3 Ideas to Explore

1. By ordering an incursion into Russia, the Ukrainian leadership has gambled that gains on the ground will produce significant leverage in future talks with the Kremlin. However, that is a “risky bet” because Vladimir Putin is now more likely to dig in his heels than negotiate, according to NYT’s Anton Troianovski and his co-authors. “Russians who know Mr. Putin said they doubted that the Kursk incursion and any ensuing public unrest could force the Russian leader to change course. The fundamentals of the fighting, they noted, have remained unchanged, with Mr. Putin convinced that he has the resources to outlast Ukraine and the West,” according to NYT. Eugene Rumer of CEIP is also skeptical that Putin will concede to negotiations because of the incursion. Rather, “the Russian leader will likely double down on his war, intent on revenge,” according to Rumer. If there was ever a good moment for the U.S. to convince Ukraine to negotiate a ceasefire, it was in mid-2022, according to Richard Haass of CFR. “It would have been better for the Biden administration to have pressed Ukraine to adopt a defensive strategy as soon as the battlefield stabilized in mid-2022, and to indicate what territorial arrangements it might be prepared to accept in exchange for a temporary cease-fire,” Haass writes in the September/October 2024 issue of FA.
2. The incursion into Russia constituted the first time the Armed Forces of Ukraine have “carried out what more than two years of Western advice and support was designed to help it accomplish: a true combined arms offensive operation,” according to ex-EUCOM commander James Stavridis. Combining infantry movements with elements of armor, air, cyber warfare; satellite intelligence and AI guidance, the operation has produced “significant returns” in “terms of territory, prisoners and morale,” according to the retired U.S. admiral. However, by sending thousands of troops and supporting arms into Russia, “the Ukrainians are accepting a great deal of risk” in the longer term, Stavridis warns in a column for Bloomberg.
3. “What does Ukraine's incursion into Russia really mean?” Responsible Statecraft has asked several American experts. Some of their answers reveal significant differences in assessments of the incursion’s outcomes so far. For instance, Peter Rutland of Wesleyan University sees the incursion refuting Kremlin propaganda “that Russia is winning the war, that Putin is protecting Russians from a hostile world.” “It has also called the bluff on Putin's threats to use nuclear weapons in the event of escalation of the fighting onto Russian territory,” according to Rutland. Like Rutland, Monica Toft of Tufts University’s Fletcher School believes the incursion has damaged Putin’s image, warning that “no Russian leader can afford to preside over the loss of Russian territory.” However, Toft also believes that “not much can be expected in terms of lasting impact” in “material terms.” “Ukraine will be forced to retreat from Russia, and its surviving troops and equipment will be redistributed,” Toft predicts. John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago sees the incursion as a “major strategic blunder, which will accelerate [Ukraine’s] defeat,” while Sumantra Maitra of the American Ideas Institute warns that it might “harden the Russian position … and dissuade Putin from pushing for any negotiations for peace.” Finally, Harvard’s Stephen Walt doesn’t believe the incursion will “affect the outcome of the war.”

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“We must save Ukrainians from catastrophic winter energy shortages,” Kadri Simson, FT, 08.18.24. 

• “To date, Russia has destroyed or captured around 9GW of Ukraine’s electricity production. This is half of the electricity Ukraine needs in winter, and represents the equivalent of the peak electricity consumption of Portugal, a country with more than 10mn inhabitants.”
• “Warm months hide the worst impact. No electricity means no access to basic services: water pumps and sewage networks will not work and heating will be off.”
• “To avoid a humanitarian disaster in Ukraine, we need to step up an unprecedented logistical and assistance effort now.  I call for action in six areas.”
  • “First. where possible, damaged power and heating generation facilities should be repaired and reactivated.”
  • “Second, the largest possible number of small-scale decentralized generators, which can become operational quickly, should be transferred to Ukraine.”
  • “Third, Solar rooftop photovoltaic systems should be deployed as fast as possible to ensure power for hospitals, schools, and public and residential buildings.”
  • “Fourth, the maximum volume of electricity that can be exported to Ukraine from elsewhere in Europe should be expanded gradually.”
  • “Fifth, interconnection capacity at the borders should be expanded.”
  • “And finally, passive defense of energy infrastructure and air defense around critical installations must be strengthened.” 

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“Symposium: What does Ukraine's incursion into Russia really mean?” Responsible Statecraft, 08.15.24. 

