Russia Analytical Report, Aug. 1-8, 2022
6 Ideas to Explore
- Kuchma cautions against wishful thinking on Putin’s or Russia’s imminent demise. Looking ahead at the conflict with Russia, post-Soviet Ukraine’s second president, Leonid Kuchma, warns the BBC’s audience not to expect that Putin will soon die or that sanctions are about to kill Russia economically or that ordinary Russians will see the light and join anti-war protests. Ukraine must “decide everything on the battlefield,” Kuchma told the BBC.
- Designating Russia a state sponsor of terrorism is a bad idea, according to Ingrid Brunk Wuerth of Vanderbilt Law School. Among other things, such a designation by the U.S. “would allow Americans to recover from the frozen [Russian] assets, but not Ukrainians,” she writes in WaPo. Moreover, most sanctions triggered by a state sponsor of terrorism designation are already in place, she writes.
- Russian military’s reliance on Western microelectronics bodes ill for Russia’s war in Ukraine, according to RUSI. After examining 27 modern Russian weapons systems and pieces of military equipment used in the war against Ukraine, experts at this British defense think tank, working in partnership with Reuters, have concluded that the specimens contain 450 unique microelectronic components made in the U.S. (the vast majority), Europe and East Asia. Russia does not have a clear alternative for producing analogous components domestically, nor would import substitution be enough to offset the volumes required to replace those expended or lost in Ukraine, RUSI’s experts write.
- 5+ months into Ukraine war, many cyber experts are still asking the wrong questions, such as when the cyber war will start, according to Brandon Valeriano’s blistering criticism of the Western cyber community. “When a cyber conflict did not materialize, pundits fell back on the typical claim that it was really happening, but we just couldn’t see it,” Valeriano writes in The National Interest. The Cato Institute fellow suggests an alternative: “How about we study the impact of cyber actions on behavior first before providing strategic solutions?”
- Few of the world’s major powers are content with the international order as it exists, but none of the significant revisionist powers has a compelling vision of what a revised order might look like, in the view of Shivshankar Menon, a former national security adviser to India’s PM. As for Russia, it never really fit into the world order that Western powers tried to squeeze it into and resented its decline after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Menon writes in Foreign Affairs.
- The Gulag archipelago is returning as one of Russia’s main production units. That is the conclusion reached by Andrei Kolesnikov of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace based on a senior Russian prison service official’s claim that inmates participating in correctional labor programs across Russia can make up for IKEA’s exit from the country’s market.
I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda
Nuclear security and safety:
- No significant developments.
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:
- No significant developments.
Iran and its nuclear program:
- No significant developments.
Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:
- “For Ukraine to keep fighting and win, it needs not only much more weaponry but also larger-scale economic support. Since the beginning of the war, Ukraine has received external support to the tune of $2.5 billion-$3 billion a month. The expected external funding for the second half of 2022 is $18 billion—a significant sum, but well below the nation’s needs. To avert economic calamity in Ukraine and sustain its ability to fight, the allies must disburse much larger amounts of about $4 billion-$5 billion a month in the nearest future.”
- “Every day of the war means more lives lost, children traumatized and homes destroyed. The economic cost of the war is no less staggering and it touches everybody—from ruined infrastructure in Ukraine to the specter of hunger in Africa and elsewhere. Ukraine must win this war and win it quickly. But a long war increasingly looks like the baseline scenario. This requires recalibrating macroeconomic policies in Ukraine and allied countries to make sure that Ukraine’s economy can sustain the war effort as long as necessary.”
“US must open its doors to more Ukrainian refugees,” Editorial Board, The Boston Globe, 08.04.22.
- “The United States has been, belatedly, generous in keeping up the flow of arms needed by the Ukrainian government to fight that war and in providing humanitarian aid to those still in Ukraine caught in its horrifying grasp. But it hasn't even come close to meeting a broader commitment to help the many seeking nothing more than a temporary haven from a war their own government did not start but is determined not to lose.”
- “The war is far from over. And the human tragedy that has become a daily part of it could conceivably get worse as Russia continues to bombard civilian areas, wiping out apartment buildings, turning hospitals and schools to rubble.”
- “Keeping the door open here to those forced to flee, including those without sponsors, is one more way to support the Ukrainian war effort and be true to the best of American ideals. It's a way to turn good intentions into demonstrably good works.”
Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:
Interview with former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma: "Putin wanted to destroy Ukraine, but he will get our rebirth," BBC, 08.04.22. Clues From Russian Views
- “I have had no illusions about the aggressive nature of Putin's Russia since 2003, when, during Moscow's first attempt at encroachment on Ukrainian Crimea, I gave the order to shoot to kill if the Russians tried to break into our island of Tuzla.”
