5 Ideas to Explore

1. As expected, the “Joint Communiqué on a Peace Framework” adopted at the June 15-16 Summit on Peace in Ukraine covered only three of the most uncontroversial points of Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s initial 10-point peace formula: food security, nuclear security and the return of prisoners and children. The June 16 declaration  also implied that Russia needs to participate in whatever follow-up may occur. “We believe that reaching peace requires the involvement of and dialogue between all parties,” said the communique, which was signed by 78 participating countries and international organizations. According to Bloomberg’s analysis, Zelenskyy fell short in his bid to broaden international support at the summit as 11 of the attending countries didn’t sign the communiqué, while China didn’t attend the summit altogether. “The failure to win over nations from the Global South shows that Russia remains far from isolated and that Ukraine’s best hopes of fending off the Kremlin’s assault is with Western assistance,” this business news agency’s Andrea Palasciano and Bastian Benrath concluded.
2. Of the commonalities between communiqués of the past week’s Ukraine peace summit and the G-7 meeting, one stands out: both documents describe the use of nuclear weapons by Russia against Ukraine as “inadmissible.” The Ukraine peace summit’s June 16 declaration, which was signed by most, but not all, of the attending countries, also asserts that the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant “must operate ... under full sovereign control of Ukraine,” while the G-7’s June 14 document condemns “in the strongest possible terms Russia’s irresponsible and threatening nuclear rhetoric as well as its posture of strategic intimidation, including its announced deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus.” The two documents were adopted shortly after Russian and Belarussian militaries announced the continuation of their joint exercise to simulate the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons and the Russian MFA issued a warning that Moscow could revise its nuclear doctrine last week.
3. Vladimir Putin’s statement on conditions for peace with Ukraine hardens Moscow’s position on this issue, in the view of Tatiana Stanovaya of R.Politik. “In essence, he is signaling that because a ceasefire seems unattainable under current political conditions in Ukraine, the conditions themselves must change from within—which implies removing Zelenskyy,” Stanovaya said of the statement, which Putin made on June 14. Speaking to Russian diplomats one day ahead of the summit on peace in Ukraine, the Russian leader stated he would agree to a peaceful resolution of the conflict with Ukraine if, among other things, the latter withdraws from four eastern regions partially occupied by his forces; gives up its bid to join NATO; undergoes denazification and demilitarization; ensures the rights of Russian-speakers; and remains denuclearized.
4. A new paper by Belfer Center researchers infers a number of lessons from major post-WWII wars for ending the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Among other things, the Belfer Center’s Kate Davidson, Raphael Piliero, Peter Gaber and Joshua Henderson advise wariness of unanticipated peace spoilers; find that resolve beats resources in a proxy conflict; and infer that complete territorial integrity is not a precondition for prosperity. They also call for seizing the first opening for peace that secures vital interests, assert that “patrons should not only empower belligerents to wage war, but to pursue peace,” and advise that “agreements must lock in the post-war status quo, making future aggression unacceptably costly.”
5. “From a military—purely military standpoint, you're at a military stand--a stalemate,” former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley said of the current state of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Russian forces in Ukraine “have run a small offensive operation ... [with] limited penetrations,” but they “don't have the military capability to overrun Ukraine,” in Milley’s June 13 assessment, and “it is not likely that the Ukrainian military can militarily eject” the Russians. That same day, Presidents Joe Biden and Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed off on a 10-year bilateral security agreement between their two countries. In the interview, Milley also advised complementing military action with negotiations. “Obviously, conduct military operations; but also, there always should be some diplomatic effort,” he said.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

“‘Monkeys with a grenade’: inside the nuclear-power station on Ukraine’s front line,” The Economist, 06.14.24. 

• “Zaporizhzhia nuclear-power station ... fell into Russian hands in the first days of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This April a drone reportedly exploded on the roof of one of the reactors. The Russians blamed the Ukrainians; the Ukrainians said it was a Russian “false-flag” operation. After the explosion, one of many such incidents over the past two years, Rafael Grossi, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said: “We are getting dangerously close to a nuclear accident.”
• “The IAEA has had observers at the station since summer 2022, but its access is restricted by the Russian army, whose armored vehicles are parked in the turbine halls. Petro Kotin, head of EnergoAtom, the Ukrainian nuclear authority, is worried that the plant, now poorly maintained and dangerously near the front line, risks deteriorating to the point where it has to be decommissioned. Nuclear fuel on site has exceeded its expiration date. “We could lose this plant forever,” he said. “Nobody knows what to do next. No other nuclear-power plant has gone beyond these limits.”
• “Meanwhile, intermittent rocket fire frequently cuts off the electricity supply. There are diesel-powered back-up generators, but no one is sure how much diesel remains on site. If the generators ran out of fuel during a power cut, there could be a “meltdown like Fukushima”, said Kotin.”

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

“Vladimir Putin’s dangerous bromance with Kim Jong Un. Russia’s dictator may arrive in Pyongyang this week,” The Economist, 06.16.24.[1]

• “Kim Jong Un has a new best friend. ... In is Vladimir Putin, who has courted Mr. Kim for weapons to fuel his war in Ukraine.”
• “When Mr. Kim and Mr. Putin meet, munitions will be front of mind. American officials allege that North Korea has shipped by sea and by rail around 11,000 containers filled with arms to Russia since September, when Mr. Kim visited Mr. Putin in Vladivostok. The goods include artillery shells—South Korea’s defense minister reckons as many as 5m rounds—as well as Hwasong-11 class ballistic missiles, which have been linked to dozens of deaths across Ukraine.”
• “North Korea’s wish list probably includes nuclear weapons designs, re-entry vehicles for intercontinental ballistic missiles, as well as technology related to satellites, submarines and hypersonic weapons. Russia could also provide less flashy, but still important support for North Korea’s conventional forces, such as spare parts for aircraft or ships and more modern air defenses.”
  • “South Korean officials say that Russia has yet to transfer sensitive military technology related to ballistic missiles or nuclear weapons.”
  • “While Russia may be eager to undermine international sanctions, that does not mean it will rush to help North Korea expand its nuclear arsenal.” 
• “China ... can ... shape how deep Russia and North Korea’s cooperation becomes. “It’s not a bilateral relationship—big brother is always watching from Beijing,” says Fyodor Tertitskiy, also of Kookmin University. China’s feelings appear mixed. Its diplomats did not stop Russia from killing off the UN sanctions panel. But during a recent summit with South Korea and Japan, China endorsed a call for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, drawing a rebuke from Mr. Kim’s regime. China’s primary interests are to maintain North Korea as a stable buffer state between it and American-allied South Korea, as well as to retain influence over Pyongyang; closer military ties between Russia and North Korea could threaten these aims. China also appears keen to avoid the appearance that the three belong to a single bloc.”  

For some of the latest reporting on this subject, see:

• “In Need of Munitions, Putin to Visit North Korea,” Choe Sang-Hun, NYT, 06.17.24.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“G7 Apulia Leaders’ Communiqué,” The White House, 06.14.24.

• “We are: standing in solidarity to support Ukraine’s fight for freedom and its reconstruction for as long as it takes. In the presence of President Zelenskyy, we decided to make available approximately USD 50 billion leveraging the extraordinary revenues of the immobilized Russian sovereign assets, sending an unmistakable signal to President Putin.[2] We are stepping up our collective efforts to disarm and defund Russia’s military industrial complex.”
• “We reaffirm our unwavering support for Ukraine for as long as it takes. Together with international partners, we are determined to continue to provide military, budget, humanitarian, and reconstruction support to Ukraine and its people. We remain strongly committed to helping Ukraine meet its urgent short-term financing needs, as well as supporting its long-term recovery and reconstruction priorities.”
• “Russia must end its illegal war of aggression and pay for the damage it has caused to Ukraine.”
• “We remain determined to dispel any false notion that time is on Russia’s side.”
• “Any use of nuclear weapons by Russia in the context of its war of aggression against Ukraine would be inadmissible. We therefore condemn in the strongest possible terms Russia’s irresponsible and threatening nuclear rhetoric as well as its posture of strategic intimidation, including its announced deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus. We remain committed to holding those responsible accountable for their atrocities against the people of Ukraine, in line with international law. We also condemn the seizures of foreign companies and call on Russia to reverse these measures and seek acceptable solutions with the companies targeted by them.”
• “We support Ukraine’s right of self-defense and reiterate our commitment to Ukraine’s long-term security, including by implementing bilateral security commitments and arrangements based on the Joint Declaration endorsed in Vilnius last July. We are increasing our production and delivery capabilities to assist its self-defense. We also support efforts to assist Ukraine modernizing its armed forces and strengthening its own defense industry. We express our resolve to bolster Ukraine’s air defense capabilities to save lives and protect critical infrastructure.”
• “We are committed to raising the costs of Russia’s war by building on the comprehensive package of sanctions and economic measures already in place.”
• “We will continue taking measures against actors in China and third countries that materially support Russia’s war machine, including financial institutions, consistent with our legal systems, and other entities in China that facilitate Russia’s acquisition of items for its defense industrial base.”
• “We will continue to apply significant pressure on Russian revenues from energy and other commodities.”
• “Ukraine’s reconstruction remains a key priority, including early recovery measures and addressing the current energy emergency caused by Russia’s increased targeting of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.”
• “We highlight the reality of 3.4 million internally displaced Ukrainians and the importance of inclusive recovery and the need to address the needs of women, children and persons with disabilities as well as other population groups who have been disproportionately affected by Russia’s war of aggression.”
• “We reiterate our support for Ukraine’s agriculture sector.”
• “We are also working to involve our private sectors in the sustainable economic recovery of Ukraine.”
• “We welcome the Summit on Peace in Ukraine planned in Switzerland on 15-16 June... Our ultimate goal remains a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in line with international law and the UN Charter and its principles and respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. We will continue to stand by Ukraine for as long as it takes.”

“A New Marshall Plan for Ukraine,” Arthur Herman and Brandt Pasco, NI, 06.16.24.

• “The World Bank Group, the European Commission, and the United Nations have released a new report estimating the cost of rebuilding the shattered country to be $486 billion, compared to $411 billion just a year ago. That includes replacing the estimated 10 percent of Ukrainian housing stock destroyed in the war, as well as repairing the damage to the transportation systems ($73 billion), commerce and industry ($68 billion), agriculture ($58 billion), and the energy sector ($49 billion).”
  • “The amount needed is staggering—and a potential burden for taxpayers everywhere. However, given the right legal framework and the proper infusion of venture capital funding, a free-market-oriented reconstruction policy could pay the way and even provide a return for investors.”
• “In that spirit, we propose a modern version of the Marshall Plan for Ukraine, one that embraces the spirit of the original but rests on free market principles and incentives—ones that can engage today’s private and venture capital sectors as well as governments willing to help a new Ukraine rise from the ruins of the old.”
• “Instead of saddling taxpayers with the bill, a modern ECA [Economic Cooperation Administration] would find its initial seed capital through a consortium of countries contributing to a general fund for the reconstruction of Ukraine.”
• “Although this plan relies on venture capital and the private sector, it will pay strategic and financial dividends. Just as the original Marshall Plan served to halt the spread of Soviet influence over postwar Western Europe, the rapid reconstruction of Ukraine as a vibrant, free market economy will be a bulwark against Russian imperial designs in Eastern Europe. It can also open a new chapter for Europe as a whole and demonstrate how democracy and freedom can be rekindled from the ashes of war.”

