Russia Analytical Report, June 24-July 1, 2024

7 Ideas to Explore

  1. On paper, European members of NATO have a total of 1.9 million soldiers in what may seem enough to counter Russia’s 1.1 million soldiers and 1.5 million reservists, according to FT’s analysis of IISS data. “But in reality, European NATO powers would struggle to commit any more than 300,000 troops to a conflict—and even then, that would take months of preparation,” analysts tell FT.
  2. “With the front line largely static,” the Russian-Ukrainian war “is settling in for a brutal season during which thousands will likely die on both sides, but neither appears poised to muster a decisive breakthrough,” according to WSJ’s analysis of the conflict.1 According to NYT, however, Russia “remains the army on the offensive” and has come close to “strategically important supply lines and towns” in Donbas, threatening to “slow the flow of food, weapons and ammunition the Ukrainian army needs to fight” in the country’s east.
  3. The nuclear clauses of Russia’s 2014 Military Doctrine and its 2020 Foundations of the State Policy in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence “had been compiled in a different era and in other conditions” and, thus, “have to be adapted to the completely changed security situation,” Russia’s deputy chief diplomat Sergey Ryabkov told Izvestiya. Ryabkov—who oversees U.S.-Russian relations and nuclear arms control at the Russian Foreign Ministry—also said “this issue is being discussed” when answering a multi-part question ending with an inquiry about whether Russia can use “tactical nuclear weapons during the special military operation.”
  4. Last week’s presidential debate between 81-year-old Joe Biden and 78-year-old Donald Trump stirred memories of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, whose mental and physical capabilities declined dramatically in the last years of his rule before he passed away at the age of 75, according to British-Russian historian Sergei Radchenko. “The pathetic sight of Brezhnev in decline has a broader meaning,” Radchenko of Johns Hopkins SAIS writes in WSJ. “Why is it that people like this end up running countries? Are there systemic, bureaucratic, institutional reasons why frail old men are appointed—or elected?” he asks.
  5. Even though Volodymyr Zelenskyy has had to tacitly concede to the dilution of his 10-point peace formula ahead of the past summit in Switzerland,  in public, the Ukrainian leader continues to insist on the most consequential clauses of that plan, including full withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine, reparations and justice for war crimes. Zelenskyy made this clear in his June 30 interview with the Philadelphia Inquirer. At the same time, he conceded, that “the West wanted to deny Putin the opportunity to fully occupy Ukraine and to put the aggressor in his place. I think for them it is the victory already.”
  6. Tensions between Zelenskyy’s team and U.S. authorities “are flickering into view, with Washington concerned about Kyiv’s anticorruption efforts, and Zelenskyy pleading for faster and bigger deliveries of military equipment,” according to WSJ. “U.S. concerns have risen in recent months, buttressed by demands in Congress for Ukraine to show U.S. military and civilian assistance isn’t going to waste,” this paper reports. In contrast, European officials point out that Zelenskyy has pushed through a range of useful anticorruption reforms, according to WSJ.
  7. When the deadline for the conclusion of nuclear talks with Iran expires in October 2025, don’t expect Russia (or China) to support new sanctions on Iran if the U.S., France, Germany and the U.K. decide to impose any via the snap-back mechanism, according to Eric Brewer of NTI. “This sows the seeds for a potential crisis in 2025, which could result in a war, a nuclear-armed Iran or Iran as a permanent nuclear threshold state,” Brewer warns in a commentary for FA.

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

  •  No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

“Why Xi Jinping is wary of Kim Jong Un’s embrace of Vladimir Putin,” Joe Leahy, FT, 06.25.24.

  • President Xi Jinping has been warily watching for months as two important, if difficult, partners have drawn closer, with Pyongyang supplying Moscow with much-needed ammunition for its invasion of Ukraine in exchange for promises of better military technology.
  • Publicly, China has refrained from any criticism. But signs of discomfort are rising. In April, Xi dispatched the most senior Chinese Communist party figure to visit North Korea in five years to reassert the two sides’ “deep friendship”.
  • The problem for China, said Shen Dingli, a Chinese professor of international studies, was that Beijing and Pyongyang had their own mutual defense agreement in the “Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance,” first signed in 1961.
  • This would mean if Pyongyang felt treaty-bound to become involved in one of Russia’s wars — such as the invasion of Ukraine — Moscow’s enemies could strike North Korea. That in turn might trigger Beijing and Pyongyang’s mutual defense treaty, putting China on the spot. “North Korea has unnecessarily put China in a very dangerous situation,” Shen said.

“Cozying Up to North Korea Means Diplomatic Sacrifices for Putin,” Fyodor Tertitskiy, CEIP, 06.28.24. 

  • Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to North Korea was remarkable not only for the neo-Soviet pageantry, but also for the inking of a mutual military assistance pact. This landmark agreement threatens to upend Russia’s relations with a whole host of Asian nations.
  • Why did Moscow need such a far-ranging agreement with Pyongyang? Wouldn’t it have been better to avoid irreparably damaging relations with South Korea? It can be surmised that North Korea may have offered Russia a good deal on ammunition supplies—Moscow’s number one priority. The Kremlin also wants to show the West that it’s prepared to keep going to the bitter end in their confrontation.
  • Ultimately, if Putin is ready to sacrifice hundreds of thousands of lives—as well as the reputation and future of his own country—in a bid to try to seize control of Ukraine, is it really surprising he’s also willing to ditch Russia’s relationship with South Korea?

“The Uncertain Russia-North Korea Relationship,” Bruce Bennett, NI, 06.28.24.

  • The United States and South Korea have ample reasons to worry about the new agreement between Russia and North Korea. The agreement involves a mutual defense commitment between Russia and North Korea as well as military-technical cooperation.
  • The agreement is almost certainly not a basis for a new Russia-China-North Korea alliance, given the very differing objectives of these three countries.
  • The agreement has unsettled South Korea. South Korea threatened to start sending weapons to Ukraine if Russia did not renounce the agreement, a natural response to Russia significantly increasing the North Korean threat. Putin naively tried to reassure the South that it “shouldn’t worry” about the agreement if it does not plan aggression against the North. Putin apparently forgot that North Korea is the established aggressor on the Korean peninsula. South Korea thus needs to implement its threat to help Ukraine, which would present Putin with consequences for his actions.
  • It is also time for the United States and South Korea to establish a public information campaign that counters the aspirations and capabilities of Russia and North Korea. For some time, North Korea was able to send large numbers of munitions for use against Ukraine and reap substantial financial and other rewards. But is North Korea running out of outdated war reserve stocks it can continue sending to Russia? And how dangerous are those munitions? Will Russia reduce its support of North Korea when it is no longer getting significant North Korean assistance? And if North Korea does send military forces to fight in Ukraine, Kim will be increasing instability in North Korea that the United States and South Korea should be prepared to exploit.

Iran and its nuclear program:

“Iran’s New Nuclear Threat,” Eric Brewer, FA, 06.25.24.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“Death and destruction in a Russian city. Russians in the border city of Belgorod have become victims too in the war Vladimir Putin launched against Ukraine,” The Economist, 06.24.24.