- “I believe that Putin invaded because he did not believe that someone would punish him for this. … It seems to me that, in fact, if we talk about the emotional component, Putin today would like everything to turn around, like in a fairy tale, to rewind. So that Feb. 24 never was. After all, the blitzkrieg failed, and failed as a result of Putin's fatal miscalculation. That's right—it was a fatal miscalculation in criminal plans, and not some kind of innocent ‘mistake’ that those who want to ‘save face’ for Putin talk about.”
- “Putin wanted the destruction of the Ukrainian state, but will get our rebirth. … Personally, I see no alternative for Ukraine to NATO membership.”
- “First of all—do not expect that Putin is about to die. That sanctions are about to kill Russia economically. That the Russian inhabitant will suddenly begin to see clearly and come out to an anti-war protest. Nothing like that will happen. Ukraine must fight and decide everything on the battlefield.”
- “I exclude the use of the Russian strategic potential. I don't believe in it at all. A state can resort to strategic nuclear weapons only if there is a real threat to its very existence, or in response to an already struck blow, as some kind of ‘retribution from the other world.’ ... With regard to tactical nuclear weapons, here, unfortunately, the situation is more complicated.”
- “RUSI staff and partners inspected 27 Russian weapons systems and pieces of military equipment lost or expended since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In partnership with Reuters, RUSI identified at least 450 unique microelectronic components inside these systems that were produced by companies based in the U.S., Europe and East Asia. The preponderance of foreign-made components inside these systems reveals that Russia’s war machine is heavily reliant on imports of sophisticated microelectronics to operate effectively.”
- “Of the 450 components found by RUSI in Russian military systems, 317 appear to have been made by U.S. companies. Components from Japan, Taiwan, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany, China, South Korea, the U.K., Austria and others were also present.”
- “[T]he vast majority appear to have been designed and manufactured by 56 U.S.-based companies. However, over 200 of the components appear to have been manufactured by only 10 of these companies. Among the 450 components, approximately 18% are covered by the U.S. export control regime for their possible application in military systems.”
- “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has not gone to plan, and the country’s military is having to expend large volumes of its weapons and equipment for small gains. Considering the preponderance of components manufactured in the West and East Asia in these systems, Russia does not have a clear alternative for the production of analogous components domestically, nor would import substitution be enough to offset the volumes required to replace those expended or lost in Ukraine.”
- “As a result, the country may have to either design or produce less capable replacements, or engage in sanctions evasion activities to acquire the necessary components. Understanding how Russia evades sanctions to import critical technology provides the opportunity for a multinational effort to curtail the replacement of Russia's tools of military aggression.”
Punitive measures related to Ukraine and their impact globally:
- “The bottom line of this rough analysis is that both the United States and the EU, if they want to, could switch to fueling their reactors with uranium and enrichment work purchased from sources other than Russia. But this would have a relatively small impact on Russia’s trade balance—only about a billion dollars or about half of a percent of Russia’s earnings from the export of oil and natural gas. Indeed, the increase in world prices of oil and natural gas caused by its invasion of Ukraine has already given Russia extra income that dwarfs any losses it would experience from its uranium or enrichment sales.”
- “How much would it cost? Replacing Russian uranium and enrichment services from other sources—if available—could raise concerns about increasing uranium and enrichment costs to U.S. and EU utilities. But these costs are small in comparison to other nuclear costs. The overall cost of nuclear power is mostly driven by the capital investment and salaries for the 500 to 800 people who tend each nuclear power reactor. In 2021, the average costs of uranium and enrichment for U.S. nuclear utilities were $90 per kilogram of natural uranium and $100 per SWU, respectively. For a typical reactor, their combined contributions would be about 4% of the average retail price of 10.6 cents for a kilowatt-hour in the United States in 2020.”
- “If the net effect of shifting away from Russian uranium and enrichment were to cause as much as a 50% increase in the cost of uranium and SWUs to US utilities, it would increase the retail cost of nuclear power by only 2%—much less than June’s year-over-year general inflation rates of about 9% in both the United States and the European Union. The cost of ending dependence on Russia’s nuclear services pales in comparison to the costs Putin’s war has already inflicted on the U.S. and EU economies.”
- “To some degree, today’s high energy prices reflect the anticipation of traders that restrictions on Russian oil are coming down the line. But crude oil prices were increasing for months before the invasion and before the west announced any sanctions.”
- “What is more, West Texas Intermediate and Brent crude oil prices have been coming down steadily since early June, just as Russia’s crude exports began to decline. The claim that current oil prices are a result of the minimal restrictions imposed by western governments on Russia’s fossil fuel exports does not stand up to scrutiny.”
- “Big energy companies … bear far more responsibility for the pain that energy consumers are feeling. Companies such as BP & Shell in the U.K., which made $8.5 billion and $11.5 billion respectively from April to June, and Wintershall in Germany, which made $1.9 billion, are doing very well.”
