Russia Analytical Report, Nov. 1-7, 2016
With the U.S. presidential election upon us, this week’s edition of the Russia Analytical Report opens with a special section: recommendations to the next U.S. president on dealing with Russia. Here you will find summaries of notable commentary and analysis from the past few months that include proposals, implicit or explicit, for the incoming administration.
I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda
Recommendations to the next U.S. president on dealing with Russia:
(in reverse chronological order)
“Course Correction,” Dimitri K. Simes, Pratik Chougule and Paul J. Saunders, The National Interest, November-December 2016 issue: The authors—all of them at the helm of the magazine and/or its parent think tank, the Center for the National Interest—argue that “too often U.S. leaders have expended American resources on causes incidental to vital interests.” Among their specific points: “The next administration will need to establish clear objectives in relations with rival major powers China and Russia,” which “are now pursuing a rapprochement explicitly designed to check American power”—a geopolitical realignment detrimental to American interests and catalyzed by “America’s well-intentioned desire to stand by its allies.” Hence, Washington will need “to design policies that further both immediate needs and enduring strategic objectives” and to stop “provoking other great powers without being prepared to force their compliance with U.S. preferences. … If terrorism is the most immediate threat to American security, a Beijing-Moscow partnership represents the greatest long-term danger to American global leadership. … Russia’s heavy-handed conduct in the former Soviet Union, though troubling, is not an existential threat to the United States—not unless nuclear weapons become a factor. Sensible policies articulated from a position of strength can avert that outcome and make U.S. allies safer. … A bottom-up review of current alliances to assess their contributions to U.S. security, prosperity, values and leadership would be a sensible first step for the next administration. … In considering whether to employ military power, economic coercion or other tools, Washington should assess costs, benefits and risks—including unintended consequences—much more systematically and frankly. … If the next president pursues a new strategy, he or she should expect resistance from America’s entrenched foreign-policy establishment.”
“Cooperation and Disagreement Can Coexist,” Angela Stent, Carnegie Moscow Center, 10.31.16: Today’s harsh, adversarial rhetoric and military posturing feel like the Cold War but without the channels of communication that operated then. That said, the experience of the past 16 years suggests that Russian President Vladimir Putin is a pragmatic leader willing to make deals if he believes they are in Russia’s interest. Two improvements that might be possible are resuming talks over a U.S.-Russian cyber agreement and restoring high-level military channels. The author heads the Russian studies center at Georgetown University.
“Four rules for a realistic reset with Vladimir Putin. Tough management of relations should not preclude recognition of mutual interests,” Philip Stephens, Financial Times, 10.27.16: “What the U.S. and its allies can usefully do is establish principles to frame a reset grounded in realism. They should start with resolve, consistency, engagement and respect.” The author is an associate editor at the newspaper.
“Obama’s Russia Policy: A Post Mortem and Lessons for the Next President,” Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Russia Matters, 10.26.16: In anticipating a policy review vis-à-vis Russia by the next U.S. presidential administration, the author, a professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, reviews the de facto compromises by Washington that provided space for the reset in U.S.-Russian relations in 2009. Today bilateral ties face more contentious and urgent issues, without any readily apparent easy pickings on the agenda. “Whatever administration takes office this coming January, it will have to wrestle with difficult questions of where to seek compromises with Russia and where to stand firm. … The review process can only be successful if the new team is willing to make these calls based on its assessment of U.S. values and interests, a sober assessment of Russian strengths and weaknesses and an understanding of where Moscow may be induced to show flexibility and where it will stand firm. This requires, in the end, an understanding both of the costs America is willing to pay and the limits of what can be demanded of Russia.”
“How Congress can protect the U.S. from Russia. Presidents typically take the lead on foreign policy. But Congress has a major role to play too,” Jason Bruder, Politico, 10.26.16: The author, a fellow at the Kennan Institute and a former senior staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, proposes a number of measures Congress can take to help manage the U.S.-Russian relationship. These include increased Title VIII funding to “ensure that America’s future leaders within and outside government possess the deep understanding of Russia,” facilitating or expediting the approval of presidential “nominees for positions dealing with Russia and its neighbors,” upgrading U.S. cyber defenses and countering Russia’s information warfare, among others. “Members of Congress should make investments to enhance our national capacity to deal with the ongoing challenge from Moscow,” the author writes. “They also can invest personally in terms of their own knowledge, firsthand experience, and relationships to maintain and develop their important role in U.S.-Russia relations.
