6 Ideas to Explore

1. Have Russia’s red lines in its war against Ukraine lost relevance? Yes, and that happened as far back as 2022, when Ukraine re-captured lands from Russia in counteroffensives in the east and south, according to Tatiana Stanovaya of R. Politik. Robyn Dixon and Catherine Belton of WP would probably concur with Stanovaya, having written an article entitled “Ukraine keeps crossing Russia's red lines. Putin keeps blinking.” In the article, this duo reminds us how Vladimir Putin made a veiled threat during Ukraine’s 2022 counteroffensive that he could order the use of nuclear weapons to protect Russia’s territorial integrity. Yet, almost two years later, the Russian leader has refrained from doing so even after Ukraine claimed to have captured some 1,200 square kilometers of Russian land in the Kursk region. According to Gideon Rachman of FT, while Ukraine has crossed some of Russia’s red lines vis-à-vis the conflict, it has not yet crossed the final one, in the Biden administration’s view. “Biden’s advisers continue to think that— if Putin believed his regime was on the point of total defeat—the Russians could resort to the use of nuclear weapons,” Rachman writes.
2. The Biden administration is yet to “publicly detail in writing its long-term strategy for the Russian-Ukrainian conflict,” even though the United States has played an integral role in it, providing Kyiv with $175 billion in aid, according to FP. Rather than unveil a detailed strategy, President Joe Biden has repeatedly promised to stand by Ukraine for as long as it takes, even as critics have contended that “the lack of a clearly articulated vision for America’s long-term role in the war has led to a de facto policy of enabling Ukraine to continue to fight, but not to win,” according to FP. “We need to have a real, demonstrative, declaratory policy,” ex-SACEUR Philip Breedlove told this magazine.
3. The Battle of Kursk probably won’t result in Russia using nuclear weapons against against Ukraine, according to Nikolai Sokov of the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. “Not that nuclear use is technically impossible. But the political and ethical implications make such a decision daunting—and unlikely,” Sokov writes in BAS. For one, use of a nuclear weapon by Russia would make it a “true pariah state in the international system turning countries—partners and neutrals alike, all critical for breaking the tight sanctions regime, which has been established by the G-7 economies and their partners—against Moscow,” according to Sokov.
4. While Russia may agree to a ceasefire with Ukraine, Putin may then follow it up with a new escalation of the conflict rather than with peace negotiations unless he concludes that such talks may end up accommodating his primary demand, according to Tatiana Stanovaya of R. Politik. That demand is for Ukraine to become not just neutral, but friendly toward Russia, Stanovaya told The New Yorker. “At no point during the war has Putin abandoned [t]his paramount aspiration,” she said.
5. The incursion of the Ukrainian armed forces into Russia’s Kursk region represents a political victory for Volodymyr Zelenskyy, but it could turn into a strategic defeat for Kyiv if the Russian armed forces manage to deplete Ukraine’s forces and make gains in other areas of the front, according to Russian military analysts whose views have been summarized by NYT. So far, the incursion has failed to force Russian command to divert so many units from Donbas so that they would stop advancing there, according to Andriy Zagorodnyuk, former Ukrainian defense minister. Yet, the offensive, which has caught the Russian leadership by surprise, was still warranted because “the only way Ukraine cannot allow Russia to win and win itself is through doing something out of the box,” Zagorodnyuk told FT.
6. “The Ukrainians have adopted an approach that allows them… to preserve what they’ve got,” but they also need to generate more forces, according to NATO SACEUR Christopher Cavoli. “I think their ability to generate force this year is going to be the strategically important thing that gets done,” Cavoli predicted at a recent event at CFR. The U.S. general has also praised the Armed Forces of Ukraine for doing an “awful lot of things that are sophisticated in terms of the employment of combined arms” during their Kursk region incursion, which “appears to be going quite well.”

NB: Next week’s Russia Analytical Report will appear on Tuesday, Sept. 3, instead of Monday, Sept. 2, because of the U.S. Labor Day holiday.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

"What Happens if Ukraine Seizes the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant?", Dmitry Gorchakov, MT, 08.16.24.

• “Ukrainian troops are not doing anything that Russia has not done to Kyiv’s territory. Ukraine has the right to defend itself against Russian aggression by any means it deems effective and acceptable — so long as they do not involve committing war crimes.”
• “But if ending this war on terms acceptable to Ukraine involves fighting around nuclear plants on both sides of the front, such a process must proceed with minimal risk of a nuclear disaster.”

“NATO must wake up to Russia’s nuclear power deal with Turkey,” Gönül Tol, FT, 08.21.24.

• “Ask NATO’s secretary-general to name the decision of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that irks him the most and he’d probably say purchasing Russia’s S-400 missile defense system. But NATO has an even bigger problem when it comes to Turkey-Russia ties: the Akkuyu nuclear power plant.”
• “The west has largely overlooked Russia’s use of nuclear energy to create long-term political, economic and military ties with strategically important countries. While Turkey was criticized and placed under sanctions for purchasing the S-400, western countries have been muted on Akkuyu. But now Turkey wants to build a second nuclear reactor and Russia is ahead in the bid. To deprive Moscow of a geopolitical asset and allay locals’ safety and environmental concerns, the west must do more to match Moscow’s favorable terms. Pressuring western development banks to drop their reluctance to finance nuclear energy projects would be a great start.”

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

"Fundamental Foundations of the Convergence of Russia, Iran, and China," Andrey Sushentsov, Valdai Club, 08.23.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. 

• “The current Chinese dilemma is that the strategic courses of the United States and China are in complete opposition, and the ongoing events inevitably make them opponents regardless of their intentions. They are objectively structural competitors to each other. This circumstance is common to China, Iran and Russia, as structural conditions bring us closer in terms of assessing the international environment.”
• “What unites Russia, Iran and China? We do not need to achieve the complete defeat of our opponents, unlike the Western countries, which have placed themselves in an opposing perspective.”
• “Why is the objective process of forming a polycentric world so dangerous for the United States? Because it is a gradual process of bringing the nominal GDPs of world states in line with the balance of financial and economic power in the world: the American stock market is 187 percent larger than the actual GDP of the United States, while the stock markets of other states account for about 40–50 percent of their GDPs. Therefore, bringing this into balance will mean a massive redistribution of financial and economic power away from the United States and Western countries.”
• “An important factor that still strongly supports the resources and unity of the West is that the Western community, centered around the United States, relies on a single normative framework. ... There is no such unified approach in the BRICS community, the non-Western states, or in the relations between Russia, Iran and China at the moment. I believe that an important task at this stage would be to initiate a discussion on what could become this unified normative framework and whether it is even possible.”
• “During my visits to Tehran, I encountered a recurring concept that the economy must always yield to sovereignty and human dignity…What could be the non-material foundation of trust in the relations between Russia and Iran? A very subtle and profound question that touches on the relations between powers that have their own unique civilizational paths. I believe that answering this question could lead to a quicker step toward a new quality of Russian-Iranian relations and the nature of the international system, which we strive to make polycentric.”

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

• No significant developments.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“A Conversation With Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) Christopher G. Cavoli,”¹ CFR, 08.15.24. 

