This Week’s Highlights

• “Current warnings of escalating cyber warfare [in Ukraine] conjure deep-seated fears of cyber doom and the recurring specter of a ‘cyber Pearl Harbor’ strategic surprise attack. In practice, however, cyber warfare has been a failure,” write Lennart Maschmeyer, a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, and Nadiya Kostyuk, an assistant professor at the Georgia Institute of Technology. According to their research, “cyber operations have remained irrelevant on the battlefield, while standalone operations to weaken Ukraine through election interference, critical infrastructure sabotage, and economic disruption largely failed to contribute to Russia’s strategic goals of making Ukraine abandon its pro-European Union and pro-NATO foreign policy.”
• “The Western attempt to expel Russia from Europe has failed,” writes Anatol Lieven, a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. “But as French President Emmanuel Macron has reminded us, Russia is part of Europe and is simply too big, too powerful, and too invested in its immediate neighborhood to be excluded from the European security order.” The solution, according to Lieven, “lies in a modernized version of what was once called the ‘Concert of Europe.’” Meanwhile, Lawrence J. Korb and Steve Cimbala, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense and a professor of political science, write that “the showdown with Russia over Ukraine provides an opportunity for NATO to rethink its purpose and priorities for the twenty-first century. … NATO is not a virus seeking to grow into every possible place for the sake of expansion per se, nor is it a surrogate for a wider European security community that includes Russia and other states that are currently non-NATO members.”
• Nikolas K. Gvosdev writes that in the context of Ukraine, Russia’s Syria campaign suggests that the Kremlin “would focus on long-distance strikes to destroy Ukrainian equipment, particularly its stockpiles of drones, and try to break up organized military formations. … We have been expecting a ground campaign to occupy territory, but the Russian General Staff may be looking to destroy capabilities, demoralize the Ukrainian military and create conditions for political upheaval. And if operations begin anytime soon, the types of military aid and training that would be needed would come too late.”
• “Instead of the West playing whack-a-mole, refuting various lies propagated by Russia, Russia is now in the position of denying the potential plots it may be hatching with respect to Ukraine,” writes Daniel Baer, a senior fellow a the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former U.S. ambassador to the OSCE. “Instead of quietly working behind the scenes and taking a wait-and-see approach … Biden and his European counterparts have got Putin trying to turn down the volume on their repeated reminders that they are watching him closely.”
• Sanctions on Russia would hit European economies, too, according to the Financial Times. “About $60 billion is owed to EU banks by Russian entities, nearly four times more than the amount they owe to U.S. banks, according to the Bank for International Settlements,” FT reports.
• “A hard sell to Ukraine … would be its ‘Finlandization,’” writes Gerhard Mangott, a professor of international relations at the University of Innsbruck. “This would mean military nonalignment, a friendly foreign policy toward Russia and freedom in domestic affairs. No one in the current Ukrainian establishment would accept such a status.” The Financial Times’ editorial board argues that comparisons between Finland and Ukraine “do not stand up to close inspection.” According to the FT’s editorial board, “Russian behavior toward Ukraine recalls not Finland but Poland in the 18th century, when the tsarist empire exerted increasing control over domestic Polish politics, eventually colluding in three partitions that wiped Poland off the map of Europe for more than a century.”

NB: Next week’s Russia Analytical Report will appear on Tuesday, Feb. 22, instead of Monday, Feb. 21, because of the U.S. Presidents' Day holiday.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Russia Belongs at the Center of Europe,” Anatol Lieven, Foreign Policy, 02.10.22. The author, a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, writes:

• “The Western attempt to expel Russia from Europe has failed. … [T]he NATO slogan ‘A Europe Whole and Free’ is an explicit statement that Russia is not part of Europe. … But as French President Emmanuel Macron has reminded us, Russia is part of Europe and is simply too big, too powerful, and too invested in its immediate neighborhood to be excluded from the European security order.”
• “The solution lies in a modernized version of what was once called the ‘Concert of Europe.’ … The essential elements of a new, reasonably consensual pan-European order should be the following: a traditional nonaggression treaty between NATO and the Russian-led … CSTO, by which both sides pledge not to attack the other militarily. As a matter of fact, neither side has any intention of doing so, and to put this on paper would reduce mutual paranoia and the ability of establishments on both sides to feed this paranoia for their own domestic purposes.”
• “Full diplomatic relations should be established or reestablished between NATO and the CSTO and between the EU and the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. On the basis of this, intensive negotiations should be launched to achieve two goals: new arms control agreements in Europe … and economic arrangements that would allow nonmembers of the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union to trade freely with both blocs.”
• “The need is for a regular, frequent, but much smaller and less formal meeting place for the countries that really count in European security: the United States, France, Germany and Russia (plus the United Kingdom…). Such a European security council would have three goals: firstly, the avoidance of new conflicts through early consultation about impending crises; secondly, the solution of existing conflicts on the basis of common standards of realism … and thirdly, democracy—the will of the majority of the local population, expressed through internationally supervised referendums (a proposal put forward by Thomas Graham). Finally, a European security council could lay the basis for security cooperation outside Europe.”

“Macron will win time for diplomacy with Russia, not go rogue,” Emre Peker, Mujtaba Rahman and Alex Brideau, Eurasia Group, 02.11.22. The authors, analysts at Eurasia Group, write:

• “President Emmanuel Macron embarked on a high-risk, high-return effort this week, engaging Russian President Vladimir Putin in a political circuit-breaker that will bolster Eurasia Group’s 60% odds of a diplomatic solution to the Russia-Ukraine crisis; Paris, however, is unlikely to drag Moscow into prolonged European security talks.”
• “Concerns over Macron’s naivete and proclivity to undermine Western unity are overblown; the French president will neither go rogue nor compromise the interests of NATO, EU or nonaligned European states, led by Ukraine, in his quest to foster dialogue with Russia.”
• “Ambiguities surrounding Macron’s proposals to Putin during their one-on-one meeting will support diplomatic efforts in the short run; but Russia will look to the U.S., not French shuttle diplomacy, as the key for concluding a security deal.”

“How to Make a Deal With Putin: Only a Comprehensive Pact Can Avoid War,” Michael McFaul, Foreign Affairs, 02.11.22. 

