6 Ideas to Explore

1. Ukraine’s Kursk offensive has dented Vladimir Putin’s war narrative and triggered “questions” among the Russian elite about the point of the war, Bill Burns of CIA and Richard Moore of MI6 asserted in their first public appearance together, according to FT. Speaking at an FT event, both men said there was no sign that Putin’s grip on power had lessened, however. The two spy chiefs believe that the Ukraine conflict “has demonstrated that technology, deployed alongside extraordinary bravery and traditional weaponry, can alter the course of war.” “Ukraine has been the first war of its kind to combine open-source software with cutting-edge battlefield technology, harnessing ... satellite imagery, drone technology ... cyber warfare, social media, open-source intelligence, uncrewed aerial and seaborne vehicles and information operations—as well as human and signals intelligence—at such incredible pace and scale,” they wrote in a joint op-ed for FT. Both in their oral remarks and in their op-ed, Burns and Moore stressed that America’s and Britain’s biggest challenge was China’s rise rather than Russia.
2. Ukraine’s incursion into the Kursk region caught Russia’s intelligence establishment by surprise and that was not the intelligence establishment’s first blunder, Michael Schwitz argues in NYT. In March, the Federal Security Service (FSB) ignored specific warnings from the U.S. and failed to prevent a deadly terrorist attack on a Moscow area concert hall, while 10 months earlier, the agency was caught off guard when Yevgeny Prigozhin launched his mutinous march. “And it was the FSB that famously informed Russia's military that its troops would be greeted with flowers when they launched their invasion of Ukraine in February 2022,” Schwitz reminds us. “Part of the problem, experts say, is a lack of coordination within the military and intelligence operations,” he writes. “It is a problem that has bedeviled the Russian war effort from the first days of the invasion, but one that Mr. Putin appears reluctant to address.”
3. Alexander Gabuev of CEIP argues in FT that prospects for meaningful diplomacy in the coming months have diminished in what makes it likely that the Russian-Ukrainian war will drag on. “Western leaders should be prepared to stand by Ukraine for a long and painful period,” he warns. According to America’s former U.N. envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, however, there are four factors why the war may end in 2025, including the Kursk incursion, significant limitations on Kyiv’s and Moscow’s abilities to escalate militarily and trends in the West that “do not favor an indefinite extension of the war.” After U.S. presidential elections, America and its allies “should embrace a negotiated settlement of the war in Ukraine as our overarching objective,” engaging “Russia and Ukraine on modalities of negotiations and terms for a reasonable outcome” while maintaining a vigorous support for Ukraine, Khalilzad proposes in NI.
4. Cooperation between EU member states, as well as U.S. commitment to its allies in the region, can create a Europe that will be more secure even as “Russia’s so-called pivot to the East will heighten its challenge to European security,” according to Thomas Graham’s report for CFR. The top priorities for advancement of “a free, prosperous and secure Europe within an EU-NATO framework with beneficial trade and investment ties with Russia that is responsibly managing geopolitical competition” should include stabilizing Ukraine and the NATO-Russia frontier. The priorities should also include accelerating construction of NATO’s European pillar and reducing Russia’s scope for hybrid warfare, according to CFR’s Graham.
5. Retired Russian Lt. Gen. Yevgeny Buzhinsky has weighed in on the debate in the country’s pundit/expert community on whether and how conditions for use of nuclear weapons should be liberalized in Russia’s strategic documents, calling for adding a preventive strike to scenarios of first use. Buzhinsky—one of Russia’s leading experts on the country’s nuclear posture—told MK that conditions for use of nuclear weapons by Russia outlined in its 2014 military doctrine and 2020 principles of nuclear deterrence policy “cover all the risks as a whole.” “However, it is quite possible to amend these documents to lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. ... We are talking about a preemptive, preventive strike,” the former deputy head of the Russian Defense Ministry’s International Military Cooperation department told the MK daily. At the same time, the general said nuclear weapons should not be used within the framework of Russia’s war in Ukraine unless “NATO attacks us with its regular troops.” Speaking to the same daily for the same article, honorary chairman of Russia’s Council for Foreign and Defense Policy Sergei Karaganov argued that Russia’s existing doctrinal documents, which regulate the use of nuclear weapons, are outdated. “It is high time to ... amend the nuclear doctrine to make it clear that any attack on our territory must get a nuclear response,” according to Karaganov, who has repeatedly penned articles calling for the liberalization of Russia’s conditions for use of nuclear weapons to re-instill fear of a nuclear war in the Western elites and public.
6. “What is the value of a Russian’s life?” This is the question that Denis Kasyanchuk and Alexander Kolyandr ask in their article for Russia’s The Bell. One answer is $1.97 million, according to Kip Viscusi, from Vanderbilt University, who is one of the world’s leading experts in value of statistical life. Another is 61 million rubles ($673,600), according to calculations by Russian economists, which tend to be lower than ones by their Western counterparts. Another answer is 5-8 million rubles ($55,219-$88,351), according to surveys about how much people are willing to spend on reducing mortality risks. The final answer is 11 million rubles ($130,000), which is the maximum compensation for each Russian soldier killed in action. “The lower the compensation payouts to the families of dead Russian soldiers, the less incentive the state has to protect the lives of its citizens,” Kasyanchuk and Kolyandr conclude.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“Russia in the Occupied Territories of Ukraine,” Nikolay Petrov, SWP, 09.05.24

• “… [A]fter two and a half years of war, Luhansk is the only region that Russia has been able to fully occupy, while it con­trols only about 58 per cent of the Kherson region, 72 per cent of the Zaporizhia region and 61 per cent of the Donetsk region. In other words, Moscow holds only some 70,68 per cent of its so declared “new regions” in Ukraine’s east and south.”
• “Between 24 February 2022 and 31 December 2023, the OHCHR recorded 687 cases of arbitrary detention of civilians (journalists, civil serv­ants, public officials, civil rights activists and others) for opposing the occupation. The real figure is likely to be much higher, because most cases are not public. Depor­tations, arbitrary violence, including sexual violence, ill-treatment and torture are com­monplace, not only in the detention centers but throughout the territory under Russian control.”
• “The naturalization of the population in disputed territories, known as passportization, has long been a tool of Russian policy. In the occupied territories of Ukraine, it is also used to force the population into obedi­ence. There are numerous reports of people being denied basic rights and access to basic services, including health care and medicine, wages, pensions and other social services, because they do not have a Rus­sian passport… In other words, without a Russian passport it is almost impossible to live in the Russian occupied territories.”
• “Russia’s occupation policy pursues several goals. It is supposed to strengthen the bridge­head for further confrontation with Ukraine and the West; to demonstrate the success of the “Special Military Operation” and the care of the Russian state for the local population. It also aims to reduce the financial burden of war and occupation making the occupied territories to economically self-sufficient. The restoration and development of “new regions” is the largest infrastructure project in Russia at present, with the goal of their rapid and complete “integration” and demonstration of the advantages of living as part of Russia. This is a continuation of the war through economic means. It is very important for the Kremlin to demonstrate that it is more effective here than on the battlefield.”
• “The colossal resources invested in the project for the restoration of “Donbas and Novorossiya” are evidence of the long-term plans of the occupation – “Russia forever.” At the same time, the Kremlin tries as much as possible not to advertise the extent of its spending on the occupied territories so as not to provoke negative reactions from its own population. There seems to be an awareness that Russians’ support for the inclusion of the “new regions” is restrained and will not extend to large-scale spending of budget funds.”

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:¹

“Danger in Donbas as Ukraine’s front line falters,” The Economist, 09.08.24.

• “Russian tactics have not changed substantially since the fall of Avdiivka in February. Then as now, they depend on glide bombs and an artillery superiority that still ranges from at least 3:1 up to 10:1 in some sections. The operations are usually led by groups of two or three infantry soldiers, usually dismounted, though recently some have been observed using Lada sedans with the doors removed for a quick exit, Mad Max-style. The groups prowl forward at any opportunity.” 

• “Recently the Russian pressure has grown more insistent and wider, spanning a front from Pokrovsk to Vuhledar in the south. This, Ukrainian soldiers believe, is evidence their enemy has been reinforced with new reserves. The wide front gives the Russians more options to attack, says Mike Temper, the nom-de-guerre of a mortar-battery commander with the 21st battalion of Ukraine’s Separate Presidential Brigade. 'They are using their numerical advantage to see gaps in our defense, and develop where they can.'”

• “The Russians are also pressing their advantages in drones and electronic warfare. This is especially evident in their search and strike system, which links advanced reconnaissance drones to strike drones, artillery and aviation.”

• “The pushback around Pokrovsk—the Ukrainians’ first for months in the area—has given soldiers hope that they will be able to fight off an encirclement. Perhaps the Russians have even overstretched. But most remain cautious.” 

“The Kursk Offensive: A Net Assessment ,” Mark N. Katz, NI, 09.05.24.

• “There have been widely differing assessments of the impact of Kyiv’s surprise military offensive, resulting in Ukrainian forces occupying territory inside the Kursk region, which Russian forces there did little to resist.  Some see it as a great triumph for Kyiv, which has humiliated Putin, bolstered Ukrainian morale, and given Kyiv a bargaining chip for seeking Russian withdrawal from internationally recognized Ukrainian territory now occupied by Putin’s forces...Others, however, see the Ukrainian occupation of Russian territory in the Kursk region as a forlorn hope since it has not stopped Russia’s grinding advance against Kyiv’s forces inside Ukraine.”
• “It seems highly likely that if Russia’s advance in eastern Ukraine continues, then Kyiv will have to redeploy its forces now in Kursk back to eastern Ukraine. A Ukrainian push to occupy even more Russian territory, even if successful, would take more Ukrainian troops away from eastern Ukraine, thus facilitating Putin’s advance there. None of this bodes well for the Ukrainian position.”
• “By itself, the Ukrainian occupation of Russian territory in Kursk may not discomfit Putin for long. But if it leads other actors to conclude that Ukraine’s Kursk offensive shows that Putin is unable to respond effectively to whatever they are contemplating, then Putin and his generals could find themselves overwhelmed with crises. It all depends on whether Ukraine’s Kursk incursion has a cascading effect or not.”