• Monica Duffy Toft, Professor of International Politics and Director of the Center for Strategic Studies at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy: “The likely impact of Ukraine’s military incursion into Russia is going to affect two axes of interest; one material, and one psychological. On the material axis, Ukraine may be able to temporarily degrade Russia’s ability to launch missile attacks against Ukrainian targets, the most sensitive of which involve the deliberate and systematic harm of Ukraine’s noncombatants. But in material terms, not much can be expected in terms of lasting impact. Ukraine will be forced to retreat from Russia, and its surviving troops and equipment will be redistributed, after rest and refit, to other critical areas of Ukraine’s front with Russia. It is on the psychological axis we can expect the most impact. Already, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s legitimacy as a “great leader” was damaged in the opening weeks of the war. This latest incursion is worse, because no Russian leader can afford to preside over the loss of Russian territory, even temporarily, and survive with reputation intact.”
• Ivan Eland, Director of the Independent Institute’s Center on Peace & Liberty: “Ukraine indeed may desire to occupy Russian territory to eventually trade Ukrainian-occupied Russian territory for Russian-occupied Ukrainian land in any truce negotiations, but Ukraine risks being surrounded by superior forces.”
• Mark Episkopos, Eurasia Research Fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and Adjunct Professor of History at Marymount University: “Efforts to keep open the Kursk pocket are unlikely to yield any strategic benefits for Ukraine and will demand a massive sustained investment of troops and equipment that may weaken Ukrainian defenses, inadvertently creating opportunities for Russian forces along the lines of contact in Ukraine’s Donbas region.”
• John Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago, and non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute: “Ukraine’s invasion (of Kursk) was a major strategic blunder, which will accelerate its defeat. The key determinant of success in a war of attrition is the casualty-exchange ratio, not capturing territory, which Western commentators obsess over. The casualty-exchange ratio in the Kursk offensive decisively favors Russia for two reasons. First, it has caused relatively few Russian casualties because Ukraine’s army effectively overran undefended territory. Second, once alerted to the attack, Moscow quickly brought massive airpower to bear against the advancing Ukrainian troops, who were in the open and easy to strike. Unsurprisingly, the attacking forces lost many soldiers and a huge proportion of their equipment.  To make matters worse, Kyiv removed top-notch combat units from the front lines in eastern Ukraine — where they are desperately needed — and made them part of the Kursk strike force. This move is tilting the already lopsided casualty-exchange ratio on that critically important front further in Russia’s favor. It is no wonder — given what a foolish idea the Kursk incursion is — that the Russians were caught by surprise.”
• Sumantra Maitra, Director of research and outreach, the American Ideas Institute, author of “Sources of Russian Aggression”: “What it also might do is harden Russian position, embolden the hardliners in the Russian government, and dissuade Putin from pushing for any negotiations for peace, especially after a new administration is elected in the U.S. Which, maybe, was the actual aim of the Ukrainian government, or whoever is advising them. In scuttling that particular process, Ukraine has been successful.”
• Rajan Menon, non-resident senior fellow at Defense Priorities and the Anne and Bernard Spitzer Chair Emeritus in International Relations at the Powell School, City College of New York/City University of New York: “Once Russia mounts a persistent counterattack, will Ukraine muster the logistical capabilities, troop numbers, firepower, and air defenses required to sustain its soldiers in Kursk? Will Russia be forced to redeploy forces from Donetsk (so far it has used reserves and troops from the Kharkiv and Kupiansk fronts)? Or will Russia foil Ukraine’s Kursk offensive, transforming the current euphoria into a blame-game in which Ukraine’s leaders are attacked for dispatching to Kursk troops that were badly needed elsewhere? It’s too early to tell.”
• Peter Rutland, professor of government and the Colin and Nancy Campbell Chair for Global Issues and Democratic Thought at Wesleyan University: “It refutes some of the central themes in Kremlin propaganda — that Russia is winning the war, that Putin is protecting Russians from a hostile world. It has also called the bluff on Putin's threats to use nuclear weapons in the event of escalation of the fighting onto Russian territory. Irrespective of the military costs and benefits of the raid, there is no doubt that it has been a political coup for Kyiv.”
• Stephen Walt, Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs, Yale University: “The Ukrainian incursion into Russia is a sideshow intended to bolster Ukrainian morale and give the West confidence to keep backing Kyiv, but it will not affect the outcome of the war. Ukrainian forces have reportedly seized about 1000 square kilometers of poorly defended Russian territory. Russia’s total land mass is more than 17 million square kilometers, which means that Ukraine now “controls” 0.00588% of Russia.  By comparison, Russian forces currently occupy roughly 20 percent of Ukraine and the failed Ukrainian offensive last summer shows how difficult it will be for Ukraine to retake these areas. The incursion may be a minor embarrassment for Putin (as well as additional evidence that Russia is far too weak to invade the rest of Europe), but Ukraine’s fate will be determined by what happens in Ukraine, and not by this operation.”

“Ukraine’s Assault Inside Russia Is Putin’s Worst Nightmare,” James Stavridis, Bloomberg, 08.16.24.

• “The first and most important point to be made is a military one. For the first time, Ukraine has carried out what more than two years of Western advice and support was designed to help it accomplish: a true combined arms offensive operation.”
• “Also notable has been Ukraine’s ability to prepare and execute the operation despite the presence of Russian satellites and intelligence operatives. It is much harder to achieve the element of surprise in a modern battlefield under the unblinking eye of modern surveillance systems, from drones to advanced cyber capabilities. Kudos to the Ukrainian planners.”
• “All this plays well for the Ukrainians with three crucial audiences.”
  • “First, and vitally for President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, it is a much-needed shot in the arm to the civilian population of Ukraine.”
  • “The second key audience is in Russia. While President Vladimir Putin has maintained iron-fisted control over the national media (and thus largely controls the diet of commentary his people receive), this is a shocking turn of events.”
  • “The third and in some ways most consequential audience is the rest of the world, notably the West. For political leaders in the US, European Union and in Asian democracies from Tokyo to Seoul to Canberra, the Ukrainian assault inside Russia validates the strategy of training, equipping and advising the Ukrainian military. The incursion also might make leaders in Beijing, Tehran and Pyongyang question how vigorous their support for Moscow should be.”
• “War is ultimately about measuring risk and return. By sending 10,000 troops and supporting arms into Russia, the Ukrainians are accepting a great deal of risk. But the returns thus far — in terms of prisoners, territory and morale — are already significant. It may be a move that ultimately is more about the negotiating table than the battlefield, and in that sense it is a smart play indeed.”

“What Does Zelensky Want in Kursk? Ukraine’s strategic objectives remain murky—and the operation creates many risks—but it could alter the course of the war,” John R. Deni, FP, 08.16.24. 

• “It is difficult to believe that the principal aim of the Kursk offensive ...is purely political, intended to strengthen Kyiv’s bargaining position in (nonexistent) peace talks, guarantee additional Western assistance, undermine Russian President Vladimir Putin’s authority at home, or facilitate prisoner exchanges.”
• “Alternatively, some Ukrainian officials have claimed that the Kursk operation is intended to complicate the flow of forces from elsewhere in Russia to Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region. This seems doubtful, given the relatively limited extent of the operation so far and the lack of evidence regarding the interdiction of major rail lines, roadways, or other transportation infrastructure or platforms related to the flow of personnel and equipment into Donetsk.”
• “Ukrainian officials have also claimed that the Kursk offensive was intended to enable the destruction of Russian facilities and platforms engaged in glide bomb and other long-range operations against Ukrainian territory. On Aug. 13, a Ukrainian official argued that Kyiv’s forces lacked enough long-range weapons to hit these targets from across the border. However, that very night, Ukraine conducted its largest drone operation to date, reportedly sending scores of drones to hit facilities and platforms across a wide swath of Russian territory, including in Kursk, Belgorod, Voronezh, Volgograd, Bryansk, Orel, Rostov, and faraway Nizhny Novgorod—approximately 500 miles from the Ukrainian border.”
• “Somewhat more likely than all these other rationales, and as some Ukrainian officials have indicated, the operation seems designed to relieve pressure on Ukrainian forces in the south and east. It may also force Moscow’s military planners to consider the longer-term defense of Russia’s border with northern Ukraine, tying down more troops there and introducing a new constraint on Russian commanders. So far, there have been some reports that Russian officials have diverted troops from the southern portion of the front as well as from Kaliningrad.”
• “However, even if pressure is relieved, it is unlikely that Ukrainian troops in the east and south will have the wherewithal to conduct a counteroffensive of their own, at least in the short run. There are two reasons for this.”
  • “First, there is evidence that Ukrainian units trying to hold the lines in the east and the south are both exhausted and undermanned.”
  • “And second, even if those Ukrainian units were capable of erasing the Russian gains of the last several months, just behind those gains lay the same in-depth Russian fortifications—trenches, tank ditches, minefields—that frustrated Ukraine’s counteroffensive operations in 2023.”
• “Instead, the Kursk offensive may be part of a broader, longer-term campaign strategy that seeks to buy time for Ukrainian troop strength to rebound over the remainder of this year while simultaneously halting a slow but steady advance of Russian forces in the east.”
   

