Russia Analytical Report, Sept. 16-23, 2024

6 Ideas to Explore

  1. “Russia ‘overwhelms’ Ukrainian forces on eastern front,” is the headline FT editors put on Christopher Miller’s dispatch from the embattled town of Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine, where a Russian offensive “has gained steam.” The Ukrainian leadership attempted to force the Russian army to divert its forces from that eastern Ukrainian region to Russia’s Kursk region with last month’s incursion into the Russian province, but “that has not happened,” according to Miller’s analysis. Instead, Russian forces have moved within 8 km of Pokrovsk and just 4 km of Myrnohrad in Ukraine’s Donetsk region.1 If these two settlements fall, “it would endanger the larger cities of Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk and Slovyansk and significantly boost Russia’s strategic position in the region,” Ukrainian commanders told FT. A map of the battlefield in eastern Ukraine by Ukraine’s OSINT group Deep State shows that several cauldrons have begun to form in the area because of Russia’s advances, FT reported. A Russian breakthrough in the area would render the Kursk incursion “an extremely imprudent sideshow,” according to Gil Barndollar of Defense Priorities.
  2. Inside the Kremlin, “there is a growing recognition that the repeated use of the nuclear threat is starting to lose its potency and Moscow's red lines are constantly being crossed,” Catherine Belton and Robyn Dixon write in WP. "There has been an overflow of nuclear threats," a Russian official told WP. "There is already immunity to such statements, and they don't frighten anyone." A Russian academic with close ties to senior Russian diplomats agreed, calling the nuclear option "the least possible" of potential scenarios, "because it really would lead to dissatisfaction among Russia's partners in the Global South and also because clearly, from a military point of view, it is not very effective,” Belton and Dixon write.
  3. The editorial boards of several Western publications, including BG, WP and The Economist, have called on Joe Biden to allow the Ukrainian armed forces to use longer-range Western-supplied missiles, such as Storm Shadows, for strikes inside Russia’s officially recognized borders. The calls were published ahead of Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to the U.S., which began on Sept. 23. Later this week, Zelenskyy intends to hold separate meetings with Biden, Kamala Harris and Donald Trump to promote his “victory plan,” in which the approval of long-range missile use is a key part, according to the Ukrainian leader. Zelenskyy has refused to disclose the plan in its entirety so far; however, the Ukrainian leader did share that "most of the decisions on the plan depend” on Biden, and that these decisions need to be made in October to December, according to Ukrainska Pravda.
  4. Should strikes into Russia by Storm Shadows and ATACMs take place, Moscow’s potential response is likely be directed in the first instance against Great Britain, not America, but it would not involve the use of nuclear weapons, according to Anatol Lieven of the Quincy Institute. One response would be to shoot down British military aircraft operating close to Russian airspace; another would be to destroy British intelligence satellites; yet another one would be to provide Hezbollah and the Houthis with both missiles and the satellite technology to launch much more effective strikes on Israel and Western shipping, Lieven wrote in Unherd.
  5. The Russia-West standoff is “even more dangerous… because we don't have that kind of set-piece of interactions that we did have back in the Cold War,” according to Harvard University Board of Overseers member Fiona Hill. “What we really… needed was more strategic empathy in the sense of really… understanding how Putin worked and what makes him tick,” she told BBC. For instance, Putin is determined to take the entire Donbas region and “it's not necessarily cost that's affected his calculations, but can he keep sending more lads to the front, and can he keep getting them?” Hill said.
  6. David Petraeus of KKR and Andy Yakulis of Vector have drawn lessons for the Pentagon from the Russian-Ukrainian war, arguing that “innovative and low-cost technologies are changing how nations wage war.” “The advent of such tech, moreover, highlights the urgency with which the U.S. must overhaul its defense system, from operational concepts, structures and training to weapons systems, procurement and manufacturing,” they write for WSJ. To replicate Ukraine’s achievements in its fight against Russia, U.S. authorities need, among other things, to “undertake several new initiatives and launch substantial partnerships with weapons system manufacturers… To succeed, the Pentagon… must seriously transform its processes, from military doctrine to weapons acquisition,” they write.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

  • No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

  • No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

“Iranian missile deliveries to Russia: escalating military cooperation in Ukraine,” Fabian Hinz, IISS, 09.18.24.

  • “On 6 September, US media reported that Washington had confirmed that Iran had begun delivering several hundred close-range ballistic missiles to Russia for use against Ukraine.”
  • “Though initial Western concerns focused on the potential use of the longer-range Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar missiles against critical infrastructure deep inside Ukraine, the shorter ranges of the Fath-360 and Ababil suggest that their employment will be more operational and tactical in nature. These systems would likely join existing Russian assets in similar range categories, such as glide bombs, extended-range Lancet loitering munitions, and guided rockets used by the Tornado-S multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) in targeting high-value assets in Ukraine’s rear echelon.”
  • “While being primarily tactical systems in nature, Fath-360s and Ababils could have some strategic implications. Using shorter-range Iranian missiles for tactical strikes could free up Russia’s longer-range Iskander-M SRBMs for additional attacks against targets in Ukraine’s depth. The CRBMs could also be employed against Ukrainian population centres located closer to the front line and the Russian border, such as Kharkiv, Sumy, Mykolaiv and Zaporizhzhia.”
  • “Beyond its immediate impact on the conflict in Ukraine, the missile transfer also signals a deepening of military ties between Russia and Iran. By supplying missiles to Russia, Tehran might be shifting towards more overt support of Moscow’s war effort, marking a departure from the more ambiguous stance it adopted following the delivery of Shahed UAVs in 2022. A key question is what other forms of military collaboration might emerge between the two states, and what Iran stands to gain in return for its missile support. Alongside much-needed financial and material compensation, Iran is reportedly seeking advanced Russian military capabilities, including fighter aircraft, combat helicopters, and air-defense systems, as well as access to Russian expertise and technology to enhance its domestic arms industry."

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

  • No significant developments.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“Russia ‘overwhelms’ Ukrainian forces on eastern front,” Christopher Miller, FT, 09.23.24. 

  • "On a recent sweltering afternoon, the screens of the Ukrainian National Guard’s 15th Brigade command center lit up with alarming footage from the eastern front: the radar was showing a dozen highly-destructive Russian glide bombs barreling towards Ukrainian positions. ... “You can see how they overwhelm us,” grumbled a commander known by the call sign “Phoenix.”"
  • "The Russian offensive gained steam in August, as Ukraine diverted thousands of its most battle-hardened troops to carry out a surprise incursion into Russia’s Kursk region. Ukraine had hoped its audacious operation would force the Kremlin to redeploy resources from Donetsk, but that has not happened. Instead, Russian forces captured several towns, moving within 8km of Pokrovsk and just 4km of Myrnohrad and unleashing the might of the Russian army on both logistical hubs in an attempt to take them before the end of the year. Some commanders and many soldiers see this as the cost of the Kursk offensive and a poor trade-off."
    • "With a combined pre-war population of 100,000, Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad are vital for Ukraine’s defense of the eastern front. If they fall, it would endanger the larger cities of Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk and Slovyansk and significantly boost Russia’s strategic position in the region, Ukrainian commanders warned."
  • "“We see many cauldrons are forming,” said Mykhailo Temper, a battery commander in the 21st battalion of Ukraine’s Separate Presidential Brigade, referring to pockets of Ukrainian troops in the process of being encircled and cut off, forcing them to withdraw. A map of the battlefield updated daily by Deep State shows several have begun to form."
  • "The head of a [Ukrainian] drone reconnaissance unit ... predicted the “total destruction and likely occupation” of Pokrovsk within two to three months."

“Ukraine's Kursk Offensive: Triumph or Tactical Misstep?” Gil Barndollar, NI, 09.19.24.