  • For most of the people in Belgorod, once a quiet and comfortable Russian city 40km from the Ukrainian border, the war started on December 30th 2023, almost two years after it began in Ukraine. That day the center of Belgorod was hit by a Ukrainian rocket, killing 25 civilians, including two children, and wounding more than a hundred. Since then the city and the province that surrounds it have been attacked almost daily. Some 200 civilians have died and 800 have been wounded—small numbers compared with what Ukraine has endured, but far more than anywhere else in Russia.
  • Ukrainian commanders in Kharkiv say attacks on Belgorod have a dual purpose. One is to take out military infrastructure. The other is to drive the war home to people in Russia. Although the former is a legitimate act of war, the latter smacks of retribution against civilians. But, if anything, being drawn into war has consolidated Belgorod. Nearly 70% of its adults are volunteering: collecting money, joining territorial defense, staffing hospitals, says Elena Koneva, founder of ExtremeScan Group, a sociology-research outfit, estimates that 150,000 people have relocated from the province. Her research shows that support for Mr. Putin’s “special military operation” is 5-7% higher than in Russia as a whole; not because they wish death on their neighbors, but because they fear retribution from Ukraine. This fear breeds anxiety, a sense of despair, depression and alienation, rather than any real enthusiasm, Ms. Koneva says.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“A Summer of Slog Is Expected in Ukraine: Thousands are likely to die as forces from both sides probe for openings in the war,” Daniel Michaels and James Marson, WSJ, 07.01.24. 

  • As Russia's invasion of Ukraine enters a third summer, the 700-mile front line is the site of a bloody chess match, each side moving pieces in search of an advantage without conceding ground elsewhere.
  • The war here is settling in for a brutal season during which thousands will likely die on both sides, but neither appears poised to muster a decisive breakthrough. For Ukraine, after last summer's failed counteroffensive, the task for now is to use fresh Western weapons to hold positions. As for Russia, it appears likely to continue sacrificing large numbers of troops for small gains, a senior Ukrainian security official said. "They don't have enough troops" for a major advance in Kharkiv, the official said.
  • With the front line largely static, both sides are trying to use deep strikes to gain an advantage ahead of winter. Russia has knocked out half of Ukraine's power-generation capacity and pummeled Ukrainian defensive positions. Ukraine is using long-range missiles provided by the U.S. and its allies in an effort to cut off Crimea, the peninsula that Russia seized in 2014.
  • Reinforced Ukrainian defenses with infantry trenches protected by explosive drone teams, and artillery guns soon to be boosted by additional ammunition approved by the U.S., are sapping Russian strength. ... Still, Russians are edging forward in the eastern Donetsk region, a priority of Russian President Vladimir Putin. ... The gains are devouring resources. Moscow suffered roughly 1,500 casualties on May 14, its worst day of the war.
  • Whether Russia will attempt a large-scale assault during the summer remains a vexing question for Ukrainian strategists and their Western advisers. Kyiv can spot Russian forces massing for a potential attack, a senior Western intelligence official said, but "taking strategic intent from that can be quite difficult." 

“Motorcycles, Not Tanks, in a Methodical Russian Advance,” Daniel Berehulak, Maria Varenikova and Andrew E. Kramer, NYT, 06.30.24. 

  • They first appeared as a cloud of dust on the horizon. A few seconds later, the motorcycles carrying Russian soldiers sped into view, zigzagging across a field, kicking up dust, attempting a noisy, dangerous run at a Ukrainian trench.
    • It's a type of attack that has been proliferating along the frontline this spring, adding a wild new element to the already violent, chaotic fighting. Russian soldiers riding motorcycles, dirt bikes, quadricycles and dune buggies now account for about half of all attacks in some areas of the front, soldiers and commanders say, as Moscow's forces attempt to use speed to cross exposed open spaces where its lumbering armored vehicles are easy targets.
  • These nonconventional vehicles have been turning up with such frequency that some Ukrainian trenches now overlook junk yards of abandoned, blown up off-road vehicles, videos from reconnaissance drones show. The new tactic is the latest Russian adaptation for a heavily mined, continually surveilled battlefield, as Moscow's forces work to achieve small tactical gains, often of just a few hundred yards. ''We are fighting a war over every meter,'' said Captain Yaroslav, an artillery commander with the 80th Air Assault Brigade, who earlier this week was firing rockets toward Russian lines.
  • Russia nevertheless remains the army on the offensive. Over time, its gains have added up and the Russian military is now close to strategically important supply lines and towns in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. Since capturing the city of Bakhmut in May 2023, a Russian offensive to the west advanced about three miles over more than a year. It is now stalled at a water canal near the town of Chasiv Yar. But now the Russians are threatening to flank Ukrainian positions there, while also approaching a key Ukrainian supply line, the Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway.

"Russia Sends Waves of Troops to the Front in a Brutal Style of Fighting," Julian E. Barnes, Eric Schmitt and Marc Santora, NYT, 06.27.24.

  • May was a particularly deadly month for the Russian army in Ukraine, with an average of more than 1,000 of its soldiers injured or killed each day, according to U.S., British and other Western intelligence agencies.
  • But despite its losses, Russia is recruiting 25,000 to 30,000 new soldiers a month — roughly as many as are exiting the battlefield, U.S. officials said. That has allowed its army to keep sending wave after wave of troops at Ukrainian defenses, hoping to overwhelm them and break through the trench lines.
  • It is a style of warfare that Russian soldiers have likened to being put into a meat grinder, with commanding officers seemingly oblivious to the fact that they are sending infantry soldiers to die.
  • At times, this approach has proved effective, bringing the Russian army victories in Avdiivka and Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine. But Ukrainian and Western officials say the tactics were less successful this spring, as Russia tried to take land near the city of Kharkiv.
  • American officials said that Russia achieved a critical objective of President Vladimir V. Putin, creating a buffer zone along the border to make it more difficult for the Ukrainians to strike into the country. But the drive did not threaten Kharkiv and was ultimately stopped by Ukrainian defenses, according to Western officials.
  • President Putin and Moscow have really tried to make big gains, to break through the front lines this spring,” Jens Stoltenberg, the NATO secretary general, said in an interview with The New York Times editorial board. “They tried and they failed. They made very small gains, and they are paying a very high price.”

“How Russia Is Recruiting for the Long War,” Margarete Klein, SWP, Summer 2024.

  • Russia is counting on a long war of attrition in which it will be able to draw on considerably more manpower reserves than Ukraine and the latter will increasingly run up against it limits following a general mobilization that started at the beginning of the war almost two-and-a-half years ago. Alone the number of men aged 18 to 60 is more than three-and-a half-times higher in Russia (at 39 million) than in Ukraine (11 million). Against this backdrop, it is all the more essential that Kyiv obtain sufficient supplies of modern weapons and equipment as well as long-term security commitments from Western states.
  • At the same time, Russia is preparing for a lengthy confrontation with the West. Its defense budget has doubled to the equivalent of €108 billion in 2024 compared with the previous year. This means that 28 per cent of government expenditure is allocated to the military, which corresponds to 6 per cent of gross domestic product. Combined with classified expenditure in other budget items used for military purposes, the figure is higher than 7 per cent. The increased military expenditure is intended not only to boost Russian defense production but also to increase the size of the armed forces to 1.5 million soldiers. In 2024, 16 new divisions and 14 brigades are to be formed.
  • Meanwhile, more fundamental changes in the structure of the Russian armed forces are becoming apparent. The direction of travel is away from the 2008 reform, which was aimed at transforming the outdated mass mobilization army of the Soviet era into a more professional and combat-ready force capable of pursuing the Russian quest for a zone of influence in the post-Soviet space and performing limited out-of-area operations.