“Ukraine Needs a New Storyline: The Kursk offensive suggests a new strategy for victory—but it will require the West to change some policies,” Raphael S. Cohen, FP, 09.05.24.

• “Two and half years into the war, Kyiv desperately needs its own tagline. It now has the chance to get one.”
• “While the counteroffensive came as a surprise to many—including officials in the U.S. Defense Department—the push into Kursk makes perfect sense. Ukraine, after all, needed to do something big. It needed to show that while the Russian military may be vast, it is still uneven and, in places, brittle. Ukraine also proved that, despite Western and particularly U.S. hand-wringing about the threats of nuclear escalation that have characterized the Kremlin’s messaging on the war from the start, Putin is not as trigger-happy with his nuclear arsenal as the messaging implies.”
• “But while the Kursk offensive is a first step, Ukraine will need to offer more if it wants to maintain the momentum that it now enjoys. Perhaps most importantly, it needs to find a new strategic storyline. Ukrainian leaders need to convince both their constituencies at home and backers abroad that they have a plan to win the war. Indeed, Zelensky has promised to present such a plan to U.S. President Joe Biden and his two potential successors this month.”
• “Inferring from Ukraine’s actions, the country’s new, if still unstated, strategic tagline seems to have three relatively well-defined parts: survive, strike, and seize. … Thus, the question that remains is what the next and final element of Ukraine’s theory of victory might be, if it exists at all. Essentially, Ukraine has two basic choices—supplant or settle.”
• “At the end of the day, it’s up to Ukraine to choose whether the tagline for its war is survive-strike-seize-supplant or survive-strike-seize-settle. Or perhaps it is something else entirely. … And then, it will be incumbent on Ukraine’s supporters in the United States and around the world to give it the resources and policy room to make that storyline a reality.”
• “Ukraine’s leadership owes its partners and allies—as well as its own public—its theory of how it will win. If not for the West’s sake, then certainly for the sake of the Ukrainians themselves.”

“Outgunned and outnumbered, Ukraine’s military is struggling with low morale and desertion,” Ivana Kottasová and Kostya Gak, CNN, 09.08.24.

• “Two and half years of Russia’s grinding offensive have decimated many Ukrainian units. Reinforcements are few and far between, leaving some soldiers exhausted and demoralized. The situation is particularly dire among infantry units near Pokrovsk and elsewhere on the eastern front line, where Ukraine is struggling to stop Russia’s creeping advances.”
• “CNN spoke to six commanders and officers who are or were until recently fighting or supervising units in the area. All six said desertion and insubordination are becoming a widespread problem, especially among newly recruited soldiers.”
• “'Not all mobilized soldiers are leaving their positions, but the majority are. When new guys come here, they see how difficult it is. They see a lot of enemy drones, artillery and mortars,' one unit commander currently fighting in Pokrovsk told CNN. He also asked to remain anonymous. 'They go to the positions once and if they survive, they never return. They either leave their positions, refuse to go into battle, or try to find a way to leave the army,' he added.”
• “Unlike those who volunteered earlier in the war, many of the new recruits didn’t have a choice in entering the conflict. They were called up after Ukraine’s new mobilization law came into force in the spring and can’t leave legally until after the government introduces demobilization, unless they get special permission to do so.”

“Plenary session of the 9th Eastern Economic Forum. The President of Russia took part in the 9th Eastern Economic Forum plenary session,” Kremlin.ru, 09.05.24.

• “Regarding the military aspect of the matter, I have already said that the enemy wanted to make us nervous, to start rushing around, to redeploy troops from one sector to another and to stop our offensive in key sectors, primarily Donbass. The liberation of Donbass is our high-priority goal. Did the enemy succeed? No, it accomplished nothing.”
• “First, our Armed Forces stabilized the situation and started gradually pushing the enemy from border territories. Second, nothing hampers our offensive, and this is the most important thing. On the contrary, by redeploying its sufficiently large and well-trained units to border areas, the enemy weakened its positions in key sectors, and our troops expedited their offensive operations. We have not made such impressive territorial gains for a long time. The day before yesterday, the Vostok group seized a triangle measuring seven by five kilometers during one strike. The Centre group is operating very successfully in the Donetsk and Pokrovsk sectors. We are gaining several square kilometers, rather than several hundred meters, there – four by five, three by five kilometers, etc. This is the second thing.”
• “And last but not least, the enemy has been sustaining enormous losses in personnel and equipment. I will not list everything now. The Russian Defense Ministry provides this data, and I consider it objective as it can be confirmed by several sources. On the one hand, there is a risk of crushing the most crucial sectors of the front as the losses may lead to the entire armed forces losing combat capacity. This is exactly what we are trying to achieve.”
• “We respect our friends and partners, whom I consider to be sincerely interested in resolving all the issues pertaining to this conflict. This is primarily the People's Republic of China, Brazil and India. I am in constant contact with our colleagues on this issue. I have no doubt that the leaders of these countries – we have trustful relations with them – are genuinely keen to help sort out all the details of this complicated process, which, of course, I would like to recall, began with the coup d’état in Ukraine in 2014.”
• “So, what is to be done? We just need to look for such forms and guarantees that could work somehow or to any extent. Still, the core security guarantee is the growth of the economy and military potential of the Russian Federation itself, reliable and sustainable relations with our partners and allies.”
• “Are we ready to negotiate with them? We have never refused it. However, not on the basis of some ephemeral demands but on the basis of the documents that were agreed and actually initialized in Istanbul.”

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• “The battle between drones and helicopters in Ukraine,” The Economist, 09.04.24. 

Military aid to Ukraine:

“Ukraine Needs Both More Weapons and the Permission to Use Them,” Editorial Board, Bloomberg, 09.09.24. 

• “It makes little sense to keep tying Ukraine’s hands. There are, by conservative estimates, hundreds of military targets — including communications centers, training grounds and air bases from which attacks are being launched or resupplied — that long-range missiles could target. Even if Putin moves many out of reach, he can’t protect all such targets, and their removal would provide Ukraine more protection and greater warning time.”
• “Of course, Putin’s dark threats of nuclear escalation shouldn’t be ignored. He has repeatedly warned the West about “red lines,” from the supply of battle tanks to aircraft, only to downplay them once they’ve been crossed. That’s entirely logical: The use of tactical nuclear weapons would be a strategic mistake for Putin, giving him no clear battlefield advantage, galvanizing the West and likely losing remaining support from Beijing. And there’s little reason to think that long-range missiles — which, remember, have already been supplied and used within Russian-occupied Ukraine — will be any different.”
• “The Biden administration is right to make its own interests and red lines clear. Western forces should not be deployed to fight in Ukraine, and the use of Western weapons against civilian targets within Russia should be proscribed. But granting Ukraine greater freedom to bring the fight to Putin makes both strategic and moral sense, putting pressure on Russia’s overstretched forces and its economy while giving Ukraine more means for its self-defense and better leverage for negotiations.”
• “[O]nly Putin ultimately has the power to end the vast destruction and killing he has unleashed. He must be convinced that that is his best option.”

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

“Putin thinks he can still win a war of attrition in Ukraine. Fighting will drag on while the prospects for diplomacy remain slim,” Alexander Gabuev, FT, 09.05.24.

• “A month into Ukraine’s incursion into Russian territory, one thing is clear: the Kremlin is ready to continue the war of attrition that Vladimir Putin still believes he can win. Hopes that the conflict can be brought to a swift end by some form of military or economic shortcut have so far been dashed. Now, what started as Putin’s war is increasingly becoming Russia’s war, boosting the Kremlin’s ability to ignore the costs.”
• “Putin is in no rush to push back the invader at any cost. His military focus this year has been on eastern Ukraine, where Russian troops are gnawing their way through Ukrainian defences. For now, it’s enough for the Kremlin to patch the breach in the Kursk area by haphazardly scrambling military units from all over Russia while continuing to employ the most combat-ready fighters in the Donbas. The Russian president believes that he needs to advance as far as possible before winter sets in, and that he can afford to deal with Kursk later. This helps to explain why the Kremlin, despite the embarrassment, is not rushing to use some of the most potent tools at its disposal, including tactical nuclear weapons.”
• “The truth is that for every setback in this war, Putin has been able to push back and extort a price from the Ukrainians — and, increasingly, from Kyiv’s western allies.”
• “Given the determination to fight on in both Moscow and Kyiv, there is unlikely to be a shortcut to a swift victory for either side. With diminished prospects for meaningful diplomacy in the coming months, the war will drag on. It remains unpredictable and is only getting more dangerous. Western leaders should be prepared to stand by Ukraine for a long and painful period.”

Key Findings of “Gold Rush: How Russia is using gold in wartime,” John Kennedy, Elena Grossfeld, Zsofia Wolfordn and Thomas Kenchington, RAND, 09.09.24. 

• “Gold has become a strategic resource for the Russian state since the invasion of Ukraine. It has a bearing on Russia's revenue generation capacity and its monetary policy; it is central to Russia's international campaign for de-dollarization; it is a major feature of Russia’s engagement in Africa and Central Asia; and it plays an important part in Russia's wartime trade relations.”
• “Russia intends to become the world's number one producer of gold, but there are signs that domestic production is flatlining. However, Russian interests hold sizeable stakes in the gold industries of several countries of the former Soviet Union and Africa.”
• “Over the last decade, Russia became the world's most important sovereign buyer of gold. In addition, Russia also holds an undisclosed — and possibly sizeable — amount of gold and precious stones.”
• “Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, Russia transferred the entire holdings of the National Welfare Fund into yuan (60%) and gold (40%). In hindsight, this was an indication that Russia was preparing for increased Western economic pressure.”
• “Gold is Russia's most important revenue-generating metal, but it is not, and will not become, a substitute for oil exports. Western economic pressure has also had a significant impact on Russia's gold mining industry, which also has high dependence on Western equipment and servicing.”
• “Gold has been crucial to Russia's most important wartime trading relationships, specifically with China, Turkey, Iran and the UAE. It has also been using gold as means to pay for hard currency, weapons and other goods.”

