day.”

"America’s Rivals Have a New Favorite Weapon: Criminal Gangs," Sune Engel Rasmussen and Daniel Michaels, WSJ, 11.22.24.

• “[There is a] growing threat facing Western security agencies already stretched thin by war and terrorism: alliances between adversarial states and criminals, including drug gangs and lone wolves hired online. Dealing with crime was once the domain of law enforcement, while threats from foreign countries were the responsibility of intelligence agencies. Today the confluence of these foes is increasingly rendering such distinctions obsolete.”
• “Numerous incidents in recent years have awakened Western intelligence officials to the problem. Among their allegations: Russia recruits criminals on social media to commit acts of sabotage across Europe. China outsources overseas cyberattacks to private hackers. Iran hires teenage boys in Scandinavia to lob grenades at Israeli embassies. North Korea deals in drugs and cyber-fraud. Even the Indian government contracted a notorious gangster’s associates to kill a Sikh separatist in Canada.”
• “Western governments have traditionally had good reasons for separating intelligence from law enforcement. In the U.S., limiting the FBI to domestic policing and the CIA to foreign activities is meant to protect civil liberties and prevent the government from using espionage for domestic political purposes.”
• “But in response to new threats, governments need to do more to collect intelligence on organized crime, Felbab-Brown said: “This needs to become a much higher priority because of the nexus and merger with state actors, but also because criminal groups can create enormously destabilizing outcomes in and of themselves.” 

“Statement by the President of the Russian Federation,” Kremlin.ru, 11.21.24.

• “On November 19, six ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles produced by the United States, and on November 21, during a combined missile assault involving British Storm Shadow systems and HIMARS systems produced by the US, attacked military facilities inside the Russian Federation in the Bryansk and Kursk regions. From that point onward, as we have repeatedly emphasized in prior communications, the regional conflict in Ukraine provoked by the West has assumed elements of a global nature. Our air defense systems successfully counteracted these incursions, preventing the enemy from achieving their apparent objectives.”
• “We are developing intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in response to US plans to produce and deploy intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. We believe that the United States made a mistake by unilaterally destroying the INF Treaty in 2019 under a far-fetched pretext. Today, the United States is not only producing such equipment, but, as we can see, it has worked out ways to deploy its advanced missile systems to different regions of the world, including Europe, during training exercises for its troops. Moreover, in the course of these exercises, they are conducting training for using them.”
• “As a reminder, Russia has voluntarily and unilaterally committed not to deploy intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles until US weapons of this kind appear in any region of the world. To reiterate, we are conducting combat tests of the Oreshnik missile system in response to NATO’s aggressive actions against Russia. Our decision on further deployment of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles will depend on the actions of the United States and its satellites.”
• “It goes without saying that when choosing, if necessary and as a retaliatory measure, targets to be hit by systems such as Oreshnik on Ukrainian territory, we will in advance suggest that civilians and citizens of friendly countries residing in those areas leave danger zones. We will do so for humanitarian reasons, openly and publicly, without fear of counter-moves coming from the enemy, who will also be receiving this information.”
• “Why without fear? Because there are no means of countering such weapons today. Missiles attack targets at a speed of Mach 10, which is 2.5 to 3 kilometers per second. Air defense systems currently available in the world and missile defense systems being created by the Americans in Europe cannot intercept such missiles. It is impossible. I would like to emphasize once again that it was not Russia, but the United States that destroyed the international security system and, by continuing to fight, cling to its hegemony, they are pushing the whole world into a global conflict. We have always preferred and are ready now to resolve all disputes by peaceful means. But we are also ready for any turn of events. If anyone still doubts this, make no mistake: there will always be a response.”

“Russia And The West: Stakes Ratchet Up,” Bulletin No. 20 (150) 2024, Tatiana Stanovaya, R.Politik, 11.25.24. Clues from Russian Views

• “Prompted by recent military developments, the Biden administration has approved the use of long-range missiles for deeper strikes into Russian territory by Ukraine. These include significant advances by Russian forces, intensified strikes on critical infrastructure, and a Russian counter-offensive in Kursk region involving North Korean units.”
• “Washington does not expect this decision to change the course of the war but aims to slow down the Russian offensive. Military experts agree that Ukraine neither possesses nor is likely to acquire the resources needed to turn the war in its favor.”
• “Even so, for Moscow, this development is a significant strategic shift: a new phase of the conflict, which it interprets as NATO directly engaging in acts of war against Russia, using Ukraine and launched from Ukrainian territory. The core threat is not the quantity of missiles Ukraine wields or its immediate military capacity but the intensification of Western involvement.”
• “From Putin’s perspective, it is only a matter of time before NATO launches more intense, deeper strikes, potentially posing what he perceives as an existential threat to Russia. This expectation is radicalizing Russia's tactics further, including pushing it to lean even more heavily on nuclear blackmail.”
• “Trump's return to the White House has not deterred Russian escalation. On the contrary, Putin views the current period—before his inauguration on January 20—as an “in-between” stage, an opportune time to escalate: to gain more territory, intimidate Ukraine, fuel debates within Europe, and give Trump the narrative that Biden's policies risked World War III. The last argument may backfire, though.”
• “Putin’s rhetoric has shifted dramatically. He has openly declared that Moscow will consider a nuclear strike in response to NATO-backed attacks on Russian territory. Additionally, he has tested the new Oreshnik ballistic missile in combat and expressed great satisfaction with its performance. The successful test has heightened his appetite for further strikes, making the further use of such missiles practically inevitable.”

“Reflections on the Path to Victory,” Sergei Karaganov, Russia in Global Affairs, 11.21.24.^ Clues from Russian Views (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• “Russia has begun to win the fight against Western aggression in Ukraine. But it is too early and dangerous to calm down. The fight is only just heating up. Let's calm down, let's stop - "let's snatch defeat from the hands of victory." But in order to achieve victory, we need a serious modernization of many aspects of the previous policy, including the correction and clarification of its goals.”
• “The strategic goal of policy, especially foreign and defense, for this period should be the prevention of the looming Third World War. ... ... our victory must stop the world from sliding towards the Third World War. ... The main tool is a sharp increase in reliance on the nuclear factor in our combined power and strategy, and in international relations in general.”
• “Another strategic task is to push back Europe - the source of most of the troubles of mankind in the last five centuries, two world wars, aggression against Russia, colonialism, racism, genocide, monstrous ideologies from the position of an important world player.”
  • “These goals will have to be achieved by strengthening nuclear deterrence and deterrence, but also by diplomacy.”
  • “Given the size of the economy, the small population, and the lag in scientific and technical development accumulated since the 1990s, it is not worth competing with rivals in general-purpose forces or digital weapons, although they need to be strengthened. Nuclear weapons are an equalizer of power for relatively small countries.”
  • “It is also necessary to move meaningfully toward a new model of socio-economic development for the country and the world, ensuring a real, relatively peaceful multipolarity. The goal, among other things, is for Russia to achieve the position of a balancer in the economic and political system of Greater Eurasia, and to consolidate its status as one of the four great powers that determine the vector of development of world politics.”
• “Moving forward, it is necessary to take into account [following] the main macro-trends that will determine the development of the world in the coming two decades of transition to a new world system.”

