Russia Analytical Report, Oct. 3-11, 2022
6 Ideas to Explore
- Should Americans and Russians regain a fear of nuclear war? “Americans have lost their fear of nuclear war in the post–Cold War period ... we’ve come to believe that’s an old problem,” the Quincy Institute’s George Beebe told Jacobin. “But in fact, the dangers of escalation to nuclear levels have gone up, not down, over the past several years,” Beebe warned. Fear of nuclear war is crucial for effective deterrence, according to Konstantin Bogdanov of IMEMO. “The adversary must always be afraid that the slightest additional escalation on his part will lead to … instantly crossing the nuclear threshold. It is this fear that deters the enemy,” Bogdanov said. Fear or not, the best way to control escalation is simply to not start it, according to Bogdanov.
- Vladimir Putin rattled the nuclear saber in his recent annexation speech to get the West to coerce Ukraine into negotiating a ceasefire, if only to give Russian forces time to regroup, according to William Alberque of IISS. Anything more lasting than a ceasefire will simply be not attainable right now, according to Alexander Gabuev of the Carnegie Endowment. “Only an armistice that will freeze the front lines can be agreed at this point, not a comprehensive solution to the war,” Gabuev writes in FT.
- Russian experts warn the Kremlin that (limited) use of nukes in Ukraine will fail to achieve a victory or even demonstrate resolve. The use of a non-strategic nuclear weapon “will not guarantee a turning point in one's favor at all,” according to RIAC’s Andrei Kortunov. “What it will guarantee [for Russia] is the risk of a full-scale nuclear war, complete strategic solitude and the status of an international pariah,” Kortunov warns in his commentary for Kommersant. If Russia were to test a nuclear weapon to demonstrate resolve, “it won’t demonstrate anything to anyone, since our visual culture, brought up on Hollywood blockbusters, will digest this nuclear explosion in a few seconds,” argues Konstantin Bogdanov of IMEMO.
- If Putin leaves the Kremlin with war in Ukraine still underway, his successor may choose to keep fighting, according to Shawn Cochran of RAND. Cochran writes in War on the Rocks that his research shows that new leaders behave as if they are at risk of punishment for a war failed by their predecessors. “For any successor, the current state of Russian domestic politics would ... disincentivize any move to extricate Russia from the conflict,” he writes. There have been exceptions, however, including at least one in the history of Russia. Russian emperor Alexander II inherited the disastrous Crimean War from Nicholas I when ascending to the throne in 1855. He then agreed to end that war, having his representatives sign the Treaty of Paris the next year.1
- Putin’s war in Ukraine is decreasing Russia’s influence across the post-Soviet space. “In trying and failing to reclaim Russian imperial influence over Ukraine, Moscow is actively accelerating the decline of its influence throughout” post-Soviet Eurasia, Jeffrey Mankoff of NDU writes in War on the Rocks. Mankoff predicts that the decline of Moscow’s influence could allow simmering disputes to boil over and create new suffering for people in the region in the short-term.
- The OPEC+ decision to cut production demonstrates that Saudi Arabia is willing to help Russia fund its war against Ukraine, according to FT columnist Edward Luce. Moreover, both Moscow and Riyadh hope the resultant hike in oil prices will weaken U.S. Democrats’ chances of retaining control of Congress, Luce writes in FT. During the oil embargo of 1973-1974, Western corporations helped mitigate the impact of the embargo, and these corporations should act again by taking a lead in helping the West to defend itself against the weaponization of energy supplies by Russia and its allies, according to William J. Magnuson’s commentary in WSJ.
I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda
Nuclear security and safety:
- No significant developments.
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:
- No significant developments.
Iran and its nuclear program:
- No significant developments.
Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:
“Vladimir Putin’s brutal vengeance on Ukraine,” Editorial Board, FT, 10.10.22.
- “Russia’s Vladimir Putin wrongly called Saturday’s [Oct. 8] partial destruction of a flagship bridge linking Russia to annexed Crimea a ‘terrorist act.’ His revenge was to unleash mass terror on cities across Ukraine on Monday, missiles raining destruction from the sky in the midst of the morning rush hour.”
- “Since international law states parties to conflict ‘must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants’ and not direct attacks against civilians, it is hard to see this as anything other than the latest in the Kremlin’s grim catalogue of war crimes in Ukraine, one directly ordered by its president.”
- “Despite the human misery of Russia’s attacks, they are likely only to strengthen Ukraine’s extraordinary spirit of resolve. Yet [W]estern democracies must also brace for potential efforts by Moscow to target their infrastructure, too.”
Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:
- “Rather than seeking a NATO membership track that Kyiv cannot currently get, Zelensky should continue to focus on securing immediate help in the form of more arms and military assistance.”
- “NATO allies can and should provide more arms. ATACMS missiles with a range of some 200 miles come to mind. ... The Ukrainian shopping list could include weapons such as U.S. M-1 and German Leopard main battle tanks, Western air defense missiles and aircraft and perhaps U.S. A-10 ground attack planes.”
- “A bipartisan group of 17 members of Congress has urged Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to immediately magnify Ukraine's technological advantage by expediting delivery to Ukraine of Gray Eagle and/or Reaper drones, thereby making distant Russian ammunition dumps and command centers—including generals and other senior officers—vulnerable. The key is knowing the target's location in all weather, day or night. Advanced drones can defeat Russia's defenses by seeing them from long range.”
- “If Biden stays strong, with U.S. drones as a judicious increment in punishing Putin's brutality by reversing his aggression, Biden's presidency will be deemed by wise historians as, on balance, a success.”
“Mobilization Can’t Save Russia’s War,” Atlantic Council’s Doug Klain, FP, 10.04.22.
- “Sending untrained, underequipped and largely unwilling men to fight in Ukraine will be a slaughter with little precedent in modern war fighting.”
- “In the United States, new Army recruits need 10 weeks of basic training, at a bare minimum, to be ready for combat. Russia’s haphazard mobilization is sending men to fight with a week or two if they’re lucky—some have been sent with no preparation at all. ‘It is criminal to send untrained soldiers into combat. … It’s murder,’ retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, who led U.S. Army forces in Europe, told the Moscow Times. ‘I doubt these men will survive very long.’”
Punitive measures related to Ukraine and their impact globally:
- “Our strategy when it comes to Russian energy is one that is very nuanced and driven toward making sure that Russian oil can continue to reach the marketplace but trying to reduce the amount of revenue Russia makes in doing so.”
