This Week's Highlights

• “If Putin is forced to choose between losing on the one hand in Ukraine and escalating the level of destruction, there’s every reason to believe he’ll escalate the level of destruction,” according to Harvard University’s Graham Allison.
• Foreign Policy’s Michael Hirsh writes that the West’s recent decision to focus on “undermining the power and influence of Russia itself” is what leaves Putin “little choice but to surrender or double down militarily, raising the possibility of widening his war beyond Ukraine.”  
• Penn State’s Steve Cimbala and Center for American Progress’ Lawrence J. Korb also believe the conflict in Ukraine could expand geographically, warning that if “Chinese and Russian aggression should occur simultaneously, all bets [would be] off.”
• “As Beijing sees it, Washington is scaling up military aid to Ukraine in order to deny Russia a diplomatic off ramp for troop withdrawal,” according to Tsinghua University’s Yan Xuetong.
• American Enterprise Institute’s Elisabeth Braw argues that volunteers interested in supporting Ukraine should be discouraged from hacking Russian targets from U.S. soil as this could cause Russia to retaliate against the U.S. as a country rather than against individual hackers.
• American Enterprise Institute’s Frederick Kagan and Institute for the Study of War’s Mason Clark describe Russia’s invasion plan as “shockingly bad,” with too many objectives pursued simultaneously.
• The Economist describes what blunders have contributed to Putin’s “crushing setback” in Ukraine, but warns that the Russian leader’s preparedness to take risks that might seem senseless to many could “lead to still more reckless aggression.”
• Agentura’s Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan try to divine what Russian top brass are thinking, concluding that “Russia’s military believes that limiting the war’s initial goals is a serious error” and that “all-out war, including mobilization” is needed.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

• No significant developments.

Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“How Not to Invade a Nation Russia’s Attack on Ukraine Is a Case Study in Bad Strategy,” Frederick W. Kagan and Mason Clark, FA, 04.29.22. 

“Start with the Political: Explaining Russia’s Bungled Invasion of Ukraine,” Jeffrey Edmonds, War on the Rocks, 04.28.22. The author, a senior analyst on CNA’s Russia Studies Program, writes:

• “One can lump Russian military failure into two large categories: those that are contingent to the current conflict and set of circumstances surrounding the invasion, and those that are inherent to the Russian military. Based on my experience as an analyst of the Russian military and former member of the National Security Council staff during the Obama administration, I focus here on the former.”
• “The fundamental mistake made at the leadership level, that carried down to the lowest ranks, was an underestimation of the lengths Ukraine’s leadership, military, and people would go to defend it.”
• “Putin’s erroneous assumptions likely justified the decision, by him, to keep the invasion largely secret from the Russian people and probably many in the leadership.”
• “At a more fundamental level, the soldiers themselves were likely shocked by suddenly finding themselves first, at war, and second, against a capable opponent.”
• “Given that this is not the war Russia planned and trained for, it is difficult to say how it would have performed in a conflict it did prepare for — one against the United States and NATO. This is just the beginning of understanding and properly preparing for Russian military power — or the lack thereof — going forward and the implications it will have for the United States, NATO, and Russia’s neighboring countries.”

“Russia Botched Its Early War Propaganda Campaign, but Now It’s Doubling Down,” Dmitry Adamsky, FP, 04.30.22. The author, a professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy at Reichman University (IDC Herzliya) in Israel, writes:

• “On the eve of the invasion, I expected a splash in ‘morale-psychological-political’ work as an indication of a transition to war. In Russian doctrine, this (next to intelligence and logistical preparations) is a prerequisite. … In reality, none of the above happened, resulting in extremely low morale in the first weeks of the war.”
• “It raises one of the most perplexing questions about Putin’s war in Ukraine: Why, despite an established tradition and a formal doctrine, was Russia’s military-political effort absent in the run-up to the invasion?”
• “The first reason was flawed assumptions; the Kremlin overestimated its military power and underestimated Ukraine’s. … Second, the Kremlin kept everyone in the dark.”  

“The botched invasion of Ukraine How rotten is Russia’s army? Vladimir Putin uses warfare to make up for Russia’s weaknesses. That is why he is so dangerous,” The Economist, 04.30.22. The news outlet writes:

• “Our briefing this week sets out just how rotten the army has been. Russia’s defense budget, of over $250 billion at purchasing power, is about three times that of Britain or France, but much of it is squandered or stolen. Mr. Putin and his top commanders kept their invasion plans from senior officers, reflecting a crippling lack of trust. Disaffected troops, fed on out-of-date rations, have deserted their vehicles. Units have tortured, raped and murdered only to be honored by the Kremlin. Russia has failed to win control of the skies or combine air power with tanks, artillery and infantry. Wallowing in corruption, unable to foster initiative or learn from their mistakes, its frustrated generals abandoned advanced military doctrine and fell back on flattening cities and terrorizing civilians.”
• “For Mr. Putin this is a crushing setback. That is partly because, although he controls a formidable propaganda machine to help drown out his critics, the loss of face threatens his standing at home. It is mostly because the use of military force is central to his strategy for making Russia count in the world.”
• “The invasion of Ukraine also holds lessons that are less comforting. For one thing, it shows that in pursuit of this strategy Mr. Putin is willing to take risks that to many others—including many Russians—make no sense. Further decline in Russian power could lead to still more reckless aggression.”
• “Even if Mr. Putin is defeated, he will remain dangerous. … The best way to be safe from Mr. Putin and his rotten army is to deter him from fighting at all.”

“Russia Isn’t a Military State. It’s a Delusional One,” Yulia Latynina, WSJ, 05.01.22. The author, formerly a journalist with Ekho Moskvy and Novaya Gazeta, writes:

• “When Russian tanks were shelling the nuclear core at the Zaporozhskaya power plant with live rounds, not all of the shells exploded because they were too old and decrepit. This story, told to me by Piotr Kotin, head of the company that owns the plant, is a metaphor for Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine.”
• “The incompetent and corrupt Russian army blundered into this war. Soldiers picked the wrong roads. Broken tanks littered the thoroughfares well before contact with the enemy: mired in mud, out of fuel and, above all, lost. In the 21st century, with satellites dotting the sky, the Russian army was using outdated Soviet paper charts with towns that had changed names and roads that no longer existed.”
• “How did Mr. Putin think he could win this war? The answer has to do with state delusion.”