• “The biggest challenges for Ukraine are sort of unmovable—their size, their population, demographics, et cetera. However, having said that, these are not insuperable problems. These are exactly the kind of things that spur a country toward innovation, especially under pressure. And I have to say that I’ve been astounded by some of the innovation that has come out of Ukraine under pressure—militarily, technically, tactically.”
• “There were some things about Russia’s invasion that were surprising. You know, by the time their—by the time their invasion actually took place they had complicated their plan tremendously—multiple different axes of advance converging, operate exclusively on what we call exterior lines where to reinforce from one axis to another you have to go all the way around a convex situation. Just some things that are basic parts of the operational art that you would expect them not to have messed up, that they messed up. But nevertheless, many of the things they did they did well, and many of the things they did poorly we knew they’d kind of do poorly.”
  • “The one thing that really got me that I did not understand fully, and I don’t think any of us did, was the impact of corruption on the readiness of the Russian Armed Forces.”
  • “The fidelity of reporting got lost. The truth didn’t get to the top. The truth still doesn’t get to the top [of the Russian command].”
• “[On Ukraine’s incursion into the Kursk region:] They found an area of weakness in the Russians position, and they exploited it quickly, and have exploited it very skillfully. They have done an awful lot of things that are sophisticated in terms of the employment of combined arms. at.....suffice it to say that it appears to be going quite well. ...They certainly achieved operational and tactical surprise. And this will put them in a good position to go whichever way they want with that afterwards... it’s a good day for Ukraine because they have behaved in a militarily and operationally very clever and insightful fashion.”
  • “I think the Russians are still working their way through this [their response to Ukraine’s incursion]. They have diverted a lot of air power to the area. That’s an easy thing to move, right? But it remains to be seen how much ground force they’re able to put against this, and what the effect will be.”
• “The Ukrainians have adopted an approach this year that allows them to preserve and defend in the east—to preserve what they’ve got. They’re clearly denying Russia the ability to use Crimea as a sanctuary. They’re protecting their critical national infrastructure, which is under grievous assault. ... The other part that they need to do this year, and they are doing, is generating strategic-level forces. They’ve got to generate a strategic reserve to bring them forward into next year. And this is one of the things that we’re working on really hard with them. ... The ability to generate force is usually an institutional ability ... and Ukraine has quietly, not in the newspapers, has been putting together those institutions this year. ... I think their ability to generate force this year is going to be the strategically important thing that gets done.”
• “Russia has ramped up. Russia has adopted—some people describe it as a wartime footing. I describe it as sort of a halfway position. It’s clear that they’re trying to avoid the costs that you impose on society when you go to full mobilization. But on the other hand, it’s also clear that they’re taking extraordinary steps to step up their production. We can beat that.”
• “I think it’s important to note that Russia’s relationship with China, in which I think it’s fair to say Russia is increasingly playing the minor role as partner, that’s happening for a reason. They’re assuming that position for a reason.”
• “Among militaries in NATO, there’s no dispute that using AI to enhance our ability to analyze large bodies of data, especially collected by our intelligence sensors, is absolutely imperative. That there’s no way you get into the future without having some sort of machine assistance for analysis, as well as some decision-making tools.” 

“Ukraine’s Invasion of Kursk: Changing the Narrative,” Lawrence Freedman, Substack, 08.21.24

• “What was the problem the Ukrainian leadership hoped to solve or at least ease by this move [into Kursk]? After last year’s Ukrainian offensive petered out, Russia seized the military initiative. Although, for the effort expended and levels of casualties, Russia’s achievements have been limited, there was little confidence that should Ukraine get another chance to mount its own offensive it would do much better. The war to date has shown how both sides find it difficult to get through well-defended positions.”
• “The consensus view was that Ukraine should not attempt a new offensive until it had mobilized and trained more men, replenished its ammunition stocks, and inflicted yet more attrition on Russian forces. While Moscow might always be able to find supplies of people their stocks of armored vehicles and ammunition pieces were dwindling so 2025 would be the better option. Until then attrition was the best strategy… The prevailing narrative therefore was bleak. The story was one of Ukraine caught up in a relentless, remorseless conflict with a more powerful neighbor that was unlikely to pull back until it was offered major concessions. This narrative depressed both Ukrainian morale and international support. This was the problem Ukraine needed to solve, to shift the narrative to a more positive story, one that showed that the Ukrainian army could still take effective initiatives.”
• “Three factors changed the perception of these events:
  • “The first was that this was clearly not a raid but a proper invasion involving thousands rather than hundreds of men. The aim was not hit-and-run but to take territory and face Russia with a new operational challenge.”
  • “Second, it was well planned and implemented. The mistakes of 2023 were not being repeated.”
  • “Third, it was successful and has continued to progress. By 20 August Ukrainian forces had advanced 28-35 kilometers into Kursk and taken control of over 1100 square kilometers including 93 settlements. The border town of Sudzha is under firm Ukrainian control. Over 121,000 civilians have been evacuated from the Kursk region.”
• “Unexpected setbacks such as the Kursk offensive poses problems for Vladimir Putin, who always wishes to show that he is in control of events, and for his subordinates, who must reassure him that he really is. ...Instead of using the threat to mobilize support for the war and add urgency to recruitment Moscow’s tendency is still to play it down.”

“Russia Seeks to Turn Humbling Incursion Into Military Gains,” Anatoly Kurmanaev, NYT, 08.21.24.

• “Instead of weakening the Kremlin’s grip on power, the invasion [of AFU into the Kursk region] may eventually cause more Russian citizens to rally around the flag, analysts said. The Kursk invasion “is certainly a blow to the Kremlin’s reputation,” Tatiana Stanovaya, a Russian political scientist, wrote on social media on Tuesday. But “it is unlikely to spark a significant rise in social or political discontent among the population, nor will it lead to an elite rebellion.”
• “Militarily, from the Russian perspective, Kyiv’s gambit has also created an opportunity to further deplete Ukraine’s own limited forces and make gains in other areas of the front. That could turn a short-term political victory for President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine into a strategic defeat, Russian military analysts said. After being initially heralded as a brilliant military stroke, the Kursk operation could end up becoming a trap for the Ukrainian Army, those analysts noted.”
  • “The invasion of Kursk has merely expanded and prolonged a war of attrition, in which Russia enjoys a resource advantage,” said Vasily Kashin, a political scientist at Moscow’s state-run Higher School of Economics, who studies the political impact of Russia’s war.”
• “Analysts are still assessing how and why Russian forces were caught so unprepared on Aug. 6, when undetected Ukrainian units poured over the border.”  
  • “Some analysts believe the Russian command did not commit significant forces to this area because it lacked obvious military value. “The strike hit emptiness,” said Dmitry Kuznets, a military analyst with the Russian independent news outlet Meduza, which operates from Latvia after being outlawed by the Kremlin.”
  • “Another Russian military expert, Ruslan Pukhov, thinks the Russian leadership may have also been lulled into complacency by the negotiation overtures put out by Kyiv this summer.”
  • “If Ukraine hoped that the shock of the attack would lead Russians to lose faith in the outlook of the war, then this is not happening,” said Russian military analyst  Kashin.”
• “Although the long-term impact of the Kursk invasion remains unclear, one certainty is that it has expanded the front by an additional 60 miles or so for the foreseeable future, forcing both sides to stretch their limited forces even further. Ultimately, the expansion of the war to new areas will, over time, favor the side with bigger resources, the Russian analysts said. With triple the population and a larger industrial base, that side remains Russia.”

“Transcript: Ukraine Wrongfoots Russia in Kursk,” Ben Hall, FT, 08.22.24.

• [Ben Hall, FT]: “When Ukrainian troops moved into the Kursk region of western Russia two weeks ago, it seems to have taken Vladimir Putin and the rest of the world by surprise. What is the strategy behind the move? How could it affect the fighting elsewhere on the frontline? And could it prove to be a turning point in the war?”
• [Hall]: “You think the Ukrainian army will continue to press forward as much as they can, or will they reach a point where they just say, listen no further, we need to dig in and hold what we’ve got? [Andriy Zagorodnyuk, former Minister of Defense, Ukraine]: I think both and that’s what we see right now. So in some areas they are already settling in, some areas they’re still pressing. And I believe that that will continue, which means that there would be constant back-and-forth movement. So basically would be a constant area of movement most likely.”
• [Zagorodnyuk]: “But of course, the key operational objective would be to distract the forces from the east of Ukraine. That would be the most logical one. And based on all indirect and direct statements and whatever we know about this operation, that is the main operational objective. So is it already a success? Probably not yet in full. However, we see that there’s already some movements which were originally not planned by Russian military leadership. And also, we know that Russian military leadership is very centralized, particularly in the times of crisis, which means that they would be distracting their attention from these two in order to deal with Kursk.”
• [Hall]: “So that would suggest that this Kursk offensive has not yet deflected enough Russian attention and manpower from a critical part of the eastern front. Do you think it’s only a matter of time before they’re forced to do that? [Zagorodnyuk]: We don’t see [Russia] abandoning anything, so they still keep on going. There was, however, information that they were ready to open another line of attack, perhaps in Kharkiv, perhaps in Sumy area. And they haven’t done that, obviously, and that might be already at some degree of success. But you’re right that they are moving in Donbas… Seems like Russia consciously decided not to get back their territory yet in order to pursue their objectives in Donbas. And we know that they don’t have forces to occupy the whole Donbas. So, frankly speaking, the logic of Russian command is still unclear… What was clearly unsafe is to keep playing Russian playbook on that war. And so everybody expected [Ukraine’s] military command to do something that’s symmetric. [Kursk] was clearly asymmetric. And I believe that these openings and these opportunities are still around not just in that Kursk area. There are other areas as well where Russia is weak.”
• [Hall]: “Where might one see another asymmetric operation? Do you think Crimea is something that we should be looking out for? [Zagorodnyuk]: I’m sure that we will… But the thing is that the only way Ukraine cannot allow Russia to win and win itself is through doing something out of the box. We clearly have seen from this one that the response of Russians is extremely slow, very unresolved and hesitant. And it takes time because nobody wants to make unpopular decisions, nobody wants to take initiative… That’s a textbook case on Russian command and control system reaction on the untraditional, asymmetric, non-linear situations.”