- “The two places that we decided to target were Russia’s revenues in order to reduce the amount of money that they would have to prop up their economy and fund their illegitimate war in Ukraine with. And the second one was going after Russia’s military industrial complex.”
- “We have an overarching strategy as an administration and as an alliance in terms of how we support the Ukrainians. That doesn’t only involve sanctions. So I would say that sanctions are an important tool, and it’s one where we’re continuing to refine our effort to do the two things that I’ve spoken about: which is to reduce revenues and go after the supply chains. But they are just a tool in service of a broader foreign-policy strategy.”
Ukraine-related negotiations:
“Russia is unlikely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine,” IISS’s William Alberque, IISS, 10.10.22.
- “While it is tempting to believe that Russia’s latest nuclear threats are directed against Ukraine, it is worth noting that, on the one hand, Russia has annexed territory it does not currently hold, and on the other, Putin has refrained from issuing a direct nuclear threat to Ukraine if it did not take up his offer for talks.”
- “Rather, his messaging was intended to push the West to coerce Ukraine into negotiations and to freeze the battlefield as it is now, which would give Russia time and space to reconstitute its land forces.”
- “Even within Russia, nuclear use would be welcomed only on the fringes. Putin has, throughout his reign, shown that he fears a popular uprising such as a color revolution removing him from power.”
- “If Putin is intent upon personal or national suicide, there are easier ways to do it than by using nuclear weapons given that there is little if anything to be gained by doing so.”
“Putin’s Speech Offers a Way Out of This War … For Now,” RUSI’s Emily Ferris, RUSI, 10.04.22.
- “The Russian president’s speech announcing the annexation of four Ukrainian territories offered signals that he is looking for a way out of the current war. ... [T]here were three potential signals in and around this speech that Putin may be looking for a way out.”
- “The first important signal was Putin’s acknowledgment the day before the speech, in a meeting with his Security Council, that the mobilization process had probably not gone according to plan.”
- “The second significant change is Putin’s modification of his wording on the use of nuclear force. ... There was also no mention of nuclear escalation in Putin’s address—indeed, toward its close he commented on the need for cooler heads and Russia’s responsibility to the international community.”
- “The third and most important signal came from the speech, which began with an offer of negotiations. Putin carefully noted that if Ukrainian forces were to withdraw—most likely meaning from the newly annexed territories—there would be an opportunity for negotiations and a ceasefire. But even if Russia might be edging toward a negotiated end to this war, Putin’s presentation of Ukraine as the mere catalyst for a much wider conflict with the West means it is not clear that any deal to end the Ukraine war would bring about broader peace.”
- “During the Cuban missile crisis, people such as Gen. Curtis LeMay argued that negotiation was tantamount to appeasement. But levelheaded discussion is essential to avoiding certain doom. To sacrifice it in the name of jingoistic posturing is not just absurd; it's potentially apocalyptic. As Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev recalled, ‘The biggest tragedy, as [my military advisers] saw it, was not that our country might be devastated and everything lost, but that the Chinese or the Albanians might accuse us of appeasement or weakness. … What good would it have done me in the last hour of my life to know that though our great nation and the United States were in complete ruins, the national honor of the Soviet Union was intact?’”
- “Today, as the world faces the threat of obliteration once more, figures of all stripes are calling for dialogue to prevent doomsday. A small but growing list of progressive members of Congress (along with several peace advocacy organizations) are increasingly focused on how best to promote de-escalation and dialogue, inspired by a truth that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has himself maintained: This war ‘will only definitively end through diplomacy.’ Pope Francis issued an unprecedented statement calling for global leaders ‘to do everything possible to bring an end to the war.’ Even former secretary of state Henry Kissinger has reiterated the importance of dialogue. As he recently argued, ‘This has nothing to do with whether one likes Putin or not. . . . We are dealing, when nuclear weapons become introduced, with a historic alteration in the world system. And a dialogue between Russia and the West is important.’”
“The risks of escalation in the Ukraine war are rising fast,” Alexander Gabuev of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, FT, 10.10.22. Clues from Russian Views.
- “Attempts to use a combination of new sanctions, more diplomatic isolation and possibly conventional NATO strikes against Russian military targets in Ukraine to deter a desperate Putin from using weapons of mass destruction, should he feel cornered, are by no means guaranteed to succeed. To improve the chances of preventing a showdown, the quiet groundwork for crisis diplomacy should be laid now.”
- “Given the high stakes and emotions, the window for diplomacy is likely to open at the most dramatic moment: for example, when Putin starts to unpack his nuclear toolkit, which will be visible to NATO and involve a lot of signaling by Moscow. Only then might the Ukrainian and Western publics be convinced there is an urgent need to negotiate. Diplomacy will have to involve Biden, since the Kremlin considers him the only real head of the opposing coalition.”
- “Only an armistice that will freeze the front lines can be agreed at this point, not a comprehensive solution to the war.”
“Red line of unclear color,” RIAC’s Andrei Kortunov, Kommersant, 10.07.22. Clues from Russian Views.
- “The decision of the Russian leadership on partial mobilization can be interpreted as a decision not to use tactical nuclear weapons directly against the Ukrainian armed forces. If the option of nuclear escalation were indeed considered, then there would be little need for partial mobilization. Apparently, Moscow hopes that mobilization will make it possible to achieve a turning point in the special operation with conventional weapons.”
- “If this is the case, then it is necessary to clearly and unambiguously define what level and format of Western support for Ukraine Russia will consider as crossing the ‘red line.’ Most likely, this [red line] would be the direct participation of the West in the conflict ... What is needed in this situation is extreme clarity, not uncertainty. As on the sign: ‘Do not enter—will cause death.’”
- “And finally, the most important thing. It must be understood that the use of tactical nuclear weapons will not guarantee a turning point in one's favor at all: its military effectiveness is not obvious. However, what it will guarantee is the risk of a full-scale nuclear war, complete strategic solitude and the status of an international pariah, from which all the poles of a multipolar world will turn away.”
“Strategic Procrastination: What’s Russia’s Game With Nuclear Signaling?” Vladimir Frolov, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 10.11.22. Clues from Russian Views.
- “Putin has made it clear that the Kremlin hopes to end the ‘special military operation’ as quickly as possible. If Zelensky does not want to stop his counteroffensive and resume talks, then the Kremlin believes it must convince his Western partners to force him.”
- “The biggest challenge to resuming negotiations today is the territorial question, which could take decades to resolve. Keeping the newly annexed territories part of Russia is now almost the only way to prove that ‘all goals of the special military operation have been achieved,’ which makes negotiations unfeasible for Russia. But continuing military action that might result in losing the acquired territory is also unfeasible.”