Punitive measures related to Ukraine and their impact globally:

“Tankers of Russian oil a prime target for western sanctions,” Gillian Tett, FT, 04.28.22. The author, chair of the editorial board and editor-at-large, U.S., with the news outlet, writes:

• “If the British government, along with its EU and U.S. counterparts, were to demand that insurance companies stop protecting tankers carrying Russian oil, it would be another potent weapon in western efforts to squeeze Moscow.”
• “More than half of recent oil shipments from Russia have been carried on tankers belonging to companies headquartered in Greece, according to data compiled by the Institute of International Finance. Most of the rest carry Russian, Chinese, Scandinavian and Singaporean flags.”
• “This means that one way for the west to reduce the tanker flow would be to ban EU ships from touching Russian crude. … Another more effective tactic that would hit non-EU vessels would be for the British government to prevent the Lloyds Marine and Aviation syndicates from insuring fleets that carry Russian oil London provides 80 per cent of war coverage.”
• “The reality is that unless Russia’s energy exports are reduced, Putin’s coffers will remain reasonably full.”

"The Profound Irony of Canceling Everything Russian," Kevin M.F. Platt, NYT, 04.22.22. The author, a professor in the department of Russian and East European Studies at the University of Pennsylvania, writes:

• “That the world should be amplifying Ukrainian art and culture is clear. This is of the highest priority. Yet support for Ukrainian culture does not entail canceling Russian culture. To adopt such a stance is to support a world of pernicious national antagonisms and closed borders. That is precisely the world that Mr. Putin seeks to create with his war. We, along with right-minded Russians, should be working to resist the reactive canceling of Russian artists and performances, rather than playing along.”

“War in Ukraine is Causing a Many-Sided Economic Shock,” Martin Wolf, FT, 04.26.22. The author, the newspaper’s chief economics commentator, writes:

• “The war is in sum a multiplier of disruption in an already disrupted world. Economically, it works via five main channels: higher commodity prices; disruption of trade; financial instability; the humanitarian impact, above all millions of refugees; and the policy response, notably sanctions.”
• “If no further shocks arrive, the present disruptions should be overcome. But we have been reminded that huge shocks are possible and are also almost always negative. Russia must be resisted. But if we cannot sustain minimal levels of co-operation, the world we will end up sharing is unlikely to be a world we want to live in.”

Ukraine-related negotiations:

"How Should the War in Ukraine End?" Steve Cimbala and Lawrence J. Korb, NI, 04.28.22. The authors, respectively a distinguished professor of Political Science at Penn State University, Brandywine and a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, write:

• “How can this war be ended? There are four broad alternatives that could be impacted either by the Russian and Ukrainian leaders, or the world community:”
  • “(1) one side imposes a decisive military defeat on the other and dictates a postwar arrangement that supports its interests;”
  • “(2) a protracted military stalemate develops, with graduated commitment of forces and growing casualty lists, leading to pressure for a diplomatic settlement;”
  • “(3) escalation changes the character of the war dramatically—either horizontal escalation (the war spreads to more countries) or vertical escalation (the use of weapons of mass destruction); or”
  • “(4) a simultaneous crisis breaks out elsewhere in the world, involving a vital interest for the United States and the international community (for example, China makes an imminent threat against, or an actual attack on, Taiwan).”
• “It may appear that diplomacy is a hard sell with respect to the settlement of the war in Ukraine. But the alternative — continued fighting with the possibility of geographical expansion and/or increased lethality — is worse. And if Chinese and Russian aggression should occur simultaneously, all bets are off.”

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Biden’s Dangerous New Ukraine Endgame: No Endgame,” Michael Hirsh, FP, 04.28.22. The author, a senior correspondent for the magazine, writes:

• “In a dramatic series of shifts this week, U.S. President Joe Biden and his NATO allies have escalated their policy of helping to defend Ukraine against Russian aggression into a policy of undermining the power and influence of Russia itself. In so doing, some observers fear, they are leaving Russian President Vladimir Putin little choice but to surrender or double down militarily, raising the possibility of widening his war beyond Ukraine.
• “George Beebe, a former chief of Russia analysis for the CIA, said that the Biden administration may be in danger of forgetting that the ‘the most important national interest that the United States has is avoiding a nuclear conflict with Russia.’ He added that ‘the Russians have the ability to make sure everyone else loses if they lose too. And that may be where we’re heading. It’s a dangerous corner to turn.’”
• “Both sides appear to be settling in for a long fight. After meeting with Putin and Lavrov on Tuesday, Guterres acknowledged that an imminent cease-fire was not in the cards and that the war ‘will not end with meetings.’”
• “Putin has year by year reintroduced nuclear weapons into his conventional war calculations. … Yet Putin has never come this close to threatening to use them, nor has he made clear if or how he might do so. … Putin has also indicated previously that he cannot accept the separation of an independent Ukraine from Russian control, writing in a July 2021 essay that such a development would be ‘comparable in its consequences to the use of weapons of mass destruction against us.’”
• “Robert Gallucci, a former senior U.S. nuclear arms negotiator, said the Russian nuclear threats are a new tactic and ‘should be taken seriously if we were to get involved directly in conflict with Russian forces in or around Ukraine, that is, on or across the Russian border.’”

“Tell us how this war in Ukraine ends,” by George Beebe, Responsible Statecraft, 04.29.22. The author, Grand Strategy Director at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, writes:

• “Putin certainly understands that direct Russian strikes inside NATO territory would be fraught with escalatory risk. But if he sees the alternative as defeat in Ukraine, with all the attendant implications for Russia’s influence in the world and stability at home, he could well decide such a step is necessary. Strikes could also serve Putin’s cause in rallying Russian popular support for the war, which he has from the start depicted as an existential conflict between Russia and NATO, not between Russia and Ukraine. ... Where crossing the line into direct military engagement between Russia and the West might lead is difficult to anticipate.”
• “Some form of Western retaliation against facilities on Russian territory would be likely. Low-level skirmishing that has long pitted U.S. and Russian cyber warriors in the digital arena could erupt into genuinely destructive acts of sabotage against critical infrastructure. … Russia might be tempted to target vulnerable U.S. satellites on which our economy, as well as military and reconnaissance operations, depends. At what stage—if any—might the prospect of a spiral toward nuclear war sober Moscow and Washington into seeking an end to hostilities?”
• “Another possibility is that we find ourselves in an extended period of unsettled standoff with Russia in which there is no agreed end to the war in Ukraine, but neither side wishes to continue active conventional combat. ... This would render Ukraine a divided state with unresolved geopolitical status, while leaving Europe with a festering, open wound.”
• “Finally, this war may end in a negotiated settlement, as most conflicts historically have ended. But finding a compromise that all parties can live with will be no small feat.”
• “This menu of potential endings in Ukraine has little appeal. If we aim for a win-lose outcome for the West against Russia, however, we may well find ourselves in a perilous lose-lose scenario. The time to answer the Petraeus question [‘tell me how this ends’] is now.”