“Ukraine, NATO, and Putin’s Self-Made Predicament,” Gerhard Mangott, Carnegie Moscow Center, 02.11.22. The author, a professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Innsbruck, writes:

• “Russian core demands, which Putin considers issues of an existential nature, will not be met. In this case, Putin can either lose face and credibility, or answer using force. Backpedaling would undermine his authority with the military and security apparatus in Russia. More importantly, any future threat made by Putin would no longer be taken seriously by the West. Even worse for Putin, Russian inaction would enable the West to strengthen its narrative that the strategy of deterrence ultimately prevented a Russian invasion of Ukraine.”
• “Putin could have gotten out of this trap, had the Russian side positively evaluated the limited Western concessions that are on the table: arms control of medium-range weapons systems, as well as confidence-building, transparency, and verification measures in the NATO-Russia borderlands, and measures of crisis communication. Putin could have accepted these concessions as a solid win for Russia, which would have allowed him a face-saving diplomatic off-ramp. But he decided not to.”
• “It is, of course, worth seeking a diplomatic solution to the current crisis. …why not declare a moratorium on NATO enlargement for the next ten years? This would help tremendously to de-escalate the crisis. An offer of a moratorium, together with the other concessions that the West has already put on the table, would be a practicable solution. It would not even be putting Ukraine at a disadvantage, since its accession to NATO is not on the agenda in any case.”
• “A hard sell to Ukraine, however, would be its ‘Finlandization,’ which French President Emmanuel Macron mentioned in passing when he was in Moscow on Monday. This would mean military nonalignment, a friendly foreign policy toward Russia, and freedom in domestic affairs. No one in the current Ukrainian establishment would accept such a status. Neutrality would have to be imposed on Ukraine. The question remains of whether the West is prepared to do that. Is it an acceptable price to pay for defusing the crisis?”

"Jens Stoltenberg Explains How to Step Back From the Brink of European Conflict," Jens Stoltenberg, The Economist, 02.09.22. The author, secretary general of NATO and a former prime minister of Norway, writes:

• “All sovereign nations have the right to choose their own path. It is a core principle of international law, laid out in the 1945 Charter of the United Nations, and many other key international agreements that Russia has signed up to. NATO’s Open Door policy is a historic success. Former adversaries became allies, spreading freedom, security and prosperity across Europe. It has benefited everyone, Russia included, because all enjoy the advantages of a stable neighborhood.”
• “Now Russia demands that we deny Ukraine the right to choose its own path. And, for the first time, China has joined Russia in calling on NATO to stop admitting new members. This is a blatant attempt to deny sovereign nations the right to make their own choices.”
• “Moreover, Russia wants NATO to withdraw troops and support from countries that joined it after the collapse of communism, in effect limiting our right to defend all allies. … NATO does not have first-class and second-class allies. We stand as one, and will always do what is necessary to protect and defend all allies, regardless of their size or where they are placed on the map.”
• “We cannot turn the clock back to an age dominated by great powers’ spheres of influence, when large countries could tell smaller neighbors what they can do. A world in which might is right is not a world we want to live in. No country should use force, or the threat of force, to redraw borders, upend Europe’s security architecture and rewrite the international rule book.”
• “Despite our deep differences, we remain ready to talk with Moscow. I have invited Russia and all 30 NATO allies–Europeans and North Americans together–for a series of meetings in the NATO-Russia Council, our formal mechanism for consultation set up in 2002. That invitation stands. We are ready to listen to Russia’s concerns, to discuss how we can improve NATO-Russia relations, reduce risks and increase transparency of military activities, such as exercises, address arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation and other issues that affect our security.”

“Does Russia’s Syria Intervention Reveal Its Ukraine Strategy?,” Nikolas K. Gvosdev, The National Interest, 02.12.22. The author, a professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, writes:

• “There are some important lessons from how the Russian military and security establishment has pursued the Syria operation that are relevant if the Kremlin decides to choose military force as its option for coercive diplomacy against Ukraine.”
• “First, the Russian intervention in Syria focused primarily on destroying capabilities and fighting formations of the anti-Assad opposition, rather than on occupying territory. … Second, the Russians have maintained a relatively light footprint on the ground in Syria. They chose not to focus on occupying territory or taking on the responsibilities of governance. … Third, whenever ground forces were needed, the Russians turned to private military companies or other irregular formations, limiting as far as possible the exposure of uniformed members of the Russian armed forces. … Finally, the Russians demonstrated … Russian capabilities to deliver lethal strikes from assets based inside Russian territory. The subtext … was to subtly demonstrate that key Russian capabilities … could be utilized without fear of reprisal or counterattack.”
• “I do not know whether the Russians will go into Ukraine, or whether U.S. assessments are correct that the Russians will seek to occupy and control large pieces of Ukrainian territory and send personnel and systems into Ukraine to engage in close combat. The Syria campaign, however, would suggest that if the Russian government decides to use military force against Ukraine, it would focus on long-distance strikes to destroy Ukrainian equipment, particularly its stockpiles of drones, and try to break up organized military formations.”
• “Preparing Ukrainian special forces for partisan warfare, or assuming that U.S.-supplied Javelins would be used against Russian tanks and armored vehicles making the rapid dash to Kyiv, is not going to be effective against the type of campaign Russia used in Syria. We have been expecting a ground campaign to occupy territory, but the Russian General Staff may be looking to destroy capabilities, demoralize the Ukrainian military, and create conditions for political upheaval. And if operations begin anytime soon, the types of military aid and training that would be needed would come too late.”

“We Must do Everything Possible to Avoid an Enormously Destructive War in Ukraine,” Bernie Sanders, The Guardian, 02.08.22. The author, a US Senator, the ranking member of the Senate budget committee, and former U.S. presidential candidate, writes:

• “We must do everything possible to try and find a diplomatic solution to what could be an enormously destructive war in Ukraine. No one knows exactly what the human costs of such a war would be. But there are estimates that there could be over 50,000 civilian casualties in Ukraine, and millions of refugees flooding neighboring countries as they flee what could be the worst European conflict since the second world war.”
• “The sanctions against Russia and Russia’s threatened response to those sanctions, could result in massive economic upheaval – with impacts on energy, banking, food and the day-to-day needs of ordinary people throughout the entire world. It is likely that Russians will not be the only people suffering from sanctions. And, by the way, any hope of international cooperation to address the existential threat of global climate crisis and future pandemics would suffer a major setback.”
• “With that said, I am extremely concerned when I hear the familiar drumbeats in Washington, the bellicose rhetoric that gets amplified before every war, demanding that we must ‘show strength’, ‘get tough’ and not engage in ‘appeasement’. A simplistic refusal to recognize the complex roots of the tensions in the region undermines the ability of negotiators to reach a peaceful resolution.”
• “Putin may be a liar and a demagogue, but it is hypocritical for the United States to insist that we do not accept the principle of ‘spheres of influence’. For the last 200 years, under the Monroe doctrine, we have undermined and overthrown at least a dozen governments. In 1962 we came to the brink of nuclear war with the Soviet Union in response to the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba, 90 miles from our shore, which the Kennedy administration saw as an unacceptable threat to our national security.”
• “We must vigorously support diplomatic efforts to deescalate this crisis and reaffirm Ukrainian independence and sovereignty. And we must make clear that Putin and his gang of oligarchs will face major consequences should he continue down the current path. At the same time, we must never forget the horrors that a war in the region would cause and must work hard to achieve a realistic and mutually agreeable resolution.”

