5 Ideas to Explore

1. Ukraine’s future is tied up in the outcome of the U.S. presidential election on Nov. 5, according to NYT’s Marc Santora and Alexander Vindman writing for FA. Vindman argues that the West’s ability and willingness to help Ukraine will depend on the results of the U.S. presidential election, predicting that a Harris presidency will “at minimum maintain the Biden administration’s support,” while a Trump win will mean “an isolationist administration that would cease all U.S. support for Ukraine, disengage from European security and make friendly overtures to Russia and other authoritarian countries while projecting hostility to NATO and other traditional allies.” The ties between the U.S. election and Ukraine’s future were highlighted during an accidental misstep into American domestic politics during Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to the U.S. last week, according to NYT’s Marc Santora. While Zelenskyy did secure $8 billion worth of weapons from the Biden administration, he failed to get a commitment from the Biden administration that it will lift restrictions on the use of Western weapons to hit inside Russia, NYT reports.
2. Russian, Iranian and Chinese efforts to sway the outcome of the U.S. presidential election will rapidly escalate in the month of October, according to an NYT report by David E. Sanger and Julian E. Barnes. While the Russians make little attempt to hide their support for former President Donald Trump, the Iranians—among Moscow’s most important suppliers in the war in Ukraine—desperately want to stop him from returning to office, and are busy hacking into his campaign and dumping whatever they find, as well as plotting to assassinate him, NYT reports. Meanwhile, China, once expected to be a major player in the election, seems uncertain which candidate it detests more. In the report, Jen Easterly, the head of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency noted that “the two main goals [of all our foreign adversaries] are to undermine American confidence in the security of our election and our democratic institutions and to sow partisan discord.”
3. Vladimir Putin publicly announced several changes he wishes to introduce to Russia’s 2020 Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence (BPSPND) on Sept. 25: (1) to “expand the category of states and military alliances with respect to which nuclear deterrence is exercised, and [to] expand the list of military threats to be neutralized by nuclear deterrence measures;” (2) to “regard an aggression against Russia from any non-nuclear state but involving or supported by any nuclear state as a joint attack against the Russian Federation;” (3) that Russia’s launch-on-warning plan should be executed not only in the case of what BPSPND describes as “arrival of reliable data on a launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies,” but also should Russia receive “reliable information abfout a massive launch of air and space attack weapons and their crossing our state border;” including “strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, UAVs, hypersonic and other aircraft;” and (4) Russia may use nuclear weapons in defense of aggression against the Russia-Belarus Union State, regardless of whether this aggression is accompanied by use of WMD. Along with the fact that Putin announced these changes publicly, this strongly suggests that the political intent of Putin’s “requests” reduce to an attempt to prevent Ukraine from gaining the capability to respond in-kind to the glide bomb and long-range missile attacks Russia has been launching at Ukraine since February 2022. Hans Kristensen of FAS writes for RM that Putin’s remarks “are obviously intended to influence Western support of Ukraine and public opinion. Whether the adjustments will change how the Russian military would actually use nuclear weapons is another question.”
4. Ukraine’s army, economy and society may reach breaking-point before Vladimir Putin is nudged toward making a deal, the Economist argues. Despite Russia’s high casualties and slow gains, Ukraine’s infantry conscripts are too old and inexperienced to help Ukraine defend itself, writes the FT’s Christopher Miller. The average person in Ukraine’s military is 45, the FT reports, and of about 30 infantry troops in a unit on average half were in their mid-40s, only five were under 30 and the rest were 50 or older. With no clear path out of the army once in it, being mobilized can seem like a one-way ticket to the morgue, according to the Economist. Additionally, as winter approaches, Russian attacks are focusing on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. The knock-on effects from extended power outages range from cutoffs of water and heating, to delivering further blows to the country’s already limping economy, WP reports, with the biggest victim being “Ukrainians’ already battered psyches.” Finally, there is a growing generational rift, the Economist reports: Those older than 60, who do not risk being drafted, are much more gung-ho about the war than the young: 54% of them believe that Ukraine is winning, compared to 31% of those between 18 and 25.
5. In The Washington Post, columnist George F. Will writes that Russia’s barbarism in Ukraine, and U.S. timidity in calling it out and responding meaningfully, has seriously damaged U.S. credibility worldwide. Barbarism is on the ballot this year. About Ukraine’s future, as about everything important, Vice President Kamala Harris is largely uninformative, and perhaps uninformed. Even worse, the Trump-Vance ticket is why Russian President Vladimir Putin’s supporters… eagerly await Nov. 5, U.S. Election Day. And then winter. Putin expects winter to help his aggression succeed. Hence, when his barbarian military is not targeting a children’s hospital, a nursing home or civilians’ apartments, it is degrading energy sources, the life-sustaining infrastructure of modern nations. U.S. “sacrifices” are merely material and negligible as a portion of gross domestic product. So, if U.S. “sacrifices” are deemed too excruciating to be justified by the goal of preventing the destruction of the geographically largest nation entirely in Europe, we will have earned from Russia and its friends (China, Iran, North Korea) what makes enemies doubly dangerous: contempt.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

“From Russia to the Houthis With Love,” Editorial Board, WSJ, 09.25.24.

• “Reuters reported this week that Iran is engaging in secret talks to help the Houthis obtain advanced Yakhont missiles, known as P-800 Oniks, from Moscow. These would help the terrorist group more precisely target commercial ships in the Red Sea, complementing the large ballistic and cruise-missile inventory the group has fielded from Iran. The Journal reported earlier this year that the Kremlin was pondering an antiship missile shipment in retaliation for the U.S. decision to let Ukraine use U.S.-supplied weapons to strike inside Russian territory.”
• “The news highlights the utter failure of American deterrence against the Houthis and Iran. The Houthis keep firing at merchant ships in the Red Sea, even tankers carrying oil that could spill into the ocean. The Biden Administration made a show of assembling a coalition… but in practice the U.S. has responded with the military equivalent of strongly worded letters—small missile strikes on Houthi launchers that do no lasting damage to the group’s ability to hold shipping hostage.”
• “The Iran-Russia cooperation underscores the extent to which these regional powers are becoming a global menace. China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are working as a de facto axis, arming and assisting each other to threaten their neighbors and spread mayhem. NATO has called China a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war in Ukraine, and Russia is helping Iran sow chaos in the Middle East.”

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• “Put Vladimir Putin on Trial for War Crimes? That’s One Lawyer’s Demand,” Farah Nayeri, NYT, 09.29.24.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“Ukraine is on the defensive, militarily, economically and diplomatically,” Economist, 09.26.24.