“Uncrewed Platforms Have Been Critical to Ukraine’s Success in the Black Sea,” H I Sutton, RUSI, 08.20.24.

• “The Russo-Ukrainian War may mark the beginning of a new era in naval drone warfare. … The success of Ukraine’s uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) is indisputable. The Russian Navy is now on the defensive, and consequently conducting minimal naval operations. It is one of the clearest examples of the success of asymmetrical threats against a larger, more powerful, opponent.”
• “This remarkable shift, where the hunter becomes the prey on a grand scale, offers numerous lessons for navies both large and small. Crucially, this achievement has only been possible due to advances in uncrewed technology. Similar results would not have been possible if Ukraine had relied on crewed platforms.”
• “The main technological enabler has been high-capacity two-way satellite communications such as Starlink and Kymeta, both of which have been observed in use. These allow human-in-the-loop navigation and targeting throughout the entire mission. Humans have proven adaptable to the tactical situation and faster to deploy than fully automated equivalents.”
• “It is not just ships being sunk that has had a tangible impact. The unsuccessful attacks, and mere threat of attack, have contributed. The Russian Navy has moved almost all its major assets to the port of Novorossiysk on the eastern coast of the Black Sea, rerouted its ‘Syrian Express’ supply lines to no longer use the Black Sea, and generally minimised patrolling.”
• “Ukraine’s success in pushing Russia’s Black Sea Fleet back to Novorossiysk is in no small part down to the use of USVs. Together with the shore-based anti-ship missiles – later joined by Storm Shadow and ATACMS missiles – which threaten ships in Crimean ports, USVs have denied Russia sea control. And their viability stems directly from the fact that they are uncrewed. … It is difficult to imagine any alternative means by which Ukraine could have achieved the same aims.”

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• “Ukraine’s Kursk offensive: big stakes, big risks for both sides,” Ben Barry, IISS, 08.26.24.
• “The Greats Agree: Ukraine's Kursk Offensive Is Strategic Malpractice,” James Holmes, NI, 08.26.24. 

Military aid to Ukraine:

“Biden’s Ukraine Strategy is Missing in Action,” Jack Detsch and Amy Mackinnon, FP, 08.21.24.

• “In the two and a half years since Russia invaded Ukraine, the Biden administration has yet to publicly detail in writing its long-term strategy for the conflict, in which the United States has played an integral role, providing Kyiv with some $175 billion in aid and working with partners in Europe and beyond to starve the Russian defense industry through sanctions and to rally support for Ukraine. That’s despite repeated urging from Congress, even before the supplemental aid was passed.”
• “President Joe Biden has repeatedly promised to stand by Ukraine as long as is necessary, but critics contend that the lack of a clearly articulated vision for America’s long-term role in the war has led to a de facto policy of enabling Ukraine to continue to fight, but not to win. “I think, by default, our real policy is keep them viable, don’t let Ukraine get defeated, and wait for one side or the other to give up and go to the table,” said retired U.S. Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove, who served as NATO’s supreme allied commander Europe until 2016. “We need to have a real, demonstrative, declaratory policy,” he said.”
• “This abdication of leadership, combined with numerous missed opportunities to capitalize on Russia’s battlefield mistakes, has needlessly cost lives and prolonged the war,” Senate Armed Services Committee ranking member Roger Wicker said in an emailed statement. “Ukraine is demonstrating every day that it can defeat Putin’s illegal invasion. It is time for the President to take the handcuffs off our aid.'”
• “With Ukrainian troops now on the offensive on Russian soil in Kursk, [House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael] McCaul has consistently pushed the administration to allow Ukraine to target Russia with the U.S.-provided long-range Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), which can hit targets nearly 200 miles away. “If our partners lifted current restrictions on the use of weapons on Russian territory, we wouldn’t need to physically enter the Kursk region to protect our border communities and eliminate Russia’s potential for aggression,” Zelensky said in a post on X on Tuesday. “But for now, we cannot use all the weapons at our disposal and eliminate Russian terrorists where they are. Russian military bases, airfields, logistics, and other military facilities whose existence allows Putin to evade the search for peace are legitimate targets for our defense forces.”

“Olaf Scholz’s decision to scale back military aid to Kyiv only encourages Russia,” Ben Hall, FT, 08.23.24. 

• “Over the weekend it emerged in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung newspaper that Germany will drastically shrink its bilateral defense aid for Ukraine from an impressive €7.5bn this year to €4bn next, and a measly €500mn in 2027. There is no money this year for any additional Ukrainian requests for ammunition or spare parts.”
• “Chancellor Olaf Scholz insists that Germany will remain Ukraine’s biggest supporter in Europe. He says Berlin will instead provide military aid via a planned $50bn loan agreed in principle by G7 leaders this summer and secured against frozen Russian central bank assets.  Scholz’s argument is a diversion. The $50bn loan is proving difficult technically to implement and is still potentially hostage to political objections, for example from Hungary’s pro-Kremlin government. In any case, it is not German money.”
• “As a share of GDP, Germany’s military aid to Kyiv lags behind Denmark, Sweden, the Baltic states, Poland and the Netherlands. It should be doing more not less. Ukraine’s victory — or at least helping it attain a battlefield position where it can secure a just and lasting peace — is fundamental to European security and possibly to the survival of the EU. It should be a top priority for Berlin. Europe needs Germany to step up not step back.”

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• "Ukraine Needs More Than Missiles From the West," Mihri Sharma, Bloomberg, 08.21.24.
• “Ukraine Has a Germany Problem Again. Here’s How to Fix It,” Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 08.21.24. 

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

“The mysterious middle-men helping Russia’s war machine,” The Economist, 08.20.24.

• “Russia is planning for decades of Western sanctions, a senior foreign-ministry official, Dmitry Birichevsky, said last week. The evidence suggests that might not be too much of a problem. The economy is growing smartly..... How come?”
  • “For a clue, look at Kazakhstan. ... Its exports to Russia rose from $40m in 2021 to $298m in 2023. ....Kazakhstan is one of several countries where trade with Russia and Europe has been mysteriously booming since Ukraine’s invasion. Others include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and the other four countries of Central Asia. Exports from the European Union to these countries increased by €46bn in 2023, up 50% from 2021. That was equivalent to three-quarters of the drop in Europe’s exports to Russia from 2021 to 2023.”
    • “The most rapid growth in exports from the EU to Kazakhstan and Armenia has been in chemicals, electronics and machinery, all product groups under heavy sanctions. Machinery exports to Kazakhstan from the EU doubled from 2021 to 2022, and then rose another 23% in 2023 to reach €6.4bn.”
• “The economies of Central Asia and the Caucasus seem to be benefiting from the war. Collectively, the economies of the five Central Asian republics grew by 6% in 2023, up from 4% in 2022, while Armenia’s economy expanded by 8%, up from 5% in 2022. A booming logistics sector has cropped up overnight, and cargo is growing by 20% each year. For Europe’s policymakers, this is all bad news. 'We expected some leakage,' says one official, 'but not on the scale we now know about.'
• “A real solution would require enlisting the help of the governments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. That is a tall order. ... Alternatively, Europe could use sticks rather than carrots. It could extend export bans to third countries or restrict their banks. That could anger Europe’s remaining sources of gas in Azerbaijan and hurt European firms. The question is whether the EU thinks that the benefit to Ukraine of a tighter sanctions regime is worth it. Its current approach suggests it doesn’t.” 