“Ukraine’s Kursk Raid Echoes the Past and Offers a Glimpse of the Future,” Eugene Rumer, CEIP, 08.15.24. 

• “It is hard to imagine a more humiliating setback for Putin and his generals than the Ukrainian army seizing some 800 square kilometers of Russian territory in that particular region.”
• “No matter how it ends, the Second Battle of Kursk is a preview of what the Russian national security establishment will have to worry about for the indefinite future. On its southwestern flank, Russia will face a country moved by its sense of grief, trauma, historic injustice, and desire for revenge. Ukraine will have a battle-tested, motivated military, equipped with the latest armaments from its own surging defense industry and its NATO partners. Even if the war ends with Russia holding on to the territories it has occupied, the victory will be truly Pyrrhic. For a country like Russia that has long equated its security with land acquisition and strategic depth, the emergence of Ukraine—thanks to Putin’s blunder—as an implacable adversary within easy striking distance of the Russian heartland is a permanent security threat that will long outlast Putin.”
• “Putin’s hold on power is unlikely to be weakened as a result of this humiliation. The entire Russian political and military establishment is complicit in his war and responsible for this disaster. They are all Putin’s creatures who depend on him for their political and probably physical survival.”
• “The Russian public, brainwashed by the propaganda it is fed constantly on TV, remains broadly supportive of the war.”
• “To the extent there was hope for a negotiated pause or an end to the war before the Ukrainian incursion—and there is little to suggest that there was any—the Kursk offensive has put an end to it for the foreseeable future. The daring move has put Putin on his back foot and humiliated him. The Russian leader is not one to back off in such circumstances. In an apocryphal story about a rat in Putin’s autobiography, the animal grows only more aggressive when backed into a corner. The Russian leader will likely double down on his war, intent on revenge, and Ukraine will again pay a heavy price. With the elite and the public behind Putin, each driven by its own logic, who or what will stop him?”

“Ukraine’s incursion disrupts Putin’s war of attempted conquest,” Lawrence Freedman, FT, 08.16.24. 

• “Zelenskyy has said that this operation will bring peace closer. These events undoubtedly embarrass Putin, but he may just double down, as in September 2022 after Ukraine’s last successful offensive. Then he ordered ferocious attacks on Ukraine’s cities and yet more mobilization. But his economy is overheating and suffering from labor shortages. He now has to qualify his claim that any peace settlement must take account of new territorial realities.”
• “It may be that Ukraine’s offensive is largely about grabbing territory for later negotiations, and taking prisoners to be exchanged for their POWs. If Kyiv can keep this going, then the strategic impact could be substantial, shifting the fighting as much as possible into Russian territory, relieving pressure on Ukraine’s defensive lines, as Russia is forced to scale back its own offensive operations.”

“Ukraine’s audacious move,” Nigel Gould-Davies, IISS, 08.15.24. 

• “An unprepared Kremlin appears rattled as it improvises a political and military response. Three features stand out.”
  • “Firstly, rather than rallying the population against a threat to the motherland, the Kremlin is anxious to downplay the incursion.”
  • “Secondly, and related to this, the Kremlin has declared a ‘counter-terrorist operation’ in the border regions of Belgorod, Bryansk and Kursk.”
  • “Thirdly, in marshalling forces to meet Ukraine’s incursion, Russia is doing all it can to avoid drawing units from its own offensive in the Donbas.”
• “This is not a crisis on the scale of the Wagner Group’s march on Moscow in June 2023 – when Putin’s panicked public appeal alluded to the total collapse of 1917. But, more than anything else so far except the brief period of compulsory recruitment in September 2022, Ukraine’s audacious move brings the war home to Russians. That is something the Kremlin had sought to avoid.”

“Ukraine Is Poking the Russian Bear,” David French, NYT, 08.15.24. 

• “How significant is the Ukrainian attack, really? Is it a potentially decisive blow that could change the course of the war in Ukraine’s favor, or is it a gamble that will ultimately cost Ukraine dearly? What is the real situation on the ground? To try to answer these and other questions, I talked to a number of military analysts, and their conclusions (with some slight variations) were remarkably similar. Here are my key takeaways from those conversations.”
  • “I spoke again to Frederick and Kimberly Kagan. Frederick is the director of the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project, and Kimberly is the founder and president of the Institute for the Study of War, which creates real-time reports on the progress of the fighting in Ukraine. Fred told me that the purpose of the Ukrainian attack is almost certainly “to achieve effects on the battlefield in Ukraine after the Russian invasion.” In other words, it’s an offensive move for a defensive purpose.”
  • “I also talked to Michael Kofman, a senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. ...He cautioned that it’s too early to tell how the offensive might unfold. ..Military history is replete with examples of hopeful advances followed by devastating defeats and humiliating retreats. Ukraine’s effort in Kursk is modest enough that it’s not rolling the dice with the entire war effort, but it could end its attack in a worse position than it held when it began. At the same time, Ukraine has created some real opportunities. Russia held the theaterwide initiative and now it doesn’t. Not only is Russia reacting to Ukraine’s actions, but it also demonstrated Russian vulnerability and highlighted enduring Russian weaknesses.”
    • “Kofman noted the effect of the attack on Ukraine’s home front. Ukraine’s attack is 'very significant in boosting Ukrainian morale,' he said, and at least for the moment, it’s 'changing the negative trajectory of the war.'”
  • “Kimberly Kagan observed that Ukraine’s ability to achieve surprise showed the limits of the idea that drones and other surveillance capabilities have created a battlefield so “transparent” that surprise is no longer possible.... Kimberly Kagan added that 'the Ukrainian operation and its consequences should show all of us that the war in Ukraine is not over.' The Ukrainians have caused us to 'open up our imagination.'”
• “Nothing about the attack changes the tough underlying realities of the war. Winter is coming, again, and Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is under immense strain. And while Ukraine has shown that it can surprise Russia and penetrate lightly defended sections of the border, it has not shown — at least since the failed counteroffensive last summer — that it can reliably penetrate prepared Russian defensive lines.”
• “There is one thing that we do know. The Ukrainian attack (at least for now) is a good news story for a valiant nation in desperate need of a win. It is hard to overstate the relentless pressure of the Russian offensive, and even the most courageous people need hope to keep fighting against overwhelming odds. Allied support gives Ukraine the weapons it needs to repel Russia and lets the Ukrainians know they are not alone.” 