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• “Risky business: How to save the G7 deal to mobilize $50 billion for Ukraine,” Charles Lichfield, Atlantic Council, 09.03.24.

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

“Will the Ukraine War End in 2025?” Zalmay Khalilzad, NI, 09.09.24. 

• “There are four reasons why the coming year could be the year the Ukraine war ends—and plenty of reasons why it might continue for the foreseeable future. Principal among these is the huge gap between Putin and Zelensky on potential terms. The factors favoring an end to the war appear to be gaining. What are these factors?”
  • “First, there is Ukraine’s brilliant and bold military move into Russia in the Kursk region.”
  • “Second, at the same time, Ukraine’s advance into Russia has been risky. Some 10,000 troops had to be pulled away from their previous critical defense mission in Eastern Ukraine.”
  • “Third, both Russia and Ukraine’s options for major military escalation are very limited and risky.”
  • “Fourth. Trends in the United States and Europe do not favor an indefinite extension of the war.”
• “In the aftermath of our elections, the United States and our allies should embrace a negotiated settlement of the war in Ukraine as our overarching objective. In support of this goal, the strategy must be two-pronged: support for Ukraine must remain vigorous because, without that, Putin will not be interested in a negotiated settlement, and an equally vigorous engagement with both Russia and Ukraine on modalities of negotiations and terms for a reasonable outcome.”

“History As It Happens: A peace plan for Ukraine, revisited,” Martin Di Caro, Washington Times, 09.02.24.

• “In this episode of History As It Happens, Anatol Lieven of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft analyzes Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s peace plan — a plan whose details are largely unclear. With the Ukrainian gains in Kursk, Mr. Zelenskyy hopes to gain leverage in any peace talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has shown little desire to end hostilities.”
• “What will it take to get Mr. Putin to the negotiating table? “It’s the usual business of sticks and carrots,” said Mr. Lieven, who directs the institute’s Eurasia Program. “The stick is that Russia has suffered very badly. … If Russia were to aim for a complete victory, or even perhaps a much bigger victory including the capture of really big cities like Kharkiv, you probably need much greater conscription and mobilization in Russia and much higher taxes. That would not be popular,” Mr. Lieven said as to why Mr. Putin could be persuaded to seek a negotiated settlement rather than escalate the war further.”
• “As for Mr. Zelenskyy, the precise details of his peace plan, which he intends to share with the Biden administration as well as both candidates for president, remain under wraps. However, Mr. Lieven says the foray into Kursk indicates Mr. Zelenskyy will be willing to negotiate a possible withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukrainian territory rather than seeking an outright military victory.”

“Interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S.V. Lavrov for the RBK media holding ‘on the sidelines’ of the Eastern Economic Forum, Vladivostok,” RBC, 09.06.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. 

• “V.A. Zelenskyy is not ready for honest negotiations. The West will not let him participate in such negotiations. Their goal is to, if not dismember (although this is also mentioned), then at least radically weaken the Russian Federation and deliver it a “strategic defeat.” The West will not allow him to make steps toward us. V.A. Zelenskyy is no longer able to understand what is in the interests of the Ukrainian people. He has betrayed these interests many times over.”
• “The [spring 2022] Istanbul principles guaranteed that Ukraine would not join NATO, ensuring its non-aligned status and outlining security guarantees for Ukraine so that it could feel secure. Ukraine's non-accession to NATO is part of the Russian Federation's guarantees. These principles are still under consideration. At least, we are ready to return to them, but, of course, taking into account the new realities. After all, more than two and a half years have passed since that time. These realities were outlined by President V.V. Putin on June 14 of this year during his address at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He articulated a path to resolving the situation between Ukraine, Russia and the West.”

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:²

“Intelligence partnership helps the US and UK stay ahead in an uncertain world,” Bill Burns and Richard Moore, FT, 09.06.24. 

• “The CIA and SIS stand together in resisting an assertive Russia and Putin’s war of aggression in Ukraine. We saw it coming, and were able to warn the international community so we could all rally to Ukraine’s defense. We carefully declassified some of our secrets as a new and effective part of this effort.”
• “Putin will not succeed in extinguishing Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence...We will continue to aid our brave, resolute Ukrainian intelligence partners.” 
• “This conflict has demonstrated that technology, deployed alongside extraordinary bravery and traditional weaponry, can alter the course of war. Ukraine has been the first war of its kind to combine open-source software with cutting-edge battlefield technology, harnessing commercial and military satellite imagery, drone technology, high and low sophistication cyber warfare, social media, open-source intelligence, uncrewed aerial and seaborne vehicles and information operations — as well as human and signals intelligence — at such incredible pace and scale.” 
• “Beyond Ukraine, we continue to work together to disrupt the reckless campaign of sabotage across Europe being waged by Russian intelligence, and its cynical use of technology to spread lies and disinformation designed to drive wedges between us.”
• “For both the CIA and SIS, the rise of China is the principal intelligence and geopolitical challenge of the 21st century, and we have reorganized our services to reflect that priority. Meanwhile, counterterrorism remains core to our partnership, and we work closely with others to protect our homelands and thwart the resurgent threat of Isis. In the Middle East, SIS and the CIA have exploited our intelligence channels to push hard for restraint and de-escalation.” 
• “Maintaining technological advantage is vital to ensuring our shared intelligence advantage.”
• “There is no question that the international world order — the balanced system that has led to relative peace and stability and delivered rising living standards, opportunities and prosperity — is under threat in a way we haven’t seen since the cold war. But successfully combating this risk is at the very foundation of our special relationship. Trust, openness, constructive challenge, friendship. These characteristics can be relied upon into the next century, as can our shared determination to remain champions for global peace and security.”³

“Ukraine’s Kursk offensive has triggered doubts among Russian elite, spy chiefs say,” John Paul Rathbone, FT, 09.07.24. 

• “Ukraine’s Kursk offensive has dented Vladimir Putin’s war narrative and triggered “questions” among the Russian elite about the point of the war, two of the world’s leading spy chiefs have said.”
  • “CIA director Bill Burns said Kursk was “a significant tactical achievement” that had boosted Ukrainian morale and exposed Russia’s weaknesses. It has “raised questions . . . across the Russian elite about where is this all headed”, he said.”
  • “MI6 chief Richard Moore...said the Kursk offensive was “a typically audacious and bold move by the Ukrainians . . . to try and change the game” — although he cautioned it was “too early” to say how long Kyiv’s forces would be able to control the Russian territory they had seized.”
• “Both men said there was no sign that Putin’s grip on power had lessened.”
• “Both also said it would be wrong to take Putin’s threats of nuclear escalation lightly but that the west should not be unnecessarily intimidated. “Putin is a bully and is going to continue saber-rattling from time to time,” Burns said.”
• “Asked whether Iran had shipped short-range ballistic missiles to Russia, Burns said that doing so would 'mark a dramatic escalation.'  Moore said that if Russia did use Iranian missiles in Ukraine, alongside the drones that Tehran had already supplied, it would be 'very obvious.'”
• “Recent Russian sabotage operations across Europe were 'reckless,' Moore said, describing Russian intelligence as 'having gone a bit feral... Asked if Russian intelligence might be conducting similar sabotage operations against the US by abetting illegal migration across the Mexico border, Burns said: 'It’s something we are very sharply focused on. Part of that is a function of so many Russian agents [being] kicked out of Europe. So they are looking for somewhere to go instead.'”
• “Despite the threat posed by Russia and the risk of conflagration in the Middle East, both Burns and Moore stressed that their biggest challenge was China’s rise. Burns said the funds that the CIA devoted to China had tripled over the past three years to 20 per cent of the agency’s budget.”

“From the Ukraine Conflict to a Secure Europe,” Thomas Graham, CFR, September 2024.