“NATO or Bust: Why Do Ukraine’s Leaders Dismiss Neutrality as a Security Strategy?,” Serhiy Kudelia, Russia Matters, 02.09.22. The author, an associate professor of political science at Baylor University in Texas and a URIS fellow at the University of Basel in Switzerland, writes:

• “When Russia’s invasion of Crimea in spring of 2014 put Ukraine at the center of a renewed confrontation between Moscow and the West, leading U.S. strategic thinkers argued that Ukraine’s adoption of a permanent neutral status could defuse the crisis. These appeals, however, have been routinely dismissed in Ukraine by key government officials and foreign policy experts.”
• “To make a more compelling case for neutrality, there needs to be a better grasp of the logic behind the anti-neutrality consensus within the Ukrainian policy and expert community. This logic is outlined below:”
  1. “Neutrality has already proved ineffective for Ukraine: The most common argument against neutrality, and probably the least compelling, points to Ukraine’s prior experience with ‘neutrality,’ which purportedly ended in disaster. However, there are flaws in this argument.”
  2. “Neutrality means surrender to Russia (and abandoning Euro-Atlantic aspirations): Neutrality is no longer viewed in Kyiv as a stand-alone policy option but is seen as part of bargaining with the Kremlin, which has long demanded neutral status for Ukraine. The adoption of such a status, in this context, would mean a major concession by Kyiv to Moscow.”
  3. “Neutrality cannot be enforced: It all but impossible to model a new security treaty establishing Ukraine’s neutrality on the international agreements signed by Finland and Austria, with the Soviet Union as one of the signatories. But without such guarantees, a unilateral declaration of neutrality could not have the same stabilizing effect or accommodate Ukraine’s concerns.”
  4. “Neutrality will only invite further Russian aggression: Moscow’s rhetoric indicates that it may still harbor expansionist designs. This raises a reasonable question about whether Ukraine’s neutral status will be sufficient to preclude Russia from any new intervention.”
  5. “Neutrality is a minority preference among the Ukrainian public: This is not unequivocally the case at present, given the absence of a public debate on the merits of neutrality.”
• “Neutrality poses its own challenges. … For a productive debate, proponents of Ukraine’s neutrality need to stop rehashing questionable historical analogies from a bygone era or focusing on the exclusive security needs of ‘major powers.’ Instead, they need to address Ukraine’s reasonable concerns about the viability of neutrality and its implementation in today’s context.”

“Russia’s Choices and the Prospect of War in Ukraine,” Nigel Gould-Davies, IISS, 02.08.22. The author, the editor of "Strategic Survey: The Annual Assessment of Geopolitics," writes:

• “Unless it is pure bluff, compellence is not an alternative to aggression, but a potential prelude. Russia’s build-up does not look like bluff.”
• “America has delivered a commanding response. … As a consequence, the Biden administration – which took office looking for reasons to ignore Russia and to focus on China – has reinforced its commitment to the continent, and to Ukraine specifically. Despite inevitable differences.”
• “Russia has four options at this point: maintain the status quo, withdraw forces, reach a more limited agreement on security issues, or implement its compellent threat to attack Ukraine. Putin has not occupied significant hostile territory before, but the scale of the forces he has assembled, and mobilization of Rosgvardia units and military police – whose function is to control a population, not fight an army — increasingly point towards this.”
• “At present, aggression is the only option that is not certain to leave Russia in a worse diplomatic position than before its build-up. …The key question is how he weighs the risks of doing so – significant casualties, severe sanctions and a deep diplomatic rupture with the West – against the probability of success and its value to him. There are three reasons why this calculus might lead Putin to war:
  • Firstly, Putin has repeatedly miscalculated in Ukraine.
  • Secondly, pandemic isolation is deepening Putin’s misperceptions.
  • Thirdly, Putin’s obsession with Ukraine appears to be growing as he ages – he will be 70 this year – and thinks more urgently about his legacy.”
• “Two developments could avert conflict. First, compellence could begin to work, and second, Putin could accept that the costs of war in blood (casualties) and treasure (sanctions) would threaten the viability of his regime – an even higher priority for him than Ukraine. … None of these appears likely. Diplomacy continues with Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Moscow this week, followed by Olaf Scholz’s next week. Unless they, or parallel US efforts, shift the parameters, military conflict increasingly looks the most likely outcome of this crisis.”

"How to End the Ukraine Crisis in 4 Steps," Alexander Dynkin and Thomas Graham, Politico, 02.09.22. The authors, respectively the president of the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Affairs of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and a distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, who served as the senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff during the George W. Bush administration, write:

• “Achieving enduring peace and stability in Eastern Europe will require an understanding the essence of the current crisis. It is not simply about Ukraine. It is about the broader European settlement at the end of the Cold War 30 years ago, which Moscow contends was imposed on it at a time of extreme weakness and fails to take into account its national interests.”
• “This should not come as a surprise. Great powers, once they can, will seek to revise a peace that was imposed on them after a defeat in a major war. … Russia’s economic recovery in the 2000s and the rapid modernization of its military in the past decade have given it the capacity to dispute the Cold-War settlement for the sake of what Moscow believes is a more just one.”
• “The United States will be reluctant to revise a European order that has served its interests extraordinarily well for the past three decades. Absent significant adjustments, however, intermittent crises such as the current standoff are inevitable. A lasting peace requires that Russia’s interests be accommodated so that it has a stake in that order. The challenge is to find a way forward that satisfies at least Moscow’s minimal security requirements without requiring the United States and its allies to compromise their core principles and interests.”
• “We think we have identified an off-ramp for this standoff that could work for our respective countries. We see four elements to a solution:
  • First, restrictions on military operations along the NATO/Russia border.
  • Second, a moratorium on NATO expansion eastward.
  • Third, resolution of ongoing and frozen conflicts in the former Soviet space and the Balkans.
  • And fourth, modernization of the 1975 Helsinki Accords, which created a pan-European forum and articulated agreed principles of interstate relations to undergird East-West detente.”
• “The final settlement will be far from ideal in the minds of many; critics will denounce it as appeasement. But the result will be better for all parties than any armed conflict could possibly deliver.”

"Who Ya Gonna Believe About Russia Invading Ukraine?," Andrew Bacevich, The Boston Globe, 02.04.22. The author, president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, writes:

• “While the danger of miscalculation persists, a nonviolent resolution of the ongoing war scare is eminently plausible, which makes the incessant warmongering of the American media all the more disturbing and repugnant.”
• “According to Western press reports, Russia has ‘massed’ … an estimated 130,000 troops along Ukraine’s perimeter. ... This formidable force, which includes dozens of armored vehicles repetitively featured on network news reports in the United States, would almost certainly suffice to defeat the Ukrainian army and to capture Kyiv. It comes nowhere close to being enough to occupy and pacify a country that is roughly the size of Texas, with a population of approximately 43 million.”
• “Should Russia invade Ukraine, in other words, it will almost immediately confront the question that US forces faced following the fall of Baghdad in 2003: Now what? Reflecting on the subsequent trials that beset US troops (not to mention the Soviet army’s experience in Afghanistan during the 1980s), members of the Russian general staff will probably view that prospect as a flashing red light.”
• “In all likelihood [Putin] is engaged in hard-nosed negotiating. His aim? To signal that the years when the United States and its European allies could get away with exploiting Russian weakness to the West’s advantage have ended. In practical terms, Putin is demanding comprehensive security guarantees. More specifically, he wants assurances that Ukraine, a former Soviet republic, will not be joining NATO at any time in the foreseeable future.”
• “In short, while the danger of miscalculation persists, a nonviolent resolution of the ongoing war scare is eminently plausible. It may even be closer at hand than members of the general public appreciate — which makes the incessant warmongering of the American media all the more disturbing and repugnant.”