- “In recent days, EU and U.K. policymakers have watered down their existing restrictions. They have created a straw man in their sanction regimes. Without having given sanctions a chance to work properly, they are now dismantling them. This backsliding rewards Putin even as his forces commit atrocities in Ukraine and as Russia expands the territorial aims of its illegal war.”
- “Ukraine will never forget the support our partners have given us. But on fossil fuels, the west faces a clear choice. Anyone serious about their support for Ukraine must stop funding Putin’s regime. Business as usual serves only to prolong the war, which has hamstrung the entire global economy. The most effective solution must include a complete and immediate embargo on Russian fossil fuels in Europe and the rapid enactment of G7 proposals for a global price cap on Russian oil.”
“Scientists from Yale published a report according to which the Russian economy is moving ‘to oblivion’ thanks to sanctions. We explain why this work raises so many questions,” Margarita Lyutova, Meduza, 08.06.22. Clues From Russian Views
- “On July 22, Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, a professor at the Yale School of Management, and colleagues published a report on the Social Sciences Research Network (SSRN) on the impact of sanctions and corporate exits on the Russian economy. The Yale report raises questions.”
- “[T]his report does not look like academic articles: for example, it does not contain a list of references, there are no appendices with the data used and description of the calculations that would allow other researchers to reproduce the authors' conclusions or make their own estimates.”
- “The work is based on the same list of retired companies that has been updated since the beginning of March and an analysis of Russian economic statistics. Thus, the authors calculated that a thousand companies that left Russia generated revenue in Russia and made investments in the amount equivalent to 40% of Russian GDP. At the same time, the review does not explain exactly how this figure was obtained.”
- “Almost simultaneously with the Sonnenfeld et al. report on ‘crippling sanctions,’ the IMF's forecast for all the world's economies was published. ... The IMF slightly improved its forecast for the Russian economy for 2022.”
- “There are contradictions in Sonnenfeld's report, which are noticeable even to those who do not deal with economics professionally.”
- “Bloomberg economist Alexander Isakov, who worked in Russia for many years, decided to check the facts in the Sonnenfeld et al. report. He found several inaccuracies.”
- “The report … says that the Russian debt market froze (meaning that neither people nor companies took out loans), and Russian companies since the beginning of the year have not been able to issue a single bond.”
- “A paper released by Yale Chief Executive Leadership Institute (Yale CELI) in July... claims the damage done to Russia is far worse than it seems and that in fact the economy has come to a standstill and that many of its main problems are ‘unsolvable.’”
- “The report exaggerates the problems Russia’s economy is facing, but that its fundamental message is correct: the heavy sanctions imposed by the West are extreme and have fundamentally reduced its long-term growth potential.”
- “The country will be permanently cut off [from] Western technology that will cripple its productivity and Russia will be unable to develop this technology for itself for the foreseeable future, nor be able to buy it from anyone else.”
- “It has also cut itself off from its most lucrative and closest markets. It will permanently loss its gas business with Europe and cannot develop a replacement market in Asia under five years at the earliest. Likewise, its oil business will be permanently reduced and less profitable. As a result of the change in orientation it has lost much of its price setting power and will have to sell energy to its remaining customers at deeply discounted prices.”
- “These changes will reverberate to affect the budget eventually, as commodity prices return to normal levels and deficits will be harder to finance as foreign investors have been barred from Russia’s capital markets and are unlikely to return.”
- “Putin’s plan seems to be to try to build a new market with the non-aligned countries of the Global South, but the reception there is only lukewarm, as most of these countries need to retain their good relations with the West in addition to wanting to buy cheap Russian commodities.”
Ukraine-related negotiations:
“Russia, Ukraine and the decision to negotiate,” Steven Pifer, Brookings, 08.01.22.
- “Even a cease-fire presents peril for the Ukrainian side. It would leave Russian troops occupying large parts of eastern and southern Ukraine, with no guarantee they would leave. The Ukrainians have learned from bitter experience. Cease-fires agreed in September 2014 and February 2015, supposedly to end the fighting in Donbas, left Russian and Russian proxy forces in control of territory that they never relinquished and did not fully stop the shooting. Moreover, the Russian military might use a cease-fire to regroup, rearm, and launch new attacks on Ukraine.”
- “This is not to say that a cease-fire or negotiation should be ruled out. But, given the risks inherent in either course for Ukraine, the decision to engage in talks on a cease-fire or broader negotiations should be left to President Volodymyr Zelensky and his government.”
- “The United States and NATO certainly have a major interest in avoiding direct military conflict with Russia. However, in order to minimize that risk, is it right to ask the Ukrainian government to make concessions to the aggressor, concessions that could reduce the size and economic viability of the Ukrainian state, that would provoke a sharp domestic backlash in the country, and that might not end the Russian threat to Ukraine?”
- “One last point to weigh. If the West pressed Kyiv to accept such an outcome, what lesson would Putin draw should his stated desire to ‘return’ Russia’s historic lands extend beyond Ukraine?”