- “The Kremlin hopes that the nuclear threat will compel Washington to step in and ‘freeze’ the conflict with Russia’s current territorial gains, though there does not appear to be unanimity among the Russian leadership on whether the conflict should be frozen temporarily, until Russia can regain its strength, or forever.”
- “For now, Moscow is not making any extraordinary steps [in the nuclear arms domain], and the Pentagon is not taking the bait. This means that Washington is not motivated to rush in and stop Kyiv on the battlefield. … In contrast to the Cuban Missile Crisis, Moscow and Washington are not currently in a direct nuclear standoff. Artificially creating this standoff would be a difficult and dubious undertaking, because for now the United States is fully capable of ignoring Russia’s signals and avoiding a nuclear conflict. Ukraine is not Cuba.”
- “One key aspect of the Cuban Missile Crisis was that Moscow and Washington initially created a back channel along intelligence lines. ... Repeating this back-channel diplomacy feat would be constructive, but following all the diplomatic ousters, there are no good candidates for it left in Moscow and Washington.”
- “Ukraine has stopped seeing its relationship with Turkey as part of its partnership with the West. In a way, this is what Erdogan had long been trying to achieve: to become more self-sufficient on the global stage, and stand between the West and the non-Western world. For a long time, Ukraine either did not notice or simply chose to ignore those intricacies: Turkey is, after all, a NATO member. Now the Russian invasion has forced Kyiv to take a more realistic view of Turkish foreign policy.”
- “This is not to say that a rupture in relations between the two countries is in the cards. Ukraine and Turkey will remain partners, but it will be a more ad hoc and pragmatic partnership than ever. Both the Ukrainian government and public will always question Turkey’s positions and its reliability as an ally, and Ukraine’s growing dependence on the EU and United States may exacerbate that trend, especially if Turkey continues to drift away from the West. The no less ad hoc partnership between Turkey and Russia will limit the development of Ukrainian-Turkish relations. Still, for the foreseeable future, Turkey will remain an indispensable intermediary in the Ukraine–Russia–West triangle—simply because no one else managed to play this nearly hopeless role more successfully and produce any deliverables.”
Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:
- “Strategically speaking, for Russia, the coast off Murmansk where nuclear strike forces are stationed will continue to take precedence over the Baltic Sea, notwithstanding the latter’s importance to the transport routes linking St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad. Hence, in part, the tendency of the Russian media—particularly pro-Kremlin talk shows—to downplay the news of Finland and Sweden’s upcoming entry into NATO. Even the newly hawkish former president and prime minister Dmitry Medvedev, while on a visit to the Russian north at the end of July, chose not to raise a fuss about the matter, instead repeating the Kremlin’s boilerplate warning that ‘Finland and Sweden’s decision to join NATO is a serious mistake to which Russia will give a symmetrical response.’”
- “Still, a glance at a map is sufficient to understand that in the longer term, the accession of two northern states to the alliance will carry serious political and psychological consequences for Moscow, though what precise form those consequences will take is not yet clear. Russia’s long border with Finland runs for 1,300 kilometers, a corridor of wooded and sparsely populated land from Murmansk to St. Petersburg. How Moscow plans to defend it remains to be seen. At the moment, the units guarding it are being rapidly redeployed to fight—and in many cases, to die—in Ukraine. The once-daunting Russian army’s grievous losses in Ukraine have revealed its true state. With Ukrainians unwilling to surrender and Putin unwilling to retreat, the war is set to be resolved on the battlefield. It will shape Russia’s fate above all else. After all, the real czars are victors, while the vanquished are mere pretenders.”
“What Caused the Ukraine War?”, Harvard’s Joseph S. Nye, Jr, Project Syndicate, 10.04.22.
- “We know from Putin’s own writings, and from various biographers like Philip Short, that the intermediate cause was a refusal to see Ukraine as a legitimate state.”
- “Putin wants to restore what he calls the ‘Russian world,’ and, as he has approached the age of 70, he has been thinking about his legacy. Earlier leaders, like Peter the Great, had expanded Russian power in their own time. Given the weakness of the Western sanctions that followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 2014, Putin seems to have asked himself: Why not go further?”
- “The prospect of NATO enlargement was a lesser intermediate cause. While the West did create a NATO-Russia Council through which Russian military officers could attend some NATO meetings, Russia expected more from the relationship. ... NATO’s decision at its 2008 summit in Bucharest to include Ukraine (and Georgia) as potential future members simply confirmed Putin’s worst expectations about the West.”
- “In the early years, Clinton and Yeltsin made a serious effort to develop good relations. But while the U.S. provided loans and economic assistance to Russian Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar’s government, Russians expected much more.”
- “None of this means that the Ukraine war was inevitable. But it did become increasingly probable over time. On Feb. 24, 2022, Putin miscalculated and lit the match that started the conflagration. It is hard to see him putting it out.”
- “The longer Russia’s war in Ukraine goes on, the dumber President Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade appears. It is not just his decision to go to war in the first place but also the ham-fisted way that Russia has fought the war and the utterly tone-deaf manner by which it has tried to defend its actions. Instead of focusing laser-like on Russia’s security concerns (i.e., its long-standing fear of open-ended NATO expansion and especially the U.S. effort to turn Ukraine into a Western bulwark on the Russian border), Putin and his cronies mixed that message with a bunch of dubious claims about the ‘natural unity’ of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, thereby reinforcing the impression that all he really wanted was to re-create the old Soviet/Russian empire. Even if that was his aim, why broadcast it?”
China-Russia: Allied or aligned?
- “[T]he Chinese leadership confronts a major foreign policy dilemma in its relations with Russia. China’s power on the world stage, geopolitical interests and view of the post-Cold War world order all differ profoundly from those of Russia. China is a rising global power that has benefited greatly from post-Cold War economic globalization while Russia has been substantially weakened by the post-Cold War international order.”
- “Chinese leaders ... believe that, following Russia’s potentially fatal loss of this war, the U.S. and its allies will focus their efforts on defeating China, the country that some in Washington perceive to be the ‘most formidable enemy.’”
- “The ongoing mutually reinforced fear and animosity between China and the United States in both the regional and global security domains will likely continue in the years to come. The intriguing China-Russia relationship, especially its future trajectory, should be understood in this broader context.”