For more analysis and reporting on this subject, see:

• “Assessing the Significance of the Current Russian and Ukrainian Operations for the Course of the War,” Riley Bailey et al, ISW, 08.17.24.
• “Behind Ukraine's Russia Invasion: Secrecy, Speed and Electronic Jamming; Ukrainians embarrass Putin by becoming first foreign military force to occupy Russian territory since World War II,” Ievgeniia Sivorka, Michael R. Gordon and Isabel Coles[1], WSJ, 08.17.24.
• “Will Ukraine’s Kursk Offensive Turn the Tide?” Emma Ashford and Matthew Kroenig, FP, 08.16.24.
• "Ukraine’s gamble in Kursk restores belief it can beat Russia – it requires a Western response," Olga Tokariuk, Chatham House, 08.18.24. 

Military aid to Ukraine:

“Want Peace for Ukraine? Let It Strike in Russia,” Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 08.13.24. 

• “It’s been absurd to consider those frontiers sacrosanct since the moment Putin sent troops across them; at that point they ceased to be agreed boundaries and became part of a battlefield.”
• “Ukrainians often lament that the Kremlin’s single greatest strategic success since the invasion’s start has been to persuade the US and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies that unless they self-regulated their provision of arms to Kyiv, Putin would launch a nuclear attack. Whether this boiling-the-frog strategy was necessary is a counterfactual, so impossible to answer with certainty. But the argument now looks threadbare.”
• “'We document all locations from which the Russian army launches strikes, including the Belgorod region, the Kursk region and other regions,' Zelenskiy said in an address to the nation on Sunday evening, posted on social media and evidently recorded on a mobile phone. That includes, he said, 2,000 missile, drone, artillery and mortar strikes on Ukraine’s Sumy region from around Kursk alone. 'It is entirely fair for Ukraine to respond to this terror in the way necessary to stop it.' Zelenskiy went on to spell out that he was talking about long-range missiles to hit Russian launch sites and logistics chains, and urged allies to lift their remaining restrictions. I’ve yet to hear a convincing argument as to why he’s wrong to make that request, or why it shouldn’t be granted.”

“Biden Can Support Ukraine's Offensive,” Jake Auchincloss, WSJ, 08.18.24. 

• “For Ukraine to achieve that victory, Mr. Biden must authorize the use of U.S.-made fighter jets and ballistic missiles to disable Russian oil-refining sites.”
• “Additional sanctions would complement those strikes. Treasury officials have advocated tougher maritime sanctions to reduce Russian oil revenue.”
• “Meanwhile, Ukraine's economy could use a shot in the arm. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen reports that she is close to a deal with Group of Seven and European Union leaders to lend Ukraine $50 billion, serviced by interest on the $300 billion in frozen Russian assets held by wealthy democracies. The linchpin will be getting the EU -- which holds most of the money -- to guarantee that the assets will stay frozen long enough to generate the proceeds.”
• “A deal with Brussels would help MAGA-proof Ukraine's defenses. Funding Ukraine with Russian money is popular even among Republican lawmakers. By investing long-term capital, Ukraine could turbocharge its defense industrial base.”

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

• No significant developments.

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

“Ukraine Says Its Incursion Will Bring Peace. Putin’s Plans May Differ,” Anton Troianovski, Andrew E. Kramer, Adam Rasgon and Kim Barker, NYT, 08.19.24. 

• “Kyiv is making a risky bet: that the incursion gives it new leverage for a favorable deal with the Kremlin, even as its military remains on the defense across much of the front line in Ukraine. Russians who know Mr. Putin expect him to lash out in response, believing that his military has the upper hand in personnel and weaponry.”
• “There are already signs that cease-fire efforts suffered a setback.
  • “A diplomat involved in the talks said that Russian officials postponed a meeting planned to be held in Qatar this month to negotiate a deal in which both sides would stop attacks on each other’s energy infrastructure. The postponement was reported earlier by The Washington Post.”
  • “In comments reported on Monday by Russian state media, Mr. Putin’s foreign policy adviser, Yuri Ushakov, said, 'At the current stage, given this escapade, we are not going to talk.' The length of any pause in negotiations, Mr. Ushakov added, 'depends on the situation, including on the battlefield.'”
  • “Grigory A. Yavlinsky, a longtime Russian politician who met with Mr. Putin last October to promote the idea of a cease-fire, said in an interview from Moscow that there had been hope in the Russian capital that 'the fighting would stop this year.' 'The circumstances that have just happened,' he added, 'they have lowered all these chances, they have removed them from the agenda.'”
  • “Two former senior Russian officials close to the Kremlin also said they believed the prospects for cease-fire talks had become more remote. ... One said that Mr. Putin’s focus now was 'not peace, but revenge.'”
• “The flurry of Ukrainian talk about peace may have served in part as strategic deception, encouraging Russia’s leadership to see meekness and let down its guard. But Ukrainian officials have also insisted that diplomacy and taking the war onto Russian territory are not contradictory efforts. And Ukrainian analysts have pointed out that Ukrainian strikes on oil refineries that began last winter provided leverage to negotiate on Russian attacks on Ukraine’s electrical power plants, a military tactic that led to the planned talks in Qatar.”
• “Russians who know Mr. Putin said they doubted that the Kursk incursion and any ensuing public unrest could force the Russian leader to change course. The fundamentals of the fighting, they noted, have remained unchanged, with Mr. Putin convinced that he has the resources to outlast Ukraine and the West. Russia continues to dominate along much of the front in Ukraine and to make gains in the east, closing in on the strategically important Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk.”
• “Since the Kursk incursion, Mr. Putin will now be looking for ways to increase the amount of pain he is inflicting on Ukraine, said Tatiana Stanovaya, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. Rather than negotiate, Mr. Putin is convinced that Russia will eventually triumph, she said, and he is prepared to take on more risk and force Russians to carry a heavier cost.”