- “History teaches that wars tend to end in two ways. Either one side wins, or a grinding stalemate is reached. Neither of those conditions exists yet in Ukraine. No matter what Zelensky says or gives, Putin will not stop fighting until his army can no longer move forward.”
- “The real party of peace is not those advising Zelensky to give Putin more land. It is those pushing the West to supply the Ukrainian army with more and better weapons, and as fast as possible. Without stalemate on the battlefield, Putin will never negotiate. The faster Ukraine’s army can stop Russia’s, the sooner Putin’s war will end.”
- “Putin, not Zelensky, is the key decision-maker for ending the Russian invasion of Ukraine. If your plan for peace does not spell out a way to change Putin’s calculus, there’s nothing realistic about it.”
“A window has opened to end the war in Ukraine,” Hrair Balian, Responsible Statecraft, 08.08.22.
- “If the war continues longer, the staggering human, material and political costs will increase not only for the two warring sides, but also for Europe and the world beyond.”
- “A game changer would be if the United States and the European Union consider tangible incentives such as accelerated EU membership for Ukraine and incremental sanctions easing for Russia conditioned by a ceasefire and good faith negotiations for a lasting peace agreement.”
- “Inevitably, the ceasefire will produce an unjust outcome initially. However, the future of Ukrainian territories under Russian control at the time of a ceasefire will be determined during extended multi-lateral negotiations, which would restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity to the extent possible, preserve its sovereignty, provide security against any future incursions, guarantee Ukraine’s non-NATO and non-nuclear status, create a multilateral infrastructure for reconstruction, and support the country’s accelerated accession to the EU.”
- “As the driving force behind the transatlantic coalition supporting Ukraine’s resistance and as the principal architect of sanctions imposed on Russia, the United States must assume responsibility for preparing the ground for eventual negotiations between the warring parties.”
Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:
“The Upside of Putin’s Delusions,” John Mueller of Ohio State University, FA, 08.01.22.
- “The severity of the military and humanitarian situation in Ukraine—including Russia’s wanton attacks on Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant—and the futility of diplomacy have led to many doomsday predictions about nuclear politics. … As awful as the situation on the ground is, though, the global nuclear order is not on the brink of collapse. The dynamics of the conflict have elevated the risks of nuclear use and nuclear proliferation. But both remain unlikely. And if one of these improbable grey-swan events were somehow to occur, states could respond within the existing regime infrastructure.”
- “Nuclear governance has existed in different forms and has a strength and resilience separate from its underlying conditions. The NPT has seen worse days … The bilateral character of U.S.–Russian nuclear-arms control has made the endeavor fickle, minimally institutionalized and unstable. In the medium term, however, arms control will be Russia’s only path back to international respectability.”
- “The odds of nuclear use have increased in recent months, but this is not the first time that has happened. … [I]t is premature to ascribe to them the erosion of the nuclear taboo. At the same time, complacency regarding the dangers of nuclear weapons in a world where they are used as shields to enable infringements of national sovereignty and grievous war crimes against civilians is simply foolhardy. … Washington will need to seize the moment to continue reassuring its allies of the ironclad nature of its nuclear guarantees.”
- “Russian defeat in Ukraine would amount to a public-service announcement about the dangers of attempted military aggrandizement even if it is backed by nuclear weapons. Russian victory would advertise the coercive power of nuclear arms and the vulnerability of states that do not possess them.”
“Stop Tiptoeing Around Russia,” Alexander Vindman of Johns Hopkins University, FA, 08.08.22.
China-Russia: Allied or aligned?
- “In response to Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration has successfully mobilized an international coalition that is imposing unprecedented, comprehensive sanctions on Russia. … As this brutal war has ground on, China has stood firmly behind its beleaguered Russian partner. While the U.S. highlights the international condemnation of Russia’s aggression, China notes that this does not include the most populous country in the world, the largest democracy in the world, the leading countries in Africa and South America and even Israel.”
- “[This] is an assessment of both nations’ statecraft and diplomacy in addressing the challenges posed by the first 20 years of the 21st century—before Putin invaded Ukraine. As such, it provides an instructive baseline against which to judge what each is now doing.”
- “[W]e report a number of troubling trendlines. Given where China started at the beginning of the century, it is not surprising that in playing catch-up it has closed the gaps with the U.S. in many arenas. … To begin with our bottom lines up front:”
- “In a phrase: game on. The era of ‘hide and bide’ is over. China is now determined to compete as aggressively in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy as it does in other arenas.”
- “For Washington, diplomacy has become a ‘lost art.’”
- “The good news is that China has not yet found it. ... [W]here Chinese diplomats have tried to play offense, former Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd notes, ‘China’s standing has taken a huge hit.’”