For more analysis on this subject, see:

Military aid to Ukraine:

"Republicans Win on Support for Ukraine," Editorial Board, WSJ, 06.27.24.

  • The prevailing press narrative is that nearly all Republicans are isolationists who want to withdraw from the world and leave a beleaguered Ukraine to fend for itself. Yet candidates running hard against U.S. support for Ukraine are getting thumped in GOP primaries. Let’s hope Donald Trump is reading these political tea leaves.
  • This is a lesson for the Republicans in Congress who understand the stakes in Ukraine but still voted no on aid for fear of the politics. Most Americans want Ukraine to win, and good candidates can defend their support.
  • A recent poll from the Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute showed 75% of Americans think a Ukrainian victory is important to the U.S. But a growing share think Russia is prevailing. The obvious political high ground for Republicans, starting with Mr. Trump, is to tune out Ukraine’s loud but few reflexive critics—and highlight President’s Biden’s meandering weapons support as far too weak and halting. 

For more analysis on this subject, see:

“A New Era of Financial Warfare Has Begun,” Michael Hirsh, FP, 06.25.24.

  • The unprecedented actions taken at the G-7 summit in June to hand over to Ukraine billions of dollars in profits earned on frozen Russian assets—along with new actions taken against Chinese banks—could begin to undermine the legitimacy of the U.S.-dominated international financial system, some experts say. And that could make Russian President Vladimir Putin and especially Chinese President Xi Jinping, who is said to want to create an alternative renminbi-based financial system, very happy in the end.
  • The “tipping point,” James  [Harold James, a financial historian at Princeton University] warns, could come in the form of many countries, even U.S. allies, beginning to move their assets away from the dollar and euro. According to Raghuram Rajan of the University of Chicago, a former governor of the Reserve Bank of India, nations are disturbed by the idea that Russia’s $300 billion in central bank reserves have been inaccessible for more than two years. “Some central banks have started diversifying reserves a little more as a result, including into gold,” Rajan said.
  • If the United States and West were to respond to an invasion or blockade of Taiwan by freezing and leveraging Chinese assets, the result could be a freeze-up of the whole financial system and a devastating blow to the global economy.
  • However it’s done, making money off other nations’ assets—even aggressor nations, such as Russia, in total violation of global norms—is a risky precedent. “Once a new sanction becomes seen as effective, its usage tends to proliferate,” said Jon Bateman, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “In recent years, creative new uses of export control powers—such as the Entity List and the Foreign Direct Product Rule—have ping-ponged between Chinese and Russian targets.”

“Why the US should sanction more Russian tankers,” Robin Brooks and Ben Harris, Brookings, 06.26.24. 

  • The price cap on Russian oil and refined products, conceived and implemented in the wake of Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, was a novel attempt to reduce revenue from oil exports while maintaining global price stability. Successful application of the cap demands continued attention by the price cap coalition to sanction private entities that violate its terms. A particularly relevant issue today is whether further enforcement actions can dissuade Russia from utilizing an expanded “shadow fleet” to circumvent the terms of the price cap—and whether more aggressive sanctions enforcement will surge the price of oil. ... we argue that the coalition should sanction 15 Sovcomflot tankers that are especially active, shutting them down as a means of transport for Russia’s oil trade. Historical experience suggests that this enforcement measure is unlikely to have even a modest impact on global oil prices.

“How to save Ukraine,” Trevor Corson, BG, 06.26.24. 

  • Now that Biden has opened the door to alternatives to NATO, ... and with the conflict getting more dangerous by the day, the Democratic Party leadership could endorse a fresh foreign-policy vision that champions not just the past successes of Finland but also the huge rewards of strong neutrality in general.
  • A heroic first step the United States could urgently take, and which would entail a deeper commitment to Ukraine's survival than sending more missiles, would be to lead the UN Security Council in collaborative guarantees for Ukrainian security as the basis for a ceasefire. This collaborative, more multilateral, and more global approach to Ukraine's security would address Russia's stated concerns about NATO. A ceasefire could then open the possibility for Zelensky, whose term has expired, to restore elections, and for Ukrainians to vote on restoring their neutrality.
  • Endorsing neutrality for Ukraine would also be a chance to rewire Washington's foreign-policy brain. Our dominance-driven wars and interventions have been disasters. The “unipolar moment" of US primacy is over and the global majority is aligning away from Washington's presumption to control their fates. Yet our drive for dominance continues to suck us deeper — in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia — toward potentially suicidal defeats.
  • The United States, too, was once a neutral country. Today the United States heads a vibrant global coalition of democracies. A retreat into isolationism would be a mistake. That said, this larger collective could declare permanent defensive armed neutrality on the world stage. Instead of trying to “win" against everyone else, maybe we could, for a change, as Finland did, try investing in and strengthening ourselves, and lead by example.

“Zelensky lays out how Ukraine can win, if the West loses its fear of Putin,” Trudy Rubin, Philadelphia Inquirer, 06.30.24. Clues from Ukrainian Views.

  • The only possible negotiations Zelensky envisions would be talks based on his own peace plan calling for full withdrawal from Ukraine, reparations and justice for Russian war crimes. … “If Trump has such a model [to end the war in 24 hours], well, everyone would like to finalize the war. Maybe even in one hour would be better,” Zelensky joked. “But if the idea is to give up our territories, no, it will not solve the issue. It will not work; it will not lead to peace [globally] or between Ukraine and Russia.”
  • “A cease-fire is the best option for the Russians so they can prepare for taking even more,” Zelensky said.
  • “The West wanted to deny Putin the opportunity to fully occupy Ukraine and to put the aggressor in his place. I think for them it is the victory already,” Zelensky said. “But for us,” he continued, growing emotional, “for the people at the front line who lost their brothers at arms, the civilians who lost their relatives, those who fled abroad but have husbands on the front line — for us, victory is a moment of satisfaction. “We are grateful that the West did not let Russia occupy us [fully], but we need justice.”
  • [T]he first part of Zelensky’s “real victory” is “not to allow the full destruction of everything Ukrainian” by Putin. … The second part … “is security for today and for future Ukrainian generations, and the impossibility of the repetition of aggression. We should be in the European Union for economic security. And we should be in NATO for physical security.”

“New Polling Shows Significant Ukrainian Support for Diplomacy to End the War,” Mark Episkopos, The Nation, 06.25.24. 

