Russia Analytical Report, Oct. 28-Nov. 4, 2024

3 Ideas to Explore

  1. “There is no silver bullet. No single capability will turn the tide. No one system will end Putin’s assault. What matters is the combined effects of Ukraine’s military capabilities—and staying focused on what works,” U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin wrote in FA, referring to Western military aid to Ukraine. “If Ukraine falls under Putin’s boot, all of Europe will fall under Putin’s shadow,” Austin warned in his Nov. 1 commentary.
  2. Given the grim news from the Ukrainian front line, Kyiv and its allies should consider a “peace settlement that would limit Russian territorial gains, and, while excluding NATO membership, allow Ukraine to seek membership of the European Union,” according to an Oct. 29 article by the Quincy Institute’s Anatol Lieven, titled “Compromise or Collapse.” Writing in FA on Nov. 4, Richard Haass proposes a solution not dissimilar to Lieven’s. CFR’s president emeritus sees Ukraine as “an independent, sovereign and economically viable country.” “It must be free to choose its political system and leadership” and “must also be free to rearm and maintain a military of whatever size it wants, to join the European Union and to accept security commitments from outsiders,” he writes, urging an end to “clinging to an infeasible definition of victory,” which entails the liberation of all of Ukraine’s land.
  3. “Russia feigns indifference over U.S. election but roots quietly for Trump,” reads the headline on a story by WP journalists Francesca Ebel and  Catherine Belton. Inside Russia’s elite, there is a growing expectation that Donald Trump will win and that if he does, there could be a chance to end the war with Ukraine on Moscow’s terms, Ebel and Belton write in their Nov. 3 story. The story quotes Sergei Markov, a Kremlin-connected political analyst, as saying that he expects a victorious Trump to “call Putin and Zelenskyy and propose an end to the military action.” Meanwhile, the Kremlin is directing multiple disinformation campaigns targeting Kamala Harris and Tim Walz, according to documents cited by WP. Citing U.S. intelligence assessments, NYT journalists also report that the Kremlin is aiming to bolster Trump’s candidacy.

NB: Next week’s Russia Analytical Report will appear on Tuesday, Nov. 12, instead of Monday, Nov. 11, because of the U.S. Veterans Day holiday.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

“Russia’s Arctic Policy Poses a Growing Nuclear Threat,” Maxim Starchak, CEIP, 11.01.24. Clues from Russian Views.

  • Before the war, the prospect of a nuclear accident in the Arctic seemed remote. It was only slightly easier to imagine one involving a nuclear vessel or a floating nuclear power plant. Today, the situation is deteriorating rapidly, as Russia continues to build new nuclear sites while halting the cleanup of nuclear legacy sites. The absence of international assistance and regional cooperation, along with the dwindling attention paid to nuclear safety in the Arctic by the federal authorities, spells further trouble.”
  • That the risks are growing is no concern to Russia, which may in fact see the peril of its development of the Arctic as a feature, not a bug. It could form part of its policy of blackmail, with Russia taking things to the brink to force concessions from the West such as the resumption of financing and technical assistance—irrespective of developments on other fronts.”

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

“North Korea’s aid to Russia raises difficult questions in China. Officials in Beijing fear they are losing leverage over their neighbors,” The Economist, 10.31.24. 

  • Many analysts agree that China is peeved by North Korea’s apparent tilt towards Russia. Since last year the two countries’ leaders, Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin, have exchanged chummy visits. These have resulted not only in the deployment of North Korean troops (on October 28th NATO’s new chief, Mark Rutte, said they had been sent to the Kursk region of Russia, which Ukraine has invaded), but also massive shipments to Russia of North Korean shells and missiles. In return, Russia is providing North Korea with economic and military aid, Western officials believe. “The Chinese always like to say that they have no influence over North Korea, but they guard their influence,” says Victor Cha of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a think-tank in Washington. He says China has 'lost control' there.”
  • Chinese officials may fear that Mr. Kim will become less reliant on their country, which has long been North Korea’s largest trading partner.
  • North Korea-watchers note signs that Mr. Kim is cooling towards China. Andrei Lankov of Kookmin University in Seoul says that North Korean media now publish far more articles about Russia than about China.”
  • China may find it hard to bend Mr. Kim to its will.”

"North Korean Special Forces in Russia’s War on Ukraine: A Game-Changer?" Bruce Bechtol, NI, 11.03.24. 

  • It is quite obvious what Russia will get out of this deployment of troops. If the Russians choose to use these troops the way they have been trained, Moscow now will have more jump-qualified special forces troops to augment its elite forces. But Russia’s special forces have had real challenges in this war. And if the goal is to beef up the strength of these capabilities in a way that will have a strong impact, significantly more North Korean troops would need to deploy to the war. On the other hand, the Russians may choose not to use these troops as special forces at all and that would likely mean high casualties for the North Koreans.”
  • For Kim Jong-un, the longer this war goes on the better off North Korea is. North Korea has survived for many years in no small part due to its military proliferation in the Middle East and Africa. But North Korea has never proliferated conventional weapons and missiles in such large numbers in such a short time as they have for the war in Ukraine. That brings in money, oil, foodstuffs, and technical/weapons systems updates and support for North Korea’s very large but largely antiquated military.  ... the more troops North Korea sends to fight the war in Ukraine, the more money it makes for the regime.  Pyongyang has never had a better deal.” 

“Russia-DPRK: threatening with sanctions is useless,” Ivan Timofeev, Valdai Club/RIAC, 10.30.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. (These organizations are affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

  • The destruction of relations with Moscow against the backdrop of the European security crisis also led to a change in the balance of power in Northeast Asia. If earlier Russia was a partner in solving the security problems of the Korean Peninsula, including in cooperation with the USA and other countries of the region, now it objectively has no motives for joint work with Washington on the Korean issue.”
  • Russia's rapprochement with the DPRK can be explained by at least three factors.”
    • The first and most important is the most serious crisis of European security, the nerve node of which was the Ukrainian conflict.”
    • The second important factor was the dynamics of the DPRK's nuclear missile program. ... A new situation arose when Pyongyang de facto turned into a nuclear state, without any incentives to abandon it. The meaning and value of multilateral diplomacy has disappeared due to the change in the situation, and with it the subject of negotiations. Solving the problem simply became hopeless.”
    • The third factor is the resistance of the DPRK and Russia to sanctions.”
  • Cooperation with Russia reduces the international isolation of North Korea. In the US, there are very few tools of influence on both sides. The use of military force against nuclear states is risky and dangerous, and economic sanctions against both countries make little sense given the fact that large-scale restrictions are already in place against them.”
  • The involvement of the DPRK in European affairs remains an open question. It is not excluded that the Republic of Korea may be involved in them simultaneously or is already taking place. It is obvious that the USA will not be able to prevent such a development of the situation either with the threat of using force or with sanctions.”

For more analysis on this subject, see:

Iran and its nuclear program:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“Hell, horror and heroism in Ukraine’s battlefield hospitals,” The Economist, 11.03.24.

  • Ukraine’s first underground hospital feels like something out of a James Bond movie... In military jargon, this is a 'role 2' facility, the second of four treatment tiers from front-line triage to tertiary hospital care. Doctors move people on if they can. Those stable enough are whisked off to 'role 3' facilities, approximately 30km away. The rest are treated and stabilized here, a little over 10km from the contact line.”
  • Ukraine believes survival on the battlefield is the key to regaining the edge in a war that has become largely attritional. The underground hospitals are a key part of the puzzle, says Roman Kuziv, the 35-year-old doctor who helped design them...The ministry of defense has just approved another 20 of his “role 2” underground hospitals, which are being co-financed by an industrial sponsor.”
  • There have been mistakes, thousands who could have been saved. But Russia’s war without limits would test the resources of any military medical service, Dr Kuziv insists. 'All-out war gives you one or two months to study and adapt.' NATO countries should be thinking about how they would cope, he says. 'Honestly, they are not prepared. They wouldn’t know what’s hit them.'”