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“Transcript: The Futurist Summit: The Age of AI: A New Era of Warfare with Gen. Mark A. Milley (U.S. Army, Ret.),” interviewed by David Ignatius, WP, 06.13.24.

• “You already see that with drone warfare and you see a lot of that in Gaza and you see a lot of that in Ukraine and elsewhere. And those are a form of robots, but what you're going to see over the next, I don't know, 10-15 years, something like that, you're going to see sophisticated militaries, U.S. military, the Russian military, the Chinese military, et cetera, you're going to see large components of those militaries become robotic.”
• “Is it at a stalemate? You know, the Russians have suffered a tremendous amount of casualties. ... I would say probably the Russians don't have the military capability to overrun Ukraine. ... The Ukrainians, on the other hand, they've also suffered tremendously. ... They've economically suffered. ... And the Ukrainian military ... their offensive capability is limited in the sense that it is not likely that the Ukrainian military can militarily eject the 2- or 300,000 Russian troops that are still in Russian-occupied Ukraine. So, by definition, if both of those descriptions are accurate, and I think they most likely are, by definition, then, from a military—purely military standpoint, you're at a military stand—a stalemate.”
• “Now, things can change, and war is all about politics by violent means. Are there going to be negotiations? Yes? No? What will those negotiations be about? I don't know. Will new weapons be introduced? You'll see the ubiquitous nature of drone warfare now has come on very, very strong in Ukraine. Will those have significant battlefield effect or not? There's a wide variety of variables out there that can change those equations. But right now, it's at a more or less military stalemate. You'll see advances, small advances, by either side measured in miles, but you're not going to see--I don't think you'll see something decisive, not in the near term.”
• “When the Nazis invaded Poland, there was the Von Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement to divide Poland between the Soviet Union and the Nazis. So, diplomacy is always ongoing, even in the conduct of war. So, I would suggest that in the conduct of the current war in Ukraine, a very, very important component of that--and you see it, by the way. You see it in the news. You see Secretary of State Blinken out there and others. You see CIA Director Burns constantly going there back-and-forth. So, you'll see negotiation of some kind, some sort of diplomatic efforts are ongoing, even in the conduct of war. And you even see--you know, you see some indications in the media of some sort of level of effort between the Ukrainians and Russians. They've actually had some--at lower levels, they've had people meet, and that was in the media a couple of different times. So, I would say you have to--you have to, in the conduct of war, you have to do both. Obviously, conduct military operations; but also, there always should be some diplomatic effort.”
• “I would not compare the current situation in the ship--Russian ships in Cuba to the Cuban missile crisis. ... It's hard to read Putin's mind, I suppose, but I suspect it has something to do with the United States saying to Ukraine that you can use U.S.-produced weapons to fire into mainland Russia--you know, in the vicinity of Kharkiv and fire into Belgrade and that sort of thing. And I suspect that the Russians come up with some clever plan to say, okay, well, we can do something on your border, as well.”

“How to Build Ukraine’s Military Effectiveness and Avoid a War of Attrition,” Oleksandr V Danylyuk, RUSI, 06.12.24. Clues from Ukrainian Views. 

• “It is obvious that ending the war with Russia requires reaching such a moment when the aggressor has no ability or desire to continue it and is forced to withdraw troops from the territory of Ukraine with or without concluding a new peace agreement (as happened with the US in Vietnam in 1972 , or with the Soviet Union in Central Europe in the early 1990s). Accordingly, bringing Russia to a state of inability/unwillingness to continue the war should be the basis of a grand strategy that encompasses all means available to Ukraine and its partners, including non-military ones. The military strategy, as the most important part of the grand strategy, should in turn be aimed at inflicting unacceptable damage on Russia through the use of the AFU.”
• “The biggest obstacle to improving the effectiveness of the AFU is the lack of a clear and agreed-upon grand strategy for winning the war by Ukraine and its partners, as well as a military strategy, which is an integral component of this. This is due, first of all, to a lack of clear political goals accepted by all of Ukraine's partners, which would ensure not only the liberation of its territory, but also long-term security in Europe. In the absence of such goals, a grand strategy and a general military strategy for victory in this war, the planning of individual operations, the assessment and provision of the needs of the AFU, the development of training programs and preparation, and the introduction of new tactical techniques can at best support Ukraine’s ability to conduct the war, but not to win it. The lack of a strategy for victory will turn this war into a war of attrition for Ukraine, which completely coincides with Russian interests.”

“Ukraine's naval drone success holds a huge lesson for the U.S. Navy,” Max Boot, WP, 06.17.24.

• “It hasn't received the attention it deserves, but Ukraine's unexpected victory in the battle of the Black Sea could be a landmark achievement in the annals of naval warfare. Without a standing navy of its own, Ukraine has disabled at least one-third of Russia's Black Sea Fleet, broken the Russian naval blockade and reopened the Black Sea to its grain exports. Ukraine's export volumes are now approaching prewar levels, providing a huge boon to its wartime economy.”
• “How did Ukraine pull off this improbable feat? Part of the explanation can be found in its use of potent anti-ship cruise missiles, including the domestically produced Neptune, which in 2022 sank the Moskva, the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. But Ukraine has also innovated brilliantly by developing its own unmanned surface vessels, which can hunt Russian warships in wolf packs.”
• “But the U.S. military still hasn't put the necessary resources behind cutting-edge unmanned systems because it remains so firmly wedded to its manned "legacy" platforms.”
• “While there is plenty of blame to go around, the bottom line is that the Navy remains essentially a 20th-century fighting force.”
• “According to T.X. Hammes, a distinguished research fellow at the National Defense University, the rise of unmanned systems is giving an advantage to defense over offense, making it harder for attackers to advance. That's good news from the U.S. perspective, given that America is a status-quo power seeking to stop China from rewriting the map of the western Pacific in its favor. But the United States and its allies aren't taking full advantage of this new technology. "Navies are inherently conservative organizations," Hammes told me, "so I expect change will be fairly slow."
• “The problem is the United States and its allies can't afford to wait: At leader Xi Jinping's direction, China's military is rapidly building up its forces so that it can be ready by 2027 to conquer Taiwan if called upon. There is not a moment to lose in preparing an effective defense, and drones need to be on the front lines.”

Military aid to Ukraine:

“How to Convince Putin He Will Lose. The West Must Show That It Can Outlast Russia in Ukraine,” Dan Altman, FA, 06.12.24. 

“Fact Sheet: U.S.-Ukraine Bilateral Security Agreement,” signed by Presidents Joe Biden and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, The White House, 06.13.24. 

“With the signing of this 10-year agreement, the United States and Ukraine will work together to:”

• “Build and maintain Ukraine’s credible defense and deterrence capability. The agreement lays out a vision for a Ukrainian future force that is strong, sustainable, and resilient. The United States and Ukraine will deepen security and defense cooperation and collaborating closely with Ukraine’s broad network of security partners. We will support the full range of Ukraine’s current defensive needs now and over the long term by helping Ukraine win the war and strengthening its deterrence capabilities against future threats. Together, we will expand intelligence sharing, enhance interoperability between our militaries in line with NATO standards, and work with our allies and partners to position Ukraine as a long-term contributor to European security.”
• “Strengthen Ukraine’s capacity to sustain its fight over the long term, including by building on efforts to bolster in Ukraine’s defense industrial base, and supporting its economic recovery and energy security.”
• “Accelerate Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration, including through Ukraine’s implementation of reforms to its democratic, economic, and security institutions in line with its EU accession goals and NATO’s program of reforms.”
• “Achieve a just peace that respects Ukraine’s rights under international law, is underwritten by broad global support, upholds the key principles of the UN Charter, including sovereignty and territorial integrity, and includes accountability for Russia’s actions.”
• “Consult in the event of a future Russian armed attack against Ukraine at the highest levels to determine appropriate and necessary measures to support Ukraine and impose costs on Russia.”

“Missile transfers to Ukraine and wider NATO targeting dilemmas,” Zuzanna Gwadera and Timothy Wright, IISS, 06.17.24.

• “The delivery of extended-range ATACMS to Ukraine, irrespective of any US restrictions, will bolster its capacity to engage high-value Russian targets at longer range. They will also supplement Kyiv’s air-launched cruise-missile capability, which is constrained by the limited number of Sukhoi Su-24M Fencer D aircraft that have been modified to carry the SCALP EG/Storm Shadow LACM. The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates Ukraine only possesses five such Su-24Ms. The low-level combat radius of the Su-24M and the range of the SCALP EG/Storm Shadow, when combined, however, are more than double that of the longer-range ATACMS.”
• “Ukraine is likely to be reluctant to unnecessarily expose its very limited number of launch platforms to Russian air defenses unless a particular target is considered worth the risk. By comparison, ATACMS SRBMs can be launched either by the M142 HIMARS or the M270 MLRS launchers, of which Ukraine has received roughly 60 in total from various Western backers. The large numbers of available launchers – and their ability to rapidly emplace, fire and relocate – provides Ukraine with another way of striking targets inside Russia’s border area (rather than using air-delivered guided weaponry), although Ukrainian aircraft have more flexible targeting options.”

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• “The Most Courageous Thing That Joe Biden Can Do,” Bret Stephens, NYT, 06.11.24.
• “Germany, Russia and my grandmother,” Martin Sandbu, FT, 06.13.24. 

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

“The West and Putin's Billions,” Editorial Board, WSJ, 06.15.24. 

• “Leaders of the Group of Seven large democracies Thursday agreed to make a loan of about $50 billion to Ukraine, with repayment to be funded from the future capital income on roughly $300 billion in Russian central bank assets currently frozen under sanctions.[3]”
• “Why insist on such a complex method of delivering only a fraction of the money Ukraine would receive if Western governments simply seized Russian state assets and turned them over to the Ukrainians?”
• “The plan is even stranger considering the source of the interest income Western governments would use to repay their loan to Ukraine: themselves. While the precise allocation of Russia's reserves held overseas is unclear, normal practice suggests that large amounts of the foreign-exchange reserves are invested in sovereign bonds of the governments that issue the currencies the Russian central bank sought to hold.”
• “This means the U.S. and European governments will use their interest payments on Russian-owned bonds to repay themselves for a loan they've made to Kyiv. It's an example of how not seizing Russian assets outright creates new and ever more complex financial and fiscal distortions.”
• “Another oddity concerns the Western depository institutions that manage the Russian central bank's overseas portfolio. These institutions aren't allowed to reinvest interest income or maturing principal because of sanctions, so they accumulate nominally Russian-owned cash on their balance sheets. The Russian "deposit" is recorded as a liability, offset by an asset that may affect the institution's regulatory risk and capital positions.”
• “The G-7 plan is an improvement over the status quo, but it also reflects the failure of the G-7 to agree to confiscate all of the Kremlin assets.”
• “The latest G-7 scheme is highlighting, in its complexity, the lengths to which leaders will go to avoid inflicting a decisive financial punishment on Mr. Putin for his war.”