- “The acid test is how successful a state’s diplomacy is in getting other states to do what its leaders want. There, China’s performance has, until recently, earned higher marks than America’s. In large part, this reflects the fact that Chinese leaders’ assignments to their diplomats were more achievable.”
- “[W]e report a number of troubling trendlines. Given where China started at the beginning of the century, it is not surprising that in playing catch-up it has closed the gaps with the U.S. in many arenas. … To begin with our bottom lines up front:”
“Taiwan, Thucydides, and U.S.-China War,” Harvard University’s Graham Allison, NI, 08.05.22.
- “Fortunately, the American and Chinese governments know that a hot war would be a disaster for both. No serious person in either government wants war. Unfortunately, history offers many examples in which rivals whose leaders did not want war nonetheless found themselves forced to make fateful choices between accepting what they judged an unacceptable loss, on the one hand, and taking a step that increased the risks of war on the other. The classic case is World War I.”
- “On the larger canvas of history, when a rapidly rising power seriously threatens to displace a major ruling power, the rivalry most often ends in war. The past 500 years have seen sixteen cases of such Thucydidean rivalries. Twelve resulted in war. In each case, the proximate causes of war included accidents, unforced errors and unintended consequences of unavoidable choices in which one of the protagonists accepted increased risks hoping that another would back down. But beneath these were underlying structural drivers that Thucydides highlighted in explaining how the two leading city-states of classical Greece destroyed each other in the Peloponnesian War.”
- “The brute facts about the face-off between China and the United States over Taiwan today are three.”
- “First, not just Xi Jinping but the entire Chinese leadership and nation are unambiguously committed to preventing Taiwan from becoming an independent state.”
- “Second, what Winston Churchill called the ‘deadly currents’ in domestic politics are now running rife in both the United States and China.”
- “Third, while most American politicians have yet to recognize it, the military balance in the Taiwan Strait has been transformed in the quarter century since the last Taiwan crisis. The local balance of power has shifted decisively in China’s favor.”
“Why Pelosi’s Visit to Taiwan Is Utterly Reckless, NYT’s Thomas L. Friedman, NYT, 08.01.22.
- “Biden, according to a senior U.S. official, personally told President Xi Jinping that if China entered the war in Ukraine on Russia’s side, Beijing would be risking access to its two most important export markets—the United States and the European Union. (China is one of the best countries in the world at manufacturing drones, which are precisely what Putin’s troops need most right now.) By all indications, U.S. officials tell me, China has responded by not providing military aid to Putin—at a time when the U.S. and NATO have been giving Ukraine intelligence support and a significant number of advanced weapons.”
- “Meanwhile, senior U.S. officials still believe that Putin is quite prepared to consider using a small nuclear weapon against Ukraine if he sees his army facing certain defeat. In short, this Ukraine war is SO not over, SO not stable, SO not without dangerous surprises that can pop out on any given day. Yet in the middle of all of this we are going to risk a conflict with China over Taiwan, provoked by an arbitrary and frivolous visit by the speaker of the House? It is Geopolitics 101 that you don’t court a two-front war with the other two superpowers at the same time.”
- “This week, the United States proved it could handle China and Russia at the same time, without starting any new wars or losing any ongoing battles. This should put to rest two trendy but wrong ideas: the notion on the right that we must back off Russia to confront China, and the notion on the left that we must back off China to confront Russia. It's a false choice—because it's all one confrontation.”
- “The good news is that the United States has many strong partners that also understand this is a dual threat, not a choice between two separate challenges. Leaders on both sides of the U.S. political spectrum should stop deluding the American people into the false comfort that we have the luxury to choose to confront one evil and not the other.”
- “Democracies are today at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the Russian-Chinese totalitarian axis, and it isn't because the West lacks the money or material resources to confront them and prevail. Rather, much like in the late 1930s, the West doesn't believe that the threat is real. Historically democracies have been unbeatable when united around a common purpose. Until the West's disbelief is replaced by a determination to resist, the Russian and Chinese dictators will keep pressing on, planning their major assaults and dreaming of future victories.”
Missile defense:
- No significant developments.
Nuclear arms control:
“Nuclear arms control is moribund, but its necessity is not,” Editorial Board, WP, 08.03.22.
- “The 10th review conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which began Monday at the United Nations, will evoke valid complaints that the treaty's lofty goals remain unfulfilled, that states equipped with nuclear weapons didn't do enough to end the arms race. The conference should also remind everyone that the promising age of nuclear arms reductions in the 1980s and 1990s has stalled, while China has rising ambitions. Nuclear arms control negotiations might be moribund, but their necessity is not.”
- “The goal of arms control—to reduce risk and make the world safer—is still a valid quest, if a far more difficult one. Hotlines and direct military channels can avoid catastrophic miscalculation and mistaken assumptions. We have long argued it is time to take U.S. and Russian missiles off launch-ready alert—together, and verifiably. New START provides valuable verification and limits, and should be extended. Tactical or short-range nuclear weapons have never been covered by treaty, and should be, as well as new technologies like hypersonic glide vehicles. Most important, despite its reluctance, efforts must be made to bring China into the circle of negotiations.”
