6 Ideas to Explore

1. “A practitioner of realpolitik, Putin sees this war as an important investment that is just beginning to pay dividends,” JHU’s Sergei Radchenko writes in a piece entitled “Why should Putin negotiate? If I were him, I'd keep fighting,” published in The Spectator. The factors that, in Putin’s calculations, make negotiations presently unappealing are that the war is mostly fought on Ukrainian territory while consolidating Russian society for his benefit, and that Western support for Ukraine is declining. It follows from Radchenko’s reasoning that these factors, in Putin’s eyes, outweigh the war’s human and budgetary costs, as well as the risk of escalation.
2. “With Western weapons deliveries limited and slow, Ukraine is facing a bleak winter” as its military is “slowly but steadily losing ground on the main eastern front,” according to WSJ’s James Marson. Yet, forcing Ukraine to negotiate from a position of weakness would embolden Putin, Ukrainian presidential adviser Mykhailo Podolyak told Marson. Without more support for Kyiv from its allies, the war could drag on for years as an emboldened Putin would press on with his main goal of total control over Ukraine, according to Podolyak.
3. An “end to the fighting that froze the battle lines more or less as they are now would not completely fulfill Russia’s territorial war aims,” according to FT’s Tony Barber. Such a freeze will mean the Russian army has failed at Putin’s declared goal of securing full control of the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, according to Barber’s FT piece, entitled “Russia’s elusive war aims.” Moreover, even Russia’s full control of these four regions (and Crimea) would still leave Putin short of his implied aims of destroying the independent Ukrainian state and discrediting the very idea of a Ukrainian national identity, Barber writes. It follows from a recent analysis by editor-in-chief of Nezavisimaya Gazeta Konstantin Remchukov, however, that Putin may have scaled down his territorial ambitions in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.
4. Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s recently unveiled victory plan sounds “like a strategy for forcing negotiations with Putin rather than a military plan for retaking all of Russian-occupied territory,” according to David Ignatius’s interpretation of this plan as presented to him by Ukraine’s Defense Minister Rustem Umerov. The plan, which calls for NATO’s quick invitation to Ukraine to join the alliance and for longer-range Western attack systems for its military, “appears unlikely” to be implemented, Tatiana Stanovaya wrote in her R. Politik’s weekly bulletin. Stanovaya has also pointed to “Ukraine’s growing desperation” that “could push Kyiv toward more radical strategies,” such as Zelenskyy’s recent “nuclear ultimatum: either NATO issues an invitation or Kyiv will look at developing nuclear weapons.” Zelenskyy may indeed be becoming somewhat desperate as the Ukrainian armed forces continue to endure slow, but steady losses of territory and mounting casualties at the main front in the east, with no Western arms supplies amounting to a game-changer of the kind that the Ukrainian top brass had once hoped for. If Zelenskyy’s victory plan, which contains unrealistic clauses like a quick invitation into NATO, were, indeed, meant to force Putin into accepting peace on Ukraine’s conditions, then it is not the first attempt of this kind. One other recent attempt was Zelenskyy’s “peace formula,” though its promotion appears to have slowed down with a second peace summit facing delays and boycott by Russia.*  
5. Post-Cold War cuts in European countries’ military budgets have turned these countries’ militaries into “a Potemkin army” that is ill-prepared to wage and win a prolonged war, U.S. experts told Bloomberg. Moreover, even after having realized that they might have to fight a full-scale land war on their own territory, some European members of NATO will still fail to adequately fund the rebuilding of Europe’s defenses because they cannot afford it, according to this U.S. news agency.
6. Corruption has been a continuing problem in Ukraine’s military procurement, according to Ignatius’s WP column, for which he has interviewed Ukrainian Defense Minister Umerov. Umerov told Ignatius that some Western partners had complained about dealing with a purchasing company called Special Techno Export, which was overseen by the military intelligence service, known as the GUR, headed by Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov. STE was "infamous for getting into money-laundering scandals," according to a recent Politico article cited by Ignatius. Umerov told Ignatius that he put STE under the ministry's direct control while advising Budanov to focus "on intelligence rather than acquisition.”

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

“Could Russia Help North Korea with Its Missile and Nuclear Programs?” Siegfried Hecker, NI, 10.17.24. 

• “Although North Korea has amassed a threatening nuclear arsenal, it still has significant gaps in its capabilities. For example, North Korea has limited inventories of plutonium and tritium, the bomb fuels required for modern hydrogen bombs. The sophistication and miniaturization of its nuclear warheads are limited by having conducted only six nuclear tests to date, in comparison to 1,054 for the United States, 715 for the Soviet Union, and forty-five for China. North Korea has demonstrated rocket technologies of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) class to reach the American mainland. However, none of their ICBMs have been launched in normal trajectories, and all have been lofted to stay close to the Korean Peninsula, which is required for obtaining crucial guidance and re-entry data.”
• “The concern is that Russia could help North Korea close these gaps quickly. Such assistance would violate Russia’s commitments to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Before the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Soviet Union/Russia had been a responsible NPT state and supportive member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Unfortunately, with its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has turned [rogue]. It has threatened the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine and surrounding states. It has violated the nonproliferation security assurances it extended to Ukraine when it signed the 1994 Budapest Memorandum to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty in return for sending Soviet-era nuclear weapons back to Moscow. It committed state-sponsored nuclear terrorism with its transgression of the Chornobyl nuclear accident exclusion area and its occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plants at gunpoint. Moreover, it has greatly set back the expansion of global nuclear power with its stranglehold on the world’s nuclear fuel supply chain.”
• “In other words, Russia has turned into an irresponsible nuclear state on which the rest of the world can no longer depend to uphold nuclear nonproliferation norms. That is the overriding near-term concern of the new Russia-North Korea relationship.”

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“Russia’s elusive war aims,. Any end to the fighting that left Moscow in control of some Ukrainian land wouldn’t necessarily add up to a victory,” Tony Barber, FT, 10.19.24. 

• “President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine … unveiled a five-point “victory plan” for the war against Russia. Even from Ukraine’s western friends, the plan didn’t receive unqualified support.”
• “One large, unanswered question about the plan is whether an end to the war would leave Russia occupying the roughly one-fifth of Ukrainian territory that it now holds.”
• “It isn’t difficult…. to imagine an end to the fighting that leaves Russia in de facto control of Crimea and much of south-eastern Ukraine.”
  • “Thomas Graham, writing for The Hill, explains: “Most western governments now acknowledge privately, if not publicly, Ukraine is not likely to drive Russian forces from all the Ukrainian land they have seized since 2014.”
• “Viewed in purely territorial terms, Russia’s war aims are to retain Crimea and the four eastern regions over which Moscow proclaimed its sovereignty in 2022. However, even after the gradual advances of Russia’s armed forces in the east this year, the Kremlin does not fully control these four regions. It follows that an end to the fighting that froze the battle lines more or less as they are now would not completely fulfil Russia’s territorial war aims.”
• “But the picture is much bigger than who controls what chunks of Ukrainian land…Putin launched his full-scale invasion in February 2022 under the pretext of demilitarizing and “de-Nazifying” Ukraine. Put differently, his aim was to destroy the independent Ukrainian state that emerged in 1991 out of the rubble of the Soviet Union, and to discredit the very idea of a Ukrainian national identity separate from that of Russia…..Looked at from this angle, Russia has already fallen short of its aims. Ukraine’s national identity has been forged in the fires of war and cannot now be subsumed into some nebulous Russian-dominated east Slav brotherhood.”
  • “Furthermore, even a dismembered Ukraine would remain a functioning state and part of the international system. Still, as Graham says, it would have to continue along the road of internal reform and would need credible guarantees of western protection.”
• “Putin’s ambitions, stimulated by the Ukraine war, also encompass a revision of the world order in favor of Russia and its sympathizers, and to the disadvantage of the US and its allies.”

“Ukraine Faces Bleak Winter as Russia Ramps Up Assaults, U.S. Support Trickles In,” James Marson, WSJ, 10.14.24.

• “With Western weapons deliveries limited and slow, Ukraine is facing a bleak winter. Its outnumbered and outgunned military is slowly but steadily losing ground on the main eastern front, trying to exact a heavy toll on Russia while minimizing its own losses. Russian missile-and-drone attacks targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure are overwhelming the country’s air defenses, forcing rolling blackouts across the country that could worsen in winter. Ukrainian troops are clinging to important strategic locations in the east, such as the high-lying city of Chasiv Yar, facing waves of Russian infantry and massive glide bombs that pulverize buildings.”
• “President Biden and other Western leaders have repeatedly said they want Ukraine to prevail, but are providing insufficient support to stop Russia and turn the tide, say Ukrainian officials and soldiers. More worrying for Kyiv, former President Donald Trump has said that if he wins the November presidential election he would seek a quick peace deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has made clear he wants Ukraine’s capitulation. Russia, meanwhile, is planning to increase military spending by one-quarter next year, signaling its long-term commitment to overpowering its smaller neighbor.”
• “On visits to European capitals and the U.S. in recent weeks, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky requested more weapons and security guarantees as part of what he has dubbed a “victory plan” aimed at ending the war on terms favorable to Ukraine. The Biden administration, which has drip-fed weapons to Ukraine for fear of provoking Russia, has given a tepid response. “We’re going to have to sit down with the Ukrainians and kind of work through what can you actually do, versus what do you have on this list,” Air Force Gen. CQ Brown Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said on Wednesday.”
• “Mykhailo Podolyak, a Ukrainian presidential adviser, said the plan was a detailed strategy encompassing military, economic, political and diplomatic steps necessary to compel Russia to end its war. Among them is a request for more long-range missiles, known as ATACMS and Storm Shadow, and permission to fire them at military targets deep inside Russia. Podolyak said that could change Putin’s calculus by increasing domestic pressure, as well as weakening Russia’s front-line forces.”
• “The U.S. has so far declined to grant permission, fearing Russia would view it as a major escalation. Without more support for Ukraine, Podolyak said, the war could drag on for years and end up eroding Western nations’ global standing. Forcing Ukraine to negotiate from a position of weakness wouldn’t end the conflict, he said, but embolden Putin to press on with his main goal of total control over Ukraine.”
• “Why should he stop? He can compete with the West only with fear—that you will be afraid and he will get what he wants,” Podolyak said.”

For more insights on this subject, see:

• “Why Zelenskyy says his Victory Plan is the only way to stop Russia,” Henry Foy, FT, 10.18.24.
• "The foreigners fighting and dying for Vladimir Putin,” The Economist, 10.20.24.

Military aid to Ukraine:

“Ukraine Must Turn the Tide Before It Can Negotiate. To Gain Leverage, Kyiv Needs a Stable Front in the Donbas—and Western Security Guarantee,” Jack Watling, FA, 10.21.24. 

“Investing in Ukraine’s homegrown defence industry could help the west,” Gillian Tett, FT, 10.21.24. 

• “This [past] week, western allies are pledging fresh support for Ukraine. On Wednesday, US President Joe Biden announced another $425mn in military aid, rushed through before the election in November. Separately, Australia announced it would send 49 of its old Abrams tanks. And with Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukrainian president, now touting a multi-part “victory plan” at an EU summit, more donations of equipment may materialize soon.”
• “This is welcome — albeit shamefully far short of the support that Ukraine needs to win the war. However, as Zelenskyy begs for more help, there is another aspect of this that has hitherto been largely overlooked: the need for private and public capital for Ukraine’s own defense industry.”
• “Oleksandr Kamyshin, a Zelenskyy adviser, .. says the Kyiv government is so cash-strapped that it only has $10bn of military procurement funds this year, creating a $10bn funding gap..... a sensible solution would be for western allies to earmark some of the aid they are giving to Ukraine say from frozen Russian assets, to provide funding for its defense start-ups, on top of recycling old western kit. Such investments would not just help Ukraine but also help the west to rethink its own defense production.”
• “The key point is that America and Europe need to get more creative in how they support Kyiv. Where Denmark has gone, larger western states should now follow — not just for Ukraine’s sake, but for their own long-term security too.”

“Defense Companies Search for Scale in Ammunition Race for Ukraine,” Sylvia Pfeifer and Nic Fildes, FT, 10.14.24.

• “The war in Ukraine has a new frontline: a new munitions factory in Queensland, Australia, jointly owned by Germany’s Rheinmetall and a local contractor NIOA, is churning out tens of thousands of artillery shells for Kyiv. Work at the Maryborough factory, the first such facility to be built in Australia since the second world war, has barely stopped since it opened two years ago. The company, which exports the shells to Germany where they are then filled with explosives by Rheinmetall, plans to increase annual production at the facility by 25 per cent to around 55,000 shells next year.”
• “Like NIOA, other defense companies globally have boosted output of everything from ammunition to rocket motors and missiles to replenish national stockpiles which have been depleted as governments have shipped arms to Ukraine. Rheinmetall has plans to increase output of Nato-standard 155mm ammunition from around 100,000 rounds before February 2022 to 1.1mn rounds per year from 2027. Sweden’s Saab said the capacity of its ground combat business, which includes ammunition, had doubled to 200,000 units a year in recent years—and it is on course to double that again to 400,000 in the near future.”
• “But overall, efforts are still being hampered by supply chain constraints, and industry stakeholders say that much greater investments are needed if Europe is to be able withstand Russia’s aggression while also refilling depleted stockpiles. There are “significant supply chain issues with munitions supply for Australia and the Allied effort,” said Nioa, including “nitrocellulose… which goes into propellant.” Rheinmetall said it had increased the “safety stock” for certain raw materials such as “cotton linters and armored steel to around three years of annual production” in order to de-risk its supply chains.”
• “Norway’s government said last week it would invest close to NKr1bn (£70mn) to boost production of critical explosives and rocket motors as part of a plan for its defense industry. It will co-finance a feasibility study with Chemring Nobel, the Norwegian subsidiary of Britain’s Chemring, to assess the development of an explosives facility. Rocket motors, said Vegard Sande, director of large caliber systems at Nammo, “are not the only bottleneck for increasing the number of missiles for air defense but it’s one of the critical components where we have to increase capacity.”
• “Jan Pie, secretary-general of ASD, the industry trade body, said that production levels were still short of what was required, especially following decades of under-investment in Europe’s industrial base. Russia, on the other hand, is operating on a war footing. Thanks to support from North Korea, Moscow can currently expend around 10,000 rounds of ammunition per day with no fear of depleting its stockpiles, according to a recent report by the Kiehl Institute for the World Economy.”
• “At a similar rate of fire, Germany would use up a year’s worth of its entire ammunition production within 70 days, it said. The Russians, said Guntram Wolff, senior fellow at Bruegel think-tank and co-author of the study, “have large factory lines… massive assembly lines, where the numbers that are churned out are frighteningly high.” But in order to deliver at scale—and over time—[European defense industry] executives said the industry needs much longer contracts to invest.”

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• "Selling Out Ukraine Casts Shame on the West," Max Hastings, Bloomberg, 10.20.24.

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

“Can the Digital Ruble Shield Russia From Western Sanctions?” Alexandra Prokopenko, CEIP, 10.17.24. 

• “In recent years, central banks in several major countries, including Russia and the United States, have been exploring the creation of digital assets, commonly known as central bank digital currencies (CBDCs).”
• “Russian policy discussions about the creation of a digital ruble center on its potential utility for facilitating international trade and mitigating the impact of sanctions. The advantages for Russia of CBDCs, including enhanced cross-border payment capabilities and reduced transaction costs, are fairly straightforward. They could provide Russia with alternatives to traditional payment systems like SWIFT that it lost access to as a result of Western economic sanctions introduced in the wake of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022.”
• “The digital ruble project initiated by the Russian central bank in 2020 has progressed rapidly, with real-world testing involving several commercial banks and clients now under way. Positioned as a retail CBDC, the digital ruble is intended to integrate seamlessly into everyday transactions. However, several important challenges persist, ranging from public skepticism toward CBDCs and concerns over state surveillance to integration costs for banks and the difficulties of aligning the digital ruble with international CBDC standards.”
• “More broadly, Russia’s CBDC efforts face competition from countries like China, which has made more progress in testing a CBDC and its associated infrastructure. China has also made more strides in fostering international collaboration. That state of affairs may ultimately increase Russia’s overall dependence on China. Meanwhile, Russia is trying to galvanize efforts within the BRICS group of countries to promote CBDC usage and alternative ways of making cross-border payments. The potential success of Russia and China in this field does not pose an immediate threat to either the dominance of the U.S. dollar or the viability of the existing Western sanctions regime, but it does pave the way for gradual yet significant changes to the global financial system as we know it.”
• “The development of CBDCs raises a number of potential concerns for the viability of the existing Western sanctions regime and Western governments’ desire to constrain Russia’s economic potential and military reconstitution efforts. Western policymakers will surely closely monitor Russia’s efforts to create a CBDC and its potential in cross-border settlements, especially with China and Kazakhstan, given the importance of such countries in ongoing attempts to circumvent sanctions.”

“The west’s halfhearted resistance to Russia,” Martin Sandbu, FT, 10.17.24.

• “The Kyiv School of Economics has long monitored [Russia’s tanker] shadow fleet, and this week published a report setting out how big it has become and the danger it poses to coastal states, quite apart from how it helps finance Russia’s illegal war.”
• “This is bad news on many levels.”
  • “One is that it significantly reduces the effectiveness of the oil price cap.”
  • “Another is that this sanctions circumvention seems to have taken place with the connivance of western helpers.”
  • “But the most acute negative consequence is that an “environmental disaster is waiting to happen in European waters”, in the words of the KSE report.”
• “Why is not more being done? The simplest answer is a lack of resources and attention. That is understandable — but not forgivable, when a small amount of focus and money could make a big difference. The bigger point is that this half-heartedness applies across the whole range of economic sanctions, as the west dithers in giving Ukraine use of Moscow’s blocked central bank reserves or looks through its fingers while banned goods are blatantly smuggled to Russia.”

“Western Companies Supply Russia with Billions of Dollars Worth of Goods But They Do Not Realize It,” IStories, 10.17.24.

• “In 2023, $5 billion worth of sanctioned goods disappeared during transit through Russia, IStories found out. The shipments from the European Union were destined for countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus—but never reached their final buyers. The fake transit scheme helps Russia evade sanctions, and compared to other import methods, it is the most profitable.”
• “In early September 2023, a truck arrived in the Finnish village of Vaalimaa, at a road checkpoint on the border with Russia. There were parts made by German Siemens inside, worth about $35 thousand. Finnish customs officers easily let the goods through, and soon the cargo was waiting for customs clearance in the Russian town of Torfyanovka. In October, the Finns again gave the green light to a batch of parts.”
• “Why did Finland allow sanctioned goods for a sub-sanctioned company to be imported into Russia? The customs representatives did not answer our questions… [but] they may simply not have known who it was intended for. This is possible thanks to the so-called fake transit scheme, with the help of which Russia could import billions of dollars worth of goods from Europe.”
• “Alexei, an employee of a company involved in importing sanctioned goods into Russia, told IStories that the scheme works as follows. A company in Central Asia, the Caucasus or China orders goods from the EU and arranges land transit through Russia. Then the cargo is sent to the eastern border of the European Union—many sanctioned goods enter Russia through Belarus, but often imported from Latvia, Estonia or, as in the case of Kvazar, through Finland, according to customs data reviewed by IStories.”
• “The goods cross the EU border under a transit declaration—ostensibly they are not destined for a Russian company, but, for example, for a Kazakh or Chinese one. But as soon as the goods are in the buffer zone, they are immediately re-registered for import into Russia. “When the cargo has passed, for example, the Polish border, the carrier simply crosses out the column ‘place of delivery’ with a pen and writes ‘Russia, Moscow’ instead of, say, ‘Kazakhstan, Almaty.’”
• “The European Union is aware of the fake transit. Lithuanian customs, for example, announced that it would check the documents of carriers more carefully and stop those they consider “suspicious.” However, there is no solution to this problem yet, noted export control specialist Eric Woods of the U.S.-based James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, in a conversation with IStories: “These imports are the hardest to detect—you need people in the country of delivery to check whether the shipment actually went where it was declared to go.”

“Russia Sanctions and the Global South: Let’s Talk National Interest,” Tom Keatinge and Kinga Redlowska, RUSI, 10.16.24.

• “No conversation on sanctions against Russia in response to its illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine is complete without reflecting on the circumvention role of third countries – those countries that have chosen not to follow the G7 and other allies of Ukraine in imposing sanctions. … [A]re there any arguments that might sway the ‘non-aligned’ community to reconsider and conclude that implementing sanctions on Russia is, after all, in their national interest?”
• “While the vice will never close entirely on the Russian economy, a recent trip to South Africa revealed a possible line of thought that might - perhaps - make a difference. In short, to coin a phrase: it’s economic security, stupid!”
• “G7 countries remain the biggest trading partners for the Global South. Consequently, to ensure economic security, the latter cannot afford to forfeit the opportunity to trade with these developed economies by, for example, losing access to correspondent banking, a fear widely held (we discovered) by South African banks if they are found to be facilitating the circumvention of US sanctions against Russia.”
• “G7 diplomats must understand and engage with the economic security concerns of these countries. A loss of economic stability is existential for most Global South governments, and thus national interest related to economic security will ultimately drive their decisions, regardless of their ideological position on sanctions.”
• “Furthermore, diplomats should find channels via which to talk directly to Global South financial institutions. These financial institutions are often critical national trade and finance gatekeepers, something governments and the general public fail to appreciate when it comes to not only sustaining good economic relations with the G7, but also issues such as financial inclusion and other development goals that are hampered by sanctions and associated consequences.”
• “Finally, analysis must be granular, engaging with all stakeholders from both the public and private sectors, and respect the differences and diversity of Global South states.”

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• "Punishing Putin Is More Important Than Ever," Stephanie Baker, Bloomberg, 10.21.24.

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

“Why should Putin negotiate? If I were him, I'd keep fighting,” Sergei Radchenko, The Spectator, 10.19.24. 

• “To understand what Putin may want, we have to put ourselves in his shoes. If I were Putin (a weird thought) I would draw up a list of factors in favor and against peace talks.”
• “On the pro side: this war has been expensive.”
  • “Russia’s military and security expenditures for 2025 are estimated to comprise 40 per cent of the entire budget, which is more than what Russia will spend on the social services, education, and health combined.”
  • “Another reason for giving peace talks a try is the extent of Russia’s military losses – at least 70,000 killed.”
  • “The third reason to talk is the possibility of escalation and, in particular, the extension of the war to Russia’s own territory.”
• “Even while considering these and other challenges, Putin would also have to weigh the benefits of war.”
  • “First, the Kursk sideshow notwithstanding, the war is still being fought on the Ukrainian territory.”
  • “The second reason for continuing the war is Putin’s reasonable expectation that western support for Ukraine will decline even further.”
  • “The final reason to keep going is that the war has helped consolidate the Russian society for the benefit of the ruling regime.”
• “A practitioner of realpolitik, Putin sees this war as an important investment that is just beginning to pay dividends. The chips are down. He does not need half-way solutions. He has spent money and lives. He is hoping to reap power and glory, and to secure his historical legacy as the czar who brought Ukraine back home.”

“May Our Collective Work Under the Victory Plan Result in Peace for Ukraine as Soon as Possible – Speech by the President in the Verkhovna Rada,” official website of the Ukrainian president, 10.16.24. Clues from Ukrainian Views.

• “We must implement the Victory Plan to force Russia to attend the Peace Summit and be willing to end the war. So, the Plan consists of five points and three secret annexes.”
  • “The first point is geopolitical.”
  • “The second and third points – they are military.”
  • “The fourth point is economic.”
  • “The fifth point of the Victory Plan is security-related.”
    • “The points are scheduled over time. Very specifically. The first four are for wartime, to bring it to an end. The fifth point is for the post-war period, to guarantee security.”
• “The first point is an invitation to NATO. Right now.”
• “The second point is defense. This is an irreversible strengthening of Ukraine’s defense against the aggressor... the keys to implementing this second point of the Victory Plan are:”
  • “successful continuation of the operations of the Defense and Security Forces of Ukraine in the defined areas of the enemy's territory in order to prevent buffer zones on our land;”
  • “irreversible strengthening of the positions of the Defense and Security Forces of Ukraine and destruction of the Russian Federation's offensive potential in the occupied territory of Ukraine;”
  • “next is assistance from our partners in manning our reserve brigades for the Armed Forces of Ukraine;”
  • “bringing Ukraine's air defense system to a level sufficient, really sufficient, to protect our cities and villages from Russian missiles and enemy drones, and joint defense operations with our neighbors in Europe to shoot down Russian missiles and drones within the range of the partners' air shields;”
  • “as well as expanding operations involving our Ukrainian missiles and drones and investing in increasing their production in Ukraine;”
  • “lifting our partner's restrictions on the use of long-range weapons on all the territory of Ukraine occupied by Russia and on the territory of Russia – on enemy military infrastructure facilities, and providing Ukraine with appropriate long-range capabilities – missiles, drones and other means of destruction;”
  • “providing Ukraine with real-time satellite data and data obtained through other intelligence means.”
• “The third point of the Victory Plan is a point called deterrence.... Ukraine offers to deploy a comprehensive non-nuclear strategic deterrence package on its territory.”
• “Point four – strategic economic potential... Ukraine is rich in natural resources, including critical metals worth trillions of U.S. dollars. These include uranium, titanium, lithium, graphite and other strategic and strategically valuable resources that will strengthen either Russia and its allies or Ukraine and the democratic world in global competition.... Ukraine offers the United States, together with selected partners, including the European Union, of which Ukraine will be a part, and other partners in the world who are our partners, to conclude a special agreement on joint protection of critical resources available in Ukraine, joint investment and use of the corresponding economic potential.”
• “And the fifth point. The fifth point is designed for the post-war period.... We envisage, if our partners agree, replacing certain military contingents of the United States Armed Forces stationed in Europe with Ukrainian units. After the war.”

“Konstantin Remchukov: About Putin and Russia today. What Western countries need to keep in mind,” Nezavismaya Gazeta, 10.16.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. (See Tatiana Stanovaya’s interpretation of Remchukov’s piece below, after this summary.)

• “1. Putin develops all fundamental decisions personally, based on his own competence, expertise and sense of historical responsibility.”
• “2. The task of ensuring the country's security and protecting Russians and Russian-speakers in Ukraine, which Putin has been facing since 2014, has become the main existential meaning of his rule. He cannot transfer power to anyone before this issue is finally resolved by international guarantees. Because this would mean transferring to the successor not so much power as a solid package of unresolved problems. Today, there are no people in Putin's entourage who are capable of solving problems better than the president. He knows this and is firmly convinced of it.”
• “3. Putin is not going to resign.”
• “4. Today, it is absolutely obvious that the world, having been under the risk of a nuclear threat for more than two years, is ripe for real negotiations on this topic. However, holding successful negotiations is in question. The most serious Western politician who truly understands the consequences of a nuclear war, Joseph Biden, is unfortunately leaving in a few months. Neither Harris nor Trump have the necessary foreign policy qualifications to even comprehend the importance of this topic for the world.”
• “5. The past years and months of the special military operation, the most severe sanctions and the radical transformation of the driving forces of the Russian economy have clearly shown that it is time for the domestic public and political consciousness to decisively abandon the ideas once sown by Brzezinski that Russia's greatness is based on unity with Ukraine… Today it is obvious that Russia exists in the world regardless of the degree of closeness with any country or group of countries. Liberation from speculative constructs in the minds of influential ideologists is a powerful factor in normalizing the development process and assessing fundamental risks and opportunities. Russia can be a great and important power regardless of the degree of integration with other countries. The greatness of a country is assessed by the level of well-being and the level of opportunities of its citizens, achievements in healthcare, education, science and technology.”
• “6. When talking about the Russian economy, one must keep in mind a simple detail. The federal budget submitted to the State Duma is based on an oil price of $60 per barrel. And according to the forecast, the average annual oil price in 2025 will be $69 per barrel. This is a very high level of conservatism, realism and sober calculation of the Mishustin government.”
• “7. Today's military actions allow us to judge that the main goal of Russian troops on the ground is to reach the administrative borders of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Listing the tasks, Putin increasingly uses the following vocabulary: liberation of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, Novorossiya. It can be assumed that Novorossiya constitutes only one part of the Kherson and Zaporizhia regions. The main thing here is the land connection with Crimea. If these observations are correct, it is possible to present a more concrete picture that will allow us to call the completion of the special military operation successful and its goals achieved.”
• “8. It should be emphasized that in recent months there has been an obvious change in the Russian leadership's assessment of the nature of Ukrainian statehood and its subjectivity… Today, Russia recognizes that a significant number of Ukrainians are opting for the current government in the country, consider themselves Ukrainians, and do not want to see any future together with Russia. Thus, the Russian leadership recognizes the state of Ukraine.”
• “9. The level of mutual trust is not even at zero. Total mistrust now gives rise to the need to provide comprehensive negotiating powers with accessible legal certainty.”
• “10. It seems that today the topic of a new international order that ensures equal security for states is equally relevant for the critical majority of countries in the world—in the West and the East. The main question is whether it will be possible to create a new international legal framework for peaceful coexistence not on the ruins of the Third World War.”

“Remchukov's Peace ‘Plan’ in Bulletin No. 18 (148) 2024,” Tatiana Stanovaya, R.Politik, 10.22.24. Clues from Russian Views.

• “Many observers in Russia and Western circles have taken note of an article by Konstantin Remchukov, the editor-in-chief of Nezavisimaya Gazeta, outlining a possible peace solution to the war.”
• “The article seems to portray a significant shift in Moscow’s thinking, proposing concessions that were previously unimaginable. Remchukov drops the demand for Ukraine’s neutral status, scales back territorial claims, and acknowledges that the Kremlin now views Ukraine as a sovereign state with a population that does not want to live under Russian control.”
• “The article has been interpreted in various ways: as a potential shift in the Russian leadership’s calculations, as a deliberate trial balloon to gauge reactions, or perhaps as part of a separate agenda by certain factions. Despite the buzz, there is no concrete sign that the Kremlin's position has significantly changed.”
• “The article seems to be a personal initiative by Remchukov, who has previously attempted to spark similar discussions. While he remains connected to influential figures like Alexey Gromov or Oleg Deripaska, there is no reason to believe the article was sanctioned by the Kremlin.”
• “Nevertheless, the fact that he was able to publish it and that it was not blocked by the media overseers at the Presidential Administration suggests a certain openness within the Russian establishment to “exit strategies” that diverge radically from Putin’s personal vision. This may reflect growing concern about Putin’s readiness to continue fighting for years at the state’s maximum capacity.”

“Trump thinks Ukraine just let Russia do it,” Philip Bump, WP, 10.17.24.

• "This should have been settled before it started," [Trump] insisted [in reference to the Russian-Ukrainian war]. "It would have been so easy if we had a president with half a brain, it would have been easy to settle." At another point in the interview, he claimed not for the first time that, should he win the presidency in November, he would quickly and easily bring the war to an end.”
• “The response to Trump's latest comments have understandably focused on his assertion that Zelensky "should never have let that war start." Even in the context of Trump's long-standing obsequiousness to Putin, it's hard to understand how Zelensky would have prevented having his nation be invaded. He could, in theory, have taken the approach that many Trump allies have since endorsed: simply agreeing to cede some or all of Ukraine to Russia, a move that would have prevented the damage incurred to the country's buildings but amplified the damage done to its sovereignty.”
• “It is generally understood that Trump's promises to bring the war to a rapid end would likely mirror this approach. Were the United States to withhold aid to Ukraine to afford Trump a political victory — a phrase which might sound familiar from his 2019 impeachment — the result would presumably be a capitulation on Zelensky's part in favor of Putin.”
• “To Trump, the powerful do what they want and the less-powerful are expected to acquiesce. No more, no less. So it is with Ukraine. So it is with everyone else.”

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“For now, NATO invitation seems out of reach for Ukraine,” Ellen Francis, WP, 10.17.24. 

• “Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky tried to drum up support for his "victory plan" at NATO on Thursday, but a key part of it, an invitation to join the military alliance, appeared elusive. Zelensky is pitching an immediate and unconditional invitation to NATO as his No. 1 ask in a multi-point plan that he says will put Ukraine in a strong position as it negotiates a just end to the war with Russia.”
• “While selling his victory plan at a summit of European Union leaders…, he acknowledged that while actual NATO membership "might come after the war," the sooner talks start the better.”
• “But NATO officials said they did not expect to extend an invitation anytime soon, especially with the United States absorbed in the final weeks of the presidential race and many European leaders watching to see how the outcome may alter the transatlantic relationship.”
  • “Ahead of Zelensky's arrival, U.S. Ambassador to NATO Julianne Smith told reporters Wednesday that NATO was "not at the point right now where the alliance is talking about issuing an invitation in the short term."
  • “[NATO SG Mark] Rutte said during Thursday's news conference, "I look forward to the day that Ukraine is here as a member of this alliance." Yet the NATO chief seemed noncommittal when asked by reporters Wednesday about his support for Zelensky's victory plan. He said he was confident Ukraine would "one day" join, but that "doesn't mean that I here can say I support the whole plan. That would be a bit difficult, because there are many issues, of course, we have to understand better."
• “Zelensky noted some U.S. concern that a NATO commitment to Ukraine "has the potential of dragging the United States into the war." "So there are certain red lines, even in inviting Ukraine to NATO, but in my view, this is not so," he said. He said Trump had "agreed with my arguments" when the two spoke about an invitation to NATO, without elaborating on the former U.S. president's views.”
• “Baltic nations, staunch allies of Ukraine gripped by their own fears of becoming targets of Russia, have voiced some of the strongest support for a NATO invitation to Ukraine.”
• “A senior NATO official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to comment on sensitive discussions, said he would not expect Ukraine's accession - and the security guarantees enshrined in NATO's mutual-defense clause that come with it - before the conflict ends "and whatever line of demarcation we have then is stabilized. It won't happen before."

“Ukraine's defense minister outlines Kyiv's 'victory plan',” David Ignatius, WP, 10.20.24. 

• “As Ukraine anxiously awaits the approaching U.S. presidential election, Defense Minister Rustem Umerov explained in a wide-ranging interview how his country plans to "hold the line" and pressure Russia to negotiate a just peace settlement….Ukraine knows that its window of U.S. support could close in several months.”
• “Umerov offered a detailed explanation of President Volodymyr Zelensky's "victory plan," which the Ukrainian leader announced in Europe last week. As I listened, it sounded to me like a strategy for forcing negotiations with Putin rather than a military plan for retaking all of Russian-occupied territory. That would be a pragmatic step for Ukraine.”
  • “The key element of the victory plan, Umerov explained, is Ukraine's request for a quick invitation to join NATO once the war ends. The Biden administration is weighing this option but worries it might give Russia an incentive to prolong fighting rather than stop it.”
    • “As the U.S. election approaches, the most urgent part of Zelensky's victory plan may be the request for a quick invitation to join NATO. The Biden administration is weighing historical precedents that might allow NATO membership even if Russia still controls some Ukrainian territory. One example is West Germany's NATO membership, even while East Germany was occupied by Russian troops. Another is Norway, which agreed when it joined NATO in 1949 that it wouldn't allow foreign bases or troops on its territory or nuclear weapons in its ports. Umerov said such details are issues for later. "We want the invitation first."
  • “A second item is defense, which Umerov defined as "hold the line and create favorable conditions to expel the enemy."
  • “A third part is "deterrence," which involves deep strikes on military targets in Russia to prevent it from attacking civilians and critical infrastructure in Ukraine.”
• “When it comes to negotiating with Russians, Umerov has been one of Ukraine's most effective representatives. He conducted back-channel negotiations in the first months of the war with Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich, a close contact of Putin's. Their talks in Istanbul collapsed in March 2022, amid reports that the two might have been poisoned. But the channel stayed open through the rest of that year and achieved some quiet breakthroughs.”
• “Umerov told me that in the secret 2022 talks, there were several negotiating tracks through international partners. These efforts resulted in a "humanitarian corridor" that allowed 400,000 people to escape Russian-occupied territory, exchanges of prisoners of war, political prisoners and wounded soldiers, and a grain-export deal that allowed Ukraine to resume shipments through the Black Sea. The United States "was always aware" of these contacts, he said, "because we were always consulting on every track."
• “Corruption has been a continuing problem in military procurement. Umerov told me that some Western partners had complained about dealing with a purchasing company called Special Techno Export, or STE, which was overseen by the military intelligence service, known as the GUR, headed by Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov. STE was "infamous for getting into money-laundering scandals," according to an article this month. Umerov told me that he launched an audit of STE and eventually put it under the ministry's direct control. Umerov said he had advised Budanov to focus "on intelligence rather than acquisition." 
  • “To reform the procurement system, Umerov this month fired three of his deputies. He said in announcing the move: "I set out to complete the process of cleaning up the acquisition system in close collaboration with law enforcement and anti-corruption agencies."
• “For a Biden administration thinking about its legacy, locking down a strategy to protect Ukraine now and build a platform for future negotiations should be a priority. "Look, guys, we showed you that we're capable of doing it," Umerov told me. "But we need the assistance now."

“Zelensky’s Victory Plan” in “Bulletin No. 18 (148) 2024,” Tatyana Stanovaya, R.Politik, 10.22.24. Clues from Russian Views.

• “President Zelensky presented his “victory plan” to the Ukrainian parliament and Western capitals, aimed to force Russia to the negotiating table and secure Ukraine’s future in NATO. The plan received a lukewarm reception from the US, Germany and other countries, while France and the Baltic states tend to support it, albeit with reservations. A more detailed response may come after the US election. As of now, it appears unlikely the plan will be implemented.”
• “Ukraine is in one of the most difficult positions it has been in since the war began and Zelensky even appeared to offer a nuclear ultimatum of his own: either NATO issues an invitation or Kyiv will look at developing nuclear weapons. While many military experts view this as a bluff and he later tried to walk back the comments, it highlights Ukraine’s growing desperation and could push Kyiv toward more radical strategies.”
• “The West is divided between those advocating for negotiations (a group that now includes not just Russia’s “friends,” like Hungary) and those insisting that victory be ensured and Ukraine's demands be met. However, even the latter group now tends to acknowledge the unrealistic nature of any plan to defeat Russia on the battlefield.”
• “There are few grounds for Russian optimism either. Moscow is operating under its own time pressure, knowing that its military advantage may decline in the coming months—although this does not necessarily indicate that there will be insurmountable problems. Despite expectations in Moscow, no proposals from the West have materialized that address Putin’s political demands.”
• “The West is now more focused on addressing threats to its own security, particularly Russian cyberattacks, criminal activity, [and] disinformation.”

“Why Europe Is Unprepared to Defend Itself,” Tom Pfeiffer and Christopher Cannon, Bloomberg, 10.16.24. 

• “After decades preoccupied with counter-insurgency operations in far-flung lands, NATO’s European members are contemplating a scenario not seriously envisaged since the fall of the Soviet Union — the possibility of a full-scale land war in their own territory.”
• “Such a campaign may need to be fought without the full firepower of the US, the indispensable ally that ensured the region’s security through the Cold War and ever since.To many Europeans, the biggest risk to the status quo appears to come from Donald Trump.”
  • “Our allies have taken advantage of us more so than our enemies,” the former US president said in an interview with Bloomberg Editor-in-Chief John Micklethwait at the Economic Club of Chicago on Oct. 15. “It’s not sustainable.”
• “Trump’s provocative comments reflect a current of thinking that transcends Washington’s political divide and may prevail whoever wins the US presidential election in November: that European governments should build their own powerful militaries instead of keeping defense budgets slim, safe in the knowledge that their Soviet-era mutual defense pact with America will protect them from invaders.”
• “Those who argue for strengthening European defense are motivated by pragmatism as well as fairness. The rise of China as a military power, with its designs on the contested island of Taiwan, has US officials wargaming a scenario in which they are forced to divert long-range weaponry from the North Atlantic to fight a war in East Asia. This could leave Europe perilously exposed. The war in Ukraine, the deadliest conflict on the continent since 1945, has demonstrated the resolve of Russian President Vladimir Putin to carve out a greater sphere of influence for Moscow in the former Soviet space.”
• “Most of the European military community has no experience in planning or commanding large-scale combined-force operations involving several nations. It’s made up of separate national armies that, for the purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, lean on America for leadership and coordination. NATO nations have cut back on troops and military hardware since the Cold War. But Europe has cut far deeper than the US. Defense budgets have become a pot that could be raided to fund more pressing priorities, such as treating and caring for aging populations. As a result, much of Europe’s military has become, in the view of some US defense experts, a “Potemkin army” that is ill-prepared to wage and win a prolonged war.”
• “Whoever might take the lead, rebuilding Europe’s defenses would require a lot of money that may not materialize. Some security officials say European military spending may need to rise to as much as 4% of national budgets — levels not seen since the end of the Soviet era — to ensure NATO can deal with the emerging threats. For some alliance members, this would require either significant spending cuts in other areas, tax increases or taking on extra debt that they can barely afford. So for now, there’s little momentum in NATO for revising the 2% goal higher. Instead, the alliance is debating whether members should be allowed to include military aid to Ukraine as part of their minimum spending.”

“Putin’s plan to defeat the dollar,” The Economist, 10.20.24.

• “Now in their 15th year together, the original BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) have achieved little. Yet at this summit Mr. Putin hopes to give the bloc heft by getting it to build a new global financial-payments system to attack America’s dominance of global finance and shield Russia and its pals from sanctions …This system, which Russia calls “BRICS-Bridge”, is intended to be built within a year and would allow countries to conduct cross-border settlement using digital platforms run by their central banks.”
• “America’s dominance of the global financial system has been a mainstay of the post-war order… Though central banks have diversified their holdings, including into gold, around 58% of foreign-currency reserves are in dollars and the network effects of the dollar put American banks at the center of the world’s payments systems.”
• “The financial attack on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine in 2022 [was ferocious].”
  • “The West froze $282bn of Russian assets held abroad, disconnected Russian banks from SWIFT and prevented them from processing payments through America’s banks.”
  • “America has also threatened “secondary sanctions” on banks in other countries that support Russia’s war effort.”
    • “Even European policymakers, who support sanctions, were alarmed at how fast Visa and MasterCard—two American firms that the euro zone relies on for retail payments—closed shop in Russia. And the tsunami crashing over Russia has prompted America’s adversaries to accelerate their efforts to move away from the dollar, and pushed many other governments to look at their dependence on American finance. China views it as one of its biggest vulnerabilities.”
  • “The “BRICS Bridge” plan was outlined in a report by the Russian finance ministry and central bank in October. Running to 48 pages it critiques Western finance and states that “a new multinational platform for the purposes of cross border settlement needs to be examined in further detail due to its novelty, associated risks, and, potentially, game-changing economics”.  With its focus on digital currencies run by central banks it appears to be at least partially inspired by an experimental payments platform called mBridge, which was developed by the BIS alongside the central banks of China, Hong Kong, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates. Chinese state media say that the new BRICS plan “is likely to draw on the lessons learned” from the mBridge project by the BIS.”
• “The BRICS scheme may have momentum.  There is a broad consensus that the current cross-border-payments system is too slow and expensive. While rich countries tend to focus on making it quicker, many others want to overturn the current system entirely. At least 134 central banks are experimenting with digital money, mostly for domestic purposes, reckons the Atlantic Council, a think-tank. The number working on such currencies for cross-border transactions has doubled to 13 since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This week’s BRICS summit is no Bretton Woods. All that Russia and its pals have to do is move a relatively small number of sanctions-related transactions beyond America’s reach. Still, many are aiming higher. Next year the BRICS summit will be held in Brazil, chaired by its president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who fulminates over the power of the greenback. “Every night I ask myself why all countries have to base their trade on the dollar,” he said last year. “Who was it that decided?” 

“Why the West Keeps Misreading Russia – and Why That’s Dangerous,” Ilya Timtchenko and Kateryna Shynkaruk, The Cipher Brief, 10.17.24. Clues from Ukrainian Views. 

• “Paradoxically, th[e] Russia-centric view still dominates among U.S. policymakers and leading academics even as Russia continues its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The lessons learned from the failure to deter Russia’s war against Ukraine and its further escalation should include a critical revision of the underlying assumptions of the U.S. policy approach that were unsuccessful in preventing the largest war in Europe since WWII.”
  • “Assumption 1: Russia is a great power with a legitimate sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and is the only guarantor of regional security.”
  • “Assumption 2: The liberal rules-based order can be upheld without recognizing the agency of medium and small powers.”
  • “Assumption 3: Effective Russia deterrence is limited to non-interference in Russia’s “sphere of influence” and the creation of a “security gray zone,” rather than through extending Western protection and military support in order to significantly increase the costs of an attack by the aggressor state.”
• “More than two and a half years into the war, these assumptions continue to persist in various forms. This needs to change.”
  • “First, the U.S. should develop a clear bipartisan strategy for dealing with Russia in the present and future. It should define the various possibilities of what kind of Russia it will be dealing with, including a dissipated Russia which will consist of smaller states, a victorious Russia over Ukraine, or a defeated yet still geographically intact Russia.”
  • “Second, if the West is to believe in the liberal vision of providing agency to medium and small powers, it must entrust these countries with a larger degree of their own vision and knowledge.”
  • “Third, U.S. academic institutions should move away from regional power programs and instead diverge their research towards individual countries.”
  • “Fourth, U.S. institutions – especially those involved in shaping policy – should be more transparent with their donations, as foreign money can influence how we think about policy.” 

“Understanding Türkiye’s Entanglement With Russia,” Alper Coşkun, Alexander Gabuev, Marc Pierini, Francesco Siccardi, and Temur Umarov, CEIP, 10.15.24.

• “During the Cold War, Türkiye presented itself as the steadfast guardian of Europe’s southern flank against the Soviet threat. It stood in lockstep with its Western allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and few, if any, questioned Ankara’s foreign policy trajectory or its commitment to NATO.”
• “But this once firm conviction has weakened in the past decade. Türkiye’s deepening entanglement with Russia and setbacks in its relations with the United States and some of its European allies have muddled the country’s image as a staunch member of the Western security architecture.”
• “Ankara’s ability to maintain a constructive dialogue with Moscow (alongside Kyiv) even after Russia’s attack against Ukraine has been beneficial in some cases, as evidenced by Türkiye’s role in the 2022 grain deal and the complex prisoner swap that freed numerous Western hostages including Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich.1 These ties could also be helpful in the future for peacemaking efforts and post-conflict scenarios in Ukraine.”
• “However, as a longtime NATO member, Türkiye’s recent hedging has created an impression of dissent within the Western front against Russian aggression. As the transatlantic allies adapt to Europe’s new geopolitical realities, maintaining unity against Russia will be critical. Türkiye will have a pivotal role to play in this long-term effort.”

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• “Can BRICS Finally Take On the West?” Keith Johnson, FP, 10.21.24.
• “Putin Brings Together Economies He Hopes Will Eclipse the West,” Valerie Hopkins and David Pierson, NYT, 10.21.24.
• “BRICS is key to Putin's fight against the U.S. Not all members agree,” Robyn Dixon, Katharine Houreld, Francesca Ebel and Karishma Mehrotra , WP, 10.21.24.
• “Only NATO can secure a ‘West German’ future for Ukraine. Accession to the EU needs to be complemented by the security alliance,” Timothy Garton Ash, FT, 10.21.24.
• “More surface warships or more drones? Both, please,” James Stavridis, WP, 10.18.24.
• "Trump, Harris, Zelenskiy: Nobody’s Plan Will End the Ukraine War," Hal Brands, Bloomberg, 10.21.24.

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Nuclear arms:

“Meeting with journalists from BRICS countries,” Kremlin.ru, 10.18.24. 

• “[In response to question by Dmitry Kiselev: “Mr. President, you have mentioned the Ukrainian crisis. Just yesterday, while addressing the EU summit in Brussels, the ‘expired president’ Vladimir Zelensky said that the sole alternative to Ukraine joining NATO would be acquiring nuclear weapons. Simultaneously, the Bild newspaper published an interview with some anonymous Ukrainian tech-savvy, who claimed that Ukraine only needs a few weeks to build its own nuclear weapons and then make a strike at Russian troops. What does it all mean?”] This is yet another act of provocation. In the modern world, creating nuclear weapons is not a difficult task. I do not know whether Ukraine is capable of doing this now though. It is not easy for Ukraine today, but generally there are no big difficulties in this regard, with everyone knowing how it is done.  This is a dangerous act of provocation, because, obviously, any step in this direction will meet an adequate response. This is the second point. And third, most importantly, the current Ukrainian leadership claimed that Ukraine should have nuclear weapons. As I have mentioned on many occasions, they had stated that even before the crisis entered its hot stage; although it was a soft statement, it was made anyway. And such a threat will elicit a corresponding response from Russia.  I can say straight away: under no circumstances will Russia allow this to happen.”
• “Let’s avoid making any hypothetical assumptions and wild guesses about the British or whoever secretly supplying weapons [to Ukraine]. Such efforts cannot be hidden; they require proper resources and actions. It cannot be done covertly just as you cannot hide a cat in a bag. And we are capable of tracking any steps in this direction.”

“Interview of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S.V. Lavrov to the Publishing House ‘Arguments and Facts,’” Russian Foreign Ministry, 10.20.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. 

• “[In response to: “Against the backdrop of NATO nuclear exercises in Europe, US President J. Biden made a statement that he is inviting Russia, China and the DPRK to talk about reducing nuclear weapons without any conditions. Is this really an invitation to dialogue?”] No, this is a desire to earn election points for the Democratic Party candidate. This is all from the evil one. The call to talk about strategic stability, about control over nuclear weapons without preconditions is a deception. What does "without preconditions" mean? This means that the Americans reserve the right to declare us an enemy in their doctrinal documents, to officially declare that their goal is to inflict a "strategic defeat" on Russia on the battlefield. Judging by what US President J. Biden said, we must accept this, not demand that they abandon this policy, but sit down with them and negotiate arms reductions.”
• “Now the Americans are proposing the same to the DPRK. Arms control negotiations are based on mutual respect, recognition by both sides that there should be no war. When they tell you, let's start negotiations without any conditions, but my goal is to destroy you on the battlefield - is that smart? I don't think so. Long before the Ukrainian events, which were prepared for many years by the Americans and the British and led to the coup d'etat and everything that followed, we proposed that the United States have such a conversation. When the nuclear "five" were conducting a strategic dialogue, the Americans wanted to involve China so that it would also enter into negotiations on limiting its weapons. But China, for obvious reasons, refused to do so, since its potential is not yet comparable to either the American or ours.”
• “Moreover, we are not part of any military alliance with China and are not bound by the obligations that NATO members are bound by. The Alliance is an alliance of three nuclear powers (the USA, France, and Britain). Therefore, we then proposed to conduct a conversation taking into account the combined potential of these three states, which is ultimately aimed geopolitically and practically at the territory of the Russian Federation. The USA said "no". They say that England and France make their own decisions, and the Americans do not want to interfere in their affairs. It sounds funny. Their goal is to promote the idea of ​​limiting arms between Russia and the USA for self-promotion, to manipulate public opinion, without touching the reserves of Paris and London and the issues of non-nuclear weapons, which are inextricably linked with strategic stability, in which NATO significantly surpasses us.  All of these are components of the strategic stability that we would all like to see. But we need to talk about this taking into account all the factors, including those I mentioned, and not slyly “throw in” a beautiful slogan that hides a desire to gain unilateral advantages.”

“Statement by a representative of the delegation of the Russian Federation at the thematic debate on Cluster 1: Nuclear Weapons in the First Committee of the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” Russian Foreign Ministry, 10.18.24.Clues from Russian Views.

• “Effective reduction and, ultimately, complete, transparent and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons can only be achieved in a military and political atmosphere conducive to these processes and on the basis of a consensus and well-balanced step-by-step approach. Engagement of all countries possessing military nuclear capabilities is needed to reach a significant progress on this track.”
• “The objective reality is that under current conditions Russia still needs nuclear deterrence to respond to specific and extremely serious external threats. Moreover, the build-up of such threats made Russia to adjust its doctrinal policy provisions to reinforce deterrence. Meanwhile, the circumstances of self-defense, where Russia reserves the right to a nuclear response, are still outlined very strictly.”
• “We expect that this step would cool off those hot heads in the Western capitals who are trying to teeter on the brink of a direct armed conflict between nuclear powers. In this context we reiterate that provocative and extremely risky policy of the United States and its allies aimed at radically undermining Russia's security runs counter political obligations under which nuclear powers should prevent nuclear war by avoiding any military confrontation among them while respecting and acknowledging each other’s security interests and concerns.”
• “Absent the conditions for a fruitful dialogue with the West, Russia continues to implement a number of still relevant measures to reduce nuclear danger and maintain an acceptable level of predictability and stability in the nuclear missile area. This includes, inter alia, voluntary compliance with the "ceilings" on relevant weapons within the duration of the suspended New START Treaty and continued commitment to a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. However, these efforts could also become irrelevant due to the Washington's destabilizing policy aimed at achieving the decisive military-strategic superiority. In particular, we will be compelled to respond to the deployment of US ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles that pose a threat to us.”

Counterterrorism:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Cyber security/AI: 

"The National Insecurity of AI," Graham Allison, Aspen Institute, October 2024.

• “About the impact of AI on American national security, I am still thinking. But for now, I offer six initial takeaways.”
• “1. No One Knows the Risks”
• “2. Consult History”
• “3. The U.S. Must Remain the Leader in AI”
• “4. U.S.-China AI Arms Control”
• “5. AI Is Not Nuclear Weapons 2.0”
• “6. The Good News”
  • “In my formal comments at the Strategy Group Summer Workshop, I proposed that we begin by stepping back and asking about the larger international security order today. That order can be summarized in three numbers: 78, 78, and 9.”
  • “The first 78 is the number of years since the last great power war. ... This unprecedented era of peace is not a finished project—but rather a fragile work in progress that has to be earned every day. It is also an accomplishment that is not likely to be sustained over the next generation.”
  • “The second 78 is the number of years since nuclear weapons were used in war. ... Like the first number, the second 78-mile marker does not signal that we have arrived. Just last year, Putin seriously threatened to conduct tactical nuclear strikes on Ukraine. The CIA estimated the odds of a Russian nuclear strike as 50-50.”
  • “Finally, and perhaps most remarkably of all, 9 is the number of nuclear weapons states in the world today. ...  Again, this is a fragile achievement. … Contemplating the possibility of a second Trump administration that might not embrace NATO’s Article 5 commitment to defend Europe against Russian aggression, Europeans are beginning to discuss the possibility of a European, or even German, nuclear deterrent.”
• “The fact that we have been able to live our entire lives without World War III, without uses of nuclear weapons in war, and without a nuclear anarchy in which nuclear wars would be a recurring feature is a largely unrecognized but almost unbelievable accomplishment. It reflects intelligent, persistent, hard work by successive Democratic and Republican administrations over almost 8 decades. It is an achievement for which we should give thanks every day. And as we face the challenges posed by AI today, it can serve as a source not only of insights but of inspiration.”

Energy exports from CIS:

"A Three-Step Plan for Stopping Putin’s ‘Shadow’ Oil Tankers," James Stavridis, Bloomberg, 10.16.24.

• “How can this shadow fleet be stopped?... Three distinct lines of effort are called for.”
  • “The first is increased intelligence attention to understand the shipping processes Russia is using from embarkation to arrival. We need a stronger coalition effort to create a refined target list of the ships that comprise the shadow fleet. Already, artificial intelligence is showing promise on this front through assessing satellite images.”
  • “The next step is name, shame and fine. The nations providing the flags of convenience — such as Barbados, which according to recent reporting has more than a dozen flagged ships engaged in the trade — should be threatened with secondary sanctions.”
  • “Third, and most controversially, Western militaries should consider boarding, seizing and impounding vessels engaged in this trade.”

Climate change:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Russia's opposition abroad is tearing itself apart, but clings to hope,” Francesca Ebel, Mary Ilyushina, Catherine Belton and Robyn Dixon, WP, 10.20.24.

• “With Russia's war against Ukraine in its third year and with no end in sight, opposition supporters say it has never been more urgent to form an effective, united front against Putin, as the number of soldiers dying on the front rises, the Kremlin imposes new taxes to fund the military and society only grows more nationalistic and repressive.”
• “But a scandal that sparked accusations that one opposition figure orchestrated a shocking attack with a hammer on another — a claim denied publicly — shows how the splits have intensified since the death of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny this year.”
  • “The current schism tearing apart the opposition is centered on accusations that an associate of Khodorkovsky orchestrated a brutal attack with a hammer against Leonid Volkov, a leader of Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation, outside his home in Lithuania in March. The foundation, known by its Russian initials, FBK, published an investigation that claimed Russian Israeli financier, Leonid Nevzlin, an ally of Khodorkovsky, planned the attack.”
• “Nevzlin wrote on X that he had nothing to do with the attacks and that "justice will confirm the absurdity and complete baselessness of the accusations against me." Many Russians who want to see change are increasingly doubtful that the opposition in its current form can lead the fight to transform the country. "It is a disparate array of individuals and small groups who basically do not even pretend to be one, who do not have a vision for Russia that they share and that they would put forward," said Maria Lipman, editor of Russia.Post and visiting scholar at George Washington University.”
• “Amid their intensifying squabbles, the main groups in the opposition say they are in survival mode, awaiting the almost mythical day of Putin's departure so they can return to Russia, replace the government and undo the damage of more than two decades of Putinism. Addressing a crowd of British MPs and Russian human rights activists at a recent event in London, Russian politician Vladimir Kara-Murza, a Washington Post contributor who was released this summer along with 16 other Russian political prisoners in the swap, said that the collapse of Putin's regime is inevitable—and when that day comes the opposition must be ready.”
• “In a post to Facebook, Russian political scientist Kirill Rogov wrote that Putin has already defeated the Russian opposition and that they had made such a fiasco of themselves.”
• “Moreover, the infighting is denting the opposition's credibility with the Western partners it is now reliant on and whose relationships will be crucial in the event of a return to Russia. Navalny's FBK has been singled out in particular for refusing to join with other opposition groups and being against any kind of consolidation of efforts.”

“Poll: Majority of Russians Would Oppose Returning Land Even if Putin Decides To Return it as Part of Peace Deal,” Simon Saradzhyan, RM, 10.17.24.

• “A majority of Russians would support ending hostilities and launching peace negotiations, according to the results of a September 2024 poll by Russia's Levada Center1 on Russians' views on the war against Ukraine. However, when asked if Russia should make concessions in such negotiations, a vast majority answered in the negative. Moreover, when asked to evaluate the conditions of a hypothetical peace deal, vast majorities of respondents rejected returning territories to Kyiv, as well as Ukraine’s membership in NATO. In addition, when Levada divided its respondents into two groups, a majority in one of the groups said they would not support an end to the military conflict if it meant returning annexed territories, even if Vladimir Putin himself made such a decision. This obviously doesn’t bode well for those in the West seeking support for brokering a peace deal that would defer territorial issues in exchange for Kyiv’s membership in the Alliance.”
• “Perhaps, one reason why majorities of Russians reject concessions to Ukraine is that many of them believe the Russian armed forces are succeeding in Ukraine (60% in September 2024). In comparison, the share of those who believe that the campaign has been going somewhat unsuccessfully or extremely unsuccessfully totaled 23% in September 2024. This belief in the success of the Russian army may also explain why a significant majority of Russians continue to personally support its actions in Ukraine (76% in September 2024).”
• “At the same time, even in spite of suppression of facts on the ground in Ukraine, Levada’s recent polls still show that the share of those who believe Russia’s war in Ukraine has generated more harm than good does not only exceed the share of those who believe the reverse, but their number has also increased. The share of those who believe the conflict has caused net damage went from 41% in May 2023 to 47% in Sept. 2024 (damage-seers). In the same period, the share of those who believe the conflict has generated a net benefit decreased from 38% to 28% (benefit-seers).”
• “The latest polling by the Levada Center reveals a complex and somewhat contradictory stance among the Russian public regarding the war in Ukraine. While a majority favor ending hostilities and pursuing peace negotiations, this sentiment is undercut by a strong unwillingness to make concessions on key issues, such as returning annexed territories, or accepting Ukraine’s membership in NATO. Such a stand leaves little room for meaningful compromise in the near future, especially given that recent polls show that majority of Ukrainians are also unwilling to compromise on key issues.”

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• “What’s behind the ruble’s steady depreciation, and is the Kremlin planning to intervene?” Meduza, 10.18.24.
• “Shifting from Repression to Awareness,” Elena Koneva, Russia Post, 10.18.24.
• “Under what conditions can the authoritarian regime in Russia collapse and the war end? Interview with former State Duma deputy Gennady Gudkov,” Republic.ru, 10.20.24. Clues from Russian Views. (In Russian.)

Defense and aerospace:

•  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including  relations with “far abroad” countries:

“How Wagner survived Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death. Its mercenary model is still effective in Africa’s most fragile places,” The Economist, 10.17.24. 

• “Wagner first arrived in CAR in 2018. Quietly backed by the Russian state (which publicly denied any involvement with the group), Prigozhin’s mercenaries offered protection to the government of Faustin-Archange Touadéra, CAR’s president. In January 2021 they helped defeat a coalition of rebels contesting Mr Touadéra’s re-election. “They saved our democracy,” claims Fidèle Gouandjika, an adviser to the president. In return, Wagner was given access to the country’s most lucrative gold and diamond mines. Russia replaced France, the former colonial power, as CAR’s most influential foreign ally.”
• “The approach was repeated across the continent. By 2023 Wagner was present in about a dozen other African countries, in particular Mali, Libya and Sudan. Reports of horrific human-rights abuses allegedly committed by Wagner fighters across Africa did little to dent the group’s influence.”
• “The events of last summer briefly threw the Wagner model—and, by extension, Russia’s entire Africa strategy—into doubt. After Prigozhin’s rebellion, Mr Putin sought more control over an operation that had previously thrived on plausible deniability. The Russian state moved in, breaking up the mutineer’s portfolio of security, business and media interests. Several hundred Wagner personnel, including some leaders, were withdrawn from CAR. By the end of 2023, Wagner’s Africa branch had been formally replaced by the Africa Corps, a new umbrella organization for multiple quasi-state expeditionary forces under Russia’s ministry of defense. Yet the practical consequences of the restructuring have been limited.”
• “If anything, Wagner has continued to expand its activities in CAR. Its mercenaries are reportedly developing a base intended to host 10,000 troops by 2030 and serve as a hub for Russian military operations in Africa.”
• “Further expansion in Africa would probably require even more top-down involvement from the Russian state. That, in the long run, might further undermine the very arm’s-length arrangement which seemed to deliver so many benefits to the Kremlin in the first place.” 

“Russia’s Influence in Africa: The Role of the Russian Orthodox Church,” Charles A. Ray, FPRI, 10.15.24.

• “Since 2021, the Russian Orthodox Church has established an expanded presence in Africa, in competition with the Greek Orthodox Church in Alexandria, Egypt.”
• “Facing condemnation from the West since its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has sought to expand its influence in Africa with soft power in addition to a military presence in the form of first the Wagner Group and now Africa Corps.”
• “In addition to spiritual guidance, the Russian Orthodox Church, through two dioceses in North Africa and South Africa, will provide humanitarian assistance and education with the aim of expanding Russian influence.”
• “The Russian Orthodox Church does not appear to be aiming for mass conversion of Africans and is likely to have more influence on leadership elites. Until more is known of its impact on US security interests, a wait-and-see attitude is perhaps the best approach.”

Ukraine:

“Political Infighting Hampers Ukraine’s Efforts to Avert Energy Crisis,” Constant Méheut, NYT, 10.15.24.

• “For more than two years, as Russia relentlessly bombed Ukraine’s power stations, the head of the national electricity company, Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, earned praise from Kyiv’s allies and energy experts for keeping the country’s power grid mostly running. But last month, Mr. Kudrytskyi was dismissed by the supervisory board of the company, Ukrenergo. Ukrainian lawmakers criticized the move as unjustified given Mr. Kudrytskyi’s record, while countries financing repairs to power plants said it was ill timed as Ukraine scrambles to restore its ravaged energy network before winter.”
• “Adding to their concern, two members of Ukrenergo’s supervisory board resigned in protest, saying the dismissal was “politically motivated.” Several lawmakers from across the political spectrum said German Galushchenko, Ukraine’s energy minister, was behind the move to gain greater control over the company’s management. Political rivalries have disrupted other Ukrainian institutions this year, undermining the smooth functioning of Parliament and causing upheaval in the country’s military command.”
• “Now, political infighting, highlighted by Mr. Kudrytskyi’s dismissal, is hampering Ukraine’s efforts to avert an energy crisis, according to more than half a dozen current and former Ukrainian energy officials, experts and lawmakers… With substantial funding allocated to strengthening the energy network, they also voiced concerns that some projects might be vulnerable to corruption, a pervasive issue in Ukraine.”
• “In an interview, Mr. Kudrytskyi said a major point of contention with the energy ministry had revolved around the strategy for securing energy supplies. He said he had advocated building dozens of small, privately run power plants across the country to make the system less vulnerable to any single Russian attack—an approach supported by most energy experts and international partners. But Mr. Kudrytskyi said his suggestions clashed with the position taken by Mr. Galushchenko, the energy minister, who favored greater centralization under state-owned companies.”
• “By the time Ukraine’s government adopted a plan to decentralize its network, in mid-July, experts and diplomats said that it was too late to bolster energy supplies significantly before winter. The dispute has cost Ukraine precious time in preparing for winter, according to Mr. Kudrytskyi. The solution, he said, was “to put aside any political preferences or any wish to create ambitious plans or whatever and follow one simple rule: Listen to the engineers.”
• “Ukraine has focused on protecting substations because Russia targeted them during the first winter of the war. But energy experts say the approach left the country open to being blindsided by a shift in Russian tactics. This spring, Russia began attacking power plants directly, and the impact was devastating: Ukraine lost nine gigawatts of generating capacity between March and July, according to the United Nations—far more than can be restored before the winter.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Moldovans back EU accession talks by razor-thin majority,” Polina Ivanova, FT, 10.21.24. 

• “Moldovans have voted by a razor-thin majority to push ahead with talks to join the EU, results on Monday showed, marking an upset for President Maia Sandu, who had hoped to secure resounding backing for her policy of closer integration with Europe. The landmark referendum asked voters whether the country’s constitution should change to enshrine a commitment to joining the EU after Moldova applied for membership in 2022.”
• “Preliminary results on Monday showed it had passed by 50.38 per cent after ballots were counted by 99.37 per cent of polling stations — a surprisingly slim win by just 11,300 votes out of 1.5mn cast. Polls had previously shown a substantial majority in Moldova — one of the poorest countries in Europe, sandwiched between Romania and Ukraine — to be supportive of the idea of joining the EU.”
  • “Sandu said her government had evidence that “criminal groups” had “aimed to buy 300,000 votes” to sway the results. “Working together with foreign forces hostile to our national interests, [they] have attacked our country with tens of millions of euros, lies and propaganda,” Sandu said. “We will not back down.”
  • “On Monday, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov depicted the results of the referendum vote as suspicious, claiming the number of votes in favor of Sandu and EU accession rose “mechanically” and “with anomalies”. He provided no evidence to support the claim.”
• “In the presidential race, Sandu landed 42 per cent of the vote, winning more votes in total than she did during her first-round run in 2020 against Igor Dodon. However, her main opponent, Stoianoglo — a former prosecutor-general and relative political newcomer born in Gagauzia, whose candidacy has been supported by Dodon’s socialists — secured 26 per cent of the vote, which means they will now face off in a second round.”
• “The result in the presidential election will be critical not just for her political future, but also for a parliamentary vote next year which looks unlikely to yield a majority for Sandu’s party. An anti-EU majority in these could block reforms necessary for membership.”

“Russia Is Playing a Long Game in Moldova,” William H. Hill, FA, 10.16.24.

“Georgian Elections Present Moscow With a Difficult Choice,” Vladimir Solovyov, CEIP, 10.18.24. 

• “The possibility of Georgia regaining control over its breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has become one of the main issues in upcoming parliamentary elections in the South Caucasus nation. However, even though the Georgian government has taken an increasingly pro-Russian stance in recent years, and is obviously willing to take its larger neighbor’s interests into account, Moscow—which has long propped up the two self-proclaimed republics—has not yet formulated a proper response.”
• “There is certainly a lot hanging on the [upcoming Georgian parliamentary] election. Georgian Dream has turned the vote into a matter of life and death. Its threats to ban opposition parties if it wins the election have only made the opposition more angry and more determined. Meanwhile, the ruling party and its founder [Bidzina] Ivanishvili are scarcely less motivated themselves: they have made too many enemies both at home and in the West. A loss of power could see Saakashvili released from prison and Ivanishvili taking his place behind bars.”
• “If Georgian Dream does win, then it will be in its interests—as well as in Moscow’s—to keep talking about reintegrating Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Getting such a process under way would allow the Kremlin to look as if it’s helping a neighbor to restore its territorial integrity (in direct contrast to what Russia is doing in Ukraine). And even if it all comes to nothing, or almost nothing, it will involve high-level contacts between the two states. The topic of the breakaway regions can only be seriously discussed between political leaders, not ambassadors, and that means Russia-Georgia ties will continue to grow stronger.”

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• “This tiny country is a laboratory for Russia’s dirty tricks,” Chisinau and Comrat, The Economist, 10.17.24.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 11:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

^ Machine-translated.

Slider photo by Ukrainian Emergency Service via AP.