"Building a Constructive U.S.-Russia Relationship," John Herbst, The National Interest, 02.08.22. The author, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine and Uzbekistan, and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, writes:

• “Using the four-part strategy described below, Washington should seek to build a relationship with Moscow in the long run:”
  • “First, work with allies and partners to counter the immediate danger from Moscow. That means bolstering NATO’s northeastern flank, beefing up a naval presence in the Black Sea, and backing democracy movements from Belarus to Venezuela. Equally important, the United States needs to stay on the same page with Europe and present a united front on sanctions, force posture, and diplomacy.”
  • “Second, establish clear red lines on Moscow’s behavior. And when those red lines are crossed, act swiftly. …Washington should hit Moscow with the most effective sanctions possible against Russia’s financial system and its oligarchs if it escalates in Ukraine. And the United States should do more to expose the corruption of the Russian regime. … The United States should also work to exploit any friction between Russia and China.”
  • “Third, work together where possible. The United States and Russia do have some shared interests, from arms control to halting the spread of Islamist terrorism in Central Asia to containing Covid-19. There are opportunities to partner on the future of Afghanistan and the future of our planet, as climate change accelerates. The United States can pursue these shared goals while still pushing back hard against Kremlin provocations. ”
  • “Fourth, lay out a vision for close future relations with a prosperous Russia. This is the carrot to accompany the United States’ many sticks. Now is the time to start to condition the Russian government, elites, and regular citizens that U.S. intentions toward Russia are not hostile and that good relations can lead to prosperity and security. … The United States should also engage Russia’s ‘non-systemic’ opposition and the Russian diaspora. ”
• “We also propose the bold step of freezing and holding the assets of senior Kremlin officials and their associates in a trust fund for return to the Russian people when a Russian government that respects the rule of law is established. ”

"Why Washington Has Lost Its Mind Over Ukraine," David C. Hendrickson, The National Interest, 02.11.22. The author, President of the John Quincy Adams Society, writes:

• “Granting that the vigorous anti-Russian turn in Ukrainian policy is seen as a big problem by Putin, it remains very difficult to see how the use of force would solve it for him. There is talk about such a rescue operation by some Russophones, but not Russian officials or legislators. No way exists of getting a clear read on how the Russophone population outside Donbas would react to a Putin move to save them with a military invasion, but I don’t think it would be favorable even in the short term. ”
• “So, Biden was wrong and Zelensky was right. There will be no war. The one in the east, as a consequence of a Ukrainian reconquest of the Donbas or Crimea, has been put on extended hiatus. The one conjured up by U.S. intelligence is a fiction.”
• “Did Washington’s alarmists really believe it themselves, or has consent been manufactured by a war scare whose utility they plainly saw, but the details of which they didn’t really believe? … The war scare, with the media dutifully performing its stenographic role, has brought great advantages to the hawks. The LNG folks have made considerable progress in their campaign to prevent the opening of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. The increased deployments to Eastern Europe and arms sales to Ukraine gratify the interests of the military-industrial complex. The anti-Russia coalition, which draws as much from sheer ideological enmity as anything resembling self-interest, has advanced its campaign to gain legal authority from Congress to impose a total shutdown in relations with Russia. That looks to me like three wins for the hawks. ”
• “The cleverest feature of the administration’s approach is that, when there is no war, Biden and Blinken can claim that it was all due to them and their solid statesmanship. … Count on it, the reduction in future numbers (as the Russian exercises wind down) will be attributed to the wise leadership of the Biden administration.”

“Minsk as Mantra: Can the Minsk Accords Avert War in Ukraine?,” William E. Pomeranz, Kennan Institute's Focus Ukraine, 02.07.22. The author, acting director of the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, writes:

• “Among all the charges and countercharges between Russia and the United States, there is only one thing that both sides apparently agree on. On February 3, State Department spokesperson Ned Price said that the United States supports the implementation of the Minsk accords. This declaration echoed previous statements from Kremlin spokesman Dmitrii Peskov, who also has called for the full enactment of the Minsk accords.”
• “For Ukraine, the accords represent a national humiliation and, if implemented, would require a fundamental rewriting of the country’s founding law. … The Minsk accords call on Kyiv not only to recognize the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk within the country but also to give these two regions veto power over any national legislation. Such authority would mean that Russia could effectively gain control over Ukraine’s internal politics. It would also require significant constitutional amendments that no national Ukrainian politician would want to put his or her name to.”
• “The Minsk agreement includes some difficult choices for Russia as well (though Russia is not specifically named in the accords as a party to the conflict), but there is no indication that Russia will follow through on its promises. Specifically, Russia shows no sign that it intends to grant Ukraine control over all of the latter’s border with Russia, as required by Minsk II, or that it plans to withdraw any of its weapons and other military equipment from the region. Moreover, it clearly has no intention of returning Crimea to Ukraine.”
• “So while the Minsk agreements define a theoretical process for resolving the conflict, all of the major concessions would be assumed by Ukraine, most notably the sacrifice of its sovereignty and its future existence as an integrated, unified state.”
• “Thus the United States is sending mixed signals when it calls for implementation of the Minsk accords while still standing firm on Ukraine’s right to defend its territorial integrity. In reality, you cannot have both.”

“Putin's impending 'march of folly,'” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 02.13.22. The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “The vast army that Russia has arrayed along Ukraine's borders could probably seize the capital of Kyiv in several days and control the country in little more than a week, U.S. officials believe. But then Putin's real battle would begin—as Russia and its Ukrainian proxies try to stabilize a country whose people largely detest them.”
• “Russia's economy would be squeezed tight by sanctions; its business and political leaders would become international pariahs; and much of the wealth Putin and his chums have accumulated would be frozen. … Ukraine might seem a triumphal victory for Putin at first, but it's unlikely to have a happy ending.”
• “President Biden's response has rested on three pillars … First, he believes the rules-based global order would be threatened by an unprovoked Russian invasion, and that Putin must pay a severe cost if he takes this lawless action. … Second, Biden is determined to avoid any direct military contact between Russian and U.S. forces, which would risk nuclear war. … Third, he is convinced that, as in the Cold War, the security of the United States and its European friends depends on … the NATO alliance.”
• “Putin probably won't decide until the last moment precisely what he will select from this meat grinder of options. … But U.S. military officials say Putin has sent orders to his commanders to prepare for possible battle by the middle of this week, when the ground in central Ukraine will have frozen more than a foot deep, allowing rapid tank advance.”
• “The world will shudder if the tank and missile assault begins, as we witness a weak country confronting a blitzkrieg, alone. The cries for a negotiated settlement will increase, with some proposing new concessions to placate Putin. But after that global shock will come a wave of rage and a demand that Russia pay a price for its aggression. Then this war will enter the porcupine phase, in which Putin, too, will feel the pain.”