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

"As Russia Advances, U.S. Fears Ukraine Has Entered a Grim Phase."  Julian E. Barnes, Eric Schmitt, Helene Cooper and Kim Barker, NYT, 11.01.24.

  • The Ukrainian military is struggling to recruit soldiers and equip new units. The number of its soldiers killed in action, about 57,000, is half of Russia’s losses but still significant for the much smaller country. Russia’s shortages of soldiers and supplies have also grown worse, Western officials and other experts said.”
  • U.S. government analysts concluded this summer that Russia was unlikely to make significant gains in Ukraine in the coming months, as its poorly trained forces struggled to break through Ukrainian defenses. But that assessment proved wrong.”
  • Gone is the Russian force that repeatedly stumbled as it invaded Ukraine in 2022. The Russian military, according to a senior U.S. military official, has evolved and is 'on the march.'”
  • As a result, some American intelligence agencies and military officials are pessimistic about Ukraine’s ability to stop Russian advances as Kyiv tries to find ways to build up forces exhausted by nearly three years of war. Still, Russia has fallen short of its own goals. Most notably, it has not been able to take the city of Pokrovsk, a logistics hub for Ukrainian forces. And independent experts say Russia’s shortages of radar, armored vehicles and, most critically, troops will come to a head next year.”
  • The most important immediate development for Ukraine, however, will not be on the battlefield but at the ballot box in the United States. Former President Donald J. Trump and Vice President Kamala Harris have laid out very different visions for future American support.”
    • Mr. Trump has promised to bring the war to a quick end, and his running mate, Senator JD Vance, has outlined a peace plan that looks a lot like one advanced by President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia. Ms. Harris, on the other hand, has vowed to fight on, warning that if Russia was not stopped in Ukraine, its forces could attack NATO.”
  • In Ukraine, morale is eroding in the face of the Russian drive and a fear that Western support and the flow of supplies are coming to an end.... but American military officials say weapons supplies are no longer Ukraine’s main disadvantage. Ukraine has sharply narrowed Russia’s artillery advantage, U.S. officials said, and Ukrainian soldiers have used explosive drones to lay waste to Russian armored vehicles. Ukraine’s biggest shortcoming now is troops, U.S. officials said. Ukrainian officials have struggled to put in place a military draft that brings in enough troops.”
    • The Pentagon assesses that Ukraine has enough soldiers to fight for six to 12 more months, one official said. After that, he said, it will face a steep shortage.”
  • Ukraine diverted some of its newly created brigades to support the incursion in Kursk instead of using them as originally planned to defend eastern and southern Ukraine or to build up reserves for an expected counteroffensive in 2025, Pentagon officials say. ... In his meeting with Mr. Zelensky in Kyiv, Mr. Austin underscored the importance of not only defending Pokrovsk and Kursk, but also of “force regeneration and recruitment,” a senior Pentagon official said. ... In a separate meeting with their Ukrainian counterparts, Mr. Austin, Christopher G. Cavoli, the top U.S. general in Europe, and other commanders discussed military planning for the winter and the kind of arms and munitions that the United States may send in the next five months, the senior Pentagon official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss confidential discussions. In an impassioned speech in Kyiv, Mr. Austin condemned naysayers who might seek to end the conflict on Moscow’s terms. He said there was “no silver bullet” to turn the tide of the war in Ukraine’s favor.”

“Ukraine is now struggling to survive, not to win, Russia is slicing through Ukrainian defenses in parts of the battlefield,” The Economist, 10.29.24.1

  • In private, Pentagon officials,  Western officials and many Ukrainian commanders are increasingly concerned about the direction of the war and Ukraine’s ability to hold back Russian advances over the next six months.”
  • Ukrainian forces have managed to hold on to Pokrovsk, an embattled town in the eastern Donbas region, an embarrassment for Mr. Putin. But elsewhere along the front, Russia is slicing its way through Ukrainian defenses.”
  • The problem is not so much the loss of territory...as the steady erosion in the size and quality of Ukraine’s forces. Ukrainian units are understrength and overstretched, worn thin by heavy casualties. Despite a new mobilization law that took effect in May, the army, outside a handful of brigades, has struggled to recruit enough replacements, with young men reluctant to sign up to tours of duty that are at best indefinite and, at worst, one-way missions. Western partners are privately urging Ukraine’s leaders to lower the mobilization age floor from 25 to increase the potential pool of recruits.”
  • Russia’s general staff and defense ministry have put 'heavy pressure' on the Kremlin to mobilize more men, says the European official.  ... The crisis in Russia’s war economy is likely to play out over a longer period. Russia’s defense industry is... far outperforming Western production lines. ... On manpower, too, Russia remains solvent.”
  • Russia cannot fight for ever. But the worry among America, European and Ukrainian officials is that, on current trends, Ukraine’s breaking point will come first.”
  • Those involved in the guts of planning in the Pentagon say that, in practice, the ambitions of early 2023—a Ukrainian force that could take back its territory or shock Russia into talks through a well-crafted armored punch—have given way to a narrow focus on preventing defeat. “At this point we are thinking more and more about how Ukraine can survive.” says a person involved in that planning.”

“Russia’s Swift March Forward in Ukraine’s East,” Constant Méheut and Josh Holder, NYT 10.31.24. 

  • Over the past month, Russian forces have seized more than 160 square miles of land in Ukraine's eastern Donbas region, the main theater of the war today. That has allowed them to take control of strategic towns that anchored Ukrainian defenses in the area, beginning with Vuhledar in early October. This past week, battle has raged in Selydove, which now appears lost. Ultimately, experts say, these gains, among the swiftest of the war, will help the Russian Army secure its flanks before launching an assault on the city of Pokrovsk, a key logistics hub for Ukrainian forces in the Donbas.”
  • Russia's rapid advance is a striking change from the situation last year, when the front lines remained mostly static, with both sides launching ambitious offensives that largely failed. But the stalemate that defined 2023 laid the groundwork for Russia's recent progress. However marginal the gains, Russia's attacks gradually weakened the Ukrainian Army to the point where its troops are so stretched that they can no longer hold some of their positions, Ukrainian soldiers and military analysts say.”
  • Half of Russia's territorial gains in Ukraine so far this year were made in the past three months alone, according to Pasi Paroinen, a military expert with the Finland-based Black Bird Group. 'The situation in southeastern Donbas rapidly deteriorates,' he said.”
  • ''The Russians are now well past the old front line and its extensive minefields, which halted the previous offensives against Vuhledar back in 2023,'' Mr. Paroinen said. To make matters worse, Ukraine has weakened its positions in the Donbas by redeploying seasoned units from there to Russia's Kursk region, where Ukrainian forces launched a surprise cross-border offensive this summer.”
  • Mr. Paroinen said Russia's recent rapid advance supports 'the overall picture that we have of Ukrainian forces: Reserves are low, too many quality units are stuck in Kursk and Russia has enough force left to exploit any weaknesses in Ukrainian lines.'”