“Ukraine on the Offensive: How Kyiv’s Attack on Russia—and Successful Defense of Its Northern Flank—Has Changed the War,” Natalie Gumenyuk, FA, 08.16.24.

“Ukraine prepares for Trump trade with Russian land grab,” Ben Hall, 08.14.24. 

• “Trump has boasted that he will bring peace to Ukraine overnight. Nobody knows how. But several of his former officials and advisers have suggested it could involve an informal ceding of territory in return for meaningful western security guarantees.  Kyiv and many of its European allies worry about a Trump administration forcing Ukraine into an unjust and unstable peace with the threat of withholding further US weaponry.”
• “Now, Kyiv may have Russian ground to barter. That could go down well with the Ukrainian public, which according to opinion polls is increasingly open to a negotiated settlement with Russia, but is still largely opposed to territorial concessions. It is also a trade that a real estate developer turned president can get behind.”
• “But if Kyiv wants to swap land it seized in Russia it has to keep it — and the cost could become excessive. Ukraine’s incursion will have to be sustained with a sophisticated supply operation as well as with the kind of troop rotations and reserves that have been lacking in the east.”

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

"The Trouble With Allies. America Needs a Playbook for Difficult Friends," Richard Haass, FA, 08.19.24. 

“Russia's War Aims in Ukraine. Objective-Setting and the Kremlin's Use of Force Abroad,” Samuel Charap and Khrystyna Holynska, RAND, 08.13.24. 

• “Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine is by far its largest and most consequential commitment of military forces abroad in recent decades. The stakes for Russia are extremely high. However, despite these stakes, the Kremlin has not provided a clear and consistent public narrative regarding its objectives, maintaining significant ambiguity and even adopting contradictory stances. In this report, the authors analyze Russia's official public narrative regarding its war aims in Ukraine in the first year of its full-scale invasion. They begin by investigating Russian strategic writings and pre-2022 Russian practice of objective-setting when using force abroad. The authors use this analysis to generate expectations about how Russia would have been expected to behave during the full-scale invasion. They then document the reality of Moscow's objective-setting in the first year of the Ukraine war through a qualitative analysis of Russian leaders' key speeches and a quantitative study of an original dataset of official statements on the war. The authors compare this reality with the expectations, noting significant divergences. Finally, they then provide implications of their findings for U.S. and allied policymakers.”
• “Key Findings
  • “Russian strategists recognize the importance of clear, publicly articulated objectives when using military force.”
  • “Russian strategists emphasize the need to adjust political objectives to realities on the ground.”
  • “Since 2014, Russia's military operations abroad have either been deniable and semi-covert (Crimea and the Donbas) or, when its operations are acknowledged and overt (Syria), such operations are accompanied by a clearly stated objective.”
  • “Moscow's failure to consistently articulate a coherent objective in the first year of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine deviates from both the postulates of Russian military science and the country's past practice since 2014.”
  • “Russian military and political leaders have pronounced objectives for the war in Ukraine, but those objectives have been numerous and varied significantly through the first year of the war.”

“The Geopolitical Opportunity of Ukraine’s Kursk Offensive: The incursion shows Washington the way to a smarter pivot to Asia,” A. Wess Mitchell, FP, 08.15.24.

• “Ukrainian offensives onto Russian soil, such as the one currently underway in the Kursk region, present an opportunity to end the war more quickly as part of a wider strategy of sequencing the United States’ geopolitical challenges. Such a sequencing strategy… is the best option for avoiding wars against China, Iran, and Russia simultaneously and on multiple fronts. By giving the Ukrainians the tools they need to consolidate and perhaps build on their recent gains, Washington has a chance to help Kyiv compel Moscow to the negotiating table, buy time for the West to rearm, and allow the United States to shift attention to the Indo-Pacific.”
• “All of this has implications for wider U.S. strategy. I have long argued that the United States’ optimal approach to Russia’s war in Ukraine is to use it as an opportunity to inflict a proxy defeat on Russia on a faster timeline than China is prepared to move against Taiwan. The last two national defense strategies made it clear that the United States is not prepared to fight wars against more than one major opponent at the same time. By using resources in a focused and disciplined way against Russia’s ongoing aggression, the United States has a chance to weaken the Russian threat to Europe—and on that basis, freeing up bandwidth to strengthen deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.”

“Ukraine Has a Strategy, the U.S. Doesn't,” Holman W. Jenkins Jr., WSJ, 08.17.24. 

• “The obvious way to lower Mr. Putin's price point on a settlement is to bring the war home to Russians on their own territory, though most advocates until last week focused on air and missile strikes rather than ground action. This, along with defending Ukraine's airspace from Russian infrastructure attacks and building up its ground forces to forestall further advance on Ukrainian territory, was the self-evident road ahead. Even without a deal, wearing down Mr. Putin's military and strategic strength remains an important U.S. interest.”
  • “That is, if the West had a strategy. The Biden administration has never laid one out. Its behavior suggests the "escalations" it most fears aren't toward World War III but in the salience of the war to U.S. voters, who might be encouraged to wonder if Mr. Biden has mismanaged the world and led America into danger.”
• “Personally, I've never seen why Ukraine's supporters should have any more confidence in a Biden-Harris administration than a Trump administration. The answer, though, may be an unspoken asterisk: Certain Ukraine supporters obviously dream of using Ukraine to dislodge Mr. Putin from power in Russia. If it happens, hooray. But it's an object of hope, not strategy. Ukraine's people have too much at risk not to be realistic about what fighting can achieve. If battling Russia to a standstill simply guarantees their national independence and freedom to evolve into a healthy, pluralistic society, this would be an excellent strategic result for Ukraine and its backers. Let Mr. Putin's regime continue to rot toward its inevitable expiry date.”

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• “'Axis of Evil'? China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran Aren't Necessarily Aligned,” Daniel R. DePetris and Jennifer Kavanagh, FP, 08.14.24.
• "Putin Has Victory in His Grasp," Anastasia Edel, NYT, 08.13.24.
• “Ukraine's Kursk Offensive Is a Turning Point in the War,” Carl Bildt, FP, 08.15.24. 

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“Why China’s and Russia’s Militaries Are Training Together,” David Pierson, NYT, 08.13.24. 