1. “The exhaustion of the currently dominant model of socio-economic development - liberal global capitalism-imperialism.”

2. “The rise of new powers, the revival of great civilizations that were suppressed for five centuries.”

3. “A desperate counterattack by the West, trying to maintain its position in the world system, allowing it not only to dominate and impose its rules and culture, but - most importantly - to pump the world's GNP in its favor.”

4. “An unprecedentedly rapid redistribution of power in the world, the rearguard battles of the West have created an acute pre-war situation that will persist in the foreseeable future.”

5. “Most of old Europe has entered a severe existential crisis.”

6. “A new military-technical revolution has begun – through the spread of relatively cheap drones, the cheapening of missile weapons.”

7. “The erosion of the former institutions and concepts that regulated the behavior of world powers is taking place.”

8. “The gratifying rise of new powers, the restoration of old civilizations has not yet filled the vacuum of controllability of the world system.”

• “The phase of direct armed conflict must be ended. But we should not strive to end the confrontation with the West. Moreover, this is impossible, given the current vector of development of Western, especially European elites.”
• “The publication in November 2024 – albeit with a delay – of the presidential decree approving the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence, which changes the nuclear doctrine almost revolutionary, decisively bringing it closer to the needs of the time, is a cause for great satisfaction. Our opponents should have no doubts about our ability and readiness, in extreme cases, to use nuclear weapons and win the war.”
• “The United States is the most important player on the world stage for the foreseeable future, but it is beginning a long-term withdrawal from a position of global hegemon that is no longer so advantageous due to the West’s loss of the basis of its dominance – military superiority.”
• “Trump will offer to ease the pressure on Russia (which he cannot provide) in exchange for abandoning a close alliance with China.”
• “Naturally, half-hearted deals should not be made. America is an unreliable partner for the foreseeable future. There is no reason to expect a radical normalization of relations with the United States in the next decade.”
• “The primary and main goal of the current war should be a decisive defeat in Ukraine of the revanchism rising in Europe.”
• “Victory in Ukraine is and should be presented in propaganda as the most important prerequisite for stopping the world's slide towards World War III, which has been going on for several years now, "a war to prevent a global war - a worldwide catastrophe."
• “The goal of policy in the Western direction now should not be the separation of Europe from the United States. For now, this is costly and unlikely. It is worth giving the Atlantic community a chance to self-destruct. The goal, in addition to those mentioned above, is to facilitate the transformation of the United States into a normal great power and, in the long term, to draw a significant part of the western edge of Eurasia into the Greater Eurasian project.” 

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "The Global Threat of Russia's International Partnerships," Nigel Gould-Davies, IISS, 11.22.24.
• “Can Europe defend itself without America? The continent will have to spend more as Trump refocuses policy elsewhere. But replacing US military heft will not be easy,” John Paul Rathbone, Henry Foy and Ben Hall, FT, 11.25.24.
• "Ukraine’s Allies Are Inviting Their Own ‘Strategic Defeat,’" Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 11.19.24.
• “Ukraine war pushes Europe into a race to build up its defense base,” Candace Rondeaux, FT, 11.24.24.
• "Europe's Missile Renaissance," Timothy Wright, IISS, 11.25.24.
• "The EU Needs More Joint Funding for Defense," Editorial Board, Bloomberg, 11.21.24.
• “Ukraine, the Balkans and the future of EU enlargement,” Tony Barber, FT, 11.24.24.
• “Nato right to heed Russian anger over Ukraine accession plan, Angela Merkel says in memoirs,” Guy Chasan, FT, 11.21.24.
• “Russia launches the ‘Oreshnik,’” Weekly Digest for 18 November - 24 November 2024, Tatiana Stanovaya, R. Politik, 11.24.24. Clues from Russian Views

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“Ideas and missiles: how Moscow and Beijing strengthen common security,” Dmitry Stefanovich, Valdai Club, 11.20.24.^ Clues from Russian Views 

• “The key characteristic of Russian-Chinese cooperation in the security sphere is general mutual support without direct involvement in individual conflicts. In this way, the possibility of greater flexibility and efficiency in work in the international arena is preserved and even, to some extent, the contradiction between the tasks of ensuring security and development is removed.”
• “An important promising area of ​​Russian-Chinese cooperation in the security sphere is the conjugation of domestic ideas about the Eurasian security system with the Chinese Initiative on Global Security. Such work is quite feasible given the open, inclusive nature of the approaches of both Moscow and Beijing, especially since certain experience of such conjugation has already been accumulated in the economic sphere. At the same time, here too, the process is by no means “automatic” and requires a balanced, in-depth analysis with an emphasis on observing, first of all, national interests in the security sphere.”
• “According to the author, the key characteristic of Russian-Chinese cooperation in the security sphere is general mutual support without direct involvement in individual conflicts. This preserves the possibility of greater flexibility and effectiveness in working in the international arena and even removes to some extent the contradiction between the tasks of ensuring security and development. Conflicts in Europe—and in particular the Ukrainian conflict—do not require the direct involvement of the Chinese armed forces, just as conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region do not require the involvement of the Russian army. At the same time, the military personnel of the two countries exchange experience on a regular basis and demonstrate growing mutual understanding.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Trump Can Win Against China—in Ukraine," Simon Johnson and Oleg Ustenko, PS, 11.25.24.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Nuclear arms:

“We're ‘inching towards a nuclear war,’ says military intelligence analyst,” interview with Rebekah Koffler, Fox News, 11.25.24.