Military aid to Ukraine:

“The Price of Principle Is Dwarfed by the Cost of Capitulation in Ukraine. What’s at Stake in Kyiv’s Fight for Freedom,” Lloyd J. Austin III, FA, 11.01.24. 

“The rise of Russia’s foreign trade middlemen,” Alexandra Prokopenko and Alexander Kolyandr, The Bell, 11.02.24. Clues from Russian Views.

  • Middlemen who organize cross-border payments for a commission are involved in up to 80% of cross-border payments, newspaper Vedomosti reported this week. Back at the start of the summer, before the West imposed sanctions on the Moscow Exchange and ramped up secondary sanctions on banks that serviced trade with Russia, such agents were involved in less than 20% of trade. But now there is no choice: it’s almost impossible to work with banks in third countries. 'The risk of secondary sanctions had a largely paralyzing effect on Chinese banks,' a lawyer who specializes in international trade told Vedomosti.”
  • These middlemen are companies, often affiliated with Russian exporters, who have offices in Russia and countries from which goods are delivered to Russia, such as Hong Kong, Kazakhstan or China. Russian importers who need to pay for goods from, say, China, transfer rubles to the agent, who then pays the supplier in China.”
  • The fees on these transactions vary according to the sums involved, the geography and the product. They are usually up to about 8%. It can take anything from five days to three weeks for funds to be credited, one importer of construction materials told The Bell. This is quicker and easier than working with banks, but it’s more expensive.”
  • Financial sanctions are among the most effective measures taken by the West, and Russia has still not found a systemic solution to circumvent them. The flip side of these sanctions is the gradual fragmentation of the financial system. However, this is a slow process. The Kremlin's vision of 'undermining the U.S. dollar' is still a long way off, and Russian companies will likely have to bear the additional costs caused by the sanctions for some time. For consumers, the impact is predictable: rising prices.”

“Biden’s Biggest Foreign Policy Legacy Will Be in Economic Warfare,” Hal Brands, Bloomberg, 11.03.24. 

  • Navigating th[e] new era will require learning 10 lessons from the Biden years.”
    • First, economic warfare is back for a very old reason: Economic strength is the wellspring of global power.”
    • The toolkit has expanded, and its tools have become sharper.”
    • The point of modern economic warfare is more often to weaken an opponent’s capabilities than to change his mind.”
    • Building up one’s own capabilities is as important as holding down those of the other side.”
    • A fifth lesson: Even a superpower needs lots of help.”
    • Sixth, economic warfare can be a substitute for military warfare — or a means of waging it.”
    • Seventh, economic warfare is powerful, but it’s not a wonder weapon. Just look at what sanctions have and haven’t achieved against Russia.”
    • An eighth lesson is that America’s tactics are inspiring insulation and imitation. US adversaries, principally China, are trying to protect themselves from economic pressure while developing economic arsenals of their own.”
    • A ninth lesson, then, is that the danger of overuse is real, even if the damage is still mostly hypothetical.”
    • The new age of economic warfare is only beginning.”

For more commentary on this subject, see:   

“The Perfect Has Become the Enemy of the Good in Ukraine. Why Washington Must Redefine Its Objectives,” Richard Haass, FA, 11.04.24. 

“Ukraine: Compromise or Collapse. The news from Ukraine’s front lines is grim,” Anatol Lieven, The Nation, 10.29.24.

  • The news from the Ukrainian front line is grim. Ukrainian forces are heavily outnumbered and outmatched in artillery and ammunition. There are growing signs of exhaustion, demoralization, desertion, and evasion of service by both the elites and ordinary people. Russian success is grounded in the fact that Russia simply has far greater resources than Ukraine in terms of both industry and manpower. It has been able to recruit hundreds of thousands of new troops by paying them very high wages, up to six times the average salaries in the regions from which they are drawn.”
  • Western industry cannot produce anything like the number of artillery shells Ukraine needs; the USA cannot provide sufficient air defense systems to Israel and Ukraine and keep enough for a possible war with China. And above all, NATO cannot manufacture more soldiers for Ukraine. The German government has already declared that it is freezing military aid, and will cut aid to Ukraine by almost half next year, and by more than 90 percent by 2027.”
  • It is true that the Ukrainian forces, with tremendous grit, are forcing the Russians to advance very slowly, and are inflicting heavy casualties. Together with the war weariness of much of the Russian population, and Russian economic problems, this could allow Ukraine to reach a peace settlement that would limit Russian territorial gains, and, while excluding NATO membership, allow Ukraine to seek membership of the European Union at some point in the future.”
  • Tragically, the Ukrainian government and Western establishments have so often condemned the very idea of a compromise peace and insisted on complete Ukrainian victory that it is now very difficult for them to change course.”
  • We cannot discover which Russian conditions are absolute, and which negotiable, until we enter into negotiations with Russia; and starting negotiations does not mean accepting initial Russian terms. Members of the Russian establishment have suggested to me the possibility that in return for a treaty of neutrality excluding NATO membership, Russia would give up further territorial ambitions.”
  • Western support to Ukraine should continue during negotiations so that the Ukrainian forces can continue to fall back slowly and inflict heavy casualties, thereby encouraging the Russians to accept a compromise. We must not, however, delude ourselves either that our support will last indefinitely, or that it can possibly help Ukraine to regain territory that it has lost. We therefore have no honest and viable alternative to also putting pressure on the Ukrainian government to accept a compromise peace.”
  • If the next US administration fails to adopt this course, then there is a serious risk that, like First World War armies after years of trench warfare, the Ukrainian army will eventually collapse. Washington will find itself faced with a choice between accepting severe Ukrainian defeat or intervening directly and risking—or even ensuring—nuclear war with Russia. We must hope that the leaders of the next administration will have the intellectual clarity and the moral courage to recognize this, and act accordingly.”

“Newly published documents from invasion’s first weeks reveal Putin’s plans to render post-war Ukraine powerless,” Meduza, 11.04.24. 

  • RFE/RL’s Russian investigative unit Systema has obtained a copy of Russia’s initial proposal for a “peace agreement” with Ukraine, which the Kremlin drafted shortly after launching its full-scale war against the country in 2022.”
  • The document consists of six pages containing the draft agreement’s main text and four pages of attachments. The proposal’s 18 articles touch on a wide range of issues, including requirements for Ukraine’s neutrality, border placement, and humanitarian concerns such as language, religion, and history.”
  • The proposal was written long before Russia’s annexation of four Ukrainian regions in September 2022 and does not include the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. However, it does include Russia’s long-standing demand for Ukraine to fully forgo any claims to Crimea and Sevastopol as well as the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.”
  • In the initial version of this “peace agreement,” Russia also insisted on the near-total disarmament of Ukraine under Moscow’s supervision, the country’s isolation from Western assistance, and the long-term stationing of Russian troops on the territories captured in the war’s first weeks. Some of these demands remained unchanged throughout the entire negotiations process.”
  • Russia’s initial demands
    • The Ukrainian army must be reduced to a minimum: 50,000 people, including 1,500 officers (five times smaller than Ukraine’s existing army in 2022).”
    • Ukraine must not “develop, produce, invent, or deploy on its territory any missile weapons of any type with a range greater than 250 kilometers.” Russia also reserves the right to ban Ukraine from using “any other types of weapons that may be developed as a result of scientific research” in the future.”
    • Ukraine must “recognize the independence” of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics,” including all of the territory within the borders of Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions (despite the fact that Russia controlled only part of these territories, as is still the case today).”
    • Ukraine must assume the costs of repairing all of the infrastructure in Donbas that had been destroyed since 2014.”
    • Ukraine and its partners must lift all sanctions against Russia and withdraw all lawsuits filed against Russia since 2014.”
    • Ukraine must make Russian an official state language and restore all of the property rights of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.”
    • Ukraine must 'repeal of and permanently ban any prohibitions of symbols associated with victory over Nazism'; in other words, it must re-legalize Soviet and communist symbols.”
  • Essentially the only things Russia offered Ukraine in this initial proposal were a “ceasefire regime” and “measures to halt combat operations.” There was no mention of any withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory; Russia only committed to not occupying territory beyond what it already controlled.”