- “As a potential Russian defeat comes into view that threatens to undermine China’s grand revisionist agenda, Xi will, perhaps sooner than he would prefer, need to consider taking bolder steps to boost Russia’s economy and war-fighting capabilities. Such support, at least at first, will probably fall well short of violating sanctions.”
- “Nevertheless, it is difficult to fathom a scenario in which China puts Russia’s needs squarely above its own, at least not without a clear return on investment or compelling evidence that such assistance will meaningfully shift the war’s momentum in Russia’s favor. Pushback from parts of China’s vast party-state may also inhibit more intense Chinese support, with different bureaucratic constituencies fearful that violating sanctions could seriously detract from their ability to meet Xi’s ambitious development targets.”
- “In short, Beijing will face paralysis by analysis, a quandary all too familiar from its current reticence to institute the painful but needed reforms to stabilize China’s rapidly cooling economy. And while China may yet hope that its economic woes will resolve themselves in due course, time may not be on Russia’s side. Just as troubling is that Beijing cannot fix what truly ills Putin’s war effort: massive failures of strategy, organization, command, and logistics, as well as severe shortages of manpower. As a result, Xi’s key challenge going forward may have less to do with making sure Putin wins, and more with figuring out just how far China is willing to go to make sure Putin does not lose. That may not sound much like a match made in heaven. But remember that no one ever said it would be.”
Missile defense:
- No significant developments.
Nuclear arms:
Twitter thread on the probability of nuclear war, GCRI’s Seth Baum, 10.09.22.
- “1) There isn’t going to be any clarity on how large the probability is. It’s too opaque, too complex, too fast-moving. 2) In this instance, it’s OK to lack clarity on the probability. Sound policy & decision-making can proceed regardless … 3) I am especially worried about endgame scenarios in which Ukraine keeps winning and Russia/Putin run out of other options. … The endgame scenarios worry me because Russia/Putin may have incentive for nuclear attack. They’ve put so much on the line, it’s hard to just walk away. In that regard, the current moment is more worrisome than even the Cuban missile crisis—though let’s let the historians judge.”
- “Point #1: The probability of nuclear war is quantifiable, but only under certain forms of probability theory, especially subjective/Bayesian probability theory, in which probability is ‘quantification of a personal belief’ … if we accept the validity of estimates of the probability of sports teams winning championships, then we have to also accept the validity of estimates of the probability of nuclear war. Both are subjective judgments of novel events. … Knowledgeable experts are likely to disagree, and it’s very difficult to resolve who’s right.”
- “[W]here do I stand on the probability? Instead of getting caught up on numbers, I am focused on the practical implications. I’m not yet at ‘head for the hills,’ but there still is a significant risk that demands attention. Things can change rapidly, but for now, the situation is still not completely terrible as @pwnallthethings points out. Perhaps we’ll learn more soon regarding Russia’s response to the Kerch attack. … Meanwhile, whatever the probability may be, we should actively try to reduce it. That's the take-away message, and it doesn't depend on exact probability numbers.”2
- “To a great degree I think Americans have lost their fear of nuclear war in the post–Cold War period. ... But in fact, the dangers of escalation to nuclear levels have gone up, not down, over the past several years. In part, it’s because a number of the guardrails we established in the Cold War … have gone away. And finally, the most important thing, in times of crisis … there was direct communication between Washington and Moscow to make sure things didn’t get out of hand … We don’t have that dialogue right now.”
- “Like Japan in the lead-up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Russians think that what they have at stake in Ukraine is existential, that unless they defend what they perceive as a vital redline there, that Russia’s existence is at stake. And when states feel that way, they can do things that appear quite reckless to outsiders.”
- “I think we had opportunities before this war to find a compromise, but the United States refused to explore those opportunities. ... That does not mean, however, that crisis management diplomacy between the United States and Russia is impossible. I think the Russians would like that kind of dialogue to go on.”
- [When asked: And what about the issue of giving in to nuclear blackmail? Won’t that, as Timothy Snyder recently argued, create a precedent that makes future war and future nuclear war more likely?] “In short, I think that’s nonsense. The history of the Cold War puts the lie to that belief. The United States and the Soviet Union recognized they were essentially co-hostages with each other … ‘Giving in to nuclear blackmail’ did not in fact encourage new crises. It helped establish some norms, some of which were formalized, some of which were tacit about what was permissible and what wasn’t.”
- “I don’t think the U.S. government should put the security of the American people in the hands of the Ukrainian government. … Ideally, we should be talking privately to the Ukrainians, saying that we believe we need to find a negotiated settlement. And we should be warning them privately that any attempt to reconquer Crimea—as morally justified as that may be—would very likely spark a nuclear response from Russia and therefore is something the United States government strongly opposes.”
“The best way to control nuclear escalation is simply to not start it,” interview with Konstantin Bogdanov by Fyodor Lukyanov, Mezhdunarodnaya Panorama/Russia in Global Affairs, 10.05.22. Clues from Russian Views.
- “If we look, for example, at the documents defining the Russian state policy in the field of nuclear deterrence, we will see that they explicitly say that ambiguity about the scale, composition and nature of the forces used constitute the basis of an effective nuclear deterrence. ... [W]e cannot give a potential adversary the opportunity to maneuver on a narrow patch, the adversary must always be afraid that the slightest additional escalation on his part will lead to ... instantly crossing the nuclear threshold. It is this fear that should deter the enemy.” That creating such fear is critical for effective nuclear deterrence is something that has also been recently acknowledged by other experts on both the U.S. and Russian sides (see, for instance, George Beebe’s interview and Dmitri Trenin’s interview).
- “All nuclear deterrence is based on potentials, but in many respects these potentials exist in our minds, and since the wind is running in the minds now, the current state of affairs constitutes a specific situation that is testing the strength of the world order.”
- “Many volumes have been written on escalation control theories, but no one knows how to manage it. ... [O]ne paradox is that the best way to control escalation is simply to not start it, because in the end everything will come to massive [nuclear] exchanges. It won’t lead to the death of humanity, but it will constitute the end of the modern type of civilization.”
- “There are two problems [with regard to testing a nuclear weapon to signal resolve]. Firstly, the test will lead to the absolute destruction of international norms, and this is a very bad signal, including from the point of view of nuclear non-proliferation. Secondly, we will not demonstrate anything to anyone, since our visual culture, brought up on Hollywood blockbusters, will digest this nuclear explosion in a few seconds.”