“A New Way to Make Russia’s Assets Pay for Ukraine’s Defense and Rebuilding,” Janet L. Yellen, NYT, 06.13.24. 

• “Since Russian troops first amassed on the Ukrainian border, the United States and our Group of 7 counterparts have leveled sweeping multilateral sanctions to deprive Russia of money and military equipment to fuel its aggression. We have equipped Ukraine with weapons, equipment and financial support. At the start of the war, we also immobilized approximately $280 billion of Russia’s sovereign assets held in our financial institutions so that they cannot be used to fuel Putin’s war of choice.”
• “A majority of these assets now sit at a financial institution in Belgium. They are generating several billion dollars in revenues each year, to which Russia has no legal claim. The European Union has agreed to direct these “windfall” earnings to support Ukraine, and I applaud this plan. But this will not be sufficient to meet Ukraine’s immediate and future needs. So the United States has worked with our allies to build on Europe’s plan and go further. We propose a loan that would get Ukraine a decisive amount of funding. The loan would be paid off by the earnings over time. The funds this loan would provide would equip Ukraine with the resources it needs to defend itself and to rebuild — paid for by the proceeds earned from Mr. Putin’s own assets.”

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• “Cutting through the fog of the Russian assets debate,” Martin Sandbu, FT, 06.13.24.
• “Europe needs strategists, not accountants,” Nigel Gould-Davies, IISS, 06.12.24. 

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

“Joint Communiqué on a Peace Framework adopted at the Summit on Peace in Ukraine,” Council of the European Union, 06.16.24. 

• “The ongoing war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine continues to cause large-scale human suffering and destruction, and to create risks and crises with global repercussions for the world. We gathered in Switzerland on 15-16 June 2024 to enhance a high-level dialogue on pathways towards a comprehensive, just and lasting peace for Ukraine. We reiterated resolutions A/RES/ES-11/1 and A/RES/ES-11/6  adopted at the UN General Assembly and underscored our commitment to upholding International Law including the United Nations Charter.”
• “We had a fruitful, comprehensive and constructive exchange of various views on pathways towards a framework for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace, based on international law, including the United Nations Charter. In particular, we reaffirm our commitment to refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, the principles of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all states, including Ukraine, within their internationally recognized borders, including territorial waters, and the resolution of disputes through peaceful means as principles of international law. We, furthermore, have a common vision on the following crucial aspects:”
  1. “Firstly, any use of nuclear energy and nuclear installations must be safe, secured, safe-guarded and environmentally sound. Ukrainian nuclear power plants and installations, including Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, must operate safely and securely under full sovereign control of Ukraine and in line with IAEA principles and under its supervision. Any threat or use of nuclear weapons in the context of the ongoing war against Ukraine is inadmissible.”
  2. “Secondly, global food security depends on uninterrupted manufacturing and supply of food products. In this regard, free, full and safe commercial navigation, as well as access to sea ports in the Black and Azov Seas, are critical. Attacks on merchant ships in ports and along the entire route, as well as against civilian ports and civilian port infrastructure, are unacceptable.  Food security must not be weaponized in any way. Ukrainian agricultural products should be securely and freely provided to interested third countries.”
  3. “Thirdly, all prisoners of war must be released by complete exchange. All deported and unlawfully displaced Ukrainian children, and all other Ukrainian civilians who were unlawfully detained, must be returned to Ukraine.”
• “We believe that reaching peace requires the involvement of and dialogue between all parties. We, therefore, decided to undertake concrete steps in the future in the above-mentioned areas with further engagement of the representatives of all parties. The United Nations Charter, including the principles of respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states, can and will serve as a basis in achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine.”

“Ukraine’s Global Outreach Hits Wall as Summit Goals Fall Short,” Andrea Palasciano and Bastian Benrath, Bloomberg, 06.17.24. 

• “The Ukrainian president’s foray to a Swiss mountaintop, where he gathered more than 100 countries and organizations, fell short in his bid to broaden international support. India, Brazil and South Africa, which sent delegates, opted out of signing the summit document. China had made clear it would have no part in it.”
• “The failure to win over nations from the Global South shows that Russia remains far from isolated and that Ukraine’s best hopes of fending off the Kremlin’s assault is with Western assistance. Securing their backing — essential to ambitions for a broad global alliance and the main thrust of Kyiv’s diplomatic agenda for almost two years — may be moving beyond reach.”
  • “On Sunday, no Saudi signature came. ... India’s delegate, Pavan Kapoor, a state secretary in the foreign ministry and former ambassador to Russia, said only options that are “acceptable to both parties” can lead to peace. ... The soft support could add pressure on Zelenskyy to make concessions. Countries outside the West have made clear that no forum designed to create conditions for peace is workable without the participation of Russia. China and Brazil have put forward a plan for peace that involves the participation of both war parties.”
  • “Biden skipped the Lucerne meeting, opting for a campaign fundraiser with Hollywood elite in Los Angeles.”
  • “Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni was absent for the first plenary session, only arriving early Sunday.”

“A peace conference over Ukraine is unlikely to silence the guns,” The Economist, 06.13.24. 

• “Officially, America says it is up to Ukraine to determine what it wants. In reality, patience is waning, and a conversation is already happening about what America believes might be an acceptable end to the war.”
• “One Western diplomat says that several factors are at play that would determine the timing and conditions of any ceasefire. It would for a start depend on the battlefield: if Ukraine is able to hold its lines past Russia’s current summer offensive, it will find itself in a stronger negotiating position. It depends on Mr. Putin’s health. And it also depends on the American elections in November. The end of this year is thus the earliest foreseeable date for talks to begin, and possibly much later.”

“Meeting with Foreign Ministry senior officials,” Kremlin.ru, 06.14.24. Clues from Russian Views.

• “Today, we are presenting another concrete and genuine peace proposal. If Kyiv and Western capitals reject it again, as they have done before, then ultimately, it becomes their responsibility, both political and moral, for the ongoing bloodshed. Clearly, the situation on the front lines will continue to evolve unfavorably for the Kyiv regime, altering the conditions necessary for initiating negotiations.”
• “Let me underscore the key point: the essence of our proposal is not a temporary truce or ceasefire, as the West might prefer, to allow the Kyiv regime to recover, rearm, and prepare for a new offensive. I repeat: we are not discussing freezing the conflict, but its definitive resolution.”
• “And I will reiterate: once Kyiv agrees to the course of action proposed today, including the full withdrawal of its troops from the DPR, LPR, the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, and begins this process earnestly, we are prepared to commence negotiations promptly without delay.”
• “I repeat our firm stance: Ukraine should adopt a neutral, non-aligned status, be nuclear-free, and undergo demilitarization and denazification. These parameters were broadly agreed upon during the Istanbul negotiations in 2022, including specific details on demilitarization such as the agreed numbers of tanks and other military equipment. We reached consensus on all points.”
• “Certainly, the rights, freedoms, and interests of Russian-speaking citizens in Ukraine must be fully protected. The new territorial realities, including the status of Crimea, Sevastopol, Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions as parts of the Russian Federation, should be acknowledged. These foundational principles need to be formalized through fundamental international agreements in the future. Naturally, this entails the removal of all Western sanctions against Russia as well.”
• “I believe that Russia is proposing an option that will make it possible to bring the war in Ukraine to a real end, that is, we call for turning the tragic page of history and, although with difficulty, gradually, step by step, restoring relations of trust and neighborliness between Russia and Ukraine and in Europe as a whole.”
• “Calls to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia, which has the largest arsenals of nuclear weapons, demonstrate the extreme adventurism of Western politicians. They either do not understand the scale of the threat that they themselves create or are simply obsessed with the belief in their own impunity and in their own exclusivity. Both of these can result in tragedy.”

“Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to media questions following President Vladimir Putin’s meeting with senior Foreign Ministry officials,” Russian Foreign Ministry, 06.14.24. Clues from Russian Views.

• “Once again, President Vladimir Putin offered a detailed account demonstrating consistency in our Ukraine policy. So far, the West has not been receptive to this policy, not even once. Instead, it decided to use Ukraine as a tool for suppressing the Russian Federation, including by relying on military, economic and other methods.”
• “Today, we reached a point when President of Russia Vladimir Putin once again asks others to heed our message. After all, over the past ten years, whenever the West turned down our proposals, nothing good came from this.”
• “As for the Foreign Ministry’s role, we have no plans to run after anyone begging for something. Our ambassadors to the corresponding capitals will share President of Russia Vladimir Putin’s remarks and will offer additional explanations on their substance, including how it all got to this point. We will wait for a response. I have no doubt that the countries of the Global Majority understand all this. We have discussed the Ukraine topic with many of their representatives.”
• “[When asked: shouldn’t it be Russia that makes the first move here and pulls back its troops?] Have you listened to the President? Twice, in the middle of his speech and in the end, he said: I want to repeat the sequence. The speech is going to be circulated, and the sequence is there. If you read it for the third time, you would understand that Russia has been doing everything possible on the basis of deals reached and then broken by Boris Johnson and a number of other politicians.”
• “[When asked: If, say, Ukraine does meet these conditions, what’s to say Russia stops there? Why should the West trust you?] Frankly, I do not care whether the West trusts us or not. The West must understand the real situation. They do not understand anything, except realpolitik. Let them go to the people. You are democracies, right? Ask the people what the West should do in response to Putin’s proposals.”

“Putin’s ‘Peace Plan,’” Tatiana Stanovaya, R.Politik Weekly Digest No. 23, 06.17.24. Clues from Russian Views.