“Biden should use cold war handbook to stop Putin’s Ukraine threat,” Edward Luce, Financial Times, 02.11.22. The author, U.S. national editor and columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “History repeats itself, first as tragedy, then as farce, said Karl Marx. But sometimes, as Mark Twain rejoined, it simply rhymes. The 1980 amassing of Soviet divisions on Poland’s border threatened to become a lethal escalation of the Cold War. America warned Moscow that an invasion of Poland would kill U.S.-Soviet detente—and probably much worse.”
• “The similarities are compelling. The USSR stood down from invading Poland in 1980 because it judged the costs could be prohibitive. The U.S. warned of arms sales to China, a total Soviet trade boycott and a grain embargo. The Poles, like Ukrainians today, were bitterly hostile to Moscow. The more Biden can convince Putin he would risk another ‘bleeding wound’—as Mikhail Gorbachev later described the Soviet war in Afghanistan—the less attractive invading Ukraine will seem. George Santayana said: ‘Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.’ For Biden that could read: ‘Those who study history may be fortunate to repeat it.’”

“The Gold Medal for Foreign Policy Goes to Germany,” Stephen M. Walt, Foreign Policy, 02.07.22. The author, the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, writes:

• “If you were handing out Olympic medals for foreign policy over the past couple of decades, which major world power should get the gold?”
• “China has stumbled of late under Xi Jinping, and its increasingly heavy-handed approach at home and abroad has tarnished its image, alarmed its neighbors, and made others wary about its future intentions. … Barring a rift between Beijing and Moscow (something the United States and others would be wise to encourage), Russia will be relegated mostly to a spoiler role as China’s junior partner.”
• “Despite many enduring advantages, neither the United States nor United Kingdom can be regarded as serious medal contenders either. … Who’s left? Well, if I were awarding the medals, I’d hand the gold to Germany. If the primary goal of any country’s foreign policy is to increase its security and prosperity without doing too much damage to its expressed political values, then Germany’s performance over the past several decades is undeniably impressive.”
• “Yet Germany’s successful run may not be sustainable for much longer. As the late Robert Jervis emphasized in his book System Effects, when relations among the major powers grow more contentious, they become less tolerant of ambiguity, and medium powers can lose their freedom of maneuver. As Sino-American relations become more competitive and Sino-Russian ties continue to deepen, it will be harder for Germany to stay on good terms with the three great powers. … Berlin will have to choose a side. If, as I expect, it opts for continued alignment with the United States and NATO, that will also be an opportune time for a serious discussion of a new division of labor between the United States and its European partners.”

“Joe Biden, a President for the New Cold War: In one way, the 79-year-old NATO adherent is the right man for his times,” Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., The Wall Street Journal, 02.08.22. The author, a member of the news outlet’s editorial board, writes:

• “Mr. Biden has a few flaws but he was a child of the Cold War and, unless I’m mistaken, has surprised and discombobulated Vladimir Putin with his un-Obama-like response to renewed tensions over Ukraine, including, on Monday, whipping a German chancellor into line. By sending military supplies to Ukraine, by deploying troops to Eastern Europe, by preparing sanctions, the Biden administration has orchestrated a set of signals that even Mr. Putin can’t misinterpret.”
• “[I]t’s already clear that his giant mobilization on the borders of Ukraine won’t yield any big payoff, just as his earlier aggressions in Crimea and the Donbas region produced only financial black holes while alienating any support Russia enjoyed in the Ukrainian population. If he proceeds now with the threatened and pointless war, his hand would be strengthened by Russia’s newly accumulated $600 billion in foreign reserves. But these funds can’t buy needed imports if the imports are embargoed by the West; they can’t be used to settle claims levied against overseas Russian assets, including oil cargoes, if banks are prohibited from receiving the funds.”
• “He needs computer chips. He needs inputs for his oil industry and Russia’s military that Russia has no capacity to produce. China might be willing to provide inferior substitutes but at a price, and only if Xi Jinping believes there is an upside to backing the Russian horse, which he may begin to doubt.”
• “He still has Russia’s oil-and-gas card, but when that’s all you have, you might be nervous about behaving in ways that incentivize your customers to seek out long-term alternatives. Which brings us to another ill-starred president to whom Mr. Biden has been compared. A disputed story has Jimmy Carter’s national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski pumping his fist when the Soviets rolled into Afghanistan, saying the Kremlin ‘took the bait.’ I wouldn’t go quite that far but Mr. Putin is not ‘winning’ the Ukraine crisis he started.”

“Invading Ukraine Will Not Meet Russia’s Expectations,” Lawrence J. Korb and Steve Cimbala, The National Interest, 02.09.22. The authors, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense and a professor of political science at Penn State Brandywine, write:

• “If Russia should decide upon a major invasion of Ukraine, instead of spoiling operations limited to the Donbass, it will likely find that its own expectations for a quick and decisive victory at an acceptable cost will be disappointed.”
• “A major war in Ukraine will leave Russia more isolated politically and more damaged militarily, with forces already strained by deployments elsewhere to deter threats in the Caucasus, Central Asia, Syria and on the Chinese border. Putin also risks domestic political blowback if Russian casualties are high or operational and tactical failures become apparent in the early stages of fighting.”
• “More importantly, any military collision between NATO and Russia will take place within a background of nuclear escalation. As both powers should have learned from their Cold War experiences, the threat of nuclear conflict invariably hangs over any military confrontation between the United States and Russia.”
• “Yet, the showdown with Russia over Ukraine provides an opportunity for NATO to rethink its purpose and priorities for the twenty-first century. NATO’s past successes have been based on clarity and unity about its mission: the security and defense of free-market democracies in Europe. NATO is not a virus seeking to grow into every possible place for the sake of expansion per se, nor is it a surrogate for a wider European security community that includes Russia and other states that are currently non-NATO members. Many NATO member states are sufficiently challenged domestically to maintain their own political freedoms and democratic safeguards against internal, not external threats.”
• “Russia will likely try to combine diplomatic, informational, military, economic and political-psychological measures to keep the United States and its allies off balance, politically confused, and militarily underprepared. Even as Russian troops continue to amass on the Ukrainian border, that is the real threat to the United States and its NATO allies.”