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

“Will Ukraine’s Incursion Into Russia Change the Trajectory of the War?” Tatiana Stanovaya interviewed by Isaac Chotiner, The New Yorker, 08.22.24. Clues from Russian Views

• “I believe that sanctions and broader “anti-Russian” policies, along with Western efforts to arm Ukraine and support its military actions—even if not universally agreed upon in the West—only reinforce Putin’s determination to destroy Ukraine in its current state.”
• “However, the situation is different for the Russian élite. If, for any reason, Putin were to disappear tomorrow, many within the Russian élite might wish to withdraw from the conflict.... Regardless of future domestic political shifts, the key question for the Russian élite is: What is the price of concessions? The fear that such concessions could be detrimental to the Russian state is currently so significant that it hampers any serious consideration of a peace process.”
• “At no point during the war has Putin abandoned his paramount aspiration: to change Ukraine politically, insuring that it becomes neutral and 'friendly.'”
• “An important nuance to consider is the distinction between strategic peace talks aimed at resolving the conflict and a ceasefire. The latter, in my opinion, is possible as a tactical maneuver under certain circumstances, such as if Ukraine faces political destabilization, fails to secure the front lines, or becomes more internally divided. Putin may agree to a temporary ceasefire if it is not used by Ukraine to rearm and gain time for a counterattack. However, a ceasefire could be a step toward genuine peace talks or a prelude to new escalation.”
• “I believe the narrative of “red lines” lost its relevance two years ago, when Ukraine began its counter-offensive. The Kharkiv counterattack, strikes on the Crimea bridge, drones hitting the Kremlin—these events have made it clear that Putin is not going to use nuclear weapons in situations that may seem grave but do not strategically reverse the situation in Ukraine’s favor or threaten Russia’s existence. It’s evident that Putin has been able to tolerate much more than we initially imagined.”
• “Putin believes that sooner or later the West must reach a point where it recognizes the many years of destructive, one-sided, biased, unpredictable, and short-term foreign policies—not just toward Russia, but also in relation to issues like the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Europe, and what he perceives as irrational animosity toward China. When the West reaches this point of self-reflection and revises its approaches, the conditions for strategic deals with Russia will emerge.”

"‘Putin will never apologize; he will seek revenge for any attempts to humiliate him.’ Interview with political analyst Stanislav Belkovsky” conducted by Yevgeny Senshin, Republic.ru, 08.26.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. 

• “The main goal of [Ukraine’s incursion into Russia] is to move to negotiations as quickly as possible, but not on the terms outlined by Vladimir Putin in mid-June before the peace conference in Burgenstock, Switzerland. To remind you, these terms included the complete withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from annexed regions, including the transfer of Kherson and (especially) Zaporizhzhia to the Russian Federation, Ukraine's official renunciation of NATO membership and the implementation of other domestic policy provisions contained in the Istanbul project of 2022, and finally, the lifting of all sanctions on Russia. The Kursk operation demonstrated that these conditions are clearly inadequate, partly because the current military capabilities of the Russian Federation and its resources necessary for military victory have been exaggerated.”
• “The U.S. administration is doubly interested in starting peace negotiations this fall, specifically before Nov. 5. This is because it is important for Joseph Biden and Kamala Harris to take away Donald Trump's main advantages by showing that the current administration's peace efforts are effective. Kamala Harris can then claim these peace medals for herself before the decisive battle with Donald Trump for the White House.”
• “The positions of China and India are that this war needs to be ended in the foreseeable future, and Moscow cannot ignore their point of view.”
• “The combination of all these factors suggests a significant likelihood that negotiations will begin this fall.”
• “Putin will never apologize. Moreover, Putin can interpret anything as his own victory with the help of his controlled information machine. This is not a problem for him. Naturally, he will seek revenge for any attempts to humiliate him.”
• “I believe that the regime's qualitative state has not changed. It remains quite stable and resilient. The possibility of a palace coup always exists, but I have never considered it highly likely. I do not currently see any groups that possess sufficiently consolidated resources, primarily the political will, to remove Vladimir Putin from power. He remains the sole and exclusive moderator of the Russian ruling elite.”
• “For his part, Putin continues to tighten the screws, toughening the regime to minimize any internal destabilization. The main vector of this tightening is, of course, the restriction of freedom of speech, including through the blockade of the internet in all its forms and manifestations, approaching a Chinese-style digital concentration camp. This process will accelerate. While it's difficult to predict an exact timeline, the trend is clear and will be realized.”
• “Therefore, I think the regime can only be destabilized by significant "black swans" affecting it from within, such as Putin's death. This could, of course, happen, but we don't know when or why. I see no other reasons for the regime to collapse in the near future due to inertia.”

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“To Whom It May Concern: America and Europe Need Each Other,” Wolfgang Ischinger, NYT, 08.25.24. 

• “We [Europe and America] need to talk about China. Unlike the European Union, which defines China as a partner, competitor and systemic rival, America appears to have concluded, in a rare show of bipartisan agreement, that China is now not only its key rival but also its main long-term adversary in terms of global political and military power and influence. Trans-Atlantic discord about how best to deal with China is already visible, and it seems bound to get worse.”
• “When it comes to handling Russia, Europe and the United States have had an elaborate consultation and coordination mechanism for the past seven decades: NATO. With China, there is nothing comparable. Why wasn’t Europe consulted when the United States decided to deny certain semiconductor chips from being exported to China? Is there any agreed strategy on Taiwan? As seen from Europe, the increasingly popular idea in Washington that America should focus on China and leave Ukraine for the Europeans to deal with is outright dangerous. Many Europeans feel that China may very well interpret declining U.S. support for Ukraine as a sign of weakness. (Remember Afghanistan?)”
• “We need to start talking like grown-ups about paying our defense bills. .. If America truly wants Europe to be more responsible for the security of its continent, Washington should encourage European partners to develop and buy more arms in Europe and do it in a coordinated manner.”
• “Finally, we need to talk about our common Western values. Isn’t the one major difference between us and authoritarian or dictatorial regimes our commitment to human rights, to the rule of law, to decency in this age of impunity, as David Miliband, the former British foreign secretary, once called the current global disorder? We can and we should be proud of this commitment. The problem is that the Western world — and in particular the United States — is being accused of applying double standards in dealing with wars, conflicts, and human rights abuses.”
• “No matter who wins the White House in November, the new American president and European leaders should remind themselves of the very real benefits of this centrally important relationship—and keep the conversation going.”

“How NATO Can Help End the Ukraine War,” Roger Myerson, Timothy Mylovanov and Konstantin Sonin, Project Syndicate, 08.20.24. 

• “The real barrier to any reasonable peace settlement is Putin, who remains committed to ensuring that a free and democratic Ukraine does not survive and has a long track record of reneging on promises and violating treaties. Since no political institutions in Russia can force Putin to honor the terms of a peace deal, it is reasonable to assume that he would readily abandon it and re-invade Ukraine at the first opportunity – unless the international community gives him a very good reason not to.”
• “A negotiated peace in Ukraine can be credible only if it includes tangible international commitments to ensure the country’s long-term independence. Incorporating NATO protection for Ukraine into any peace deal is the obvious solution. After all, it is the threat of war with NATO that prevents Russia from invading, say, the Baltic states.”
• “A plausible way forward would start with Ukraine’s military stabilizing the frontlines, using Western weapons and aid. Once this condition is met, Ukraine could join Russia at the negotiating table, with the shared understanding that any agreement would be backed by NATO guarantees. For example, NATO membership could include a proviso that the alliance’s protection covers only the parts of Ukraine controlled by the Ukrainian government at the time of admission. This approach would reassure Ukrainians that any territorial concessions would not simply enable Russia to invade more of the country.”

“The Perils of Isolationism: The World Still Needs America—and America Still Needs the World,” Condoleezza Rice, FA, September/October 2024.

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• "5 Global Trends That Will Shape the US Election," Matthew Kaminski, Politico, 08.20.24.

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“‘Senior-junior partnership’ claim distorts China-Russia relations,” Andrey Kortunov, Global Times, 08.19.24. Clues from Russian Views.

• “When the current dynamics of China-Russia relations is discussed, the conversation often boils down to the concept of a "senior-junior partnership." …Let's have a closer look at this concept. Are there any particular indicators or benchmarks that tell us when and how a nation becomes the junior partner?”
  • “The first guess is that this should be mostly about bilateral trade. Conventional wisdom might suggest that by trading too much with Beijing, Moscow becomes overdependent on China, and this overdependence is becoming detrimental to Russia's sovereignty. However, sheer numbers may be deceptive. China is the main trade partner for around 140 nations all over the globe. Should we consider all of these nations to be Beijing's junior partners?”
  • “Maybe, being a junior partner is not about the absolute size of your trade, but about the trade's structure. The West maintains that Russia's exports to China are not diverse enough: Russia sells mostly oil and gas on a buyer's market, which turns Beijing into a deal-maker, and Moscow - into a deal-taker. This is not entirely true - Russia is consistently diversifying its exports to China, with agricultural products being the most graphic example.”
    • “When we dig deeper into to the military domain of China-Russia relations, we will see that Moscow has assisted Beijing with some military technologies.”
    • “As for the West-assumed deliveries of China's weapons to Russia, China handles the export of military products prudently and responsibly and strictly controls the export of dual-use articles.”
  • “Moreover, Russia and China routinely conduct joint military exercises. … None of these exercises can qualify as a sign of Russia becoming a junior partner with any of these nations.”
  • “Overall, there seems to be only one credible indicator that would suggest that Moscow is indeed turning into a "junior partner" of Beijing. As a "senior partner," China should have the capacities and the political will to contain Russia's freedom of action in international relations by forcing the Kremlin to adjust its foreign policy according to "friendly advice" coming from Beijing. But have we seen any specific indicators of this trend?”
• “In the 21st century, the whole idea of junior and senior partners looks outdated and even archaic. True international partnerships are based on mutual respect, empathy and a carefully calibrated balance of interests.”