• “On 14 June, Russian President Vladimir Putin ... explicitly acknowledged that Russia's starting position in any negotiations will require Ukraine to recognize the four regions annexed in 2022, within their administrative borders, as Russian territory.”
  • “Putin's statement hardens Moscow's position.... he is demanding serious concessions from Ukraine in exchange for even a ceasefire (which is far from a peace arrangement). He is insisting that Kyiv withdraw Ukrainian soldiers from territories that are not currently and have never been controlled by Russia. As such, the proposed ceasefire should be seen as a strict prerequisite to a set of further Russian long-term strategic conditions, essentially amounting to Kyiv's capitulation. In other words, Putin is saying that he will not accept an unconditional ceasefire, but could agree to one if it is a facilitating step towards full capitulation and one part of a wider arrangement. This is a critically important caveat to the idea that Putin's proposal reflects his desire to pause the war before initiating more substantive talks. In essence, he is signaling that because a ceasefire seems unattainable under current political conditions in Ukraine, the conditions themselves must change from within—which implies removing Zelenskyy.”
• “Regarding NATO, Putin set forth two demands.”
  • “Firstly, Ukraine must declare its refusal to join NATO at the same time as it begins withdrawing its forces from the aforementioned territories. In Putin’s view, this likely ensures that Kyiv's current leadership will not be representing Ukraine in talks with Russia because NATO membership and involvement in the conflict have become non-negotiable points fort hem. As such, Putin is appealing to alternative political forces within Ukraine, inviting them to cease their reliance on the West and proposing that they act independently ... Putin clearly stated that if Ukraine and the West do not accept his “proposal,” Russia will continue the war and further such “proposals” will be even harsher.”
• “Finally, Putin says that any agreement, which will be based on the provisions of the Istanbul talks (neutrality, denazification, demilitarization and the acceptance of the "new status" of the five Ukrainian regions that Russia has annexed), must be secured by international binding treaties that will include provisions lifting Western sanctions.”
• “Putin’s plan is deliberately premature and is not intended to be immediately taken up. .... Putin needs to accelerate anti-Zelenskyy trends both internationally and domestically in Ukraine, against the backdrop of the failing peace summit. According to the Kremlin’s logic, Zelenskyy’s removal could significantly affect the West's approach to Ukraine and create conditions by which Kyiv will cease resistance. As such, Moscow believes it would be a major development that could lead to a Russian victory.”

“Everyone has held their own,” ^[4] Fyodor Lukyanov, Russia in Global Affairs/Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 06.17.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. (These organizations are affiliated with the Russian authorities.) 

• “A whole series of major political events centered on the Ukrainian crisis has ended. Following the conference on assistance to Ukraine in Germany and the summit meeting of the Group of Seven in Italy, the so-called “peace summit” was held—a large gathering in Switzerland. ... Intrigue was added by a lengthy speech at the Foreign Ministry by the Russian President.”
• “The conference in Switzerland confirmed the state of affairs that has existed for quite some time and left everyone at the status quo. No one is ready to talk about negotiations that would include any concessions.”
• “The United States, it seems, quite consciously, gives Europe the opportunity to speak in the forefront, remaining slightly in the shadows.”
• “The non-Western community, represented primarily by the BRICS countries, as before, is not going to follow the Western channel, maintains a detached position, but also does not want to quarrel with anyone.”
• “China, which decided not to attend at all, stands apart ... mainly, because it assesses its weight and influence as already sufficient to not participate in other people's events on key issues, but rather to organize its own.”
• “If we summarize recent events, the exchange of various “peace formulas” at this stage has nothing to do with peace.”

“From Stalemate to Settlement,” Kate Davidson, Raphael Piliero, Peter Gaber and Joshua Henderson, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 06.12.24. 

• “The paper surveys the history of war termination beginning with World War II, selecting eight cases that exemplify one or more of the following: a meaningful territorial stalemate, an eventual negotiated settlement, and involvement by great-power patrons in an otherwise regional war.”
• “Our eight case studies ... offer six major takeaways for American policymakers and their Ukrainian partners on how to negotiate peace—and how to keep it.”

1. “Be wary of unanticipated peace spoilers: Remember any deal will be shaped by external factors outside the control of any actor. Negotiations are unlikely to start until after the 2024 US election.”
2. “In a proxy conflict, resolve beats resources: Western aid should aim to position Ukraine for negotiations, not out-last Russia or force Russian capitulation. Don’t bank on Russian battlefield collapse or regime change.”
3. “Complete territorial integrity is not a precondition for prosperity: Ukraine should shift from offensives to defending the territory it currently holds, especially its access to the Black Sea. Ukraine should begin rebuilding major economic centers. Ukraine should not make reclaiming currently occupied territory a precondition in negotiations.”
4. “Carpe diem: Seize the first opening for peace that secures vital interests: Ukraine should accept a peace offer if it gives Ukraine the chance of being sovereign, free, and able to prosper. Ukraine should capitalize on major battlefield changes to negotiate, not continually hold out for a better position.”
5. “Patrons should not only empower belligerents to wage war, but to pursue peace: Both the US and China should privately condition future support on participation in negotiations and decline to support major new offensives. The US should not support escalatory measures by Ukraine, such as strikes inside Russia, or a major assault on Crimea.”
6. “Agreements must lock in the post-war status quo, making future aggression unacceptably costly: Western states should provide Ukraine long-term military aid, at a lower “peacetime” level, with security guarantees for continued aid and automatic stabilizers if attacked. Ukraine should receive reconstruction assistance, as well as eventual EU accession. Russian sanctions on finance and technology should be reduced but with a snapback mechanism. Ukraine should be recognized as a militarily neutral state, with NATO membership deferred.” 

“War and Peace: Ukraine’s Impossible Choices,” Nicole Gonik and Eric Ciaramella, CEIP, 06.11.24.

• “In recent months, Ukraine’s battlefield prospects have seemed some of the bleakest since the early days of the invasion, despite the long-awaited approval of the U.S. aid package. One would expect that Ukrainian society would have pessimistic assessments of the war’s trajectory. But a Carnegie-sponsored opinion poll conducted in mid-March 2024—just weeks after Ukrainian troops were forced to retreat from Avdiivka.[5]”
• “Ukrainians overwhelmingly rejected the notion that Russia is winning the war (only 5 percent believe it is); the remaining majority was split almost evenly between those who thought Ukraine is winning and those who thought neither side is winning. When it comes to war outcomes, 73 percent of Ukrainians believed that Ukraine will eventually liberate all of its territories. A sizeable percentage also believed that Ukraine will regain some or all of its territories within the next year (56 percent) and that the war will end within two years (59 percent). While other polls have found less optimism about the current situation, the general belief in eventual victory is consistent across recent polls.”
• “On the surface, it may seem that a large share of Ukrainians are willing to negotiate with Russia; the Carnegie-sponsored poll found that 43 percent of respondents were in favor when asked a simple yes or no question. Other polls appear to show that Ukrainians have warmed to the idea of negotiations in the past year. But further analysis and more targeted questioning shows that support for negotiations is largely theoretical. The share of Ukrainians who preferred seeking a compromise to end the war through negotiations fell from 43 percent in the yes or no question to 26 percent when respondents were asked to choose between negotiating with Russia and continuing to fight.”
• “Zelenskyy’s official presidential term expired in late May, but elections are indefinitely on hold while martial law remains in force. While most Ukrainians (63 percent) were at least somewhat satisfied with his performance as president, support for him is unquestionably lower than it was in the initial stages of the war.... Far worse are assessments of the Verkhovna Rada: only 13 percent of Ukrainians are even somewhat satisfied with the legislative body.”
• “Further mobilization is often portrayed as a highly unpopular and politically risky decision, but that impression may be exaggerated: 58 percent of respondents supported further mobilization.”
• “Ukrainians remain committed to the war effort, are opposed to capitulating to Russian demands, and are far from clamoring for a change in leadership. They also understand the importance of self-reliance in Ukraine’s long-term defense strategy. Still, their expectations for victory remain high. Ukrainian and Western leaders would be wise to communicate clearly about what is achievable on the battlefield and under what circumstances a more intensified diplomatic process could meaningfully pave the way for a just and lasting peace.”

“Ukraine-Russia Peace Is as Elusive as Ever. But in 2022 They Were Talking,” Anton Troianovski, Adam Entous and Michael Schwirtz, NYT, 06.15.24. 

• “With Russia and Ukraine locked in their third year of all-out war, there is no clear path to military victory for either side. Nor are there immediate prospects for a ceasefire and an eventual peace plan, with both sides sticking to irreconcilable positions. Yet the issues that would need to be tackled in any future peace settlement are evident, and in fact were at the center of negotiations two years ago that explored peace terms in remarkable detail. Documents reviewed by The New York Times shed light on the points of disagreement that would have to be overcome.”
• “The documents[6] emerged from negotiating sessions that took place in the weeks after the start of the war, from February to April of 2022. It was the only time that Ukrainian and Russian officials are known to have engaged in direct peace talks. The talks failed as both sides dug in on the battlefield, but not before negotiators produced multiple drafts of a treaty that was supposed to guarantee Ukraine’s future security while fulfilling some of President Vladimir V. Putin’s demands.”
• “Today, even with hundreds of thousands dead and wounded, Moscow and Kyiv appear further from peace than at any other time since the full-scale invasion.”
  • “On Friday, Mr. Putin said Russia would agree to a ceasefire only if Ukraine handed over four regions the Kremlin has declared part of Russia and dropped its NATO aspirations. It was essentially a demand for capitulation, which the Ukrainian government immediately denounced.”
  • “Ukraine’s current demands — a withdrawal of all Russian forces from Ukrainian territory — also appear unrealistic given Mr. Putin’s apparent resolve and his army’s current advantages. This includes the Crimean Peninsula, which Mr. Putin annexed in 2014 in a swift operation that he considers central to his legacy.”
• “But at some point, both sides could return to the negotiating table again — a scenario that is expected to be discussed as Ukraine gathers scores of countries, though not Russia, for a peace conference in Switzerland this weekend. If and when Ukraine and Russia resume direct negotiations, the issues raised in the documents produced at the start of the war, including the status of occupied Ukrainian territories and Ukraine’s future security guarantees, would remain relevant.”

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• “Here's Why Ukraine Should Seek Peace,” A. Walter Dorn, NYT, 06.14.24. 

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“America Isn't Leading the World,” Stephen Wertheim, NYT, 06.11.24.

• “To reclaim global leadership, the United States should show a suspicious world that it wants to make peace and build resilience, not merely bleed an enemy or back up an ally. That would mean supporting Ukraine but working just as hard to end the war at the negotiating table -- along with gradually shifting to a smaller role in NATO and insisting that Europe lead its own defense. Mr. Biden's recent proposal for a cease-fire in Gaza was laudable, except that it lacked a threat to stop sending arms to Israel if Israel refused.”
• “Pulling back from Europe and the Middle East would improve American engagement where it matters most -- in Asia. It would clarify that America's purpose is not to pursue hegemony, as Beijing's propaganda alleges, but rather to keep China from establishing an Asian hegemony of its own. From this standpoint, the United States could be a confident leader in the Indo-Pacific even if China continues to rise. China is today far from capable of imposing its will throughout the region, nor would seizing Taiwan, risky in the extreme, enable it to do so.”
• “None of this would be easy, of course. But compare it with the alternative. Leading only a faction of the world turns the United States into a fretful follower. It puts Americans perpetually on the cusp of war in the Middle East, Europe and Asia alike, afraid that losing ground anywhere will set off catastrophe everywhere. The real danger, though, is to stake so much of global security on one country's willingness to overcommit itself. True leaders know when to make room for others.”

“Recommendations for a New Containment: How to Deny and Deter the Kremlin” in “Reverberations From Ukraine: The Rising Risk of Conflict in Europe and Eurasia,” Andrea Kendall-Taylor, CFR, 06.12.24. 