- “Putin does not want nuclear war, because it could escalate and mean the end of Russia. However, he wants Ukraine and the West to believe that he and Russia could go nuclear. In doing so, Putin hopes to intimidate Kyiv into negotiating an end to the conflict on Moscow’s terms, while using the nuclear threat to persuade the West to cease its flow of arms and other assistance to the Ukrainians.”
- “If Moscow were to set down a nuclear path, it would have no idea—and even less control over—where it would lead. While Putin may understand that, will he make another miscalculation? And if he did, would senior Russia military leaders carry out an order that they understand would be fraught with risk for Russia? The possibility of a Putin miscalculation remains a worry, but Western leaders also need to consider what would happen were they to accede to the Kremlin’s nuclear blackmail and cease support for Ukraine. They have to ask what would come next.”
- “On Oct. 9, Biden and Scholz spoke by phone, and the two agreed that Russian nuclear threats were ‘irresponsible’ and that the consequences of any Russian nuclear use would be ‘extremely serious.’ Senior Western defense and military officials should be conveying this message directly to Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. They may well have a fuller appreciation of the risks and consequences for Russia. Western diplomats should also be engaging their Chinese, Indian and other counterparts in the Global South to orchestrate a barrage of ‘don’t do it’ messages.”
- “Putin has put in play a nuclear threat to send a political signal regarding an action that, all things considered, the Kremlin has strong reasons not to take. The West nevertheless cannot ignore the risk but has compelling motivations to continue to support Ukraine and must ensure that it gets its political signaling to Moscow right.”
“Putin’s Apocalyptic End Game in Ukraine: Annexation and Mobilization Make Nuclear War More Likely,” Tatiana Stanovaya of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, FA, 10.06.22. Clues from Russian Views.
- “For six decades, the Cuban missile crisis has been viewed as the defining confrontation of the modern age, the world’s closest brush with nuclear annihilation. The war in Ukraine presents perils of at least equal magnitude, particularly now that Vladimir Putin has backed himself into a corner by declaring large chunks of neighboring Ukraine as belonging to Russia ‘forever.’”
- “While the war in Ukraine is obviously different from the Cuban missile crisis, it is not hard to imagine comparable failures and miscalculations.”
- “A stray shell from either side could cause an accident at a nuclear power plant, spewing radioactive fallout over much of Europe.”
- “A bungled attempt by Russia to interdict Western military supplies to Ukraine could spill over into NATO countries like Poland, triggering an automatic U.S. response.”
- “A Russian decision to use tactical nuclear weapons against Ukrainian troop formations could escalate into a full-blown nuclear exchange with the United States.”
- “The most dangerous phase of the Cuban missile crisis lasted just 13 days; we are already in the eighth month of the war in Ukraine, with no end in sight. The longer it drags on, the greater the threat of some terrible miscalculation.”
- “Could internal critiques deter Putin [from using nuclear weapons]? Perhaps, if they gain in number. Working out what will deter Putin is the question of the moment. The U.S. and NATO have been firm about the devastating consequences of a Russian nuclear attack, and the three-part response: political, economic and military. The political deterrent might turn out to be surprisingly effective. … Overall, the threat of further economic sanctions is probably the least effective deterrent against Putin. ... Which brings us to military deterrence.”
- “Washington has made it clear that a military response is on the table. Options may range from kinetic attacks, perhaps on Russian targets in Ukraine, perhaps on Russian military sites responsible for the attack. No doubt, the response would be carefully planned to avoid escalation and conventional (rather than nuclear) in nature. Another possibility is a non-kinetic response, perhaps using offensive cyber means.”
- “There is little enthusiasm for these options in NATO capitals, however. Military options are there for deterrence, rather than any desire to strike Russian targets. It is a dangerous moment, and one we should do our utmost to unwind. Which brings us to diplomacy. Is there any chance that negotiation could change Putin’s calculus? The Cuban missile crisis ended with a quiet bargain—the U.S. would remove its missiles from Turkey and the USSR would remove its missiles from Cuba. With Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence at stake, there is no obvious trade.”
- “But some quiet nuclear diplomacy might produce results. Two years ago, Putin offered to remove Russia’s new ground-based intermediate-range nuclear missile from Europe under verifiable conditions, thus underpinning a moratorium on such missiles in Europe. When Putin and Xi Jinping met in Beijing prior to the February invasion, they spoke of extending such a moratorium to Asia. Perhaps it is time to launch discreet talks, if only at a technical level, to explore what the two men had in mind. It would not solve the horrendous crisis in Ukraine, but it might lower the nuclear temperature.”
“Putin's Nuclear Threat Is Real,” WSJ’s Walter Russell Mead, WSJ, 10.03.22.
- “Yielding to Russian blackmail over Ukraine would be a massive blow to American credibility and power overseas and would look weak to Americans who have cheered Ukraine on. Yet deterring a Russian attack involves the risk of a deepening American engagement in an escalating war. Mr. Putin's armies are in headlong retreat across much of Ukraine. His support at home looks threatened. But the threat he poses to vital American interests must not be underestimated, and the threat that he will use nuclear weapons in Ukraine is real.”
“How the war in Ukraine has remade Europe,” WP’s David Ignatius, WP, 10.05.22.
- “As Ukrainian troops surged forward on the ground this week, European leaders who gathered at a conference here were heady with what many described as an impending Ukrainian triumph over Russian President Vladimir Putin and the lawless, autocratic system he represents. The victory celebration is stirring but wildly premature. Many months of bloody fighting probably lie ahead, with the danger growing that Russia might use tactical nuclear weapons in an effort to stave off defeat. But politicians from across Europe seemed so galvanized by Ukraine's recent battlefield success that many dismissed the dangers of Russian escalation and what could be a cold winter for an energy-short Europe.”
- “The war in Ukraine has largely reversed Europe's phobia about the utility of military power—and the value of a strong alliance with the United States.”
- “The most surprising theme of this gathering was the dismissal of Putin's nuclear threats. Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki said the saber-rattling was just ‘an attempt to frighten us.’ Tactical nuclear weapons ‘will gain nothing militarily,’ agreed Lithuania's former foreign and defense minister Linas Linkevicius. Adm. Rob Bauer, a Norwegian who chairs the NATO military committee, said that despite Russian nuclear threats, ‘strategically, they have lost the war already.’”
- “As it has been repeatedly explained, the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation and the Fundamentals of State Policy in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence remain unchanged. The attempts of Washington and its vassals to distort this reality and our position are aimed at intimidating the international community, at forcing its sane part to follow the failed course of recklessly supporting Kyiv in all its adventures.”
Counterterrorism:
- No significant developments.