• “We war gamed this exact scenario, exactly this scenario back in the intelligence community. And we are right now on the escalation ladder, inching towards a nuclear war. It's not going to happen today or tomorrow. But the way that it happens, Eric, the Russians and the United States are de facto right now in a war. Why is that? It is because those ATACMS don't fire by themselves … it all requires U.S. personnel and U.S. satellites. This is why the Russians have stated that the United States and European targets are now in crosshairs. And every war game that we conducted back in the intelligence community ended up in a nuclear war. There was an escalation ladder, and the Russians have mapped that out in the course of 20 years, and we are on it right now.”
• “President Biden himself, just two years ago, at the CMC Donuts, at the fundraising event in New York, he explained that the reason why he was not providing those strategic missile systems at the time, in quantities needed for Ukraine to actually make a difference on the battlefield, is to prevent World War 3. Biden also said that the threat of nuclear Armageddon is real. So Biden has done a 180.”
• “The US Intelligence Community has recently as September advised president Biden against providing the ATACMS because Putin would likely retaliate, likely with lethal means against the United States and against Europe, saying nothing about Ukraine. Ukraine is being destroyed right now.”
• “My intelligence assessment, shared by multiple experts, is that the Russian Army has not been decimated. … Ukraine is massively outgunned, and the Russian military-industrial complex is right now working on a 24/7 basis. Three shifts a day, pumping out those missile systems. Why is that? Because Putin has transitioned the Russian military and economy on a wartime footing, 7 years prior to invading Ukraine.”
• “Russian intelligence classed Trump as unpredictable. That means when Trump negotiates, the Russians will not be able to tell when Trump is bluffing or not. The Russians will be in an excellent position to negotiate, the Ukrainians will not.”

"How Serious a Threat Is Russia’s New Nuclear Doctrine?" Maxim Starchak, Carnegie Politika, 11.01.24.

• “Russia’s updated nuclear doctrine, which was formally approved by President Vladimir Putin on November 19, would likely never have seen the light of day if not for the U.S. move to allow Ukraine to fire long-range Western missiles into Russia. The West ignored Putin’s dire threats about the consequences of such a decision—and Russia had to respond. The Kremlin believes the new doctrine will scare the United States into starting to doubt itself. However, it could end up having the opposite effect.”
• “A number of significant changes have been made to the nuclear doctrine since it was previously approved by Putin in 2020.”
  • “The wording about scenarios that could prompt the use of nuclear weapons has been broadened from a “threat to the very existence of the state” to a “critical threat to sovereignty and/or territorial integrity.” In other words, the threshold for nuclear weapons use has been lowered—and Moscow now considers it possible to use nuclear weapons to protect Russian territory.”
  • “It’s no coincidence that the doctrine’s list of military threats has been altered to include “the actions of a potential adversary designed to isolate part of the territory of the Russian Federation.” This immediately brings to mind the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, which is surrounded by NATO countries that could, theoretically, impose a blockade. The authors of the changes appear to be trying to signal that the Kremlin will now take extreme steps even if there is a threat to just one of Russia’s regions. That’s unconvincing, however, because their tough words do not correlate with the reality of the battlefield in Ukraine. Not only is Kyiv trying to retake Russian-occupied regions that Moscow has formally annexed and claims as its own, but Ukrainian forces also seized part of Russia’s Kursk region in a 2024 offensive and fighting continues to rage there.”
  • “Other changes to the doctrine include making it clear that Moscow will view aggression from a non-nuclear power with the support of a nuclear power as a joint attack. It will also view an attack by any NATO country as an attack by the whole alliance. In other words, the Kremlin wants the doctrine to scare countries that join alliances or coalitions hostile to Russia. The message is clear: you can’t hide behind nuclear-armed powers. Yet more changes mean that Russia will now use nuclear deterrence in relation to “states that give over land they control, airspace, and/or seas for the preparation or implementation of aggression against Russia.” This is an obvious reference to Ukraine, which, in Moscow’s thinking, is a pawn of the United States and NATO… and the updated doctrine states that any nations that join NATO risk being targeted by a nuclear strike.”
  • “It’s also significant that Russia removed a point in the doctrine about complying with arms control agreements (even though Moscow is still a signatory to many such agreements).”
  • “Finally, amid its struggle with the West, Russia has significantly broadened the list of possible threats that could trigger a nuclear response. In addition to the abovementioned “isolation of a part of Russian territory,” this list now also includes attacks on environmentally dangerous targets (primarily nuclear power plants), the obstruction of access to transport communications essential for life, further NATO expansion, and large-scale military exercises on Russia’s borders. In the past, nuclear threats were made when such scenarios were discussed, but now they have been formalized in an official document.”
• “Taken as a whole, the updated doctrine significantly lowers the threshold for Russia’s use of nuclear weapons. The problem is that the lower this threshold becomes, the harder it is to convince anyone that any such threshold actually exists.” 

"New Principles of Russia’s Nuclear Deterrence Liberalize Conditions for Use, Unsurprisingly," Simon Saradzhyan, RM, 11.19.24.