• “The United States and its European allies should ensure Ukraine’s victory.”
• “The United States and its European allies should undermine Russia’s capacity for aggression beyond its borders.”
• “The United States and NATO should strengthen their deterrence of Russian conventional threats.”
• “NATO should increase deterrence and resilience against Russia’s use of hybrid tactics.”
• “NATO should bolster its most vulnerable partners.”
• “The United States and NATO should consider measures to minimize the threat of accidental or unintended conflict and shape the environment for an eventual return to arms control.”
• “The United States should work to grow the coalition of countries aligned with Washington.”
  • “U.S. and European policymakers have repeatedly stated that Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has been a strategic failure. As CIA Director Bill Burns articulated, “Putin’s war has already been a strategic failure for Russia—its military weaknesses laid bare; its economy badly damaged for years to come; its future as a junior partner and economic colony of China being shaped by Putin’s mistakes; its revanchist ambitions blunted by a NATO which has only grown bigger and stronger.” That could very well end up the case, and making this war a strategic failure for Russia is a vital policy objective. But that mission is not yet accomplished. Russia is in many ways adapting and, even if weakened, retains significant capacity for destruction. The United States and its allies should prepare for a long-term confrontation with Russia and prevent Moscow from producing the turmoil it seeks to create.”

“Why Europe’s new political turmoil will delight Putin?”, Lee Hockstader, WP, 06.12.24. 

• “Take a moment to look at Europe's burgeoning turmoil through Vladimir Putin's gimlet eyes. You don't need to imagine the wolfish smirk creasing his face to know that Russia's tyrant is enjoying a spectacularly good spring. The two countries at the fulcrum of European power, France and Germany, are in late-stage political meltdowns - compounded in the latter's case by deepening economic rot.”
  • “In France, the Russophile extreme right has just scored a concussive victory in elections for the European Parliament.”
  • “In Germany, an even more Russophile extreme right got more votes than Chancellor Olaf Scholz's own party.”
• “European elections are mainly referendums on each country's governments. Seen that way, Scholz and French President Emmanuel Macron are political roadkill.”
• “Putin, determined above all to be a protagonist on the world stage, is not standing idly by. His divisions of cyber-trolls are carpet-bombing Europeans with disinformation, deepfakes and deceptions. But Moscow's attacks now go beyond that: Its assaults on Washington's European allies are increasingly kinetic, in Pentagon parlance. That means bombings and sabotage planned by Russian military intelligence, known as the GRU, according to Western officials.”
• “About one-third of the of the countries in the 27-member European Union are now led by governments controlled or shared by extreme-right parties. Not all are friendly to the Kremlin, but some are. Not all would be content to see Ukraine abandoned by the West and parceled out in pieces to Russia, but some would be.”
• “What he [Putin] cares about is sustaining the violence, turbocharging Russia's overheating economy increasingly dependent on military spending and biding his time until a second Trump presidency. ”

“Rewind and reconnoiter: a case for French leadership on Ukraine,” Gesine Weber, War on the Rocks, 06.13.24.

• “Particularly since summer 2023, this dynamic has significantly changed: France’s statements on Russia are now unambiguous and its military support for Ukraine much more resolute, and French President Emmanuel Macron pushes the red lines of Europeans, most recently with the announcement to create a coalition training Ukrainian forces in Ukraine.”
• “Macron has announced that France will bring together a coalition of European states willing to deploy soldiers to train Ukrainian soldiers on the ground in Ukraine. In general, creating 'coalitions of the willing' is relatively easy to implement for France thanks to the central decision-making power of the president.”
• “It is difficult to say how Russia would react to the deployment of European advisors or soldiers for training purposes to Ukraine. In the past, the red lines announced by Putin — think of the supply of heavy battle tanks or long-range cruise missiles to Ukraine — have been crossed by Western allies, and it has never led to escalation. However, Europeans would of course be operating at a certain level of risk.”
• “From a strategic perspective, the much more important moment for Ukraine’s future, and the future of the European security order, is the NATO summit in Washington, DC, in July. The decision on NATO membership for Ukraine, or its status in the trans-Atlantic security order, will most likely determine the nature and scope of Western support to Ukraine and the future of the European security order.”
• “I think that France has proven that its aspiration for leadership in European security is more than just lip service: The recent announcements from Macron, namely the delivery of Mirage warplanes to Ukraine and the willingness to train soldiers in Ukraine, underline this change. France is well positioned to take the lead on other critical aspects of European security, such as the European contribution to nuclear defense or defense industrial questions — but this also requires building broader coalitions and not just French solo-riding.”
• “It is impossible to say how the war in Ukraine will end, but it is clear that Europeans could have ended this war earlier by not providing the weapons to Ukraine to resist the Russian attack. The political priority for Europeans is continuing this support to allow Ukraine to prevail, and to be in a position where it has ownership in a future peace process.”

“Mare Nostrum Revisited: Maritime Competition in The Mediterranean,” Jeremy Stöhs and Sebastian Bruns, WoTR, 06.13.24.

• “With the re-emergence of great-power competition and a multipolar world order, maritime aspects of international security have re-entered the strategic discussion. From punitive strikes courtesy of American aircraft carriers to humanitarian assistance support activities in Gaza, from drones sinking Russian warships in Black Sea to drones sinking merchant vessels off the coast of Yemen, the wider Mediterranean again has become an area of regional and international competition. Perhaps more importantly, the region is shaping up to be a petri dish for the challenges and opportunities of naval power in our time.”
• “In most parts of the Mediterranean, Western sea control is not challenged to the same degree as in others areas of the world. Still, the dramatic decline in Western naval power relative to rising Asian powers coupled with a focus on lower-end operations have left NATO and partner navies unprepared and stretched thin. Meanwhile regional actors and middle powers, including several states across North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, have gained greater maritime agency with militaries and navies that show significant sign of improvement.”
• “On an operational and tactical level, it appears that land-sea interdiction is much easier now, including for countries or actors like Ukraine and the Houthi rebels that do not maintain a navy. The proliferation of cutting-edge defense technology in the region, particularly drones and advanced missiles, pose an increasing threat to warships and naval platforms. Indeed, war at sea is back.”
• “The question now is how should Western and particularly European governments react to this increasingly competitive and complex environment? To successfully navigate the Middle Sea’s future, Western states should follow an additional set of Rs.”
  • “The first R is “revisiting.” This involves revisiting regional dynamics to gain a better appreciation of them. Both America’s and Europe’s inconsistent responses to the war in Ukraine, the conflict in Gaza, and the corresponding escalation off the Horn of Africa show that many Western policymakers and military leaders remain ill-prepared for the competitive era we have entered.”
  • “The second R is for “refocusing.” … With the exception of Ukraine, which is in a fight for its national survival, none of the regional actors has sought naval strategies and doctrines that deviate significantly from the past. In other words, none are pursuing a Jeune École-like approach to their force structure and doctrine, and too few are introducing a vast numbers of uncrewed systems or offensive and defensive fires.”
  • “The final R stands for a long-term “regeneration” of naval capabilities and corresponding posture in the region.”

“A Brief Naval Overview of the Baltic Sea Region,” Scott Savitz and Isabelle Winston, RAND, 06.13.24. 

• “Russia’s geography obviously puts it at a severe disadvantage if it were to attempt to achieve control of the Baltic Sea. Having lost its former possessions and satellite states, it retains only the narrowest of outlets to a sea whose entrances and remaining shores are controlled by NATO powers.”
• “In the event of war, Russian surface warships or commercial ships attempting to use the Baltic Sea would be highly vulnerable to multiple NATO capabilities: naval mines, submarine-launched torpedoes and missiles, land-based missiles, and aircraft attack.”
• “Recognition of Russia’s inherent disadvantages in the Baltic Sea and NATO’s expansion across it have led some to refer to that sea as “Lake NATO.”... However, in the event of conflict, Russia can achieve some degree of sea denial by hindering the ability of NATO nations to use the Baltic Sea and its environs. Russia can use a diverse array of capabilities to target ships and coastal locations in the Baltic Sea: These capabilities include submarines, mines, missiles, surface vessels, aircraft, electromagnetic warfare, cyberattacks, special forces, and marines.”
• “The most important conclusion is that NATO expansion in the Baltic region and Russia’s struggles in Ukraine should not lead to complacency by NATO nations regarding maritime security in the Baltic Sea and its environs. Despite Russia’s inability to achieve command of the sea, it retains the capability to exert some degree of sea denial via various mechanisms. Although NATO nations control almost all of the Baltic Sea’s shores, the sea is not Lake NATO, and its security requires continual focus and investments.”

“The Baltic (R)evolution in Military Affairs,” Justina Budginaite-Froehly, FPRI, 06.11.24. 

• “Despite their limited resources and unfavorable starting positions, the Baltic states achieved considerable progress in developing their defense policies, armed forces, and military capabilities during the past 20 years of their NATO membership. External shocks such as Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine were the most important triggers leading to unprecedented regional dynamics in the areas of security and defense. Strengthening practical links with NATO allies, intensifying regional cooperation, and ambitious national measures of the past several years not only contribute to security in the Baltic states themselves, but also have a positive impact on Europe’s strategic posture. Steadily growing defense spending, support for the development of national defense industries, and the launch of the Rotational Air Defense Model can be considered a part of the Baltic role model for other NATO countries and regions to follow while adjusting to new security realities in Europe.”

“The metropolises’ time has passed,” Dmitri Medvedev, Rg.ru, 06.14.24. Clues from Russian Views. (RG.ru is a Russian-government-owned media outlet.)

• “More and more countries on the planet are expressing their desire to live in a global community free from the legacy of the colonial system and based on the principles of inclusive multilateralism, sovereign equality, peaceful coexistence, and mutual respect between countries with different political and social systems.”
• “Brazen interference in the affairs of independent states has occurred and, unfortunately, continues in various forms. No matter how strong humanity's intentions to eradicate neo-colonialism, the Western world will desperately resist this.”
  • “They intend to control not only wallets and health but also the mindset of the rest of the world’s inhabitants.”
• “To maintain its geopolitical presence in various regions of the world, the West actively uses mechanisms of 'debt neo-colonialism.' One of the theorists of Pan-Africanism, a prominent statesman of Burkina Faso, Thomas Sankara, warned of this danger back in 1987: 'Debt is neo-colonialism, in which the colonizers have transformed into ‘technical assistants.’”
• “Neo-metropolises should be hit where it hurts most - their wallets, which are significantly filled through the exploitation of the rest of the world. We believe that compensation to the victims of neo-colonial practices should be based on clear, legally verified, and substantiated evidence.”
• “Significant forces were deployed to pull the South Caucasus Republic (Armenia) into the Euro-Atlantic camp. It is no coincidence that one of the largest American embassies in the world is located in its capital. We observe how emissaries from the USA, the EU, and NATO are increasingly frequent guests in Armenia, handing out generous promises left and right.”
• “Today, it is clear that the future belongs to strong, proven, viable, ideologically coherent, conflict-free regional structures. Within these frameworks, mutual understanding and trust among participants are much higher than between great powers on a global scale. These organizations and unions will become the engines of growth, independent centers of global development with their own global agenda.”