"Putin the Planner," Andrew Goodman, War on the Rocks, 04.26.22. The author, who retired from the Senior Foreign Service in 2009 after over 30 years, writes:

• “There’s a particularly ominous aspect of Putin’s character that was clear to those of us who knew him. Since his St. Petersburg days, his response to opposition has been to stay the course until he overcomes all resistance. If Putin’s meticulous planning fails, and he perhaps has to settle for seizing just the Donbas region, it will mean another failure on his part to solve the Ukraine problem. Given his single-minded desire for fully compliant Ukraine and his determination to finish what he starts, no one should not expect such an outcome to be the end of the story. Putin’s vindictive character and his longstanding modus operandi suggest that he would view this as a temporary setback, much like in 2014. This means that at some time in the future he would again seek to bring Ukraine to heel.”

“Does the exit ramp look more attractive to Putin now?” David Ignatius, WP, 04.26.22. The author, a foreign affairs columnist for the newspaper, writes:

• “To defeat Putin, the United States and its NATO allies are pumping weapons and ammunition into Ukraine at an astonishing pace. But the truly decisive tactic will be to choke out the Russian war machine through economic sanctions.”
• “Superpowers sometimes lose ill-considered wars. That happened to the United States in Vietnam and Afghanistan, and it might be Russia’s fate in Ukraine. The exit ramp surely must look more attractive to Putin now than it did several months ago.”

“America Needs a Comprehensive Compellence Strategy Against Russia,” Frank G. Hoffman, FPRI, 04.28.22. The author, a distinguished research fellow with the Institute for National Strategic Studies, writes:

“The West needs to craft a comprehensive strategy with the explicit goal of compelling Putin to stop his aggression, not just merely keep Ukraine at the survival level. To date, U.S. statecraft has helped Ukraine buy time, but it has to be expanded to include the marshalling of greater military power in collaboration with its key allies. Ukraine can still be saved from protracted devastation, mass casualties, and an ignoble capitulation that merely extends Putin’s influence and weakens Europe. Russia can be compelled to limit its objectives and to stop its egregious violations of international law and return to diplomacy. It may be time for the United States and its democratic states to take Biden’s impressive speech in Warsaw to heart, and ‘Be not afraid.’”

“Defeating Putin will require larger U.S. commitments—and risks,” Editorial Board, WP, 04.30.22. The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

“The record of the war so far, including Europe's admirable determination to seek new energy sources, vindicates a policy of maximum firmness. Mr. Putin's war aim is not merely to conquer Ukraine but to overthrow the international order itself. It's worth accepting costs and taking risks to make sure that Russia fails—and emerges from the conflict unable to wage such aggression again.”

“The Fight for Ukraine Is Forging a New World,” Dmytro Kuleba, FP, 04.27.22. The author, Ukraine’s minister of foreign affairs, writes:

• “As the great disruptor of the 21st century, the digital universe must strike a balance between the common good and narrow interests. It must remain decentralized and controlled by communities, not governments. At the same time, it must be governed. The question of whether the metaverse, Web3, the Internet of Things, and cryptocurrency will remain decentralized and community-driven is the defining question of this century. I believe it is in the best interests of all big players to strike a balance early on.”
• “It may not seem obvious now, but Ukraine’s victory in the war against Russia would further catalyze this digital transformation and speed up the establishment of the tripolar world. On the other hand, the defeat of a vibrant, democratic Ukraine by the frozen authoritarian Russia would reverse world history.”

“NATO’s Nordic Expansion: Adding Finland and Sweden Will Transform European Security,” Carl Bildt, FA, 04.26.22.  

“Nine reasons why NATO should close the door to Sweden and Finland, Doug Bandow, Responsible Statecraft, 04.22.22. The author, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, writes:

• “1. Neither Finland nor Sweden is under threat.”
• “2. NATO’s fabled ‘open door’ is a fiction promoted by those who want to constantly expand the alliance, irrespective of U.S. security interests.”
• “3. Finland and Sweden would add greater defense obligations than assets to NATO.”
• “4. Obligation would beget obligation. ... Bringing in more states bordering Russia likely would increase calls for more unnecessary U.S. troop deployments.”
• “5. Since including the two states would address no Russian threat to existing members, doing so would be seen as threatening by Moscow.”
• “6. Although further expanding NATO might appear to be an appropriate riposte to Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, doing so would reinforce the security fears which animated Russia’s aggressive policy against both Georgia and Ukraine.”
• “7. The U.S. has no substantial security interests in either nation and thus no reason to go to war for them.”
• “8. Both Finland and Sweden have capable militaries that would promote an independent European defense system.”
• “9. The U.S. no longer can afford to underwrite a gaggle of wastrel, indifferent states. Uncle Sam should shrink, not expand, his defense dole.”

“America Needs Strategic Empathy in a Multipolar World,” Arta Moeini and Coleman Hopkins, NI, 05.02.22. The authors, the Director of Research and a Research Associate at the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy, write:

• “Washington faces a choice: accept multipolarity and the rise of middle powers and thus adopt a more sensible, realist grand strategy that is mindful of ‘the resurgence of both realpolitik and cultural sovereignty,’ or deny that reality and insist on an untenable posture of a ‘Monroe Doctrine for me, but not for thee.’ Should hubris impel it to choose the latter, then Washington will have ensured needless strife in many more RSCs than just the former Soviet bloc, damaging America’s standing and jeopardizing the lives of billions.”

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“China’s Ukraine Conundrum Why the War Necessitates a Balancing Act,” Yan Xuetong, FA, 05.02.22.