“A surprising thing Walz and Vance have in common,” Stephen Kinzer, BG, 08.22.24. 

• “The outcome of November's election could be decisive for Ukraine. Harris asserted in Munich that continued military aid to Ukraine is vital “to stop an imperialist authoritarian from subjugating a free and democratic people.” Vance argues that Russia poses no serious threat to US interests and could even join us in confronting China, which he sees as America's true enemy. Based on their dueling speeches, a Trump-Vance administration would seem likely to push Ukraine toward compromise with Moscow; a Harris-Walz team would be less likely to do so.”
• “Walz has been out of Washington politics since the Ukraine war broke out and has said little about it. In one recent interview, however, he warned that Republicans “want to take away our alliances and leave Russia to do whatever they want.” While Vance envisions partnership with Russia to confront China, Walz would prefer the opposite.”
• “As vice president, Walz would be the first major national figure in this century to promote partnership with China. Vance would be among the first to suggest partnership with Russia. Each position would outrage many in Washington. The next vice president may be as powerless as most before him. But if that changes, either Vance or Walz could upset America's foreign policy applecart.”

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

“The Battle of Kursk probably won’t result in nuclear weapons use against Ukraine. But Russian escalation vis-à-vis NATO can’t be ruled out,” Nikolai N. Sokov, 08.26.24. 

• “The successful Ukrainian offensive in the Russian Kursk oblast started in early August has once again triggered speculation about possible Russian nuclear use against Ukraine. The situation resembles the successful Ukrainian offensive in the late summer–fall of 2022 in the Kharkiv oblast, when many worried Russia would resort to battlefield nuclear use to stop advancing Ukrainian forces. On the face of it, there was reason to be concerned: Russian President Vladimir Putin did reference nuclear weapons in September 2022, and it became known more than a year later that the United States was “rigorously” preparing for that contingency.”
• “A closer look reveals, however, that Putin’s 2022 reference to nuclear weapons sounded as an emotional impromptu remark made under stress, whereas the U.S. assessment was reportedly based on an intercept of conversations among Russian generals rather than on tangible signs of preparation or data about discussions among policymakers. We now know that Moscow dealt with that situation in a different way: Partial mobilization helped beef up forces, which stopped the Ukrainian Kharkiv offensive.”
• “Although the Kursk operation caught Russia by surprise once again, its military and civilian leadership are better prepared today to deal with surprise than in 2022.”
• “One has reasons to be skeptical about the prospect of battlefield use of nuclear weapons. It was considered an acceptable option during the Cold War, especially its early years. Both the United States and the Soviet Union held large-scale exercises with live nuclear explosions in the 1950s, and both nuclear powers contemplated large-scale use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Today, however, is different. The “nuclear taboo,” which began to take shape in the 1950s, has grown very strong.”
• “Not that nuclear use is technically impossible. But the political and ethical implications make such a decision daunting—and unlikely. Battlefield nuclear use in Ukraine, for whatever reason, would make Russia a true pariah state in the international system, turning countries—partners and neutrals alike, all critical for breaking the tight sanctions regime, which has been established by the G-7 economies and their partners—against Moscow. In other words, any nuclear use against Ukraine would be self-defeating for Russia.”
• “A more likely contingency is escalation starting with something relatively small, but visibly consequential. For example, Russia might shoot down a Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle over the Black Sea or engage in a confrontation on or over the Baltic Sea or strike Ukrainian assets outside Ukraine as the possibility of basing F-16s outside Ukraine is still discussed.”

“Ukraine Keeps Crossing Russia's Red Lines. Putin Keeps Blinking,” Robyn Dixon and Catherine Belton, WP, 04.24.24. 

• “If Russia's territorial integrity were threatened, "we will certainly use all the means at our disposal to protect Russia and our people. It's not a bluff," [Putin said] in September [2022]. "The citizens of Russia can be sure that the territorial integrity of our Motherland, our independence and freedom will be ensured — I emphasize this again — with all the means at our disposal," making a clear reference to Russia's nuclear weapons.”
• “But Ukraine's punch through Russian defenses in the first foreign invasion since World War II exposed Russia's military flaws and laid bare Moscow's apparently illusory red lines. Now some are again questioning the centerpiece of Washington's Ukraine strategy: a slow, calibrated supply of weapons to Ukraine to avoid escalating tensions with Russia that critics argue has dashed Kyiv's chances of driving Russia out and resulted in a grinding war of attrition with massive casualties.”
• “Ukraine's attacks have repeatedly crossed ostensible red lines: sinking Russia's Black Sea flagship, Moskva; the 2022 Crimea Bridge blast; Storm Shadow missile attacks on the fleet headquarters in Sevastopol; the 2023 drone attacks on the Kremlin and Moscow; the assassinations of propagandists on Russian territory; and attacks on strategic air bases hundreds of miles from Ukraine. The Western hardware being used by Ukrainian forces, HIMARS, tanks, ATACMS and F-16s, were all once red lines, too.”
• “When Ukrainian drones struck Moscow in May 2023, hitting a Kremlin dome and closing major airports, Putin downplayed the problem, analyst Tatiana Stanovaya wrote at the time in an analysis for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace." Within a few months, it seemed that the Kremlin's red lines had either never existed or had become extremely mobile." The Kremlin claimed to be unperturbed, she wrote, "even if it flies in the face of common sense." It was to become a striking pattern, yet the U.S.-led policy on military aid to Ukraine has remained timid, according to many analysts.”
• “Russian authorities have been seeking to downplay the significance of the Ukrainian incursion [into the Kursk region] and failure of its military leadership. The presence of Ukrainian troops in 15 to 20 "little known" villages in the Kursk region was of "little significance" compared to Russian advances in Donetsk, [pro-Kremlin analyst Sergei] Markov said. But if Ukraine occupied all of Glushkovsky district in Kursk or took the regional capital, Kursk city, "this would be a very big loss" that could force Putin to change his approach, he added.”

“Ukraine Has Crossed Moscow’s and Washington’s Red Lines,” Gideon Rachman, FT. 08.26.24.

• “In the aftermath of the Kursk incursion, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine has been contemptuous of the restraints that America has placed on Ukraine’s war efforts, denouncing the “naive, illusory concept of so-called red lines regarding Russia, which dominated the assessment of the war by some partners.” That view, said the Ukrainian president, has now “crumbled.” But has it? The difference between the caution in Washington and the risk-taking in Kyiv reflects not just a difference in analysis about how far Vladimir Putin can be pushed. It is also a reflection of a subtle difference in war aims.”
• “At the start of the conflict, President Joe Biden set his administration two goals. The first was to support Ukraine. But the second was to avoid World War III. If forced to choose between those two aims, the U.S. would clearly choose the latter. But Ukraine is fighting for its survival. It would accept direct U.S. involvement in a war with Russia. According to a recent book by David Sanger, Biden even suggested to his aides that Zelenskyy might be deliberately trying to draw America into a third world war. As a result, there is a different appetite for risk in Washington and Kyiv.”
• “Even Ukrainian success is unlikely to lead to the U.S. throwing caution to the winds. The Americans are still intent on avoiding a direct conflict with Russia and still take the threat of nuclear conflict seriously.”
• “Phillips O’Brien of the University of St Andrews argues that invading Russia “has always been the last assumed red line of nuclear weapons usage — and the Ukrainians are marching… right across it.” But the U.S. does not believe that the last red line has been successfully crossed. Biden’s advisers continue to think that — if Putin believed his regime was on the point of total defeat — the Russians could resort to the use of nuclear weapons. When the Ukrainians complain that their allies are scared of the idea of victory, they have a point.”

“Ukraine's Kursk Offensive Isn't Just a Raid. It's Upending Assumptions,” Max Boot, WP, 08.26.24. 