  • New polling showing significant Ukrainian support for diplomacy to end the war—paired with a closer look at other indications that Ukrainians are rejecting risking everything for victory—challenges this understanding.
    • The narrative of totally unified Ukrainian opinion is premised on polls from the earliest days of the war showing nearly unanimous Ukrainian support for the government and its handling of the war effort. This seeming consensus has steadily eroded since the peak of Ukraine’s battlefield successes in 2022, when 70 percent of survey respondents affirmed that Ukraine “should continue fighting until it wins the war.” That number dropped to 60 percent in the summer of 2023, according to Gallup.
    • Polling since the failure of Ukraine’s 2023 offensive shows that 44 percent of Ukrainians favor entering into talks with Russia and only 48 percent—still a plurality but, notably, no longer a majority—believe Ukraine should fight on.
    • Other recent polling shows that even in Kyiv, where Ukraine’s elite and bureaucracy is concentrated and political investment in the war effort is at its highest, complete confidence in Ukrainian victory is weakening.
    • Tellingly, recent surveys—including a new poll from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace— suggest that the share of Ukrainians open to a negotiated settlement has dramatically risen over the past year and, if present trends hold, is well on the way to becoming a majority-held view.
    • Another key metric of public investment in the nation’s war effort is support for mobilization. A plurality of Ukrainian men said in a February poll that they are not prepared to fight.
  • Continuing to conflate the interests of the Ukrainian government with the hopes and aspirations of the Ukrainian people is a way of ducking responsibility. 

“Putin’s ‘Peace’ Proposal for Ukraine Isn’t Serious,” Editorial Board, Bloomberg, 06.25.24.

  •  Before heading off to North Korea ..., Russian President Vladimir Putin made a “peace” offering to Ukraine. He pledged an immediate cease-fire and peace negotiations if Ukraine withdraws from four partially occupied regions and abandons its bid to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. His other stipulation, of course, is that the West lift sanctions. This offer was patently designed to tempt and divide Ukraine’s friends. No one should fall for it.
  • Sadly, wars don’t always end justly. It’s likely, however lamentable, that some form of territorial concessions will be part of a negotiated end to the war Putin started. That must be Ukraine’s decision to make. But it’s preposterous for Putin to demand such concessions before talks can even begin. Moreover, if talks ever do get started, Putin’s offers should be viewed with utmost skepticism. Nine out of 10 Ukrainians say they don’t trust him, and they’re right: He has an unblemished record of using negotiations to regroup and plan the next assault.
  • Putin’s actions speak volumes. His proposal for talks in exchange for territory should be read as just his latest attempt to divide the allies and throttle Western support. Thanks, but no thanks.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Wanted: new soldiers for Europe’s shrinking armies,” Sam Jones and John Paul Rathbone, FT, 06.26.24.

  • With 181,000 active troops, the German military is at least 20,000 soldiers short of what its military chiefs say it needs to fulfil its current mandate. The deficit is one of the largest in Europe, but troop numbers from the International Institute for Strategic Studies show it is not the only one.
  • The UK has missed its annual military recruiting targets every year for the last decade, and last year its land forces lost 4,000 soldiers. The French armed forces, the largest in Europe with 203,850 men and women, are still short of what generals say are the numbers needed, and down 8 per cent since 2014. In Italy, the military’s size has dwindled from 200,000 a decade ago to 160,900 today.
  • On paper, European NATO allies have 1.9mn troops between them — seemingly enough to counter Russia (1.1mn soldiers and 1.5mn reservists). But in reality, European NATO powers would struggle to commit any more than 300,000 troops to a conflict — and even then, that would take months of preparation, analysts tell the FT.
  • “NATO defense planning in Europe for many years was about, ‘Are you ready to supply 300 special forces for Afghanistan,’ and nothing to do with mass. That’s created gaps,” says Camille Grand, distinguished fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and, until 2022, assistant secretary-general of NATO. With the exception of Greece and Turkey, “we have seen a shrinking in forces all over the continent year after year”.

“Le Pen, Trump and liberal panic,” Gideon Rachman, FT, 07.01.24.

  • [Marine] Le Pen’s Rassemblement National has just won the largest share of the vote in the first round of French legislative elections and Macron’s party has been trounced. Her protégé, Jordan Bardella, may soon become prime minister and she is the bookies’ favorite for the presidency in 2027. The hope that Macron had permanently buried the threat from the far right turned out to be an illusion.
  • In the US and France, centrists and liberals are in full panic mode. Nationalist populism now looks like a permanent and even defining feature of western politics, rather than a temporary aberration.
  • On both sides of the Atlantic, the populist nationalist forces push similar policies on immigration, trade, climate, the “war on woke” and the war in Ukraine.
  • But liberals should not panic. Dismantling American or French democracy would be no simple task. 

“Europe Alone,” Mark Leonard, Constanze Stelzenmüller, Nathalie Tocci, Carl Bildt, Robin Niblett, Radoslaw Sikorski, Guntram Wolff, Bilahari Kausikan, Ivan Krastev and Stefan Theil, FP, 07.01.24.

  • [Mark Leonard] The U.S. Congress gave Ukraine and its European allies crucial breathing room when it finally passed a $61 billion aid package in late April. But what happens after the U.S. presidential election in November is anyone’s guess. In the long run—no matter who wins—U.S. engagement in Europe is likely to have peaked. The upshot is that everything will soon hinge on whether Europe can step up to the plate as a geopolitical actor amid U.S. retrenchment.
  • [Constanze Stelzenmüller] Germany’s domestic intelligence chief, Thomas Haldenwang, likes to say Russia’s war against Ukraine is the storm whereas China’s quest for global dominance is climate change. What Europe is facing today is nothing less than a geostrategic firestorm.
  • [Nathalie Tocci] The question haunting Europe today is whether it will be united once again if Trump returns to the White House. Of course, Trump is not the only reason Europe should be unified. Europe and its neighborhood are even more ablaze today than in 2016. Europe itself is at war, with Russian officials openly stating that their imperial appetites won’t be sated with the subjugation of Ukraine.
  • [Carl Bildt] If Ukraine and its Western supporters lose resolve, Europe may face a scenario where Russia subjugates the rest of Ukraine, installs a puppet regime, and gradually integrates most or all of the country into a new Russian empire. ... Sooner or later, Russia would face its third state collapse in little more than a century.
  • [Robin Niblett] Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 overturned the strategic calculus behind Brexit. Then-Prime Minister Boris Johnson had promised to raise Britain’s sights beyond Europe—to the sunny uplands of closer trading and political relations with the United States and dynamic emerging markets in Asia. 

“Why the Conflict Between Russia and the US Will Persist Beyond the Ukraine Crisis,” Andrey Sushentsov, Valdai Club, 06.25.24. Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

  • It is essential to consider the Russian-American conflict as a prolonged confrontation that will continue even after the United States recognizes that Ukraine has lost its significance as a tool. Consequently, the US will shift the focus of its anti-Russian activities to another country that, like Ukraine, is willing to sacrifice itself and lead the fight against Russia in the front lines. The United States will remain a strategically important actor for us, and therefore, we cannot ignore it in our planning processes. We must view the US as a constant source of threat and prepare for a protracted conflict. 

For more analysis on this subject, see:

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“The US Is Learning the Wrong Cold War Lessons on China: Hoping for a repeat of history isn’t the wisest foreign-policy strategy for winning the 21st century version of the Washington-Moscow rivalry,” Minxin Pei, Bloomberg, 06.24.24.