• “As widely expected, the Kremlin has unveiled the new edition of Russia’s official nuclear doctrine, “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.” The document, which Russian President Vladimir Putin signed off on Nov. 18 as Ukraine tested his red line by striking the Bryansk region with U.S.-made longer-range missiles,¹ ushers in an expansion of conditions under which Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons, but contains few surprises for those who have followed the Russian leadership’s nuclear rhetoric since the re-invasion of Ukraine in 2022, including, most importantly, Putin’s Sept. 25 preview of changes that would be introduced into the 2020 edition of the document.”
• “The second section of the principles, on “Essence of Nuclear Deterrence,” contains… significant changes. The 2020 document’s second section starts by explaining the aim of nuclear deterrence, stating that “Nuclear deterrence aims to provide a potential adversary with comprehension of the inevitability of retaliation in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation and/or its allies.” In contrast, the 2024 document’s second section starts with an explanation of what actors Russia deters with nuclear weapons. It also includes one key innovation, which Putin proposed in his Sept. 25 preview with an aim of dissuading the West from helping Ukraine militarily: “Aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies by any non-nuclear state with the participation or support of a nuclear state is considered as their joint attack.”² In addition, the second section in the 2020 document identifies six “main military risks that might evolve into military threats.” In the 2024 document, as many as 10 such risks are listed. The newly added risks include:”
  • “The creation of new or the expansion of existing military coalitions (blocs, alliances), leading to the advancement of their military infrastructure to the borders of the Russian Federation.”
  • “The actions of a potential adversary aimed at isolating part of the territory of the Russian Federation, including blocking access to vital transportation communications.”
  • “The actions of a potential adversary aimed at defeating (destroying, eliminating) ecologically hazardous objects of the Russian Federation, which may lead to man-made, ecological or social disasters.”
  • “The planning and conduct of large-scale military exercises by a potential adversary near the borders of the Russian Federation.”
• “The third section, on “Conditions for the transition of the Russian Federation to the use of nuclear weapons,” has undergone even more significant changes. The opening paragraph of this section in the 2020 document states that “The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.” In contrast, this section in the 2024 document states that “The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) the Republic of Belarus as participants in the Union State with the use of conventional weapons, which creates a critical threat to their sovereignty and/or territorial integrity.”
• “The third section of the 2020 and 2024 editions also differ significantly in their descriptions of the actual “conditions for the transition of the Russian Federation to the use of nuclear weapons,” with the latest document, again, reflecting the innovations Putin called for on Sept. 25. The 2024 edition introduces new official conditions for Russia’s use of nuclear weapons such as: the use of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction by an adversary against military formations and (or) facilities of the Russian Federation located outside its territory; the identification of Belarus as an ally, aggression against which could prompt Russia to use nuclear weapons against the aggressor; and the addition of an all new condition, the receipt of reliable data on a massive launch (takeoff) of air and space attack weapons (strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned, hypersonic and other aerial vehicles) and their crossing of Russia’s state border.”
• “While it is important to identify and analyze the declaratory policies of nuclear powers such as Russia, one should, however, keep in mind that they are, well, declaratory (and that, perhaps, could explain the absence of a doctrinal response by the U.S., whose own nuclear posture is considerably more vague than Russia’s… in absence of access to top secret operational plans, it is important to not only follow what a nuclear power declares in its strategic documents (and what its leader says), but also what it does in terms of deployments and wargames.”

“New Nuclear Doctrine,” in Bulletin No. 20 (150) 2024, Tatiana Stanovaya, R.Politik, 11.25.24. Clues from Russian Views

• “President Putin on 19 November ratified Russia's updated nuclear doctrine, just two days after news broke that the U.S. had approved the use of long-range missiles for deeper strikes into Russian territory by Ukraine.”
• “While the updated doctrine was prepared over several months, the final political decisions were made in September when Putin introduced some key amendments. The Kremlin delayed publication until after the U.S. election and the victor's initial steps became clear, counting on adjusting the final wording.”
• “Most of the changes were anticipated and proved less radical than hard-liners expected. While the doctrine lowers the nuclear threshold, it stops short of incorporating more extreme measures, such as a right to a preventive strike.”
• “While the updated doctrine de jure eases Russia’s legal framework governing nuclear weapons use, this mostly reflects changes that were already de facto the case before the document was signed. As such, the amendments underscore already existing elevated risks, rather than being the cause of them.”
• “The timing of the document's ratification was particularly significant, directly signaling that deeper strikes into Russian territory by Ukrainian forces using NATO-supplied missiles could provoke a nuclear response. For the first time, this was stated explicitly and unequivocally.”
• “Moscow is signaling that the nature of the conflict has shifted and that the risk of nuclear escalation has grown. Russia will intensify its use of strategic weapons against Ukraine and escalate its nuclear threats towards the West.”

“Vladimir Putin climbs escalatory ladder with missile experiment,” Ben Hall, FT, 11.22.24.

• “Ever since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has tried to deter the west from supplying Kyiv with ever more potent weaponry by threatening retaliation and escalation of the war. On each occasion—the supply of short-range missiles, tanks, F-16 fighter jets, longer-range missiles—Moscow’s bluff has been called. This week the Kremlin finally followed through on its threat. Some 72 hours after the U.S. gave permission to Kyiv to use long-range U.S., UK and French missiles on targets inside Russia, Moscow hit back with a strike on Ukraine of the likes we have not seen before—the first combat use of what Kyiv called a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile.”
• “A video purportedly of the strike, shows six explosions consistent with the multiple warhead a weapon like this is designed to carry. The impacts on the video suggest there was no payload at all let alone a nuclear charge. This was first and foremost a warning.”
• “Nobody can afford to take Russian nuclear saber-rattling lightly. But what is curious about Moscow’s ICBM strike is how performative it was. As a prelude reports began circulating in Ukrainian media on Wednesday that the Kremlin was preparing for a possible strike with an RS-26 from a site in southern Astrakhan, from where the attack was launched the following day.”
• “Russia has struck Ukraine with scores of other nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, such as Iskander and Kinzhals. Nevertheless, firing a strategic weapon at its neighbor is clearly an escalatory step. For Moscow, it also has the benefit of exposing further vulnerabilities in Ukraine’s overstretched air defenses. It has triggered Ukrainian calls for the U.S.-built Thaad system, the most sophisticated anti-ballistic missile defense available, which Kyiv is unlikely to get soon if at all.”
• “The incrementalism suggests that finding the next escalatory step without alienating Moscow’s friends in Beijing or unsettling the Russian public, could prove as difficult for the Kremlin as this one. With Donald Trump returning to the White House vowing to bring peace to Ukraine, or impose peace on it, Putin may not have to dwell on it for long.”

"Putin's Nuclear Shadow War With Ukraine Is a Magician's Trick," Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 11.21.24.

• “The key to all magic tricks is distraction, which is the best way to understand Russian President Vladimir Putin’s latest round of nuclear saber rattling, including Thursday’s use of a new generation missile to hit a target in Ukraine.”
• “It’s essential to retain perspective. We are not on the cusp of a nuclear conflagration. Putin talks up his massive nuclear arsenal because it has proved extraordinarily successful in getting the Biden administration and leaders in Europe to self-censor and slow-walk their aid to Ukraine. If he can now get Trump to frame peace talks as a question of whether Americans and Europeans would like: A) to avoid World War III and a nuclear Armageddon, or B) go on supporting Ukraine until it gets a sustainable deal, they will surely pick option A.”
• “The sudden reversal of U.S. policy on ATACMS has alarmed him [Putin] and does indeed make things more dangerous. The prospect that the next U.S. president will try to force a quick end to the war makes it vital for both sides to ensure they’re in as strong a position as possible when the music stops. If Putin’s forces are no longer driving forward because Ukrainian drones, U.S. ATACMS and British Storm Shadow cruise missiles are destroying Russian ammunition depots and energy infrastructure, he will be in a much weaker position to treat ceasefire negotiations as a venue to demand Kyiv’s surrender.”
• “This is the bottom line. Putin is trying to claw back Russia’s territorial sway; he’s as reluctant to give up the power that comes with empire as were the British, French, Austrians and Ottomans before him. I don’t hear anybody suggesting the world would be a better place with Algeria still a French colony, or Hungary still ruled from Vienna. If those empires had been able to threaten the world if they didn’t get their way, you can be sure they would have. Yet none of this means Putin is ready to invite the radical risks and certain costs of a nuclear strike.”