  • “Hardly anyone expects the embarrassment of Kursk to seriously threaten Vladimir Putin’s hold on power, though Russia was quick to agree to a prisoner swap for some of its conscripts captured in the operation.”
  • “The utility of Kursk in military terms is unclear. The offensive has been justified in myriad ways by Ukrainian leaders. It is an attempt to find a soft spot to strike Russia, a hammer blow to Putin’s prestige, a new threat that will tie down enemy resources in border defense, a feint to draw Russian troops away from the grinding campaign in the Donbas, and a bargaining chip in future negotiations. Kursk may well be some or even all of these things. Its success as an operational raid is undeniable. But the troops sent into Russia, drawn mostly from elite units like the Ukrainian army’s air assault brigades, seem to be in no hurry to leave. Ukrainian officials have spoken about creating a civilian administration for the territory. Their troops are digging in and preparing for the inevitable Russian counter-offensive, which has also been notable for its lack of urgency. But if Kursk is drawing in Russian forces, it is also tying down some of Ukraine’s best soldiers.”
  • “Perhaps Kursk will prove a triumph for the classic paradigm of coupling an operational offense with a tactical defense, forcing the enemy to attack at a time and place of one’s choosing. But Russia has deferred a decision in Kursk, conducting its defense as an economy of force operation while continuing to hammer away in the Donbas, especially at the transportation hub of Pokrovsk. Continued success in Kursk, never mind holding this new salient indefinitely, is predicated upon the ability of the hard-pressed Ukrainian brigades in Donetsk to hold on for the foreseeable future.”

For the NYT podcast of the story of Ivan, a deserter who served as a captain in the Russian Army, fought in Ukraine and then ultimately fled the war and his country with his wife, Anna, see here.

Military aid to Ukraine:

“Let Ukraine hit military targets in Russia with American missiles,” The Economist, 09.19.24.

  • “Every day, Vladimir Putin rains bombs and missiles on civilian targets in Ukraine, spreading terror and trying to shut down the power supply as winter approaches. Ukraine has proposed a proportionate, legal response to these illegal attacks. It would like to use Western missiles to hit military targets in Russia from which Mr. Putin’s forces are launching their barrage. So far, America has denied this reasonable request.”
  • “Unfortunately, America is holding back out of a misplaced fear of escalation. Mr. Putin has said that if Ukraine fires American missiles into Russia, it would be like NATO joining the war, and has promised severe consequences. The threat is not so much that Mr. Putin acts in Ukraine—Russia is already doing everything it can there short of using a nuclear weapon, and crossing that threshold would provoke outrage, including among its allies such as China. The threat is instead that Russia attacks Western interests elsewhere by, say, giving weapons to Iran or the Houthis. This would be destabilizing, but holding back would encourage Russian aggression in Europe—even as Mr. Putin continued to wield the threat of stoking proliferation in the Middle East.”
  • “Mr. Biden’s caution rewards Mr. Putin’s recklessness. What is more, it rubs off on other faint-hearts, such as Olaf Scholz, Germany’s chancellor, thus dividing NATO. Mr. Putin sees that division, and concludes that the West is tired of war and keen to cut a deal that will be to his advantage. Peace talks may indeed begin next year, after America’s election. The best way to raise morale in Ukraine and to strengthen Mr. Zelensky’s hand in any talks would be for the West to show that it is fully behind its ally.”

“Ukraine needs long-range missiles before winter's onset,” Editorial Board, WP, 09.22.24.

  • "This week, Ukraine used its own drones to launch a massive strike that obliterated a weapons depot in Toropets, some 300 miles inside Russia. The audacious strike apparently destroyed a stock of lethal Soviet-era glide bombs — reconfigured with guidance systems and wings. Russia has been using these glide bombs effectively and ruthlessly to target Ukraine's civilian infrastructure, such as power stations."
  • "With more accurate, more lethal Western missiles, many more Russian arms depots, airfields and military bases could be hit. (The Institute of War lists 245 potential targets.) Perhaps that might force Mr. Putin to draw back his deadly cache further from Ukraine's borders."
  • "The stakes are high in this conflict — the survival of democracy, the principle of the inviolability of borders, the future of the European Union and U.S. credibility. Mr. Biden needs to give permission and set the ground rules quickly."

“A new threat to Ukraine,” Editorial Board, Boston Globe, 09.19.24. 

  • “Sometime in the next few weeks, Russia will probably begin launching Iranian-made Fath-360 ballistic missiles at Ukrainian cities, after Tehran recently shipped a batch of the powerful weapons to its neighbor and fellow authoritarian state.”
  • “Iran's ballistic missiles, which move far faster and can carry more powerful warheads, represent a significant escalation — and the transfer calls for a strong response from the United States and its allies.”
    • “First, the Biden administration should speed air defense systems to Ukraine to help the country protect itself.”
    • “Second, the United States and its allies need a new strategy to stop Iran from exporting weapons to its fellow autocracies and to its proxy groups across the Middle East.”
  • “The best way to respond to the transfer of missiles is to ensure the move backfires on Russia on the battlefield, and the best way to do that is by stepping up support for Ukraine. The Biden administration has repeatedly held back or slow-walked aid to Ukraine for fear of escalating the conflict, but Russia's allies have shown no such compunction.”
  • “The US goal should be to alter the military balance enough to end the war in a way that's favorable to a fellow democracy — either through an outright victory or a negotiated end to the conflict that preserves Ukrainian independence and territorial integrity. Conversely, if the Biden administration lets Iranian missiles tip the balance for Russia, it'll all but guarantee that this shipment of Iranian weapons to an adversary of the democratic world won't be the last.”

“Germany, political extremism and the risks to Ukraine,” Gideon Rachman, FT, 09.23.24.

  • "The potential impact of Donald Trump on the Ukraine war and the western alliance is well understood. But what happens in Germany could be almost as important. The Germans are the second-largest national aid donors to Ukraine, after the US, and they are central players in both the EU and NATO. But populist parties, sympathetic to Russia, are on the rise in Germany."
  • "The Alternative for Germany party (AfD) almost won the elections in the state of Brandenburg on Sunday. This is the party’s third strong performance in a row, after coming first in state elections in Thuringia and a close second in Saxony."
  • "Combine the AfD vote with that of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) and something like a third of Germans — and many more in eastern Germany — are voting for populist parties that are militantly anti-migration, hostile to NATO and determined to cut off aid to Ukraine. When Volodymyr Zelenskyy addressed the Bundestag in June, all but four of the AfD’s 77 members boycotted his speech."
  • "Chancellor Olaf Scholz is lagging badly behind in national polls and looks to be heading for defeat in next September’s federal elections. Ukraine’s most ardent supporters worry that Scholz may be tempted to try to revive his political fortunes, by launching a pre-election peace initiative with Russia."
  • "For the Ukrainians, h... — long frustrated by what they regard as the snail-like pace of German aid — any suggestion that the Scholz government may become even more cautious is dismaying. Hawks in Kyiv and Berlin argue that if Putin is not defeated in Ukraine, he will move on to threaten NATO and ultimately Germany itself."

“West Seeks to Increase the Costs of Russia Sanctions Evasion,” Alexander Kolyandr, CEIP, 09.20.24. 

  • “With the aid of sanctions, the European Union has reduced exports to Russia to a record low and completely halted the supply of some key industrial components. Yet that is only part of the picture. Some countries—like Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Armenia—function as intermediaries through which Russia still receives European goods and equipment.”
    • “Prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there was little demand for EU maritime navigation equipment in landlocked countries like Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. But after the start of the war, demand from those countries skyrocketed. In January 2024, Kyrgyzstan imported almost 1 million euros of maritime navigation equipment from the EU, while Armenia’s imports of the same totaled 6.5 million euros.”
  • “European policymakers are not blind to these problems. The EU’s 14th package of sanctions, passed at the end of June, was designed to limit the reexport of EU goods to Russia.”
  • “The EU measures will lead to delays with export agreements. To get around the rules, Russian buyers will likely create ever more complex trading arrangements involving more intermediaries, or they will clear goods through customs in third countries before shipping them to Russia. This will make trade more complicated, more expensive, and slower—as well as increase risks and create supply crises. The result will be more inflation in Russia and a less efficient economy.”
  • “However, none of the existing measures will fully prevent the reexport of sanctioned goods to Russia. If that were the goal, the West would need to take drastic steps like a full trade embargo maintained with military force. Clearly, the West is not ready for such a move. Nor is it willing to take the more moderate step of imposing import quotas on third countries, as that would violate free trade principles.”