• “Whatever happens in Kursk, the success the Ukrainians have so far enjoyed reveals that Russian red lines are not as menacing as President Joe Biden seems to imagine in setting sharp limitations on the use of U.S. weaponry against Russian territory. Far from going nuclear, Putin is trying to minimize the Ukrainian incursion by pretending it's business as usual for the Kremlin.”
• “Because of those Western restrictions, Ukraine has been forced to rely on its own drones for strikes deep into Russian territory. In recent days, Ukrainian drones have targeted the Russian capital, a giant oil-storage facility in southern Russia and Russian air bases. The Moscow attack is purely symbolic, but deep strikes against Russian air bases and energy infrastructure demonstrably degrade Russian war-making capacity—the former by limiting the number of sorties that Russian bombers can fly, the latter by reducing the revenue the Russian energy sector can generate for the Kremlin.”
• “Biden should grant the Ukrainians the authority [to employ U.S.-made ATACMS rockets] they seek, or else risk the possibility that Russia will simply continue to use its greater manpower and manufacturing base to slowly grind down Ukrainian defenses. Ukraine has scrambled assumptions with its push into Kursk. It's time for fresh thinking at the White House too—and for the administration to finally deliver the strategy for victory in Ukraine that Congress mandated as part of its last aid package in April.”

"Why Is the U.S. Fighting Nuclear Threats Behind Closed Doors?," Andreas Kluth, Bloomberg, 08.23.24. 

• “Biden has apparently given classified instructions to the Pentagon to prepare for a new approach, based on deterring—that is, being able and determined to retaliate against—a concerted nuclear attack by Russia, China and North Korea. That policy shift occurred this spring, before he passed the baton in the presidential race to Harris.”
• “The reasons for the new strategy are fathomable, and yet the new approach by Biden and Harris (to the extent that she’s privy to it) is wrong. Secret armaments or doctrinal shifts without public messaging will only make adversaries more paranoid and a full-on arms race all but inevitable, raising the risk of miscalculation by someone, somewhere, somehow.”
• “This frightening scenario has some American policymakers arguing that the U.S. needs to enter and win a new arms race, with warheads and launch technologies that will in sum always match or exceed not only the arsenal of America’s only nuclear peer, Russia, but the combined forces of those four horsemen of the atomic apocalypse.”
• “The cognoscenti of arms control counter that such a nuclear build-up would be foolish. Not only would it be economically ruinous and divert resources from America’s non-nuclear (misleadingly called “conventional”) military might. It would also be pointless, because in a nuclear war the absolute number of warheads stops mattering once you can convince any and all enemies that you could annihilate them even after they hit you first. America has that capability several times over.”

“If a China and America War Went Nuclear, Who Would Win?” The Economist, 08.22.24.

• “It is bad enough to contemplate a war in Asia. It is grimmer still to think through a nuclear one. But somebody has to. And so Andrew Metrick, Philip Sheers and Stacie Pettyjohn, all of the Centre for a New American Security (CNAS), a think-tank in Washington, recently gathered a group of experts to play a tabletop exercise—a type of wargame—to explore how a Sino-American nuclear war could break out. The results were not encouraging.”
• “In the exercise scenario, it is 2032 and a war over Taiwan has been raging for 45 days. China uses “theatre” nuclear weapons—with a shorter range and smaller yield than the city-busting “strategic” missiles—to shorten the war by coercing America into submission. The targets include Guam and Kwajalein Atoll—a pair of islands vital to America’s military position in the Pacific—as well as an American aircraft-carrier strike group.”
• “That is distressingly plausible [because]:
  • “One reason is the geography of the Asian battlefield.
  • “That is related to a second reason: the evolution of weaponry.
  • “The third factor is the effect of a long war.” 

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• “Searching for Nuclear Bombs at the Democratic Convention,” Thomas Gaulkin, BAS, 08.24.24. 

Counterterrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security/AI: 

• No significant developments.

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant developments.

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Tim Walz on Russia and Ukraine,” RM Staff, RM, 08.20.24.

• “Since Kamala Harris chose Tim Walz as her running mate on Aug. 6, the U.S. press has published dozens of news stories on what qualities make the Minnesota governor most appealing to American voters concerned with domestic issues. Significantly less, however, could be found in American media on Walz’s record and views on foreign policy issues in general, and U.S. policies in the post-Soviet space in particular.”
• “The first evidence of Walz’s public support for Ukraine in its interaction with Russia dates back to his first term in the U.S House of Representatives. In September 2008, Walz co-sponsored H.Res.1314: “Remembering the 75th anniversary of the Ukrainian Famine (Holodomor) of 1932–1933.” Walz then repeatedly acted in support of Ukraine in his subsequent years in Congress.”
• “When Russia invaded Ukraine in February of 2022, the governor instantly condemned the attack as “unprovoked,” adding “It’s time to unite, protect democracy and work together to hold Russia accountable.” In 2022, Walz also issued an executive order to compel Minnesota state agencies to terminate any contracts with Russian entities over Russia’s war against Ukraine.”
• “What emerges from a review of Walz’s foreign policy views and votes in Congress and as governor is that like his running mate, Vice President Kamala Harris, Walz believes that Ukraine deserves support for aspiring to develop as a democracy under the shadow of a predatory Russia. Like most American foreign policy thinkers of the post-WWII generation, he also shares the American view that economic growth and trade go hand-in-hand with healthy democratic governance. This explains the consistency of his positions on U.S. trade and security assistance with Ukraine.”
• “In addition to being staunchly pro-Ukrainian in the conflict between Kyiv and Moscow, Walz has also once confessed that concerns related to Russia and nuclear security keep him awake at night and called for lifting Moscow’s restrictions on exports of American dairy products to Russia.” 

“'I Cannot Understand Putin's Hold on Trump;' In an exclusive excerpt from his new memoir, H.R. McMaster details the clashes over Russia that led President Trump to fire him as national security adviser,” H.R. McMaster, WSJ, 08.23.24. 

• “Like his predecessors George W. Bush and Barack Obama, Trump was overconfident in his ability to improve relations with the dictator in the Kremlin. Trump, the self-described "expert dealmaker," believed he could build a personal rapport with Putin. Trump's tendency to be reflexively contrarian only added to his determination. The fact that most foreign policy experts in Washington advocated a tough approach to the Kremlin seemed only to drive the president to the opposite approach.”
• “Putin, a ruthless former KGB operator, played to Trump's ego and insecurities with flattery. Putin had described Trump as "a very outstanding person, talented, without any doubt," and Trump had revealed his vulnerability to this approach, his affinity for strongmen and his belief that he alone could forge a good relationship with Putin: 'It is always a great honor to be so nicely complimented by a man so highly respected within his own country.'”
• “Moreover, Trump's tendency toward moral equivalence made him relatively unconcerned about some of Putin's brazen acts of aggression. When Fox News host Bill O'Reilly asked Trump in February 2017 why he respected Putin even though 'he's a killer,' the newly inaugurated president responded, 'There are a lot of killers. We've got a lot of killers. What do you think? Our country's so innocent?'”
• “Just a few days after the poisoning of [Sergei] Skripal and his daughter, a story appeared in the New York Post with the headline "Putin Heaps Praise on Trump, Pans U.S. Politics." When I walked into the Oval Office that evening, on another matter, the president had a copy of the article and was writing a note to the Russian leader across the page with a fat black Sharpie. He asked me to get the clipping to Putin. I took it with me. When I got home that night, I confided to my wife Katie, 'After over a year in this job, I cannot understand Putin's hold on Trump.'”
• “Trump wanted to call Putin to congratulate him on being elected to a fourth term as president of Russia. I explained that Putin's victory had been rigged, thanks to the Kremlin's control over the media, its quelling of the opposition, the disqualification of popular opposition candidates such as Alexei Navalny, and restrictions on election monitors. A call was arranged anyway… at this stage in our relationship, my advice on Putin and Russia had become pro forma.”

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Is Putin's Inner Circle Wobbling? A Prominent Oligarch is Publicly Critical of the War. He Likely Isn't Alone,” Amy Knight, WSJ, 08.19.24.