“’We will sober them up harshly’ Political scientist Karaganov predicted the defeat of Europe,” AiF.ru/Russia in Global Affairs, 11.23.24.⁷^ Clues from Russian Views (Russia in Global Affairs is affiliated with the Russian authorities.) 

• “If we use nuclear weapons, this would… be a great sin… But if we are not ready to use nuclear weapons to defend peace throughout the world, then this will definitely be a sin [too]. Therefore, we must be ready for this. And, accordingly, the changes that were made to the nuclear doctrine are a powerful shift in the right direction. But it is too early to rejoice. We see the convulsions of Europe, which is heading towards a world war. We see that the Biden administration, as a farewell, decided to stir up another mess by giving the order to strike long-range missiles on Russian territory.”
• “If the situation in domestic American politics were not a turning point, I would recommend immediately striking targets in NATO territory with conventional weapons, and declaring that the subsequent strike would be nuclear. But now I will not push our leadership to do this, because it is absolutely obvious that the Biden administration and all the European riffraff that revolves around it simply want an escalation and prolongation of the war in Ukraine.”
• “[When asked what to consider a critical threat, which, per the new 2024 Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence, enables Russia to use nuclear weapons] Anything [can be considered such a threat]. This is called "strategic ambiguity." Now we have the right to launch a nuclear strike (but first, perhaps, a non-nuclear one) in response to any attack on Russian territory. And this is very correct… our adversaries must know that they are constantly under attack.”
• “[When asked to comment on the 2024 nuclear deterrence principles' provisions, which, according to the interviewer, "Technically, even a dozen drone attacks are now considered grounds for nuclear deterrence. But such attacks happen almost every day and usually do little damage."] Yes, this will be a disproportionate response. But to stop drone attacks, we need to achieve Ukraine's complete capitulation and demilitarization of the territory that it will have left. I would even suggest establishing a no-fly zone over it.”
• “In fact, drafting of the new nuclear doctrine [Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence] was started… about a year ago.”
• “The enemy must understand that we are ready to take the most decisive steps. First, if necessary, by striking with conventional weapons on the territory of NATO countries, while at the same time warning them that if they respond to such a strike even more strongly, there will be a nuclear strike, [which would be] the second wave. And the third wave will go to American bases…”
• “I propose moving to the nuclear level only if absolutely necessary, going through many steps on the escalation ladder, striking with conventional weapons. The point is precisely to prevent a nuclear war, to prevent the Ukrainian conflict from escalating into a global one. And how many nuclear strikes—one, two or five—would be required in an extreme case—that is the next question. Although I, for one, believe that if we are going to strike, then strike in a group manner. But—God forbid.”
• “[When asked whether he sees any signs that the standoff over Ukraine will soon be over] Not yet. This war is very profitable for Western elites, especially the Americans—it allows them to spin up the military-industrial complex, plunder Europe and damage Russia—their primary, although not their main rival. Therefore, they need to be convinced that this game also threatens American territory… I think that the Europeans will need to be sobered up much more harshly. They have completely lost their fear of both nuclear war and God. For the third time in the last 120 years, they are driving the world to a world war. And this is a very big challenge—to put an end to Europe as the source of all human ills. Not to physically put an end to Europe, but to eliminate the threat it poses.”
• “I believe that there should be no freezing. From my point of view, there can only be one solution, in one form or another. This is the return to Russia of the original Russian territories of the east and south of Ukraine, the complete defeat and capitulation of the Kyiv regime, the imposition of complete demilitarization and even a no-fly zone on it. And then we can negotiate on the details.”

“Stabilizing "Basics": Moscow Reduces Options for Escalation at the Pre-Nuclear Level. How Can Russia's Updated Nuclear Doctrine Affect Strategic Security?” RIAC, 11.22.24.^ Clues from Russian Views (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• “Dmitry Stefanovich, Research Fellow at the Center for International Security at IMEMO RAS: Lowering the nuclear threshold in itself is unlikely to have a positive effect, but in the conditions of the most acute confrontation between Russia and the "collective West," the collapse of the arms control system, the quantitative and qualitative development of the nuclear arsenals of the countries of the world, the role of the updated "Basics"⁸ may also be stabilizing. Nuclear weapons have returned as a central factor in international military-political relations; it has been demonstrated that this is not a theoretical subject, but a completely practical and "living," evolving area that can be useful.”
• “Petr Topychkanov, Head of the Sector of New Challenges in South and Southeast Asia, Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Science: Regardless of the situation, there is an obvious aspect of the doctrine that has a positive impact on strategic stability. This is transparency, as far as possible, at the stages of preparation, approval and publication of the updated doctrine. Instead of creating greater uncertainty, provoking potential adversaries to speculate about the nuclear doctrine, creating fertile ground for erroneous assessments of Russia's capabilities, intentions and plans in the nuclear field, Russia has chosen transparency. This serves as a strong argument in support of the part of the doctrine that speaks of Russia's desire to reduce nuclear risks. The publication of the doctrine creates the preconditions for an official nuclear dialogue on a bilateral and multilateral basis.”

“The New Russian Nuclear Doctrine and Its Long-Term Implications,” Vasily Kashin, RIAC, 11.25.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. 

• “The changes officially introduced into the [“Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence”] on November 19, 2024, were Russia’s signal to the West in response to the first use of American and British tactical missiles on Russian territory.”
• “Judging by Russia’s actions, the adjustment of nuclear policy is part of a plan for retaliatory escalation steps prepared a significant time ago, when the United States came close to deciding to use its missile weapons deep into Russian territory.”
• “We are at the beginning of a dangerous escalation spiral that may well end first in a conventional and then in a nuclear conflict between Russia and the United States. The immediate objective of the Doctrine is to explain to the enemy the essence of future Russian signals for their correct interpretation. At the same time, a number of innovations introduced in this document may have far-reaching consequences for the deterrence strategies of all world states.”