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• “NATO Gets Serious in the Face of Russia's Threats,” Daniel Silverberg and Elena McGovern, WSJ, 06.13.24.
• “6 Swing States Will Decide the Future of Geopolitics,” Cliff Kupchan, FP, 06.06.23.
• “How the shift of the pole of power to the East affects the development of the Ukrainian crisis,” Andrey Sushentsov, Valdai Club, 06.13.24. In Russian. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“Chinese Assessments of the War in Ukraine, 2 Years on,” Evan Medeiros, Brian Hart, Elizabeth Wishnick and Joseph Webster, CSIS, 06.11.24.

“What insights are scholars in China drawing from the war in Ukraine, over two years on from Russia’s invasion in February 2022? Here, leading experts leverage recently translated scholarship to explore how Chinese analysts weigh the key dynamics, likely trajectory, and broader geopolitical implications of the war.” [7]

• “Evan Medeiros [on the essays reviewed in this collection]:”
  • “First, none of the essays criticize or call into question China’s support for Russia or its nominal claims of neutrality. These are treated as accepted facts.”
  • “Second, to the extent that there is space to debate China’s policy, it is over Russia’s approach toward Ukraine and the various mistakes Moscow has made in prosecuting the conflict, especially in the first year. Criticizing Russia seems to be a viable approach in the current Chinese political context. It is possible these arguments are Chinese experts’ musings about the problems Beijing should seek to avoid in a military campaign against Taiwan.”
  • “Third, the essays suggest an incipient confidence on the part of Beijing that the straddle policy is working. Support for this policy is provided in all the articles, validating not only the assumptions driving it but also its key tenets.”   
  • “Fourth, the articles discuss how the war in Ukraine—and, implicitly, China’s backing of Russia—has actually created opportunities for Beijing to advance its geopolitical interests.”
• “Brian Hart [on the essays reviewed in this collection]:”
  • “In looking to the future of this intense confrontation between Russia and the West, the translated texts draw out numerous important observations. Two of these are worth mentioning in detail.”
    • “First, domestic politics will determine the willingness of key powers to engage in the conflict. Because the U.S. has so greatly affected the course of the war—and because support for Ukraine has become so politicized in Washington—the November 2024 U.S. elections will have a major impact on how Ukraine will fare in the coming year, as Feng Yujun of Peking University argues.”
    • “Second, given the worsening international environment, Chinese researchers believe Beijing needs to play a greater role in shaping global developments. Experts from the Chongyong Institute for Financial Studies call for pursuing greater multilateralism, with a focus on engaging the Global South through efforts and mechanisms such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Group of Twenty (G20), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and BRICS. Engaging BRICS is particularly important for Beijing, as China has been investing in the organization and its expansion to serve as a greater counterweight against U.S.-dominated institutions such as the Group of Seven (G7), which Washington has leveraged to confront Russia.”
• “Elizabeth Wishnick [on the essays reviewed in this collection]:”
  • “Feng Yujun, now a professor at Peking University and the former director of Fudan University’s Center for Russian and Central Asian Studies—one of the more critical voices on Russia’s war in Ukraine—argues that it has a negative impact on Russia’s domestic political and economic situation. The only one of this group of experts to refer consistently to a “war,” rather than a “conflict” or a “special military operation” (the term favored in Russia), he also emphasizes that Russian actions in Ukraine have led to a sharp deterioration in its international environment.”
  • “Ding Xiaoxing, director of the Institute of Eurasian Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), under the Ministry of State Security, takes a more forgiving tone on Russia’s difficulties in achieving its aims in Ukraine, referring to “an error of judgment” in assuming that a “blitzkrieg approach” would succeed without much resistance from Ukraine. While making the U.S. the scapegoat for the ongoing war (he refers to it as both a “conflict” and a “war”), Ding also notes that the 2023 Russian foreign policy concept encourages global confrontation by bifurcating the world into Russia-friendly and unfriendly countries. He points out that without addressing the underlying problems of European security, it will be difficult to resolve the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.”
  • “Scholars from the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University focus on the lessons China should learn from the conflict. The scholars urge China to play a greater role in formulating the rules of the evolving global economic order, buffeted by the growing military role of U.S. private-sector technology companies and the increasing vulnerability of supply chains, especially in the (likely) scenario of a protracted war.”
• “Joseph Webster [on the essays reviewed in this collection]:”
  • “Some scholars see the China-Russia axis as increasingly resolute. Both sides undeniably share deep suspicions of the Washington- and Brussels-led alliance. Still, future terms of bilateral economic interactions are uncertain, as Beijing’s military-tech espionage against Russia may strain ties and Vladimir Putin’s long-term hold on power is unsure. Beijing’s limited—but growing—anxiety about future relations with Moscow is reflected in its new framing of ties since the failed Prigozhin mutiny in June 2023. Aiming to institutionalize relations for whenever the 71-year-old Putin leaves office, Beijing now says bilateral relations benefit the “fundamental interests of their respective countries and peoples.” 

“Why China Is Sabotaging Ukraine. Beijing Has No Interest in a Peace Agreement It Can’t Help Broker,” Alexander Gabuev, FA, 06.14.24.

“Sergei Witte and Russia's first turn to the East,” Andrei Kortunov, RIAC, 06.17.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• “Sergei Witte was the Minister of Finance of the Russian Empire for eleven years (1892–1903) … His name is associated with many significant changes in the life of the country - tax reforms and the introduction of the gold standard… Probably, among these historical achievements, the beginning of Russia's turn to the East was neither the most important nor the second most important… And yet, it was through the efforts of Sergei Witte that Russia’s turn to the East was first formalized in the form of a comprehensive long-term political, trade, investment, transport and logistics national strategy… Witte's Eastern Strategy, although not fully implemented for reasons beyond his control, nevertheless forever changed the country's position in the Asia-Pacific region and laid the foundation for all subsequent attempts to turn Russia into a full-fledged Eurasian power.”
• “Witte had his own… concept for the development of the Russian Far East… Witte invariably placed industrial development at the forefront, which, according to his ideas, should have been export-oriented.”
• “Strategic partnership with China would, in any case, have remained the main priority of Witte's Eastern policy. It can be assumed that he would have done everything possible to prevent or at least delay the fall of the Qing Empire.”
• “Witte tried to improve relations with the United States, understanding the growing economic, financial and military power of the American state, including in the Asia-Pacific region.”

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• “Will America and China Heed the Warnings of Twentieth-Century Catastrophe?” Odd Arne Westad, FA, July/August 2024.
• “Biden Must Rally a Reluctant G-7 Against the Russia-China Axis,” Andreas Kluth, Bloomberg, 06.13.24.
• “China and Russia Are Beating the US in Africa,” James Stavridis, Bloomberg, 06.13.24.

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

“Why the West should take Russia’s nuclear threats more seriously,” Giles David Arceneaux, BAS, 06.12.24.

• “Russian nuclear threats have returned to the forefront of the war in Ukraine, but this time with a new feature: exercises involving tactical nuclear weapons. These exercises come in response to Western powers signaling broader support for Ukraine.”
• “In response, Russia characterized these statements as a “completely new round of escalation of tension” and announced on May 6 that it would conduct drills simulating the use of tactical nuclear weapons, or—as Russia describes them—“non-strategic” nuclear weapons. Although these drills constitute a new kind of nuclear threat, they have been dismissed as not credible by a growing number of European countries. But the fine line between skepticism and complacency could pose significant risks for crisis stability in Europe.”
• “Contrary to the perspective that Russian nuclear threats are empty and ineffective, nuclear weapons have played an essential role in enabling Russia’s war against Ukraine. To the extent that such threats have deterred or slowed Western support—an effect acknowledged by US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan—Russia has successfully leveraged its nuclear arsenal to conduct its conventional invasion of Ukraine.”
• “Since 2022, Russia’s declaratory threats have become increasingly paired with changes in operational military behavior on the battlefield. In practice, Russia has slowly but steadily altered its nuclear posture to create greater risks for Western powers in considering a greater involvement in the war in Ukraine.”
• “Western countries should not be immobilized by fear of Russian threats, but they should nevertheless take the risks of conflict seriously. Despite an emerging narrative that Russian nuclear threats are not credible, these threats continue to pose tangible risks for crisis stability. As Putin recently stated, the West would be wrong to completely ignore Russia’s doctrine and threats to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict.”
• “Before Russia invaded Ukraine, many Western states were skeptical of US warnings regarding an imminent Russian attack. This skepticism was clearly misplaced, however, and Western leaders should avoid repeating such complacency in response to Russia’s nuclear threats. The outright rejection of Russian threats could lead the West to stumble into a nuclear crisis and force decisions in the face of massive risk and significant uncertainty. Russia can be opposed, but Western policymakers must be prudent in their actions to manage the potentially low—yet very real—risks of nuclear escalation.”

“NATO in talks to deploy more nuclear weapons,” Joe Barnes, Telegraph, 06.14.24.[8]

• “NATO is in talks to deploy more nuclear weapons in the face of a growing threat from Russia and China, the head of the alliance has said. Jens Stoltenberg added that the bloc must show its nuclear arsenal to the world to send a direct message to its foes in an interview with The Telegraph. He revealed there were live consultations between members on taking missiles out of storage and placing them on standby as he called for transparency to be used as a deterrent.”
• “Mr. Stoltenberg said: “I won’t go into operational details about how many nuclear warheads should be operational and which should be stored, but we need to consult on these issues. That’s exactly what we’re doing.”
• “A decade ago when the 65-year-old assumed his role at the top of the bloc, nuclear exercises were conducted in complete secrecy. Now he openly praises a number of its 32 allies for contributing to the deterrent, including most recently The Netherlands for investing in dual-capable fighter jets that can host US nuclear weapons.”
• “In a not-very-distant future,” he said, “NATO may face something that it has never faced before, and that is two nuclear-powered potential adversaries – China and Russia. Of course, this has consequences.”

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• “The US Needs More Nukes. Biden Finally Gets That,” Hal Brands, Bloomberg, 06.14.24.

Counterterrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security/AI: 

• No significant developments.

Energy exports from CIS:

“The EU’s continued dependency on Russian gas could jeopardize its foreign policy goals,” Armida van Rij, Chatham House, 06.17.24.

• “What could a pragmatic, long-term and sustainable EU energy security policy look like? Some have argued the EU should impose an embargo on Russian LNG altogether, and that it could do so without disrupting supply by ensuring sufficient storage facilities.”
  • “A first step is to help EU countries still reliant on Russian gas – pipeline or LNG – to diversify their energy imports. This requires infrastructure. The recently agreed funding for an Austria-Germany pipeline will allow Austria to import nearly one-third of its needs from LNG portals along the German coast.”
  • “A second step is to ensure diversity of supply. If the EU’s dependency on Russian gas has demonstrated anything, it is the danger of being overly reliant on a sole source of energy.”
• “If and when the EU moves to ban Russian LNG imports, it must also look carefully at the countries of origin of the replacement pipeline gas or LNG. Importing laundered Russian gas will not help the EU achieve its foreign policy objectives. In fact, it could undermine them.”