“Beware comparing Ukraine with Finland: The west must resist any security deals with Russia that compromise Kyiv’s independence,” Editorial Board, Financial Times, 02.09.22. The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “[P]roposals for the ‘Finlandization’ of Ukraine must be treated with great caution. … Comparisons between Finland and Ukraine are superficially attractive but do not stand up to close inspection.”
• “Finland was neutral in the Cold War and careful not to antagonize the Soviet Union. Yet it was a prosperous western-style democracy whose people had an unquestioned right to live in a sovereign state of their own. Matters stand very differently with Ukraine today. Putin casts doubt over Ukraine’s legitimate right to independent statehood. He suggests Ukrainians lack a national identity distinct from that of Russians. He regards the vibrancy of Ukraine’s democracy as a potential threat to his system of power at home, as the Russian people might one day demand the same freedoms.”
• “Russian behavior toward Ukraine recalls not Finland but Poland in the 18th century, when the tsarist empire exerted increasing control over domestic Polish politics, eventually colluding in three partitions that wiped Poland off the map of Europe for more than a century.”
• “This is not to deny that a case for a neutral Ukraine exists. Although NATO allies defend the right of any country to make a free choice to apply for membership, it is clear some governments in western Europe would rather Ukraine did not join. An understanding between NATO, Russia and Ukraine on Ukrainian neutrality would be a recognition of that fact, not intolerable weakness on the west’s part.”
• “Putin’s pressure on Ukraine is part of his broader push for revised post-cold war security arrangements in central and eastern Europe. Western leaders are right to resist these extravagant demands. But they should also send a clear message that they view a free, stable, independent Ukraine as a core element of the improved western-Russian relationship that Europe sorely needs.”

“Biden may be outplaying Putin in one critical way,” Daniel Baer, The Washington Post, 02.09.22. The author, a senior fellow a the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former U.S. ambassador to the OSCE, writes:

• “What the Biden administration seems to have figured out is that it need not make definitive statements about exactly what Putin is planning. Instead, it can release intelligence and analysis of what he could be up to, before he has a chance to execute his plans. And as long as the intelligence's basic facts are right, and the potential Russian plans are clearly presented as working hypotheses, the United States can remain committed to being factual without allowing Putin to weaponize that commitment.”
• “This approach entails seeing the public sphere differently. Instead of awaiting action and an assessment of that action, Biden and his team are engaging through the media.”
• “A lot of people know more about how false flag attacks work now than they did a month ago. If Putin were to use that approach, it would no longer come as a shock—and confirmation of, and consequences for, such tactics would come more swiftly. Broadcasting Putin's possible plans also strengthens the impression that allies could quickly present a unified response to any action, presumably amplifying any deterrent effect.”
• “And so the tables have turned: Instead of the West playing whack-a-mole, refuting various lies propagated by Russia, Russia is now in the position of denying the potential plots it may be hatching with respect to Ukraine. (Putin himself reportedly offered the latest such denial, according to French President Emmanuel Macron, after their five-hour meeting on Tuesday.) Instead of quietly working behind the scenes and taking a wait-and-see approach that allows Putin to keep the world guessing, Biden and his European counterparts have got Putin trying to turn down the volume on their repeated reminders that they are watching him closely.”

"Will Russia Send Missiles to Cuba?," James Homes, The National Interest, 02.07.22. The author, J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Nonresident Fellow at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfighting, writes:

• “Russia-watchers have been quick to invoke the Cuban Missile Crisis precedent, which implies that Russia would station nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles of some type in the Caribbean. But history may not repeat itself. Russian magnates have other options than a nuclear deployment—a move Moscow might deem needlessly escalatory. They might avail themselves of conventional options.”
• “For one, the Russian Navy might stage a squadron of warships in the Caribbean with sufficient numbers and combat power to make its weight felt along sea lanes crisscrossing the region. … Russian strategists have doubtless taken note of Cuba’s strategic value. … It is an ideal central position for making mayhem.”
• “To think Moscow would try to mount a deployment of such magnitude strains credulity. There appears to be strategic logic to such a move. It would tug U.S. forces southward, potentially from embattled regions, and thin out U.S. forces there. … But it would mean putting vital interests close to home at risk to play the troublemaker abroad.”
• “Rather than up the ante by positioning nuclear weapons or a major joint force in the Western Hemisphere, Moscow might instead dispatch anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and surface-to-air missiles. In so doing, Russian magnates could radiate influence to the United States’ south while helping curb U.S. and allied influence in the Russian near abroad.”
• “A posture founded on conventional missiles in Cuba would not dismember the United States’ strategic position to the degree a musclebound fleet might. … In all likelihood, though, seeing Russians couple geography with high technology to erect a blocking position thwart the approaches to the Gulf of Mexico would compel the U.S. military to act, which would consume resources best spent elsewhere. … At the very least, a Pentagon struggling to cope with demands around the globe would have another headache to contend with. This may all sound fanciful, [but] it behooves U.S. officialdom to think the unthinkable lest Washington be caught off-guard once again.”

“Putin, US intelligence and the global fight for the Ukraine narrative,” Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, 02.13.22. The author, chief foreign affairs columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “Jake Sullivan, Biden’s national security adviser, took to the White House podium on Friday to tell the world about the Russian troop build-up in Ukraine—and to warn of a possible impending invasion. The goal was not simply to give Americans time to get out of Ukraine. It was an effort by the U.S. to gain control of the narrative, before Russia does. But any U.S. effort to use intelligence to shape world opinion has to contend with the shadow of the Iraq war.”
• “Unlike Iraq in 2003, Western governments seem largely in agreement over what is happening on the ground in Ukraine.”
• “But Western public opinion remains a weak link. Recent polls suggest that 26 percent of Americans agree that ‘Joe Biden is a puppet president’ controlled by a Deep State; while 31 percent of Americans, 28 percent of French people and 23 percent of Germans think it is definitely or probably true that there is a ‘single group of people who secretly control events . . . and run the world together.’”
• “That kind of extreme, irrational skepticism is a weak base on which to build a consensus for a Western policy response that is likely to be expensive and dangerous. Unfortunately Putin has plenty to work with, as he tries to exploit the weaknesses of the West.”