“Conventional Arms Control and Ending the Russo-Ukrainian War,” William Lippert, War on the Rocks, 10.30.24. 

  • The extent to which Russia and Ukraine want to limit the other’s military capabilities at the conflict’s termination will be determined by how the conflict ends, and particularly by which side, if either, is the mutually perceived victor. The victor will be able to make demands that the defeated may be compelled to accept. On the other hand, a stalemate will mean neither side will be able to compel the other to accept major military capabilities limitations, laying the conditions for a frozen conflict or a renewal of violence in the future. Thus, post-conflict conventional arms control forms a basis of Moscow and Kyiv’s strategic military goals, and will likely be a substantial component of a post-conflict peace. This means that both sides, their partners, and neutral parties seeking to facilitate negotiations to end the conflict should define conflict-ending conditions in part by conventional arms control goals; and then parties should be prepared to incorporate conventional arms control within any conflict termination agreements, while bearing in mind which demands and approaches are reasonable and which are unlikely to be accepted.”

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“No, BRICS Isn’t Trying to Rival the West. The declaration from last week’s summit reads like a cri de coeur for the existing order,” Nicholas Bequelin, FP, 10.30.24. 

  • As BRICS has grown in size, Western analysts have expressed increasing concern over its reach. Some claim that the bloc is fanning anti-Western sentiment in the global south and that China and Russia have propped it up as an alternative or rival to the postwar order rooted in the United Nations and other key institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Yet these fears are overblown. Instead, BRICS should be seen as what it truly is: an effort to rebalance power within the existing order away from Western hegemony rather than to overthrow it.”
  • The grouping’s official positions reflect not only the preferences of its most authoritarian members but compromises reached with other members, including democracies such as Brazil, India, and South Africa. The joint statement from last week’s summit is a case in point: Far from advocating for a break from the current international architecture, the Kazan Declaration reads like a cri de coeur for the existing order.'[W]e reaffirm our commitment to multilateralism and upholding the international law, including the Purposes and Principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations (UN) as its indispensable cornerstone, and the central role of the UN in the international system,' the declaration states.”
  • Throughout the 32-page document, the solutions proposed for nearly every issue—from peace and security to development aid and conflict resolution—are routed through existing institutions.”
  • Labeling attempts by non-Western groups to gain more weight in international relations as a breakdown of multilateralism, as is often heard in Western capitals, sidesteps the West’s own responsibility and unwillingness to take steps toward long overdue reform—whether that’s the need to fix the global financial architecture, respect climate pledges and assume responsibilities for climate impacts in developing countries, curb double standards in the invocation of international humanitarian law, fulfill aid and development commitments, or lessen drastic intellectual property rules that prevent poorer countries from producing lifesaving medicine.”
  • When the West conflates demands for a fairer international system with a plot to dismantle it—the perennial “me or chaos” argument—it undermines the legitimacy of the principles that urgently need global safeguarding: adherence to international law, the prohibition of wars of aggression, recognition that individuals and civilians have both a legal status and rights, and the necessity of global governance beyond mere multilateralism. If the West refuses to lead on these, it can hardly complain about the rise of groups such as BRICS.”

“The U.S. Shouldn’t Dismiss BRICS Challenge,” Alexander Gabuev and Oliver Stuenkel, CEIP, 10.29.24. 

  • It’s easy to dismiss BRICS. The dominant view in the U.S. is that the grouping of emerging economies can’t present a real challenge to the current order – especially when it comes to the global financial system still underpinned by the U.S. dollar. But this week’s BRICS summit hosted by Russian President Vladimir Putin points to a problem. Some of the most impactful countries in the Global South are cozying up to America’s adversaries like China and Russia, hoping to get more maneuvering space amid waning U.S. preeminence. They share an interest in reducing their dependency on the greenback, and have embarked on a long-term project to create hedging options.”
  • The challenge may seem insignificant and remote, but doing nothing about it only increases the risks of it materializing some years down the road. For obvious reasons, no systemic solution to the problem exists without addressing the state of public finance in the U.S. Beyond that, the U.S. could work more with BRICS members like India and Brazil that are interested in adapting the current order to make it more inclusive, rather than destroying it. For example, the further redistribution of voting rights inside the IMF and World Bank and expansion of their leadership beyond the current American-European duopoly could be a good symbolic start to boost trust and inclusiveness in the existing system.”

“The Return of Total War. Understanding—and Preparing for—a New Era of Comprehensive Conflict,” Mara Karlin, FA, 10.22.24.

“How America Can Succeed in a Multialigned World,” Anne-Marie Slaughter, FA, 10.30.24. 

“The Best NATO Is a Dormant NATO. Less Reliance on America Would Yield a Stronger Alliance and a Safer Europe,” Sumantra Maitra, FA, 11.04.24. 

“The World From the Bottom Up or The Masterpieces of Eurasian Architecture,” Oleg Barabanov, Timofei Bordachev, Fyodor Lukyanov, Andrey Sushentsov and Ivan Timofeev, Valdai Club, 11.04.24. Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

  • If there is a central theme to this year, it is probably the world getting accustomed to the lack of predetermined scenarios. Discussions focusing on international order are fading; the former order no longer functions, and there’s no knowledge what the new one, if it ever materializes, will look like. When the authors of an annual Valdai report suggested several years ago that order, as we know it, was unlikely to ever emerge, their hypothesis drew restrained comments at best. How can we possibly do without order?”
  • However, the habit of living in a structured international system was formed relatively recently by historical standards. The political history has been largely marked by unregulated international relations. These relations took shape in the process of interaction between the countries and quickly changed. What we now habitually call a multipolar or a polycentric world is reminiscent, in its form, of a return to an environment last seen before the Great War that broke out in the early 20th century. However, such parallels are misleading, because the international relations today are structured in a whole different manner.”
    • First, despite stark differences, the world remains an integral and interconnected place. Conflicts do not sever ties but warp them, quite badly at times.”
    • Second, compared to the turn of the 19th and the 20th centuries, or even 1945 when the most robust so far known global order was established, the number of significant players influencing international processes has increased almost by orders of magnitude. That includes more than just major countries.”
  • Previous approaches to establishing the global balance through peaceful or military means are no longer effective, and the countries have yet to see innovative tools make their way to their arsenals. We will be compelled to make do with what we have and accommodate this toolset to dealing with the changed circumstances. This will require everyone to re-interpret the ongoing developments and to forgo the stereotypes that defined our perspectives in the previous era. In last year’s report, we suggested that the impossibility of structuring international relations around a hierarchy-based approach would be a hallmark of the coming era. The ensuing events showed that things have indeed taken this course.”
  • The emergence of new global organizations is highly unlikely. However, at the level of large regions, unilateral efforts will probably be insufficient, and the push for more stable forms of cooperation is likely to prevail. Currently, new constructs of that kind − the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union, the Organization of Turkic States, and the Belt and Road Initiative − are being tested in Eurasia. All of these initiatives, as well as any existing or future ones, are experimental in nature. Time will tell how effective and functional they really are. In the future, universal regional platforms might be able to encompass different cooperation institutions in specific areas whose objectives will not conflict with one another.”
  • In the middle of the 20th century, the world was built from the top down, from the peak of the hierarchical pyramid down to its base. The new system will not be that consistent, but it will be far more democratic. It is being built from the bottom up and relies on self-organization and cooperation between countries within individual regions, where they must jointly address pressing, practical issues. If humanity avoids making the mistakes that will set it back as was the case in the past, then practical interaction at the regional level will give rise to a new system that will capture the planet’s complexity and diversity and be able to transform these qualities from obstacles on the way to development into a foundation for growth.”