“Beijing’s Ukrainian Battle Lab,” David Finkelstein, War on the Rocks, 05.02.22. The author, director for China & Indo-Pacific Security Affairs at CNA, writes:

• “The success or failure of this operation will certainly color Beijing’s views about the ‘comprehensive national power’ of the Russian Federation in general and the state of the Russian armed forces in particular.”
• “Second, assessing Russian operational performance may have very direct implications for the PLA’s own recent and future reform and modernization choices.”
• “Third, the Chinese and Russian armed forces have been conducting combined exercises with each other for many years. Russia’s performance in Ukraine will provide the PLA with a sense of the difference between training and actual combat.”
• “Fourth, the technical performance of Russian weapons systems—their strengths and vulnerabilities—will be of particular interest.”
• “Officials in Beijing continue to state that this conflict is not something they wished to see. We should take that statement at face value. Nevertheless, the Russian military campaign is providing the PLA with another ‘battle lab’ from which it will continue to learn as it studies the wars of other countries.”

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

“Putin’s nuclear threat and China ‘friendship,’” Graham Allison speaks to Gideon Rachman on Vladimir Putin and his friendship with Xi Jinping, FT, 04.29.22. In this podcast episode, the Harvard professor says:

• “If Putin is forced to choose between losing on the one hand in Ukraine and escalating the level of destruction, there’s every reason to believe he’ll escalate the level of destruction.”
• “The painful fact about Ukraine is that we have to hope to get to some resolution or some ceasefire or some place where it stops before we give him that option. Because I think, unfortunately, in that option, there’s no reason to believe he wouldn’t conduct a nuclear strike.”
• “The scenario I envisage is by nightmares, he conducts a nuclear strike on a small city, maybe 20,000 people. And now he says, Zelensky, would you like to see what a Ukrainian Nagasaki looks like? ... Again, in response to this, could you imagine we sort of settle on some stalemate with a monster and then try to live with the monster? Well, I can, but this man’s gonna be a monster as long as he’s the leader of Russia anyhow, whether it be double Bond Street. But then what am I gonna do about it? So we really this is the land of the ugly and uglier.”
• “I don’t think Putin will ever be rehabilitatable. .... But we’re gonna have to live with him.”
• “The most urgent problem today is Russia and Europe, but the most significant problem over the next generation is China. And we have to find a way to do more than one thing at the same time.”

“The U.S. Should Show It Can Win a Nuclear War,” Seth Cropsey, WSJ, 04.27.22. The author, founder and president of the Yorktown Institute, writes:

• “The ability to win is the key. By arming surface ships with tactical nuclear weapons as well as attacking a nuclear-missile sub and thus reducing Russian second-strike ability, the U.S. undermines Russia's ability to fight a nuclear war. The Soviets were deeply afraid of a pre-emptive strike by NATO. That fear has morphed, under Mr. Putin's regime, into a fixation on the ‘color revolutions,’ pro-democracy uprisings in former Soviet republics. Jeopardizing Russian second-strike capability would tangibly raise the military stakes. Mr. Putin could no longer unleash his nuclear arsenal with impunity. Instead, he would need to reckon with the possibility that NATO could decapitate the Kremlin — yes, suffering casualties in the process, but still decapitate it.”
• “A nuclear war should never be fought. But the Kremlin seems willing to fight one, at least a limited one. If the U.S. demonstrates it is unwilling to do so, the chance that the Kremlin will use nuclear weapons becomes dangerously real.”

“Putin Really May Break the Nuclear Taboo in Ukraine, Peggy Noonan, WSJ, 05.02.22. The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “Mr. Putin talks about nuclear weapons a lot. ... It’s a tactic: He’s trying to scare everybody. That doesn’t mean the threat is empty. There are signs the Russians are deliberately creating a historical paper trail, as if to say they warned us.”
• “For this man, Russia can’t lose to the West. Ukraine isn’t the Mideast, a side show; it is the main event. I read him as someone who will do anything not to lose.”
• “People who have known Mr. Putin have told me I am wrong in my concern about his potential nuclear use in that he knows if he makes one move with such a weapon, Moscow will in turn be reduced to a smoking ruin. But I am reading Mr. Putin as someone who’s grown bored of that threat, who believes he can more than match it, who maybe doesn’t even believe it anymore. In any case the Americans would not respond disproportionately.”
• “No one since 1945, in spite of all the wars, has used nuclear weapons. We are in the habit, no matter what we acknowledge as a hypothetical possibility, of thinking: It still won’t happen, history will proceed as it has in the past. But maybe not. History is full of swerves, of impossibilities that become inevitabilities. For the administration’s leaders this should be front of mind every day. They should return to the admirable terseness of the early days of the invasion. They should wake up every day thinking: What can we do to lower the odds?”

“The Pentagon plans anew to head off an old worry: nuclear war,” David Ignatius WP, 04.28.22. The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “Frank Kendall said his thinking about deterrence has been focused for more than a decade on China, rather than Russia. ‘The scenario that I was really worried about was one in which China would commit an act of either coercion or aggression, and the U.S. would have two options: back down or lose. And neither one of those was very attractive.’”
• “Kendall, like all senior Pentagon officials, insists that the United States won’t get involved in a direct military confrontation with Russia unless NATO is attacked. But the Ukraine war has intensified the strategic modernization effort already underway at the Pentagon—and has pushed military planners, as in the depths of the Cold War, to think more about the unthinkable.”

Counterterrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

“The War in Ukraine and Its Impact on Syria,” Sinem Adar, Muriel Asseburg, Hamidreza Azizi, Margarete Klein and Mona Yacoubian, SWP, 04.28.22. The authors of the report write:

• “The war in Ukraine has already had immediate effects on the situation in Syria, rendering a very difficult humanitarian situation even worse. To date, the most relevant external players in Syria have tried to insulate their cooperation on Syria from tensions over Ukraine. In particular, they have continued military deconflicting and largely upheld ceasefire arrangements. At the same time, the balance of power on the ground has started to shift, with Iran and its allies filling the void left by Russian redeployments. This has led to serious concerns in Israel as well as continued air attacks on Iran-linked targets.”
• “The more protracted the war in Ukraine becomes, or the more it escalates into an open confrontation between NATO and Russia, the more likely it is that Syria will be seen as another battlefield of the West and Russia. This could set dynamics into motion that threaten Syria’s fragile status quo of the last few years. Much depends on whether Moscow will change its approach from (pro-regime) stabilizer to spoiler. … Additionally, Russia might be more reluctant to allow US-led anti-terrorism strikes in areas under its air control. If that were combined with Russia reducing its own air assets and Syrian troops being deployed in sizeable numbers to Ukraine, it would seriously diminish the capacity to fight a resurging ISIS.”
• “Europeans are not in a position to shape the larger geopolitical dynamics in Syria. Yet, having shown their ability to act decisively and in unison with regards to Ukraine, they should not neglect other violent conflicts in their direct neighborhood, but rather overcome their fatigue when it comes to Syria and attend to four policy priorities in particular: Insulate the war in Ukraine; … Maintain humanitarian access; … Contain ISIS; … Contribute to regional conflict mitigation.”