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

• No significant developments.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Tax Hikes Reflect Shift in Russia’s Economic Priorities,” Alexander Kolyandr, CEIP, 06.12.24. 

• “Passed under the guise of reform, tax hikes became inevitable in Russia in the fall of 2023, when discussions of the budget for the next three years revealed just how drastically government spending—particularly defense spending—was set to rise. In February, the month before the presidential election, Vladimir Putin confirmed that taxes would go up. The only remaining questions were who would pay more—and how much more.”
• “Now details of planned income and corporate profit tax hikes have emerged, showing that Russia’s leadership is not only prepared to increase the tax burden on Russians, but is also shifting its economic development priorities.”
• “The Finance Ministry projects that in 2025, the new rates will bring in an extra 2.6 trillion rubles ($29.1 billion at current exchange rates). Along with Russia’s reserves, this additional revenue will pay for Putin’s latest “May Decrees” passed following his inauguration for a fifth presidential term: they are expected to cost 9.7 trillion rubles ($109 billion) through 2030, leaving a surplus of more than 1 trillion rubles ($11.2 billion).”
• “The savings could be even greater, with the draft budget for 2025 assuming a year-on-year decrease in defense spending of 2.3 trillion rubles ($25.8 billion), or 1.3 percent of GDP. But how that could happen without the war in Ukraine ending is unclear. Either the Finance Ministry’s revenue projections are too conservative, or its prediction that the budget deficit will stand at 0.4 percent of GDP in 2025 is overly optimistic.”
• “The government says the tax hikes will make society more fair. Certainly, with the rollout of a progressive tax system, wealthier Russians will have to pay a larger share of the tax bill. Finance Minister Anton Siluanov estimates that the increase will affect just 3.2 percent of taxpayers.”
• “It is hard to say how effective the tax hikes will be in reducing social inequality. It will take several years for the Gini coefficient, a measurement of income inequality, to reflect any progress made. Even if the gap narrows, economists will surely debate whether it is attributable to the tax reform or wartime spending.”
• “Ultimately, the tax reform marks the end of a quarter century in which Russians enjoyed an unprecedentedly high standard of living. In this new era, the cost of the transition to domestic technology and increased social spending will be borne by the owners of companies working outside the defense sector and related industries; high-earning individuals; and natural resource exporters, who must also pay more in taxes. ”

“Shifting Political Thresholds among the Russian Public,” Danielle Lussier, PONARS, 06.12.24.

• “Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, observers of Russian politics have anticipated a tipping point in Russian mass political behavior. To maintain its military campaign, the Russian regime demands large-scale mass compliance with policies related to the “special military operation.” A prevailing question is: How long will Russian citizens tolerate the human costs of the war and the level of political repression required to sustain the Kremlin’s version of events? After two years, a tipping point away from support for the regime or its policy in Ukraine has not arrived.”
• “Indicators of public opinion, tracked regularly over the past two years, show that perspectives about the war are stable and a majority of the population consistently accepts the Kremlin’s justification for it. Insights from the scholarship of opinion formation in authoritarian regimes, combined with reliable indicators about Russian mass behavior, can help explain this stability. Critics of the regime remain a visible and vocal minority in the population. Those who display public support are a combination of genuine supporters and skeptics.”

“Russian Identity and War Support,” Maria Snegovaya, PONARS, 06.14.24.

• “Consistent with theoretical expectations, we find that support for the war in Ukraine is driven at least in part by the salience of one’s identity, i.e., the strength of respondents’ association with Russia. Unfortunately, our findings also suggest that support for the militaristic action has its micro-foundations in the composites of Russian mass consciousness and is ideological in nature.”
• “While it is common for scholars to focus on Putin when accounting for the origins of the war, our results pretty clearly show the opposite. There appears to be a significant faction within Russian society that identifies strongly with Russia and supports militaristic action, and any future Russian leader will have to deal with this group. In other words, Russia’s aggressive posture vis-à-vis its neighbors might change little even if the leadership were to change. Furthermore, it might be hard for Putin to pull out of the war now that it has begun. Accordingly, not only would generic counter-disinformation efforts be inefficient, they might even cause Russians to recoil and support the government and its actions even more. Future research should account for the role of Russians’ in-group attachment in exploring ways to decrease their war support.”

“Is Putin Too Old to Rule Russia?”, RM Associates and Staff, RM, 06.12.24.

• “When Vladimir Putin was sworn in for a fifth term as Russia’s president at the age of 71, the Russian ruler—whom the country’s exiled opposition likes to refer to as the “old man in the bunker”— he was visibly the oldest participant in the lavish ceremony … However, as our research indicates, when it comes to advancing age, Putin is not an outlier among Russia’s rulers of the past century nor among the present rulers of some of Russia’s peers, allies and adversaries.”
• “We have analyzed the ages of top officials in several countries that are either Russia’s peers or competitors, including the following comparands in our non-random sample: the founding BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) plus South Africa, the United States, Germany and Ukraine. Of these eight countries, Russia is somewhere in the middle: Putin is the fourth oldest head of state or “chief executive” at 71 years old, and Russia has the fifth highest average age of top officials, at 58, tied with Brazil. … As for Putin’s “age ranking” among the members of the Russian ruling elite, our research shows Putin is 13 years above the average age of Russia’s top officials, but he is not the oldest.”
• “Do all these age comparisons matter, though? In other words, is the age of a country’s ruler and his retinue a relevant factor to consider when evaluating their performance in running the country? We have approached four experts with that question, including two demographers who have studied Russia among other countries and two political scientists who study Russia. Below is a summary of what they told us:”
  • “Until recently, the age of elites mattered significantly, especially in countries in transition from socialism to capitalism, and Russia was no exception, according to Andrei Kolesnikov of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.”
  • “Dr. Dmitry Gorenburg, senior research scientist at CNA, cautioned against jumping to the conclusion that aging ruling elites necessarily lead to poor governance outcomes, citing both positive and negative examples from the past half-century.”
  • “Dr. Nicholas Eberstadt argued, like Gorenburg, that health matters just as much as age, if not more. … Eberstadt recommended considering health-adjusted age when examining countries’ leadership age data, noting that “of course, decision-makers are elites, typically with better than [average education] and health.”
  • “Finally, Dr. Raul Magni-Berton … finds that older leaders tend to underperform in their roles, with declines in economic growth, increases in international conflicts and initiations of war—whether they lead democracies or autocracies.”

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• “Western Praise for Nabiullina Deserved but Misses the Point,” Oleg Kashin, Russia.Post, 06.14.24.
• “The War is Less Important than Keeping the Regime Going,” Ekaterina Schulmann and Ilya Davlyatchin, Russia.Post, 06.12.24.

Defense and aerospace:

“The Eclipse of the Russian Arms Market,” Benjamin Tkach and Vasabjit Banerjee, NI, 06.14.24.

• “Scholars and commentators have published numerous analyses of the 2023 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reports on defense expenditures and imports and exports for countries across the world. Overall, the top five weapons exporters remain the same: the United States, France, Russia, China, and Germany. However, the data showcases a subtle but important shift: Russia’s international share of arms exports is being challenged by France, China, and South Korea. In fact, Russia lost its status as the number two arms exporter for the first time in decades.”
• “Russia’s negative reputational consequences of invading Ukraine, combined with the poor, inconsistent performance of the Russian military, the impact of Western economic sanctions, and domestic production limitations, are impediments to exports with potentially limited time horizons. However, Russia remains sufficiently resilient against Western sanctions to continue defense manufacturing. Russian augmentation of its industrial base via the acquisition of machine tools and other dual-use technology, as well as concentrated defense industry investment, has increased the rate of production of several vital military capabilities used in Ukraine, including ammunition.”
• See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Why Is Russia Legalizing the Taliban?” Kirill Krivosheev, CEIP, 06.13.24. 

• “Russia, Kazakhstan, and the other Central Asian states have little choice but to lift restrictions on the Taliban—and they are not alone. The Taliban’s interior minister Sirajuddin Haqqani is wanted by the FBI, which is offering up to $10 million for information about his whereabouts. Yet earlier this month, the UN Security Council lifted travel restrictions for him and three other Taliban leaders to allow them to travel unimpeded to Mecca.”
• “After the flurry of international interest in 2021, Afghanistan disappeared from the headlines. It’s now inconvenient to retain the extremist designation for the country’s de facto rulers. Even so, the legalization of the Taliban by Afghanistan’s neighbors is not guaranteed to lead to a rush of joint economic ventures or booming bilateral ties.”

“Dubaigrad: Is Moscow Now the ‘Eighth Emirate?’” Diana Galeeva, The Russia Program of George Washington University, 06.13.24. 

• “The UAE has emerged as a strategic “inner circle” ally of Russia, despite also carefully balancing relations with Western countries. As this piece illustrates, positive trends are being developed in the fields of diplomacy, economy, trade, military, defense, culture and educational links.”
• “One starting point for growing further connections between the two countries is finding strategic points in implementations of the Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030 and Economic Agenda of Dubai “D33.” Common points can be found in Russia, under the expressed vision of the development of the country up to 2030 in the address to the Federal Assembly by President Vladimir Putin (on 29.02.2024). Given the special relations with the UAE, it is possible to integrate the visions of Abu Dhabi and D33 (Dubai as an economic hub; Dubai as the safest and most developing city in the world, and an international hub) into projects in the field of science, economics and finance, reflecting a leading role in the implementation of the North-South Transport Corridor.”

Ukraine:

“Ukrainians’ Unwavering Path Toward the EU,” Olga Onuch, CEIP, 06.13.24. 

• “The steadfast support for European integration among Ukrainians is rooted in a perception of the EU as a community of shared democratic principles. The union should leverage its democratic appeal to solidify its role as a catalyst for change beyond its borders.”
  • “Although the three issues of wartime support, EU accession, and postwar reconstruction overlap considerably, there is an argument for the EU to decouple them. The technical practicalities, policy priorities, and coordination required to win the war are not the same as the policy progression needed for Ukraine’s EU accession and full reconstruction. In fact, it might be possible for Ukraine to align with most, if not nearly all, of the acquis—the body of EU law—required for accession before the country can secure a decisive victory against Russia and certainly before it can complete its postwar reconstruction.”
  • “By contrast, if the EU links these issues, such an approach might give citizens the impression that membership is being pushed back. Furthermore, Ukraine’s path to accession should not be tied to those of neighboring countries, for even in wartime Ukraine’s progress on key policy areas might be exceptional. The danger of falling short of expectations or of not managing expectations correctly can and will be exploited by both internal dissenters and external adversaries.”
  • “But perhaps most importantly, the EU’s approach toward its neighbors and broader policy frameworks must evolve to acknowledge the almost magnetic appeal of its democratic values. As Europe and the wider world increasingly embrace democratic ideals, with many citizens in neighboring countries aspiring for closer ties with the EU or even full membership, the response from autocratic regimes has been notably adversarial. These regimes perceive the democratic orientation and EU aspiration of their citizens as direct threats to their authoritarian grip on power.”
  • “This situation underscores the urgent need for the EU not only to recognize its democratic pull factor but also to leverage it strategically. Such an approach would solidify the EU’s role as a catalyst for change that can promote democratic governance in the face of autocracy and enhance the resilience of democratic institutions and values on a global scale.”