- “Mr. Biden's team has been busy rewriting its National Defense Strategy and National Security Strategy in light of the war in Ukraine. This has delayed the expected release of a declassified Nuclear Posture Review, an important declaration of nuclear weapons policy, strategy, capabilities and force posture. It should be released soon. The public debate will be healthy. Nuclear weapons haven't gone away.”
“Greetings on the opening of the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Vladimir Putin, 08.01.22. Clues From Russian Views
- “As a party to the NPT and one of its depositaries, Russia consistently follows the letter and spirit of the Treaty. Our obligations under the bilateral agreements with the United States on the reduction and limitation of the relevant weapons have been fully realized. We believe that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, and we stand for equal and indivisible security for all members of the world community.”
- “We attach great importance to the IAEA’s safeguard system as a verification mechanism under the Treaty and consider it extremely important to ensure objective, depoliticized and technically grounded application.”
- “We believe that all NPT-compliant countries should have the right to the peaceful use of the atom without any additional preconditions. We are ready to share our experience in nuclear energy with our partners.”
- “We expect that this Conference will reaffirm the willingness of all states—parties to the NPT to strictly comply with their commitments and will make a significant contribution to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime to ensure peace, security and stability in the world.”
- “Although the enthusiasm created by a rich SRR [strategic risk reduction] debate was interrupted by the Russian war against Ukraine … several SRR recommendations continue to be useful:”
- “Firstly, the recommendation to unilaterally conduct technical actions to reduce the risks of accidents and the risks to the systems themselves is still valid despite the vicissitudes of the strategic environment.”
- “Secondly, the transparent implementation of defense policies remains valuable for states that care about openness, the free provision of information, explanation of postures and doctrines, restraint and anticipation of misperceptions by designated or de facto adversaries, even without reciprocity.”
- “Thirdly, the Ukrainian crisis and the rise of strategic adversity in several regions of the world highlight the need to distinguish between chosen and suffered risks. In other words, it is up to the analysis to distinguish, without preconceived ideas and with lucidity, in each case, the risks that cannot be reduced from those for which a reduction method is potentially useful.”
- “Finally, formal formats for dialogue and negotiation will probably continue to decline, at least in the short to medium term. Then, informal communication channels between strategic communities will have to increase.”
- “SRR remains valid in the current strategic context as one of the functions of a tripod, the other two being deterrence and defense. This means that SRR does not have to be rethought as an approach, as a method, as an objective, but probably specified and circumscribed. The debate on SRR in the NPT framework should be about the scope of the discipline. It is the improvement of the strategic context that should be the primary focus of all the NPT states parties.”
- “This week, Russian President Vladimir Putin proclaimed in his written address to the Tenth Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that he ‘believe[s] that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, and we stand for equal and indivisible security for all members of the world community.’ Interestingly enough, there was no such coupling in Putin’s address to the previous NPT Review Conference in 2015. … Perhaps this new coupling indicates that Putin wants the world to know that according to Russia, preventing nuclear war should be indivisible from ensuring that no country can enhance its own security at Russia’s expense. If so, that would not be inconsistent with Putin’s and his team’s efforts to implicitly threaten the use of nuclear weapons over the West’s assistance to Ukraine.”
- “It would, perhaps, be just as interesting to know what Putin, as a practicing member of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), may believe when it comes to nuclear war. For clues on that, one can read Dmitry Adamsky’s profound ‘Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy’ volume. Or one can skim the statements on the issue, gathered below, made by the ROC’s leadership and Putin’s apparent confessor. These statements, gathered from various sources, indicate that the ROC has nothing quite as extensive, long and thoughtful as the Catholic Church’s just war theory in general or Catholics’ views on nuclear weapons. Overall, if these statements (and blessings) are any guide, the ROC appears to be significantly more tolerant of nuclear weapons than the Catholic Church.”
Counterterrorism:
- “The state sponsor of terrorism designation is not a symbolic act to chastise states that behave badly. Instead, it is a legal trigger embedded in an extremely complex statutory and regulatory framework. The effects of pulling that legal trigger are not easy to identify and untangle. In the case of Russia, some of those effects would be negative for Ukraine and for U.S. interests. They could even help Russia.”
- “This litigation would have several pernicious effects. It would allow Americans to recover from the frozen assets, but not Ukrainians (or Libyans or Syrians or Georgians) who have suffered from Putin's brutal conduct. It would deplete frozen Russian assets that could otherwise provide important leverage in efforts to negotiate a peace deal—one that could provide compensation to many groups of injured people.”
- “Compensating U.S. victims of Russian aggression from frozen Russian state-owned assets might also encourage other countries to compensate their nationals from Russian assets that they have frozen, further diminishing the global pool of resources available to assist Ukraine and creating more cracks and fissures in what should be a unified global response.”