Cyber security:

“The Risks of a Self-Directed, Volunteer Army of Hackers,” Elisabeth Braw, FA, 05.02.22. 

Energy exports from CIS:

“Russian Gas/Poland: Energy War Slips Toward Mutually-Assured Debilitation,” Lex Team, FT, 04.27.22. The authors, staff members of the newspaper’s Lex financial commentary service, write:

• “Russia’s action against Poland and Bulgaria follows an earlier threat to cut off customers who refuse to pay in rubles, which both duly did. See them as first on the list due for normal contract renewal from April. The two import about 13bn cubic meters of Russian gas a year, with Poland accounting for the bulk of that.”
• “Heated rhetoric on both sides reflects the economic risks. Europe could lose thousands of industrial jobs as businesses curtail output due to energy shortages. The pain for Russia would also be acute. A rough and ready estimate of the value of Russian pipeline gas exports to Europe this year is $120bn before disruption. That reflects a tripling in gas prices. If Russia forfeited eight months of the income via stoppages, it would shave 5.3 per cent off forecast GDP, which is expected to drop sharply in any event.”
• “Given the risks, a face-saving compromise may be found. One solution might be for European customers to pay in euros through Gazprombank, which would, in turn, pay exporter Gazprom in rubles. That solution would also shield Gazprombank, one of Russia’s top three banks by assets, from the imposition of sanctions that would otherwise hobble the financial system. The alternative would be the mutually-assured debilitation of Russia and the big European economies dependent on its gas.”

“Europe no longer trusts Moscow’s energy brand,” Daniel Yergin, FT, 04.29.22. The author, vice-chairman of S&P Global, writes:

• “For half a century, Russia has trumpeted its brand as a reliable supplier—no matter the political tensions, its energy would flow to Europe without interruption. The war has pulverized that brand. Europe doesn’t trust Russian energy any more and doesn’t want it.”
• “Russia may further manipulate supplies as the battle grows fiercer in Ukraine. But the lasting cut-off of Russian energy won’t come from Kremlin action. It will come from Europe, determined to disconnect from its main supplier. As the war intensifies, the timeline is getting shorter.”

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

• No significant developments.

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

"‘This War Cannot End in a Victory,’ Anthropologist Alexei Yurchak Speaks to Meduza on Why Putin Hates Lenin and in What Ways Russia Is Similar to the Late USSR." Anna Fillipova, Meduza, 04.25.22. The author, a correspondent for the news outlet, interviews anthropologist Alexei Yurchak, who says:

• “I think that the main problem for the regime now … will be fact that the war in Ukraine is not going at all as the regime has expected. This, in principle, can lead to changes at the top, in circles of people with political and financial power. A situation may arise that is somewhat reminiscent of the last years of the Soviet Union. Then the changes began precisely from above; without reforms from above, nothing would have happened.”
• “When reforms start at the top—and they will start because this war [in Ukraine] cannot end in a ‘victory’—the regime will collapse. How exactly and when will this happen? It is hard to say. But we know from our recent history that such changes happen quickly and unexpectedly.”
• “What matters to him [Putin] is not the communist component of the Soviet past … but rather the role of the world leader played by the USSR. ... Why does he attack Lenin in his articles about Ukraine? ... according to Putin's logic, Lenin was guilty of two crimes. First, his abstract idea of ​​the right of nations to self-determination led to their actual withdrawal from the Soviet Union. Second, the Bolshevik approach, in which nations and territories were randomly created and sometimes included the former territories of neighbors, led to these territories ending up in new, independent states. That was exactly how, in Putin’s view, did the independent Ukraine emerged … In his logic, it was from Russia that the territories were taken away.”
• “Yet, it I think or rather I would like to hope—that after a relatively short time, less than a decade, the system in Russia will completely change. It can’t help but change given how much is broken. … It is difficult to imagine that the revolution could start from below in this system … But when reforms do come from above, it will quickly transpire that huge masses are ready for them. ... this was already the case in the last years of the Soviet Union—no one expected changes, but everyone was ready for them.”

"The Power Struggle After Putin: Russia’s inevitable succession crisis," Brian D. Taylor, FA, 04.26.22. 

“How Russia's grim demographics could thwart Putin's global ambitions,” Nicholas Eberstadt, WP, 04.29.22. The author, the Henry Wendt chair in political economy at the American Enterprise Institute, writes:

• “Russia is depopulating—even after Putin's annexation of Crimea in 2014, its total numbers are lower today than when the Soviet Union collapsed. Russia's working-age population and its pool of prospective 18-year-old conscripts are also falling. Shrinking societies can prosper, as Germany and Japan have shown. Kremlin policies all but preclude that path for Russia.”
• “The problem is that Russia has somehow managed to create a high-education, low-human-capital society. The syndrome was evident under the Soviets, but it is even more acute under Putin's malign rule.”
• “Russia's record of creating value out of its human resources is miserable. It has the world's ninth-largest population, but its exports of commercial services—marketed knowledge and skills, such as banking or insurance—ranked 26th in 2019, behind both Thailand and Turkey. Since the invasion of Ukraine, some of Russia's best talent has been voting with its feet, heading abroad any way it can.”
• “According to Credit Suisse, total private wealth in Russia in 2020 amounted to $3 trillion: one-ninth of Japan's, one-sixth of Germany's and scarcely more than Sweden's (a country with a population 14 times smaller). … Russia's dire basic demographic problems are relatively well-known—its declining prospective global shares of total population, working-age manpower, etc. But the demography of Russia's squandered human potential darkens its prospects further still.”
• “An open and liberal Russia could still prosper, but it cannot become a normal country under the rule of a petro-kleptocracy.”