“Deterring the Nuclear Dictators. To Confront China, Russia, and North Korea, Trump Should Forgo a Review and Speed Up the Arsenal’s Modernization,” Madelyn Creedon and Franklin Miller, FA, 11.20.24.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Bluff and Bluster: Why Putin Revised Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine," Rishi Paul, ELN, 11.25.24.
• "‘Menacing, but it changes nothing:’ Strategic weapons expert Maxim Starchak answers questions about the experimental ballistic missile system Russia just fired at Ukraine," Meduza, 11.23.24.
• "Should Ukraine Have Nuclear Weapons?," Slavoj Žižek, PS, 11.22.24.

Counterterrorism:

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Countering a 'Great Jihad' in Central Asia," Bruce Pannier, FPRI, 11.19.24.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Cyber security/AI: 

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Energy exports from CIS:

“OPEC+ Faces an Internal Foe in 2025—Kazakhstan,” Javier Blas, Bloomberg, 11.25.24.

• “OPEC+ faces many enemies in 2025—weak oil demand growth, rising production from its rivals and the arrival of Donald Trump at the White House chanting “drill, baby, drill.” Those are the external threats. But there are internal foes, too.”
• “Every few years, the cartel faces a recurring challenge: One of its members has spent lots of money on new oilfields and is ready, eager, and aching to turn that investment into barrels of crude. In the early 2000s, Algeria was that impatient member wishing to boost output; in the 2010s, it was Iraq. More recently, the United Arab Emirates played the role. Next year, it will be Kazakhstan.”
• “The central Asian nation joined forces with OPEC in 2016 when the oil cartel created an alliance with several other big petrostates, with the expanded group dubbed OPEC+. For nearly a decade, Kazakhstan has been an uneasy partner for the cartel, more often than not pumping above its quota. The challenge will increase next year when a $45 billion project to expand the country’s largest oilfield will be ready.”
• “Back in June, OPEC+ approved a plan to slowly increase its quotas through the final months of 2024 and then into 2025. The monthly hikes should have started in September, but falling oil prices prompted delays until January. The cartel is scheduled to meet on Sunday to discuss whether it should pause again.”
• “If the cartel agrees to a further delay, it would be a significant setback for Kazakhstan. If the country adheres to its OPEC+ output limits, it won’t be able to produce that extra oil despite heavy investments—or it would need to reduce output elsewhere to offset the Tengiz increase. If driven purely by economics, Kazakhstan would do the latter, as Tengiz has the lowest cost of production and therefore is very profitable for the government and its foreign partners. The Tengiz field, operated by American energy giant Chevron Corp., is part of a trio of super-giant oil fields in Kazakhstan that include Karachaganak and Kashagan.”
• “The key is how long OPEC+ delays the quota increases. Chevron recently assured investors that the expansion of Tengiz will start pumping in the first half of next year, putting a deadline for the new oil by the end of June. Reading between the lines, it appears that Chevron is trying to under promise and over deliver, so the barrels may flow earlier. If the group just announces a three-month delay, until the end of the first quarter, it may not cause much trouble to Kazakhstan. But if increases are deferred until the second quarter, as many in the oil market expect, it may put the Asian country and OPEC+ on a collision course.”

Climate change:

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Why I’m Not in Baku—and How to Prevent Further Cooptation of UN Climate Summits," Allison Morrill Chatrchyan, BAS, 11.19.24.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Putin Sees America Hurtling to Disaster, With Trump at the Wheel;” Mikhail Zygar, NYT, 11.19.24.

• “To officials in the Kremlin, mostly former KGB members for whom the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest catastrophe of modern times, Mr. Gorbachev was a self-absorbed narcissist who loved to talk—a man without a plan, a strategy or any clear understanding of his goals, a politician who undermined core institutions that supported the state and left only chaos in his wake. They much prefer Mr. Trump, naturally. But they see him playing a similar role.”
• “Of course, much of this is wishful thinking. Predictions of America’s imminent collapse have no basis in reality. The Soviet Union fell because it bankrupted itself under the weight of excessive military spending and imperial ambitions. Its economy proved to be unsustainable and ethnic tensions emerged, with some Soviet republics pushing for independence. Mr. Gorbachev, for his part, was a reformer within the ruling party who aimed to refine rather than overthrow the system. The differences with the United States and Mr. Trump should be obvious.”
• “But that won’t stop the Kremlin from seeing what it wants to see: an America hurtling toward disaster, with Mr. Trump at the wheel.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “Tulsi Gabbard’s Sympathetic Views Toward Russia Cause Alarm as Trump’s Pick to Lead Intelligence Services," Katie Rogers, NYT, 11.18.24.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

"Despite Slowing Growth, Russian Economic Stability Not at Serious Risk in 2025-26," Vladislav Inozemtsev, MT/Russia.Post, 11.25.24. Clues from Russian Views

• “The main conclusion of the new report, “Dictator’s reliable rear: Russian economy at the time of war,” by Sergei Aleksashenko, Dmitri Nekrasov and your author, was that a serious economic crisis in Russia is not forthcoming.”
• “The Russian economy looks poised to stand the test of war next year and beyond. Growth rates will slow, but the trend of a moderate improvement in living standards (for all groups except pensioners) is set to continue. Respected colleagues have noted that our findings generally overlap with their own and stand out from the growing alarmism in reports about the economic situation in Russia. It is this contrast that should be the focus of those who seek an objective idea of what is going on in the Russian economy.”
• “The Kremlin’s current economic policy—which some call “military Keynesianism”—is unlikely to threaten economic stability in 2025–26. Stagflation is unlikely to materialize: inflation should start a slow decline next year, and economic growth should stay positive. There is also no reason to expect a fiscal crisis, with the softening ruble actually working in the government’s favor.”

“Vladimir Putin is in a painful economic bind. Russia’s reliance on China is becoming a problem,” The Economist, 11.18.24.