  • It is tempting to bet that a Reaganesque approach will deliver the same outcome for the US in its rivalry with China as it did in the 1980s. But wishing a repeat of history may not be the wisest foreign-policy strategy for winning the 21st century version of the Washington-Moscow rivalry.
  • The narrative that Reagan’s confrontational tactics, in particular his military build up, were decisive in winning the Cold War is unsupported by evidence. Although Reagan escalated the pressure on the Soviets, his policy did not yield results during the first half of his presidency. It was the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev that directly contributed to the Soviet demise
  • Counting on a similar scenario in China is unrealistic.
  • We may have to wait decades to see the end game of the US-China rivalry. But applying the wrong lessons of the Cold War will not help the US win, especially because Chinese leaders seem to have a better grasp of how the Soviets lost it.

For more analysis on this subject, see:

Missile defense:

  • No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

“Reducing nuclear dangers,” Matthew Bunn, Science, 06.20.24.

  • Dark clouds loom on the nuclear horizon, with threats from all directions: Russia’s nuclear bombast in its war on Ukraine, China’s construction of hundreds of nuclear missile silos, North Korea’s missile testing, India and Pakistan’s ongoing nuclear competition, and Iran’s push toward nuclear weapons capability. … The risk of nuclear war has not been so high since the Cuban Missile Crisis.
  • These are the kinds of danger that accords for nuclear restraint were meant to mitigate by providing predictability and transparency while moderating worst-case analysis on all sides. But these agreements have been gravely weakened. … The world could soon face an unrestrained arms competition for the first time in over five decades—and a more complex one involving more countries and more technologies.
  • Nongovernment “Track 2” dialogues—which offer more freedom to explore ideas than is available to government representatives—can develop concepts for governments to take up later. … In-depth technical discussions involving the scientific community are essential for issues such as reducing the dangers of conflict in outer space and cyberspace and exploring how new technologies such as commercial space systems and artificial intelligence can help verify the next generation of arms restraints.
  • Initial steps forward should focus on reducing US tensions with China, Russia, and North Korea. Governments should revitalize and expand key risk reduction measures including steps to avoid and manage dangerous military accidents, to establish communication at multiple political and military levels, and to notify one another about missile tests and major military exercises.
  • In addition, the United States, Russia, and China must work out ways to build predictability, reduce hostility, and avoid the dangers and costs of unrestrained competition. 

“Interview with Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov, Izvestia Multimedia Information Centre, Moscow, June 27, 2024,” Russian Foreign Ministry, 06.27.24.

  • [When asked: Does Moscow believe that it would be possible to use tactical nuclear weapons during the special military operation?] The issue is being discussed, and you are absolutely right in referring to these commentaries by our Supreme Commander-in-Chief. There have been some others, and I hope that our opponents are taking them seriously, rather than just at the level of certain behind-the-scenes discussions without any practical conclusions. There are fairly clear regulations for using nuclear weapons. Our doctrinal documents are also known, they are the military doctrine and the Foundations of the State Policy in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence. Those taking part in the panel session of the Primakov Readings noted aptly that these documents had been compiled in a different era and in other conditions. They have to be adapted to the completely changed security situation. We are making relevant efforts, and the President has also repeatedly noted this. I am not anticipating the results, but I am urging our adversaries to ponder what the President is saying. They are literally playing with fire. They should eventually learn not to indulge in extremely dangerous illusions, and they should try and take a sober look at the world. They should realize that we have unwavering national interests, and that we are ready to defend them till the end.
  • I cannot say that they [Americans] are adhering to these [New START] ceilings. Moreover, they failed to do this long before the current collapse in relations between Moscow and Washington and before we suspended the New START Treaty, due to completely changed circumstances. We presented claims to Washington for removing a substantial share of its strategic delivery vehicles from the treaty’s ceilings through manipulative practices and mendacious ploys. 

"Nuclear escalation may open Pandora’s box, but it will also free the world from the 500-year-long Western yoke," Sergei Karaganov’s interview with Ukraina.ru, 06.21.24.[2] Clues from Russian Views. (Ukraina.ru is run by the Russian government-funded Rossiya Segodnya media outlet.)

  • I believe that the nuclear threshold will be lowered granting our president the right, not just formal but real, to order any retaliatory strikes if any weapon is used against Russia, is common sense. ... I strongly hope that such amendments to our nuclear doctrine will be made. They are not only possible but even likely.
  • I think we need to watch the situation and NATO’s actions for another year or two. If the bloc and its mercenaries in Kyiv keep throwing new hundreds of thousands of people into this meat grinder and supplying them with new weapons, then we will have to move faster up the escalation-deterrence ladder. In this case we might be forced to deliver nuclear group strikes on countries that are helping them. But naturally, there will be other preliminary steps first, including, perhaps non-nuclear strikes.
  • I hope, I pray, I work so that it never comes to a nuclear strike, and our distraught Western neighbors sober up, because the use of nuclear weapons entails heavy moral damage, including to ourselves, even if justified and even advantageous from a strategic point of view. Besides, stepping over the nuclear threshold can open Pandora’s box for the world.
  • Nuclear weapons have a large number of functions, and one of them is to block a conventional and other non-nuclear arms race. We have weakened this function because of our rather lightweight and carefree doctrine. But it has also been weakened by objective factors. When the nuclear threshold is lowered, a potential adversary will begin to understand that a conventional arms race cannot be won. In other words, you win a conventional arms race but get a nuclear strike. So it makes “race” useless.

For more analysis on this subject, see:

Counterterrorism:

“What Isis did next: the return of the threat that never left,” Raya Jalabi, David Pilling, Aanu Adeoye and John Paul Rathbone, FT, 06.25.24.

  • An Isis assault on a Moscow concert hall in March killed 143 people. This month six inmates linked with the group took hostages at a prison in southern Russia and were shot dead. France said the same Isis branch had also attempted multiple attacks on its soil. On Sunday, at least 20 people died in Russia’s Dagestan region after gunmen attacked churches and synagogues in two cities. While no group has yet claimed the attack, the shootings were praised on some Isis-affiliated social media channels. And officials in Berlin warned this month, as their country hosts the Euro 2024 football championship, that Germany could witness an assault on the same scale as Moscow.
    • “In the eyes of the average person on the street, Isis was done and finished years ago,” said Shiraz Maher, director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization. “Attacks like these are them saying: ‘don’t forget about us, we’re still here and we still pose a threat’.”
  • the attacks and recruitment by Isis use “a bit of everything . . . there is no textbook way that it is done”, said Colin Clarke, director of research at The Soufan Center intelligence and security consultancy.
    • One threat is “lone wolf” attacks by individuals with a hodgepodge of grievances who have consumed radicalizing material, often online.
    • Another risk comes from “enabled” individuals who receive some degree of support from foreign groups.
    • But the most potent threat comes from “directed” assaults in which attackers are trained, funded and logistically supported by groups overseas.   
  • “We haven’t heard the last of Isis,” Maher said.

Conflict in Syria:

  • No significant developments.

Cyber security/AI: 

“Signals intelligence has become a cyber-activity,” The Economist, 07.01.24. 