“Patrushev: The West has created an empire of lies, involving the destruction of Russia,” Interview with Nikolai Patrushev, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 04.26.22. In this interview, the Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, says:

• “The United States is doing everything to ensure that other centers of the multipolar world do not even dare to raise their heads, and our country not only dares, but publicly declares that it will not play by the imposed rules. They have tried to force Russia to give up its sovereignty, self-consciousness, culture, independent foreign and domestic policy. In an attempt to suppress Russia and with use of their henchmen in Kyiv, the Americans decided to create an antipode of our country. … The policy of the West and the Kyiv regime—which is under its control—can only result into disintegration of Ukraine into several states.”
• “Europe will bite its elbows, while America will be freed from its main geopolitical fear—the political and economic union of Russia and Europe. … The American and European military-industrial complexes rejoice, because thanks to the crisis in Ukraine, they see no end to orders. It is not surprising that, unlike Russia, which is interested in the speedy completion of the special military operation and minimizing losses from all sides, the West is determined to drag it out to the last Ukrainian.”
• “The special military operation has specific goals. Not only the well-being, but the lives of millions of people depend on achievement of these goals. Speaking of denazification, our goal is to defeat the foothold of neo-Nazism, which has been created by the efforts of the West near our borders. Demilitarization is needed because Ukraine … poses a threat to Russia, including the threat of development and use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons there.”
• “[T]he most important condition for ensuring the economic security of Russia is reliance on the country's internal potential, restructuring of the national economy on a modern technological basis. … Every resident of our country, every Russian from childhood must know and understand what we all live and work as a single people for.”
• “Washington and Brussels do not hide the fact that their sanctions are aimed at both material and spiritual impoverishment of Russians.”

“Russia’s Hardliners Present Their Manifesto: A Forever War with the West and a permanent wartime economy,” Mark Galeotti, MT, 04.29.22. The author, a senior associate fellow at RUSI, writes:

• “Even the most powerful figures at Tsar Vladimir’s court must play [at court politics]. This was evident in a recent interview Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of the Security Council, gave to the official government newspaper of record, Rossiiskaya Gazeta.”
• “This interview was in many ways a silovik manifesto. It paints an apocalyptic picture of a world in which an America that ‘has long divided the whole world into vassals and enemies.’”
• “Patrushev’s claims that this has become a proxy war against NATO is the hard-liners’ attempt to construct a narrative that presents this reframing of the conflict not as the product of defeat, but as a response to the West’s own escalation.”
• “When the war started, many siloviki advocated in effect nationalizing and militarizing the economy. The technocrats dominant in cabinet pushed back successfully, and at present are still largely calling the shots on the economy. Patrushev, though, is reopening this front, arguing … that Russia can somehow create its own economics, driven by the needs of the state and enforced by ‘tighten[ing] the discipline of implementation.’ This all sounds very reminiscent of the Soviet economy, it has to be said.”

“Tested by Ukraine. Third Attempt,” Konstantin Zatulin, Russia in Global Affairs, 2022. The author, a member of Russia’s State Duma, writes:

• “Having assumed [in 2014] the actual responsibility for the Donbas, we could not either establish a normal life there under bullets and shells or achieve success in an unspoken but obvious competition—where is it better to live: in the Donbas or in the rest of Ukraine, that was being reassured by the West?”
• “I will not hide the fact that until the last moment I and many others had had the hope that it would be possible to do without a military operation, that we would still be able to influence Ukraine from within ... The West also turned out to be a weak point in our reasoning: the war ‘to the last Ukrainian’ turned out to be more important to it than the losses. So the war with Ukraine and the West behind it became inevitable.”
• “After Feb. 24 ... we have no other choice other than to win. Without victory, attempts at negotiation will not lead to agreements. And uncertainty will entail much worse consequences for us as a people and a state.”
• “For a long period of time we will be talking about the existence of two Ukraines. … It is necessary to achieve the maximum possible, the boundaries of which will be determined on the map of Ukraine by the balance of forces and the ability to continue the struggle.”

“Who supports war for justice and why? Evidence from Russia and Ukraine,” Mohammad Reza Farzanegan and Sven Fischer, Philipps-Universität Marburg, 2022. The authors of the paper write:

• “A political regime may try to get more popular support for military interventions in other countries by highlighting attractive goals such as addressing injustice. It is therefore important and interesting how an average citizen thinks about concepts of a just war and the socio-economic and political characteristics that drive acceptance of it. Our sample of more than 1600 respondents in Russia and more than 1300 respondents in Ukraine from the World Value Survey  provides an opportunity to examine this issue.”
• “Our logit regression analysis show that in Russia, higher levels of religion importance have significant negative association with acceptance of war. … In addition, we find that individuals in Russia with higher preferences for economic growth and democracy are less likely to support a war for justice, as are the unemployed. … In Russia, people with left political attitudes show higher support for war for justice.”
• “There are findings which also apply to both the Russia and Ukraine samples. … For example, we find that female respondents are less likely to support a war for justice. … Those who are interested in politics are more likely to support a war for justice. … Married individuals also show higher acceptance of war to obtain justice, while individuals with higher levels of happiness are clearly less supportive of war. … Only in Ukraine were higher levels of worry in engaging in a possible war significantly and negatively associated with the acceptance of war.” 

“Russia’s Right-Wing Reactions to the War,” Katharina Bluhm and Mihai Varga, PONARS, 04.28.22. The authors, Dean of the Institute for East European Studies and a Senior Lecturer and Researcher at the Freie Universität Berlin, write:

• “Russia’s right wing is united in strongly supporting Putin and the war against Ukraine as a justified and urgent matter for Russia’s survival. Despite many differences about what ‘full’ economic, political and cultural sovereignty exactly means and how one can accomplish it, the right shares the view that the fight over Ukraine is not just about historic Russia or Eurasian unity but also about ‘de-Westernizing’ and ‘de-Europeanizing’ the whole world.”
• “Despite the overlap with the far right caused by fringe characters such as Dugin, Malofeev, and Prokhanov, the mainstream right represents a fraction of the political class and its elite. It contributed to the ‘conservative turn’ by feeding the propaganda apparatus, supporting Putin in intra-elite conflicts, and inspiring (selectively) concrete policies. Its ideologues promoted the formula of ‘Russian spring’ and ‘Novorossiya’ for the Donbas, pondered over Russia as a distinct civilization and elaborated on a new Russian conservatism long before these went into official documents. They pushed for the Eurasian Economic Union since the end of the 1990s, organized the lobby for the law on ‘internet safety’ (2012), established a blacklist for internet websites and helped to formulate the 2013 law against ‘gay propaganda,’ to name a few examples.”
• “At the same time, the mainstream right’s fringe elements and the ultra-Orthodox and monarchist far right continuously criticize Russia’s political class for not acting decisively enough in developing Russia’s own way. In turn, Russia’s political elite abhors the right’s criticism of Russian politics. Dugin stated after fourteen days of war, ‘Since the 1990s, a powerful anti-state stratum has formed in Russia, which has been significantly pushed aside by Vladimir Putin. But not eliminated in any way, only weakened.’ Although Dugin claims that Putin finally made his ‘choice’ to restore Russia’s empire, there’s uncertainty within the right as to what extent this will last.”