“Negotiate with Moscow to end the Ukraine war and prevent nuclear devastation,” Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and Donald Trump Jr., The Hill, 09.17.24. 

  • The hawks in the Biden administration seem to have forgotten that Russia is a nuclear power. They have forgotten the wisdom of John F. Kennedy, who said in 1963, “Nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war.”
  • We should take this advice seriously. Putin has signaled numerous times that Russia would use nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances.
  • Imagine if Russia were providing another country with missiles, training and targeting information to strike deep into American territory. The U.S. would never tolerate it. We shouldn’t expect Russia to tolerate it either.
  • This game of nuclear “chicken” has gone far enough. There is no remaining step between firing U.S. missiles deep into Russian territory and a nuclear exchange. We cannot get any closer to the brink than this. And for what? ...No vital American interest is at stake. To risk nuclear conflict for the sake of the neoconservative fantasy of global “full-spectrum dominance” is madness.
  • It is past time to de-escalate this conflict. This is more important than any of the political issues our nation argues about. Nuclear war would mean the end of civilization as we know it, maybe even the end of the human species. Former President Donald Trump has vowed to end this war, but by the time he takes office, it might be too late. We need to demand, right now, that Harris and President Biden reverse their insane war agenda and open direct negotiations with Moscow.

For more analysis on this subject, see:

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Ukraine's Lessons for the Pentagon,”  David Petraeus and Andy Yakulis, WSJ, 09.19.24. 

  • "The wars in Ukraine, Gaza, and the Red Sea have revealed a pressing reality: Innovative and low-cost technologies are changing how nations wage war. The advent of such tech, moreover, highlights the urgency with which the U.S. must overhaul its defense system, from operational concepts, structures, and training to weapons systems, procurement and manufacturing."
  • "This transformation will require the armed services to undertake several new initiatives and launch substantial partnerships with weapons system manufacturers. This is critical to enabling the U.S. to replicate the achievements of Ukraine -- a country that has sunk about a third of Russia's Black Sea fleet without a meaningful Navy and held off major ground assaults despite being outnumbered and outgunned. In each case, cutting-edge technologies, produced rapidly and at enormous scale, have enabled Ukraine's successes."
  • "Kyiv's efforts underscore that warfare is at an inflection point. Combat now features cheap, mass-produced, one-way air and maritime drones, as well as innovative ground robotic systems. These advances have democratized highly capable but inexpensive unmanned weapons. Though it is still in its early stages, this tech is producing seismic changes on the battlefield."
  • "Grassroots efforts have taken off among the U.S. military's special-operations community and in innovative conventional forces. There are also important albeit modest industry initiatives compared with Ukraine's. Kyiv is constantly updating its military software to contend with Russia's evolving electronic and air-defense capabilities. U.S. service members, meantime, are using only modest funds to buy drone components and teach themselves to assemble them. Discussions with one of the Navy's elite special-operations units indicate it spends 80% of the time building drones and 20% learning to fly them."

“Is the West finally seeing sense on long-range missiles to Ukraine?” Anatol Lieven, Unherd, 09.16.24. 

  • “When it comes to allowing Ukraine to strike deep into Russia with US and British missiles, sense appears — for the moment at least — to have prevailed in Washington, and London has fallen into line. Though senior UK politicians have encouraged Prime Minister Keir Starmer to go against the American line and permit the use of these missiles, we should all hope that his current restraint continues. For while such strikes would help to slow down Russian advances, they would not lead to Ukrainian “victory”, and they would be likely to cause some form of Russian retaliation against Britain — with no certainty that the US would then come to Britain’s aid. The Russian President’s latest statements mean that it would be extremely difficult for him not to react. For he has long been subjected to intense — though mostly private — criticism from Kremlin hardliners, who have argued, not without reason, that he has so far mobilized only a fraction of Russia’s available manpower and resources for the war in Ukraine. More than that, he is judged to have allowed the West to repeatedly violate Moscow’s “red lines”.”
  • “Russia is not remotely likely to respond with a nuclear strike on Ukraine, let alone the West — though a nuclear test is a possibility. Moves towards the use of even tactical nuclear weapons would be Russia’s very last resort. Instead, the danger is that strikes into Russia by Western missiles would lead to more limited retaliation, in turn provoking a cycle of mutual escalation ending in full-scale war.”
  • “Should strikes into Russia by Storm Shadows and ATACMs take place, Moscow has a range of possible responses. These would most likely be directed in the first instance against Britain, not America, so as to send a strong signal without necessarily leading to US retaliation.”

“Interview: Former Trump Russia Advisor Fiona Hill,” BBC, 09.01.24. 

  • "We see, you know, Vladimir Putin going rogue, you know, in terms of, you know, particular people around him, and threatening nuclear response to what's going on the ground in Ukraine. In a way, it's even more dangerous now than it was then, seemingly, because, you know, we don't have that kind of set piece of interactions that we did have back in the Cold War."
  • "You've got, in the case of Vladimir Putin in Russia, someone who's kind of unchecked, you know, in their power and in their, you know, ability to do things like declare war against Ukraine and, you know, invade back, you know, two years ago. Whereas in the Soviet period, you had a Politburo, the Secretary General of the Communist Party, who was also kind of the head of state, and you had a lot more checks and balances in the system."
  • "Putin himself is still convinced he can make some grand bargain deal with the West on his own terms, obviously, and especially over Ukraine and perhaps the division of Europe again in the same way that happened after World War Two—Yalta, when essentially, Churchill and Stalin exchanged notes on bits of paper about divisions of Europe during the Cold War."
  • "I don't think that's likely to be the outcome, but I think, you know, things could change quite rapidly in Russia in unexpected ways. We have to be ready for that, and having those contacts, those relationships, and that deeper understanding of the dynamics there is going to be very important."
  • "What we really kind of needed was more strategic empathy in the sense of really kind of understanding how Putin worked and what makes him tick."

“A new ‘quartet of chaos’ threatens America,” The Economist, 09.22.24.

  • “The military-industrial ties between China, Iran, North Korea and Russia [are growing]. “We’re almost back to the axis of evil”, says Admiral John Aquilino, the recently-departed head of America’s Indo-Pacific Command, referring to the term applied by George W. Bush, a former president, to Iran, Iraq and North Korea. Others draw parallels with the Axis forces of Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan and fascist Italy, with worrying conclusions. “Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea…have now been co-operating for a longer time, and in more ways, than…any of the future Axis countries of the 1930s,” warns Philip Zelikow, in the Texas National Security Review, a military and security journal.”
  • “The members of this new quartet of chaos—whose ideologies range from Islamism to hardline communism—are riven by distrust, and they have very different visions of the world. Yet they are united by a shared hatred of the America-led order, and are keen to deepen their economic and military-industrial links.”
  • “The quartet of autocracies still faces a number of constraints that may limit the extent of its members’ co-operation. One is that their appetite for risk varies. …Another constraint is mistrust, born of a history of feuds and infighting.”
  • “It could, of course, be far worse: the four autocracies have yet to co-ordinate their nuclear weapons efforts or conduct joint military campaigns. Yet for all their shortcomings and differences the autocracies operate according to a simple shared calculus: the more powerful and troublesome each member becomes, the greater the opportunity the others have to capitalize on chaos.”

“Confronting Another Axis? History, Humility, and Wishful Thinking,” Philip Zelikow, Texas National Security Review, Vol. 7, Issue 3, Summer 2024.