• “Russia’s economy has confounded analysts since the country invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Despite facing one of the tightest sanction regimes in modern history, it has undergone its fastest expansion in more than a decade. Russia enjoyed growth of 3.6% last year and is expected to maintain such a pace this year. Yet rather than being a demonstration of strength, the central bank’s decision to lift interest rates is a warning of trouble to come.”
• “Government outgoings are increasingly difficult to sustain. Russia’s budget, unveiled in September, included a plan to increase defense spending by a quarter next year. Taken together, annual expenditures on defense and security—a separate budget item that covers the intelligence services—are now expected to rise to 17 trillion rubles ($170 billion), an amount representing more than 40% of all government spending or 8% of Russia’s GDP. Defense spending alone will be 6% of Russian national income, the most since the cold war.”
• “That is a lot, but not unusual for a country at war. America’s defense spending, for example, was 8–10% of GDP during the Vietnam war. During the second world war the great powers devoted 40–60% of their total economic output to military ends. The crucial difference is to be found in monetary policy. British policymakers in the early 1940s endeavored, and mostly succeeded, in fighting what they termed “a 3% war,” keeping interest rates near that level. America’s Federal Reserve held rates at 2.5% during the same conflict. Lower borrowing costs helped keep the large deficits affordable. By contrast, in Russia, the yield on ten-year sovereign debt has risen from around 6% before the war to 16%.”
• “Conscripting prisoners and hiring North Korean soldiers is an unconventional indicator of a hot labor market, but it is one nonetheless.”
• “Had Britain lacked an ally [during WWII] with the deep pockets and industrial capacity of America, willing and able to supply two-thirds of its imports, then the fall in the value of the pound would have become a military problem. Mr. Putin’s difficulty is that he lacks such an ally. China has become Russia’s most important trading partner, providing a third of all imports and more than 90% of microelectronics, which are used in drones, missiles and tanks. Yet such support is not being offered for free.”
• “Until recently, the Russian government had cushioned the economy from higher borrowing costs. A variety of schemes made it easier for households to suspend debt payments and for firms to borrow at lower subsidized rates, with the government stepping in to compensate banks for lost income. There are signs, though, that such programs are becoming unaffordable. A mortgage-subsidy scheme, which had allowed borrowing at a cost of just 8% when official rates were much higher, ended on July 1st. Mortgage volumes halved in the following month. Corporate bankruptcies have risen by 20% this year. The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, a trade body, reckons investment plans for next year are being put on hold owing to heavy borrowing costs.”
• “Higher interest rates will crimp spending by both firms and consumers. The IMF expects Russian economic growth to slow sharply to 1.3% next year. Even VEB, the state-run development bank, has cut its growth estimate to 2%. A combination of lower investment and manpower lost to the front is taking a toll. The need to maintain the value of the ruble to pay for crucial imports is a vulnerability for Mr. Putin, and one which could soon take a toll on his ability to fight. He may be hoping that Donald Trump keeps his promise to bring the conflict to an end. Waging a 3% war is one thing; a 21% war is quite another.” 

“In His Memoir, Aleksei Navalny Speaks from the Grave,” David Kortava, NYT, 10.21.24.

• “Aleksei Navalny did not set out to write a posthumous memoir. He began the project in 2020 as a conventional autobiography propelled by an “intriguing thriller about uncovering an assassination attempt.” Of course, he was the victim of the assassination attempt — a nerve agent laced into his clothing took hold on a flight from Siberia to Moscow that summer as Navalny was watching an episode of the sci-fi cartoon “Rick and Morty” on his laptop. He stumbled to the airplane bathroom. Thanks to his wife, Yulia, he came to in a hospital in Berlin.”
• “Months later, before he could complete the manuscript, he boarded another flight to Moscow and soon found himself in a jail cell. Over the next two and a half years, he faced a series of trumped-up charges, from embezzlement to insulting a Russian World War II veteran.”
• “One might expect a work by an anti-corruption activist and political prisoner, serving multiple sentences adding up to more than 30 years, to read like a righteous diatribe. It does not. “Patriot” reveals less about Navalny’s politics than it does about his fundamental decency, his wry sense of humor and his (mostly) cheery stoicism under conditions that would flatten a lesser person. In solitary, he devours Yuval Noah Harari’s “21 Lessons for the 21st Century,” in which Harari recommends Vipassana meditation. “People pay to be locked in a room where they remain silent for two weeks, eat scant food and have no contact with the outside world,” Navalny observes. “I’m getting all that for free.”
• “At one point, Navalny imagines how successful the memoir will be if he is killed before publication: “The book’s author has been murdered by a villainous president; what more could the marketing department ask for?” Good for his sales abroad perhaps, but what about back home? After his death, according to polling conducted by the independent Levada Center, only one in 10 Russians held a favorable view of Navalny.”
• “He may have died for his country, but in his final years he spoke principally to an international audience, and to history. Still, had he lived, he might have emerged from captivity as an old man. Like a Slavic Nelson Mandela, he might have become leader of a Russia exhausted by war and repression and ready for change.”
• “By the time of his death, he had effectively shed all political commitments but the most basic ones. In an authoritarian police state, the struggle to bring into being a “normal country,” as he puts it, where citizens can freely squabble and freely vote, is revolution enough.”

"How the Traumas of 2004 Blinded Putin," Christopher Bort, CEIP, 11.18.24.

• “Russia’s President Vladimir Putin has been in a geopolitical standoff with the United States for so long that it’s hard to remember how it started: twenty years ago, events shaped his core narrative about the harm Russia has suffered at the hands of a malevolent U.S. national security establishment. In September 2004, a group of Chechen terrorists seized a school in Beslan, a town in the Caucasus region of North Ossetia. Hundreds died in the attack, including some 186 children, following a botched rescue attempt for which Putin and his security forces have been widely blamed. But he blamed external actors for capitalizing on Russia’s perceived weakness.”
• “The traumas of 2004, however, weren’t yet over for Putin. Less than three months after Beslan he suffered another setback when his preferred candidate for president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, saw his fraud-tainted election overturned by the country’s supreme court, under pressure from mass street protests. The pro-Europe candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, went on to win a new election. It was Ukraine’s first post-Soviet popular revolt, the so-called Orange Revolution, and it was a personal slap in the face for Putin, who had twice congratulated Yanukovych on his phantom victory.”
• The Beslan attack and the prospect of losing Ukraine to the West were a watershed. They convinced Putin that “people power” was being weaponized against him.”

Defense and aerospace:

Vladimir Putin’s “Meeting with the Defense Ministry leadership, representatives of the military-industrial complex and missile system developers,” Kremlin.ru, 11.22.24. 