  • Eleven years ago Edward Snowden, a disgruntled contractor working for the NSA, America’s signals-intelligence (SIGINT) service, fled to Hong Kong then Russia and revealed that America and its allies were sweeping up much of the world’s communications. Intelligence agencies warned that his disclosure would have dire consequences, as enemies found other ways to communicate. In the end it was not as bad as feared. Agencies could no longer access “all of the data they needed to see, or had access to before,” writes Ciaran Martin, then a senior official at GCHQ, Britain’s SIGINT agency. But they could still get “lots,” he notes. Indeed, enough to provide American SIGINT with the lion’s share of intelligence, including intercepts of communications, that showed in 2021 that Russia was planning to invade Ukraine, and how it planned to do so.
  • In the past two decades, SIGINT has been transformed. The internet took over from radio and telephone traffic in the 1990s. Now, a decade after Mr. Snowden, most internet traffic is encrypted and data have pooled in new places, like the cloud. The same computer networks that ferry it about have also become integral to the physical world—from cars to power grids to military systems—blurring the line between cyber-espionage and cyber-attacks, and reshaping the identity of sigint agencies. But they remain extraordinary intelligence-gathering machines.
  • The next frontier is likely to be quantum computers that are expected to be able to unscramble much of what is encrypted using current methods. Some fear that China is collecting data today to decipher when the technology bears fruit—a strategy known as “store now, decrypt later” or SNDL. That could include, say, cables between a CIA outpost and headquarters.

Energy:

“Green Peace: How the Fight Against Climate Change Can Overcome Geopolitical Discord,” Meghan L. O’Sullivan and Jason Bordoff, FA, July/August 2024.

Climate change:

  • No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

For a Russian view of the state of the U.S. economy, see: 

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Presidential Debate Stirs Memories of Leonid Brezhnev,” Sergey Radchenko, WSJ, 06.28.24.

  • Thursday's presidential debate reminded me of an old Soviet joke. Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev presides over the opening of the Olympic Games in Moscow. “O-O-O-O-O,” Brezhnev says. An aide pulls him by his elbow: “Comrade Brezhnev, these are the Olympic rings. The text of the speech is down below.”
  • Brezhnev was only 75 when he died in 1982, but he was barely in charge in the last six or seven years of his long reign. His diary shows that he was preoccupied with his weight, playing dominoes and bathing in the sea.
  • Once Brezhnev’s health began to deteriorate, Soviet bureaucratic interests took over. Detente withered. Soviet overextension worsened. When the U.S.S.R. invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the decision was imposed on the ailing Brezhnev by the KGB and military who had him sign off on the misadventure.
  • The Soviets’ problem wasn’t so much that they couldn’t replace senile leaders, but that they couldn’t change leaders at all. They had no democratic accountability.
  • The pathetic sight of Brezhnev in decline has a broader meaning. Why is it that people like this end up running countries? Are there systemic, bureaucratic, institutional reasons why frail old men are appointed -- or elected?
  • The consequences… are deeply troubling. It undermines faith in the social contract. If we are willing to be led by those who don’t know where they are going, we can’t aspire to build a better future for ourselves. All we can do is drift purposelessly in a violent, vengeful world. That’s what the Soviets did.

“‘A reality show’: World reacts to Trump-Biden debate,” Rachel Looker, BBC, 06.28.24. 

  • A weak Joe Biden self-destructed in front of the whole world, while an aggressive Donald Trump told lies and mangled his sentences in a presidential debate that was like a reality show, according to international media. The verdicts of pundits from around the globe to Thursday night’s televised clash in Atlanta, Georgia, between the two White House rivals was damning.
  • Even before last night’s debate, the main evening news shows on Russian TV on Thursday were speculating that Mr. Biden would not be able to survive it. “An hour and a half live on air is a test of mental and physical fitness,” Channel One said, asserting that Mr. Biden would “find it difficult to withstand this.” Both state-owned Channel One and Rossiya 1 reported opinion polling showing that some 60% expected Mr. Biden to be given a stimulant to get through the debate.

  • Afterwards, pro-Kremlin commentators portrayed Mr. Biden’s performance in the debate as lackluster.  Military blog Rybar branded his performance a “total failure,” while the Telegram channel of the Russia in Global Affairs magazine said that Mr. Biden had failed to prove that he was in “proper physical shape” to lead the country and that his performance “appears to have frightened his supporters.” Rossiya 1 TV said on Friday morning that voters were concerned about Mr. Biden’s “mental health.”  It also highlighted Trump's attacks on Mr. Biden’s handling of the Ukraine war.

    “Trump the Realist: The Former President Understands the Limits of American Power,” Andrew Byers and Randall L. Schweller, FA, 07.01.24.

“The process has begun. What do Biden’s defeat in the debates and Macron’s defeat in the elections have in common,” Fyodor Lukyanov, Profil/Russia in Global Affairs, 07.01.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. (Russia in Global Affairs is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

  • The two eye-catching political events of recent days are the debate of U.S. presidential candidates, which ended with the embarrassment of Joe Biden, and the failure of Emmanuel Macron’s party in the early parliamentary elections in France. Both have sharply raised the question of the state of the Western establishment. The next link in this chain will probably be the general election in Great Britain, at which an unprecedented defeat is predicted for the incumbent Conservatives.
  • Each case has its own reasons. But one pattern emerges. The lack of understanding of how to solve growing socio-economic problems puts an end to the mediocracy of the political mainstream, which has been accepted as the norm after the end of the Cold War. Voters are waiting for ideas and proposals. In order for them [ideas and proposals] to appear, an essential debate is needed. But no such debate has been conducted in recent decades.
  • Attempts to simply suppress and marginalize populists no longer work. There is a demand for a meaningful ideological struggle, in which different solutions to significant issues would be proposed.
  • The process of changing political generations has begun. And it will not pass without a trace.

For Ukrainian views on the recent U.S. presidential debate, see the section on Ukraine below.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:
“How Russian Elites Made Peace With the War. Moscow’s Victories Have Dampened Opposition to the Kremlin,” Mikhail Zygar, FA, 06.28.24. 

  • When the war in Ukraine began, the Russian elite entered a state of shock… But that was then. As 2023 wound on, elites started endorsing the war… Russian elites have learned to stop worrying about the conflict.
  • Instead of debating whether to support Putin, Russian elites are now discussing a different question: how the war might end.
  • According to one businessman with close connections to the Kremlin, Putin won’t be satisfied by winning Ukraine’s northeast. The only outcome he will accept is the capture of Kyiv.
  • For Putin… the war in Ukraine is not only—or even mostly—about Ukraine. Instead, people close to Russia’s president say that he sees the invasion as just one front in a conflict with the West. That means Russia’s battlefield success may not be enough to please Putin. To defeat his real foes, in Brussels and Washington,
  • Putin may feel that he needs to attack a NATO member. According to Russia’s elites, the most likely target would be Estonia or Latvia: the two Baltic countries with large Russian minorities.
  • Putin, of course, may also try to weaken Biden without attacking the Baltics. Most of my sources believe that Putin could deal blows to the president by simply winning more battles in Ukraine—and that he will try to do just that.
  • But not everyone in Russia thinks the war will end if Trump is elected. Some believe that the war will not end in any situation. As a businessman close to the Kremlin told me, Putin has grown too fond of the war, which has helped him mobilize society, imprison some dissidents, kill others, and force most of the rest out of the country.