• “China and Russia have pressed an informal political and economic alliance against the West. Now they are stepping up the cooperation between their militaries with increasingly provocative joint war games.”
• “Chinese and Russian long-range bombers patrolled together near Alaska for the first time last month. ... By taking off from a Russian air base in Chukotka, nuclear-capable Chinese bombers were able to fly about 200 miles from the Alaskan coast, a distance that would have been unreachable taking off from China. ...Days earlier, the countries held live-fire naval drills in the hotly contested South China Sea for the first time in eight years. And they have more frequently buzzed the skies and sailed the waters together near Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, where America has strategic interests.”
• “The military exercises are, in some ways, the most vivid expression of an alignment between China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, and President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia as they have sought to challenge their chief geopolitical rival, the United States.”
• “The biggest difference Russia brings to bear should it join China in any conflict is the threat of its nuclear arsenal, the world’s largest. At the same time, “there are many things Russia can do to help China that doesn’t include fighting,” said Oriana Skylar Mastro, a fellow in international studies at Stanford University and the author of “Upstart: How China Became a Great Power.”
  • “Russia’s 2,500-mile land border with China could prove critical for the delivery of arms, oil and other supplies if the United States and its allies ever succeeded in imposing a sea blockade on China.”
  • “Russia could also deny access to airspace near its borders, particularly close to Japan, where the United States maintains bases.”
• “The use of a Russian air base by Chinese military planes may be an indication that the two militaries can communicate, work together and use each other’s resources, part of what in military speak is known as interoperability. It also reflects a growing level of trust between two countries that have not always been friendly.”

“China Is in Denial About the War in Ukraine. Why Chinese Thinkers Underestimate the Costs of Complicity in Russia’s Aggression,” Jude Blanchette, FA, 08.13.24.

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

• No significant developments.

Counterterrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security/AI: 

“From Iran and Russia, the disinformation is now. The target is America. With help from AI, Russia now supercharged its malign influence campaign,” Editorial Board, WP, 08.19.24. 

• “The artificial-intelligence company OpenAI announced Friday that it disrupted a covert Iranian campaign using its ChatGPT tool to create social media posts and long-form articles to influence American voters about political candidates in both parties, spiced up with remarks about fashion and beauty to look more authentic. …If this sounds like a repeat of the 2016 presidential campaign, with foreign nations trying to interfere in U.S. democracy, it is. And Iran is not alone. Russia has also been heavily engaged, and both the scale and sophistication of its efforts have grown immensely, thanks to AI.”
• “As details emerge about Iran's efforts, consider this: Last year on social media, "Sue Williamson" posted a video of Russian President Vladimir Putin declaring that the war in Ukraine is not a territorial conflict or a matter of geopolitical balance but, rather, the "principles on which the New World Order will be based." … According to court documents filed by the FBI this summer, "Sue Williamson" was one of 968 bots created by the Russians on social media platform X. Assembled by covert AI software known as Meliorator, the bots can be swiftly programmed to respond to world events and are authentic in appearance. Though past malign influence campaigns on the internet required some painstaking human trial and error, Russia has now supercharged the process to spread disinformation at high speed and on industrial scale. Details exposed by the FBI link the effort to the Kremlin.”
• “The United States and other open societies must not be complacent. The latest Russian campaign was caught, fortunately, by law enforcement and intelligence agencies of the United States, Canada and the Netherlands. The domains were seized on grounds of possible money laundering. But it is likely there are many other still-undetected influence campaigns, and it is impossible to catch or stop them all with existing statutes. After all, open societies earn the designation by allowing free-flowing expression and debate.”
• “Congress ought to fund and upgrade programs that warn citizens against getting duped. And everyone should remain alert for more strangers named Sue peddling propaganda from a guy named Vladimir. He's for real.”

“Russia’s Becoming More Digitally Isolated—and Dependent on China,” Justin Sherman, CFR, 08.12.24. 

• “Over the last several years, and especially since 2022, Russia has become more digitally isolated—and increasingly dependent on China—with significant ramifications for human rights in Russia, cybersecurity, and the international community.”
• “These dependencies ... create policy opportunities for the West.”
  • “The United States and its partners should use open-source intelligence to identify Russian demands for specific Chinese tech products and services; this intelligence can draw from many sources, including Russian cyber conferences, and public contracts and partnerships in smartphones, mobile apps, and operating systems.”
  • “Analysts in the United States and its partner nations should also use open-source intelligence to understand Russian deployment of technologies like the Astra Linux operating system. Astra Linux is widely used in Russian military and intelligence systems, possibly introducing vulnerabilities that can be exploited at scale. It is also a customized and (allegedly) hardened version of an open-source operating system. By shifting toward Chinese and domestic products, Russia is additionally losing access to cybersecurity talent in the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and elsewhere. It is possible that Astra Linux developers have fewer opportunities for a wider base of individuals to test and secure their code. Those could be areas for the United States and its allies to press the advantage in cyberspace.”
• “For all the Kremlin may cheer its growing tech isolation and its construction of operating systems and software registries, its need for Chinese tech spells anything but tech independence.”

Energy exports from CIS:

“A Drunken Evening, a Rented Yacht: The Real Story of the Nord Stream Pipeline Sabotage,” Bojan Pancevski, WSJ, 08.15.24.