• “Ukraine’s hope seems to be that an influx of new recruits, a steady supply of Western arms and the clever application of firepower can hold Mr. Putin’s armies at bay, forcing him to bear the political costs of mobilizing more reservists and further straining the economy, and so nudging him towards a deal. But it may be Ukraine’s army, economy and society that reach breaking-point first.”
• “Russia’s advances are coming at a horrifying cost. Volodymyr Horbatyuk, the Ukrainian army’s deputy chief-of-staff, claims Russia has recently been losing six men for every Ukrainian casualty. … The pace of Russian gains, already grindingly slow, has recently reduced even further. It is possible that Pokrovsk may continue to hold out for several more months. Western fears of a Ukrainian collapse and a rapid Russian advance on big cities such as Dnipro and Odessa have receded, provided America does not suddenly cut off the flow of munitions.”
• “Although Ukrainian casualties are much lower than Russia’s (but probably not as low as Mr. Horbatyuk claims), Ukraine is finding it harder to replace them. … Officers complain that many of those drafted into service are ill-suited to fighting: too old, too ill, too drunk. There is no clear path out of the army once in it, which makes being mobilized seem like a one-way ticket to the morgue.”
• “Ukraine has been asking for permission to use powerful Western missiles to attack military targets deep inside Russia …  But American officials worry that using Western weapons in this way might prompt Russia to retaliate by making life difficult for Western countries in other ways, by arming Houthi rebels in Yemen, say. Anyway, they argue, there are not enough missiles available to make a big difference.”
• “Among other things, [Russian] weapons have allowed Russia to launch nine waves of attacks from March to August against Ukraine’s power plants and electricity grid. It has hit targets in almost every province under Ukrainian control, according to a recent un report. This onslaught took out some 80% of Ukraine’s coal- and gas-fired generation.”
  • “The deficit [of power] will become more severe as the weather gets colder—and as Russia’s blitz intensifies. There are fears of rolling blackouts of as long as 12 hours. In the worst case, pipes may freeze and burst, disabling heating systems even after power has been restored.”
• “On the face of things, most Ukrainians are equally confident and combative. Almost three-quarters tell pollsters that military victory remains possible. Only 9% say they would accept an end to the fighting that simply cements the current front lines without any other concessions. But these figures disguise a growing generational rift. Those older than 60, who do not risk being drafted, are much more gung-ho about the war than the young: 54% of them believe that Ukraine is winning, compared to 31% of those between 18 and 25.”
• “Some 6.5m people, almost a fifth of the population, have fled the country. More than 60% of those who remain tell pollsters their income has shrunk and they are struggling to cope. The government is even harder up. Its revenues are barely projected to cover half of its spending in 2025. It needs grants or loans to cover the remaining $38bn or so. Although allies including America and the EU have agreed to fund the deficit using earnings from frozen Russian assets, the process is bureaucratic and leaves Ukraine hostage to its benefactors’ whims.”
• “If the new president is Kamala Harris, the Democratic candidate, Ukraine expects a broadly similar approach to Mr. Biden’s. But if Mr. Trump wins a second term, the outlook is much less predictable.”
• “At the UN General Assembly this week, Mr. Zelensky talked about the dangers of appeasing belligerent powers like Russia and the injustice of trying to impose a lopsided peace on Ukraine. But he has yet to spell out what an acceptable end to the war might be, short of total victory. But in Ukraine’s current straits, total victory does not look like an option.”

“200 Clashes a Day as Russia Races to Break Ukrainian Strongholds,” Marc Santora, NYT, 09.26.24.

• “After months of constant pressure and grinding, bloody advances, Russian forces are pressing up against multiple strongholds along more than 100 miles of the jagged front in the eastern Donetsk region of Ukraine. For Ukraine, losing any of those important defensive positions could significantly alter the contours of the fight for control of the region, long coveted by President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia. Despite staggering casualties, Russian forces are mounting armored assaults and sending waves of infantry on foot, motorbikes and all-terrain vehicles to attack Ukrainian positions from Chasiv Yar in the north to the southern stronghold of Vuhledar, which is at risk of being encircled, according to Ukrainian soldiers and combat footage.”
• “With attacks across cratered fields, the Russians are racing to seize territory before the fall strips the foliage they use for cover and the rains turn fertile farmland into bog. Sergeant Valeria, a 23-year-old combat medic, ticked off a list of the traumatic injuries the wounded have sustained, including severe head injuries and burns covering more than 20 percent of their bodies. As bleary-eyed fighters slumped against a wall listening to the screams of a soldier injured in fighting around Vuhledar, she said that in the grim calculus of her vocation… “The most important thing about someone who’s screaming is that they’re breathing…”
• “Along the eastern front line, the Ukrainian soldiers interviewed this month spoke of exhaustion and of securing one area only to see another come under threat. The territory that they are protecting, the remaining unoccupied sections of Donetsk, is part of the Donbas region, what was once the industrial heartland of Ukraine. The cities and towns under assault are of strategic importance for different reasons, including their use as hubs to move soldiers and supplies, and their elevated positions.”
• “The Russians have, however, failed to turn some past advances into rapid breakthroughs. They are also paying a steep price in troops and equipment for every mile they gain.”
• “And in Vuhledar—a former mining town strategically located at the intersection of the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions—the Russians are also gaining ground, advancing around the city from the northeast. They recently drove the Ukrainians from two mines that had served as key bases, soldiers said, raising the risk that a city that had been the site of some of Russia’s most devastating losses in this war could now fall.”
• “'They still haven’t taken Vuhledar to this day,' said Dmytro, a 41-year-old senior lieutenant with the 72nd Mechanized Brigade, which has led the defense of the city for two years without a break. But he is worried. “If they manage to get past the mines,” he said, “they’ll surround Vuhledar.” For now, he said, the soldiers in the city “are just hanging on.”

“Ukraine’s New Infantry Recruits ‘Freeze’ in Face of Russian Onslaught,” Christopher Miller, FT, 09.27.24.

• “Outmanned and outgunned since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine’s troops have valiantly defended their territory from Russian bombardments, ground assaults and dirty tactics such as employing chemical weapons, which the US has said amount to war crimes. Kyiv’s forces inflicted huge losses on the Russian army this year and proved they were still capable of seizing the initiative when they invaded Russia’s southern Kursk region. Despite those achievements, Ukraine’s troops and their commanders are growing concerned over manpower problems, particularly the quality of new recruits and the speed at which they are injured or killed.”
• “Senior Ukrainian officials said a recent mobilization drive had allowed Ukraine to draft about 30,000 soldiers a month since May, when a new conscription law came into force. That is on par with the number of troops Russia has been able to recruit by offering large bonuses and generous salaries. But commanders on the ground and military analysts have warned that the newly drafted troops are not highly motivated, are psychologically and physically unprepared—and are being killed at an alarming rate as a result.”
• “Age is a key concern—the average person in Ukraine’s military is 45. Of about 30 infantry troops in a unit, said the deputy commander of the 72nd brigade, on average half were in their mid-40s, only five were under 30 and the rest were 50 or older. “As infantry, you need to run, you need to be strong, you need to carry heavy equipment,” he added. “It’s hard to do that if you aren’t young.”
• “But the problems start long before the recruits reach the battlefield, the commanders and analysts said… “long-standing systemic problems that were left unaddressed for years”. Largely composed of mobilized former civilians, the Ukrainian army is led by officers and generals who started their career in Soviet times and had “never been in combat…” Commanders lay part of the blame on military recruiters: “It would be wise to pay more attention to each person’s characteristics and background to see where the guys best fit instead of sending everyone to the infantry… Not everyone is fit for the front.”
• “Mykhailo Temper, a battery commander in the 21st battalion of Ukraine’s Separate Presidential Brigade, said “trainers themselves don’t have real battle experience so they aren’t teaching what the newbies need to know to fight and, more importantly, to stay alive.” Instead, conscripts were still receiving “Soviet-style” training, where “the army just passes everyone with good marks and sends them to the front,” said the deputy commander. New troops rarely practiced with live rounds because of ammunition shortages, he added.”
• “Ukraine’s commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrsky said this month that he had ordered improvements to the quality of training for new recruits by selecting “motivated instructors with combat experience” and raised the possibility of setting up an instructor school. But the commander of an artillery unit said the deaths of tens of thousands of experienced soldiers over the course of the war were taking a toll: “If there are not enough people to fight, there are not enough people to teach.”

“Ukraine’s Winter Energy Woes Expected to Weigh Heavily on a Tired People,” David L. Stern, WP, 09.26.24.