“The unpredictable consequences of economic overheating,” Denis Kasyanchuk and Alexandra Prokopenko, Bell, 06.28.24.

  • The overheating of the Russian economy is now an accepted fact. Top officials, including Central Bank head Elvira Nabilullina and the head of state-owned banking giant Sberbank German Gref, talk about it openly.
  • In Russia, the two primary indicators of overheating are inflation and labor shortages, according to the Central Bank. These two indicators are closely linked: high consumer demand pushes up prices. And that demand is fanned by uncontrolled wage increases (21.6% in March compared to the same month a year earlier). Wages are rising particularly fast in industrial regions, with the biggest increases in Siberia’s Kurgan Region (+33%), which is home to the only factory in Russia manufacturing infantry combat vehicles.
  • The main culprit for overheating is the state, which is spending record amounts amid the war in Ukraine. According to analysts from the Gaidar Institute, budget expenditures in 2022 and 2023 went up 17.2% and 14.2%, respectively. That caused the share of government spending in Russia’s GDP to rise from 34.7% in 2021 to 36.6% in 2023.
  • In theory, high rates should cool the economy – the higher interest rates, the more expensive it is to borrow (which dampens demand and inflation). Right now, though, this doesn’t seem to be happening. The reasons for this are a subject of disagreement.
    • Economist Georgy Zhirnov has suggested that the failure of high interest rates to impact the economy is down to high levels of “non-market” borrowing, especially state-subsidized mortgages. Many other economists agree. However, Zhirnov has also pointed out that, in the first half of this year, the volume of approved mortgages was down 60% on the equivalent period in the previous year. This suggests high interest rates are having an effect. 

“To Build a Democratic Russia, We Must Stop Kidding Ourselves About Yeltsin,” Vasily Zharkov, MT, 06.28.24.

  • In the eyes of most Russians, democracy and liberalism have been tarnished by their association with Boris Yeltsin and the chaotic 1990s. Therefore, the quest to build a democratic future for Russia will have to learn from the mistakes of that infamous decade, which allowed the country to slide into today’s rigidly authoritarian regime.
  • Criticism of the 1990s has long been actively used by opponents of liberalism and democracy to further their own interests. Putin builds his image as the savior of the country. But in reality, his policies are a direct continuation of that chaotic era. The most important steps on the way to today’s regime were the granting of emergency powers to Yeltsin in November 1991, the abolition of soviets and the adoption of a monarchical constitution in 1993, and the organization of a campaign to vote for the incumbent president in 1996.
  • It is high time for the Russian opposition to get out of the pseudo-elitist ghetto that the authorities drove it into during the 1990s and learn to speak to the public in a way that they can not only understand but makes them feel respected. We are not talking about a single party, but rather about a popular front - a broad coalition of democratic and leftist movements that can offer a real alternative to today’s hopeless state of affairs. “Traitors” provoked a major reset of the entire system of values and political priorities of the opposition both in Russia and beyond.

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

Defense and aerospace:

  •  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

  • No significant developments.

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including  relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Year After Failed Mutiny, Russia Tightens Grip on Wagner Units in Africa,” Elian Peltier, NYT, 06.25.24.

  • Since Prigozhin’s death, Russia has been carving up Wagner’s assets and redistributing them to branches of the Kremlin, according to interviews with a dozen diplomats and military and intelligence officials from Western countries, Russia and Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Defense has taken control of Wagner’s mercenary arm in Africa and placed it under a bigger umbrella group, Africa Corps.
  • The West African leaders who have sought closer partnerships with Russia want personal protection, soldiers and weapons to fight rebels and Islamist insurgents affiliated with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State.
  • But just as African militaries have been unable to defeat the insurgents despite the American and European support, they have also had limited successes with their Russian partners, security experts say.
  • And abuses against civilians have soared in the years since these militaries have called in Russian instructors, with Wagner mercenaries accused of mass killings and torture in Mali and rape and other crimes in the Central African Republic.

“UK Policy Toward Russia, Ukraine: Could It Change Under Labour?”, Mary Dejevsky, RM, 06.27.24.

  • "The Labour Party, which is set to take power in the U.K. after the General Election on July 4, has campaigned under the slogan “Time for Change.” While there are many areas where Labour’s leader, Sir Keir Starmer, is eyeing change, policy toward Russia and Ukraine will not be among them. Thus, unlike the looming concern over an imminent shift of France’s government to the far right, insofar as the U.S. Biden administration continues to consider Ukraine’s defense a vital U.S. national interest, a shift in the United Kingdom’s government to Labour would seem to be good news."
  • "On Ukraine, politicians have set the agenda, and the public has largely acquiesced. … It is clear, both from the Labour party’s manifesto and from official statements, that the team of Keir Starmer and his likely Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, will not waver from this. Indeed, it can be reasonably predicted that security permitting, Sir Keir will rush to Kyiv within hours of taking office, bearing a pledge of uninterrupted and undiminished support. Time was when a new U.K. leader’s first foreign duty was a trip to Washington or Paris. It is now a photo-op with Volodymyr Zelenskyy."
  • "It is equally predictable that there will be no change—in the short term—in U.K. relations with Russia, which may justifiably be described as being as bad as they have ever been."
  • "Could the new government perhaps face public pressure to change its uncompromisingly black and white stance on Russia and Ukraine? For most of the campaign, the answer would have been no. … Then two weeks before polling day, Nigel Farag … ventured to suggest in a television interview that the West shared some culpability for the Ukraine war because of how NATO had expanded."

“The Arctic: The Next Frontier in India-Russia Relations,” interview with Raj Kumar Sharma, RIAC, 06.21.24. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

  • India’s relationship with Russia has been the only ‘constant’ in its foreign policy, despite numerous geopolitical changes in the last seven decades. Policymakers in New Delhi view a strong relationship with Russia as an ‘insurance policy’ against great power rivalry that could harm India’s core national interests. Currently, India also enjoys a good relationship with the US-led Western world.
  • Russia is already talking about the ‘Easternization’ of its Arctic policy, in which countries like India have an important role to play. India understands the importance of Russia in the Arctic as it not only has the biggest coastline, but also the largest population and natural resources in this region. Hence, the Arctic is the next frontier in India’s ties with Russia. Russia sees itself as the northernmost country in the world. It has an image of representing the Global North while India represents the views of the Global South. There is ample room for the two countries to cooperate in the Arctic.

Ukraine: 

“For Ukrainians, the Biden-Trump debate was a high stakes affair,” Veronika Melkozerova, Politico, 06.28.24. Clues from Ukrainian Views.