• “In May of 2022, a handful of senior Ukrainian military officers and businessmen had gathered to toast their country’s remarkable success in halting the Russian invasion. Buoyed by alcohol and patriotic fervor, somebody suggested a radical next step: destroying Nord Stream.”
• “Just over four months later, in the small hours of Sept. 26, Scandinavian seismologists picked up signals indicating an underwater earthquake or volcanic eruption hundreds of miles away, near the Danish island of Bornholm. They were caused by three powerful explosions and the largest-ever recorded release of natural gas, equivalent to the annual CO2 emissions of Denmark.”
• “Now, for the first time, the outlines of the real story can be told. The Ukrainian operation cost around $300,000, according to people who participated in it. It involved a small rented yacht with a six-member crew, including trained civilian divers. One was a woman, whose presence helped create the illusion they were a group of friends on a pleasure cruise.”
• “'I always laugh when I read media speculation about some huge operation involving secret services, submarines, drones and satellites,' one officer who was involved in the plot said. 'The whole thing was born out of a night of heavy boozing and the iron determination of a handful of people who had the guts to risk their lives for their country.'”
• “Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky initially approved the plan, according to one officer who participated and three people familiar with it. But later, when the CIA learned of it and asked the Ukrainian president to pull the plug, he ordered a halt, those people said. Zelensky’s commander in chief, Valeriy Zaluzhniy, who was leading the effort, nonetheless forged ahead.”
• “The Journal spoke to four senior Ukrainian defense and security officials who either participated in or had direct knowledge of the plot. All of them said the pipelines were a legitimate target in Ukraine’s war of defense against Russia.”
• “Portions of their account were corroborated by a nearly two-year German police investigation into the attack, which has obtained evidence including email, mobile and satellite phones communications, as well as fingerprints and DNA samples from the alleged sabotage team. The Germany inquiry hasn’t directly linked President Zelensky to the clandestine operation.”
• “Gen. Zaluzhniy, now Ukraine’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, said in a text exchange that he knows nothing of any such operation and that any suggestion to the contrary is a “mere provocation.” Ukraine’s armed forces, he added, weren’t authorized to conduct overseas missions, and he therefore wouldn’t have been involved.”
• “Within days, Zelensky approved the plan, according to the four people familiar with the plot. All arrangements were made verbally, leaving no paper trail.”
• “But the next month, the Dutch military intelligence agency MIVD learned of the plot and warned the CIA, according to several people familiar with the Dutch report. U.S. officials then promptly informed Germany, according to U.S. and German officials.”

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Trump or Harris? It Makes No Difference for Moscow,” Ivan Timofeev, Valdai Club/Kommersant, 08.16.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. (The Valdai Club is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• “Those who count on “deals” with the U.S. under a [President] Trump or at least on more constructive relations are mistaken. The Trump factor will not play a significant role in changing the structure of relations between Russia and the West. By and large, Moscow should not care who exactly will be the U.S. president. The figure of the head of the White House is unlikely to play a big role in Russian-American relations.”
• “Trump’s possible victory in the 2024 elections will change little for Russia.”
  • “The politician is known as an opponent of the arms control regime. But its erosion continued under Biden, and the final nail in it can be driven in with equal success by both Donald Trump and his rival Kamala Harris.”
  • “Trump will more actively lobby for the promotion of American energy resources on the European market, especially since the EU sanctions policy toward Russia will only contribute to this course.”
  • “Trump’s threat to force the U.S.’s European allies to pay for security will not violate NATO solidarity.”
  • “Trump will not be able to untie the Ukrainian knot.”
  • “Finally, Trump's rise to power is unlikely to lead to the destabilization of the American political system.”
• “The bottom line is that the outcome of the U.S. elections is of purely secondary or even tertiary importance for Russia. It is premature to consider it a significant factor in Russia's relations with the U.S. and the entire collective West.”

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Putin the Resilient. Predicting the Collapse of His Regime Is Wishful Thinking,” Julian G. Waller,² FA, 08.14.24

“Kremlin response to Kursk incursion shows how Putin freezes in a crisis; When Russian President Vladimir Putin’s authority is tested, his response often lacks quick, decisive action that lives up to his bellicose rhetoric,” Robyn Dixon, WP, 08.18.24.

• “The Kursk incursion is the fourth major blow to Putin's authority since his February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and highlights the weaknesses of a top-down autocracy that operates largely on fear and punishment.”
• “In each case—after Russia's failure to topple the Ukrainian government at the start of the invasion, after the Wagner mercenary boss Yevgeniy Prigozhin led a rebellion against the regular Russia military command and after Islamist extremists struck the popular Crocus City Hall concert venue—the Kremlin's response has been halting, with Putin waiting 24 hours or more to offer any public comment.”
• "'It's always the same style. Putin likes to keep everything secret. When he appears publicly, he doesn't say much. He prefers not to be alarmist,' said Tatiana Stanovaya, founder of France-based analytical group R.Politik.”
• “Top officials, meanwhile, often dissemble to hide their failures rather than risk displeasing the president. Immediately after Ukraine's attack on Kursk last week, Gen. Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the General Staff, who personally wields operational command over the war in Ukraine, insisted—falsely—that the Ukrainian assault had been stopped.”

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• “The economic impact of Ukraine’s incursion into Russia,” Alexander Kolyandr and Alexandra Prokopenko, The Bell, 08.16.24.
• “Russian Prisoner Who Didn’t Want to Be Freed. The opposition figure Ilya Yashin was part of the exchange that led to the release of Evan Gershkovich. Now, in Germany, he dreams of returning to his cell in Russia,” Joshua Yaffa, New Yorker, 08.14.24. 

Defense and aerospace:

“Russia’s Post-War Military Recruiting Strategy Emerges,” Dara Massicot, War on the Rocks, 08.16.24. 

• “While the military wants to recruit professional volunteers into its ranks after the war in Ukraine ends, the success of that endeavor depends on the willingness of the Russian population to sign up. That willingness will depend on many factors: how the conflict ends, how demobilization is managed, if the conflict is viewed as a failure or success inside Russia, and if postwar benefits and patriotism hold. After the war freezes or ends, if Russia can continue to offer high salaries, housing support, and other social benefits, it can attract those who are motivated by economic considerations, particularly as memories fade and casualties decline. With the right messaging, it can likely attract those with patriotic motivations—messages like the need to defend the motherland from NATO, the Russian army can withstand Ukraine and NATO together, and so on. To offer high salaries and benefits, Russia must select the number of officer and professional enlisted billets that it can afford, during a time when the defense budget will also be bearing the weight of a long-term regeneration and procurement program.”
• “On the other hand, there are many intangible factors that influence an individual’s choice to join the military. The recruiting themes that worked in a prewar context—perceptions of order and discipline, better commanders and service conditions, and views of the military as a respectable or prestigious career—may no longer work in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine. The incomplete and distorted information about the war that is provided by Russian authorities stands in stark contrast to the reality that thousands of Russian soldiers and their families are experiencing. The military’s actions at war—notably the deception it used against its own soldiers at the outset, harsh discipline and brutal command styles, and intimidation of soldiers’ families—harkens back to some of the darkest aspects of Soviet military culture that the Russian military spent 15 years and billions of rubles to convince the population it intended to change.”
• “Recruiting is a numbers game. When the war ends, how much of the Russian population will remember the cost? For some in Russian society, trust in the military has been broken by how the war in Ukraine is being fought, and no amount of the Kremlin’s money, spin, or censorship will overcome that. The Russian government is taking steps to keep that segment as contained as possible, while it works to keep everyone else enveloped in its preferred narratives. Ultimately, rebuilding the personnel of Russia’s future military will hinge on its ability to lure volunteers with large salaries and social benefits once the war in Ukraine ends, while pivoting to new messaging and carefully crafted narratives about patriotism and the duty to the motherland. For some, this will be enough.”
• See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including  relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Anti-war parties are set to clean up in eastern German elections: Skepticism about support for Ukraine runs deep in parts of the former communist republic,” The Economist, 08.15.24.