For more commentary on this subject, see: 

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

 “Xi Jinping’s Axis of Losers. The Right Way to Thwart the New Autocratic Convergence,” Stephen Hadley, FA, 11.02.24. 

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

Missile defense:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Nuclear arms:

“‘NATO or Nukes’: Why Ukraine’s nuclear revival refuses to die,” Mariana Budjeryn, BAS, 11.01.24.

  • Recently, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky alarmed international audiences by alluding to the prospect of Ukraine’s nuclear rearmament. Addressing a European Council meeting in Brussels on October 17, Zelensky invoked Ukraine’s decision to surrender nuclear weapons inherited from the Soviet Union in exchange for security commitments from nuclear states—the United States, United Kingdom, and Russia—recorded in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. … The Budapest Memorandum commitments failed spectacularly to prevent Russian aggression against Ukraine.”
  • So, how does Ukraine provide for its security? Zelensky outlined two options: “Either Ukraine will have nuclear weapons, and then it will be a defense for us, or Ukraine will be in NATO. NATO countries are not at war today. All people are alive in NATO countries. And that is why we choose NATO over nuclear weapons.” … However, at a press conference with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte later that day, Zelenskyy walked back his comments, emphasizing that Ukraine has no intention to pursue nuclear weapons.”
  • Zelensky’s recent declarations may be a reminder of Ukraine’s contribution, in good faith, to nuclear nonproliferation in the early 1990s, of its dire security predicament today, and of the need to find a solution for Ukraine’s long-term security and to maintain sustainable peace in Europe.”
  • Now that Zelensky resurrected the “NATO or nukes” proposal, he might be taking a page from an old playbook used successfully by other US allies and partners in the past by leveraging fears of nuclear proliferation in exchange for a more robust security guarantee: Ukraine’s NATO membership. West Germany during the Cold War, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea have all successfully leveraged their nuclear latency to bolster US commitment to their security.”
  • Only a sustainable long-term security solution, like that of a NATO membership to deter a nuclear Russia, will put the specter of nuclear-armed Ukraine to rest. Absent such a solution, Ukrainians and their president will continue to call out the hypocrisy of those countries that are incensed by the very mention of Ukraine’s nuclear ambitions—real or imagined—while basing their security on a nuclear deterrent or hiding comfortably under the US nuclear umbrella, both of which are denied to Ukraine.”

“U.S. Nuclear Defense Should Not Be So Costly,” Ivan Eland, NI, 11.02.24. 

  • The United States (and other great powers) really only need a nuclear force surviving an enemy’s first strike that can hit all major targets in the attacking country to deter other great powers from launching nuclear attacks on it in the first place. If there are 500 major targets in Russia or China and two warheads are needed to destroy each target, the United States could take out those targets by creating a survivable but powerful, minimum nuclear deterrent with about 1,000 warheads placed aboard twelve invulnerable undersea Columbia-class SSBNs. (Any small nuclear arsenals of North Korea and Iran are lesser included cases).”
  • Thus, the ICBM and bomber modernization programs could be scrapped. Building only those twelve submarines would cost $130 billion instead of the $1.7 Trillion to modernize the entire triad force, according to the Times report. Critics will label this nuclear “monad” unilateral disarmament, but it is really just eliminating the costly and wasteful massive overkill in our current nuclear forces. The foolish nuclear arms race among the great powers may continue, but the United States safely can unilaterally choose to opt out of it.”

For more commentary on this subject, see:

Counterterrorism:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Conflict in Syria:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Cyber security/AI: 

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Energy:

“America Can't Do Without Fracking; Shale is crucial to the U.S. economy, and it allows Washington to buttress our allies across the globe,” Daniel Yergin, WSJ, 10.31.24. 

  • Not long ago the prospect of U.S. energy independence seemed fanciful. For more than four decades every president aspired to it, but their goal seemed unattainable. Many observers considered the U.S. destined to grow more dependent on imports. In recent years, however, America has achieved energy independence on a net basis. U.S. output is closing in on 13.5 million barrels of crude oil a day, exceeding that of perennial big producers Saudi Arabia and Russia by several million barrels per day. Add what are called natural-gas liquids, and the U.S. produces around 20 million barrels per day.”
  • Shale influences more than America's prices or balances of payments; it also enhances our geopolitical strength. One of Vladimir Putin's several miscalculations in invading Ukraine was that he could use energy to shatter the European coalition supporting Kyiv. His strategy failed because large supplies of LNG—bolstered by increased exports from Norway—compensated for the loss of Russian gas. Nearly half of the European Union's LNG supply in 2023 consisted of U.S.-sourced LNG, mostly processed from shale gas, making the U.S. its largest supplier. Were that supply to be constrained, our allies' security would be severely compromised and a significant feature of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's arsenal eliminated.”
  • The same dynamic applies for U.S. allies in the Pacific. Japan and South Korea have come to rely on U.S. energy exports, which have proved essential for diversifying their supply and strengthening their security. Losing that contribution would make them more vulnerable, reduce their confidence in the reliability of the U.S., and likely push them toward importing from Russia. A ban on fracking would be both misguided and destructive for the U.S. and its allies. Recurrent out-of-touch debates on the topic need to be tabled in light of a central fact: Shale has become crucial to the U.S. economy and global energy security. It's here to stay.”

Climate change:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Elections and elections interference:

“Russia feigns indifference over U.S. election but roots quietly for Trump,” Francesca Ebel and Catherine Belton, WP, 11.03.24. 

  • [There is a] sense in Moscow that Russia would have a lot more to gain from a second Trump presidency even as it publicly downplays the importance of Tuesday’s U.S. elections.”
  • In a clear sign of its interest, the Kremlin and Russia’s military intelligence service have directed multiple disinformation campaigns targeting Harris and her running mate, Tim Walz, as well as casting doubt on the validity of the vote, according to U.S. officials and documents previously reported on by The Washington Post.”
  • “'Of course they want Trump — that’s clear — but the result of this election will not be a game changer for Russia,' said a former Kremlin official who still operates in government circles and spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters. 'The situation has become truly terrible. U.S.-Russian relations are in deadlock. And everyone is a hostage of it — even Putin.'”
  • Russian state media has striven to cast the upcoming election as the trigger for a 'new civil war' in America, while propagandists have disproportionately attacked Harris and defended Trump, analysts say, recycling insults made by far-right outlets in the United States and repeating Kremlin statements. ... But generally, both candidates are still portrayed as two sides of the same coin of America’s global hegemony — they just have different strategies.”
  • That said, inside Russia’s elite there is a growing expectation that Donald Trump will win and that if he does, there could be a chance to end the war with Ukraine on Moscow’s terms and potentially redraw the global security map.”
  • Sergei Markov, a Kremlin-connected political analyst, said that he not only expected a Trump victory but that 'on November 7, I expect that Trump will call Putin and Zelensky and propose an end to the military action.' Harris, meanwhile, is an unknown entity, though the expectation is that the strong support for Ukraine would continue if she wins.”
  • JD Vance, the Republican nominee for vice president, has proposed a plan in which Russia would retain the land it has already taken and a demilitarized buffer zone would be established along the current front line. He also said Ukraine would have to accept neutrality. Two former Trump advisers, Fred Fleitz and retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, have also proposed a plan that calls for a temporary cease-fire along current battle lines, while Ukraine would receive further Western supplies of weapons only if it enters into peace talks with Russia. Though these proposals have faced strong criticism for handing Ukrainian territory to Russia, analysts said it was not clear whether Russia could accept those conditions.”
    • “'For Putin, this is a very bad scenario,' [R. Politik’s Tatiana] Stanovaya said. 'Putin doesn’t want territory. He wants Ukraine.' She envisioned a series of meetings and discussions between Russia and the United States over Ukraine that would ultimately reach a dead end. 'Trump is never going to propose to Putin what he wants in Ukraine.' Putin would not be satisfied until the United States agrees to rebuild relations with Russia in a way that makes concessions to Moscow’s security concerns and redraws the global security map. Until then, Russia will continue to try to stoke chaos to weaken the United States, Stanovaya said. Indeed, post-election chaos would greatly benefit Moscow, said the former Kremlin official. 'The worse it is in the U.S., the better,' he said.”