  • “We are in an exceptionally volatile, dynamic, and unstable period of world history. During the next two or three years, the situation will probably settle more durably in one direction or another: wider war or uneasy peace. There is a serious possibility of worldwide warfare. Because of the variety of contingencies and outcomes, some involving nuclear arsenals, this period could be more difficult to gauge and more dangerous for the United States than the prior two episodes.”
  • “All three of the major anti-American partnerships during the last hundred years were founded on a common core. In each case, the partners believe that the United States is the leader or anchor of a domineering imperial or neo-imperial system. They believe this hegemonic system strains in every way to block or strangle their nation’s aspirations.”
  • “Under their current leaders, America’s principal adversaries — China and Russia — are fundamentally revisionist powers. Their leaders regard themselves as men of destiny, with values and historical perspectives quite different from the consumerist or social metrics that suffuse much of the world. During the last two years they, Iran, and North Korea have intensified their common work to shore up weaknesses in each other’s defense-industrial bases, with Russia the most active entrepreneur.”
  • “One way to rethink [U.S. military plans in the Pacific and Middle East] is to hedge the reliance on military insurance. For several reasons, the U.S. government has leaned too much on military capabilities to offset deep, chronic weaknesses in all its civilian institutions for foreign work. The United States is turning more frequently to economic sanctions… [But] the overall capacity to guide these efforts strategically relies on a few overburdened civil servants.”

“Washington and the West struggle for a way forward with Putin’s Russia,” Robyn Dixon and Michael Birnbaum, WP, 09.20.24.

  • On each side of the Atlantic, there is uncertainty about how to counter Putin’s aggression without stoking a direct conflict with the man who controls the world’s largest nuclear arsenal.
  • That fear — and the inability, even of Western diplomats with decades of experience dealing with the Kremlin, to see a viable path forward — has revived calls for Cold War-style containment: restricting contacts with Moscow to essential issues and bracing for conflict by boosting Europe and Ukraine’s military capacity.
  • Washington, while arming and financing Ukraine, has yet to define a longer-term strategy to deal with a resurgent Russia, which, for more than 20 years, a succession of presidents hoped to befriend or to write off as irrelevant.
  • Current U.S. policy is “more of a reaction and an outgrowth to events,” said Fiona Hill, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution who has advised multiple administrations on Russia policy and was President Donald Trump’s top Russia adviser at the National Security Council. “We haven’t had a holistic approach,” Hill said.
  • “There are no good choices here — it’s just degrees of bad going forward,” said Samuel Charap, a senior political scientist at Rand, adding that “accepting Russian conditions that are unacceptable” would be a mistake. Instead, he urged “a combination of deterrence and potential negotiations.”

“The losing strategy of underestimating Russia,” Lee Hockstader, WP, 09.19.24. 

  • “[Russia is staging] a massive worldwide naval exercise. That exercise, dubbed Ocean 2024, involved some 400 Russian warships, submarines and support vessels in the North Atlantic and Pacific, as well as the Mediterranean, Caspian and Baltic seas, along with some 90,000 military personnel, according to the Russian Defense Ministry. Chinese vessels also participated.”
  • “Even if Russia's figures are inflated, the operation was a muscle-flexing reminder that Moscow remains plenty equipped to project power across the globe.”
  • “If Russia is a corrupt, retrograde, nihilistic power, it remains a power. Given the West's pattern of misreading Moscow's resilience, it's worth taking stock of the menace it still poses far beyond Ukrainian borders.”
  • “That is not to say Putin intends to launch a nuclear war, or that he believes Russia's fleet could go toe-to-toe with the U.S. Navy. But the longer the war in Ukraine grinds on, the more credence the West should give his bedrock assumption — that Moscow can outlast Washington and its allies through the sheer mass of Russian forces and resources, and by keeping the West off balance with threats of escalation.”
  • “Putin's strategy seems increasingly sound as public support for Ukraine has softened in the United States and parts of Europe. There, hopes have receded that Russia can be defeated on the battlefield, or that its economy will crumble under the weight of U.S.-led sanctions.”
  • “The wishful view of Russia as a paper tiger has been discredited by the failure of Ukraine's counteroffensive last year, and by Putin's ability to shrug off an attempted mutiny last year and repeated military setbacks.”

“U.S. Shrugs as World War III Approaches,” Walter Russell Mead, WSJ, 09.16.24.

  • “The news from abroad is chilling. Washington Post columnist David Ignatius reports from Kyiv that Ukraine is “bleeding out” as its weary soldiers struggle against a numerically superior Russia. The New York Times reports that China is expanding the geographical reach and escalating violence in its campaign to drive Philippine forces from islands and shoals that Beijing illegitimately claims. And Bloomberg reports that Washington officials are fearful that Russia will help Iran cross the finish line in its race for nuclear weapons.”
  • “What none of these stories do is connect the dots by analyzing the consequences of repeated American failure on the widely separated fronts of the international contest now taking place. To see what this all means and where it is leading, we must turn to the recently released report of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy. ... The bipartisan report details a devastating picture of political failure, strategic inadequacy and growing American weakness in a time of rapidly increasing danger.  ... "China and Russia's 'no-limits' partnership, formed in February 2022 just days before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, has only deepened and broadened to include a military and economic partnership with Iran and North Korea. . . . This new alignment of nations opposed to U.S. interests creates a real risk, if not likelihood, that conflict anywhere could become a multitheater or global war." ... To summarize, World War III is becoming more likely in the near term, and the U.S. is too weak either to prevent it or, should war come, to be confident of victory.”

“Does Western Help With Missile Targeting Cross Putin’s Red Line in War Against Ukraine?”, Simon Saradzhyan, RM, 09.18.24.

  • “To hear Vladimir Putin say it the other day, NATO countries assisting Ukraine in collecting and using information for its strikes against targets inside Russia would cross one of his red lines, prompting him to escalate. Speaking on Russian TV Sept. 12, Putin identified two reasons why NATO countries giving Ukraine permission to use their long-range missiles for such strikes would mean that these countries “are at war with Russia.””
    • “The first reason is that for Ukraine to use such missiles, these NATO countries will have to provide Kyiv with satellite intelligence on targets in Russia.”
    • “The second reason is that some of these countries’ specialists would have to enter data into the Western-supplied missiles’ targeting systems because it is something Ukrainians cannot do themselves, according to Putin. “We will make appropriate decisions in response to the threats that will be posed to us,” the Russian leader warned.”
  • “Putin’s reasoning is problematic, however.
    • First, Ukraine has been using U.K.-made Storm Shadow missiles, which Ukraine wants the Biden administration to approve for its use against targets inside Russia along with their French-made analogue Scalp, for strikes inside parts of Ukraine that are controlled by the Russian armed forces and which Putin describes as Russia’s own (e.g. Crimea), at least since 2023.
    • Second, Ukraine has reportedly been using intelligence data collected by satellites operated by entities located in NATO countries, including the U.S., since the first half of 2022.”
  • “It is the damage that Storm Shadows and Scalps could cause to Russia’s military-political infrastructure, as well as to the Kremlin’s efforts to make sure the war stays in the background of most Russians’ lives so that they remain content with his rule, that may cross Putin’s red line, triggering his “appropriate” response to NATO countries.”

“Exiles Cannot Save Russia. But the West Can Learn From—and Should Support—Those Who Fled Putin,” Michael Kimmage and Maria Lipman, FA, 09.18.24. 

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

  • No significant developments.

Missile defense:

  • No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

“Putin struggles to defend red lines as threats lose potency,” Catherine Belton and Robyn Dixon, WP, 09.23.24.