“Toward a New Russia Policy for America,” Thomas Graham, Russia Matters, 10.25.16: The author, a senior fellow at Yale and former senior director for Russia at the National Security Council, gives a conceptual framework for reshaping relations with Russia based on a “disciplined pursuit” of U.S. priorities and an acceptance of the significant changes in today’s world order.
“Nuclear modernization, arms control, and U.S.-Russia relations,” Steven Pifer, Brookings, 10.25.16: “Arms control can make a significant contribution to U.S. national security and is more important when relations are adversarial than when they are working well. The next administration should prepare a position in case Moscow decides to reengage. It should seek a negotiation on further nuclear arms reductions that would include all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons while also indicating that it is prepared to address the related issues raised by the Russians. Even if Moscow does not engage, having a forward-looking approach may prove useful for maintaining the support of allies and resisting international pressures to pursue disarmament courses that Washington will not like.” The author is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and this brief is part of “Election 2016 and America’s Future”—an institution-wide initiative in which Brookings scholars have identified the biggest issues facing the United States this election season and are providing individual ideas for how to address them.
“America’s Russia Policy Has Failed: Here are seven things the next U.S. president should do to put Washington back in the driver’s seat,” Thomas Graham and Matthew Rojansky, Foreign Policy, 10.13.16: The authors argue that “for the moment, America’s priorities must be on putting out the fires of regional conflicts in Ukraine and Syria and preventing the simmering threats of WMD proliferation and a new arms race from igniting. But success on any one of these issues cannot occur in a vacuum and depends on the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. approach to other regions and issues where Russia holds important cards. By weighing the value of cooperation and competition with Moscow in terms of what matters most to the United States, the next presidential administration has its best chance to come out ahead in dealing with the Kremlin.” The seven points referred to in the title of the piece are: (1) understand that it’s not just about Putin; (2) stop Ukraine from becoming a frozen conflict; (3) have an honest talk about Europe; (4) push for more arms control; (5) work with Russia in Asia; (6) recognize that Syria is about more than Syria; (7) show America’s promise.
“What Can the Next President Do About Russia? Moscow sees its ‘near abroad’ as one operational theater. To end the stalemate in Syria, exert NATO pressure in Eastern Europe,” Robert D. Kaplan, Wall Street Journal, 10.16.16: The author, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, writes that: “In the cyber domain the U.S. has not sufficiently drawn red lines. What kind of Russian hacking will result in either a proportionate, or even disproportionate, punitive response? The Obama administration seems to be proceeding ad hoc, as it has done with Russia policy in general. The next administration, along with projecting military force throughout the Russian near abroad, will have to project force in cyberspace, too.”
“The Growing Danger of Military Conflict with Russia,” Nikolas K. Gvosdev, The National Interest, 10.11.16: The author, a professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, argues that even if long-term projections of a decline in Russian power are accurate, they should not be a basis for policy right now in view of “current, real, actual Russian capabilities today—which, as operations in Syria and Ukraine and the reputed cyber intrusions have demonstrated, are real. … The prudent response would either be to find ways to de-escalate the pressure on the spring or to prepare for its snapback and to be able to cushion the shock.” Over the past two years, the costs of both options have been deemed too high. “But U.S. leaders have to make these calls” and make them “based on their assessment of U.S. values and interests combined with costs America is willing to pay.”
“A Transatlantic Strategy for Russia,” Julianne Smith, Task Force on U.S. Policy Toward Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, 08.29.16: The author, a senior fellow and director of the Strategy and Statecraft Program at the Center for a New American Security, argues that the new U.S. president “should work with Europe to craft a new strategy toward Russia rooted in the four pillars of unity, resilience, deterrence and engagement.” These should involve a reaffirmed “commitment to transatlantic unity.” Moreover, the author writes, “NATO members will have to ensure they don’t lose sight of the importance of sustaining, resourcing and reinforcing … new measures in the medium and long terms.” But “engagement with Russian policymakers should be viewed as little more than an insurance policy against seemingly small events escalating in unexpected ways.” Additionally, the author argues for “a handful of short-term policy changes,” including a review of the Minsk peace agreements and the West’s overall strategy for Ukraine. “Beyond near-term responses to the Russian challenge, the United States and its European allies need to invest in their capabilities to follow and understand developments in Russia, its domestic and foreign policies, and the drivers behind them.”
“There will be no 'reset' with Russia,” Angela Stent, The Washington Post, 08.18.16: The author argues that, with the Kremlin defining “the United States as its main adversary … engagement for engagement's sake does not work.” While urging the U.S. to “continue negotiating with Russia over both Syria and Ukraine,” Stent argues that “it should only open an intensified dialogue with the Kremlin if and when the Russian leadership is genuinely interested in offering constructive proposals. The gap between U.S. and Russian interests in both cases is significant” and “as long as Russia supports the conflict in eastern Ukraine … U.S. sanctions should remain in place.” The author also believes that “the United States should consider enhancing its own military presence in Europe and needs to deter any further attempts by Russia to destabilize its neighboring countries. … The Russia challenge is long-term and will likely outlast both the next U.S. president's term and Putin's time in office.”