"How Russia, China and Iran Are Interfering in the Presidential Election,” Sheera Frenkel, Tiffany Hsu and Steven Lee Myers, NYT, 10.29.24.

  • When Russia interfered in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, spreading divisive and inflammatory posts online to stoke outrage, its posts were brash and riddled with spelling errors and strange syntax... Now, eight years later, foreign interference in American elections has become far more sophisticated, and far more difficult to track.”
  • Disinformation from abroad — particularly from Russia, China and Iran — has matured into a consistent and pernicious threat, as the countries test, iterate and deploy increasingly nuanced tactics, according to U.S. intelligence and defense officials, tech companies and academic researchers. The ability to sway even a small pocket of Americans could have outsize consequences for the presidential election, which polls generally consider a neck-and-neck race.”
  • Russia, according to American intelligence assessments, aims to bolster the candidacy of former President Donald J. Trump, while Iran favors his opponent, Vice President Kamala Harris. China appears to have no preferred outcome.”
  • But the broad goal of these efforts has not changed: to sow discord and chaos in hopes of discrediting American democracy in the eyes of the world. The campaigns, though, have evolved, adapting to a changing media landscape and the proliferation of new tools that make it easy to fool credulous audiences. Here are the ways that foreign disinformation has evolved.”
    • Now, disinformation is basically everywhere.
    • The content is far more targeted.
    • Artificial intelligence is propelling this evolution.
    • Technology companies aren’t doing as much to stop disinformation.

For more commentary on this subject, see: 

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“With the war’s future uncertain, the Putin administration doesn’t know how to prepare for Russia’s next State Duma elections,” Andrei Pertsev, Meduza, 10.30.24. Clues from Russian Views.

  • Right now, the willingness of Russia’s top leadership to enter peace negotiations might be “higher than in August,” when Ukraine’s cross-border operation in the Kursk region became a new source of uncertainty in Russian domestic politics, another source close to the Kremlin told Meduza. Russian officials and Kremlin-loyal businessmen initially expected the incursion to cause a major escalation. 'The Kremlin has concluded, ’Now we’re definitely going to destroy the Ukrainian state,’ a source from Russia’s leadership told the outlet Faridaily at the time, adding: 'Right now, there are no rules — both sides are thinking about how to make things worse for the other.'”
  • But as of late October, the sentiment among Russian elites has changed, according to Meduza’s source close to the Kremlin. 'The shock has worn off. We’ll push back the Ukrainian forces sooner or later, and [the Russian army] is making progress in Donbas. The atmosphere has gotten more positive,' he said. A source close to the government added that in his view, if Putin decides to enter into negotiations, they 'won’t begin from a position of weakness for Russia.'”
  • Both sources note that the Russian authorities’ official demands have not changed: they want full control over the annexed Ukrainian territories and for Kyiv to reject NATO membership. The government source says he believes that 'compromises are possible' regarding the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, but adds that this is his 'personal view' of the situation.”
  • However, none of Meduza’s sources expect to see negotiations in the foreseeable future; one said they’re not likely to begin “in the coming days, weeks, or even months.” One factor that will influence Russia’s top leadership, according to the sources, is the result of the upcoming U.S. presidential election.”
  • Russia’s next federal parliamentary elections are scheduled for September 2026 — less than two years away. This means it’s time for the Putin administration to start crafting a strategy to keep the ruling United Russia party in power. However, sources close to the Kremlin and the Russian government tell Meduza that the chaos of the war has left authorities at a loss as to what they should even be planning for. As one political strategist put it, if the war is still going on, the campaign will need to emphasize 'ultrapatriotism,' while a post-war scenario would call for more 'moderate forces.'”

“Russia Can’t Keep Spending Like This for Long,” Agathe Demarais, FP, 10.28.24.

  • Like a cash-strapped household pretending that all is well while quietly burning through emergency savings, Moscow is trying to project economic normalcy by tapping into its vast financial buffers.”
  • This is not a sustainable strategy: Without fresh inflows of cash, even the largest of savings only last for a while. Russia could soon struggle to preserve costly social stability at home while waging its expensive war against Ukraine.”
  • To understand Russia’s economic troubles, looking at inflation is a good starting point. Official statistics are fishy, but even without consulting them, it’s easy to see that price growth is an issue in Russia.”
    • First, the ruble has lost one-third of its value against the U.S. dollar since early 2022, inflating the price of imports and therefore fueling inflation.”
    • Second, Russian firms are struggling to hire because of the combined impact of a shrinking population; a high death toll from the COVID-19 pandemic; and the war in Ukraine, which has killed or seriously wounded 2 percent of Russian men between the ages of 20 and 50, and is causing an exodus of highly skilled workers.”
  • Central bankers like to raise interest rates when inflation is high, seeking to tame price growth by weighing on demand. The Central Bank of Russia has applied these principles to the letter; since mid-2023, it has gradually increased its key rate to a whopping 21 percent. Russian companies are feeling the pinch.”
  • Russia’s bigger fiscal picture looks dire. On the expenses side, war is costly, and defense spending keeps rising to record highs: Military expenses will make up 40 percent of Russia’s public spending in 2025, for an eye-popping $142 billion.”
  • The revenue side of the fiscal balance does not look any better. Excluding dividends, Russia’s state-owned gas giant Gazprom used to provide around 10 percent of the Kremlin’s fiscal revenues. Such largesse is over: After losing access to the European market, Gazprom recorded a $6.8 billion loss in 2023, making it impossible for the company to transfer money to state coffer.”
  • With debt issuance out of the equation, Russia is now forced to turn to plan C: tapping into its savings. Russia is depleting its rainy-day holdings, and this cannot last forever.”

Defense and aerospace:

“Russia Showers Cash on Men Enlisting in Ukraine War, Bringing Prosperity to Some Towns,” Neil MacFarquhar and Milana Mazaeva, NYT, 11.02.24.