“Integration of the Occupied Regions Going Better for the Kremlin than the War on the Battlefield,” Nikolai Petrov, Russia.Post, 06.13.24.

• “It appears that Moscow intends to convince Ukrainian citizens of the advantages of living “under Russia.” Social payments, the reconstruction of Mariupol, the construction of social infrastructure, etc. serve this purpose. The Kremlin's message to the Russian people is that Putin’s military strategy in Ukraine is successful.”
• “At one of these meetings, held remotely on the eve of the recent presidential election, Putin announced that “last year we allocated RUB 1.083 trillion for a comprehensive program for the development of our historical regions, including the economy and infrastructure, healthcare and education, culture and sports.” The opening ceremony of social infrastructure facilities in all four regions was streamed.”
• “The announcement of new, albeit temporary, capitals of the occupied Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions – Henichesk and Melitopol, respectively – can be considered a consolidation of the status quo and a renunciation of further expansion in the near future.”
• “Successful integration—under Putin's personal leadership and with Putin's active participation—is especially important for the Kremlin to demonstrate, considering the army’s underperformance on the battlefield. Russia’s strategy in the Ukrainian territory occupied since 2022 is primarily about strengthening it as a base for further confrontation with Ukraine and the West and continuing the war in a sometimes more, sometimes less intense format.”
• “The reconstruction and development of the ‘new regions’ is Russia’s largest infrastructure project at present, with the goal of completely integrating them into Russia as quickly as possible. The colossal resources invested are meant to demonstrate to the whole world and, most importantly, to Ukrainians and Russians the advantages of being part of Russia and the Kremlin’s care for the people on the ground.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Russian exiles are making a mark in the Caucasus and Central Asia,” The Economist, 06.13.24.

• “All three countries in the Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) and the five in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) have refused to endorse Russia’s war in Ukraine. Last year, China replaced Russia as Central Asia’s biggest trading partner. Feeling betrayed by Russia, Armenia is re-aligning more firmly with the West.”
• “However, many of these countries are having it both ways. All five Central Asian leaders attended Russia’s victory-day parade in Moscow last month. Georgia’s rulers are tightening their links to Russia. Energy ties between Central Asia and Russia are expanding. When Mr Putin visited Tashkent, Uzbekistan’s capital, in May, it was announced that Russia would build Central Asia’s first nuclear power plant.”
• “Russia’s presence in the CCA has grown in other ways too. Since 2022, Russian people, firms, cash and goods have poured in. Easy immigration laws and political neutrality have attracted Russians evading sanctions, dodging conscription and seeking international finance. The benefits are mutual. Russia’s war has helped several CCA countries grow faster and gain geopolitical heft. Last year, their economies grew by 4.9%, surpassing pre-war forecasts.”
• “The CCA has become a hub for Russian trade, providing a lifeline for Russia as it faces 20,000 economic sanctions. Almost every country in the CCA has boosted imports from Europe, China, the UAE and Turkey, while expanding exports to Russia. The CCA’s share in non-hydrocarbon exports in 2022 to the EU, Russia and America rose by 25, 22 and 53 percentage points, respectively, according to the IMF. German exports of cars and spare parts to Kyrgyzstan, a backwater in global terms, soared 50-fold between 2021 and 2023.”
• “Serving as a trade conduit to Russia does not fully explain the CCA’s trade boom, though… The Caucasus and Central Asia have also benefited from the hundreds of thousands of Russian emigrants, or relokanty, who have fled from their homeland. They are mostly young, educated and wealthy. As they transfer money out of Russia, the CCA has received an unprecedented surge of remittances (see chart). A wave of Russian tourists has brought cash, too. Russians have opened at least three times more businesses in Georgia since 2022 than in the previous 27 years combined. In Kazakhstan, Russia now accounts for 41% of foreign-owned firms, up from 32% in 2021.”

“Belarus: Sovereignty Under Threat,” Manfred Huterer and Astrid Sahm, SWP, 06.12.24.

• “Belarus is not a protectorate of Russia. Even if the country has continued to deepen its ties to Russia under Lukashenko’s rule, the West should not dismiss Belarus and treat it as a protectorate of Russia. Rather, the West should try to define its own relationship with Belarus and not view it as a feature of its relations with Russia.”
• “Sanctions are not game changers. Western sanctions have hit the Lukashenko regime hard, yet have still not made it respond to Western demands. Many members of the Belarusian state apparatus are coming to terms with the loss of their European foothold in foreign policy. They speculate that the importance of the West will, in any case, diminish in the emerging multipolar world order. In their view, this would balance out the imperial claims of the Kremlin. Therefore, the EU must not rely exclusively on sanctions.”
• “(Informal) talks with the regime must not be taboo. Providing comprehensive support to the country’s democratic opposition and civil society is a necessary but not a sufficient prerequisite for Belarus to be able to develop freely and independently in the future. The further actions of the Luka­shen­ko regime depend on whether the country’s progressive loss of sovereignty becomes irreversible. Therefore, selective talks with representatives of the regime should not be ruled out, so that it is pos­sible to convey messages and receive more information. The Belarusian elite is less monolithic in its attitudes than it appears from the outside. European prospects for the future should be communicated not just to the Belarusian population, but also to those in power who are not repressive hardliners. This applies even more as the Lukashenko regime will be faced with the question of its succession plan sooner or later.”
• “Borders must remain open. Crucial social exchange can only be maintained as long as the borders remain open and visas issued not only for humanitarian purposes, but also for tourism and business trips. Therefore, the EU has every interest in ensuring that there is no further escalation in the relations between Belarus and Poland or the Baltic states. A poker game with the stakes of closing the borders against migrant flows is also not in the West’s interests. It is, therefore, particularly important to coordinate with Poland and the Baltic states as closely as possible. The change in government in Warsaw offers new opportunities here that should be used.”
• “Consider the opportunities of conditionality. The Lukashenko regime fears that its position with regard to Moscow will be significantly weakened if there are negotiations to end the war in Ukraine and a restructuring of the European security order without Minsk’s involvement. In this case, the West could consider if the Belarusian leadership would be open to conditionality logic, which it had always rejected in the past. This would mean that Minsk fulfills Western demands for the release of all political prisoners, and, in exchange, specific sanctions would be lifted. In any case, for the foreseeable future, the West will remain confronted with the problem that the goal of preserving Belarusian statehood is being undermined by isolationist strategies that are effectively driving the country into Moscow’s arms. The yardstick of Western policy should be to what extent it succeeds in ending the inhumane repressive practices in Belarus, securing the release of political prisoners and expanding the scope for change in the country.”

“Yerevan says goodbye to Moscow. And comes to an agreement with Washington. What is behind Armenia’s intention to leave the CSTO,” Alexander Zhelenin, Republic.ru, 06.17.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. 

• “In 2020, the Russian authorities not only did not help their official CSTO ally during the Second Karabakh War with Azerbaijan, but, as it now turns out, they also betrayed it by agreeing with Baku behind Yerevan’s back. Putin later claimed that he did not intervene in this war because Karabakh is not an internationally recognized territory of Armenia. Interesting, I wonder when this ever stopped him?”
• “If the CSTO does not protect its official ally, then why is this organization needed at all? To suppress the will of the peoples for freedom, helping the authoritarian rulers of the countries included in this bloc to maintain their power? In order to recruit cannon fodder for Putin’s wars of conquest? Why does the current democratic Armenia need this “happiness,” which, firstly, joined the CSTO even before Pashinian came to power, and secondly, solely because of the hopelessness of its geographical, economic and political situation?”
• “After Russia and other CSTO members abandoned Armenia in 2020, it became clear that Yerevan’s exit from this association was a matter of time. So far, Armenia has not formally left the CSTO, but an official statement of intentions has already been made at the highest level.”
• “Pashinian’s statement about his country’s withdrawal from the CSTO was made for a reason. As part of the final meeting of the strategic dialogue between Armenia and the United States, a joint statement was adopted in which the parties agreed to increase the level of partnership… In other words, now Armenia is moving towards concluding an agreement with the United States similar to the one in force between The United States and its most important non-NATO partners in the world. The United States has such treaties with, say, Israel, South Korea and Taiwan.”

Footnotes

[1] Putin is to visit North Korea on June 18-19, 2024.

[2] It should be noted that as of June 14, key details of the financing arrangement still need to be agreed, however, and who will guarantee the loan is vague, according to NYT and WSJ. The Americans have said that they will put up the entire sum, but would like others to participate. They have also agreed to underwrite the entire loan, according to NYT. In a clear effort to maximize the perceived importance of the agreement even though its financial aspects are yet to be finalized, a senior Biden administration official described it as a “political agreement at the highest levels.”*

[3] On June 13, G-7 leaders reached a preliminary agreement to finance Ukraine with a loan of up to $50 billion, backed by the profits on frozen Russian assets, so that it can be spent to support Ukraine militarily; to help cover the country’s budgetary deficit; and to help with reconstruction of infrastructure, according to NYT. Key details of the financing arrangement still need to be agreed, however, and who will guarantee the loan is vague, according to NYT and WSJ. The Americans have said that they will put up the entire sum, but would like others to participate. They have also agreed to underwrite the entire loan, according to NYT.

[4] “Ostatsya pri svoikh” can also be translated as “to break even.”

[5] The full results of the poll, conducted by the Rating Group, are available here.

[6] March 17, 2022, treaty draft: An early draft of a Ukraine-Russia treaty. The document is an English translation that Ukraine provided to Western governments at the time. [English]

March 29, 2022, Istanbul Communiqué: The proposed agreement that was discussed at in-person talks in Istanbul, as summarized by Ukrainian negotiators. [English translation] [Russian original]

April 15, 2022, treaty draft: A later draft of a Ukraine-Russia treaty. The document’s header shows this was a version that landed on Putin’s desk. The map referred to as Annex 6 is not included. [English translation] [Russian original]

[7] Newly translated documents discussed in these analyses include:

1. After the U.S. Election, Parties Involved in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict May Take Steps to Discuss Ceasefire Plans by Ding Xiaoxing, director of the Institute of Eurasian Studies at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.
2. Second Anniversary of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Effects and Implications by scholars at the Renmin University Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies.
3. The Russian Situation Under Prolonged Warfare by Feng Yujun, professor at the Peking University Department of History.
4. Analysis of Uncertainties Affecting the Russia-Ukraine Conflict by Ouyang Xiangying, researcher at the Institute of World Economics and Politics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Director of the Research Office of Marxist Theory of World Political Economy; and Zhang Yuxin, assistant researcher at the Xi Jinping Diplomatic Thought Research Office at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Institute of World Economics and Politics.

[8] For an assessment of Stoltenberg’s interview by FAS’ Hans Kristensen, see this thread on his X account.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 11:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

^Machine-translated.

Slider photo by Office of the President of Ukraine shared under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.