Conflict in Syria:
- No significant developments.
Cyber security:
- No significant developments.
Energy exports from CIS:
- “[T]he West isn't helpless in defending itself against a weaponized energy sector. Its greatest asset will be found in its corporations, not in conventional armies. There is no better example than the Yom Kippur War, the last time the energy weapon was deployed in earnest.”
- “[T]he oil embargo remained in place … from October 1973 to March 1974 ... But while Western governments flailed, their largest oil companies got to work. Intensive negotiations between Exxon and its counterparts, including Texaco and Mobil, led to an agreement on how to coordinate shipments and minimize disruptions. Oil produced in Arab countries would be redirected to non-embargoed countries—and oil produced elsewhere would be sent to embargoed nations.”
- “Corporations today earn their fair share of scorn, some of which is deserved. They're no more angels than humans are. But more important is that they've proved themselves uniquely talented vessels for bringing together talent, industry and technology in the name of peace and progress. Far from mindless avatars of greed, they are indispensable tools for promoting the public good. As winter in Europe approaches, we need such corporate might more than ever.”
“The Saudi prince’s ominous axis with Putin,” FT’s Edward Luce, FT, 10.07.22.
- “We should not be in the slightest bit surprised that Saudi Arabia is now overtly helping Russia in its war on Ukraine with the latest 2 million barrel a day cut announced on Wednesday by OPEC+. The move is a twin salvo aimed at Joe Biden’s administration.”
- “One salvo will boost U.S. petrol prices less than a month before the U.S. midterm elections—an inflationary hit that will weaken Democratic chances of retaining control of Congress.”
- “The other will help Russia’s coffers in its illegal and brutal war on Ukraine. None of this should come as a shock.”
- “I cannot forecast the precise impact the OPEC+ move will have on oil prices, though they are expected to go above $100 a barrel again.”
“Putin and M.B.S. Are Laughing at Us,” NYT’s Thomas L. Friedman, NYT, 10.06.22.
- “On Wednesday [Oct. 5], with the world already heading toward recession and with the global oil and natural gas market already tight, the OPEC Plus cartel, which includes Saudi Arabia and Russia, agreed to collectively reduce its output by two million barrels a day—to ensure oil prices don't retreat, but instead go back over $100 a barrel and stay there.”
- “Putin and Saudi de facto ruler Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman are also probably hoping that the soaring energy inflation unleashed since Russia's invasion helps the Donald Trump-led Republicans to regain control of at least the House of Representatives in next month's elections. That would be icing on the cake for both, who view Trump as a president who still loves black crude over green solar and knows how to look the other way when bad things happen to good people.”
- “If we want to make a difference, we need to maximize our energy security, natural security and economic security, all at once. The only way to do that effectively is to incentivize our market to produce a stable and secure supply of energy, with the lowest possible emissions at the lowest possible costs as fast as possible. The only truly effective way to do that is with a strong price signal—either taxes on dirty stuff or incentives for clean stuff—plus steadily increasing clean energy standards for power generation along the lines proposed by Hal Harvey and Justin Gillis in their new book 'The Big Fix: Seven Practical Steps to Save Our Planet.'”
- “Energy is like the blood running through the veins of our economies. But it is becoming clotted by Russia’s aggressive actions. Households and companies face exorbitant energy bills. The EU’s energy imports in the first half of 2022 amounted to almost €380 billion, which is close to what we usually pay for an entire year. Our energy trade deficit is likely to double in 2022, reaching about 5% of gross domestic product.”
- “Our common energy strategy should have four goals.”
- “First, reducing our consumption.”
- “Second, we need to ensure security of supply.”
- “Third, we must get prices down.”
- “Our common energy strategy should reinforce the cohesion of our single market.”
- “A review of every large LNG development project, liquefaction terminal and production field shows that this year alone, more than 100 billion cubic meters of additional supply is expected to be brought online. This is a 20% increase in total LNG supply. With demand for LNG declining in the rest of the world, particularly in China, the new additions to global supply are enough to fully replace Europe’s dependence on Russian gas from the Nord Stream and Ukrainian transit pipelines. So much for Putin’s ‘gas supply crunch.’”
- “All the data suggest that, contrary to fears of a supply crunch, Europe is securing enough gas and LNG from global markets to fully replace supplies from Russian gas. Putin, by contrast, will be losing what we conservatively estimate to be $100 billion from lost gas sales annually.”
- “Having undermined his country’s reputation as a reliable energy supplier, which the Soviet Union maintained even at the height of the cold war, Putin has very little existing export capacity and faces difficulties in building more given icy conditions and the challenges of Arctic shipping. The single pipeline connecting Russia to China carries 10% of the capacity of Russia’s European pipeline network, and China is not rushing to build any new ones.”
Climate change:
- No significant developments.
U.S.-Russian economic ties:
- No significant developments.
U.S.-Russian relations in general:
- “The question [is] whether Russia still has an offensive biological weapons program. ... Although there is no definitive proof—nor should one expect such proof from the current Russian government—there are numerous public indications that suggest that Russia has maintained and modernized the surviving parts of the Soviet biological weapons program. The indications include, but are not limited to, the Russian government’s repeated admission and subsequent, repeated denials that it had inherited a large part of the Soviet biological weapons program; press and other public accounts of continuing research into biological weapons (including non-lethal biological weapons); and the Russian pursuit of a disinformation campaign that is directed against the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and attempts to characterize it as a U.S. bioweapons effort. Meanwhile, the ‘debate’ and policy decisions regarding genetic weapons demonstrate that the Russian leadership is obsessed with the idea of a new generation of advanced bioweapons.”
- “It needs to be stressed that thanks to years of relentless Russian state-sponsored propaganda, many Russians take it for granted that the U.S. military has an offensive biological weapons program. According to a recent Russian survey, 84.4% of Russians have heard about a U.S. biological weapons program in Ukraine and 66.5% believe that bioweapons were being developed there.”
- “Even if genetic weapons are a dead-end, there are plenty of ways in which genetic engineering can be used to enhance existing bioweapons or develop entirely new ones. If nothing else, the last 30 years since the fall of the Soviet Union has demonstrated that the Russian government never abandoned the belief that biological weapons could play an important role in future warfare. It would be very foolish to ignore this belief and the threat it poses.”
- “Amid the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict, in which Washington has firmly taken Kyiv’s side, Russian public opinion toward America has deteriorated, as might be expected. But anti-Americanism in Russia has stayed below its peak values of 2014-2015, when the U.S. condemned and sanctioned Moscow for its annexation of Crimea and military support for separatists in Ukraine’s east. Why?”