• “As Ukraine scrambles to repair the damage that Russian missiles are inflicting on the country’s power stations, the weary population is facing what is shaping up to be one of the worst winters of the war so far. Power outages are a given — because Ukraine’s energy system is already working at a deficit after receiving heavy blows from Russian strikes this year — but the estimates vary on just how bad it will be. The best-case scenario is just four hours of power cuts a day, but it could also end up being 20 hours of darkness or more a day in the depths of Ukraine’s frigid winter.”
• “In his speech before the U.N. General Assembly on Wednesday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, was trying to break Ukrainians’ spirit by attacking the power infrastructure. “This is how Putin is preparing for winter: hoping to torment millions of Ukrainians, ordinary families, women, children, ordinary towns, ordinary villages. Putin wants to leave them in the dark and cold this winter, forcing Ukraine to suffer and surrender,” he said.”
• “The knock-on effects from extended power outages would be many—from cutoffs of water and heating, to delivering further blows to the country’s already limping economy. But the biggest victim of all could be Ukrainians’ already battered psyches. After some 2½ years of war, with little prospect of a complete victory on the horizon and a string of battlefield setbacks in recent months, people are reaching their limit.”
• “The exhaustion of the population has direct military implications because many fighting units are heavily supported by civilian donations to purchase needed equipment—backing that is likely to fall off as people run out of resources. “This winter we could be in deep, deep trouble,” a senior Ukrainian official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject. As the winter progresses, people may grow “worn down, depressed and angry.”
• “Ultimately, this could affect public morale. “My biggest fear is that people go through this kind of winter, there will be zero way to find consensus among the population,” he said. Public opinion surveys bear him out, said Anton Grushetsky, executive director of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. He described “a growing tiredness, and this causes more conflict, because people are more psychologically unstable.”
• “His surveys show readiness for territorial concessions among the population rising from just 10 percent in May 2023 to 32 percent one year later. That number rose to 57 percent if a potential deal included membership in NATO as well as leaving just the east and Crimea under Russian control.”

“Ukraine Defends Kharkiv by Going on Offense,” Jillian Kay Melchior, WSJ, 09.26.24.

• “Ukraine’s second-most-populous city is only 18 miles south of the Russian border. When the air-raid sirens go off, residents have at most a few minutes to race to shelter. Throughout the spring and summer, Russians launched between 30 and 60 strikes a day on Kharkiv oblast. In recent weeks that number has plummeted to three to five on most days and rarely more than 10, according to Oleh Syniehubov, head of the Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration.”
• “This partial respite offers a lesson for the West. By long restricting Ukraine’s ability to strike Russian territory using Western weapons, the U.S. effectively promoted an interception-only response to Russian aerial attacks. Ukraine, however, can’t keep its skies safe solely on the defensive. It has too little air-defense capability to shield its territory, and Russia is ramping up production of glide bombs and other weapons, in addition to getting drones and missiles from Iran and missiles from North Korea.”
• “No one knows how long Kharkiv’s period of relative calm will last. The Russians still have “enough combat power” that “they can choose to prioritize almost any sector they want,” says Fred Kagan, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. “But they’re increasingly facing trade-offs, whereas before, they were able to do everything.”
• “The U.S. can build on this momentum by removing restrictions on Ukraine’s use of Army Tactical Missile systems on Russian territory. The Institute for the Study of War last month documented “no fewer than 245” Russian targets that would be in range, including more weapons-storage facilities, as well as military bases, tank-repair facilities, logistics centers and other sites that support front-line operations. Kharkiv’s experience illustrates what a difference striking them could make.”

“The war is going badly. Ukraine and its allies must change course,” Economist, 09.26.24.

• “If Ukraine and its Western backers are to win, they must first have the courage to admit that they are losing. … Ukraine needs something far more ambitious: an urgent change of course.”
• “However much Mr. Zelensky wants to drive Russia from all Ukraine, including Crimea, he does not have the men or arms to do it. Neither he nor the West should recognize Russia’s bogus claim to the occupied territories; rather, they should retain reunification as an aspiration.”
• “Western leaders need to make his overriding war aim credible by ensuring that Ukraine has the military capacity and security guarantees it needs. If Ukraine can convincingly deny Russia any prospect of advancing further on the battlefield, it will be able to demonstrate the futility of further big offensives. Whether or not a formal peace deal is signed, that is the only way to wind down the fighting and ensure the security on which Ukraine’s prosperity and democracy will ultimately rest.”
• “This will require greater supplies of the weaponry Mr. Zelensky is asking for. Ukraine needs long-range missiles that can hit military targets deep in Russia and air defenses to protect its infrastructure. Crucially, it also needs to make its own weapons. Today, the country’s arms industry has orders worth $7bn, only about a third of its potential capacity.”
• “The second way to make Ukraine’s defense credible is for Mr. Biden to say Ukraine must be invited to join NATO now, even if it is divided and, possibly, without a formal armistice.”
• “NATO membership entails risks. If Russia struck Ukraine again, America could face a terrible dilemma: to back Ukraine and risk war with a nuclear foe; or refuse and weaken its alliances around the world. However, abandoning Ukraine would also weaken all of America’s alliances—one reason China, Iran and North Korea are backing Russia. Mr. Putin is clear that he sees the real enemy as the West. It is deluded to think that leaving Ukraine to be defeated will bring peace.”
• “A firmer promise of NATO membership would help Mr. Zelensky redefine victory; a credible war aim would deter Russia; NATO would benefit from Ukraine’s revamped arms industry. Forging a new victory plan asks a lot of Mr. Zelensky and Western leaders. But if they demur, they will usher in Ukraine’s defeat. And that would be much worse.”

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• Podcast: “Why it is crunch time for Ukraine,” Economist, 09.30.24.

Military aid to Ukraine:

“On Trip to U.S., Zelensky Finds Ukraine’s Fortunes Tied to the Election,” Marc Santora, NYT, 09.27.24.

• “After wrapping up a whirlwind week capped by a meeting with former President Donald J. Trump on Friday in New York, [Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy] was set to return to Kyiv with “more questions than answers about the near future” for the Ukrainian war effort, said Mikhail Minakov, head of the Ukraine research program at the Kennan Institute in Washington.”
• “The only thing that seemed clear was that Ukraine’s prospects for repelling Russian aggression were now firmly swept up in the maelstrom of the American presidential campaign.”
• “Republicans called for an investigation into his trip to a Pennsylvania munitions factory, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mike Johnson, said Kyiv should fire its U.S. ambassador for arranging the visit, and Mr. Trump delivered a series of speeches deriding Mr. Zelensky, misstating facts about the war, echoing Kremlin talking points and saying Ukraine was already basically lost.”
• “While the meeting [between Trump and Zelenskyy] was an effort to maintain bipartisan relations, it did little to alleviate concerns in Ukraine that a Trump presidency could lead to a dramatic change in American policy.”
• “[T]he Ukrainian leader failed to get a commitment from the Biden administration that it will lift restrictions on the use of Western weapons to hit inside Russia, with the White House weighing concerns in the American intelligence community that Russian retaliation for such a move would outweigh the benefits, given the limited supplies of weapons at Kyiv’s disposal.”
• “But Mr. Zelensky did get promises of military assistance that should help Ukraine fight through the winter, whatever happens in the November election. President Biden’s commitment of $8 billion worth of weapons — including glide bombs, air defense missiles and an additional Patriot battery — is a desperately needed boost.”
• “President Vladimir V. Putin sought to influence the diplomatic negotiations from the Kremlin by announcing an updated nuclear doctrine that authorized the use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states that attack Russia when they are supported by nuclear powers. … Ukrainians were largely dismissive of the threats. Andriy Yermak, Mr. Zelensky’s chief of staff, said the announcement demonstrated that Russia “no longer has anything other than nuclear blackmail to intimidate the world.”

“What the U.S. Election Means for Ukraine: A Trump Win Would Cause a Crisis for Kyiv—but Wouldn’t Guarantee Defeat,” Alexander Vindman, FA, 09.25.24.

“The Most Important Question Kamala Harris Hasn’t Answered,” Ross Douthat, NYT, 09.28.24.