  • “Inside the Kremlin, there is a growing recognition that the repeated use of the nuclear threat is starting to lose its potency and Moscow's red lines are constantly being crossed. Analysts and officials close to senior Russian diplomats said instead that Putin is casting around for a more nuanced and limited response to the West allowing Ukraine to use longer range missiles to strike Russia. "There has been an overflow of nuclear threats," said a Russian official speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject. "There is already immunity to such statements, and they don't frighten anyone."”
  • “A Russian academic with close ties to senior Russian diplomats agreed, calling the nuclear option "the least possible" of scenarios, "because it really would lead to dissatisfaction among Russia's partners in the Global South and also because clearly, from a military point of view, it is not very effective." "All this discussion of the nuclear threshold overexaggerates the threat of such a type of escalation and underestimates the possibility of alternative options," the academic added. "Since the West has a global military infrastructure … a lot of vulnerable points can be found."”
  • “Putin is searching through a range of options to deter Western support for Ukraine and try to enforce his red lines, said Tatiana Stanovaya, the founder of France-based political consultancy R-Politik. "There are options he doesn't want to deploy, and there are options he is ready to review today," she said, and he sees nuclear weapons as the "worst option for everyone including for himself." Nuclear measures or a direct attack on NATO territory would only be considered if "Putin feels there is a threat to the existence of Russia in its current form, when he considers there is no other way out," she said.

“What will you do to avoid a nuclear arms race with Russia and China?” Steven Pifer, BAS, 09.19.24. 

  • “Unfortunately, the nuclear arms control regime is collapsing.”
  • “The next president will have several options.
    • First, he or she could choose just to continue the current strategic modernization program to replace aging systems, while keeping the number of US nuclear warheads at about current levels. (The United States has about 3,700 warheads in its nuclear stockpile, of which some 1,500 are on deployed strategic delivery systems.) The president could determine that this program would suffice to deter nuclear or other large-scale attacks on the United States or its allies, even in the face of a growing Chinese nuclear arsenal.
    • Second, the next president could decide to “upload” nuclear warheads in storage on to intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles that now carry fewer warheads than their capacity and, in the longer term, plan to increase the strategic modernization program. The hope would be that such plans would cause China to reconsider its nuclear expansion while not provoking a Russian build-up. However, if China decided to continue its nuclear build-up and Russia determined that it would maintain strategic forces equivalent to those of the United States, the race would be on.
    • Third, the next president could renew efforts to engage Russia and China in discussions, most likely separate, on nuclear risk reduction and arms control. He or she could offer that, in return for restraint—ideally, an arms control agreement—on nuclear weapons numbers, Washington would make a serious effort to address issues of concern to Moscow and Beijing. Those issues include constraints on missile defenses and long-range conventionally-armed strike missiles.”

“The new red line: Why a prolonged conflict in Ukraine makes a nuclear attack more likely,” Phillips P. O’Brien, BAS, 09.19.24. 

  • "By deferring to Putin’s nuclear threats in the way that the United States has in this war, two very dangerous precedents have been set that, if anything, could make nuclear weapons usage more likely in the future."
    • "First, the United States has provided massive battlefield advantages to Russia throughout the war by overreacting to Russia’s nuclear threats."
    • "Second, the US policies that try to limit Ukraine from going up a (probably mythical) escalation ladder have lengthened this war a great deal."
  • "After two-and-a-half years of full-scale conventional war, many of the assumptions underlying the use of nuclear weapons lie in tatters. Strategists need to rethink and reframe this debate entirely. And it’s important to start soon. The old policies that counselled against escalation because it could lead to nuclear weapons usage might prove to have entirely the opposite effect."

“U.S. Nuclear Strategy and the Future of Arms Control,” Lawrence Korb and Stephen Cimbala, NI, 09.19.24.

  • “According to recent press reports, the Biden administration has approved a secret nuclear strategy designed to adapt U.S. defense planning to the anticipated rise of China as a third nuclear superpower, continuing competition from Russia, and possible challenges from North Korea. The highly classified document approved in March 2024 seeks to adjust what is called “Nuclear Employment Guidance” to a new international environment of competing and colluding, hostile nuclear powers.”
  • “Noted scholar and national security analyst Theodore Postol contends that the Biden strategy is no more than a tacit acknowledgment of a decade-long U.S. technical program to improve U.S. capabilities “to fight and win nuclear wars with both China and Russia.” According to Postol, a relatively new “super-fuse,” already being fitted onto all U.S. strategic ballistic missiles, more than doubles the ability of the Trident II D-5 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) to destroy Russian and Chinese nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in hardened silos.”
  • “China’s nuclear rise is a matter of imminent concern to U.S. political leaders and their military advisors, and China’s ambitions to become a global nuclear superpower merit close attention. On the other hand, China’s nuclear modernization ambitions are not necessarily inconsistent with nuclear strategic stability and the control of future arms races. China has options among alternative nuclear futures, and even under its currently projected levels of deployment (1,000 weapons on international launchers by 2030 and 1,500 weapons by 2035), China would remain within the envelope of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by the U.S. and Russia under existing New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) protocols.”

“Newly found Reductionism in Nuclear Deterrence Russian-Style,” Pavel Baev, PONARS, 09.16.24. 

  • “The rationale behind Putin’s moderate and even timid response to Ukraine’s August offensive into the Kursk region, as well as his reluctance to resort to nuclear weapons, remains unclear. The political humiliation from failing to expel enemy troops from Russia’s territory is evident and appears to be increasing, but Putin still seemingly prefers to endure the humiliation rather than to issue nuclear threats and risk exposing his bluff. The decision-making process regarding the use of nuclear weapons is highly streamlined, a situation exacerbated by the removal of the authoritative (though deeply corrupt) Sergei Shoigu from the position of Defense Minister and the appointment of Andrey Belousov, a career bureaucrat with no expertise in strategic culture.”
  • “It seems probable that Putin believed the Kursk operation was not orchestrated by US leadership. Assuming Ukraine had minimal political agency, he likely concluded that the incursion would deplete available reserves within a few weeks and end ingloriously. While the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) publicly claimed that the operation was planned and prepared by the USA, the UK, Poland and Germany, its actual assessments are most likely quite different.”
  • “An attempt to conceal real intentions cannot be ruled out, suggesting that Putin’s apparent indifference to the prolonged Kursk disaster could be a cover for his preparations to use nuclear options. However, this scenario seems less likely given the apparent lack of concern in Brussels and Washington D.C. In autumn 2022, US intelligence assessed the risk of nuclear escalation during the battle for Kherson, where Russian troops were trapped on the far side of the Dnipro River—as dangerously high. Consequently, the Biden administration “rigorously” prepared a set of responses to address the looming crisis. In August 2024, President Joe Biden, after delivering a valedictory address to the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, went on vacation in California.”

“The head of the central nuclear test site of Russia on Novaya Zemlya Andrey Sinitsyn: ‘If the command comes, we will start testing at any moment,’” Rosssiskaya Gazeta, 09.17.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. 

  • “The test site is ready for the resumption of full-scale testing activities. It is ready in full. The laboratory-testing base is ready. I'm getting ready. If the command comes, we will start the test at any moment.”
  • “The most important thing for us is not to disrupt the implementation of state tasks. If the task is set to renew the trials, then it will be carried out in the set terms.”
  • “[When asked about threats posed by attacking drones:] We have regular training to repel this type of attack. We are also preparing our specialists, instructors, even operators of unmanned aerial vehicles, operators of radio-electronic warfare. That's what we're preparing for, the specialties that are now in demand in the zone of the Special Military Operation. And we are preparing them based on the experience of the Special Military Operation. Finally, it is believed that we are very far from the zone of the Special Military Operation and that it is difficult to reach us, even if the enemy used modern rockets that are transferred to them by the West. However, we have air surveillance posts on duty every day, mobile groups to suppress the [drones]. Various [electronic warfare] complexes are used for the protection of objects. We are constantly ready to repel all kinds of threats. Including the penetration of sabotage-intelligence groups on the island.”
  • “The training of the children was carried out, including the instructors of the Special Operations Forces, who participated in the Special Military Operation. Our complex security system includes the study of all issues related to reconnaissance, radio-electronic warfare, communications, and physical protection. Our soldiers study it very actively. They themselves show initiative and are interested in innovations in this area. This is a real spetsnaz with an arctic bent.”