• “Saxony, the east German state of which Dresden is the capital, holds an election on September 1^st… [The] Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), a new party named for its founder… has a dovish line on Russia that, when Ms. Wagenknecht turns on the demagogy, can be hard to distinguish from Kremlin propaganda. (Russian media celebrate her as a hard-nosed teller of truth to power.)”
• “The BSW is polling in double figures in the three voting states. The hard-right Alternative for Germany—another pro-Russia party—could come first in all three. But because it is shunned by every other party, the BSW has a good chance of entering government in Saxony and elsewhere.”
• “For the BSW to enter government in Saxony or elsewhere would not directly undermine Germany’s solid support for Ukraine. But, says Sarah Pagung, a Russia analyst at the Körber Foundation in Berlin, it could strengthen the hand of those in the ruling Social Democrats who are uncomfortable with Germany’s stance on the war. That in turn might influence the party’s position in next year’s federal election. Perhaps more important, next month’s votes could illustrate something that is troubling politicians across Germany. Namely that 35 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, eastern and western Germany appear if anything to be growing apart.”

 “Russia Is Being Drawn Deeper into the Middle East Conflict,” Nikita Smagin, CEIP, 08.14.24. 

• “For many years, Russia has striven to keep its distance from events in the Middle East, maintaining channels of communication with all parties. But the new, post-October 7 reality has made this an ever more difficult tightrope to walk. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine led Moscow to seek warmer relations with Iran, which has caused serious concern in the United States and Israel. That concern has been aggravated by the confrontation between the United States and Russia, which pushes Moscow further into Tehran’s arms. Even if Russia would like to continue to perform a balancing act in the Middle East, regional powers increasingly believe it has taken a side—and they will act accordingly.”

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• “India’s Russia Option,” Abhinav Pandya, NI, 08.12.24.
• "The Long Shadow of Soviet Sabotage Doctrine?" Daniela Richterova, War on the Rocks, 08.19.24.

Ukraine:

“Ukraine’s Democratic Progress is Entirely on Track,” Olena Halushka, FP, 08.16.24. 

• “Ukraine is currently resisting one of the largest wars in Europe since World War II, all while keeping its democratic progress on track. Although various issues indeed remain to be addressed, the significant strides made since 2014 are way beyond the “baby steps” portrayed in the Foreign Policy article titled “Ukraine Is Still Too Corrupt to Join the West,” which largely focuses on Ukraine’s hardships and misses the big picture.”
• “Ukraine is at the initial stage of accession to the European Union, while its wish to join NATO remains denied. In their pursuit of rule of law and zero corruption, Ukrainians are inspired by countries such as Denmark, which tops the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International. However, it is fair and objective to compare Ukraine’s current state of affairs with others than the best in class. Furthermore, comparing scores rather than rankings would be more objective, as the scores are individualized and merit-based, while rankings depend on the performance of other states.”
• “In 2023, with a score of 36, Ukraine has made an impressive 11-point jump since 2013, outperforming or coming close to some NATO members, such as Turkey (which received a score of 34) or Albania (37). Ukraine’s score also surpasses the 35 that North Macedonia received in 2020, the year it joined NATO. Transparency International changed the CPI methodology in 2012, so it is impossible to reliably compare Ukraine’s current performance with that of other Central and Eastern European countries at the times of their NATO accessions or invitations. Nonetheless, even the existing data proves that “Western standards” vary.”
• “Many… tectonic changes have happened in Ukraine, and they are anything but “baby steps.” Ukraine understands its duties at home well, and further comprehensive reform agendas will be delivered during Ukraine’s EU accession. The Ukrainian people demonstrate a strong commitment to democracy, watchdogging against any attempted disruptions to reform efforts.”
• “However, the real reason for not inviting Ukraine into NATO is not a lack of Ukrainian reforms, but its Western partners’ ongoing delusion that doing so will appease Russia and manage the escalation. But they tend to forget that Russia sees itself as an empire without borders. In these circumstances, the integration of Ukraine into the Western security and economic architecture—with no further delays—is the only mutually beneficial track that can ensure safety and security not only for Ukraine, but also for the entirety of Europe.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“What Can Azerbaijan Expect From Its New Partnership With China?,” Zaur Shiriyev, CEIP, 08.14.24. 

• “Baku is eager to boost its role in China’s strategic cooperation with Central Asia, and positions itself as a bridge between that region and the Caucasus… China, meanwhile, is set on expanding its role in the South Caucasus, evidenced by its investing in major infrastructure projects in Georgia and increasing trade with Armenia too. There are, however, significant challenges.”
  • “Firstly, balancing the influx of Chinese investment against the protection of strategic sectors could be difficult, though not impossible.”
  • “Beyond these challenges, steady economic cooperation with China and other international partners requires economic reforms in Azerbaijan to diversify the economy, given that the majority of the country’s exports are oil and gas, and that oil revenues are declining.”
  • “One of the main challenges for Azerbaijan will be to calibrate its expectations of China and to carefully watch whether Beijing’s lofty promises match its deeds. Even Russia, the champion of cooperation with China among post-Soviet states, with its sizable market, geography, complementary economy, and shared opposition to the United States, is waiting for an influx of Chinese investment that so far hasn’t materialized.” 

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• “German Central Asia Policy after the “Zeitenwende”,” Manfred Huterer, Jacopo Maria Pepe and Andrea Schmitz, SWP, 08.16.24.
• “Will Georgia’s Eurasian Pivot Lead to Rapprochement with Russia?” Emil Avdaliani, CEIP, 08.19.24.

Footnotes

1. This account of the Kursk incursion is drawn from interviews with dozens of Ukrainian soldiers involved, U.S. and allied officials and a person familiar with the operation, as well as videos verified by WSJ and reports by Russian military bloggers.
2. Research Analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 11:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

^ Machine-translated.  

Slider photo: AP photo.