• “Not all the policy questions left unanswered by Kamala Harris’s studiously vague presidential campaign are created equal. … It is rather more important … to know what a President Harris would do about the war in Ukraine, the most significant crisis that she would immediately inherit.”
• “With Volodymyr Zelensky in Washington this week, we were treated to a formal restatement of Harris’s support for the Biden administration’s position from early in the war, which envisioned Ukraine taking back most of its lost territory.”
• “[F]or now Ukraine’s main goal is to stabilize the front, and the hope of a rapid Russian retreat that many hawks nurtured in 2022 and 2023 has slipped away. Such a situation presents two levels of uncertainty about what a Harris administration might decide to do.”
  • “The immediate questions are how long the United States can persist in supporting a “plan” for victory that does not actually exist, to what extent Trump’s call for negotiations is a likely endpoint for U.S. policy no matter which candidate wins in November, and whether both the Biden White House and Harris herself are just hoping Ukraine holds the line through the election — at which point their no-negotiation stance may become a lot more flexible.”
  • “The longer-term questions involve the place of Ukraine in American grand strategy, which is dealing with a range of dangerous stress points at the moment.”
• “[T]his is the most fraught moment for American power since the end of the Cold War, with challenges on a scale that requires either substantial rearmament, meaningful retrenchment or some combination of the two.”
• “Does Harris have a different vision from the current president on how to defend the Pax Americana? Does she have any specific vision? None of the unanswered questions about her candidacy are likely to matter more, or have answers that cost more if the world does not cooperate.”

“Dither and Deliver: Kyiv Navigates Putin’s Red Lines—and Western Indecision,” Charles Clover, Felicia Schwartz and Anastasia Stognei, FT, 09.24.24.

• “Since the launch of the Russian full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s Western allies have repeatedly had to be cajoled and reassured by Kyiv that introducing new weapons on Ukraine’s side is worth the risk, and Moscow will not follow through on threats to retaliate against them. Ukraine has repeatedly pleaded with the US to provide such missiles to strike the bases of the warplanes Russia uses to drop glide bombs and launch missiles targeting Ukrainian cities. Kyiv has argued that the weapons would also allow it to strike Russian command and control centers, logistics hubs, arms depots, naval bases and various other military facilities. Ukraine’s defense minister Rustem Umerov provided a list of some such targets to the Biden administration earlier this month.”
• “But the Biden administration remains wary of green-lighting the request, despite increasing support for it from many of its Western allies and a fierce push by the UK. Kyiv’s request has taken on more urgency after western intelligence agencies confirmed that Iran supplied Russia with ballistic missiles, which the west also sees as an escalation.”
• “What to make of Russian threats to escalate, even to use nuclear weapons, has prompted a fierce debate in western capitals. Many analysts say that Putin’s red lines are growing less credible the more times he draws them and fails to act. “I don’t think Putin worries about his credibility in the eyes of the western public,” said Dmitri Trenin, a professor at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow.”
• '“The Biden administration has taken a very cautious approach to risk,' said Alexander Gabuev of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin. Still, he said, in Russia “they are worried that if they keep allowing these small steps, after two years they will see direct missile strikes on the Kremlin if they don’t find a way to push back. Russia has been looking for ways to attach costs to western decisions to escalate,” added Gabuev.”
• “He said Moscow had a whole toolbox at its disposal: military action, the nuclear threat, which the Kremlin views as “the ultimate insurance against defeat in this war” and hybrid threats from cyber and influence operations to sabotage and transfer of weapons to American adversaries.”
• “'The problem is that we can’t know,' said Janice Stein of the University of Toronto. 'People want to deal with probabilities but the problem with nuclear [weapons] theory is that there is no empirical evidence,' she said… But leaders have an interest in maintaining a certain amount of ambiguity about their intentions, Stein said. 'Being too clear is not an advantage,' she said. 'If you are overly specific, you trap yourself, you foreclose your own options.'”

“Debate over Ukraine weapons restrictions divides allies, administration,” Isabelle Khurshudyan, Siobhán O'Grady, Michael Birnbaum and Ellen Francis, WP, 09.24.24.

• “The United States’ lingering refusal to relax restrictions on Ukraine’s use of Western missiles for deeper strikes on Russian territory has exacerbated a growing divide between the allies—with Kyiv angry over yet another setback in slowing Russia’s assault across the country while its biggest backer considers the possibility of Moscow’s backlash.”
• “The discussion is ongoing in Washington, splitting the Biden administration and Capitol Hill, and it has confounded America’s partners in Europe, several of whom have publicly said they’re in favor of granting the permission for more cross-border strikes using their missiles. So far, U.S. officials insist there is no indication that the White House will change its position on this… And with the lengthy debates playing out in public, the Russians have always had time to prepare long before the new weapons reach the battlefield.”
• “U.S. officials, for their part, express frustration about what they perceive as Ukraine’s lack of understanding of their occasionally cautious approach even as they provide Kyiv with significantly more security assistance than anyone else… Washington has often cited managing escalation with Moscow as a reason for not approving some of Ukraine’s armament requests immediately. That rationale is mocked in Ukraine, where the daily Russian bombardment has killed thousands and Russian troops occupy more than 20 percent of the country.”
• “More frustrating for Ukrainians is seeing Russia receive a steady supply of critical weapons from Iran and North Korea. “As it turns out, Russia has more decisive allies than we do,” said Roman Kostenko, the secretary of the defense and intelligence committee in Ukraine’s parliament. In Zelensky’s meeting with Biden this week, the Ukrainian delegation’s priority is to pitch its secretive “victory plan”… An important aspect of that plan is the ability to hit the Russians on their own territory.”
• “Russian glide bombs, converted munitions with guidance systems that are launched from aircraft, have been devastating Ukrainian front lines. With Kyiv’s limited air defense capabilities unable to prevent the glide bomb attacks, Ukrainian officials want to hit the planes launching these weapons while they are still on the airfields in Russia.”
• “One U.S. official maintained that this request is different from past ones because it is not worth the risk of a Russian escalation. Because the stockpile of missiles is limited and Russia has already pulled 90 percent of the jets launching glide bombs out of ATACMS range, a changed U.S. policy would not reshape the course of the fighting. But European military officials and diplomats emphatically disagreed that allowing the longer-range strikes into Russia would only have limited impact and condemned the policy of refusing to lift the restrictions on Western weapons.”

“Russia is Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Retaliation,” Hanna Notte, FT, 09.25.24.

• “Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy [presented] his “victory plan” for ending Russia’s war against his country during [his] visit to the US this week. Central to the plan is likely to be the demand that the Biden administration remove limits on Ukraine’s use of Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) to strike deep into Russia. Kyiv argues that long-range strikes would enable it to destroy Russia’s logistics infrastructure, airfields, and artillery and rocket positions.”
• “The debate about the wisdom of allowing Ukraine to conduct such strikes hinges not only on their military utility but on divergent views over the risks of Russian retaliation. Some argue that Ukraine’s ongoing Kursk offensive and its recent drone strikes against large Russian ammunition depots are ultimate proof that Russia’s red lines are a chimera. Others worry that, were ATACMS or British Storm Shadow missiles to rain down on Russian territory, Moscow would escalate the conflict horizontally or vertically.”
• “But Russia faces its own dilemmas in weighing how and where to retaliate. Serious assistance to the Houthis would cost Moscow its relations with third parties—chiefly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—that have been important to its wartime economic survival. Significant weapons transfers to the Houthis would not just risk irritating Gulf leaders but also Xi Jinping: China gets most of its oil from the Middle East and its ships have already come under attack in the Red Sea, notwithstanding the Houthis’ promises of safe passage.”
• “Vertical escalation vis-à-vis Ukraine’s backers would not come attached with the same risks of irking Russia’s non-western partners. Should the Biden administration lift its veto on Ukrainian long-range strikes, Russia may well expand its sabotage, espionage and disinformation operations in Europe. It may also look for additional ways to stoke fears of nuclear war.”
• “This is neither to argue that horizontal escalation is off the cards, nor that a point of nuclear last resort is non-existent: should Russia perceive itself to be on the back foot in Ukraine in ways that cause it to seriously worry, factors that should at present weigh in favor of restraint could suddenly become less important.”
• “Recognizing that Putin faces constraints in contemplating options for escalation should also be no cause for trivializing the cumulative impact its actions will still have. Russia’s moves up the escalation ladder still make it the midwife of a more dangerous global nuclear environment.”

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

• No significant developments.

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

“Volodymyr Zelensky Has a Plan for Ukraine’s Victory,” Joshua Yaffa, New Yorker, 09.22.24.