• “A free, prosperous, and secure Europe (including Ukraine) within a NATO-EU framework beyond Russia’s borders with beneficial trade and investment ties with Russia, capable of responsibly managing geopolitical competition, is a vision that is imaginable, achievable, and adequate for U.S. interests. A strong deterrence and defense posture could maintain an uneasy peace, with the hope that arms control agreements and consultative forums would eventually reduce the costs of maintaining peace and ease tension along the NATO-Russia frontier stretching from the Barents Sea through the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. Restored diplomatic, commercial, cultural, and scientific relations with Russia—even if less robust than in the past—would be mutually beneficial.”
• “What ... does the West need to understand about Russia and Ukraine—and about itself—to advance its interests vis-à-vis Russia?”
  • “Russia: Russia ... will remain what it has been throughout history: a country with an authoritarian political system driven by an expansionist impulse, lagging economically and technologically behind the world’s leading powers yet determined to remain one of them (even at the cost of extraordinary sacrifice). For the foreseeable future, it will retain imposing military capabilities—including one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals and world-class space and cyber assets—as well as highly capable conventional forces, once reconstituted. Moreover, Russia’s so-called pivot to the East will heighten its challenge to European security.”
  • “Ukraine: As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stresses, the war is existential for Ukraine. Depending on its outcome, the country could cease to exist as an independent state, absorbed de jure into the Russian Federation or reorganized as a protectorate. If Ukraine manages to thwart Russia’s designs and survives as an independent state, the war will determine how much of the territory within its internationally recognized 1991 borders remains under Kyiv’s control... Regardless of Ukraine’s postconflict trajectory, it will remain an object of Russian desire.”
  • “Europe: Europe has been shocked out of its geopolitical slumber by two developments: Russia’s massive invasion of Ukraine and the possibility that Donald Trump will return as the U.S. president ... the answer to Europe’s security problem is not simply more money and expanded capacity. To lessen dependence on the United States, Europeans will also have to integrate their defense efforts.”
  • “The United States: both schools of thought [those in U.S. who argue for retrenchment and those who seek to restore the United States’ global leadership] agree that Europe has to do more to provide for its own defense. Retrenchers and restorers would, of course, proceed in different ways.... Crudely put, most retrenchers would leave Europe to its own devices, with little concern about whether it succeeds or fails. Restorers would be inclined to work closely with European governments to gradually shift the lion’s share of defense responsibilities to them while ensuring continued partnership in securing the continent, as well as on a range of global issues.”
• “Advancing the vision of a free, prosperous, and secure Europe within an EU-NATO framework with beneficial trade and investment ties with Russia that is responsibly managing geopolitical competition is a multiyear project that will stretch well into the next decade and beyond.”
  • “Top priorities [for such an advancement should be:
    • Stabilize Ukraine.
    • Stabilize the NATO-Russia frontier.
    • Accelerate the construction of NATO’s European pillar.
    • Reduce Russia’s scope for hybrid warfare.
  • Intermediate Goals:
    • Anchor Ukraine in the West.
    • Resolve the Ukraine crisis.
  • The Destination
    • Firmly establish a European pillar in NATO.
    • Reduce the expense of maintaining a stable Russia-NATO front.”

“Planning for a Post-American NATO. Europe Must Prepare for a Second Trump Term,” Phillips P. O’Brien and Edward Stringer, FA. 09.06.24. 

“U.S. Strategy Should Be Europe First, Then Asia,” A. Wess Mitchell, FP, 09.06.24.

• “The United States’ ability to cope with the pressures of great-power competition hinges on securing Europe and preserving the trans-Atlantic alliance. While it is true that there are serious and pressing national security problems in Asia and the Middle East, these can only be dealt with effectively once the Atlantic foundation of Washington’s global strength is secure. To conduct a future pivot to Asia, the United States needs a fulcrum in Europe—not vice versa.”
• “It is an advantage to the United States that the first big crisis of the 21st century broke out in Europe.”
  • “First, it gives the United States the opportunity, in a region of accustomed U.S. strength, to make a stand and stop aggression now, before it can spread to other places.”
  • “Second, the crisis on Europe’s eastern frontier has given Washington the opportunity to reawaken its defense industrial capability and produce what is most needed in a war: ammunition.”
    • “For both reasons, U.S. strategy should center on securing Europe before turning greater attention to Asia.” 

“Isolationism Doesn’t Protect” in “Letters to the Next President,” Arancha González, FP, 09.09.24. 

• “We have seen the United States undermining the same multilateral system that it helped build. It is time you double down on regaining the trust of your friends and allies. They will make you stronger and safer. Investing in developing the European pillar within NATO and cooperating on the defense industry with European nations will not only ensure that Europe takes responsibility for its defense, but it will also strengthen the United States to project its power globally, particularly in the Asia-Pacific.”
• “In a world more intertwined than ever before, isolationism doesn’t protect. Disengaging from Ukraine sends a message not just to Russia; China reads it, too. Disengaging from NATO is heard not just in Brussels; it is felt in the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan as well as the Middle East.”
• “It is worth investing in a shield that would protect and preserve democracy for future generations. This will require a combination of measures including bolstering cybersecurity; regulating social media platforms and introducing transparency in algorithms; providing warnings and counterarguments for misinformation before citizens face it; and strengthening U.S. election systems, including election certification processes and protecting the right to vote.”
• “We will both be stronger if we trust and respect each other, if we work hand in hand to protect our democracies, and if we can still count on the United States as our ally.”

“Europe is Split Over How to Thwart Putin’s Spies,” Helen Fitzwilliam, Chatham House, 09.09.24.

• “[There has been] a string of incidents highlighting the spike in Russian spying in Europe and beyond. Last month’s prisoner swap between Russia and the West revealed how deeply Kremlin spies have penetrated European capitals… Ensuring the release of such people is how Putin retains the loyalty of his security services. As the exchange shows, Russia’s shadow war with the West has intensified with widespread use of saboteurs, electronic warfare, attacks on infrastructure and an alleged attempt to assassinate the head of a German armaments firm.”
• “The aim is to destabilize and intimidate Ukraine’s supporters. How can the West formulate a response to these hybrid attacks? While many western allies have been criticized for their complacency, those on the front line in the Baltic states and new NATO member Finland have begun putting extra measures in place. Marek Kohv, of the International Centre for Defence and Security, a leading Estonian think tank, believes holding [Russian spies] to account acts as a deterrent, increases public awareness and promotes vigilance to intercept potential operations. ‘Our counterintelligence is highly effective at countering,’ he told The World Today, but experts add that you need political will.”
• “In April, Finland closed its 800-mile border with Russia after its neighbor began weaponizing migration, pushing across more than a thousand migrants from the Middle East and Africa since last year. Russian border guards are members of the FSB, so this was no normal migration but a way of overwhelming the authorities, said Minna Alander of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. The Finns are driven by what they call pragmatic pessimism to constantly improve their defenses and prepare for the worst, explains Alander, which is why they are arguably one of the most war-ready states in Europe. They have studied their neighbor and have long understood that Russians are ‘completely different’, she adds, a fact that may have been lost elsewhere in the West.”
• “Ejecting more than 600 Russian intelligence officers with diplomatic cover in Europe after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine eviscerated the Kremlin’s spy network. Yet there was a glaring exception—Russia’s diplomatic mission to the European Union in Brussels, which escaped sanction. According to analysts, EU officials, keen to keep their mission in Moscow open, opposed plans by Belgium’s State Security service to expel 20 personnel including chargé d’affaires Kirill Logvinov, alleged to be a senior intelligence officer. Spies under the cover of an EU diplomatic passport can go anywhere in the Schengen area. This makes it easier for them to pursue a new Kremlin tactic of hiring criminal gangs as proxies to carry out acts of violence or disrupt the supply of weapons to Ukraine.”
• “The war in Ukraine has changed the nature of that threat, however. Russia’s somewhat random recruitment of agents on encrypted apps such as Telegram shows a certain desperation, suggests Ingesson. ‘It all looks a bit sloppy,’ but it makes them more unpredictable. Operations were far more professional and followed certain rules during the Cold War, he explained, but now Moscow has a more urgent need to undermine support for Kyiv.”

“The Year of Elections Has Been Good for Democracy,” Francis Fukuyama, FA, 09.04.24.

“Reagan Didn’t Win the Cold War,” Max Boot, FA, 09.06.24.

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• “The Trans-Atlantic Partnership Still Matters” in “Letters to the Next President”,” Catherine Ashton,  FP, 09.09.24.
• “Russia’s Espionage War in the Arctic,” Ben Taub, New Yorker, 09.09.24.
• "This UN General Assembly Will Feel Like a Wake, Not a Rebirth," Andreas Kluth, Bloomberg, 09.05.24.
• “USA, China, Russia: Multiplying Deterrence,” Ivam Timofeev, Valdai Club/RIAC, 09.05.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. (These organizations are affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“China’s Double Threat to Europe: How Beijing’s Support for Moscow and Quest for EV Dominance Undermine European Security,” Liana Fix and Heidi Crebo-Rediker, FA, 09.05.24.

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

“We Must Invest in Our Aging Nuclear Arsenal,” Mike Turner, NYT, 09.06.24. 

• “Russia, as it pursues its war on Ukraine, is not only aggressively modernizing all three legs of its nuclear triad, it is also developing a nuclear weapon to launch into space that could destroy satellites and grind our economic, international security and social systems to a halt. The Biden administration, after being challenged by a group of bipartisan members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence this year, declassified its intelligence about this weapon but has not released any further information about Russia’s space-nuke program since then. Russia’s use of an antisatellite nuclear weapon in space would be a catastrophic attack on Western economic and democratic systems.”
• “Our current nuclear arsenal is insufficient to face these fast-evolving threats… Our current missile defense systems protect the United States from some incoming missiles but may not be able to effectively handle large-scale or multidirectional attacks. Complicating matters further, Russia and China are developing advanced weapon systems like hypersonic missiles, which are harder for our defense systems to track because of their high speed and maneuverability.”
• “In addition to being able to adequately detect new nuclear threats, there must be a concerted effort to coordinate with our allies on technologies that can defeat them.”
• “The time is now to fully integrate these systems, invest more in our nuclear-arms program and protect the homeland from an increasing array of threats. Only through this kind of decisive action and cohesive strategy can we make certain that our nation’s defense is as formidable as the challenges we face.”