• “Mr. Putin has had to deal with discontent since the conflict began. His security team, including then-security council secretary Nikolai Patrushev, was noticeably uneasy when the president previewed his Ukrainian invasion at a televised meeting in February 2022. The posse got in line, but discontent emerged again when Mr. Putin failed initially to rein in Wagner Group mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin in June 2023.”
• “Mr. Patrushev gave a speech in November discussing Mr. Putin only in the past tense, which spawned rumors of the Russian leader's death. Around the same time he lamented the exodus of scholars and scientists from Russia because of the war. Mr. Patrushev got his due in May, when Mr. Putin removed him from his security council leadership post and gave him the ignominious job of advising the president on shipbuilding.”
• “Yet the choir of discontent gained a new member this month when Oleg Deripaska—one of Russia's richest businessmen—spoke up. In an Aug. 5 interview with Nikkei Asia, he criticized the Kremlin's defense spending, called the Ukraine war 'mad,' and urged an 'immediate, unconditional cease-fire.'”
• “Mr. Putin likely won't dispose of Mr. Deripaska as he might other figures, say, in a plane crash or a push out of a window. As Mr. Deripaska told Nikkei Asia, "[The Kremlin] don't touch me, and we [businessmen] stay out of politics." He likely wouldn't have spoken so candidly if other members of the business and political elite didn't agree with him. As political analyst Abbas Gallyamov observed on Telegram, "Deripaska is a very analytical person, so before saying such things, he always absorbs the mood of other elites… This is not the voice of Deripaska alone." Mr. Patrushev, popular among Russian security and intelligence circles, may be among those elites.”
• “Ordinary Russians, fed a steady stream of propaganda about defending their country against the "evil" West, are unlikely to protest. But Mr. Putin's support among elites, essential to his remaining in power, is less certain. He shouldn't assume they will always back a war with no end in sight.”

“In Russia, Ukraine’s Invasion Pops Putin’s Bubbles,” Alexey Kovalev, FP, 08.19.24.

• “For two weeks now, soldiers of what Russian President Vladimir Putin considers a “Nazi regime” have been pouring over the border in the first foreign occupation of Russia since World War II. Putin and his propaganda apparatus, from the media to schools to the scholars rewriting history books, have been drumming up this moment: the great threat to Russia’s very survival on par with the real Nazi invasion in 1941.”
• “Yet the response of most Russians to Ukraine’s offensive into Kursk, now entering its third week, has been a passive, fatalistic shrug. Indeed, Ukraine’s occupation of around 1,000 square kilometers of sacred Russian soil—which Putin’s forces are still struggling to contain—has popped numerous bubbles in Russia and, by extension, in the West’s perception of the regime’s strength and motivations for waging the war.”
• “The first bubble to pop was the Kremlin’s decadeslong propaganda about the supposed existential threat to Russia emanating from Ukraine. As Johns Hopkins international relations professor Eugene Finkel rhetorically asked on X: 'By the way, have you noticed the wave of nationalist fervor and mobilization washing over Russia in response to a military invasion?'”
• “The second bubble Ukraine’s incursion has popped is Putin’s image as an authoritarian leader, which is built on strength, order, and the promise to make Russia great again. His evident inability to defend the country’s borders makes Putin, who has tied his reign to the restoration of Russia’s lost empire, look weak.”
• “Third, by taking the war to Russian territory, Ukraine has popped the bubble of the Kremlin threats to escalate the war, based on the idea that Russia’s existence—rather than Ukraine’s—was somehow at stake. The supposed threat from NATO is no longer a talking point.”
• “Finally, the invasion punctures the notion that Russians collectively support the war, just because government-sponsored polls say so. It appears that most just take their cue from Putin: In case of trouble, just ignore it and hope it goes away.”

“The Chilling Rise and Fall of Wagner Group Warlord Yevgeny Prigozhin,” FT book review, 08.21.24. Miles Johnson reviews “Downfall: Prigozhin, Putin and the New Fight for the Future of Russia,” by Anna Arutunyan and Mark Galeotti, and “The Wager Group: Inside Russia’s Mercenary Army,” by Jack Margolin.

• “A year after the Wagner Group leader [Yevgeny Prigozhin] staged a spectacular mutiny against Vladimir Putin and died in a suspected state assassination, two complementary books tell, in gripping style, Prigozhin’s implausible journey from street hot-dog seller to secretive international warlord to a social media-addicted insurrectionist.”
  • “Downfall by Anna Arutunyan and Mark Galeotti, one a Russian-American journalist and the other a British historian, casts Prigozhin as a creature spawned in Putin’s Russia who eventually turns on his patron and creator.”
  • “In The Wagner Group, Jack Margolin, an independent researcher and expert on modern mercenaries, provides a deeply reported history of the Wagner private military company. Both books show how the ill-fated Wagner mutiny was a product of the “ad-hocracy” that defines Putin’s rule—and that Prigozhin’s savage, entrepreneurial spin on the privatization of force will probably long outlive him.”

“Putin’s Cousin is a Rising Star in Russia’s Defense Ministry,” Natalie Gumenyuk, Bloomberg News, 08.21.24.

• “[Anna Tsivileva, 52, daughter of Vladimir Putin’s late cousin] enjoys better and more direct access to Putin than many of her superiors at the Defense Ministry and is considered to be a serious political figure now… She is influential enough to have one-on-one work meetings with Putin, and close enough to see him at unofficial events and parties, according to two of the people. The Russian president has become increasingly isolated, said three of the people, which has made that access more valuable.”
• “As Ukraine’s military incursion into Russia this month inflicts fresh humiliation on the Kremlin, Putin is leaning on trusted aides to help prosecute the war that he started in February 2022 and that’s now in its third year… Putin handed Tsivileva more power by promoting her to state secretary on Aug. 17. Whereas before she oversaw housing and social services for troops, she’s now the main interlocutor between the Defense Ministry and parliament for all military-related legislation and in control of the ministry’s bureaucratic machine.”
• “Putin, 71, doesn’t discuss his family in public, even refraining from confirming the identities of his two adult daughters despite their occasional career-related appearances in the media. But times are different, and Putin has now put his distant cousin in a public-facing role in the upper echelons of the Defense Ministry and allowed her husband to be named energy minister. Putin named Tsivileva to head the “Defenders of the Fatherland” state fund for soldiers last year over his own aide’s proposed candidates for the role, according to a person close to the Kremlin… It was at the fund that Tsivileva made her strongest impression on Putin… She turned the project into an important tool for the Kremlin amid Russian military casualties that Western estimates have put as high as 500,000 since the start of the invasion.”
• “Tsivileva is tough, which proved useful in fighting the Defense Ministry to expand the fund’s remit to work with all categories of troops fighting in Ukraine, and not only with returned soldiers and families of the deceased, a person familiar with the project said. Today, her political weight is buttressed by her media savvy.”

“Life in Putin’s Gulag: ‘A Long Groundhog Day,’ says Vladimir Kara-Murza,” Vladimir Kara-Murza and David Shipley, WP, 08.20.24.

• “[A day in prison is] basically just a long “Groundhog Day”— endless and meaningless and exactly the same. Omsk, where I was imprisoned, is a city in western Siberia that has a centuries-long tradition of holding political prisoners in Russia, both in imperial times and in Soviet times.”
• “It is the harshest prison regime in the whole of Russia. Everything is by the second, by the minute, by the rule. Five o’clock in the morning is the official wake-up call. You attach your bunk to the wall, where it stays until 9 p.m. when it’s lights out. So, you cannot lie down or sit properly during the day. You just basically walk in the small cell as much as you can. Or you sit at this very small and uncomfortable stool that basically just sticks out of the wall at a tiny desk.”
• “I was in solitude for almost 11 months straight without any break. And I have to say, it's really not easy when you are just completely deprived of any human contact… In the two years and three months that I've been in prison, I only once was able to speak with my wife on the phone and only twice to my three children. This is an old, very Soviet habit of the Kremlin when they try to punish not just political opponents themselves but their families as well.”
• “[Why put a human in solitary confinement in a Siberian prison a world away?] Because the enemy must be punished, right? In my case, it wasn’t just public opposition to the war in Ukraine. It wasn’t just public advocacy on behalf of political prisoners. It wasn’t just public speeches talking about the illegitimacy, the illegality of Vladimir Putin bypassing the constitutional term limits and staying in power indefinitely. This was all in my sentence, too. So, we know that these things have really irritated them. But sort of the unspoken and unwritten charge that I was convicted of was also my involvement in the passage of the Magnitsky Act in several Western countries, beginning here in the United States… And so just to drive home the point, the judge that gave me my 25-year sentence was the same judge who imprisoned Sergei Magnitsky back in 2008. He was one of the first people sanctioned by the United States government under the Magnitsky Act. So there couldn’t have been a clearer message that the Kremlin could send than this.”
• “If we still believe in that goal of a Europe whole, free and at peace, a goal that was expressed famously 35 years ago by an American president speaking in West Germany—that goal will only be possible when Russia, which is the largest country in Europe, also becomes peaceful and democratic. A Europe whole, free and at peace will only be possible with a peaceful and democratic Russia as a part of it. And this is a road map that we need to start preparing today.”