Defense and aerospace:

“Vicious Blame Game Erupts Among Putin’s Security Forces,” Andrei Soldatov, Irina Borogan, Center for European Policy Analysis/MT, 04.27.22. The authors, investigative journalists and non-resident senior fellows with the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), write:

• “Russia’s army is deeply unhappy at the new and curtailed strategy Putin has ordered them to adopt in Ukraine, abandoning the big goal of capturing Kyiv for a much more modest objective of invading Donbas in the country’s east. And they are pointing the finger at other agencies, the FSB’s foreign intelligence branch primarily, for misinforming the president about the true conditions inside Ukraine that have led to failure. Other FSB departments appear to share the military’s analysis.”
• “Does this mean that the military or the FSB has concluded that the war, with its enormous casualties and incompetent direction, was a mistake? The short answer is no, quite the opposite.”
  • “Russia’s military believes that limiting the war’s initial goals is a serious error. They now argue that Russia is not fighting Ukraine, but NATO. Senior officers have therefore concluded that the Western alliance is fighting all out (through the supply of increasingly sophisticated weaponry) while its own forces operate under peacetime constraints like a bar on airstrikes against some key areas of Ukraine’s infrastructure. In short, the military now demands all-out war, including mobilization.”
• “Somehow Shoigu has succeeded in keeping the respect of the military and redirecting all the anger away from the military. Privately, the army, and even the secret services, have been heard to blame not only the Fifth Service of the FSB for misinforming the president, but also the president himself for making a bad call on changing the military strategy.”
  • “Does it matter? It matters a lot. This is the very first time the siloviki are putting distance between themselves and the president. Which opens up all sorts of possibilities.”
• See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Rethinking Strategic Sovereignty,” Nicolai von Ondarza, Marco Overhaus, SWP, April 2022. The authors, respectively head of the organization’s EU/Europe research and a senior associate of its Americas research division, write:

• “The quest for European strategic sovereignty has gained new urgency with the return of a major military conflict to Europe. The transformation towards a confrontational European security order requires a rethinking of the goals, frameworks, priorities, and partners with which strategic sovereignty can and should be implemented. German and European policy should draw four conclusions from this.”
  • “First, the EU should change course. Strategic sovereignty, rather than autonomous capacity to act, should come first.”
  • “Second, the Russian war against Ukraine also puts into focus, once again, the EU’s ‘Achilles’ heel’ with regard to strategic sovereignty, namely the continued weakness in defence policy.”
  • “Third, it must be emphasised that strategic sovereignty cannot be achieved through minor reforms at the European level. It is not enough to just push for – the still blocked – majority voting in foreign and security policy or to fine-tune PESCO projects.”
  • “Fourth and finally, the pursuit of strategic sovereignty also requires more German leadership and commitment. The initiatives for strategic sovereignty have so far come primarily from France, while Berlin has played more of a wait-and-see role.”

“Elites Are Getting Nationalism All Wrong,”  Stephen M. Walt, FP, 04.27.22. The author, a professor of international relations at Harvard University, writes:

• “Not only do nations see themselves as unique and special, but they also tend to see themselves as superior to others and therefore destined to triumph if a conflict was to arise. This blind spot makes it harder to recognize that another nation might be its equal (or, god forbid, superior). It was hard for some Americans to understand how the Viet Cong or the Taliban could possibly defeat them, and it seems to have been hard for Putin to recognize that the Ukrainians he regarded as inferior could and would stand up to a Russian invasion.”
• “Elites may also discount the power of nationalism if they spend their lives in a transnational, cosmopolitan bubble. If you go to the World Economic Forum conference held in Davos, Switzerland, every year; do business deals all over the world; hang out with like-minded people from lots of different countries; and are as comfortable living abroad as you are in your native country, it’s easy to lose sight of how people outside your social circle retain powerful attachments to places, local institutions, and their own sense of belonging to a nation. Liberalism’s emphasis on the individual and his/her/their individual rights is another blind spot, insofar as it directs our gaze away from the social bonds and commitments to group survival that many groups view as more important than individual freedom.”
• “So if some political leader came to me for advice or wanted to know what I thought about some foreign-policy maneuver they were contemplating, I’d ask them if they took nationalism into account, and I’d remind them of what happens when major powers ignore it. And I’d paraphrase Marxist revolutionary Leon Trotsky: You may not be interested in nationalism, but it is still interested in you.”

“Russia Can’t Depend on India Either,” Sadanand Dhume, WSJ, 04.28.22. The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “India’s neutrality in the growing confrontation between Russia and the West over Ukraine is causing heartburn in Western capitals. But while disappointment may be justified, undue focus on New Delhi’s unwillingness to condemn Moscow or impose sanctions misses an important detail: India’s apparent forbearance toward Russia is largely symbolic. As a practical matter, New Delhi is unlikely to help its ‘special and privileged strategic partner’ stave off Western pressure.”

"How the Ukraine War Is Changing Japan: Tokyo Moves Toward a More Assertive Security Strategy," Takako Hikotani, FA, 04.28.22. 

“How Russia’s Hollow Humanitarianism Hurt Its Vaccine Diplomacy in Africa,” Matthew T. Page and Paul Stronski, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 04.28.22. The authors, a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment and a senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, write:

• “If Russia wants to be influential on the continent, African political and economic leaders should demand more of Moscow, not simply settle for the symbolic diplomatic engagements or agreements at which the Russian leadership excels. This might even spark Moscow’s interest in building more durable, sustained and transparent grassroots connections. Over time, this could transform Russia into a more welcome and stabilizing influence in Africa. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, was not welcomed by many African countries. It interrupted the exports of Russian and Ukrainian grain and fertilizer on which many African countries depend, led to rising energy prices and inflation, and likely will complicate Russia’s ambitions to play the role of a development partner. Russia’s ability to cultivate new partners in Africa will also depend largely on whether it can shake off the damage done to its image by its bloody shelling of Ukrainian cities, where Ukraine’s African diaspora, largely medical students, was caught in the crossfire in the early weeks of the war.”