“Why the West’s Diplomacy With Russia Keeps Failing,” Anne Applebaum, The Atlantic, 02.12.22. The author, a staff writer for The Atlantic and a Pulitzer-prize winning historian, writes:

• “Tragically, the Western leaders and diplomats who are right now trying to stave off a Russian invasion of Ukraine still think they live in a world where rules matter, where diplomatic protocol is useful, where polite speech is valued. All of them think that when they go to Russia, they are talking to people whose minds can be changed by argument or debate. They think the Russian elite cares about things like its ‘reputation.’ It does not.”
• “In fact, when talking to the new breed of autocrats, whether in Russia, China, Venezuela, or Iran, we are now dealing with something very different: People who aren’t interested in treaties and documents, people who only respect hard power.”
• “Their intentions are different from ours too. Putin’s goal is not a flourishing, peaceful, prosperous Russia, but a Russia where he remains in charge. Lavrov’s goal is to maintain his position in the murky world of the Russian elite and, of course, to keep his money. What we mean by ‘interests’ and what they mean by ‘interests’ are not the same. When they listen to our diplomats, they don’t hear anything that really threatens their position, their power, their personal fortunes.”
• “Despite all of our talk, no one has ever seriously tried to end, rather than simply limit, Russian money laundering in the West, or Russian political or financial influence in the West.”
• “Now we are on the brink of what could be a catastrophic conflict. … This terrible moment represents not just a failure of diplomacy; it also reflects a failure of the Western imagination, a generation-long refusal, on the part of diplomats, politicians, journalists, and intellectuals, to understand what kind of state Russia was becoming and to prepare accordingly. We have refused to see the representatives of this state for what they are. We have refused to speak to them in a way that might have mattered. Now it might be too late.”

Sanctions:

“How sanctions against Russia could hit European economies,” Valentina Romei, Martin Arnold and Nastassia Astrasheuskaya, Financial Times, 02.09.22. The authors, reporters for the news outlet, write:

• “Cutting gas flows to Europe is Moscow’s trump economic card if the west imposes tougher sanctions in the event of a Russian invasion of Ukraine. But the EU’s vulnerability to countermeasures by the Kremlin extends well beyond energy.”
• “Russia is the EU’s largest energy supplier. About 40 percent of the bloc’s natural gas imports and nearly one-third of its crude oil imports come from Russia. … Gas reserves are below historical levels and prices have soared in recent months, giving Russia increased leverage. … Russia is a leading commodities exporter and features in the European Commission’s list of suppliers of critical raw materials. … Russia supplies about 40 per cent of the world’s palladium, which is needed in the catalytic converters used in vehicles to limit harmful emissions, and about 30 per cent of titanium, which is crucial for the aerospace industry.”
• “Lenders are also at risk, as the ECB has warned. About $60 billion is owed to EU banks by Russian entities, nearly four times more than the amount they owe to U.S. banks, according to the Bank for International Settlements. Large amounts deposited in EU banks by Russian entities could be frozen.”
• “Ukraine’s government owes about $23 billion to holders of its sovereign bonds. … Investors have said a full-blown invasion of Ukraine would trigger a flight to safety in global markets, away from stocks and into government bonds or other traditional havens such as the Swiss franc, yen and gold.”

“The U.K. Can Hit Putin Where It Hurts,” Editorial Board, The Wall Street Journal, 02.09.22. The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “Moscow could be forgiven for not taking British threats seriously, given London's weak response to previous provocations. The British Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, created in 2016, has imposed only six fines in its history, according to the Financial Times. The enforcers need more funds, especially given the deep pockets that oligarchs bring to legal fights.”
• “The U.S. and Europe have a role to play here. The Biden Administration has drawn up a list of Russian elites who will face penalties, and oligarchs also own properties elsewhere. But the U.K. is the key player, and the White House could push London to tighten the screws. Even absent another invasion of Ukraine, there's no reason to keep accepting this money and the malign influence over British politics that comes with it.”
• “One goal of Brexit was for an independent U.K. to play a more decisive role on the world stage. As the window closes for Ukraine diplomacy, London can prove its willingness to hit Mr. Putin and his cronies where it hurts.”

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“Ukraine Is a Distraction From Taiwan,” Elbridge Colby and Oriana Skylar Mastro, The Wall Street Journal, 02.13.22. The authors, a principal at the Marathon Initiative and a center fellow at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, write:

• “A Russian invasion of Ukraine would be the most consequential use of military force in Europe since World War II and could put Moscow in a position to threaten U.S. allies in Europe. Many in the American foreign-policy establishment argue that the appropriate U.S. response to any such invasion is a major American troop deployment to the Continent. This would be a grave mistake. The U.S. can no longer afford to spread its military across the world. The reason is simple: an increasingly aggressive China.”
• “The U.S. must defend Taiwan to retain its credibility as the leader of a coalition for a free and open Indo-Pacific.”
• “The critical assets—munitions, top-end aviation, submarines, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities—that are needed to fight Russia or China are in short supply. For example, stealthy heavy bombers are the crown jewel of U.S. military power, but there are only 20 in the entire Air Force. The U.S. has no hope of competing with China and ensuring Taiwan's defense if it is distracted elsewhere.”
• “The U.S. should remain committed to NATO's defense but husband its critical resources for the primary fight in Asia, and Taiwan in particular.”
• “The Chinese can't be allowed to think that America's distraction in Ukraine provides them with a window of opportunity to invade Taiwan. The U.S. needs to act accordingly, crisis or not.”

“The crisis in Ukraine is one for the history books,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 02.08.22. The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “China's Xi rarely takes such an emotional or sentimental approach to policy, and U.S. officials think he might be skeptical about Putin's overbearing manner and disdain for rules, as well as the damage a Ukraine war could do to global energy markets and economic growth. But such misgivings aren't evident in the communique released by the two leaders [Xi and Putin] on Feb. 4.”
• “Think of this communique as a Russian-Chinese version of George F. Kennan's famous containment strategy against the Soviet Union. The two nations are digging in for a long war, mostly cold, but with some possibly hot episodes such as Ukraine. Biden's retort should be to stress the one thing that Putin and Xi don't have and America does have—good allies. History also teaches that such partners could be crucial in the coming battle for the ‘new era.’”

“Russia and China announce a bid to make the world safe for dictatorship,” Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 02.07.22. The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “There was potent symbolism in the warm meeting between President Xi Jinping of China and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, as the Winter Olympics opened in Beijing. At a time when other countries are troubled by the actions of these Eurasian giants … the two dictators took center stage to support one another.”
• “More important, they matched that show of unity with substance: a remarkable joint statement, running more than 5,000 words, that can be described only as a blueprint for combined confrontation with the United States. The two countries endorsed each other’s foreign policy wish lists, with Russia affirming China’s opposition to ‘any forms of independence of Taiwan’ and China denouncing ‘further enlargement of NATO.’ China agreed to buy $117.5 billion worth of oil and gas from Russia.”
• “Though not quite a green light from Beijing for Russian aggression against Ukraine, which was not mentioned by name, the statement signals that, if Russia invades, China will help Mr. Putin withstand the crippling economic sanctions that the United States and its allies plan to impose. In fact, the document says, there are ‘no limits’ to the two’s ‘friendship’ and ‘no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation,’ suggesting that it could some day extend into intelligence sharing and weapons development.”
• “Russia and China have many potential points of conflict—economic, territorial and otherwise—that could eventually divide them as they did 60 years ago. Over time, Russia might chafe at the imbalance of a partnership with a much larger and richer China. What seems most relevant for now, however, are their strong shared hostility toward the United States and their belief that it is a declining power whose weakness can be exploited: ‘a trend has emerged towards redistribution of power in the world,’ as their joint statement says. Their nostrums about peace and development aside, what Mr. Xi and Mr. Putin clearly seek is a world made safe for their dictatorships. Western democracies must be equally determined about countering them.”