“Political Scientist Karaganov Calls for Altering Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine: A Step Up the Escalation Ladder,” former Russian Defense Ministry deputy head of the Main Directorate of International Military Cooperation retired Lt. Gen. Yevgeny Buzhinsky quoted in MK, 09.02.24. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

• “General Buzhinsky clarifies that the concept of "nuclear doctrine" as such does not exist at all. If we do not deviate from legal accuracy, then the cases of Russia's use of nuclear weapons are listed in two documents: the [2014]⁴ military doctrine and the 2020 principles of nuclear deterrence policy.”
  • “The first document lists two conditions in which Moscow can [use nuclear weapons]: [1] an attack on Russia or its allies using weapons of mass destruction… and [2] an attack on Russia using conventional, non-nuclear weapons, given that such an attack threatens our territorial integrity and sovereignty.”
  • “The 2020 document [provides for two additional conditions for use of nuclear weapons]: [3] a confirmed launch of ballistic missiles by an enemy state and [4] the destruction of critical elements of our infrastructure, which will make our nuclear response impossible.”
  • “The cases specified in these [two] documents cover all the risks, according to Buzhinsky. However, it is quite possible to amend these documents to lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons… We are talking about a preemptive, preventive strike. The US military doctrine already has all this spelled out. Why shouldn't we also include this point based on the principle of reciprocity? Incorporating the 2022 document’s two [additional] conditions [3 and 4] into the [2014] military doctrine… will not be superfluous.”
• “[Buzhinsky believes that] a so-called limited strike will not help to stop the escalation: These are all inventions of the Americans, who believe that this can be done somewhere in Europe. A limited strike will be followed by a global conflict with mutual destruction of us, Europe and the USA. That is why everyone thinks that this is a scare tactic, that no one will use nuclear weapons.”
• “The expert rejected the idea of ​​using nuclear weapons within the framework of the special military operation even in a "limited" format. But a scenario in which Russia will still press the red button still exists: In the Ukrainian theater of military operations, we can easily cope with conventional weapons. But if NATO attacks us with its regular troops, then a strike may be carried out on decision-making centers or, for example, on the Ramstein base. Yes, this will entail a global conflict. But the West does not understand this. There is an unscared generation in power there, one which has not seriously fought with anyone since Vietnam.”

“Political Scientist Karaganov Calls for Altering Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine: A Step Up the Escalation Ladder,” MK.ru, 09.02.24. Clues from Russian Views. 

• “The current nuclear doctrine has long been outdated. It is a product of our state of mind of the 1980s. Not even being completely aware of this, by adopting it we cleared the way for NATO’s expansion and now for its direct aggression against us. By failing to amend our nuclear doctrine and carry out appropriate military-technical actions, we have exacerbated our strategic position dramatically, which could lead to our failure or necessity for massive use.”
• “Tactically, our military are winning on the battlefield, but we have opened the way to a grueling, long and protracted war to be won by the one who is stronger economically,” Karaganov emphasized. “Concrete proposals for amending the nuclear doctrine and plans for conducting―if it ever comes to that―a war with limited use of nuclear weapons exist, and they sit in certain offices. But they do not leave those offices.”
• “Our indecision is becoming dangerous and bordering on recklessness, to say the least. It is dangerous for us and for the whole world. Not only have we opened the way for the aggressor, but we are also clearing it for more aggressions around the world. It is high time to stop doing this and amend the nuclear doctrine to make it clear that any attack on our territory must get a nuclear response,” the expert said.”
• “The President always makes the final decision on the specific form of such a response,” Karaganov said. “However, the main point in the nuclear doctrine and deterrence theory is to make the adversary aware that he can and will get a nuclear strike in the event of aggression.”
• “'If Moscow does not alter the wording in the doctrine and does not go up the escalation ladder, we are in for trouble.' Sergei Karaganov foresees two scenarios: 'either we condemn ourselves to a long and bloody war, or we will have to allow the massive use of nuclear weapons as a gesture of despair.'” 

“Russia’s Burevestnik Is No Wonder Weapon,” Decker Eveleth, FP, 09.03.24.

• “On Monday, Reuters reported my discovery that Russia is building what appears to be the first deployment site for its experimental nuclear-powered cruise missile, the Burevestnik—which the United States calls the SSC-X-9 Skyfall. The facility is almost complete, suggesting that the new missile may enter service with the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces soon.”
• “The site is located at a nuclear warhead storage facility, reportedly called Vologda-20, roughly 400 miles from Russia’s borders with Finland and Estonia, and contains nine fixed launch positions supported by missile-handling facilities and nuclear warhead storage bunkers. With the launch positions, missiles, and warheads all present at the same site, it’s likely that the Burevestnik will be an on-alert missile ready to launch at a moment’s notice.”
• “There is significant hype surrounding the Burevestnik: U.S. officials have decried Russia’s development of “radiation-spewing, nuclear-powered cruise missiles” and called the system a “flying Chernobyl.” Unlike standard cruise missiles, which are powered by jet engines, the Burevestnik uses an unshielded nuclear reactor for propulsion. This gives it the ability to fly almost unlimited distances, at least in theory. If deployed, the Burevestnik would be the first missile of its kind actually fielded.”
• “Because of the problems with communications and accuracy, the Burevestnik likely does not have the capability to truly surprise NATO. A better way of understanding the Burevestnik is as a straightforward way to penetrate U.S. and NATO air defenses, capable of flying more-or-less directly toward its target at extreme low altitudes.”
• “The real problem with Burevestnik is that Russia may be compelled to launch it preemptively in a crisis because its fixed deployment site is vulnerable to attack. Moreover, the missile has a very long travel time to intercontinental targets compared to intercontinental ballistic missiles, requiring many hours rather than minutes. A Russian leader may feel pressure to launch a Burevestnik before the United States has a chance to maneuver its air defense assets into place and before the launch site can be destroyed by NATO missiles—including, for example, the conventional hypersonic missiles the United States will deploy to Germany in 2026.”
• “The Burevestnik is not a wonder weapon, and the challenges it poses for NATO security are neither new nor unmanageable. It may seem scary on paper, but the technical infeasibility of its mission limits its threat. Much of the hype around the missile stems from Russian saber-rattling about its capabilities. In this context, perhaps one of the best things NATO can do to stay strong in a crisis is to call out this weapon for what it is—a terror weapon, not a silver bullet. So far, the only people the Burevestnik has killed are its own designers. Combating Russian propaganda will help keep it that way.”

For more analysis that is relevant for this section see 

• "How to Read Russia’s Next Nuclear Threat," Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 09.06.24.
• "Understanding China's Perceptions and Strategy Toward Nuclear Weapons: A Case Study Approach," Lyle J. Morris and Rakesh Sood, Asia Society, 09.05.24.
• “Indian nuclear weapons, 2024,” Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns and Mackenzie Knight, BAS, 09.05.24. 

Counterterrorism:

“Terrorism Warning Lights are 'Blinking Red Again.' This Group is a Big Reason,” Max Boot, WP, 09.09.24. 

• “While the world's attention has been riveted elsewhere—in particular on Ukraine and Gaza—the Islamic State has been staging a slow-motion resurgence, not only in its Iraq-Syria heartland but also as far afield as Afghanistan and Africa.”
  • “In July, U.S. Central Command warned: 'ISIS is on pace to more than double the total number of attacks they claimed in 2023. The increase in attacks indicates ISIS is attempting to reconstitute following several years of decreased capability.'”
  • “The United Nations estimates that the group has 3,000 to 5,000 fighters in Syria and Iraq. "This year has been the worst year since we defeated Islamic State," the co-commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces told the Wall Street Journal last month.”
  • “Meanwhile, the Islamic State offshoot in Afghanistan, known as Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K), has become a leading sponsor of international terrorism. Earlier this year, it claimed responsibility for major attacks in Russia and Iran, which killed nearly 250 people. The U.S. government had tried to warn both Moscow and Tehran—to no avail.”
  • “The United Nations now assesses that ISIS-K represents "the greatest external terrorist threat" to Europe.”
  • “The United States is also struggling to deal with the growing ISIS threat in Africa after roughly 100 U.S. troops were withdrawn from Chad and 1,000 from Niger at the request of their governments… While U.S. military personnel were leaving Niger, Russian advisers were arriving—at the very same base once occupied by the Americans. You can bet that the Russians in Niger are there to exploit local resources, not to cooperate in counterterrorism operations.”
• “The group's resurgence is… a warning that just because our attention has shifted, that doesn't mean threats have necessarily gone away. Dealing with this vile terrorist group will test the staying power of a superpower with an understandable, and bipartisan, desire to forget the 'forever wars.'”

“Struggling to Stem Extremism, Tajikistan Targets Beards and Head Scarves, Valerie Hopkins, NYT, 09.08.24.

• “People in Tajikistan were expecting a government crackdown after Tajik men were arrested and charged with a terrorist attack on a Moscow concert hall in March. But it still seemed excessive to Nilufar, a 27-year-old education professional, when she saw local authorities with scissors outside a K.F.C. in Dushanbe, Tajikistan’s capital, trimming beards that were deemed too long.”
• “With a population of 10 million, the vast majority of whom are Muslim, Tajikistan has many challenges that counterterrorism experts say make it an incubator for extremism: poverty, poor education, high unemployment and grievances against an autocratic government that severely restricts the practice of religion.”
• “The country came under global scrutiny after four Tajik men were charged as the assailants in the worst terrorist attack in Russia in two decades, which killed 145 people and injured more than 500 at the Moscow concert hall. Other Tajiks were later arrested in connection with the attack.”
• “American officials have said that Islamic State Khorasan Province, a branch of ISIS known as ISIS-K, was responsible for the attack, and radicalized Tajiks have in recent months caught the attention of governments and counterterrorism experts around the world.”
• “Instead of tackling substantive problems like corruption, poverty, and social inequality, said Larisa Aleksandrova, a Dushanbe-based expert on human rights… the state was focusing on 'where to put a comma in a sentence, what to name a particular ministry or what clothes, for example, women or men should wear'””

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security/AI: 

• No significant developments.

Energy exports from CIS:

“The West Still Needs Russian Gas that Comes Through Ukraine,” The Economist, 09.05.24. 