- “Based on regularly conducted research by the Levada Center, at least three interrelated factors may help explain: First, negative attitudes toward the U.S. have been widespread for at least eight years, fluctuations notwithstanding, so U.S. policies perceived as aimed against Russia may simply seem like more of the same; second, younger audiences who get their news online have greater exposure to independent and/or pro-Western voices than they did just a few years ago; and, third, is the possibility that peak anti-Americanism is still ahead of us.”
II. Russia’s domestic policies
Domestic politics, economy and energy:
- “Based on my research, I argue that new leaders behave as if they are at risk of punishment for a failed war because they are at risk, often facing the same hard choice as their predecessors. … For any successor, the current state of Russian domestic politics would be a proverbial minefield and disincentivize any move to extricate Russia from the conflict, at least in the short term.”
- “If Putin departs office (voluntarily or not) with the war in Ukraine ongoing, his successor may elect to quit fighting, but the decision will not be easy or risk free, and this holds regardless of who replaces Putin, whether it is Medvedev, Sobyanin or even Navalny. “
- “Russia’s current domestic political environment, with its vicious blame game pitting political versus military leadership, would be especially problematic for a new political leader seeking to extricate Russia from the war. Looking at the historical record, many new leaders in comparable circumstances have decided to keep fighting an ongoing war or else push for peace only to have the extrication process drag on for years.”
- “It is difficult and probably pointless to predict the outcome of any wartime change of leadership in the case of Russia’s war in Ukraine. At a minimum, however, the West should not assume a change of leadership would result in an end to the war, at least in the short term, as Putin’s war could very well continue without Putin.”
“The World According to Patrushev,” RM Staff, RM, 10.07.22.
- “A great power that is politically, culturally and economically sovereign and self-sufficient, benefiting from the rise of the East while jealously watched by the financially, culturally and morally bankrupt West—that is Nikolai Patrushev's vision for a future Russia. The picture, in some domestic policy respects, is not very different from the one painted by Vladimir Sorokin in his novel ‘Day of the Oprichnik.’ For Sorokin, however, such a Russia is dystopian, while for Patrushev … it would be a dream come true, one he would likely pursue with even greater vigor were he to succeed Vladimir Putin as president of Russia.”
- “Generally speaking, Patrushev has been consistently hawkish in his public views since then-prime minister Putin lobbied his appointment as director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) in 1999. However, like Putin, Patrushev has not always been as hostile toward the West as he is today. … The hardliner also seemed to have a soft spot for Europe at the time, calling for ‘strengthening’ the EU in 2011 … More recently, Patrushev even implied that there was at one point a hypothetical possibility of a ‘political and economic union of Russia and Europe.’ Patrushev was also one of the few top Russian officials who did not initially support the immediate recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk ‘people’s republics’ as independent at a fateful Security Council meeting on Feb. 21; instead, he suggested another round of negotiations between the U.S. and Russia, even if it were to fail to yield results acceptable to Putin.”
- “Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, however, Patrushev quickly emerged as a leading proponent of the war, publicly justifying the invasion and promoting Moscow’s war aims in a spate of interviews and trips. According to Andrei Kolesnikov of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, these public appearances illustrate that Patrushev, unlike even Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, speaks for Putin, and is ‘allowed to explain and clarify Putin’s thoughts.’”
- “Will the state production of ideology—which reaches the population mostly through talk shows, patriotic pop culture initiatives and education—with its vagueness be enough to motivate citizens to support the war now that it touches many Russian families? Can the Russian elite itself become more imbued with beliefs like the ‘Front Philosophy’ and the ‘Ideology of Russian Victory’ proponents hope? Or will it be the Russian Orthodox Church—which I have not discussed here—and its promotion of a ‘holy war,’ that will see its narrative adopted by the state?”
- “The regime’s balancing act to avoid having the most reactionary lobbies dictating to the Presidential Administration heavier ideological indoctrination is becoming more difficult by the day. As a radical shift away from the regime’s usual policy of keeping people demobilized, the mobilization inevitably emboldens rabid militarists. And if ideological radicalization might not be needed to get people to go to war, it could in the forthcoming months be required to justify their deaths. Still, it would be challenging for the state to recreate the Soviet, multi-leveled system of propaganda, with official philosophers and an army of university instructors and teachers teaching the new doctrine, including everyday agitprop. The regime will likely have to continue to function with some ideological blurriness and improvised mechanisms for indoctrination/repression, to the great despair of the most radical groups.”
“Ukraine’s military success is reshaping Russia as well as the war,” The Economist, 10.06.22.
- “There is no sign of any immediate threat to Mr. Putin’s rule, although Moscow is rife with rumors of impending martial law and border closures. Fatalistic acceptance is widespread, just as it was during the pandemic, when perhaps 1 million Russians perished without any uproar. But a businessman describes a growing sense of his vulnerability by quoting from ‘The Jungle Book,’ a classic British children’s novel that is apparently a favorite of Mr. Putin: ‘When a leader of the Pack has missed his kill, he is called the Dead Wolf as long as he lives, which is not long.’ Even if that proves wishful thinking, no one would have said it a few months ago.”
Defense and aerospace:
- “The primary sources reflect a sustained perception by China and Russia that U.S. military activities related to space are threatening and demonstrate hostile intent.”
- “This perception partly encompasses the space-based threat to their respective nuclear deterrents and concerns related to U.S. counterspace capabilities and the ability of U.S. satellites to covertly fly close to space objects to inspect them and collect information.”
- “The condition of bilateral relations at a particular moment appears to shape each government's view of U.S. space activities. Yet, both countries tend toward confirmation bias, whereby more plausibly ‘aggressive’ U.S. activities tend to reinforce the perception that the U.S. military has a hostile intent in the space domain, whereas more plausibly cooperative U.S. initiatives are discounted as disingenuous.”
- “China and Russia generally attempt to strike a rhetorical balance of characterizing U.S. actions as threatening while characterizing their own, similar actions as nonthreatening.”
- “Washington, Beijing and Moscow appear to be caught in an action-reaction cycle that perpetuates justifications for continued military actions in space based on previous adversary activities.”
- “Both Chinese and Russian officials have contended that the United States has led the way to militarizing space, particularly since 2001, leaving them no choice but to take countervailing measures.”
- “Both countries point to the U.S. decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty as a key inflection point in U.S. efforts to weaponize space, and this is one of the few instances in which a causal relationship can be drawn between a U.S. action and a Russian counteraction.”