- “The designation would also affect sanctions. … [M]ost sanctions triggered by a state sponsor of terrorism designation ... are already in place. ... To the extent Congress wants to impose further sanctions on Russia, it should do so with legislation tailored for that purpose—not with the blanket trigger of the ‘state sponsor of terrorism designation,’ which would have unintended consequences.”
Conflict in Syria:
- No significant developments.
Cyber security:
- “The questions are always the same and rarely evolve. Is this a cyber war? Can cyber deterrence work? Will cyber operations help states during wars and change the nature of warfare? Instead of pushing knowledge forward, the field of cybersecurity in geopolitics has mostly become about explaining why something didn’t happen rather than why it did. The entire concept of cyber war has been inflated to such a point that every modern movie seems to include the necessary shot of the hacker winning the day.”
- “After nearly five months of a reckless and norm-busting conventional war in Ukraine, the cybersecurity community is still asking when the cyber war will start. When a cyber conflict did not materialize, pundits fell back on the typical claim that it was really happening, but we just couldn’t see it. The cyber war is mainly fought in the shadows, or perhaps the ‘Upside Down’ like in Stranger Things. It's all there, we just don’t know where to look, apparently.”
- “Instead of focusing on the need to achieve coercive effects in cyberspace suggesting that the cyber offense has the advantage, how about we study the impact of cyber actions on behavior first before providing strategic solutions? Precision is needed in research; investments should only come through clear evidence of an impact, all hallmarks of social science.”
- “Without novelty, cybersecurity will continue to fail as a field. There is no progress in cybersecurity. Instead, there are frequent setbacks and academic arguments that go in circles with no clear resolution. It would be nice to feel stupid from time to time when reading the next emerging generation of cyber security scholarship. Progress here will require throwing off the shackles of expectation and searching for novelty.”
Energy:
Climate change:
- No significant developments.
U.S.-Russian economic ties:
- No significant developments.
U.S.-Russian relations in general:
- “Russia's recent announcement that it has decided to withdraw from the space station ‘after 2024’ is deliberately vague, signaling at least a few more years of continued cooperation with the United States. It is cooperation, though, with an increasingly unreliable partner. For NASA, this reinforces the importance of planning ahead: for continuing operations of the aging space station without Russian involvement, and for investment in the space projects that come next.”
- “If Russia wants to leave the space station to pursue its own space station, the United States must look ahead, too. At the end of last year, NASA picked three companies to develop commercial space stations for government and private sector use. … For the United States to maintain an uninterrupted presence in low Earth orbit, these projects should be given the support they need so that a commercial station is waiting in the wings when the space station is retired.”
- “Launched in 1998, the space station has been sustained by the hope that despite other differences, the United States and Russia can work together. As the space station approaches its last decade of use, it's unfortunate that U.S.-Russian relations have deteriorated to a point where such hope is in jeopardy. Amid such uncertainty, NASA should be guided by pragmatism.”
II. Russia’s domestic policies
Domestic politics, economy and energy:
- “At an exhibition of products made by inmates of the Federal Penitentiary Service in Yekaterinburg, Ivan Sharkov, head of the department for labor adaptation of inmates of the Russian State Penitentiary Service's Sverdlovsk Region, said that the Russian system of correctional labor camps could replace IKEA. The inmates do better work, he said, and are cheaper. Alexander Fyodorov, the head of the region's Central Penitentiary Service, claimed that penal labor camps could replace other foreign companies that have left the market.”
- “The Gulag archipelago is returning as one of the country's main production units. The way things are going, soon the FSB will get tired of accusing professional physicists of treason and espionage and will send them to ‘sharashki’ to invent advanced technologies. In these camps they’ll bring about that ‘technological sovereignty’ promised by the top leadership. This is what ‘import substitution’—which no one has actually seen—might look like in Russia.”
- “Russia is slamming shut like a clam shell. Self-isolation and autarky—economic self-sufficiency—have been elevated to the level of managerial valor and human virtue. But Russia doesn’t have enough resources for self-sufficiency. So we are forced to return to the methods of the distant autarkic past and rely on the capabilities an almost free workforce, i.e. the Gulag. … Labor — especially forced labor — sets you free!”
Defense and aerospace:
- See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.
Security, law-enforcement and justice:
- No significant developments.
III. Russia’s relations with other countries
Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:
- “Comprising nations that account for some 85% of global economic output, the G-20 is supposed to be more reflective of the world. Yet only half its number has joined the international sanctions imposed on fellow member Russia over its invasion of Ukraine.”
- “Senior officials from the smaller group of wealthy nations have been traveling the world to make the case for a tougher economic net around Russia. They’ve been surprised by the lack of sign-on from G-20 states, even if those countries aren’t going out of their way to help Moscow circumvent the penalties.”