• “[Volodymyr] Zelensky is saving the details [of his “victory plan”] for his meeting with Biden, but he has said that the plan contains a number of elements related to Ukraine’s long-term security and geopolitical position, which presumably includes joining NATO on an accelerated schedule, and the provision of Western military aid with fewer restrictions… Ukraine’s incursion last month into Kursk, a border region in western Russia—where Ukrainian forces currently occupy around four hundred square miles of Russian territory—is also part of this plan, according to Zelensky, in that it provides Kyiv with leverage against the Kremlin, while also demonstrating that its military is capable of going on the offensive.”
• “Zelensky has pleaded for more Western military aid, which would certainly help but would not solve Ukraine’s other problems: an inability to sufficiently mobilize and train new soldiers, and ongoing struggles to maintain effective communication and coördination on the front. Meanwhile, across the country, a lack of air defenses has allowed Russia to strike power plants and other energy infrastructure; a recent U.N. report predicted that, come winter, power outages may last up to eighteen hours a day. Polls show increasing levels of fatigue for the war in Ukrainian society, an uptick in those willing to consider peace without a total victory, and an erosion in public trust in Zelensky himself.”
• “During our interview… Zelensky skipped between history and political philosophy, military strategy and the mechanisms of international diplomacy. He is a discursive speaker, sometimes hard to pin down, but unfailingly focused on one overarching message: Ukraine is fighting a war not only with Western backing but on behalf of the West. Ukraine’s sacrifices, Zelensky argues, have kept the U.S. and European nations from having to make more personally painful ones.”
• “[Zelenskyy]: When I’m asked, “How do you define victory,” my response is… victory is about justice… The fact that Ukraine desires a just victory is not the issue; the issue is that Putin has zero desire to end the war on any reasonable terms at all. If the world is united against him, he feigns an interest in dialogue—“I’m ready to negotiate, let’s do it, let’s sit down together”—but this is just talk.”
• “After the first peace summit, our partners saw that Russia was not prepared for any talks at all—which confirmed my message to them and my insistence that without making Ukraine strong, they will never force Putin to negotiate fairly and on equal terms. No one believed me. They said, We’ll invite them to the second summit and they’ll come running.”
• “And so the victory plan is a plan that swiftly strengthens Ukraine… during the months of October, November, and December, and to enable a diplomatic end of the war. The difference this time will be that Putin will have grasped the depth of this plan and of our partners’ commitment to strengthening us, and he will realize an important fact: that if he is not ready to end this war in a way that is fair and just, and instead wishes to continue to try to destroy us, then a strengthened Ukraine will not let him do so.”

“What is Zelensky’s ‘Victory Plan’ for Ukraine’s War With Russia?,” Constant Méheut, NYT, 09.25.24.

• “Beyond the formal addresses, [Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky] has one primary objective: selling what he calls his “victory plan” to Western allies, especially President Biden. The stakes are high for the Ukrainian leader. Faced with waning Western support for his country’s defense against Russia’s invasion, now in its third year, Mr. Zelensky aims to improve his country’s negotiating position ahead of any possible talks with Moscow.”
• “For now, that means reversing the dynamic on the battlefield, where Kyiv’s forces have been steadily losing ground to Russian troops this year. Enter the “victory plan,” which Mr. Zelensky has described in news media interviews as a bridge to a future peace settlement—a strategy aimed at strengthening Ukraine’s position on the battlefield enough to force Russia to the negotiating table.”
• “Mr. Zelensky and other Ukrainian officials have been tight-lipped about the specifics of the plan… but its general outline has begun to emerge… Mr. Zelensky said the plan includes enhancing Western security guarantees for Ukraine, increasing military aid and securing further financial support. Military experts say one of the key demands is for Western allies that have supplied powerful missiles to allow Ukraine to fire them into Russia, an authorization that has yet to be granted despite intense lobbying.”
• “It remains unclear to what extent Mr. Biden would endorse any plan that would involve increased U.S. financial aid for Ukraine. A recent Pew Research Center poll revealed a divided American public: about a third believe the United States gives too much support to Ukraine, while a quarter think the current level is sufficient, and another quarter feel the U.S. is not doing enough.”
• “In an interview with The New Yorker published on Sunday, Mr. Zelensky said Mr. Biden refusing to endorse the plan is “a horrible thought… It would mean that Biden doesn’t want to end the war in any way that denies Russia a victory,” he said in the interview. “We would end up with a very long war—an impossible, exhausting situation that would kill a tremendous number of people.”

“A Ukraine Cease-Fire Might Do More Harm Than Good,” Editorial Board, Bloomberg, 09.30.24.

• “The details of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s “victory plan” haven’t been made public. But Zelenskiy has been open about the premise: Only a strong Ukraine can force Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table.”
• “The impulse to throw in the towel — to accept Putin’s terms, stop the carnage and prevent further escalation — is understandable. But is such an agreement even possible?”
• “As desirable as a cease-fire may be, then, it would entail enormous risks for Ukraine. For one thing, a pause would give Russia’s military time to recruit replacements for the estimated 30,000 soldiers it is losing each month, plan a new mobilization effort, address operational shortcomings and replenish its weapons stocks. Putin would likely use such a truce to simply plan more attacks, as he has done repeatedly in the past — including after his previous invasion of Ukraine in 2014.”
• “Compounding this risk, a pause could jeopardize international support for Ukraine, making it all the harder for it to defend itself against a revitalized Russia. Putin has long bet that the West will tire of supporting Ukraine, that the Russian public will remain passive and that his military is funded well enough to keep up the fighting. A misguided cease-fire could make all these bets more likely to pay off — and leave both Ukraine and the West in a worse position when hostilities resume.”
• “The goal for the US and its allies, then, should be to ensure that Ukraine has maximal negotiating leverage before entering into talks.”
  • “As a start, the West must recognize that any meaningful reduction in funding now would not end the war — it would embolden Putin.”
  • “Next, the allies need to agree on a credible security guarantee for Ukraine.”
• “Without proper precautions, a cease-fire wouldn’t end the war, save lives or benefit everyday Ukrainians. It would do the opposite.”

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• “Zelensky’s Star Power Fades on Capitol Hill,” Karoun Demirijian, NYT, 09.26.24.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“The Battle for the BRICS: Why the Future of the Bloc Will Shape Global Order,” Alexander Gabuev and Oliver Stuenkel, FA, 09.24.24.

“Putin Is Already Escalating His War on the West,” Hal Brands, Bloomberg, 09.26.24.

• “Since the war in Ukraine started, avoiding escalation—a leap into a larger, more globally consuming conflict—has been US President Joe Biden’s abiding preoccupation… Concerns about escalation have flared in recent weeks, as Biden has considered whether to allow Ukraine to use US weapons, notably ATACMS missiles, to conduct long-range strikes into Russia. Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, says that a more lethal, comprehensive strike campaign is crucial to ravaging Russian rear areas, command centers and arms depots, as Ukraine managed to do in spectacular attacks over the last week. US officials and some outside analysts are reportedly skeptical that Washington and its allies can provide enough of the relevant missiles, which are among the scarcest, highest-value tools in their arsenals, to make a major difference.”
• “Russian President Vladimir Putin, however, would apparently prefer not to find out: He has warned that if Western countries give Ukraine the go-ahead, they will effectively become belligerents in the conflict, with all the fallout that might follow—and on Wednesday said he is revising Russia’s nuclear doctrine to reflect that threat.”
• “But [the use of nuclear weapons and escalating against Western countries supplying Ukraine] aren’t the most likely forms of Russian escalation… More likely is an intensification of two types of asymmetric escalation that Russia is already undertaking… First is an ongoing campaign of sabotage and subversion targeting Europe… Russia has conducted quasi-covert operations: targeting railroads, warehouses and other key logistical facilities, sometimes by hiring local criminals or refugees as geopolitical “gig workers.”
• “The second type of escalation involves exacerbating geopolitical turmoil in other conflict zones, particularly the Red Sea. This summer, Putin considered providing Yemen’s Houthis with advanced anti-ship cruise missiles, which could cause deadly havoc for patrolling US warships as well as civilian vessels. He reportedly backed down only at the behest of Saudi Arabia’s de facto leader, Mohammed bin Salman.”
• “The Russia-Houthi connection is one thread in the growing web of ties between the actors that are most committed to destroying the existing international order. And from Putin’s perspective, increased support for the Houthis would be a strategic twofer, distracting the US from Ukraine while also penalizing America for its role in that war. None of this is to say that the US shouldn’t increase support for Ukraine.”
• “The conflict in Ukraine is a global proxy war, a high-stakes conflict that is drawing in rival countries and coalitions from around the world. The effects of wars with global implications rarely stay contained. Today, the war’s effects are already spilling over into other regions, albeit unconventionally and asymmetrically. The more matters escalate between Ukraine and Russia, the more intense that global spillover may become.”