Nuclear security:
“The End of the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement: A Dark Cloud with a Silver Lining,” Katherine Owens, Nukes of Hazard, 11.03.16: “Make no mistake: Russia’s withdrawal from the PMDA is a step backward for non-proliferation cooperation and threatens stability by allowing diplomatic tensions to have nuclear repercussions. However, the United States could take advantage of the one possible silver lining in Russia’s decision and save billions of dollars by disposing of its plutonium more efficiently.”
Iran and its nuclear program:
No significant commentary.
New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:
No significant commentary.
NATO-Russia relations/new Cold War:
“Managing Hazardous Incidents in the Euro-Atlantic Area: A New Plan of Action,” Łukasz Kulesa, Thomas Frear and Denitsa Raynova, European Leadership Network, November 2016: “Despite the maintenance of several bilateral agreements on incident management between individual NATO member states and Russia, there are significant gaps in their coverage, not least because some NATO countries, including Poland and Romania and non-NATO states Finland and Sweden, do not have such agreements with Russia. … The restricted nature of existing agreements and their failure to properly account for civilian activities is also a serious cause for concern. … Concluding that the existing mechanisms are inadequate in modern circumstances, the report collates a number of options through which to stabilize the Euro-Atlantic security environment” and makes a number of recommendations.
Missile defense:
No significant commentary.
Nuclear arms control:
No significant commentary.
Counter-terrorism:
No significant commentary.
Conflict in Syria:
“You Don’t Need a No-Fly Zone to Pressure Russia in Syria,” Steven Heydemann, New York Times, 11.02.16: The author, a professor of Middle East studies at Smith College and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center for Middle East Policy, argues that “two steps are needed to advance America’s Syria policy. The first is to move beyond a discussion limited to no-fly zones or increased support to the armed opposition; the second is a clear-eyed, fact-based assessment of just how risky further American involvement might be. Both are possible between now and when the next president takes office.” Washington should “lead an international effort to … recognize a different government as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people,” with the best candidate being “the little-known Syrian Interim Government, or S.I.G. Unlike many other opposition groups, … the S.I.G. is based inside Syria” and “its prime minister, a politically independent heart surgeon,” was elected by a large majority of an important opposition coalition in exile. Washington “should also rethink how it uses air power to advance diplomatic objectives,” for example by protecting UN-authorized humanitarian relief efforts, which would carry “far fewer risks than establishing a permanent no-fly zone.” There has been evidence to suggest that this kind of operation will not “provoke counterattacks from Russia or the Syrian government.”
“Getting to Negotiations on Syria,” Paul R. Pillar, The National Interest, 11.05.16: The author, a senior fellow at Georgetown University and the Brookings Institution, argues that earlier wars have demonstrated that “for a belligerent to be willing to negotiate requires not only that the war not be going too well for it, but also that it not be going too badly.” Hence, “the likely result of added military pressure on the Assad regime would be not a greater willingness of Assad to negotiate, but instead a greater determination to keep fighting to move the military situation more in its favor—with the help of Russia, playing a situation-moving role somewhat similar to the role the Chinese played in Korea.”
Cyber security:
“That secret Trump-Russia email server link is likely neither secret nor a Trump-Russia link,” Philip Bump, The Washington Post, 11.01.16: The author, a New York-based writer for one of the newspaper’s blogs, details a number of reasons to be skeptical about the existence of any nefarious link between Donald Trump’s businesses and Russia’s Alfa Bank—a possibility that surfaced as researchers tried to track alleged Russian attempts at hacking American political interests.
“5 Possible Ways to Hack the Election, and How Much to Worry About Them,” David E. Sanger, New York Times, 11.03.16: “America's top intelligence officials expect Russian hackers, or others, to try to disrupt the [U.S. election] process—perhaps to help Donald J. Trump, but more likely to simply undercut what [Russian President Vladimir] Putin views as America's holier-than-thou attitudes about its democratic procedures,” writes the author, the paper’s national security correspondent and a senior fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. “Federal and state officials are focusing on five possible ways to hack the election.” Their biggest concerns: a flood of disclosures (possible, but hard to make an impact); interfering with voter registration rolls (lots to worry about); manipulating the count reported to news organizations (a significant risk, but detectable); an internet disruption that makes it hard to get to the polls (the new big fear); tinkering with voting machines (unlikely, but possible).