• “When Ukrainian forces stormed into Russia early in August, Europe’s energy markets took fright. Russia’s gas exports to the EU are a fraction of what they once were. Still, news that Ukraine had captured Sudzha—a town in Russia that hosts its last major terminal for exporting the fuel to Europe via Ukraine—was enough to send the continent’s benchmark gas price to its highest level this year.”
• “Ukraine and Russia have agreed—for now—to keep gas moving through Sudzha. But whether it will continue next year is less certain. The deal whereby Russian gas is delivered westward via Ukraine was signed by the two countries alongside the EU in 2019. It is due to expire at the end of this year. The EU, which aims to phase out Russian gas by 2027, does not want to renew it. Nor does Ukraine.”
• “But some countries still depend heavily on Russian gas and would be hurt by a sudden end to supplies via Ukraine. EU officials are worried. Three countries are most at risk. Russian supplies made up around 47% of Hungary’s gas imports in 2023. For Slovakia they made up 89%. Austria depended even more: in January 97% of its gas imports were from Russia.”
• “European officials are frustrated. “If they had done more to get off Russian gas two years ago, we wouldn’t even be having this conversation,” sighs the diplomat. Ukraine is exploring the option of getting Russian gas delivered from Azerbaijan to keep supplies flowing, though this scheme’s feasibility is unclear. Two winters on from the invasion, Russian gas is still rattling Europe.”

“Lessons Learned in Power Plays: Europe’s Response to the Energy Crisis,” Max Bergmann, Cy McGeady, Otto Svendsen, Mathias Zacarias, and Ignacio Urbasos, CSIS, 09.03.24. 

“The [energy] crisis [in Europe] spawned many lessons relevant for experts and policymakers in a variety of fields:

• Democracies and markets are resilient and durable and can survive shocks.
• The strength of the European Union and its ability to act should not be underestimated.
• Russia failed in its attempt to blackmail EU member states.
• U.S. LNG was critical to mitigating the crisis and can play an important role in U.S. foreign policy
• The market shock served to supercharge renewables deployment, particularly solar energy.
• There is economic urgency for Europe to accelerate the green transition.
• U.S.-EU partnership is vital and must be strengthened.
• The crisis has added to Europe's fiscal strains.
• Political backlash came primarily against incumbents rather than Ukraine.” 

“Clean Energy Is Security in “Letters to the Next President” Jason Bordoff, FP, 09.09.24 

• “Your administration has the chance to chart a policy path forward that unites both parties around core areas of agreement to advance the U.S. national interest.”
  • “First, all should agree that climate change is real and worsening.”
  • “Second, just as the energy revolution that made the United States the world’s largest oil and gas producer strengthened it economically and geopolitically, so will ensuring U.S. leadership in clean energy technologies enhance the country’s geostrategic position.”
  • “Third, using less oil in our domestic economy reduces our vulnerability to global oil supply disruptions, such as conflict in the Middle East or attacks on tankers in the Red Sea.”
  • “Fourth, energy security risks extend beyond geopolitics and require investing adequately in domestic energy supply to meet changing circumstances.”
  • “Fifth, expanding clean energy sectors in the rest of the world is in the national interest because doing so creates economic opportunities for U.S. firms, diversifies global energy supply chains away from China, and enhances U.S. soft power in rapidly growing economies.”
  • “Your administration should prioritize making it easier to construct power plants with advanced nuclear technology—which reduce costs, waste, and safety concerns—and to produce nuclear power plant fuel in the United States. Doing so also benefits U.S. national security, as Russia is building more than one-third of new nuclear reactors around the world to bolster its geostrategic influence. While Russia has been the leading exporter of reactors, China has by far the most reactors under construction at home and is thus poised to play an even bigger role in the international market going forward. The United States also currently imports roughly one-fifth of its enriched uranium from Russia. To counter this by building a stronger domestic nuclear industry, your administration should improve the licensing and approval process of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and reform the country’s nuclear waste management policies.” 

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• "OPEC+ Kicks the Can Down a Very Uphill Road," Javier Blas, Bloomberg, 09.05.24.

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

 “Russia Secretly Worms Its Way Into America’s Conservative Media,” Steven Lee Myers, Ken Bensinger and Jim Rutenberg, NYT, 09.07.24.

• “In early 2022, a young couple from Canada, Lauren Chen and Liam Donovan, registered a new company in Tennessee that went on to create a social media outlet called Tenet Media. By November 2023, they had assembled a lineup of major conservative social media stars, including Benny Johnson, Tim Pool and Dave Rubin, to post original content on Tenet's platform. The site then began posting hundreds of videos -- trafficking in pointed political commentary as well as conspiracy theories about election fraud, Covid-19, immigrants and Russia's war with Ukraine -- that were then promoted across the spectrum of social media, from YouTube to TikTok, X, Facebook, Instagram and Rumble.”
  • “It was all, federal prosecutors now say, a covert Russian influence operation. On Wednesday, the Justice Department accused two Russians of helping orchestrate $10 million in payments to Tenet in a scheme to use those stars to spread Kremlin-friendly messages. The disclosures reflect the growing sophistication of the Kremlin's longstanding efforts to shape American public opinion and advance Russia's geopolitical goals, which include, according to American intelligence assessments, the election of former President Donald J. Trump in November.”
    • “'Influencers already have a level of trust with their audience,' said Jo Lukito, a professor at the University of Texas at Austin's journalism school who studies Russian disinformation. 'So, if a piece of information can come through the mouth of an existing influencer, it comes across as more authentic.'”
• “The indictment—which landed like a bombshell in the country's conservative media ecosystem—also underscored the growing ideological convergence between President Vladimir V. Putin's Russia and a significant portion of the Republican Party since Mr. Trump's rise to political power.”
  • “The federal investigation that led to the indictment unsealed on Wednesday is part of a broader government effort, first reported in The New York Times, to combat Russian disinformation, election interference and cyberattacks. Administration officials have said the effort could lead to more charges.”
• “The indictment detailed the lengths Russia went to try to make Tenet a player in the country's political discourse, while obfuscating the fact that it was footing the bill. That included transferring at least $9.7 million from Russia through shell companies in countries like Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Mauritius. Those payments accounted for 90 percent of the company's revenue from last October to August, the indictment said.”
• “Prosecutors have not, so far, charged Ms. Chen and Mr. Donovan. It is unclear where they are, and they did not respond to requests for comment. The indictment did note that neither they nor Tenet had registered as a representative of a foreign government, a requirement of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, known as FARA.”

“A New Reminder that Russian Interference was Never a ‘Hoax,’” Philip Bump, WP, 09.05.24.

• “Ten years ago, two Russian nationals, Aleksandra Krylova and Anna Bogacheva, spent a month touring the United States… They were employees of a new agency that had decided to “spread distrust towards the candidates and the [American] political system in general,” as a subsequent federal indictment alleged… [T]he Russian effort was… an enormous success, as reflected in new federal documents articulating how that ongoing effort has evolved.”
• “On Wednesday, the Justice Department published an indictment targeting two employees of RT, the media entity controlled by the Russian government that was formerly known as Russia Today. With RT banned after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, those employees allegedly funneled $10 million to a U.S.-based media company to have a platform for content they wanted to share. That announcement documented several proposed prongs of an ongoing influence effort, including one focused on social media content.”
• “Unsurprisingly, both efforts aligned with America’s political right. The company appears to have been Tenet Media, which published videos from popular right-wing commentators such as Tim Pool and Benny Johnson. The documentation for the broader influence effort, referred to as “Doppelganger,” explicitly indicates an effort to aid Republicans and the right. The document articulates the concerns of members of Political Party A, the Republicans, and suggests that they “should be exploited in the course of an information campaign” in the United States.”
• “It’s been somewhat forgotten over the eight years since Russia’s interference effort was first revealed, but amplifying division in this way was the effort’s initial intent. The desired outcome wasn’t necessarily to ensure anyone’s election but, instead, to stoke and heighten internal conflicts in the United States. It wasn’t that Russian actors were injecting new, divisive narratives into the national conversation. It was that they were doing what they could to increase the volume around those narratives.”
• “Trump proclaimed… (as he had claimed since early 2017) the Russia probe was “a hoax.” Over the years, he and his allies responded to any report about Russia’s efforts with this same simplistic rejoinder: All that Russia stuff was a hoax!… [I]t was more broadly a catchall aimed at waving away any claim about Russian activity as a Democratic fever dream.”
• “The new indictment reinforces that it wasn’t. Russia began trying to influence American politics a decade ago, ultimately finding a sympathetic ally in Trump. Now, instead of trying to make fake personalities who can elevate contentious issues to Russia’s benefit, there’s a stable of Trump-allied voices who already are.”

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• “Explainer: The Russian Influence Operations Targeting the 2014 U.S. Elections, Roman Osadchuk, Eto Buziashvili, Atlantic Council, 09.06.24.
• "Russia’s First Secret Influence Campaign: Convincing the U.S. to Buy Alaska," Casey Mitchell, Politico, 09.08.24.
• "Foreign influence efforts are circling the presidential election. Again," Hailey Fuchs and Josh Gerstein, Politico, 09.07.24.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“The value of a Russian life,” Denis Kasyanchuk and Alexander Kolyandr, The Bell, 09.06.24. Clues from Russian Views.