  • As U.S. presidential hopefuls Joe Biden and Donald Trump hashed it out on screen, a lot was on the line for us. Though he may be tired and old, Biden is still a more predictable figure for Ukrainians, as he supports providing aid to Kyiv that helps us stand against the Kremlin. The glaring question is what to expect from Trump, who treats Russia’s war against us like a dispute between two kids that should settle down.
  • It was a glimmer of hope when Trump called Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ultimatum for Kyiv to give up for regions and disarm as a condition for peace unacceptable. “This already a sign that he, at least openly, is not a supporter of appeasement of Russia through Ukrainian territorial concessions,” Oleksandr Merezhko, head of the Ukrainian parliament’s foreign relations committee, told POLITICO.
  • Kyiv officials think Trump may initially try to bring Ukraine and Russia to the negotiating table. “But when he realizes this is unrealistic, he will continue to help Ukraine, and may even increase this assistance,” Merezhko added.

“Zelenskyy’s Formidable Task: Keeping the West and His Citizens On Board,” Ian Lovett and Laurence Norman, WSJ, 06.26.24.

  • Mounting challenges cloud the horizon, as both Ukraine and its Western partner recognize the huge investment—financial, military and human—that will be required even for Ukraine to hold its current defensive lines
  • Domestically, efforts to mobilize more troops to fight are reshaping Ukrainian life. Military officials are pulling men off the street and sending them to the front, often with little training. Some men stay at home all day, afraid they will be forced into the armed forces on the way to work.
  • Tensions with the U.S. are flickering into view, with Washington concerned about Kyiv’s anticorruption efforts, and Zelenskyy pleading for faster and bigger deliveries of military equipment. Questions loom over Western strategy as elections in the U.S. and Europe could bring populists to power who have decried excessive spending on Ukraine.
    • U.S. concerns have risen in recent months, buttressed by demands in Congress for Ukraine to show U.S. military and civilian assistance isn’t going to waste. In May, Oleksandr Kubrakov, the infrastructure minister, was fired. Several weeks later, Mustafa Nayyem, the head of Ukraine’s restoration and infrastructure development agency, resigned, citing “constant confrontation, resistance and artificial obstacles.”
      • Both U.S. and Ukrainian officials said they thought Kubrakov and Nayyem were targeted in part because they maintained close ties with Western partners, which the president’s office viewed as a threat. After Kubrakov’s dismissal, the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine posted a message of support for him on X.
      • European officials say that Zelenskyy has pushed through a range of useful anticorruption reforms and measures to strengthen judicial independence even during the difficult circumstances of the war.

“Ukraine has a month to avoid default,” The Economist, 06.30.24. 

  • War is still exacting a heavy toll on Ukraine’s economy. The country’s GDP is a quarter smaller than on the eve of Vladimir Putin’s invasion, the central bank is tearing through foreign reserves and Russia’s recent attacks on critical infrastructure have depressed growth forecasts. “Strong armies,” warned Sergii Marchenko, Ukraine’s finance minister, on June 17, “must be underpinned by strong economies.”
  • Ukraine faces a cash crunch… For the past two years, Ukraine’s creditors have agreed to suspend debt-service payments. The let-off—from both government and private lenders—is worth 15% of GDP a year. Indeed, if payments had been required, they would have been the state’s second-biggest expenditure, behind defense. Now, however, the moratorium from private foreign bondholders, including Amundi, a French asset manager, and PIMCO, an American one, is set to expire on August 1. Thus, Ukraine has a month to avoid default.
  • The IMF is keen for Mr. Marchenko to negotiate a write-down, but a deal seems unlikely in the time available. If Ukraine does default, it would reflect a troubling lack of faith among private investors concerning the West’s commitment. In the long run, that could spell disaster for the country’s recovery.
  • Much of Ukraine’s recovery—including the construction of basic infrastructure and civic buildings, as well as training people to rebuild the country—will never turn a profit, and will thus need to be shouldered by the country’s allies. The current impasse raises a worrying prospect: that distrust between them and private investors will slow down progress. Mr. Marchenko was right to remind Ukraine’s commercial creditors that a country’s army is only as strong as the economy behind it. He could also have reminded Ukraine’s allies that an economy is only as strong as the army keeping it in existence. 

Russia’s other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Do Baltic Russian Speakers Blame Russia for the War in Ukraine?”, Māris Andžāns, FPRI, 06.28.24.

  • The Baltic states are among the most ardent supporters of Ukraine in the war against Russia… However, perspectives on the war within Latvian society are not as straightforward as the political action might imply. Indeed, polling throughout the course of the war has highlighted splits in perspectives along ethnolinguistic lines.
  • Views of the Latvian-speaking respondents were relatively stable over the three years. There was a slight decrease in those blaming Russia (down from 87% in 2022 to 82% in 2024) and a slight increase in those neither agreeing nor disagreeing with the statement (from 7% in 2022 to 11% in 2023 and 2024).
    • Among Russian speakers, the trend has been slightly more dynamic. The share of those blaming Russia increased (from 32% in 2022 to 39% and 38% in 2023 and 2024), while the share of those neither agreeing nor disagreeing went down (33% and 32% in 2022 and 2023, but 22% in 2024). The share of those not blaming Russia decreased from 24% in 2022 to 16% in 2023 and again increased in 2024 to 21%.
  • As is clear from this and other polls, Latvia’s Russian speakers are not a monolithic group. Not only does the term include multiple ethnicities, among whom are ethnic Ukrainians, but also views about the culpability of Russia in the war on Ukraine are not straightforward. The difference between those who use Russian or Latvian as their home language is notable. While close to 40% of Russian speakers attribute the blame over the war to Russia and thus share Latvia’s official position, the rest do not.
  • There remains notable societal polarization regarding one of Latvia’s most defining national security issues — the war in Ukraine — and the clearest source of risks to its national security, Russia.

“Georgia at a Crossroads: Can the West Still Compete?”, Callum Fraser and Natia Seskuria, RUSI, 06.27.24.

  • The backlash over the foreign agents law indicates that Georgia’s current political crisis is not just about the protection of civil liberties and independent media, but has broader geopolitical implications. Once a champion of democracy in the region, Georgia’s European future is now much more uncertain.
  • The government of Georgia has been increasingly looking for alternative strategic partners, such as China, emphasizing the economic benefits of bringing Chinese investment into the country.
  • Georgia’s drastic policy shift threatens to further destabilize the geopolitical balance in the South Caucasus. What was once a hub of pro-Western democracy has been swayed by the allure of populism, likely amplified by the geopolitical interests of Russia and China… With the West in danger of losing out to Russian and Chinese influence, there is an urgent need to reassess what it can offer the region.
  • The turbulence in Georgia is a reminder to the EU of how state policy can drastically shift during the protracted waiting periods for European candidacy.
  • Within the emerging multipolarity of the FSU, there are clear limits to the effectiveness of current EU integration policy. Decades of waiting for approval has empowered individuals with vested interests to extend their influence in domestic politics, while allowing authoritarian powers the time to sway opinion through development projects, economic investment, and disinformation campaigns.

Footnotes

  1. In the past month, Russian forces have gained 50 square miles of Ukrainian territory, while Ukrainian forces have re-gained 6 square miles, according to the June 25, 2024, issue of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card.
  2. Translation provided S. Karaganov’s staff.

 

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 11:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

^Machine-translated.

Slider photo by Michael Linennen available for fair use under NATO content policy.

Click to Subscribe

Russia Matters offers weekly news and analysis digests, event announcements and media advisories.
Choose and sign up here!