  • The Kremlin has been showering cash on men who enlist. It wants to avoid an unpopular draft, while also addressing the lack of men with sufficient patriotic zeal to join up. There are large signing bonuses, fat monthly salaries and what Russians call 'coffin money,' a substantial payment to the families of the tens of thousands of soldiers killed in battle.”
  • The money is changing the face of countless Russian backwaters like the Siberian city. 'The allure of extremely high salaries and other benefits has been a major factor in attracting voluntary recruits, especially from relatively poor regions,' said a report issued this year by the Bank of Finland’s Institute for Emerging Economies.”
  • By improving the standard of living among Russia’s poor, the payments have spurred support for President Vladimir V. Putin and the war, researchers noted, while also changing the perception of fighters from patriots to 'soldiers of fortune.'”
  • The Bank of Finland researchers found that the number of bank accounts in Russia’s poorer areas surged over the past year.”
  • Also, in recent months, recruitment posters across Russia changed noticeably, replacing patriotic themes with financial offers.”
  • U.S. officials estimate that Russia is recruiting 25,000 to 30,000 new soldiers a month, roughly equal to the number of dead and wounded. As soon as local governments see interest lagging, they jack up the financial incentives, experts say. ... This past month, the frontline Belgorod region broke all records with a signing bonus amounting to more than $30,000, well above the previous leader, Moscow, at about $20,000. The lowest bonuses are around $500.”
  • The larger sums constitute a small fortune in many of the less developed towns and villages of Russia — where the average salary is a few hundred dollars per month — especially when combined with a frontline fighter’s monthly salary starting at 210,000 rubles, or about $2,100.....the signing bonus equals roughly the average annual per capita income in Russia, and the monthly salary is three times the average wage.”
  • Coffin money payments amount to almost $150,000 per family, enough to buy an apartment in all but the most expensive Russian cities. While an apartment is often the main goal, recipients say they buy all kinds of things, including new teeth, breast implants and vacations.”
  • The war payments are especially attractive to impoverished, middle-aged men who see them as their last chance to escape a lifetime of debt, said Ivan Grek, the director of the Russian Program at George Washington University. ... Government statistics from early 2024 show a 74 percent growth in ordinary Russians across the country purchasing cars compared with the same time period last year, Mr. Grek noted, while those paying off consumer debts jumped to 21 percent, up from about 9 percent before the war.”

“The Wagner Group' Review: Russia's Guns for Hire; In Ukraine, Vladimir Putin was aided by a ruthless private army that was deeply loyal to him—until it wasn't,” Arthur Herman’s review of Jack Margolin’s “The Wagner Group,” WSJ, 11.01.24. 

  • Prigozhin's abortive uprising, in June 2023, was halted by troops loyal to the government, and Mr. Putin agreed to a deal that granted amnesty to the Wagner fighters and allowed Prigozhin (with Dmitry Utkin, his lieutenant) to go into exile in Belarus. It is a mystery how anyone as wily as Prigozhin could have fallen for this empty promise. The Belarus sojourn was short-lived—as was Prigozhin. Mr. Margolin sums up the story: 'The burning husk of the jet lying in a field north of Moscow was a warning to any other elite who would dare to challenge not only Putin, but the order he had created.'”
  • As for the Wagner Group itself, it has been largely absorbed into the Russian National Guard, and Prigozhin's 26-year-old son, Pavel, has taken charge. It is hard to say what its future will be—whether, given its history, it will break out again into a far-ranging guns-for-hire role or stay within Russia's official military command structure. Meanwhile, Mr. Putin's new North Korean 'recruits' may be taking over as cannon fodder for the fighting in Ukraine.”
  • The future of PMSC warfare in general is equally unclear. ... Future mercenaries may be armed not with machine guns and sledgehammers but with algorithms aimed at disrupting an enemy through cyber warfare. They may even be driving armored lunar vehicles in battles over strategic minerals on the surface of the moon. In that sense, the Wagner Group—whatever its origins, whatever its fate—may be a harbinger, a disturbing prevision of the way of war in a turbulent global era.”

“Resilience Strained: How Civil-Military Relations Are Shaping Russia’s War Effort,” Kirill Shamiev, PONARS, 10.28.24. 

  • Despite strong appearances, such as Russia’s methodical advance in Ukraine and relatively high numbers of soldiers, a critical look reveals a steady rise in extraordinary policies, unprecedented in Russia’s post-Soviet history. The intensification of repressive and disciplinary measures, along with the mobilization economy, provides the government with more tools to keep the Russian military and society under control. From this perspective, however, Russian civil-military relations look like a pendulum, swinging from shock to government response and back again. The initial invasion was a shock, forcing the government to respond by announcing mobilization and changing Russian legal norms; Prigozhin’s rebellion came as another shock, to which the government responded with a new set of changes, including replacing the leadership at the Defense Ministry a year later.”
  • Western observers should not take the outward stability of Russia for granted. Putin’s personification of control over the military, together with the military’s stubborn resistance to internal reforms, could multiply the effects of another destabilizing event, threatening Russia’s war effort and even domestic political stability.”
  • See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Russia’s Enduring Presence in the Middle East,” Eugene Rumer and Andrew S. Weiss, CEIP, 11.01.24. 

  • Russia’s foreign policy is unburdened by ethical considerations or moral principles. Its national security apparatus remains nimble and opportunistic, notwithstanding the demands of the war in Ukraine. Moscow is well positioned to sustain and, whenever possible, to expand a web of relationships throughout the Middle East. Russia has turned to the Middle East when its relationship with the West imploded in the wake of its aggression against Ukraine. Political leaders in the Middle East—where authoritarian governance is the norm—have been largely indifferent to the plight of Ukraine and accepted Russia as a convenient partner devoid of reservations or scruples.”
  • For Russia and its partners, this turn of events has been a win-win, as rewards come in the form of upgraded security relationships, geopolitical gains, influence over the direction of the global economy and energy markets, and the creation of new supply chains and financial flows free from the constraints of U.S.- and European-led sanctions and export controls. But is this a permanent shift in Russian foreign policy? How long will it last? After all, the importance of the Middle East to Russia since 2022 has grown mostly as a by-product of the breakdown in relations with the West, which promises to last well beyond Putin’s time at the helm.”
  • Russia’s new or renewed relationships established since its return to the region in the early 2000s have served it well, and the possibility of repairing ties with the West does not preclude a continued, robust engagement with the Middle East. If one were to imagine a reversal in Russia’s position in the Middle East, it is more likely to be due to changes in the region itself than to Russia severing its ties there.”
  • Russia remains a well-resourced economy with a powerful military and defense-industrial base, despite the setbacks suffered during the war in Ukraine. The Kremlin retains the ambition to act on the world stage and to project power and influence beyond its periphery. That, combined with its rivalry with the West, will translate into a continuing and influential presence in the Middle East.”
  • For the foreseeable future, Russia’s expanded presence in the Middle East presents a nagging problem for the West. Moscow has disregarded and cast aside the few remaining guardrails and global norms. By acting as a rogue power with a global reach, today’s Russia feels comfortable flouting its nonproliferation commitments and supporting rebel groups such as Hamas and the Houthis. At the same time, it is necessary to recognize that Russia is not the author of the enormous security problems facing Israel and other U.S. partners in the region. Nor is it driving Iran’s nuclear ambitions; it is only facilitating them. Nor is it the reason behind Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea.”
  • Any Western détente with Russia will do little to address the root causes of those problems. Unfortunately, the United States and its allies will find it difficult to choke off disruptive Russian behavior or to curb its growing alignment with countries like Iran. In the meantime, the Kremlin will be eager to identify new tools and sources of leverage against the United States in the period of confrontation and testing that lies ahead. Thwarting such efforts and minimizing the headaches that a belligerent Russia seeks to capitalize upon in various parts of a restive Middle East will remain a preoccupation for Western policymakers for a long time to come.”