- See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.
Security, law-enforcement and justice:
- No significant developments.
III. Russia’s relations with other countries
Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:
- “Russia will end 2022 a far less attractive partner to India than it was at the year’s beginning. Its appeal as a source of weapons has been shot to hell in Kyiv, Kharkiv and now Kherson. Unlike China, India can hardly rely on Russian hydrocarbons in the long-term even if it has reached out for a few short-term bargains over the past months. Above all, India prizes global stability, and Moscow has shown itself to be a profoundly destabilizing force.”
- “We in India should ... consider more carefully whether alienating the U.S. and the West is really worth it. ... [I]f the next decade is to transform our economy and young Indians’ futures, we will need Western investment, technology and markets. If we are to secure ourselves against Pakistan and China, we will need Western weaponry, at least in the short term.”
Ukraine:
- No significant developments.
Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:
- “In trying and failing to reclaim Russian imperial influence over Ukraine, Moscow is actively accelerating the decline of its influence throughout Eurasia, including the former Soviet countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia.”
- “Perceiving the fragility of Russian power, governments across the region have begun creating facts on the ground in ways that Russia’s post-imperial power long prevented. Since the start of the ‘special military operation’ against Ukraine, worried neighbors like Kazakhstan have been demonstratively spurning Russia.”
- “In the past few weeks, Eurasia has also seen a renewal of conflicts that could be a harbinger of greater instability to come. Regional powers, especially China and Turkey, are more openly pushing back against Russian influence. And now Russia’s mobilization has touched off a flood of migration to other Eurasian states—particularly Armenia, Georgia and Kazakhstan. This is reversing a longstanding pattern of migration to Russia and bringing many ordinary Russians face-to-face with the resentment still felt in many post-colonial societies.”
- “These developments are the first signs of what is likely to be one of the war’s more enduring outcomes: a diminution of Russian influence throughout post-Soviet Eurasia and the emergence of a more dynamic, if complex, regional order. In other words, it is exactly the opposite outcome that Moscow hoped to achieve with its invasion of Ukraine and effective occupation of Belarus. As the resurgence of fighting in both the South Caucasus and Central Asia suggests, the retreat of Russian influence could allow simmering disputes to boil over and create new suffering for people in the region. Over the longer term though, it could contribute to the emergence of stronger, more effective states—especially if the United States and its European allies can provide a more liberal alternative to the growing influence of countries like China and Turkey.”
- “Last month, soldiers from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan exchanged gunfire along several points of the countries’ un-demarcated border. After a brief cease-fire, fierce fighting resumed and escalated from border areas into the territory of Kyrgyzstan, hitting remote areas of Osh province. Tajikistan’s military destroyed a bridge crossing the Ak-Suu River, residential areas, and businesses. The Tajik military then occupied and erected a flag on a public school in Dostuk village in Batken province. Kyrgyzstan shelled Tajikistan’s border areas well. The conflict was among the most serious interstate military escalations in Central Asia’s history since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.”
- “The conflict reveals the limitations of both China- and Russia-led regional security organizations in Central Asia. Both states clashed when China, Russia and Central Asian countries were gathering at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan—just 200 miles away from the Kyrgyz-Tajik border.”
- “The SCO’s reluctance to resolve conflicts among its members reveals how it is limited to promoting only China’s security interests in the region. Beijing is interested primarily in strong regimes in Central Asia that will suppress the Uyghur minority and support China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the region. It has made clear that its Central Asian members must find other venues for solving intraregional territorial disputes.”
- “Likewise, both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are members of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which historically chose not to intervene in interstate conflicts among its members. The only time it acted in unity and deployed troops to a member state’s territory was to suppress demonstrations in Kazakhstan this January.”
- “Unlike the renewed fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which has been widely attributed to Russia’s weakening, the aggression in Central Asia is driven mostly by domestic factors. If the Russian president still plays a role in the conflict, it is from a position of strength, not weakness.”
- “Neither China nor Russia wants growing instability in Central Asia, even if it involves smaller countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are heavily indebted to China. Both also have hundreds of thousands of migrant laborers working in Russia. Yet, even with strong economic influence, neither country can deliver on security guarantees for conflicts in Central Asia. Instead, the clashes exposed both the SCO’s and the CSTO’s inadequacy in preventing the escalation of tensions among their member states.”
- “The fate of Ukraine shows that the challenges of state-building on the ruins of the communist empire are just one step away from an apocalyptic, large-scale war in the spirit of the twentieth century. Post-Soviet countries that are smaller and less important to the West than Ukraine have the most to fear as geopolitical balances are put to the test. But all are vigilant, even Belarus, where the Russian invasion has ‘changed the structural environment of the Belarusian regime and complicated prospects for its survival,’ write Ryhor Nizhnikau and Arkady Moshes. Indeed, Russia is larger and more powerful than all the other former Soviet countries combined by every parameter—population, territory, economy, military—even if it appears provisionally hesitant and weak.”
“Russia’s Mass Exodus Is Forcing Its Neighbors to Get Off the Fence,” Kommersant’s Kirill Krivosheev, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 10.05.22. Clues from Russian Views.
- “As more Russians flee to neighboring countries and more nationals of those countries go to fight in Ukraine, their governments will find it increasingly difficult to ignore these developments. In the seven months since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the other former Soviet states have been adhering to a set of unwritten rules. Moscow realized that putting excessive pressure on its neighbors could destabilize the region, and therefore refrained from making too many demands of them.”
- “Russia’s post-Soviet neighbors are likely to continue to distance themselves as far as possible from the problems Moscow creates and refrain from comments, or at least limit them to cautious phrases about the ‘sanctity of states’ territorial integrity.’ But as more Russians flee to neighboring countries and more citizens of those countries join the fight in Ukraine, their governments will find it increasingly difficult to ignore these developments. Sooner or later, they will have to call it what it is, especially because the public is likely to support any criticism of Moscow. So far, Kazakhstan is the only country to have openly refused to recognize Moscow’s recent sham referendums in occupied Ukrainian territory. Tokayev, who has previously described the Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics as ‘quasi-states,’ is clearly enjoying his newfound reputation as a maverick who has thrown down the gauntlet to Putin. Others will likely follow suit.”
Footnotes
- Here and elsewhere italicized text represents contextual commentary by RM staff.
- The chart was originally published in "A Model For The Probability Of Nuclear War," Seth Baum, Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, 03.08.18.
News Archive