“Public Figures in Russia and Beyond React to Telegram Founder Pavel Durov’s Arrest,” Meduza, 08.25.24. Clues from Russian Views

“On Saturday evening, Telegram founder Pavel Durov was arrested in Paris immediately after his private jet landed at Le Bourget airport. According to French media reports, Durov is set to be charged with an array of offenses, including promotion of terrorism, fraud, drug trafficking, cyberbullying, and organized crime, for Telegram’s lack of content moderation. Meduza has compiled initial reactions to Durov’s arrest from public figures in Russia and around the world.”

• “Dmitry Medvedev: Deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council: Once, a long time ago, I asked Durov why he wouldn’t cooperate with [Russian] law enforcement to solve serious crimes. “This is my principled position,” he said. “In that case, you’ll face serious problems in any country,” I told him. He believed his biggest problems were in Russia, so he left and went to other countries to get citizenship or residency… Durov needs to understand once and for all that you can’t choose your Fatherland, just as you can’t choose the times you live in.”
• “Vladislav Davankov, State Duma deputy chairman: Right now, we need to get him out. I’ve called on Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to urge the French authorities to release Pavel Durov from custody. […] If the French authorities refuse to release Pavel Durov from custody, I suggest we make every effort to have him moved to the UAE or the Russian Federation. If he agrees, of course.”
• “Ruslan Leviev, Founder of the independent Russian investigative group Conflict Intelligence Team: Pavel’s arrest has united everyone: Russian officials, Tucker Carlson, Elon Musk, and our opposition figures. For what it’s worth, I also believe he shouldn’t be in prison. If he refuses to moderate content and remove various terrorism- and drug-related content, then apply economic pressure.”
• “Christo Grozev, investigative journalist: His refusal to cooperate with the FSB for the sake of free speech is, unfortunately, completely canceled out by his refusal to cooperate with anybody to stop Telegram from being used for all manner of horrible things. This was his choice. Could he have done one without doing the other?”
• “Tatyana Moskalkova, Russian human rights commissioner: It’s obvious that Pavel Durov’s arrest is an attempt to shut down Telegram—an Internet platform where one can learn the truth about what’s happening in the world. This is concerning among everyone who supports freedom of speech and the building of a multi-polar world.”
• “Georgy Alburov, Investigator for Alexey Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation: Durov’s arrest, in addition to being unjust as hell (Durov obviously isn’t engaged in terrorism or weapons trafficking), is also a huge blow to freedom of speech.”

Vladimir Putin’s Remarks at “A Meeting on Economic Issues,” Kremlin.ru, 08.26.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. 

• “Russia's economy, as last year, continues to grow at a good, strong pace. According to estimates for the first half of the year, gross domestic product increased by 4.6%, and industrial production grew by 4.4%. At the same time, manufacturing sectors traditionally set a higher bar, with a growth rate of 8%.”
• “Consumer demand remains strong. Retail trade turnover increased by 8.8% over six months. It is worth noting that this result is mainly supported by wage growth. In real terms, adjusted for inflation, wages increased by 10.1% from January to May of this year. At the same time, Russia maintains a record low unemployment rate. In June, it was 2.4%.”
• “The growth of the economy and wages is positively reflected in the federal budget. In the first seven months of this year, its revenues approached 20 trillion rubles, 36% higher than last year.”
• “At the same time, I once again draw the attention of both the Government and the Central Bank of Russia: we need to improve the effectiveness of coordinated actions to reduce inflation.”
• “As for monetary policy, it is known that the Central Bank of Russia changes the key interest rate to curb inflation and regulates the banking credit market. Here, the dynamics are ahead of the curve. Strangely enough, despite the increase in the key rate, we are observing this dynamic. In June, the volume of loans to businesses grew by more than 20% year-on-year, and debt on consumer loans not secured by mortgages increased by 3.5 trillion rubles. According to specialists and experts, this situation largely stimulates consumer demand and contributes to inflation growth. It is very important that the rapid development of the financial sector does not lead to negative consequences—it is a delicate matter.”

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• “Putin is Getting Rattled,” NYT Opinion, Serge Schmemann, 08.23.24.
• “Ukraine’s Offensive Bolsters Russia’s Separatists. A Disparate Collection of Minorities Hopes to Bring Down Putin,” Justin Ling, FP, 08.20.24. 

Defense and aerospace:

•  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

• No significant developments.

Ukraine:

“Changes in Ukraine’s Religious Landscape Triggered by New Law,” Cyril Hovorun, Russia.Post, 08.26.24. 

• “When viewed in the context of the rapid social, political and religious developments taking place in Ukraine, the new Ukrainian law “On the Defense of Constitutional Order in the Sphere of Activities of Religious Organizations” indeed looks less untimely, biased and damaging than it seems at first glance. Though problematic in some respects, it has the potential to bring about positive changes in the religious landscape in Ukraine.”
• “The law, [which bans Russia-linked Orthodox Church in Ukraine and which was] passed by a majority in the Ukrainian parliament on August 21, and signed by President Zelensky on Ukraine’s Independence Day, August 24, was pushed by the opposition European Solidarity party in a populist move to challenge Zelensky’s Servant of the People party. Zelensky and his ruling party, instead of acting to contain this populism, yielded to it and proposed its own, watered-down, though still-populist, piece of legislation. As with any populist measure, this law satisfies popular emotions but fails to address the issue it promises to solve strategically. If this law was the only attempt to limit Kremlin interference in Ukraine through the Church, then it might only worsen such meddling.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

"The South Caucasus as a World in Miniature," Fyodor Lukyanov, Rossiiskaya Gazeta/Russia in Global Affairs, 08.21.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. (Russia in Global Affairs is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• “A month and a half ago, [I] suggested two current models of organizing international relations. The first, which attracts most countries in the world, is pragmatic partnership without fixed obligations, based on a practical understanding of mutual interest and allowing each to connect with any other players. The second is rigid commitments within a fixed alliance, based on shared ideological principles and implying bloc discipline, meaning a unified policy toward external players. This is characteristic of the collective or political West.”
• “In the South Caucasus, profound changes are occurring after several decades of relatively stable power distribution. Azerbaijan has significantly strengthened its position by resolving the Karabakh issue in its favor. Armenia is trying to benefit from its own painful failure—by freeing itself from the need to worry about what to do with Karabakh, it is reorienting toward prioritizing cooperation with the Western community.”
• “If we look at the situation through the lens of the two models described, an interesting picture emerges. Azerbaijan is consistently acting according to the logic of the first model… Armenia adhered to the other model. Yerevan relied on bloc-type relationships… Yerevan now wants to exit the scheme within which it has operated until now. Naturally, this does not excite Russia. However, [Russia] is not taking drastic steps to retain Armenia.”
• “Both interaction models will continue to coexist. However, all participants in these events should be aware of the balance of risks and opportunities in each case.”

“Alleged Coup Plot in Tajikistan Linked to Pre-Transition Jitters,” Galiya Ibragimova, CEIP, 08.20.24. 

• “All summer, Tajikistan has watched as, one after another, prominent politicians and public figures have been arrested for allegedly conspiring to carry out a coup. The criminal case itself is classified, so the available details are scarce. Indeed, there are many indications that this “uprising” is nothing more than a figment of the regime’s imagination. After three decades at the top, President Emomali Rahmon is preparing to hand over power to his son Rustam Emomali, and it seems likely he is seeking to purge anyone who could feasibly threaten the transition.”
• “It’s difficult to imagine everything will go to plan. The experience of neighboring Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan shows that inheriting a whole nation is a process fraught with unexpected complications. Even if Tajikistan’s transition goes smoothly, Rustam Emomali will still need to retain power. The big question is whether he’s up to the task.”

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• “What Georgia’s Foreign Agent Law Means for Its Democracy,” Marc Goedemans, CFR, 08.21.24.
• “Kazakhstan’s Role in U.S.-China Competition,” Eugene Chausovsky, NI, 08.20.24. 

Footnotes

1. Gen. Cavoli spoke to Ivo H. Daalder, Chief Executive Officer, Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 11:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

^Translated with assistance from ChatGPT.

Slider photo by the Russian Defense Ministry shared under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.