Ukraine:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“When Did Russia Decide That Borders Could Be Moved?” Dmitri Kartsev, CEIP, 11.04.24.

  • An analytical line from Russian exceptionalism to redrawing post-Soviet borders was sketched out by none other than Anatoly Sobchak, St. Petersburg mayor and Putin’s immediate boss in the early 1990s. In 1992, just after the Soviet collapse, Sobchak declared that its founding republics, having annulled the treaty on its formation, should return to the borders in which they had entered. This was a transparent allusion to annexing Crimea. Curiously, but perhaps not surprisingly, Putin went on to directly cite his mentor in his prewar article 'On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians.'”
  • Russia’s special status within the Soviet Union might explain that early resurgence of revisionism. Unlike the other Soviet republics (and even Russia’s own autonomous republics), Russia lacked a separate party organization at a time when presence in the party state was itself a key manifestation of power. Ordinary citizens might not have cared much that their republic did not have its own Central Committee, but it was especially painful for the Russian elite.”
  • Today, when Putin calls Ukraine an “artificial state,” he is largely projecting Russia’s own problem onto it. After all, the considerations that produced Russia’s current borders aren’t exactly transparent. Many parts of Russia could easily have become full-fledged republics themselves and therefore independent states after the fall of the Soviet Union. Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev had not only handed Crimea to Ukraine (a fact mentioned regularly in Kremlin propaganda), but also stripped Karelia of union republic status, which is less often remembered. If Khrushchev had not done so, the region’s fate could have been completely different.”
  • To overcome anxieties about its own 'artificiality,' Russian propaganda manipulated the term 'historical Russia,' refashioning a weak position into a strong one and legitimizing the right of modern Russia to dispute the borders of any territory previously belonging to Muscovite princes, Russian czars, and Soviet general secretaries.”
  • The modern Russian elite did not pursue redrawing others’ borders as a key objective. Rather, many factors seem to have led it to settle on revisionism. That gives hope that, in different circumstances, there might be other ways for Russia to conquer the fear of its own 'artificiality.' One of those ways might be a referendum—or, more likely, more than one—on who wants to remain part of Russia and in what form.”

“Moldova’s pro-EU president has won re-election,” The Economist, 11.04.24. 

  • There were deep sighs of relief in the capitals of western Europe as well as among liberal-minded reformers in Chisinau, Moldova’s capital, when Maia Sandu, the country’s incumbent president, was re-elected on November 3rd. Ms. Sandu looks set for another four years in office after a nerve-jangling run-off against an opponent strongly backed by Russia. She had comfortably won the first round on October 20th with 42% of the vote against ten other candidates, but most of the also-rans were pro-Russian. The runner-up, Alexandr Stoianoglo, a former chief prosecutor, who got 26% in the first round, was expected to close the gap. Early returns showed him a whisker ahead. But Ms. Sandu eventually clinched victory with 55% of the vote to his 45%. The late count for Moldova’s large diaspora, especially in western Europe, is thought to have tipped the result in her favor.”
  • Vladimir Putin, who is determined to recover a dominant influence in the borderlands of the former Soviet Union, will be disappointed that his campaign of hybrid warfare, including vicious disinformation, crude bribery and sabotage, has narrowly failed to bring Moldova to heel. At the same time as the first round, a referendum had been held on whether to change the constitution to enshrine an aspiration for Moldova to join the European Union. This passed by the slimmest of margins.”
  • With the yes vote in the referendum on the EU and Ms. Sandu’s re-election both hopefully now secured, Moldova will continue its westward pivot, which speeded up after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.” 

“Georgia’s crumbling European dream,” Editorial Board, FT, 10.29.24. 

  • Georgia’s hope of closer integration with Europe is hanging by a thread. The ruling Georgian Dream party that is steering the South Caucasus republic back towards Russia’s orbit declared victory in weekend elections. Opposition parties and Georgia’s president say the vote was falsified; observers alleged ballot-stuffing, intimidation and fraud.”
  • The Central Election Commission, whose nominations the ruling party now controls, says Georgian Dream won 54 per cent of votes. But two exit polls on Saturday by independent pollsters whose projections have proved accurate in previous elections put GD support at 42 per cent or less. Georgian Dream has seized on “positive” language from a monitoring mission led by the OSCE’s democracy arm while ignoring its criticisms. Other missions have reported multiple irregularities, and misuse of state and media resources by GD before the election.”
  • The EU and the US should make clear now that they are ready to sanction Ivanishvili’s circle and senior GD officials if abuses of democracy and human rights are confirmed, or protests in Tbilisi are violently snuffed out. Failure to do so would be a betrayal of the hopes of hundreds of thousands of Georgians, especially among the young, for a future as part of the democratic world. It would be seized on, too, by the Kremlin, which is taking advantage of distractions provided by the US presidential election and the war in the Middle East to step up efforts to bring ex-Soviet neighbors back into its sphere.”

“Preparing for a Climate Summit by Jailing Activists and Journalists,” Anton Troianovski, NYT, 11.01.24. 

  • In the months leading up to a high-profile global climate summit in November, the government of Azerbaijan has been intensely preparing for its role as host, renovating building facades, training volunteers and retrofitting a stadium for tens of thousands of delegates. … It has [also] locked up dozens of activists and journalists in what experts describe as the country’s most aggressive campaign of repression in years.”
  • [H]uman rights monitors and political analysts say, [President Ilham] Aliyev appears intent on stamping out the last vestiges of independent civil society and free press in his country. 'We haven’t seen repression like this in the country in a long time,' said Stefan Meister, who studies Azerbaijan and other parts of the former Soviet Union for the German Council on Foreign Relations. Some of the arrests, he said, appeared to be an effort to 'eliminate everything that could lead to criticism around COP.'”
  • Those arrested have included at least 12 journalists for at least three prominent independent media outlets, human rights watchdogs say.”
  • But the international response has been muted. In the Caucasus, the mountainous region where Europe and Asia meet, Mr. Aliyev has emerged as a dominant player after 21 years of rule. With modern weaponry funded by oil and gas revenues, his military defeated neighboring Armenia in 2020 and again last year in a long-running conflict.”
  • At the same time, the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have elevated Azerbaijan as a key partner for the West. The European Union sees Azerbaijan as an alternative to Russia as a source of fossil fuels, and it pledged after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to double imports of natural gas from Azerbaijan by 2027. Azerbaijan is also a key partner for Israel, importing Israeli weaponry and selling Israel oil.”
  • Last week, Mr. Aliyev traveled to Kazan, Russia, for Mr. Putin’s marquee geopolitical event of the year: the BRICS summit … Mr. Aliyev 'doesn’t have to fear a harsh reaction from the West,” said Rauf Mirgadirov, an Azerbaijani political analyst living in exile in Switzerland. “As long as he’s not totally come under Russia’s sway, the West will be in dialogue with him.'”

For more commentary on this subject, see:

 

Footnotes

  1. Interestingly the headline on this story, which The Economist ran on Oct. 29 and which RM staff accessed on that day and wrote about in an X post, said "Ukraine is now struggling to survive, not to win.” That headline was also reflected in the piece’s original web address on the Economist’s site: https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/10/29/ukraine-is-now-struggling-to-survive-not-to-win. On Oct. 31, however, that story’s headline already read "Ukraine is now struggling to cling on, not to win." 

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 11:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute an RM editorial policy.

^ Machine-translated.

Slider photo by AP Photo/Gerald Herbert.

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