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

Counterterrorism:

  • No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

  • No significant developments.

Cyber security/AI: 

  • No significant developments.

Energy exports from CIS:

“Kazakhstan’s Hydrogen Ambitions Should Extend Beyond Exports,” Yana Zabanova, CEIP, 09.13.24.

  • "Recent years have seen a wave of global interest in the European Union’s plans to import up to 10 million tons of green hydrogen (hydrogen produced by the electrolysis of water powered by renewable electricity) by 2030. The EU and member states like Germany have stepped up their engagement on hydrogen with a wide range of partners around the globe, including Kazakhstan. In November 2022, the EU and Kazakhstan signed a strategic partnership on green hydrogen and critical raw materials, and in March 2023, Germany opened a Hydrogen Diplomacy Office in Astana. Yet Europe’s vision of ramping up the international hydrogen trade is running into obstacles."
  • "The slow growth of an international hydrogen market and the lack of cross-border transport infrastructure make hydrogen exports from Kazakhstan to Europe unlikely in the short and medium term. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan should capitalize on its green hydrogen potential. Hydrogen can be used to produce higher-value green industrial products, generating positive spillover effects for the economy. The EU can provide valuable assistance to Kazakhstan in promoting R&D, mobilizing investment, creating a solid regulatory framework, and developing strong sustainability standards."

Climate change:

“Why Russia is ambivalent about global warming,” The Economist, 09.19.24. 

  • “[The] tension between catastrophe and opportunity has shaped the contours of the climate-change debate in the world’s fourth-largest carbon-emitter. Russia has signed but has not ratified the Paris agreement, making it the only large emitter outside the pact. It is not only the world’s second-largest producer of oil and gas combined, it also possesses ice-locked coasts and a vast, underpopulated hinterland which, some argue, could use the boost brought by a few degrees of warming.”
  • “Yet the downsides are proving harder to ignore, as Mr. Putin himself acknowledged at a G20 summit this summer. Russia is warming more than twice as rapidly as the world’s average rate, and is experiencing a full range of climate-change-connected calamities for itself. The Ministry of Economic Development has accelerated climate policymaking. A national adaptation plan is in the works, and bills introducing carbon taxes and other mechanisms to regulate greenhouse-gas emissions have also been drafted.”
  • “Frequent severe weather will trigger alarming consequences across Russia’s vast territory, its environment ministry warns. Modern-day infectious diseases will spread and ancient ones may return, as thawing permafrost exposes old burial sites. Arctic infrastructure will crumble as the ground becomes softer. In Yakutsk, locals have already taken to calling one tilting nine-story apartment block built on the thawing ice their own leaning tower of Pisa. The floods that have devastated the Russian far east in recent years will become more common. So, too, will forest fires like the ones this summer that struck Siberia. “Nature is sending us little signals,” says Sardana Avksenteva, Yakutsk’s mayor. Russia, and the world, would be wise to notice.”

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

  • No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“‘Midnight in Moscow’ Review: Losing the Deterrence Game,” John Bolton, WSJ, 09.22.24.

  • “Recall Franklin Roosevelt's appalling observation about Joseph Stalin: "I think if I give him everything that I possibly can and ask nothing from him in return, noblesse oblige, he won't try to annex anything and will work for a world of democracy and peace." Incredibly, Roosevelt's mindset, with variations, persists in many contemporary American leaders. John J. Sullivan worked for two such presidents, first as deputy secretary of state from May 2017 to December 2019, and as U.S. ambassador to Russia from then until September 2022. In "Midnight in Moscow," Mr. Sullivan describes what it was like.”
  • “Describing Mr. Biden's actions prior to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Mr. Sullivan shows that the president's minimal emphasis on deterring Moscow contributed to Vladimir Putin's confidence that he could succeed. At Mr. Biden's June 2021 Geneva summit with Mr. Putin, Ukraine barely came up. Nor did it often arise at lower levels in the following four months, further confirming to Moscow that Mr. Biden gave it low priority. Watching "the calamitous and tragic American withdrawal from Afghanistan," the Kremlin "drew a direct connection to Ukraine," Mr. Sullivan writes. Nikolai Patrushev, Moscow's then-counterpart to our national security advisor, predicted that Ukraine, like Afghanistan, "would be left to 'the whim of fate.'" Mr. Sullivan found the Afghanistan pullout the only point at which even ordinary Russians expressed "to me personally their contempt for the United States."”
  • “The Biden administration, then and now, seemed completely unaware that its behavior was encouraging the Kremlin to believe that a second invasion of Ukraine would produce the same response as Barack Obama's after Russia attacked the Donbas region and annexed Crimea in 2014—essentially no response at all. At least from Embassy Moscow's perspective, there is little evidence that Mr. Biden's policy makers were thinking hard about deterring a renewed Russian assault.”
  • “On Oct. 25, 2021, Mr. Sullivan, then in Washington, attended an intelligence-community briefing at the National Security Council, stressing that Russia was "undertaking a massive aggregation of forces" on its Ukraine border, preparing to invade. This news "changed everything in my life," he writes. He was "struck . . . that the information had come together so quickly." The week before, he had "met with the senior U.S. military leadership in Europe, and no one had raised an alarm about an imminent invasion of Ukraine by Russia."”

“How the Kremlin Finds Ways to Spread Its Messages,” Neil MacFarquhar, NYT, 09.21.24.

  • Major American social media companies sometimes describe the task of identifying disinformation or other malevolent material pushed online by state actors as an endless game of cat and mouse. This week several of them made a significant play in that game by booting RT and its related Russian state-owned media network off their platforms, a move that in the short term will sharply reduce the network’s audience numbers, media analysts said. But the Kremlin, when thwarted in the past, has quickly devised new ways to get its message out, they noted, and RT can move to other outlets for distribution.
  • Take what happened just two years ago, when Canada and the European Union banned RT outright. Viewership in different countries for channels like RT Deutsch and RT France immediately cratered, but within days new pages appeared that exactly mirrored RT under different, unrelated names that were not blocked and popped up in internet search results, experts noted. “This does not collapse their audience,” said Bret Schafer, a senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund, referring to the new ban. He cowrote a report examining the continued spread of RT content after the earlier ban, which was prompted by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. “If you are a really hardcore RT follower, you’ll find a way to access it,” he said, “What this really hurts is their ability to span platforms, to reach new audiences, to get in front of people who are not actively seeking out RT.”
  • During the past decade, the Kremlin moved to strangle all independent domestic media, driving much of it out of the country. But it also worked to create a state-run international broadcast network to end what President Vladimir V. Putin called a Western “monopoly” on information globally. RT is the central pillar of that network The online pages of RT and other, related outlets like Sputnik built a worldwide audience on Facebook of more than 88 million followers, according to data released on CrowdTangle early this year. RT’s basic message that the West remains an imperialist aggressor meshed well with widespread distrust of the United States and Europe.
  • Ultimately, one strength of Russian media overseas has been its ability to constantly appear in new guises, experts said. “They have been very adaptive to different cultures,”  Sarah Ann Oates, an author of a new book, “Seeing Red: Russian Propaganda and American News,”  said, “RT is a lot like a hydra, you cut off one head and another one springs up.”

“'Why am I being singled out?' a Russian state media pundit asks,” Josh Rogin, WP, 09.20.24. 