Energy exports from CIS:
No significant commentary.
U.S.-Russian economic ties:
No significant commentary.
U.S.-Russian relations in general:
No significant commentary.
II. Russia’s relations with other countries
General developments and “far abroad” countries:
No significant commentary.
China:
“Russia’s dissenters choose passive resistance,” John Lloyd, FT, 11.02.16: The author, a contributing editor at the newspaper, gives an assessment of Russia’s perceptions of its place in the world, based on last month’s annual Valdai Club gathering, and some of the social undercurrents that accompany it. “Russia sees itself as part of a threesome that determines the fate of the world,” he writes: “the U.S., China and Russia, in descending order of military and economic strength. Russia is a member of the trio because of its military power, spending on which has been protected even as stubbornly low oil prices and Western sanctions have pushed the country into recession. … The EU, meanwhile, was seen as a nullity. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s remark in a recent speech that Europe was ‘gradually crumbling’ was recalled. Kevin Rudd, the former Australian prime minister, said the EU was ‘holding a seminar with itself.’” At the same time, the author concludes, there is also “a private sphere of mainly passive opposition to officialdom. It is in the regime’s interest to ensure that it stays passive.”
Ukraine:
“Ukraine Has Opened Pandora's Database of Corruption. Declaring billions of dollars in wines, watches and tickets to outer space isn’t going to win the public’s love—or the West’s trust,” Reid Standish and Ian Bateson, Foreign Policy, 11.04.16: The authors consider the revelations and potential fallout from Ukraine’s online database of “the incomes and assets of tens of thousands of Ukrainians officials and lawmakers,” which became publicly available at the start of this month. “In a country where the average monthly income is roughly $200, revelations that elected officials have personal holdings worth hundreds of millions of dollars in real estate and eccentric items, like Fabergé eggs, Japanese art and even a ticket to space, are now causing a public uproar.” The authors highlight some of the most jaw-dropping examples of public officials’ immense personal wealth and note that anti-corruption activists in Ukraine suspect that “assets like yachts and foreign villas [are] likely still hiding in unnamed offshore accounts.” In the West, meanwhile, “there is growing fatigue with the slow pace of Kiev’s reforms” and EU support for economic sanctions against Russia “is quickly eroding,” while “in Washington, where the U.S. government has committed more than $1.3 billion in foreign assistance to Ukraine since late 2013, frustration with Kiev’s failures to curb corruption is high” and has policymakers debating how to force the Ukrainian government to fight graft. Nonetheless, the disclosures have won Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko “another lifeline from his Western backers,” opening a door to visa-free travel within the EU and helping release more financial assistance from the IMF. “Ukrainians’ own post-revolutionary support of their leaders is rapidly wearing off,” with 72% of respondents in one new poll saying “the country is moving in the wrong direction.” The authors conclude that, while Ukraine will “continue to be a priority for the next U.S. president, … frustration with Kiev’s domestic setbacks” could see it “relegated to being solely a Russian policy issue.”
Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:
No significant commentary.
III. Russia’s domestic policies
Domestic politics, economy and energy:
Defense and aerospace:
"The Culture of Strategic Thought Behind Russia’s Modern Approaches to Warfare," Stephen R. Covington, Belfer Center, October 2016: This paper explores the roots and implications of Russian strategic thought, which stands on several fundamental assumptions, including: (1) Strategic uniqueness demands unique military approaches to maximize and seize opportunity; (2) strategic vulnerability demands aggressive counter-surprise measures for a Russia perceived as potentially “undefendable”; (3) going to war with Russia means “going to war with all of Russia”; (4) the initial phase of war is decisive. President Vladimir “Putin’s worldview has set a new purpose and identity for the Russian military, one built on the emotion of humiliation from the end of the Soviet Union and Soviet Army and the perception of subsequent exploitation by the West to Russia’s great disadvantage. The Russian military has embraced both the vanguard role in erasing these disadvantages, and setting the competition between Western and Russian visions of European security on advantageous terms and azimuths for Russia.” The author goes on to outline some of the differences between Russia’s military thinking and NATO/European practice and also discusses Russia’s emphasis on “counter-surprise.” He points to a “destabilizing duality of Russian thinking on crisis and war where they simultaneously seek strategic advantage and seek to counter anticipated surprise with surprise. … This traditional duality in Russian strategic culture is now interwoven with a more modern duality, one that pairs Putin’s ambitions for European security system change with fears for regime change in Moscow.”
Security, law-enforcement and justice:
No significant commentary.