“As Putin’s military barbarism continues, U.S. credibility is at stake,” George F. Will, The WP, 09.25.24.

• “Barbarism is on the ballot this year. About Ukraine’s future, as about everything important, Vice President Kamala Harris is largely uninformative, and perhaps uninformed. Even worse, the Trump-Vance ticket is why Russian President Vladimir Putin’s supporters—such as Hungary’s authoritarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban (Donald Trump swoons about his being “strong,” a weak person’s adjective of admiration)—eagerly await Nov. 5, U.S. Election Day. And then winter.”
• “Winter rescued Russia from Napoleon’s aggression and, 129 years later, from Hitler’s. Eighty-three years after that, Putin expects winter to help his aggression succeed. Hence, when his barbarian military is not targeting a children’s hospital, a nursing home or civilians’ apartments, it is degrading energy sources, the life-sustaining infrastructure of modern nations. Ukrainians are scavenging batteries from scrapped Teslas for winter power.”
• “Zoltan Barany, a University of Texas political scientist, writes… that Russia’s military “is a quintessential reflection of the state that created it:” corrupt … brutal, hyper-centralized and institutionally stupid because it is hostile to debate. And until Feb. 24, 2022, inexperienced: Its engagements in Georgia …, Crimea and Syria were “against feeble adversaries and said zero about how Russian forces would perform in a conventional land war against a resolute, well-armed enemy.” Furthermore, “The 2018 decision to revive the post of zampolit (political officer) in units as small as infantry companies harks back to the Soviet era and signals that the state doubts its soldiers’ loyalty.”
• “One candidate [for U.S. president] seems unaware that it is momentous for a powerful nation to lose a war. Even, perhaps especially, a proxy war, in which the most serious sacrifices—of live —are done by others. The former commander in chief will not say it is vital for Ukraine to prevail. Imagine what our watching enemies will conclude if U.S. policy, particularly regarding permission for Ukraine to strike military targets deep in Russia, continues to be timid…”
• “This timidity exists, even though support for Ukraine is not politically risky. The number of Republican senators and representatives who, deviating from Trump, robustly support U.S. aid to Ukraine, and who this year lost in primaries, is zero. Today, U.S. credibility, the coin that purchases deterrence, depends on the success of Ukraine, which does the dying.”
• “U.S. “sacrifices” are merely material and negligible as a portion of gross domestic product. So, if U.S. “sacrifices” are deemed too excruciating to be justified by the goal of preventing the destruction of the geographically largest nation entirely in Europe, we will have earned from Russia and its friends (China, Iran, North Korea) what makes enemies doubly dangerous: contempt. If Putin succeeds, historians generations hence might designate Russia’s war against Ukraine — as they did, after World War II, the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) — the “great rehearsal”: a bloody prologue to a blood-soaked aftermath.”

“Stopping Putin in Ukraine could also arrest a slide toward World War III,” George F. Will, WP, 09.27.24.

• “Many people who dismiss warnings about a third world war were, before February 2022, confident that state-on-state war in Europe had become unthinkable. Even though Russia at that point was in the eighth year of its war to extinguish a contiguous European nation.”
• “Only for Americans did World War II begin Dec. 7, 1941. It did not begin with Germany’s September 1939 invasion of Poland. Or with Italy’s 1935 invasion of Ethiopia. Rather, the 14 years of global anarchy properly designated World War II began with Japan’s 1931 invasion of Manchuria. Today, two major regional wars are raging (against Ukraine and Israel), China is conducting edge-of-war aggression in the South China Sea and Iranian-armed Houthis are disrupting Red Sea navigation.”
• “As analysts Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Richard Fontaine argue in Foreign Affairs, the 1940 Tripartite Pact (Germany, Italy, Japan) is echoed by the intensifying collaboration among China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. The authors note that one attack this year on Ukrainian cities involved “weapons fitted with technology from China, missiles from North Korea, and drones from Iran.”
• “The West … has given Ukraine substantial succor. But absent many more weapons, with fewer restraints upon their use, the West might be purchasing protracted defeat, thereby vindicating Putin’s estimation of the West’s inability to persevere.”

“Don’t Let Germany Go Back to Its Old Russia Tricks,” Benjamin L. Schmitt, FP, 09.25.24.

• “To make sure that Russia cannot use energy to wage war again, it’s time for the United States to place permanent sanctions on the remaining Russian gas pipelines to Europe, starting with the existing but soon-to-expire sanctions on Nord Stream 2, the inactive gas pipeline that connects Russia with Germany under the Baltic Sea.”
• “Recent developments suggest that the next big question mark concerning support for Ukraine and Europe’s ability to withstand Russia is emanating not from Washington, but from Berlin. In the years running up to Russia’s most recent invasion of Ukraine, successive German governments under Chancellors Gerhard Schröder, Angela Merkel, and Olaf Scholz pursued a policy of accommodation toward an increasingly authoritarian and aggressive Russia under President Vladimir Putin.”
• “For almost two decades, there was a persistent chorus of contemporaneous warnings against Berlin’s policies toward Russia, the folly of which remains as evident today as it was at the time of their enactment. Despite Putin’s increasingly brutal crackdowns at home, multiple occupations of neighboring countries, and mounting attacks against Western democracies, successive German leaders kept rolling out their tired nostrums on Russia to cover the increasingly sordid business and energy ties they forged with Moscow.”

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• Podcast: “Alliance vs. Isolation: Harris and Trump’s Competing Views on Foreign Policy,” Hosted by Sabrina Tavernise, featuring Peter Baker, NYT, 09.30.24.

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

• No significant developments.

Missile defense:

“American long-range missiles are coming back to Europe,” Economist, 09.24.24.

• “When Donald Trump pulled out of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019 most European states were aghast. They agreed that Russia had cheated on the cold-war pact, which prohibited all ground-based missiles (conventional and nuclear alike) with ranges between 500km and 5,500km. But they thought Mr. Trump’s decision reckless and liable to start an arms race. Who in Europe would host such missiles anyway? Pretty much everyone, it turns out.”
• “On July 10th America and Germany announced that from 2026 a trio of American medium-range missiles—all non-nuclear—would be deployed to Germany. … On July 12th France, Germany, Italy and Poland signed a letter of intent to build a cruise missile with a range of more than 1,000km. … Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and Poland are buying 1,000km-range JASSM-ER missiles for their f-35 jets; the Dutch navy is also buying Tomahawks for its ships and subs.”
• “This is not the first time America has stationed missiles in Europe. … But those “Euromissiles” were meant as bargaining chips to secure the removal of Soviet ones—a gambit which succeeded with the inf Treaty in 1987. Today’s deployments are for the long haul.”
• “The new American long-range missiles are meant to serve as a deterrent in what [Jens Plötner, foreign-policy adviser to Olaf Scholz, Germany’s chancellor] called the “sub-strategic domain”, ie, below full-fat nuclear weapons. If Russia attempts to coerce European allies during a war by striking cities or high-value targets, American missiles can do the same in return.”
• “The most prolific European consumer of long-range missiles is Ukraine. It has built its own long-range “one-way attack” drones and ballistic missiles to strike targets deep inside Russia. … European drone-makers are collaborating with Ukrainian firms on short-range drones. That co-operation could one day extend to longer-range ones like those which are thought to have blown up the Toropets arms depot, 500km inside Russia, on September 18th, suggests Fabian Hinz of IISS.”
• “Perhaps the more important question is whether Europeans will be able to fire their own weapons. At present, Ukraine cannot use its British-supplied Storm Shadow cruise missiles to strike complex targets in Russia. … America has withheld permission for fear of escalation. If Europeans are serious about deterrence by deep strike, building the missiles is only half the challenge.”