• “How much is a Russian life worth? There is no single method for calculating the value of a human life. But, as a general rule, the wealthier the country, the more value it places on lives. Irrespective of methodology, the value of a Russian life is several times less than in the U.S. or Europe.”
• “$1.97 million: Kip Viscusi, from Vanderbilt University, is one of the world’s leading experts in VSL [value of statistical life]. In one of his studies he developed a method to estimate the value of lives in countries where the necessary statistics were unavailable. Taking the U.S. figure ($9.6 million at 2015 prices) as his base, he calculated the VSL for other countries, adjusting the values for differences in income. It turned out that the average value of a human life in Russia was $1.97 million. That’s under a fifth of the U.S. figure, about a quarter of what it is in Germany, and a little bit higher than in Kazakhstan, Mexico and China.”
• “61 million rubles: The figures calculated by Russian economists tend to be lower than their Western counterparts.”
  • “In 2018, economists at the Financial University of the Russian Government calculated the country’s VSL based on the population’s satisfaction with their lives, average life expectancy and average household consumption per capita. At 2017 prices, they put the value of a Russian life at between 51 million rubles and 61 million rubles (~$1 million at 2017 exchange rate).”
  • “In 2021, economists from RANEPA published a study that calculated the value of life based on an analysis of official figures about salaries and workplace injuries. According to their calculations, a Russian life was worth between 15.8 million rubles and 26.3 million rubles ($243,000–405,000).”
  • “In late 2023, economists at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Central Institutes of Economics and Mathematics published a study in which they assessed the damage that premature death causes the Russian economy. According to their calculations, the economic impact of one year of life lost to a Russian is up to 513,000 rubles ($8,300). They reckoned the total value of a life in Russia was, therefore, up to 37.5 million rubles at 2021 prices ($576,000).”
• “5–8 million rubles: Surveys about how much people are willing to spend on reducing mortality risks are another way of calculating the value of life. Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, such surveys were regularly carried out in Russia. In a study undertaken in 2018 by the Financial University, Russians said 5.2 million rubles ($92,400 at 2017 exchange rate) would be fair compensation for loss of life. A 2019 study by Sberbank Life Insurance found that on average, Russians reckoned an average pay-out of 5.8 million rubles (in case of death was fair. The same survey showed this varied widely across the country, with the highest sums suggested in Moscow (8 million rubles) and St. Petersburg (7.2 million). They also found that wealthier the person, the higher the value they put on life.”
• “The value of a Russian life in wartime: ...The maximum compensation for each dead soldier is close to 11 million rubles ($130,000). That’s several times higher than, for example, the payments made to relatives of the victims of the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack that took place in March in Moscow (3 million rubles).”
• “The lower the compensation payouts to the families of dead Russian soldiers, the less incentive the state has to protect the lives of its citizens.”

“Russia Is No Conservative Haven. The Western Populist Right has Fallen for Vladimir Putin’s Latest Propaganda Ploy,” Adrian Karatnycky, FP, 09.06.24. 

• “This image of Russia as a traditionalist’s paradise led former Fox News commentator Tucker Carlson to offer both Putin and Russian far-right philosopher Alexander Dugin, one of Putin’s most vicious cheerleaders for genocide in Ukraine, the opportunity to expound their views to millions of Americans in a comfortable, uncritical setting. It is the reason that MAGA-aligned U.S. Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene talks about Russia as a strong protector of Christianity. And it’s why former Trump administration National Security Advisor Michael Flynn has framed Putin as a defender of 'family and God.'”
• “The contrast between myth and reality couldn’t be starker. The truth is that Russia is one of the world’s least religious societies, with only 9 percent of Russians attending religious services at least somewhat regularly, according to a poll conducted in 2022 by the Moscow-based Levada Center. By contrast, nearly one-third of Americans are frequent churchgoers. Just 1.4 million Russians—a mere 1 percent of the population—attended the most recent Christmas services. The Russian state also persecutes Christians who do not adhere to Russian Orthodoxy, including Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and, of course, anyone connected to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.”
• “Nor is Russia a bastion of what true conservatives would consider traditional values. Based on data calculated by the Guttmacher Institute, the Russian abortion rate from 2015 to 2019 was nearly four times higher than that of the United States and more than twice as high as that of Ukraine. Russia also has the fourth-highest divorce rate in the world—60 percent higher than in the United States and more than 50 percent higher than in Ukraine. Those among the U.S. and European far right who project their own ideals onto Russian society ignore the obvious and copious evidence.”
• “The false image of a god-fearing Russia is hardly accidental. It is the consequence of systematic efforts by Putin and his propagandists to craft talking points for the global right—an effort that has accelerated since Russia launched its all-out war on Ukraine in 2022.”

“‘You Give Us Support and We Will Not Call You Up to Fight,’” Andrei Kolesnikov, Novaya Gazeta/Russia.Post, 09.09.24. 

• “It cannot be denied that Putin’s “power vertical” is facing serious problems, which may turn out to be time bombs. Yet the desire of the overwhelming majority of the country to get on with their lives and distance themselves from current events is so strong that the informal social contract in 2023–24 of “you give us support and we will not call you up to fight” has proven unshakeable so far.”
• “A sharp deterioration in the economy or a careless move by the Kremlin could undermine this contract. But for now, as we see, most Russians are afraid of upsetting the fragile balance in their lives, while the government fears a rise in discontent. Thus, the handling of the “situation” (what Putin and Russian officialdom, echoing him, call the Ukrainian army’s penetration into Kursk Region) suits both sides of the informal contract.”
• “Two and a half years ago, when Russian troops went into Ukraine, Russians agreed with the line that “we were attacked” and now is not the time to be critical of the government, and now the “Kursk anomaly” is perceived as something like floods in the spring or burst pipes in the winter—best to support the leader and his policies and wait for the conflict to end (in polls, Russians say they want peace, but peace means “victory,” or “victory” means peace).”
• “It is in the interests of the regime to prolong in one way or another the confrontation with external threats (the US, NATO, the “collective West”) and internal threats (the fifth column, “national traitors,” foreign agents, extremists). If there are threats, it means that justifications can be found for war, increased repression within the country and more spending on “defense and security.” The Kursk “situation,” in this context, is just another, new threat.”
• “The experience of recent years has shown that by skillfully manipulating the mass consciousness and using the habitual obedience of citizens and learned indifference, the Kremlin not only successfully suppresses discontent but also effects greater and greater consolidation.”

“Putinism and Russian Ideological Shifts,” Olena Snigyr, FPRI, 09.03.24.

• “Seeking to secure its superpower status and unable to compete with the West militarily and economically, Moscow competes for discourse power, offering international actors a set of opinions and beliefs that are assembled into a system of strategic narratives. Russia seeks to secure a wide range of supporters among the Multi-aligned Community and to undermine the cognitive, value, and political resilience among Western countries and their allies. Russian Information Influence Operations are carried out mainly within the context of Russian strategic narratives and are guided by Russian ideological principles, which are hostile to the idea of liberal democracy.”
• “Ideology is back as an instrument of creating international alliances in global rivalry, and Russia’s role in this process is pivotal. War, propaganda, and pushing the new ideology are tools for Russia to achieve foreign policy goals and create an anti-Western alliance. It can be suggested that today Russia’s renewed ideology combines the ideological heritage of the Russian Empire and the USSR and is adjusted to the needs and goals of the Russian leadership. In his recent book, “Putinism—Post-Soviet Russian Regime Ideology” (2024), Mikhail Suslov mentions three main components of Russian ideology:”
  • “Anti-liberal, communitarian, or identitarian conservatism, which presumes that Russian identity was created at the moment of Christianization of Kyivan Rus more than a thousand years ago and has never changed since that time;
  • “Right-wing communitarianism, which means denial of individual freedom to choose identity—to be born Russian means to be Russian forever.
  • “Organic, geopolitical, identitarian populism, can be found such constructs as the theory of the “deep people,” the concept of “Russian world,” pan-Slavism, etc.”

“Why Does the Kremlin Need Queerphobia?,” Inna Bondarenko, Mikhail Shubin, and Dan Storyev, Carnegie Politika, 09.06.24.

• “Russia was ranked as the most dangerous place for LGBTQ people in Europe in 2024. But it wasn’t always like that. Despite some stereotypes, Russian society is not virulently queerphobic by default. Instead, the country’s anti-LGBTQ drive has been cultivated and honed by the Kremlin, which is motivated by both foreign and domestic policy concerns. Russian officials seemingly want to both appeal to the global conservative movement and build a repressive machine based on domestic conservatism.”
• “The 1990s were a time of openness: conferences, film festivals, and publications thrived with little to no government interference. In big cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg, LGBTQ organizations grew, offering support and advocacy while attracting more allies. By 2012, however, as repression intensified, the queer community once again found itself in the crosshairs. In June 2013, a law banning “gay propaganda” among children led many queer people to leave the country.”
• “Large opposition demonstrations in 2011 and 2012 spooked the Kremlin, which was worried that “color revolutions” in ex-Soviet countries might reach Russia. So once the protests were quelled, the regime began to seek ideological tools to mobilize its supporters over the long term. Like many authoritarian leaders, Russian President Vladimir Putin turned to conservatism, marking the beginning of a shift in Russian public life that would lead to anti-queer legislation, as well as an overall increase in repression.”
• “Anti-LGBTQ oppression has been weaponized by the Kremlin and its ideological sympathizers in the global culture war. A network has emerged of Western conservatives, Russian oligarchs, and Russian Orthodox clergy engaging in “anti-gender diplomacy,” which has been particularly successful in southeastern Europe.”
• “At the same time, queerphobic repression in Russia has been portrayed by pro-Kremlin outlets as a sign of traditional values, contrasting Russia against the “decadent West.” In this respect, Russia’s anti-queer laws are used as an ideological bludgeon, demonstrating Russia’s supposed purity to the world. It is a form of soft power.”
• “In its public rhetoric, the Kremlin uses queerphobia to justify an aggressive foreign policy—in other words, turning it into an ideology for war… In this way, the Kremlin has transformed Russian society, enabling its queerphobic elements. And it did all this to create a perfect wartime ideology: one that depicts Russia as a savior of traditional values, both at home and abroad.” 

Defense and aerospace:

•  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

“Distracted and Divided, Russian Security Service Misses Threats,” Michael Schwirtz, NYT, 09.06.24. 