  • “In the run-up to the 2024 presidential election, the U.S. government is cracking down on what it calls a vast "Russian government-sponsored foreign malign influence operation" targeted at audiences inside the United States and around the world. ... one related case stands out: a situation where, unusually, authorities are going after not just Russian companies and executives, but a U.S. citizen who works as a media personality on their payroll. On Sept. 5, the Justice Department unveiled criminal charges against Dimitri and Anastasia Simes, two dual Russian American citizens who have residences in both countries but now live in Moscow.”
  • “Notably, in the new set of actions by the Justice Department, Simes is the only pundit charged with attempting to help his employer evade sanctions, despite the fact that many U.S. citizens work for various Russian state media outlets with sanctions. ... Even in the case of Tenet Media, a pro-Trump U.S. news site allegedly covertly funded by the Russian government, the U.S. government did not charge the paid commentators. That forms the basis of Simes's claim he is being selectively prosecuted. "If this is really about sanctions violations, then why am I being singled out? The sanctions violation charge is an excuse, a pretext, because they don't like what I'm saying," he told me, noting that his show isn't broadcast in the United States.”
  • ‘His explanations deserve some skepticism, and ultimately their credibility and legal value should be decided in the courts. But on the broader issues surrounding his case, Simes raised legitimate questions. If the real reason Simes is being prosecuted is not breaking sanctions or money laundering but because of the opinions he's espousing, what are the implications for other journalists working abroad?”

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Putin wants Russia’s youth to become ultranationalist patriots. Many are all in,” Francesca Ebel, WP, 09.19.24.

  • “About 7 in 10 Russians between ages 18 and 24 — 69 percent — support Russia’s war in Ukraine, according to an August poll conducted by the Levada Center, an independent polling group; at the same time, nearly as many — 67 percent — say they are not following the war closely or at all. But 66 percent of young Russians also support moving toward peace talks, according to the poll — a higher proportion than the overall population, of whom only 50 percent support moving toward such talks.”
  • “Since Putin ordered tanks with the letter Z scrawled across them into Ukraine in February 2022, the Kremlin has drastically expanded its focus on youth — introducing militaristic programs in schools and unleashing a barrage of hyper-patriotic messaging. While thousands of young people have left Russia, those who remain are part of a new generation that is redefining what it means to be Russian and will shape the nation’s outlook for decades. As much as any seizure of Ukrainian territory, experts say, this will be a tangible legacy of Russia’s war.”
  • ““This new generation is being raised on the idea that the West hates us,” said a former senior Kremlin official who still operates in government circles and who, like some other Russians interviewed by The Post, spoke on the condition of anonymity to speak about sensitive matters. “Now everyone, including young people, must be for the war, for traditional values and religion — you must be performatively patriotic.””
  • “The Youth Army, created by the Russian Defense Ministry in 2016 to prepare children for war, has … seen a significant increase in membership, rising to at least 1.3 million children and teenagers since the invasion. Its members must all take an oath: “I swear to remain forever true to the Fatherland and to the Brotherhood of the Youth Army!””

“Putin casts his net over Stalin’s exonerated victims,” Tony Barber, FT, 09.23.24.

  • In 2013, during a televised question-and-answer session with Russian citizens, Vladimir Putin took the opportunity to condemn Joseph Stalin’s persecution of millions in the Soviet era. “We do not need to go back to the dark period of 1937,” he told viewers. “Stalinism is associated with a personality cult and mass violations of the law, with repression and camps. There is nothing like this in Russia and, I hope, never will be again.”
  • Why, then, are the authorities revoking some of the official rehabilitations of Stalin’s victims that have occurred, in fits and starts, since Nikita Khrushchev’s rule in the 1950s and 1960s? It risks reopening painful wounds in society, and even tempting people to draw comparisons between Putin and Stalin, at a time when the Russian president puts a premium on national unity in the war against Ukraine.
  • According to a draft order prepared this month by Igor Krasnov, Russia’s chief prosecutor, the reversal of rehabilitations is limited in scope. Supposedly, it only affects “Nazi collaborators” and “traitors to the motherland” deemed to have been wrongly rehabilitated after Stalin’s death. Among these categories are said to be Ukrainian and Baltic nationalists as well as Russian “bandit groups” that resisted Soviet rule. Clearly, the all-important context for Krasnov’s order is Putin’s assault on Ukrainian nationhood and his crackdown on dissent at home.
  • For most of his rule, Putin has confined himself to praising some “good” aspects of the Stalin era, above all the victory over the Nazis, while distancing himself from the dictator’s mass repressions. But the review of some rehabilitations is a sign that even this version of history may soon be altered to suit Putin’s purposes.

Defense and aerospace:

“Putin’s purging of defense ministry suggests he is preparing for a long war,” Nikolai Petrov, Chatham House, 09.20.24. 

  • The senior leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense has been in a fever since April 2024, when the decision was made to remove Sergei Shoigu as minister. 10 people have lost their posts, with eight of them having been arrested... What are the aims of the purge?
    • First, Putin is dissatisfied with how the defense ministry has performed during the war on Ukraine. This requires punishment.
    • Second, rather than simply replacing Shoigu at the very top, there is clearly an ongoing effort to replace his entire team.
    • Third, the removal and arrest of senior defense officials is meant to help blow off steam among both citizens and the military following battlefield frustrations and failures in Russia’s war on Ukraine.
    • And fourth, the purge is meant to instill fear and maintain relative efficiency in a system without genuine impartial enforcers of the rules (e.g., courts) and lacking the oversight provided by real public political competition.
  • Putin is consolidating his control over the elite by merging past semi-independent corporations into one single pyramid upon which he sits. One key driver for this increased central control is a desire to have more direct authority over the use of the colossal budget funds allocated to the war effort. The fact that the Kremlin is doing this today indicates that it is planning for a long war and military confrontation with the West. As the war continues, so may the purge – and that means senior defense officials will remain on their toes.
  • See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

  • No significant developments.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including  relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Putin Is Doing Something Almost Nobody Is Noticing,” Lilia Yapparova, NYT, 09.23.24.

  • “In November 2022, my editors2 asked me to be careful about what I ate and stop ordering takeout. Initially, I didn’t think much of it. But I soon realized the importance of their advice when, just one month later, my colleague Elena Kostyuchenko discovered she had been poisoned in Germany, in a probable assassination attempt by the Russian state.”
  • “Such stories have become routine. Last year, an investigative journalist, Alesya Marokhovskaya, was harassed in the Czech Republic; in February, the bullet-riddled body of a Russian defector, Maxim Kuzminov, was found in Spain. In both cases, the Kremlin was assumed to be involved. Russian opposition figures know well that even in exile they remain targets of Russia’s intelligence services.”
  • “There are also the hundreds of thousands of Russians who left home because they did not want to have anything to do with Vladimir Putin’s war — or were forced out, accused of not embracing it enough. These low-profile dissenters are subjected to surveillance and kidnappings, too. Yet their repression happens in silence — away from the spotlight and often with the tacit consent, or inadequate prevention, of the countries to which they have fled. It’s a terrifying thing: The Kremlin is hunting down ordinary people across the world, and nobody seems to care.”
  • “Many Russians abroad are vulnerable and lack protection. In the summer of 2023, civil society groups petitioned the European Parliament to help with the legalization of people who refused to fight in Mr. Putin’s army; there was no meaningful response. Political asylum is routinely denied not only to draft dodgers but also to activists — sometimes “with monstrous arguments that ‘the situation in Russia is normal and you can count on a fair trial,’” Margarita Kuchusheva, an immigration lawyer in Cyprus, told me.”

Ukraine:

  • No significant developments.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Reframing of '08 War With Russia Infuriates Georgians,” Ivan Nechepurenko, NYT, 09.16.24.