Nuclear arms:

“Meeting of the Security Council standing conference on nuclear deterrence,” Vladimir Putin, Kremlin.ru, 09.25.24.

• “[T]oday, we will discuss an issue related to updating the Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence. Alongside the Military Doctrine, this is a document that officially defines and details Russia’s nuclear strategy. First of all, it sets forth the basic principle of using nuclear weapons: the use of nuclear forces is the last resort measure to protect the country’s sovereignty.”
• “At present, our nuclear triad remains the most important security guarantee for our state and citizens, an instrument for maintaining strategic parity and balance of forces in the world. At the same time, we can see that the modern military-political situation is rapidly changing and we have to factor that in, including the emergence of new sources of military threats and risks for Russia and our allies.”
• “Over the last year specialists from the Defence Ministry, Foreign Ministry, Security Council Office and other agencies have made an in-depth and comprehensive analysis and evaluated the need for adjusting our approaches to a possible use of nuclear forces. Based on the results of this work, a number of updates have been proposed in terms of defining the conditions for using nuclear weapons.”
• “The updated version of the document is supposed to regard an aggression against Russia from any non-nuclear state but involving or supported by any nuclear state as their joint attack against the Russian Federation.”
• “It also states clearly the conditions for Russia’s transition to the use of nuclear weapons. We will consider such a possibility once we receive reliable information about a massive launch of air and space attack weapons and their crossing our state border. I mean strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, UAVs, hypersonic and other aircraft.”
• “We reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of aggression against Russia and Belarus as a member of the Union State. All these issues have been agreed upon with the Belarusian side and the President of Belarus. Including the case when the enemy, using conventional weapons, creates a critical threat to our sovereignty.”

“Putin's Updated Conditions for Russian Nuclear Use Are Not So New,” Hans M. Kristensen, RM, 09.27.24.

• “Not a week seems to go by without Russian officials issuing some kind of nuclear warning. During a meeting with the Russian Security Council on Sept. 25, President Vladimir Putin described “clarifications” proposed to the “Fundamentals of State Policy in the Sphere of Nuclear Deterrence,” a document he said officially defines and details Russia's nuclear strategy, including establishing the basic principle of using nuclear weapons.”
• “In his remarks, Putin mentioned three apparently “new” conditions where Russia could consider the use of nuclear weapons:”
  • “Aggression by a non-nuclear state against Russia “with the participation or support” of a nuclear-armed state would be considered an attack by both.”
  • “A “massive launch of air and space attack weapons” crossing the Russian border involving “strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, drones, hypersonic and other aircraft.”
  • “An attack on Russia and Belarus, including with conventional weapons, “if the enemy… creates a critical threat to our sovereignty.”
• “The first “adjustment” is not as new as it may seem. As far back as in the 1994 Budapest memorandum, Russia (with the United States and United Kingdom) promised not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear state party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), “except in the case of an attack” on Russia, its territory or dependent territories, its armed forces or its allies, “by such a state in association or alliance with a nuclear weapon state.” The United States later dropped the exemption.”
• “The second “adjustment” is also not entirely new. Although previous public documents didn’t explicitly mention “strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, drones, hypersonic and other aircraft,” air and space attack weapons were likely part of the previous conditions; it would seem odd if they had not been.”
• “The third adjustment is also not new. Although Putin mentioned Belarus by name, previous versions of Russian doctrine have long included a reference to protection of allies. With Russia’s establishment of a “nuclear sharing” arrangement with Belarus, this adjustment was expected.”
• “Leaving uncertainty about the precise conditions that could trigger nuclear use is normal for nuclear-armed states. So, it might seem odd that Putin is injecting so much specificity into the doctrine about what types of attacks could potentially trigger a nuclear response. The current update is happening only four years after the previous update but after nearly three years of full-scale war against Ukraine. From the get-go of that war, Russian officials have issued warnings reminding the West about nuclear weapons.”
• “Putin’s remarks about the doctrine should be seen in that context. He made them in public, so they are obviously intended to influence Western support of Ukraine and public opinion. Whether the adjustments will change how the Russian military would actually use nuclear weapons is another question.”

“Political Scientist Trenin: In the West, Many People Have Assured Themselves That Putin is ‘Bluffing,’" Dmitry Trenin, Rossiskaya Gazeta, 09.26.24.^ (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• “The update of [Russia’s] nuclear doctrine [ordered by President Vladimir Putin] is not a spontaneous reaction to current events. For example, the threat of a strike on Russia with long-range missiles. The correction of the doctrine was announced by the President of the Russian Federation several months ago… As for the substance of the issue, the need to strengthen nuclear deterrence, or intimidation, became obvious more than two years ago, when the United States said that its goal was to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia.”
• “Now we will monitor the reaction in the West, where, unfortunately, there are many people in high positions who have assured themselves that Putin is "bluffing," that Russia will "be afraid to answer" and that, therefore, it is possible to behave with impunity for Russia. Therefore, the correction of the doctrine is, in fact, a signal to the sober heads remaining in power in the United States: this is the last warning.”
• “At the same time, in countries that are friendly to us, and simply in neutral ones, there is great anxiety about the possibility of nuclear war. In China, they may already be thinking about it. India, Brazil, South Africa and others would like an early end to hostilities without any conditions.”
• “Russia's task is to convince friends of the absolute need to solve the problem that caused the war. And to prove to them that strengthening our deterrence, also intimidation, is the only way to prevent a general nuclear war, to which Washington's crazy and thoughtless strategy leads the world.”
• “If we talk about what our next steps will be, they are less predictable than the pre-announced correction of the nuclear doctrine. They will depend, among other things, on the enemy's reaction to yesterday's statements of the president. It is clear, however, that verbal warnings and demonstrations will have to move on to practical measures. What exactly, where and when—no one will say publicly now.”

Counterterrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security/AI: 

“Crunchtime for Election Interference: October Is the Month of Mischief,” David E. Sanger and Julian E. Barnes, NYT, 09.26.24.

• “Federal officials battling foreign interference in the coming election say they are entering what may be the most perilous period of the campaign: October, when the prospect for mischief runs high and the time to react runs short. While the Russians make little attempt to hide their support for former President Donald J. Trump, the Iranians—among Moscow’s most important suppliers in the war in Ukraine—desperately want to stop him from returning to office, and are busy hacking into his campaign and dumping whatever they find, as well as plotting to assassinate him.”
• “And China, once expected to be a major player in the election, seems uncertain which candidate it detests more. So, for now, Beijing is focusing on local races, conducting influence operations that have the potential to undermine public faith in the basic democratic process. That has been the essence of a series of private intelligence briefings for election workers and members of Congress recently, as U.S. officials describe the stark, oftentimes confusing battlefield in which disinformation ramps up and the risk of cyberattacks is greatest.”
• “At first glance, those briefings sound right out of the playbooks from 2016 and 2020. But as the briefing went on it was clear that what may unfold in the next month and a half includes some new features that American election officials have never seen before. The scenarios that worry American officials are legion.”
• “While the actual balloting processes being used on Nov. 5 seem safer than in previous elections—97 percent of votes cast will involve some form of paper backup that makes recounts far more reliable—federal officials have been war-gaming the possibility that registration systems become locked up, perhaps in what may initially look like the kind of ransomware attacks that have closed down city services in Baltimore or Atlanta, or that have hit the Seattle airport. The fear is that if it becomes difficult to register voters in the final weeks before an election, it could skew the results on Nov. 5—or, alternatively, give an opening to seemingly pro-Trump election officials who have taken power in a few key states, like Georgia, and give them an excuse not to certify the vote.”
• “Jen Easterly, the head of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, which has primary federal authority for helping the states defend election systems, said the U.S. government this year was undertaking a far more sophisticated effort to make sure the public is aware “of what these actors are doing and how they are doing it… The two main goals are to undermine American confidence in the security of our election and our democratic institutions and to sow partisan discord,” she said in an interview. “Those are the two goals of all our foreign adversaries.”
• “The intelligence agencies’ findings echoed work done this month by Microsoft, which reported a shift by Russian operatives to attack Ms. Harris. Russia appears to have been initially caught flat-footed when President Biden exited the race. And for days after Ms. Harris took his place, Russian operatives continued to push out videos accusing the Biden family of corruption, said Clint Watts, the head of the Threat Analysis Center at Microsoft.”