• “The Ukrainian offensive over the border caught Moscow's intelligence agencies by surprise, experts say. … On the day Ukraine launched its daring incursion into Russia's Kursk region, the Federal Security Service, the Russian agency most responsible for protecting the border, played down the seriousness of the operation. Calling it ''an armed provocation,'' the agency said its forces were working to push the Ukrainians back. That was nearly a month ago. Since then, Ukrainian forces have occupied a small but significant patch of Russian territory and killed or captured hundreds of Russian troops, according to officials, analysts and satellite imagery.”
• “When Ukrainian troops charged across the border on Aug. 6 and pushed dozens of miles into Russian territory, they encountered almost no resistance. ''We are talking about many, many units which should have seen something and they failed,'' said Andrei Soldatov, an author who has spent his career researching Russia's security services.”
• “The FSB is a muscular, authoritarian version of the American FBI, with a broad national-security mandate that includes defending against threats from within Russia and in former Soviet republics. But the agency is hindered by infighting, rivalries with other security agencies and an aversion to delivering bad news to Mr. Putin. Particularly since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the FSB has also been distracted by a large-scale crackdown on internal dissent. As a result, the agency has suffered a series of damaging intelligence failures since the start of the war, Western officials and experts say. Kursk was just the most recent.”
  • “In March, the agency ignored specific warnings from the United States and failed to prevent a terrorist attack on a Moscow concert hall that killed more than 140 people.”
  • “Ten months earlier, the agency was caught off guard when Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner mercenary group, launched a rebellion aimed at toppling Russia's military leadership.”
  • “And it was the F.S.B. that famously informed Russia's military that its troops would be greeted with flowers when they launched their invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.”
    • “In each instance, though, there were few visible repercussions from Mr. Putin, and there is no indication that there will be after the debacle in Kursk. A week after Ukrainian troops crossed the border, the agency's longtime director, Aleksandr Bortnikov, made a public appearance in which he seemed to place blame for the incursion on local municipalities in the border region, even as he made assurances that everything was under control.”
• “Other agencies besides the FSB, including the military intelligence service and the National Guard, as well as the army, have intelligence-gathering resources that could have detected the Ukrainian buildup. Part of the problem, experts say, is a lack of coordination within the military and intelligence operations that is likely to have impeded any Russian response. It is a problem that has bedeviled the Russian war effort from the first days of the invasion, but one that Mr. Putin appears reluctant to address.”

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Was Putin’s Visit to Mongolia Really About a New Gas Pipeline to China?” Mikhail Krutikhin, Russia.Post, 09.06.24.

• “If you listen to the pundits, both pro- and anti-Kremlin, you might get the impression that the main goal of Putin’s recent visit to Ulaanbaatar was to persuade the Mongolians to agree to the construction of the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline to China through their territory. Yet there are two issues with this:”
  • “First, what is the point of negotiating for a section of the gas pipeline when there is nothing doing on the Chinese side, the main intended consumer of the gas? With the Chinese unwilling to take this gas, why troubleshoot with the Mongolians? Even for Putin, with his often-illogical behavior, this makes no sense.”
  • “Second, all the issues around the construction of Power of Siberia 2 through Mongolia have long been resolved and approved. Were it not for the Chinese, work on the Mongolian section of the pipeline could have already been underway. Sure, the Mongolians did not include the project in their updated national energy strategy until 2028, but the reason for this was China’s refusal to participate in the Gazprom venture—not some challenge that they supposedly threw down to the Russian leader. Blaming them for the absence of Power of Siberia 2 in their strategy document would be unfair.”
• “When the Russian president visited Mongolia exactly a decade ago, in September 2014, the set of documents inked by two countries was, to put it mildly, rather meager. The recent visit was only slightly more productive. Given the absence of a real, constructive agenda, Putin’s sole task in Mongolia seems to have been to demonstrate personal courage in the face of the International Criminal Court warrant out for his arrest as a war criminal.”

Ukraine:

“Ukraine during the Russian War of Aggression,” Susan Stewart, SWP, 09.06.24. 

• “The Russian war of aggression has deepened relations between the EU and Ukraine. This can be seen, above all, in Ukraine’s EU candidate status.”
• “Despite the war, Ukraine continues to pursue many reforms, even if their pace has slowed since February 2022.”
• “The strong concentration of power in the Office of the President negatively affects the separation of powers. It makes judicial reforms more difficult and hinders parliament’s ability to exercise its functions.”
• “The war has weakened the power of oligarchs in Ukraine in many respects. Yet the form of governance in the country has not experienced a clear break from the past.”
• “Even during the invasion, the authorities are continuing their fight against corruption among the elite. The population perceives some progress, but high-level corruption remains a deep-rooted challenge.”
• “Civil society activities have changed both qualitatively and quantitatively as a result of the war and have become more significant since the inva­sion. Civil society engagement can be fostered with the help of returning Ukrainian migrants and through the involvement of Ukrainians abroad.”
• “Ukraine’s municipalities will play a key role in reconstruction, or are doing so already. To ensure that reconstruction is successful in all its dimensions, municipalities should continuously be involved in the mechanisms and processes currently being developed.”
• “In order to meaningfully intensify Ukraine-EU relations, it is essential that rule of law be expanded and consolidated, not only in Ukraine, but also in the EU and its member states.”

A selection of hot takes on drivers, circumstances and consequences of the cabinet reshuffle in Ukraine:

""Castling Instead of Renewal. What do the Reshuffles in the Ukrainian Government Mean?", Konstantin Skorkin, CEIP, 09.06.24. Translated from Russian.

• “In the absence of elections, reshuffling within the government has become almost the only opportunity for the president to demonstrate at least some kind of changes in power and to uplift the spirit of the Ukrainian society. However, in reality, these reshuffles work towards even greater centralization and monopolization of power.”
• “This… reshuffle clearly reflects the main tendencies of Zelensky's rule, which have become even more apparent under martial law: a desire for centralization, formation of a de facto presidential structure of power [to run the country], favoritism, and a belief not in institutions, but rather in individuals, who can be arbitrarily combined at the president's discretion.”
• “The lack of new faces and breakthrough ideas in the president's team is being compensated for by a reshuffling of powers. However, there is no clear plan behind [this]. On the contrary, the most bizarre and contradictory things are being discussed. While there are talks about the need to reduce the number of ministries, there are also proposals to create a new 'Ministry for the Return of Ukrainians,' with vague responsibilities.”

“As His Popularity Fades Volodymyr Zelensky Culls His Cabinet,” The Economist, 09.04.24. 

• “Explaining his reshuffle, Mr. Zelensky said the country needed a “new structure.” He will not have missed the massive drop in government popularity registered by polls in recent months. With elections cancelled during the war, this was one of the only levers he could pull.”
• “Several sources… describe the changes as a further consolidation of power around Volodymyr Zelensky’s influential chief of staff Andriy Yermak. “They had loyal people around them,” says Yaroslav Zhelezhnyk, an opposition MP. “But they now have even more loyal ones.”

“A Cabinet Shake-up Suggests Zelensky is Planning for a ‘New Phase of the War,’ Analysts Say,” Marc Santora and Maria Varenikova, NYT, 09.04.24:

• “On Wednesday, the Ukrainian leader said the changes would bring “a new energy” to his administration. “These steps are related to strengthening our state in various areas,” he said. He declined to comment on where some of the ministers who tendered their resignations might end up in the reshuffle.”
• “While a reshuffle had long been in the works making the move now was a recognition by Mr. Zelensky that “Ukraine has to prepare for a new phase of the war and new phase of diplomacy and he would like to see some new managers for these processes,” said Mykhailo Minakov, a senior adviser on Ukraine for the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute. The reshuffle, Mr. Minakov said, had been in the works for months, first discussed at the beginning of the year and again in the spring.”
• “'This is Zelensky’s style of work,' said Volodymyr Fesenko, a Ukrainian political analyst. 'When he sees stagnation in the work, he changes people,' he added. 'He thinks that new people will be more motivated and will bring new ideas.'”
• “The reshuffle could see 'an increase of [powerful head of the president’s office, Andriy] Yermak’s influence,' said Yevhan Mahda, a Ukrainian political analyst, who added that more authority in the president’s office comes at the expense of the parliament and cabinet ministers, who are subject to parliamentary approval.”

“Zelensky Makes Biggest Shake-up of Ukraine’s Wartime Government,” Christopher Miller, FT, 09.04.24:

• “Some in Kyiv’s political class said Zelenskyy was continuing to consolidate power. 'It is hard to consolidate it any more,' said one government interlocutor in Kyiv. But other political observers noted Zelenskyy’s preference for new faces, with one MP saying the president 'simply likes change.'”

  "Ukraine's Zelensky Launches Government Overhaul for Fresh Military, Diplomatic Push," Jane Lytvynenko, WSJ, 09.04.24:

• “Zelensky identified five top priorities for a new government, including improving relations with NATO, advancing Ukraine’s EU membership status and strengthening the country’s growing defense industry through foreign investments.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• “The Final Call for Georgia’s Democracy,” Editorial Board, WP, 09.05.24. 

Footnotes

1. On Sept. 8, Russian forces were reported to have captured two villages in eastern Ukraine and are now pressing to encircle Ukrainian soldiers at two locations along the frontline. The two villages, Nevelske and Vodiane, were captured by Russian troops, according to DeepState, a group of analysts mapping the battlefield. DeepState’s analysis is based on sources in the Ukrainian military and open-source data like satellite imagery and photos and video posted on social media, according to NYT.
2. On Sept. 8, two NATO members said that Russian drones violated their airspace, as one reportedly flew into Romania during nighttime attacks on neighboring Ukraine while another crashed in eastern Latvia the previous day, according to AP.
3. At a Sept. 7 event hosted by FT, William Burns of CIA and Richard Moore of M16 said it would be wrong to take Putin’s threats of nuclear escalation lightly but that the West should not be unnecessarily intimidated. “There was a moment in the fall of 2022 when I think there was a genuine risk of the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons,” Burns said. “I have never thought, however, and this is the view of my agency, that we should be unnecessarily intimidated by that. Putin’s a bully. He’s going to continue to saber-rattle,” Burns added. (FT, 09.07.24, NBC, 09.07.24)
4. In the original MK.ru piece, it was inaccurately implied that the 2010 military doctrine is Russia’s latest doctrine.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 11:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

^ Translated with assistance from Chat GPT.

Photo by www.mil.gov.ua shared under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license.