  • For months, politics in the Caucasus nation of Georgia has been roiled by a tussle between those advocating closer relations with the West and those who lean more toward Russia. Now, as the country prepares for critical elections in October, Bidzina Ivanishvili, the leader of the governing party has ignited a political firestorm by saying that Georgia should apologize for a 2008 war with Russia for which many Georgians blame Moscow
  • His comments at a rally in Gori, a town that was briefly occupied by Russian forces in 2008, were quickly condemned by pro-Western activists and the opposition. They also highlighted how Georgia's relationship with the West has deteriorated over the past months.
  • On Monday, the United States announced that it had imposed sanctions against two Georgian officials and two activists associated with a pro-Russian political group that it said were involved in violent suppression of protests this year.
  • ''He asked Georgians to apologize for the invader,'' said ex-Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili, who is serving a six-year sentence in Georgia on charges related to abuse of power that he says were politically motivated. ''We won't be able to wash away this shame for a while.''
  • In 2009, an independent fact-finding mission set up by the European Union found that the war was initiated by ''a sustained Georgian artillery attack'' that was not ''justifiable under international law'' but that ''much of the Russian military action went far beyond the reasonable limits of defense.'' The report also accused all sides, including separatist formations, of violating international humanitarian law. But many Georgians blame Russia for the war, which is why Mr. Ivanishvili's comments blaming the country's opposition set off such an uproar.

“Armenia and the U.S. Election,” Anna Ohanyan and Nerses Kopalyan, NI, 09.17.24. 

  • “As the U.S. election campaign enters its decisive home stretch, with the candidates now nominated, there will be much focus on how the outcome will impact the wars in Gaza and Ukraine.”
  • “That’s because the region is currently being reshaped by a below-the-radar geopolitical shift: Armenia’s strategic tilt away from Russia and toward the West. This coincided with Armenia’s hostile neighbor Azerbaijan deepening its ties with Russia, with Vladimir Putin visiting Baku on August 18 for meetings with President Ilham Aliyev. Azerbaijan’s latest wave of purging and arresting peace activists, scholars, and a few civil society actors makes Armenia’s tilt away from Russia strategically significant for U.S. policies in South Caucasus and Central Asia.”
  • “Should Donald Trump emerge victorious in November, a basic assumption of Armenia—that the United States would reward the move and welcome an ally that is an emerging democracy on the basis of shared values—will be upended. The result could be a more aggressive and revisionist Azerbaijan and a new war. Should Kamala Harris win, there will be greater continuity and perhaps deepening of relations with Armenia, even if the United States does not abandon Azerbaijan.”
  • “Deepening U.S. engagement with Armenia reduces Russian influence over Eurasia by weakening Russia’s multi-regional power projection from Eastern Europe and the Caucasus to Central Asia. Strengthening U.S.-Armenia relations and achieving border stability with Azerbaijan enhances the U.S. goal of Western transit and connectivity with Central Asia, which is crucial for maintaining influence in the global economy and countering China’s presence in the region. Additionally, supporting Armenia, a stronger democracy than Georgia, helps the United States bolster democracy in the South Caucasus, benefiting both the European Union and Euro-Atlantic integration.”

“The World has the Chance to Hold Azerbaijan Accountable,” Thomas Becker, NI, 09.22.24. 

  • “A year ago, Azerbaijani forces launched a brutal military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh that, within days, expelled a population of 120,000 ethnic Armenians who had called the region home for millennia. Besides issuing a few perfunctory statements, the international community did nothing to hold Azerbaijan to account. Now, it has a unique chance to make amends.”
  • “From November 11-22, Azerbaijan will host the UN Climate Change Conference, or COP29, the most important gathering of world leaders to address climate change. ... COP29 can serve as a forum for state participants to pressure Azerbaijan to cease its abuses and also propose a concrete path for the multitudes who were banished from their homeland.”
  • “While Aliyev dismisses condemnation by organizations like Freedom House or UNHR, he does care about his status among world leaders, particularly in Europe, which is the primary purchaser of Azerbaijan’s fossil fuels. Oil and gas production accounts for 92.5 percent of Azerbaijan’s export revenue, so Aliyev’s political survival hinges on his reputation in fora like COP29.”
  • “The conference may be the last opportunity for the international community to condemn Azerbaijan and prevent the total erasure of Nagorno-Karabakh’s population. Those who fled should be allowed to go back—or receive significant compensation.”

“From Mines to Markets in the Middle East and Central Asia,” Fabian Villalobos, et al, RAND, September 2024. 

  • There is substantial untapped potential in the AOR [area of responsibility]  that, if developed, could contribute toward diversifying global supply chains. There is a broad distribution of resources and reserves in these countries; some extraction or processing is already underway in more than half of them.
  • The AOR's reliance on external suppliers for several critical minerals, including China and Russia, reflects supply chain vulnerabilities. China and Russia have previously leveraged supply chain dependencies for economic coercion. Countries in the AOR may be able to fulfill some of this demand, which presents an opportunity to build intra-regional value chains and de-risk.
  • The potential for local conflict and disruption underscores the importance of monitoring and mitigating conflict to ensure the security and stability of mineral supply chains. Although Afghanistan, Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, and Yemen possess significant mineral resources, these countries have been highlighted on the conflict-affected and high-risk areas list. In the region, Kazakhstan is a strategic supplier of critical minerals.
  • Access to critical minerals is needed to meet the stated climate goals of countries in the AOR. Climate plans, as described in these countries' Paris Agreement Nationally Determined Contributions, outline these countries' intent to increase deployment of clean energy technologies and diversify economies by developing minerals and manufacturing sectors. Some have explicit plans to manufacture clean energy technologies. These plans may increase demand for critical minerals in the region, necessitating access to capital, mapping, workforce development, and the transfer of technical capabilities.

“Have President Tokayev’s Reforms Delivered a ‘New Kazakhstan’?” Aliya Tlegenova and Serik Beysembaev, CEIP, 09.18.24. 

  • Over the last two years, Tokayev’s regime has learned how to create the illusion of change while doing little of substance. Big ideas—like that of a “new Kazakhstan”—have turned out to be simply efforts to fill the vacuum left by years of political stagnation. Genuine reform would entail the introduction of meaningful constraints on the power and privilege of Kazakhstan’s rulers. But the regime is obviously not ready for such a step.

“Why Is Belarus Freeing Political Prisoners?” Artyom Shraibman, CEIP, 09.23.24. 

  • Belarus has freed about 110 political prisoners in four waves in the last three months. The most recent release was on September 16, when thirty-seven people walked free. Of course, this is a drop in the ocean of political repression in Belarus. Over 1,300 political prisoners remain behind bars, including opposition leaders, journalists, and activists—and new arrests continue.  Nevertheless, this is Belarus’s way of sending a signal, and there can only be one possible addressee: the West. Alexander Lukashenko’s regime may be benefiting from the ongoing war in Ukraine, but he still wants to prepare for a less rosy future.
  • Lukashenko’s image in the eyes of the West is so bad that it couldn’t possibly be rectified by a handful of symbolic pardons.
  • Whatever Lukashenko was seeking by freeing political prisoners, the very fact of this move suggests that Minsk is uncomfortable about total dependence on Moscow over the long term. An alliance with Russia guarantees Lukashenko’s authority, but the Belarusian leader is clearly concerned it might be difficult for him to continue to rule—and then hand power to a successor—if he’s completely isolated from the West. The current honeymoon period with Moscow is not seen as permanent by Minsk.
  • It’s entirely possible that Lukashenko will not even be able to start a dialogue with the West, because of the huge gulf between the two sides. Even if such a dialogue did get under way, it would be easy for officials in Moscow, or hawks in Minsk, to derail any budding rapprochement. Still, the overture itself is telling. Minsk has revealed that it does not consider its current status as an isolated Russian vassal a return to historical normality, but a temporary deviation.

Footnotes

  1. “Ukraine's invasion of the Russian region of Kursk this summer was a propaganda triumph. But it has given Kyiv control of just .006% of Russia's landmass. By contrast, Moscow's forces occupy nearly 20% of Ukrainian territory—despite the infusion of $200 billion of Western military and other aid,” according to Lee Hockstader’s commentary in WP.
  2. Lilia Yapparova (@lilia_yapparova) is a special correspondent at Meduza, an independent Russian news outlet.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 11:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

^Translated with assistance from machine translation.

Slider photo: AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka, File.

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