“The Lies Russia Tells Itself: The Country’s Propagandists Target the West—but Mislead the Kremlin, Too,” Thomas Rid, FA, 09.30.24.

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• “Why Is My Video Game Full of Russian Propaganda?”, Joshua Foust, FP, 09.27.24.

Energy exports from CIS:

“Is a “Shadow Fleet” of Oil Tankers Really Circumventing the Russian Price Cap?”, Sergey Vakulenko, CEIP, 09.27.24.

• “At the end of 2022, Ukraine’s allies established a price cap regime for Russian crude exports, aimed at limiting and controlling Russian revenues. … Russia has chosen to defy the price cap by sourcing tankers and auxiliary services outside of the Western coalition. These tankers, which supposedly knowingly operate in defiance of Western sanctions, have been nicknamed the “shadow fleet.”
• “The article covers 2,849 oil tankers, of which 735 picked up at least one cargo in a Russian port this year, and is based on data collected via the ships’ automatic identification systems, which can be accessed via many ship tracking services. The vessels carried an average of 48 million barrels of oil per day (the rest most likely traveled via pipelines to the refineries).”
• “The data show that Russia employs a relatively old fleet to sell its crude around the world. This may be a conscious strategic choice: ships participating in sanctions-violating activities run the risk of being singled out by the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control, which enforces sanctions, and other forms of exemplary punishment, which would limit their use and force the owner to scrap the vessel. Faced with this threat, the rational strategy is to employ ships with low residual value in order to limit the potential losses.”
• “On the other hand, the fleet serving Russia is not drastically older than that which serves the rest of the world, and there are many ships employed by reputable oil sellers and buyers that are of the same age as or older than those serving the Russian oil trade. With a quarter of the global tanker fleet transporting Russian cargo in 2024, the so-called “shadow fleet” is neither as separate nor as obscure as might have been thought.”

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• “U.S. Ramps Up Hunt for Uranium to End Reliance on Russia,” Ivan Penn and Rebecca F. Elliott, NYT, 09.30.24.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

• No significant developments.

Defense and aerospace:

• See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including  relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Soviet and Russian Policies Toward Egypt: Two Snapshots,” Amr Hamzawy and Rain Ji, CEIP, 09.26.24.

• “Russia has always seen Egypt as a major regional player in the Middle East and North Africa. Its strategy towards the most populous Arab country and the region since 2014 exhibits several parallels when compared to the Soviet Union’s approach between 1955 and 1967.”
• “The Soviet Union leveraged Egypt as a strategic entry point into the region, capitalizing on Egypt’s need to cover the military and developmental aid denied by the West in times of regime crises. Years later, Russia adopted this approach once again, using Egypt as a key foothold in the Middle East and North Africa.”
• “[U]nder Nasser, especially between 1955 and 1967, the constant rejection of Egyptian demands for military and development aid by Western powers pushed Cairo closer to the Soviet Union. When faced with instability at the Egypt-Israel borders and domestic economic conundrums, Nasser’s government sought to leverage Soviet aid to fulfill its ambitious military and industrial plans.”
• “Since 2014, Sisi has aimed to diversify his country’s military and economic alliances by hedging its bets between different superpowers.”
• “Russia, seizing the opportunity to fill another vacuum, has adopted the Soviet Union’s historical tactics to expand economic ties and influence in the region. Amid inconsistent U.S. aid, Egypt has increasingly relied on Russia for military support and economic investment, exemplified by the pivotal El Dabaa nuclear power plant project.”

Ukraine:

• No significant developments.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“COP29 is greenwashing a dictatorship, writes Azerbaijan’s main opposition leader,” Ali Karimli, Economist, 09.26.24.

• “[W]hy the sudden desire to host this global event [COP29]? Quite simply, Mr. [Ilham] Aliyev is interested in laundering his reputation, which has been stained by two decades of authoritarian rule, blatant corruption (repeatedly exposed through diligent work of brave investigative journalists and via Wikileaks and the Panama Papers), and a disdain for the human rights and political liberties of the citizens of Azerbaijan.”
• “For Mr Aliyev, hosting cop29 is a prime opportunity to exploit the international prestige bestowed upon a host state. It is a chance to present Baku as a modern city and Azerbaijan as a rapidly developing country.”
• “Mr Aliyev hopes that Baku’s polished image and Azerbaijan’s participation in global climate negotiations will distract from his regime’s darker side: more than 300 political prisoners, a crushed media and civil society, and the absence of fundamental political freedoms like free speech, freedom of assembly and due process.”
• “The West is also eager to broker peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia … However, Vladimir Putin and Mr Aliyev view the prospect of lasting peace as a threat to Moscow’s influence in the South Caucasus.”
• “Azerbaijan is at a pivotal moment. If allowed true freedom, most Azerbaijanis would opt for democratisation, rooted in the nation’s 1918 parliamentary democracy, before it was incorporated into the Soviet Union. The people seek free elections and the rule of law, yet the authoritarian Aliyev regime instead stifles dissent through mass arrests, bringing Azerbaijan ever closer to Russia and the club of authoritarian heads of state. Azerbaijan’s democratic forces call on the global community not to ignore their fight for democracy and human rights.”

“Moldovan Elections to Spotlight Decline of Support for Russia,” Vladimir Solovyov, CEIP, 09.30.24.

• “Presidential elections in Moldova scheduled for October 20—the first since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—will show how much influence Moscow still wields in the country. Before the war, Russia’s position was fairly strong. However, integration with Europe is now even supported by those Moldovan politicians who were previously considered to be Kremlin puppets.”
• “The war in Ukraine triggered an immediate shift in Russia–Moldova relations, with Chisinau throwing its support behind Kyiv and freezing official ties with Moscow at all levels.”
• “Historically, Russia has sought to wield influence during Moldovan elections. … Today, almost every Moldovan politician wants to avoid being seen as pro-Russian. Even the Party of Socialists—traditionally considered Moldova’s most pro-Russian political force—has changed tack.”
  • “The only exception to this rule is Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor’s political bloc Victory. Shor, who holds Moldovan, Israeli, and Russian citizenship, currently lives in Moscow (he was sentenced in absentia to fifteen years in jail by a Moldovan court for his role in the 2014 theft of $1 billion from three Moldovan banks).”
• “Still, despite the war, there remains significant support for Russia in Moldova. This is reflected both in polling data and in the number of Moldovan voters who back politicians calling for improved ties with Moscow. In a June survey by the U.S. International Republican Institute, 53 percent of Moldovans named Russia as one of their country’s most important economic partners (69 percent gave that title to Romania, and 66 percent to the EU). And 50 percent of Moldovans identified Russia as one of their country’s most important political partners—the EU came in top with 65 percent.”

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• “Turkey and Central Asia are riding together again: The Organisation of Turkic States is a counterweight to Russia,” Economist, 09.26.24.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 11:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

^ Machine-translated.

Slider photo is AP Photo/Julia Demaree Nikhinson.