“The Ministry of the International Situation,” Fyodor Lukyanov, Kommersant, 04.29.22. The author, editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs, writes:

• “Changes in the world [order] have begun, and they are resembling an avalanche from the top of a mountain. ... Russia has no reason to attribute [these changes] to anyone [else]: what is happening is the result of our sovereign decisions.”
• “The ‘foreign policy’ of Russia is being replaced by its ‘international position’ by the surrounding circumstances, to which it is necessary to quickly and effectively respond ... Our country is influencing the world situation not through diplomacy ... but through its very presence in the world context, [through its] reorganization, survival, development.”
• “The place of Russia on the political map of the world depends on fulfillment of tasks that relate to its internal sphere—political and socio-economic rather than on drawing schemes of the world order.”
• “The Russian foreign policy community is given the most important mission—building a variety of ties with countries, groups of countries, organizations, relations with which can help the survival and development of the Russia Concert [of Europe-like] component [of Russia's foreign policy] is losing its practical meaning. ... Any dispute with the West, in fact, would be directed at ourselves rather than [Russia’s Western] interlocutor, who will neither listen nor hear.”
• “A radical reorientation of assets from the western flank to others is a natural necessity.”

“Ukraine Invasion and Votes in favour of Russia in the UN General Assembly,” Mohammad Reza Farzanegan and Hassan F. Gholipour, Philipps-Universität Marburg, 2022. The authors of the paper write:

• “Most of the countries in the U.N. General Assembly voted against the Russian invasion. However, there were also countries which were against the resolution, abstained from voting or did not in vote. Our findings show that the importance of military and aid dependence on Russia, access to Russian markets, the level of a country’s political freedom and historical interactions with Russia in former Soviet Union are main positive or negative determinants of nations’ voting in favor of Russia.” 

Ukraine:

• No significant developments.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Is Transnistria Being Dragged into the Ukraine War?” Dionis Cenusa, ISPI, 04.30.22. The author, a political risk analyst and visiting fellow at ISPI’s Eastern Europe Studies Centre, writes:

• “Three types of actions are necessary to prevent the current destabilization attempts from turning into military escalations similar to the ones Russia has inflicted on Ukraine, which would ultimately lead to destruction—primarily in Transnistria—and the intensification of Moldova’s humanitarian crisis.”
• “First, it is of the utmost importance to support Ukraine's military to prevent the advance of Russian forces on the West (in the Odesa region), as well as to help the Ukrainian resistance in other parts of the country.”
• “Second, assistance must be offered to Moldova, even if it does not seem to be publicly asking for it. Given its neutrality status, if it were to overtly ask for military support, pro-Russian political forces could perceive it as a breach of the constitution at best. This could escalate the situation before Moldova managed to receive any substantial support. Protecting critical infrastructure, conducting an inventory of military reserves, and possibly supplying the lacking supplies to law enforcement agencies are essential measures to ensure a minimum level of preparedness.”
• “Third and last, international actors should use the existing negotiation formats around the Transnistria conflict with—or without—Russia’s participation to ensure permanent communication between Chisinau and Tiraspol. The EU is the best placed actor for the job, particularly some European countries, such as Sweden, which have good communication with the region’s de jure authorities. Without communication, it is impossible to prevent certain decisions that might otherwise lead to partial destabilization or, worse, full-fledged escalation.”

“The Ukraine War Is Reshaping the Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict,” Alexa Fults, Paul Stronski, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 04.25.22. The authors, respectively junior and senior fellows in the Carnegie Russia and Eurasia Program, write:

• “Russia retains enormous influence in the region and could easily play the spoiler, especially to an EU-brokered agreement. On April 21, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova accused the West of ‘paralyzing’ the Minsk Group and condemned the EU ‘appropriating’ the peace process.”
• “Hardline elements in Armenia or Azerbaijan could also stymie negotiations. Internal disagreements on compromise already derailed a U.S.-negotiated settlement agreement to the conflict in 2001. Pashinyan’s recent willingness to engage with Baku stoked fierce criticism from the political opposition, former members of his government, and the de facto authorities in Karabakh.”
• “For the first time since the late Soviet period, the Armenians in Karabakh fear Yerevan no longer has their back, a perception that the opposition appears eager to play up. A peace agreement that mandates compromise imposes serious risks to the leaders of both countries, particularly Pashinyan, who now has a far weaker hand than ever before.”
• “Yet instability to the north in Ukraine is reshuffling dynamics in the South Caucasus and Eurasia overall, forcing Baku and Yerevan to talk to each other through new formats and negotiators. That is both a risk and a potential opportunity.”

"Russia Squeezes Kazakhstan: The U.S. should curb Moscow’s clout in its highly dependent and oil-rich neighbor.," Walter Russell Mead, WSJ, 04.25.22. The author, an opinion columnist for the newspaper, writes:

• “There is little doubt here that no country has as much influence over Kazakhstan’s future as the colossus to the north. That reality disheartens many here who remember the savage repression of the Soviet era, fear Mr. Putin’s ultimate intentions, and bemoan the effect of Russian tolerance of corruption on the local economy.  Many Kazakhs, however, see few alternatives to close relations with Moscow.”
• “American influence appears to be fading in the region following the retreat from Afghanistan, and Beijing’s persecution of ethnic Kazakhs in nearby Xinjiang has reinforced a deep cultural distrust of China.  Now that the Biden administration has made weakening Russia a major strategic goal, that calculation could change. Along with the Netherlands and Switzerland, the U.S. is one of the three largest investors in Kazakhstan, outpacing both Russia and China. As Washington policy makers look for ways to counter Russian influence and complicate Mr. Putin’s life, helping Kazakhstan reduce its dependence on Moscow-controlled pipelines, reform its economy, and coordinate with neighboring Central Asian states to limit the influence of both China and Russia might be a good place to start.”

“U.S. Sanctions on Russia Should Not Punish Central Asia," James Bacchus and Ariel Cohen, NI. 05.01.22. The authors, an adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute and a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, write:

• “The policy of the United States and its allies must be to support, not punish, its strategic partners in Eurasia and encourage countries in the region to take a more independent path. This must include crafting economic sanctions against Moscow that avoid or minimize their indirect effects on former Soviet states that are resisting pressure from a resurgent Russia. Expanding investment and economic ties with Eurasia would be in U.S. national interests.”