- “The biggest opt-out is China. Xi joined hands with Putin and declared a ‘no limits’ friendship just weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine. China’s outlays on Russian oil have soared since the war’s outbreak—it spent 72% more on Russian energy purchases in June from a year earlier.”
- “But Beijing is far from alone in rejecting the pleas to rein in the Kremlin.”
- “Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke over the phone with Putin on July 1 and discussed how trade could be built up.”
- “Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, the frontrunner in Brazil’s presidential race, laid the blame for the war on Ukraine as much as Russia.”
- “In South Africa, President Cyril Ramaphosa criticized U.S.-led sanctions.”
- “Turkey concluded that penalizing Russia would be detrimental to Ankara’s economic and political interests, according to a senior official, who cited a $35 billion hit from higher energy costs and the impact on tourism.”
- “In a rare snub to Ukraine, the South American trade bloc Mercosur declined a request by President Volodymyr Zelensky to address its summit in late July.”
Ukraine:
- “There has been an unofficial agreement among Ukraine's raucous and highly competitive politicians since Russia invaded: Put aside old differences and form a unified front against Moscow.”
- “But now, as the war grinds on and billions of dollars in international aid pours in, cracks and prewar tensions are beginning to emerge between the central government and local leaders. Recent frictions between President Volodymyr Zelensky … and Ukrainian mayors who are trying to defend or rebuild their devastated cities and towns underscore Ukraine's mounting internal challenges as it approaches six months of war.”
- “Mayors and analysts told The Washington Post that Zelensky's government appears to be trying to sideline mayors to maintain control of recovery aid and to weaken any future political rivals. More broadly, several mayors told The Post there is growing concern that amid the war, Zelensky's administration is backtracking on promises and plans to remove a lingering vestige of the Soviet era by decentralizing power and granting more authority to regional and local governments.”
- “[Borys Filatov, 50, the powerful mayor of Dnipro in southeastern Ukraine] said mayors have been at the front line of defending cities and they want more control over how their communities rebuild. He criticized Zelensky's government, as did others, with one major caveat: No matter the internal divides, he said, the bigger foe is Russia, and the West must continue to support Ukraine's defense of its sovereignty.”
Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:
- “With the Russian armed forces bogged down in Ukraine, an obvious temptation exists for Azerbaijan to disregard the Russian peacekeeping force and launch a new offensive with the aim of total victory in Nagorno-Karabakh. The latest clash was preceded by a series of moves by Azerbaijan to put increased pressure on Nagorno-Karabakh. This temptation also exists in Georgia.”
- “Any such plans on the part of Georgians and Azeris should be strongly discouraged by the West. The Russian armed forces have fared poorly in Ukraine, but Russia remains vastly more powerful than Georgia and Azerbaijan. A war between Russia and Azerbaijan would bring with it the risk of Turkish and Iranian intervention and a general regional conflict. In the case of Georgia, a fresh Georgian defeat at the hands of Russia would face the United States and NATO with a choice between humiliation, if they failed to intervene to help a partner, and the risk of direct war with Russia if they did intervene.”
- “The West should go on working to try to resolve these conflicts, while doing its utmost diplomatically to prevent their escalation. Condemnation of Russia’s role in the southern Caucasus is easy. Replacing that role would be extremely hard. And bad though the existing situation is, absent wisdom and restraint it could easily get much worse for everyone involved.”
- “Moldova’s newly acquired EU candidate status has rekindled old speculation in Moscow about its potential unification with Romania. On June 25, former president Dmitri Medvedev, who is now deputy head of Russia’s Security Council, suggested that Moldova might try to fast-track its membership in the EU by uniting with Romania, a member since 2007. Russian media have been flooded with speculation about Bucharest’s alleged designs—in cahoots with Chişinău and backed by NATO’s increased presence in Romania—to send troops to Moldova and occupy Transdniestria.”
- “The result of any such action would be catastrophic for Moldova and Transdniestria, and would bring Russia and Romania to the brink of a direct military confrontation. After thirty years without incident, it seems improbable that the leaders in Chişinău would contemplate new hostilities, further destabilizing the situation. It is equally improbable that Romania would move to unite with Moldova and seize Transdniestria. But such scenarios are part of the fever dreams of Russian nationalist bloggers in the far reaches of the internet, who use as evidence the decades-long political rhetoric of Moldova’s ‘unionist’ parties, which regularly attract the support of roughly 10% of the electorate.”
- “At the moment, Transdniestria and Moldova share an interest in staying out of the war. For Tiraspol, this may mean defying Russia, always an uncomfortable course of action, but the alternative looks like military and economic suicide. Chişinău has few choices other than to try to keep tensions with Tiraspol low, to quietly support its efforts to stay out of the war, and to plead with politicians in Bucharest not to inflame the situation further. Politics makes strange bedfellows. In this instance, war does too.”
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