• “The Oreshnik system is not an upgrade of old Soviet-era systems, even though we are all originally from the Soviet systems, and we were all raised on the accomplishments of previous generations and, to a certain degree, we built on their achievements. However, this system is, in fact, the result of your work that was done in modern Russia, new Russia. The system relies entirely on contemporary cutting-edge innovations.”
• “I must say that in today’s circumstances, when we face new and mounting threats and challenges, the development of such weapons systems holds special, one might even say vital, importance for our country.”
• “The weapon system tested yesterday serves as yet another reliable guarantor of Russia's territorial integrity and sovereignty.”
• “Due to its striking power, especially when used en masse and in combination with other long-range precision systems that Russia also has, using it against enemy targets will be comparable in effect and power to using strategic weapons.”
• “There are no means of countering such a missile; no means of intercepting it exist in the world today. And I will emphasize once again: we will continue to test the latest system. Lots to dissect in RF's new nuclear deterrence doctrine and in Putin's latest nuclear rhetoric, including his two statements on Oreshnik. One nugget in the second of those statements is the decision of the Russian commander-in-chief and his top brass to have the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN) commission Oreshnik in both non-nuclear and nuclear configurations. Until now I don’t recall any conventional attack systems in RVSN’s arsenal. Apparently, Putin wants RVSN to follow suit set by other parts of the strategic triad in development of what RF MoD's encyclopedia calls "strategic non-nuclear forces" as part of “strategic deterrence forces.”
• See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

“The G20 Summit in Brazil,” in Weekly Digest for 18 November—24 November 2024, Tatiana Stanovaya, R.Politik, 11.24.24. Clues from Russian Views

• “On 18–19 November, a G20 summit took place in Rio de Janeiro. During the event, participants established the Alliance to Combat Hunger and, in the final communiqué, called for peace in Ukraine and the Middle East. In Russia, the summit garnered little attention. Putin decided against attending, having announced last month that his participation might disrupt the forum and pose challenges for Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Putin emphasized that, even if the risks associated with the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant were removed, his presence would dominate discussions, overshadowing the summit’s agenda. Putin has also skipped G20 summits in Indonesia (2022) and India (2023), even though the arrest warrant was only issued in 2022. He considers dialogue with Western leaders at these forums to be largely pointless. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov represented Russia instead.”
• “At the conclusion of the summit, the G20 leaders signed an 85-point joint communiqué. Reaching consensus on the final declaration proved challenging. According to Brazil’s Folha de S.Paulo, American and allied representatives pushed for the inclusion of language condemning Russia’s actions in Ukraine.”
• “The wording of the final communiqué reflected compromises on both sides. Unlike last year’s declaration, which devoted seven paragraphs to the war in Ukraine, this year’s document included only one—and it was conspicuously vague. The G20 leaders acknowledged the “human suffering” and “additional negative consequences” of the conflict on global food and energy security. They also expressed support for “all constructive initiatives” aimed at achieving a “lasting and just peace” consistent with the UN Charter.”
• “Aside from the actual talks, Russian media outlets highlighted some protocol details. During the summit’s photo ceremony, French President Emmanuel Macron was seen shaking hands with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. In contrast, U.S. President Joe Biden, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni were absent, reportedly to avoid being photographed with Lavrov.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “Greater Eurasia and the Classical Foundations of Cooperation," Timofei Bordachev, Valdai Club, 11.25.24. Clues from Russian Views (In Russian.)

Ukraine:

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Ukraine Is Now a Proxy War for Asian Powers," Azeem Ibrahim, FP, 11.18.24.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

"Will Trump 2.0 Be a Boon for Belarus?" Artyom Shraibman, Carnegie Politika, 11.22.24.

• “Today, the West’s asking price for sanctions relief is incompatible with the survival of Lukashenko’s regime: sweeping democratization and an end to supporting Russia’s war. The new U.S. administration gives Lukashenko hope that the West’s bar might be lowered, making a way forward at least somewhat feasible. In short, Minsk is counting on Trump’s actions vis-a-vis Russia and Ukraine to bring it partially out of isolation in the West, without meaningful concessions on its part.”
• “Of course, nothing is guaranteed to happen: Trump’s second presidency merely presents a window of opportunity for Minsk. Moreover, that window will only open if several conditions are met at once: the war is stopped, and Moscow retains a strong enough bargaining position at peace talks.”
• “Lukashenko’s expectations of Trump have another, more global dimension: one that puts him on common ground with like-minded leaders from Budapest to Beijing. Minsk dreams of dealing with a West ruled by multiple Trumps, a place where mercantile realpolitik triumphs and Lukashenko is accepted for who he is, no lecturing necessary.”
• “That is the maximalist program. Even if Trump’s example does not prove contagious in Europe, Minsk expects Trump to at least bulldoze transatlantic solidarity around liberal democracy. For Lukashenko, the collective liberal West’s self-destruction and values-free relations with individual states don’t sound too shabby either.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Beyond the Russia-West Dichotomy: Georgia’s New Identity Crisis," Sofia Gavrilova, Russia.Post, 11.19.24.
• "Why Central Asia Should Be Donald Trump’s National Security Agenda," Margarita Assenova, NI, 11.24.24.

Footnotes

1. As of Nov. 21, 2024, Russian forces made a net gain of 487 square miles in Ukraine, according to RM staff’s estimate based on data provided for that period by ISW.
2. Polls show that 52% of Ukrainians want negotiations, with some saying they are willing to give up land to Russia, according to The Economist.
3. There is no language in the revised principles, which would explicitly say that Russia can use nuclear weapons in response to “any” attack.
4. The U.K. gave permission on Nov. 20, 2024.
5. This article is adapted from “Intent to Destroy: Russia’s Two-Hundred-Year Quest to Dominate Ukraine” by Eugene Finkel, November 2024.
6. Thorton’s assessment runs counter to the assessments of analysts at the Economist and ISW, among others. Russian forces are already moving faster than at any time since the early days of the invasion, according to the Economist, whose latest daily tracking estimates that Russia has gained 739 square kilometers in the past 30 days. As of Nov. 21, 2024, Russian forces made a net gain of 487 square miles in Ukraine, according to RM staff’s estimate based on data provided for that period by ISW. The DC-based Institute of the Study of War, which has no love lost for the Russian aggression, put it mildly in its latest assessment of that aggression: “Russian forces’ recent confirmed battlefield gains near Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka demonstrate that the war in Ukraine is not stalemated.”
7. Karaganov was interviewed by AIF.ru’s Vitaly Tseplayev.
8. 2024 Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 11:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

^Machine-translated.

Photo by AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka.