Russia Analytical Report, Sept. 30-Oct. 7, 2024

2 Ideas to Explore

  1. Ukrainian armed forces are using rope-a-dope tactics against their Russian counterparts, but “it remains unclear how much territory Kyiv will have to give up before the Russian Army runs out of steam—if it ever does,” NYT journalist Constant Méheut writes in his analysis of what has become a war of attrition. According to calculations of Finland-based Black Bird Group’s Pasi Paroinen cited by Méheut, the Russian forces have advanced in Donbas at a pace unseen since 2022, already capturing some 270 square miles in the area in the past two months; however, “that leaves Russia far short of achieving its long-held objective of fully seizing the region,” Meheut writes. To gain full control of the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces, which comprise Donbas, Russian forces would need to take another 4,000 square miles of Ukrainian territory, about five times as much as they have captured over the past year, according to the NYT analysis.
  2. Ukraine should reconcile itself to the idea of territorial loss, suggested Jens Stoltenberg, who just stepped down as NATO chief. When asked by FT what he would propose to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Stoltenberg demurred, then suggested a historical comparison. “Finland fought a brave war against the Soviet Union in ’39. They imposed much bigger costs on the Red Army than expected… The war ended with them giving up 10% of the territory. But they got a secure border,” said Stoltenberg. “To be clear, neither Kyiv nor its supporters are proposing to recognize Russia[’s] sovereignty over one-fifth of Ukrainian territory…” FT’s Ben Hall writes in his analysis of how the war may be brought to a close. “What is envisaged is tacit acceptance that those lands should be regained through diplomatic means in the future,” Hall writes. While, according to past polls, a majority of Ukrainians themselves used to staunchly oppose accepting any territorial losses, now, they may be more amenable to delaying the restoration of their country’s territorial integrity, according to the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. “Ukrainians are prepared for a format that would postpone the full return of certain territories for the future, only on the condition that there is some kind of security factor in place,” Anton Grushetskyi, the director of this institute, told WP.

NB: Next week’s Russia Analytical Report will appear on Tuesday, Oct. 15, instead of Monday, Oct. 14, because of a U.S. federal holiday.

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

“Containing Russia's Dangerous Game of 'Chernobyl Roulette,'” review of Serhii Plokhy’s book “Chernobyl Roulette: War in the Nuclear Disaster Zone,” Charlie Hancock, MT, 10.04.24.

  • "A professor of Ukrainian history at Harvard, Serhii Plokhy has found a rich niche in chronicling the history of nuclear disasters – and near-misses. While the invasion of Ukraine gave a boost in support for nuclear energy as markets were thrown into turmoil when they could no longer rely on Russian fossil fuels, Plokhy urged caution."
  • "Plokhy’s latest book, “Chernobyl Roulette,” is a tautly written account of the 35 days the power plant and its 300 workers and guards were held hostage — and a warning of the dangers that threaten humanity when nuclear facilities fall into the crosshairs of conflict."
  • "Valentyn Heiko, the 59-year-old shift supervisor who was on duty when Chernobyl was cut off from the rest of the world, laid down the law for his captors: they may have arrived with guns and the belief they were keeping the plant – a potential dirty bomb – from “fascist Banderites.” But everyone was subject to the rules of the plant, where failure to comply could have devastating consequences."
  • "The plant workers found ways to test the limits of how much defiance they could get away with, from decorating mandatory identifying clothing with Ukrainian national symbols to playing on the occupiers’ fears of radiation. At the same time, the Russian forces became increasingly demoralized as they learned how badly the war was going for them."
  • "The occupation of Chernobyl is a distillation of the Russian Armed Forces’ absurd lack of preparedness in the early days of the invasion. While some troops had a background in handling radioactive material and dangerous chemicals, many did not. Some of these tankmen came from Buryatia in the Far East and barely spoke any Russian, complicating communication with the multilingual, university-educated plant workers. Drunkenness and infighting were common."

For more analysis on this subject, see:

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

“North Korean Shells Fuel Russia’s War—and Kim’s Ambitions,” Keith Johnson, FP, 10.03.24.

  • Top Ukrainian defense officials and U.S. diplomats agree about one thing: North Korean arms deliveries to Russia are among the biggest threats to Kyiv’s ability to defeat the Russian invasion.
  • While estimates of the exact number of North Korean artillery shells delivered vary widely, from 1.6 million to almost 6 million shells, experts say at least 2 million were sent to Russia as of this summer, though many of them were old, degraded, or defective in some way.
  • A big question is what North Korea is getting out of the bargain, beyond the shipments of food and energy that the isolated regime badly needs, particularly after the economic devastation of the COVID-19 years and the continued impact of Western and U.N. sanctions.
  • One obvious win for Pyongyang was Russia’s blocking at the United Nations this spring of the renewal of the body that oversees sanctions enforcement against North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs; shuttering that oversight program after 15 years in operation will likely make it even easier for North Korea to skirt the sanctions meant to curb its ability to develop a long-range nuclear strike capability.
  • Another high-profile win was the inking in June of the Russia-North Korea defense pact, essentially an updated version of a similar agreement dating from the 1960s between the Soviet Union and the then-nascent North Korea.
  • One big fear is that the refurbished relationship between Pyongyang and Moscow could embolden Kim to take an even more aggressive line regionally than he has in recent years. Since the demise of bilateral talks with the United States in 2019, Kim gave signs of jettisoning decades of family preference for a normalization of relations with the United States based on denuclearization, said Rachel Minyoung Lee, a Korea expert at the Stimson Center. 

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

Iran and its nuclear program:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“How Russia and Ukraine Use Teenagers for Sabotage Operations,” Nikolay Mitrokhin, Russia.Post/Republic, 10.04.24. Clues from Russian Views.

  • In Russia and Ukraine, the number of acts of sabotage, often involving minors, is growing rapidly. For a promised reward from foreign security services, railway facilities, military enlistment offices, army vehicles and even helicopters are being torched.
  • Small-scale terrorist attacks (primarily arson of railway infrastructure and military enlistment offices), committed in Russia almost daily and often by minors, are likely part of the hybrid warfare being carried out by the Ukrainian security services, which are thus trying to compensate for the relative weakness of Ukraine in the face of a powerful and aggressive Russia. Meanwhile, since July, Ukrainian news agencies have been reporting similar acts on Ukrainian territory.
  • The successes of the Russian and Ukrainian security services in recruiting small-time saboteurs and “terrorists” mirror each other, though the Ukrainian security services had a two-year head start.
  • Whereas about 50-60 minors have been detained in Ukraine for sabotage since the beginning of 2024, in Russia, for the same period up to September 13, 93 minors have been designated “terrorists and extremists,” Novaya Gazeta reports. Almost 80% of the teenagers on this Rosfinmonitoring list have already been convicted on terrorism charges or are suspects in ongoing terrorism cases. This is the highest number of minors on the list in at least six years.
  • the Russian and Ukrainian security services, by pushing minors to commit serious crimes that risk long prison sentences and the loss of their rights long into the future, are violating international legislation on protecting children’s rights and keeping them out of armed conflicts.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“Ukraine's Donbas Strategy: Retreat and Maximize Russian Losses,” Constant Méheut, NYT, 10.06.24. 

  • Ukraine, a country that is a fraction of the size of Russia and with about a third of the population, is at an inherent disadvantage in this kind of battle. It has fewer men to send to the front, and, despite an influx of Western military aid, remains largely outgunned on the battlefield ... That has left Kyiv with little choice but to adopt what Mykola Bielieskov, a military analyst at Ukraine's government-run Institute for Strategic Studies, called a strategy of ''trading space for Russian losses.'' The idea is to retreat from towns under attack after exacting the highest price it can on manpower and materiel.
  • With Moscow so far proving capable of absorbing its losses by recruiting more soldiers and ramping up arms production, it remains unclear how much territory Kyiv will have to give up before the Russian Army runs out of steam -- if it ever does.
  • Pasi Paroinen, a military expert from the Finland-based Black Bird Group, which analyzes footage and satellite images from the battlefield, said that after the Kursk offensive, Russia advanced in the Donbas region at a pace unseen since 2022. In the past two months, it captured some 270 square miles in the area, roughly three times the amount taken in June and July, he said. But that leaves Russia far short of achieving its long-held objective of fully seizing the region. To do that, it would need to take another 4,000 square miles of Ukrainian territory, about five times as much as it has captured over the past year.
  • Analysts from the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based military and security research organization, estimated that with the current rate of losses and the production of replacements, Russia is likely to exhaust its stocks of armored fighting vehicles by 2026.

“Ukraine's east buckling under improved Russian tactics, superior firepower,” Alex Horton and Serhii Korolchuk, WP, 10.02.24. 

  • Soldiers from several Ukrainian units along the front have described improved Russian tactics this summer that combine their advantages into powerful attacks that Ukrainians have struggled to counteract, even as they achieve local victories. That is apparent in places like Vuhledar, the small Donetsk citadel that fell to Russian forces Tuesday, forcing a Ukrainian withdraw in a hardscrabble town they fiercely defended for two years.
  • Enemy troops are storming the battlefields in small teams that minimize detection and make return fire difficult, backed by superior quantities of artillery and drones. Russia has also improved its battlefield communication, helping coordinate attacks. While losses are staggering, Ukrainian soldiers have said, the Russians have the numbers to keep up the pressure and Western aid isn't making up the equipment deficit.
  • That confluence of factors, combined with Ukraine's perennial challenge to replenish its combat units and its focus on a large operation inside Russia, has allowed Moscow's forces to claim territory in the Donetsk region with speed and aggression not seen since the full invasion in 2022. Ukrainian forces have been retreating along dozens of miles of a front line being pushed to its breaking point.
  • The effects of Russia's advance are already being felt in the region. Pokrovsk, a key highway and rail hub central to Ukraine's efforts to move troops and equipment throughout the southern Donetsk region, has been a focus of attack and civilian evacuations for weeks. The destruction of railways and bridges means it is effectively lost, soldiers have said, forcing longer and more perilous routes through the area. But the most consequential aspect of the fight along this portion of the Donetsk front may be more about the loss of troops than territory, FPRI’s Rob Lee said."

“Intense Urban Battles Pitch Russia's Numbers Against Ukraine's Agility; Russia is advancing gradually and with heavy losses in Ukraine's east. Kyiv's forces are striking back deftly where they can,” James Marson, WSJ, 10.07.24. 

  • The tactics Russia's army used to seize the eastern town of Niu-York recalled Stalingrad, one of the bloodiest battles of World War II. Soldiers advanced in groups of three, darting forward along a street guided by a drone. When Ukrainian defenders opened fire, the survivors would duck into a house. Then another trio would advance toward the position. They kept coming in waves, taking heavy losses until a dozen or so Russian infantrymen had gathered in one spot. Then they would start the process again.
  • In a high-tech war shaped by drones, precision weapons and electronic jammers, it is still boots on the ground that take and hold territory. Russia is counting on overwhelming Ukraine's army with waves of untrained infantry dispatched forward with slim hopes of survival. It is a costly approach: Russia is losing around 1,200 men dead or wounded every day, according to Western intelligence estimates. Russian forces are grinding forward on the eastern front, although Ukrainian officials and some analysts say the mounting losses could cause them to run out of steam. Fewer in number, Ukrainian troops have to fight smarter. 

“Ukraine faces its darkest hour,” Ben Hall, Christopher Miller and Henry Foy, FT, 09.30.24.

  • Once buoyed by hopes of liberating their lands, even soldiers at the front now voice a desire for negotiations with Russia to end the war. Yuriy, another [ Ukrainian] commander on the eastern front who gave only his first name, says he fears the prospect of a “forever war”. “I am for negotiations now,” he adds, expressing his concern that his son — also a soldier — could spend much of his life fighting and that his grandson might one day inherit an endless conflict.
  • Ukraine is heading into what may be its darkest moment of the war so far. It is losing on the battlefield in the east of the country, with Russian forces advancing relentlessly — albeit at immense cost in men and equipment. It is struggling to restore its depleted ranks with motivated and well-trained soldiers while an arbitrary military mobilization system is causing real social tension. It is also facing a bleak winter of severe power and potentially heating outages. “Society is exhausted,” says Oleksandr Merezhko, chair of the foreign affairs committee of the Ukrainian parliament.
  • At the same time, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is under growing pressure from western partners to find a path towards a negotiated settlement, even if there is skepticism about Russia’s willingness to enter talks any time soon and concern that Ukraine’s position is too weak to secure a fair deal right now. “Most players want de-escalation here,” says a senior Ukrainian official in Kyiv.
  • The Biden administration is aware that its present strategy is not sustainable because “we are losing the war”, says Jeremy Shapiro, head of the Washington office of the European Council on Foreign Relations. “They are thinking of how to move that war to a greater quiescence.”

For an update on key developments in the Ukraine war, see:

Military aid to Ukraine:

“Hezbollah and the Russia-Iran Link,” Seth Cropsey and Harry Halem, WSJ, 10.01.24.

  • Israel and Ukraine are improbably but inexorably linked. Russia’s war against Ukraine is one front in a broader contest for Eurasian mastery. The Ukrainian military thus far has doggedly held off its larger, wealthier, more technologically capable foe with a combination of initiative, ingenuity and grit. But for Ukraine, defeat would mean obliteration.
  • The key to European security is the relationship between the European powers and Russia. This makes Ukraine central. It’s the largest wholly European country by territory, has a population of about 38 million, is important to global production of food, oil and fertilizer, and dominates the Black Sea’s northern coastline. A Russia-controlled Ukraine would provide the Kremlin with crucial resources, population and territory. Combined with Russian dominance over Belarus, probable control over Moldova, and de facto control of Georgia, this political-economic unit would be strong enough to take on the U.S. and Europe in a protracted contest of wills. If Russia gains control of the Danube River’s mouth, it could isolate NATO’s vulnerable Black Sea members. The U.S. thus has a national interest in Ukrainian victory.
  • In Europe the Biden administration pursues an untenable policy paradox. On the one hand, the White House drip-feeds aid to Ukraine; on the other, it restricts how Ukraine can attack Russia.
  • Ukraine and Israel can articulate remarkably similar theories of victory. Both Israel and Ukraine must outlast their adversaries and demonstrate their resolve to fight a long, brutal contest. During this contest, they must impose costs on their adversaries, making the price of offensive warfare prohibitive. Ultimate security arrangements and borders are secondary; strategic exhaustion is the only way to win a great-power war.

“Russia’s war on Ukraine: Moscow’s pressure points and US strategic opportunities,” Ariel Cohen, Atlantic Council, 10.01.24.

  • The current battlefield stalemate cannot become a “new normal.” As Russia is fully mobilized, the question facing the West is how to compel change. A US-led strategy that focuses on military and economic aid to Ukraine denying Russia export revenue, unflinchingly enforcing technological embargos, and reaching out to the Russian population to change their view of the war and encourage emigration needs to be formulated, issued, and vigorously implemented.
  • Without a coherent strategy led by the United States and broadly adopted by its European and Asian allies, a victory in Ukraine is inconceivable. However, with bold leadership, coordination, and cooperation of the Western alliance, Russia cannot sustain a long-term war effort. An even greater level of grit and determination on the part of the West is needed to deter China from adventurism in the Asia-Pacific and elsewhere. No matter where the West turns its eyes, troubles abound. It will have to choose wisely, steer the course, and persevere. Nothing less than its Euro-Atlantic and democratic prosperity, survival, and future are at stake. Failure is not an option.

For an explainer on U.S. aid to Ukraine, see: 

“How Much U.S. Aid Is Going to Ukraine?” Jonathan Masters and Will Merrow, CFR, 09.27.24. 

“Russian Missiles, American Chips,” Stephanie Baker and Daryna Krasnolutska, Bloomberg, 10.02.24.

  • Truth Hounds, a Ukrainian human-rights organization, interviewed residents along the flight path of the Iskander [missile] that hit Chernihiv [in August 2023] and concluded that a Russian brigade most likely launched the missile from the Kursk region, just across the border with Ukraine. … From there, the SN-99 navigation system, the brain inside the missile that links to satellites, guided it about 200 miles to Chernihiv.
  • Markings on the missile’s engine and some of the components showed it was assembled no earlier than March 2023, more than a year after the US and its allies imposed export controls that banned shipments of a broad class of technology to Russia to kneecap its defense industry. … Ukrainian officials had been complaining for months before the attack on Chernihiv that the effort was failing, and the Iskander fragments offered stark proof.
  • Ukrainian officials say Western semiconductor companies aren’t doing enough to police their supply chains and stop chips from flowing to Russia’s military factories. Kyrylo Budanov, a lieutenant general who heads Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, voices his frustration with the continued sale of technology to Russia in an interview inside his heavily guarded concrete headquarters in Kyiv. Dressed in black military fatigues, he says he’s seen no change in the flow of components to Russia. … Budanov says the only way to block the Kremlin’s targeting capability is to stop the flow of semiconductors to Russia. That’s not happening, he says: “Everybody’s averting their eyes from what’s going on.”

“Ukraine, NATO Membership and the West Germany Model,” Ben Hall, FT, 10.05.24.

  • Ukraine has scaled back its war aims. Although it remains committed to recovering the lands seized by Russia over the past decade, it regrettably lacks the manpower, weaponry and western support to do it. Ukraine’s new strategy—presented by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to U.S. leaders last week—is to ask its allies to strengthen its hand, militarily and diplomatically, to bring Russia to the negotiating table. Western diplomats and increasingly Ukrainian officials have come round to the view that meaningful security guarantees could form the basis of a negotiated settlement in which Russian retains de facto, but not de jure, control of all or part of the Ukrainian territory it currently occupies.
  • To be clear, neither Kyiv nor its supporters are proposing to recognize Russia sovereignty over the one-fifth of Ukrainian territory it has illegally grabbed since 2014. To do so would encourage further Russian aggression and severely undermine the international legal order. What is envisaged is tacit acceptance that those lands should be regained through diplomatic means in the future.
  • Ceding land to gain NATO membership may be the “only game in town,” as a western diplomat told us, but for Ukrainians it remains a taboo, in public at least. The problem is the US is against moving beyond the agreed position of the alliance that Ukraine’s “future is in NATO,” that its accession is on an “irreversible path” and that it will be invited to join “when allies agree and conditions are met.” It fears that offering a mutual defense guarantee under the NATO treaty’s Article 5 before the war is over would simply draw in the U.S. and its allies.

“Ukraine left in security limbo after appeal to U.S.,” Isabelle Khurshudyan, Anastacia Galouchka, WP, 10.06.24. 

  • "More than a week after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky presented his "victory plan" for how to end the war with Russia to top U.S. officials, details of the strategy and how it was received remain hazy, and Kyiv is scrambling for additional international support just a month before the U.S. election."
  • "Zelensky's administration has so far kept the points of the victory plan, which was shared with President Joe Biden and other top officials, a secret, but it probably hinges on either accelerated NATO membership or binding security guarantees from Ukraine's Western partners."
  • "Nobody is planning to abandon Ukraine, but Ukraine is definitely not in the top three of main issues for the U.S. right now," said Mykola Davydiuk, a Kyiv-based political expert. "And maybe it's because of a lack of preparation and understanding of what the U.S. is dealing with right now, but it does look like he was a couple of steps lower than during his previous visits."
  • "At issue for Ukrainian officials is that the looming U.S. presidential election - and a new administration regardless of the outcome - puts future security assistance to Ukraine in doubt. Zelensky's team tried to persuade Biden to support the victory plan as a way to solidify Biden's legacy before his term ends. But the White House is unlikely to take any action now that could be unpopular so as to not jeopardize Kamala Harris's campaign, officials said."
  • "Though Zelensky and his government have repeatedly said that ceding Ukrainian land to Russia, which occupies more than 20 percent of the country now, would be a nonstarter, ordinary Ukrainians are showing more acceptance for talks that would make temporary compromises on territorial integrity - as long as NATO membership or security guarantees from allies were part of the deal."

“Russia's Lavrov Warns of 'Dangerous Consequences' for US in Ukraine,” Newsweek, 10.07.24. Clues from Russian Views.

  • Russia is open to a politico-diplomatic settlement that should remove the root causes of the crisis. It should aim to end the conflict rather than achieve a ceasefire. The West should stop supplying weapons, and Kiev should end the hostilities. Ukraine should return to its neutral, non-bloc and non-nuclear status, protect the Russian language, and respect the rights and freedoms of its citizens.
    • The Istanbul Agreements initialed on 29 March 2022 by the Russian and Ukrainian delegations could serve as a basis for the settlement.
    • On 14 June, President Vladimir Putin listed prerequisites for the settlement: complete AFU withdrawal from the DPR, LPR, Zaporozhzhia and Kherson Oblasts; recognition of territorial realities as enshrined in the Russian Constitution; neutral, non-bloc, non-nuclear status for Ukraine; its demilitarization and denazification; securing the rights, freedoms and interests of Russian-speaking citizens; and removal of all sanctions against Russia.
  • At present, as far as we can see, restoring peace is not part of our adversary's plan. Zelensky has not revoked his decree banning negotiations with Moscow. Washington and its NATO allies provide political, military and financial support to Kiev so that the war would go on. They are discussing authorizing the AFU to use Western long-range missiles to strike deep into Russian territory. "Playing with fire" in this way may lead to dangerous consequences. As stated by President Putin, we will take adequate decisions based on our understanding of the threats posed by the West. It is up to you to make conclusions.
  • What we have in mind is that the world order needs be adjusted to the current realities. Today the world is living through the "multipolar moment". Shifting towards the multi-polar world order is a natural part of power rebalancing, which reflects objective changes in the world economy, finance and geopolitics.

"Roadblocks to Peace in Russia’s War in Ukraine," Anna Batta, Orbis, October 2024.

  • [N]egotiations prior to [Russia’s full-scale] invasion were primarily at a standstill because of the way in which the parties interpreted the conflict and how each saw possible ways of conflict resolution. This paper assesses the major roadblocks to negotiations prior to the invasion and provides potential lessons learned from this past process that could inform policymakers today. The basis for evidence is a series of interviews conducted in the fall of 2021 in Germany and France, the key state-level negotiators during the Normandy and Minsk talks.
    • First, this article provides some background information about the geopolitical environment prior to the invasion and a short description of peace talks over time to set the stage for the argument.
    • Second, it discusses how each side interpreted the conflict regarding whether Russia was considered to be party of the war or not and the complications this has led to.
    • Third, the question of Crimea and sequencing of issues will be discussed to illustrate how each side saw ways of conflict resolution.
  • Perhaps the parties have not reached a “hurting stalemate” yet and the moment is not ripe for conflict resolution. Ukraine has not been willing to compromise on elections in the DNR and LNR. Similarly, neither side has been willing to compromise on Crimea. However, this does not mean that an outside negotiator cannot start developing a vision for how to end this war. Previous conflicts have been managed by using the military and diplomatic instruments of power simultaneously. This strategy could also be applied in the Russia-Ukraine War, as well.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“America’s Strategy of Renewal,” Anthony J. Blinken, FA, 10.01.24.

"Biden is right to hold the line against escalation in Ukraine," David Ignatius, WP, 10.01.24.

  • Russia has been signaling ever more loudly that long-range missile strikes are a “red line.” Ukraine is already striking deep into Russia with its own swarms of drones and rockets. But the ATACMS, which requires U.S. targeting, is different to Russian President Vladimir Putin. He underlined that by announcing this past week that Russia was revising its nuclear doctrine to treat attacks by a nonnuclear state (Ukraine) backed by a nuclear state (the United States) as a “joint attack on the Russian Federation.”
  • What would Putin do if Biden did decide to authorize deeper strikes with ATACMS?
    • Analysts think Russia might arm antagonists who are already attacking the United States, such as the Houthis in Yemen. But in arming the Houthis, the Kremlin would have to consider the reaction of neighboring countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
    • Russia might strike at transit hubs in Poland for U.S. weapons shipments into Ukraine. Or Russia might target Western operations in Ukraine more aggressively — hitting defense companies or intelligence operations that are aiding Kyiv.
    • Deputy Secretary of State Kurt M. Campbell noted this month that Russia is sharing highly sensitive submarine technology with China; what other secrets might it share with, say, Iran or North Korea? Former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev said in June that because of an alleged Ukrainian attack on Russia’s Nord Stream pipeline, Russia would feel justified in cutting Western undersea communications cables.
  • As this grim list of escalatory options suggests, the Ukraine conflict is probably as close as we’ve come to the brink of all-out superpower war since the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

“Contesting Russia: Preparing for the Long-Term Russian Threat,” Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 09.30.24.

  • Russia poses a serious and persistent threat to its neighbors, the United States, and the democratic world. Even if the country’s current regime were to be replaced today, Russia would still face systemic obstacles to becoming a free and democratic state. Until Russia can reckon with its imperial history and present, cease using repression and corruption as tools of power, and build governing institutions that are grounded in respect for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, Russia cannot be a responsible international actor. We need to be prepared to contest Russia for the long term.
  • Ukraine defeating the Russian invaders is a necessary, but not sufficient, step towards not only forcing Russia into significant reflection and reform, but also towards uprooting Russian influence and countering Russian aggression more broadly. Ukrainian victory would preserve Ukraine’s sovereignty as an independent, democratic state, while also stopping Russia from pursuing further conquest in the Visegrad 4, Baltics, Caucasus, and beyond. By fully empowering Ukraine to defeat Russia, the United States can demonstrate to countries who believe Russia is their best hope for protection and support that Russia is, in fact, a poor partner and that the United States and other democracies are more reliable.
  • Throughout Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Black Sea regions, which constitute the core portfolio of the U.S. Helsinki Commission, the United States must implement a comprehensive strategy to contest Russia. This process should include supporting and empowering our partners and allies who are on the front lines of countering Russian influence, offering economic and security arrangements that are viable alternatives to Russia’s, and investing in institutions that hold Russia accountable.

“‘Collusion’ and World War III,” Holman W. Jenkins Jr., WSJ, 10.01.24.

  • "If Russia’s government sought Donald Trump’s election, it wouldn’t noisily tell Americans it wanted Mr. Trump elected. On the other hand, if it wanted Americans roiled by accusations and insinuations about Russian meddling, it would do exactly as it’s been doing."
  • "When our media and historians stop being corrupted by their own pusillanimity, here’s what they’ll see. The attempt by the U.S. national security establishment to defeat the domestic Trump phenomenon by painting it as a Russian cat’s-paw belongs on any list of its biggest post-Cold War failures. The misguided “collusion” enterprise ranks up there with Iraq, Afghanistan, the failure to stop 9/11, the failure to deter Russia in Ukraine and the failure to deter Iran’s proxies in the Middle East."
  • "Many dystopias touted in the current campaign now are in sight as a result of these blunders. America’s alliances may unravel no matter who wins in November if we can’t find a way to secure Ukraine and deter China over Taiwan. Price controls and rationing? They’ll be coming no matter who’s elected if the U.S. is forced to fight a global war while already running massive deficits to prop up Social Security and Medicare."
  • "In a close election every bloc is a swing bloc. One that ought to worry the Kamala Harris campaign consists of sophisticated voters waiting with growing impatience for a few words out of her mouth to indicate she’s not a brainless parrot, that she has the imagination to lead when so many domestic and foreign failures are intertwined as described above."

“Will Putin Stop at Ukraine? That’s the Wrong Question,” Samuel Charap and Miranda Priebe, The Washington Quarterly, 09.18.24.

  • In the spring of 2024, Western leaders began issuing dire warnings about the threat posed by Russia to NATO allies… [T]the leaders’ assertions reflect four increasingly widespread and influential assumptions in the transatlantic community:
    • First, that Russian reconstitution is proceeding rapidly, giving it the capability to attack NATO in the near future;
    • Second, that NATO’s deterrent against a risk-acceptant Russia is inadequate; third, that the organizing principle for the alliance’s military planning and broader strategy should be to counter opportunistic Russian aggression; and
    • Finally, that a Russian“win” in Ukraine will embolden the Kremlin and imperil NATO’s security.
  • In this article, we assess these four assumptions, and find each questionable. They have led to a focus on planning for opportunistic Russian aggression after the Ukraine war has ended while ignoring other, potentially more plausible pathways to NATO-Russia conflict, such as war resulting from first-strike pressures or an escalation of a second full-scale Russia-Ukraine war. We argue that allies should not optimize their posture and strategy around a single, highly unlikely scenario.
  • Instead, we propose a postwar strategy toward Russia focused on preventing the more likely pathways to a NATO-Russia war, responding to threats below the threshold of armed conflict, and ultimately stabilizing the security environment on the continent. That strategy would entail taking steps to avoid a NATO-Russia war that results from misperception and minimizing the chances of conflict recurrence in Ukraine, along with maintaining a robust force posture that could respond effectively in a contingency. The objective is a more stable NATO-Russia dynamic in the context of what will be a continued—and likely bitter—rivalry.

“Donald Trump is a Latter-Day Neville Chamberlain,” Scot Lehigh, BG, 10.03.24.

  • “Little is as incongruous in this presidential campaign as the notion that Donald Trump was and would be a towering figure on the world stage. To hear JD Vance tell it, Trump’s four years in the Oval Office proved that his mere presence as president would project a Pax Americana around the globe. “People were afraid of stepping out of line,” recognizing that “if they got out of line, the United States’ global leadership would put stability and peace back in the world,” Vance contended in Tuesday’s vice presidential debate.”
  • “Chamberlain, of course, was the British prime minister who sought to appease Adolf Hitler as the German fuhrer prepared to vivisect Czechoslovakia… Chamberlain flew to Germany in September 1938 and put the face of international acceptance upon Hitler’s demands that Germany be ceded the Sudetenland… Chamberlain next offered the misplaced hope that, having gained the Sudetenland, Hitler would become peaceful, noting that “he told me privately and last night he repeated publicly that after this Sudeten German question is settled, that is the end of Germany’s territorial claims in Europe.””
  • “Chamberlain portrayed Germany’s absorption of the Sudetenland as a virtual fait accompli, something that couldn’t be forestalled and had to be accepted to keep the peace. That’s what Trump has done with regard to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggression against Ukraine. In remarks made last month while President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine was in the United States to speak at the United Nations and attempt to bolster support for Ukraine’s battle against Russia, Trump declared that Ukraine should have capitulated earlier to Russia’s land demands.”

“Former NATO Chief Jens Stoltenberg: ‘So Far, We Have Called Putin’s Bluff,’” interview by Henry Foy, FT, 10.04.24.

  • “If there’s anything I in a way regret and see much more clearly now is that we should have provided Ukraine with much more military support much earlier,” he says, speaking slowly and carefully. “I think we all have to admit, we should have given them more weapons pre-invasion. And we should have given them more advanced weapons, faster, after the invasion. I take my part of the responsibility.”
  • “There were days and weeks, especially in the beginning of the full-scale war, where we had to discuss and address the issue of these Russian red lines,” Stoltenberg says. “Of course you have to stop and think, well, maybe, this is just too dangerous. But then the alternative, to stop supporting Ukraine because of some rhetoric, isn’t really an option.
  • ““If anything, I pushed for crossing all those so-called red lines that Putin has put up. And we have crossed many of them, and he hasn’t done anything. The reality is that if President Putin wants to escalate with the use of weapons of mass destruction, he can create all the excuses he needs,” Stoltenberg adds. “So far, we have called his bluff.”
  • I ask what he would propose to Zelenskyy. He demurs, then suggests a historical comparison. “Finland fought a brave war against the Soviet Union in ’39. They imposed much bigger costs on the Red Army than expected,” he says. “The war ended with them giving up 10 per cent of the territory. But they got a secure border.” But that came with Finnish neutrality, until it joined NATO.

“Is a No-Nonsense Dutchman Just What NATO Needs?,” Ben Coates, NYT, 10.01.24.

  • [Mark] Rutte takes office at a turbulent time, with NATO allies fighting a proxy war against Russia in Ukraine, the Middle East in turmoil and the alliance wracked by difficult questions about how it should expand in the future. A rising tide of far-right populism in countries including France, Germany and the Netherlands itself also threatens to upend decades of solidarity between allies. This would be an intimidating to-do list for any new secretary general, but also may mean that it’s the perfect moment for NATO — for the fourth time — to again be led by a plain-spoken Dutchman.
  • Rutte himself has been a staunch ally of Ukraine, describing Vladimir Putin as “coldhearted, brutal, merciless,” and telling the U.N. in 2022: “This war is bigger than Ukraine itself. It’s about upholding the international rule of law.”
  • But Mr. Rutte is also a political chameleon, capable of being almost all things to almost all people. In The Hague, Mr. Rutte is known as an unassuming figure who generally eschews bodyguards, lives in a modest house and often gets around by bicycle. He is hawkish but socially liberal.
  • And he was … prime minister of the Netherlands for 14 years. In the same period there were three U.S. presidents, three French presidents and six British prime ministers. That’s at least partly down to an ability to avoid the dirt that clung to others sometimes through charm and political skill, but sometimes (at least in his opponents’ eyes) by dodging accountability. It’s a skill set that earned him the nickname “Teflon Mark.”
  • That ability will be particularly important if Donald Trump, who has repeatedly denounced NATO as a rip-off, wins the U.S. presidential election in just over a month.

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s article for Rossiyskaya Gazeta on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China,” Russian Foreign Ministry, 10.03.24. Clues from Russian Views.

  • "Our friendly and unneighborly relations are not a formal alliance, yet their effectiveness surpasses the confrontation-based military-political alliances."
  • "Today, Russian-Chinese cooperation has evolved to become a comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction on the cusp of a new era. According to our leaders, bilateral relations have soared to an unprecedentedly high level and never stop to be enriched with new content. We firmly believe that Russia needs a prosperous and stable China, just as China needs a strong and successful Russia."
  • "In this day and age, as the world is undergoing truly tectonic shifts caused by the emerging multipolar international order, the Russia-China strategic partnership serves as a balancing force in international politics and contributes directly to the economic growth and the well-being of the people in both countries."
  • "Close and trust-based contacts between our leaders are the driving force behind Russian-Chinese relations. President Vladimir Putin and Chairman Xi Jinping have held over 40 bilateral meetings."
  • "The high level of mutual trust allows us to vigorously expand military and military-technical cooperation, conduct joint military exercises, organize air and naval patrols, and maintain friendly interactions along our shared border. These efforts strengthen the security of both countries and contribute to international and regional stability, particularly in Greater Eurasia. Importantly, everything that we do is completely transparent, and is carried out in full accordance with international law, and is not directed against any third party."
  • "It is gratifying to note that, despite various restrictive measures imposed by the United States and its allies, the economies of Russia and China continue to grow dynamically. ...Our mutually beneficial collaboration transcends trade. We are deepening ties in industry, investment, transport, and the high-tech sector, including advanced areas such as space exploration, civilian nuclear energy, fundamental research, and artificial intelligence."

Missile defense:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Nuclear arms: 

“The Kremlin stated that the update to the nuclear doctrine is a "signal" to the West. What is the meaning of this "signal"? Is Putin continuing with "nuclear blackmail"? Disarmament expert Pavel Podvig responds,” Meduza, 09.27.24. Clues from Russian Views. Translated with the help of machine-translation.

  • "We don't know the exact changes  [in Russia’s nuclear doctrine] yet since the final document has not been released. However, based on what the Russian president announced on September 25, the changes don't seem to be very significant."
  • "The point that attracted the most attention was the statement that in the case of aggression from a non-nuclear state that is receiving help or support from a nuclear state, Russia may consider the use of nuclear weapons. This wording was deliberately crafted to influence the ongoing debates about allowing Ukraine to use long-range weapons. However, this kind of possibility already exists in current Russian doctrinal frameworks: Russia has promised not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, except in cases where those states are acting in cooperation with or as part of an alliance with nuclear states. This wording was adopted back in 1995. The idea behind the current formulation is that if a nuclear state is supporting such aggression, that state will be considered a party to the conflict [and Russia will consider] them as jointly attacking. Accordingly, the possibility of using nuclear weapons would extend to the "supporting" nuclear state as well."
  • "It is important to understand that all of this falls within a broader scenario. While we don't have the final document in hand, the current doctrine includes a general framework stating that the right to use nuclear weapons arises if Russia is attacked with weapons of mass destruction or in the case of conventional aggression that threatens the very existence of the state. In other words, a broad umbrella concept is introduced, followed by specific scenarios—for example, the detection of ballistic missile launches or attacks on strategic forces using various means (such as cyberattacks or something else)."

“How Serious a Threat Is Russia’s New Nuclear Doctrine?” Alexander Gabuev, CEIP, 10.03.24. Clues from Russian Views.

  • "Russian President Vladimir Putin has announced imminent changes to the country’s nuclear doctrine. Those changes, announced in public comments at the start of a Security Council meeting on Sept. 25, amount to a lowering of the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. ... Putin listed the main innovations in his short speech."
    • "The first proposal is that aggression against Russia by any non-nuclear state, but “with the participation or support” of a nuclear one, should be considered a joint attack."
    • "The second defines the conditions for the possible use of nuclear weapons: Moscow will be prepared to use them “upon receipt of reliable information of a massive launch of air and space attack weapons and their crossing of the state border,” including strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, drones, and hypersonic aircraft."
    • "Finally, nuclear weapons may be used in response to an attack on Russia and Belarus using conventional weapons if that attack poses a “critical threat to sovereignty.”"
  • "The nuclear shield has insured Russia against NATO’s large-scale involvement in the war, but below that threshold the West is doing more and more to support its Ukrainian allies. The war has shown that Russia does not have a sufficient arsenal of high-precision conventional weapons to mitigate many of the threats to it, or to break the resistance of a country as large as Ukraine. The Kremlin therefore faces the difficult question of how to restore the effectiveness of Russia’s deterrent."
  • "The upcoming changes to the nuclear doctrine are intended to be part of Russia’s response. But the changes announced by the president, although verbally lowering the threshold for nuclear use, leave the Kremlin with plenty of room for maneuver and interpretation."

“Nuclear Doctrine” in “Bulletin No. 17 (147) 2024,” R. Politik, 10.08.24. Clues from Russian Views. 

  • "Russian President Vladimir Putin has announced changes to Russia's nuclear doctrine (yet to be published) that will lower the threshold for nuclear use. However, they are more moderate than was expected. There has been a notable divide among professional observers, both in Russia and abroad, over the significance of the nuclear doctrine update. On one hand, some commentators argue that the changes are minor, predictable and aimed at filling in gaps—i.e. they clarify and build upon what was already implied in Russia's nuclear policy and was more or less reflected in the previous doctrine. On the other hand, some commentators claim that Putin has significantly lowered the nuclear threshold, marking an escalation and making the move a worrying development for Ukraine. It could make it more challenging—both strategically and politically—for the West to increase military aid and assistance to Ukraine. Both interpretations seem valid."
  • "The decision was caused by several factors. Primarily, it is a response to strategic shifts in Western policy, including a long awaited decision by Washington and Berlin to deploy ground-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles and other long-range weapons in Germany. Moreover, Russia expects the US to review its own nuclear doctrine. The war in Ukraine has catalysed these concerns: discussions in the West about “boots on the ground” and the potential lifting of restrictions on long range strikes deeper into Russian territory were also key incentives."
  • "By decreasing the nuclear threshold, Moscow expects the West to refrain from taking any action that could potentially reverse current trends in the war. Moscow believes that its “nuclear insurance” deters the West from directly entering the conflict in a manner that could risk a Russian “defeat.” The adjustments to the nuclear doctrine are aimed precisely at preventing that."

“Putin Keeps Threatening to Use Nuclear Weapons. Would He?,” Lawrence Freedman, NYT, 10.03.24.

  • "Last week, President Vladimir Putin announced a plan to change Russia’s nuclear doctrine. He said Russia would be prepared to use a nuclear weapon in response to an attack with conventional weapons that creates a “critical threat to our sovereignty” and would treat “aggression against Russia by any nonnuclear state, but with the participation or support of a nuclear state,” as a “joint attack on the Russian Federation.” This is the key change, and it’s not subtle."
  • "Its purpose is to influence Washington on the specific question of whether to grant Ukraine’s request to use American weapons systems against targets inside Russia, and more generally to persuade Western leaders to take Mr. Putin’s threats more seriously. His problem is that he is unable to describe situations, however belligerent his rhetoric, in which using nuclear weapons would make sense."
  • "When Mr. Putin announced the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he warned that those standing “in our way” must know “that Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history.” In September 2022 (when U.S. officials were particularly worried about nuclear escalation) he said, “If the territorial integrity of our country is threatened, we will certainly use all the means at our disposal to protect Russia and our people. This is not a bluff.”"
  • "Each of these statements at different times was designed to deter NATO countries from certain actions—Sweden and Finland joining NATO, the West supplying weapons to Ukraine—without committing to any specific course of action if those actions went ahead. But as we know, Sweden and Finland joined NATO, and Europe and the United States have supplied rocket launchers, tanks, F-16 fighter jets and long-range missiles to Ukraine."

“Why Russia is More Likely to Go Nuclear in Ukraine if It’s Winning,” Mariana Budjeryn, BAS, 10.02.24.

  • “Russia’s war against Ukraine has been a conventional conflict. But it is very much a nuclear crisis, too. Russia, the aggressor, is in possession of the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, including a vast cache of battlefield nuclear weapons. Since the beginning of the war, the Kremlin relied heavily on nuclear threats and signaling to intimidate the West and thwart its military assistance to Ukraine, with some—albeit limited—success.”
  • “From the first days of the invasion, the received wisdom has been—and remains—that the most likely scenario for Russia’s limited nuclear use is to reverse an imminent military defeat or possibly break a hurting stalemate in Ukraine… But has the international community overlooked another scenario—a situation in which Russian nuclear use might not only be possible but even more likely? What if Russia resorts to nuclear use not when it’s losing—but when it’s winning the war?”
  • “Consider that the only use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict so far was by a nuclear power that was on a winning path. The United States decided to drop two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, when Japan was nearly defeated by conventional means, but stubbornly refused to stop resistance and accept US conditions for surrender.”
  • “… [T]he bombings achieved at least three goals. They terminated the war with Japan more quickly, possibly saving the United States from having to mount a costly invasion of the home islands. They allowed the United States to impose the conditions of war termination and post-war settlement—that is, unconditional surrender and US military occupation of Japan. And finally, they made a strong impression on the Soviet Union.”

“Would Kamala Harris Change US Nuclear Weapons Policy?” Allie Maloney, Instickmedia, 10.07.24. 

  • Former President Barack Obama once said, “If more women were put in charge, there would be less war.” In this election, Kamala Harris could become the first woman president of the United States. Some 58% of likely women voters support her. A Harris presidency would represent historic progress for women, but would it necessarily mean a more peaceful United States?
  • Not only does the research actually contradict the “women as peacemakers” argument, but the assumption that women are inherently peaceful is an argument that portrays women as a homogenous group with little differentiation in experiences, failing to address the real problem: the patriarchal hierarchies built into state security institutions.
  • While having women in decision-making roles increases the probability of diverse perspectives and new policies, it does not guarantee a shift in the status quo or a preference for dovish policy. After all, women will still have to fit into and adapt to existing hierarchies that govern nuclear policy. Those structures must change as well for leaders of all genders to be able to implement new nuclear policy with consideration of humanitarian impacts. 

“Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergei Lavrov's remarks (statement) at the General Debate of the 79th Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, September 28, 2024,” Russian Foreign Ministry, 09.28.24. Clues from Russian Views.

  • The West not only fails to seek the global cooperation called for by our Secretary-General, but in its doctrinal documents openly and harshly accuses Russia, China, Belarus, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Iran of creating threats to its dominance. The goal of the strategic defeat of Russia is declared there: just as London and Washington did in May 1945, when (before the end of the Second World War) they developed Operation Unthinkable to destroy the Soviet Union. This was kept a deep secret, but today's Anglo-Saxon strategists do not hide their intentions. However, they expect to defeat Russia through an illegitimate neo-Nazi Kiev Regine, however they prepare Europe to fall in this suicidal affair. I will not dwell on the futility and danger of the very idea of trying to fight Russia, a nuclear power, to the bitter end.
  • Equally meaningless are the chants of Kiev's Western masters that the infamous peace formula is the only viable basis for peace talks. Just as they support this doomed ultimatum, the West unreservedly invokes the UN Charter, which demands that Ukraine's territorial integrity be guaranteed.

Counterterrorism:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Conflict in Syria:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Cyber security/AI: 

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Energy exports from CIS:

“In a Cat-and-Mouse Game, Russian Oil Tankers Are Flying New Flags,” Rebecca R. Ruiz and Jacob Judah, NYT, 10.03.24.

  • “But by a quirk of the shipping industry, the Jaguar [oil tanker] had ties to the West. The tanker flew the flag of St. Kitts and Nevis, which has its maritime registry just outside London …  After unloading the oil, the Jaguar would soon switch to a more obscure flag, the Central African nation of Gabon. With an act of paperwork, the Russian tanker had moved beyond the reach of Western financial authorities.”
  • “Dozens of tankers have made similar moves over the past year and a half, records show, as Moscow has worked to protect its so-called dark fleet in the face of international pressure to limit the market for Russian oil. … Whether American and British regulators were unaware, preoccupied or simply unsure whether they had jurisdiction to act, dark-fleet tankers remained untouched more than a year into the war.”
  • “Since July 2023, more than 85 Russian-affiliated ships changed their registrations to Gabon from Liberia, according to the maritime analytics company Windward. Among them are ships in the fleet of Sovcomflot, a state-owned Russian shipping company that has been the subject of Western sanctions.”
  • “Other Russian tankers have re-registered in Panama and Palau, according to vessel registration information retrieved through MarineTraffic and Lloyd’s List, providers of maritime analytics.”
  • “That maritime reshuffling has put the small countries in a position to profit off the war in Ukraine. Once a stalwart ally of the United States and France, Gabon has been increasingly friendly with Russia after a military coup in 2023. With Western exports to Russia largely frozen, Gabon has emerged as a key part of Moscow’s supply chain, with Western-made aircraft parts recently flowing through a Gabonese company to Russia, according to The Moscow Times.”

“How Western Curbs on Russian Oil Revenue Benefit China,” Paul Saunders and Harry Stevens, RM, 10.03.24.

  • Steps targeting Russia’s reliance on energy exports, and on banking, thus inherently also affected Russia’s customers and global markets for key commodities with tightly balanced supply and demand. The reorientation of Russia’s oil exports following U.S. and (partial) European Union oil import bans, and the collapse of Russia’s natural gas exports, have likely been among the war’s most consequential global impacts.
  • [E]ven as America’s closest allies struggle with high natural gas prices, and pay market prices for oil, Washington’s principal geopolitical rival is reaping substantial economic gains from discounted Russian oil.
  • We estimated China’s savings by comparing the price of Russian crude to oil from a basket of OPEC nations … Between March 2022 and June 2024, those savings amounted to nearly $16 billion. Because this figure only accounts for oil shipments that were officially registered, the actual savings could be greater.
  • Nor is China the only country to benefit from the price cap. From a near-zero starting point, Russia has become India’s largest oil supplier. Based on calculations from Indian analysts, India likely saved between $10.5–13 billion between 2022-2024 by importing Russian oil.
  • This is not a call to eliminate the price cap or, for that matter, for lifting the oil import bans. Either step would look like an admission of defeat at this time. It is, however, an urgent call for policymakers to adapt to the reality that the United States is competing simultaneously with China and Russia. Perhaps a $16 billion windfall to China is an acceptable price to pay for denying the funds to Moscow. But U.S. officials and members of Congress should weigh decisions like this in advance rather than discovering them afterward. 

Climate change:

“Russia's climate warms at twice the global average,” BNE, 10.02.24. 

  • A new report by Rosgidromet, Russia's federal service for hydrometeorology, has found that the country is warming at twice the rate of the global average, reports Vedomosti on October 2. The data shows that Russia's territory has seen an increase in average temperatures of around 0.5°C per decade, nearly double the global rate of warming. This alarming trend is expected to intensify in the coming years, with both short- and long-term consequences for the country.
  • Changes in temperature have been accompanied by shifts in other climate characteristics. These include altered precipitation patterns, shrinking snow cover, and modifications in river flow patterns. “In Russia, we are seeing an increase in precipitation of around 2.2% every decade since 1976,” the report states. The increase is especially pronounced during the winter months.
  • This warming trend has vast implications for Russia's natural ecosystems, with Arctic areas – already fragile – at greatest risk. The melting of permafrost in Siberia threatens infrastructure and poses additional challenges to local economies reliant on agriculture, mining, and energy production.
  • “The global problem of climate change fully affects Russia,” the report concludes. The Russian government, represented by its climate envoy Ruslan Edelgeriev, has pledged to continue contributing to international efforts to mitigate climate change. Edelgeriev highlighted the need for "pragmatic and depoliticised cooperation" and underscored Russia's commitment to supplying essential resources, particularly food and fertilisers, to countries in need.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

For analysis on this subject, skim:

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

 “How Russians Serve the State: In Battle and in Childbirth,” Anton Troianovski, NYT, 10.02.24.

  • "What the Kremlin wants from Russians now boils down to two things. Men should join the army. Women should have more children."
  • "In recent months, the Russian government has doubled sign-up bonuses for contract soldiers and blanketed the airwaves, social media and city streets with recruitment ads. And a new law allows criminal suspects to avoid trial if they sign up to fight. At the same time, President Vladimir V. Putin has decreed that increasing births is a national priority, an effort that entered a newly repressive phase last week with a bill that would outlaw any advocacy for a child-free lifestyle."
  • "For the short term, Mr. Putin’s army needs more soldiers. It is suffering 1,000 casualties per day, by Western estimates, in a war of attrition in Ukraine that shows no sign of ending. And for the long term, in Mr. Putin’s view, Russia needs more people—to underpin an economy increasingly isolated from the West, to reduce the country’s reliance on immigration, and, of course, to provide the recruitment pool for any future wars."
  • "Last month, Mr. Putin ordered the ranks of Russia’s military to be increased by 180,000 service members to 1.5 million—a number that would make it the second-largest in the world after China’s. The Kremlin tied the increase to the “number of threats that exist for our country.” But analysts say that standing up an army of 1.5 million is unrealistic—in large part because of Russia’s shrinking population."
  • "Dara Massicot, an expert on the Russian military at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, argues that Russia’s challenge will not only be recruiting new soldiers, but also to have a labor force big enough to churn out the weapons and equipment that such a huge army would need."

“Spy Mania Sows Fear Among Russia’s Scientists,” Ann M. Simmons, WSJ, 10.02.24.

  • [O]ver the past six years, at least a dozen scientists, many of whom conducted research in the field of high-speed aerodynamics or hypersonics, have been arrested. Some of the arrests were on suspicion of handing over scientific data to Moscow’s rivals. The latest was sentenced to 15 years in prison.
  • The fear in the Russian scientific community now is that anyone who worked on the technology that could be used in hypersonic weapons could be picked up and held for years before facing a treason trial. For some, the idea of pursuing related research is too risky now—potentially stunting Moscow’s progress just as it gains an edge over the West.
  • Hypersonic missiles are one of President Vladimir Putin’s pet projects and are one of the few areas in which Russia can claim to lead the world. The U.S. hasn’t deployed any similar weapons.
  • Some analysts suggested there was an element of theater behind the detentions in that they help buttress the idea that Russia had achieved a significant technological advantage…Most of the scientists arrested are older academics who have had distinguished careers. They have worked for prestigious Russian institutions, been co-authors of papers on aerodynamics with foreign colleagues and attended overseas conferences—and didn’t necessarily have a direct role in the developing the weapons applications of the new technology.
  • The suspicion among some observers is that the Russian security agencies are pursuing these arrests in part “to convince themselves, and to convince Putin, that Russia has really advanced scientific achievements and that spies from all over the world are trying to steal them,” Smirnov said.
  • If that is the case, there could be unintended consequences. As the other researchers wait to go to trial, many scientists already are too afraid to pursue meaningful research lest they also are arrested.

“The Baton and the Cross—Putin’s cynical co-opting of Russia’s church,” review of “The Baton and the Cross: Russia’s Church from Pagans to Putin” by Lucy Ash, Nadia Beard, FT, 10.03.24. 

  • Today’s Russian Orthodox Church is devoted to advancing the Kremlin’s agenda. Its head, Patriarch Kirill, has presided over corruption, attacked the LGBTQ community, obstructed legislation protecting victims of domestic violence and encouraged Russian soldiers to fight in Ukraine by telling them that they’ll be granted eternal salvation. Meanwhile Putin continues to publicly demonstrate his religious observance.
  • The Kremlin’s current claims to spiritual observance would be laughable had the consequences of its actions committed under religious cover not been so deadly. It will be to Ukrainians that Russia will have to seek forgiveness for violating, so cruelly, the second commandment: to love thy neighbor as thyself.

Defense and aerospace:

  •  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Russian opportunism and tricky diplomacy,” Nigel Gould-Davies in “The Israel–Hamas war one year on,” IISS, 10.07.24. 

  • Russia has used the Hamas-led attacks on Israel on 7 October 2023 and the regional conflict they triggered to spread a series of anti-Western narratives. The scale of civilian suffering, and the West’s failure to deliver a ceasefire or criticize Israel, have provided an easy opportunity to amplify anti-Western narratives in the Global South. Russia has portrayed these events as a fundamental failure of U.S. policy in the Middle East that reflects the decline of the Western-led international order.
  • At the extraordinary G20 summit in November 2023 President Vladimir Putin criticized the double standard of condemning civilian suffering in Ukraine but not in Gaza. Other Russian voices have depicted Western support for Israel as a form of colonialism. Russia has portrayed itself, by contrast, as a constructive mediator that can engage all parties in the region, including by hosting a conference of Palestinian factions in February. Russia has also tried to use such messages to exploit divisions in the West and so undermine direct support for Ukraine.
  • But despite its claim to play a uniquely constructive role in the Middle East, the Israel-Hamas war has complicated Russia’s diplomacy. Relations with Israel have sharply deteriorated, and Arab Gulf states are alarmed by the prospect of a wider war that draws in Iran—whose relationship with Russia, driven by the latter’s war needs in Ukraine, has deepened. Russian mediation between the Palestinian factions failed to create unity among them, demonstrating Moscow’s limited influence. Moscow has also had to worry about Syria.
  • Russia’s relations with Israel are worsening, despite Israel’s large Russian-origin population, partly due to Moscow’s defense cooperation with Tehran. Should Russia help Iran acquire sensitive technologies or provide it political cover for its nuclear program or other activities, Israel will have to decide whether or not to treat Russia as a foe.

“Russians Tend to Say Neither Israel nor Hamas Are Justified in Military Actions,” Chicago Council on Global Affairs and Levada Center, 10.07.24. 

  • Data from a September 26–October 2, 2024, Chicago Council on Global Affairs-Levada Center survey show that most Russians prefer not to take a side in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Among those who do, more tend to side with Palestinians than Israelis
    • Like Americans, significant shares of Russians (up to 42%) say they do not know enough about the conflict in the Middle East to express their opinions. 
    • Russians tend to say that neither party in the Israel-Hamas conflict is justified in its actions. A clear majority say Israel has gone too far in its military actions in Gaza and is not justified (59%, 15% justified, 26% unsure). Russians also tend to believe Hamas’ actions on October 7, 2023, were more unjustified (40%) than justified (18%), though 42 percent are unsure.
    • Russians believe the United States and NATO countries (38%) are most responsible for the continued bloodshed and instability in the Middle East, but a significant portion also say it is difficult to answer the question of who is most responsible (19%) or that no party in particular is to blame (9%). Russians are more likely to say that Israel (22%) bears responsibility for the ongoing conflict than Hamas and the Palestinians (8%) or Iran and other Mideastern countries (1%).
    • Half of Russians (49%) favor the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, while 14 percent oppose it and nearly four in 10 (37%) are unsure.

"The US May Have Lost the Sahel—But Russia is No Savior," Raphael Parens, Christopher Faulkner and Marcel Plichta, FPRI, October 2024. 

  • In lieu of strategic military partnerships with the West, Sahelian regimes from Burkina Faso to Niger have pivoted to Moscow.
  • Moscow has attempted to use nonmilitary tools to support Sahelian states in their plights against terrorists through hollow commitments of economic investment or through influence operations designed to garner support for Moscow and erode Western legitimacy rather than resolve insecurity.
  • Moscow’s counterterrorism operations, spearheaded by Wagner and now Africa Corps, rarely accomplish objectives that benefit partner governments in any enduring and meaningful way.
  • US policymakers need to look at the problem as one of African security, not great power competition. Policy that solely exists to undermine Russia will accomplish little if the international community has no viable alternative.

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

Ukraine:

“Behind Trump’s Views on Ukraine: Putin’s Gambit and a Political Grudge,” Mark Mazzetti and Adam Entous, NYT, 10.05.24. 

  • A close examination of the [July 7, 2017 Trump-Putin] Hamburg summit, and the months that led up to it, help explain the roots of Mr. Trump’s often-disdainful attitude toward Ukraine. The meeting in Hamburg fit into a yearlong pattern in which an escalating political grudge against Ukraine on Mr. Trump’s part became an opening for Mr. Putin to pursue his own aim of tempering American support for Kyiv, according to interviews with American and European officials and allies of Mr. Trump, as well as accounts in memoirs.
  • That animus toward Ukraine remains front and center in the final weeks of the 2024 campaign. Mr. Trump has left unclear whether, if elected, he would cut off or reduce American military and diplomatic support for Ukraine as it battles the Russian invasion, at a time when he has pushed the Republican Party toward his vision of a less interventionist foreign policy open to dealing with authoritarian leaders like Mr. Putin. The views that Mr. Trump was developing in 2016 and 2017 could, if he returns to the White House, shape policies with profound consequences for the stability of Europe, the future of NATO and America’s relations with Russia.
  • While Mr. Trump’s foreign policy team during his presidency included Russia hawks, it is not clear that he would populate a second administration with aides and advisers who would check his overtures to Moscow and his suspicions about Ukraine.
  • Mr. Zelensky’s trip to Pennsylvania last month left Mr. Trump fuming again. So did Mr. Zelensky’s remarks in an interview in The New Yorker in which Mr. Zelensky said that Senator JD Vance, Mr. Trump’s running mate, was “too radical” and that Mr. Trump “doesn’t really know how to stop the war even if he might think he knows how.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Georgian and U.S. Elections: Defining the Next Chapter for the South Caucasus,” Robert E. Hamilton and Nvard Chalikyan, 10.07.24.

  • "Following the Rose Revolution in 2008, Georgia adopted a democratic and pro-Western orientation. However, over the past five to six years, Georgia has been expanding relations with Russia and, more recently, has adopted a range of policies that indicate a shift away from a Western trajectory toward closer ties with Russia and China. Increased trade with Russia and selecting a Chinese-Singaporean consortium to build the Anaklia port are examples of this."
  • "All this while Georgia finally was granted EU candidate status in December 2023, which was later halted as a result of the laws passed by the Georgian government. Amid these developments, Georgian voters will go to the polls on October 26 in elections that both the government and the opposition see as having vital consequences. The results of these elections and Georgia’s foreign policy orientation will play an important role in shaping the region’s future."
  • "The upcoming Georgian elections are less predictable than any in recent memory. The ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party has been steadily losing popularity and is now polling at 34.4%. Meanwhile, the opposition remains fractured, with no single party gaining more votes than GD… Unless the opposition forms a single bloc, GD may remain the most powerful party in the parliament, even if it fails to secure a majority of seats."
  • "If GD wins outright and gains a majority of seats in the parliament, the victory will likely be met with mass protests similar to those that occurred this spring in response to the adoption of the “foreign agents law.” Formal diplomatic relations with Russia are unlikely to be reestablished due to the Russian occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the fact that most Georgians support joining the European Union (86%) and NATO (79%)."

For more analysis on this subject, see:

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 11:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

Slider photo by Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP.

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