“Enemies of My Enemy,” Michael Beckley, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2022. 

“Why the Ukraine-Taiwan Analogy Doesn’t Make Sense,” Charles K. S. Wu, Yao-Yuan Yeh, Fang-Yu Chen and Austin Horng-En Wang, The National Interest, 02.13.21. The authors, professors at universities worldwide, write:

• “What we are suggesting is that believing China could invade Taiwan because the United States does not react to Ukraine is premature and unproductive war-mongering. A simple analogy is insufficient, and additional factors need to be considered in weighing this particular consideration. There is no denying the strategic importance of Taiwan given its favorable strategic location for U.S. naval power projection, leadership in global semiconductor manufacturing, and central role in the emerging new Cold War between the United States and China.”

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms control:

"US Defense to its Workforce: Nuclear War Can Be Won," Alan Kaptanoglu and Stewart Prager, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 02.02.22. The authors, respectively a post-doctoral researcher at the University of Washington, and a professor of astrophysical sciences at Princeton University, write:

• “Many in the US defense establishment—the military, government, think tanks, and industry—promote the perception that a nuclear war can be won and fought. Moreover, they do so in a voice that is influential, respected, well-funded, and treated with deference. The US defense leadership’s methodical messaging … advances a view of nuclear weapon policies that intensifies and accelerates the new nuclear arms race forming between the United States, China, and Russia.”
• “The 23-chapter Guide to Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Great Power Competition provides an excellent and representative case study for examining this critical messaging. ... All of the authors have direct or indirect connections with the nuclear weapons complex or associated think tanks.”
• “The guide’s messaging is comprehensive but dangerously skewed. ... The guide centers around a new reality—the aggressive development of nuclear arms by Russia and China that is intensifying a new Cold War. Nuclear arms treaties—an important tool for limiting arms races—are brushed aside as functionally pointless since, according to the guide, Russia will cheat and China won’t come to the bargaining table.”
• “If service members received more thoughtful messaging about nuclear deterrence and preparedness, their efforts to think critically might help them understand—in the profound ways that Reagan and Gorbachev once understood—that ‘a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.’”

Is the United States Trying to Fight and Win Nuclear Wars?, Peter Huessy, The National Interest, 02.09.22. The author, president of GeoStrategic Analysis, writes:

• “Several former U.S. presidents have negotiated successful arms control treaties that reduced deployed strategic nuclear forces by nearly 90 percent. Certainly, some arms control agreements (such as START I) improve U.S. security. But given the long record of Soviet and now Russian cheating and treaty non-compliance, ensuring that arms agreements are highly verifiable is necessary—though highly difficult.”
• “It is critical to avoid harmful concessions. Both Russia’s massive strategic warhead upload capability under New START and the thousands of Russia’s unregulated regional and medium-range nuclear weapons are prime examples. Further, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was not and is not required for arms control to take place.”
• “Some advocates of disarmament hold that if Russia or China use nuclear weapons against the United States, Washington should only retaliate with conventional weapons—going beyond even advocates of a ‘minimum deterrent’ nuclear strategy.”
• “As for U.S. great power adversaries, both Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have been talking about using limited nuclear strikes as a means of escalating or threatening to escalate conventional conflicts to the nuclear level to get the United States and its allies to preemptively surrender. … Imagine how easy it would be for China and Russia to prevail if the United States stopped relying on its nuclear deterrent.”
• “Kaptanoglu and Prager’s preferred deterrent strategy is apparently to hold an adversary’s cities at risk. But even when the United States and its allies respond to a nuclear attack from China or Russia with a retaliatory strike against only their cities—a highly immoral strategy—both China and Russia are certainly going to think that this is a matter of warfighting … and not de-escalation. These two major powers are willing to kill tens of millions to stay in power and have military strategies that reflect that. The only deterrent option is to take down their remaining military power in the event of conflict.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

“Inside the U.S.-Russia Deal that Eases Pressure on Assad,” Stéphanie Fillion, Colum Lynch, and Robbie Gramer, Foreign Policy, 02.08.22. The author, reporters for the magazine, write:

• “The United States has quietly cut a deal with Russia that eases the political pressure on Syria at the United Nations. If the 15-nation Security Council endorses it, the U.N. security body would hold fewer meetings on Syria’s chemical weapons and consolidate separate sessions on humanitarian relief and a political transition that have gained little traction over the past several years.”
• “The proposal—which is still under negotiation by the council—reflects the growing fatigue in the council over a seemingly endless procession of meetings that diplomats contend hash over the same material, exacerbate big-power squabbles, and result in desperately few concrete achievements.”
• “But it also represents the latest in a series of incremental concessions the United States and other Western powers have been making to Russia, which holds the presidency of the council this month. These concessions arise from key U.S. foreign-policy objectives: avoiding a clash with Moscow and ensuring the survival of a humanitarian lifeline for moving supplies from Turkey to northwestern Syria that Russia wants to shutter.”
• “The latest pact drew sighs of relief from some Security Council diplomats who say they have been worn down by the repetitive war of words between the big powers over the fate of Syria, with little to show in terms of resolving the decadelong conflict. ‘I’ve been on the council for a year, and I could write every country’s statement,’ said one council diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonymity … ‘We’ve been repeating the same thing again and again three times a month. That time in the Security Council could be used more productively.’”

Cyber security:

“There Is No Cyber ‘Shock and Awe’: Plausible Threats in the Ukrainian Conflict,” Lennart Maschmeyer and Nadiya Kostyuk, War on the Rocks, 02.08.22. The authors, a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich and an assistant professor at the School of Public Policy and the School of Cybersecurity and Privacy at the Georgia Institute of Technology, write:

• “Jason Healey predicts that if Russia invades, ‘the opening salvo is likely to be with offensive cyber capabilities.’ William Courtney and Peter A. Wilson from RAND warn of the ‘massive employment’ of cyber warfare tools to create ‘shock and awe causing Ukraine’s defenses or will to fight to collapse.’ Accordingly, the United States and the United Kingdom have deployed cyber warfare teams to help Ukraine defend against an impending strategic cyber strike against critical infrastructure. Some go further, suggesting that Russia may not need to use military force at all, because cyber strikes can ‘achieve much the same effect from across the border.’ This assessment is apparently shared by policymakers working on countering the Russian threat to Ukraine, with an (anonymous) senior Biden administration official recently stating as much.”
• “These predictions suggest that cyber operations will provide significant strategic advantages to Russia either as complements to military force, or as standalone instruments — or at least that policymakers and commentators think that they will. Current warnings of escalating cyber warfare conjure deep-seated fears of cyber doom and the recurring specter of a ‘cyber Pearl Harbor’ strategic surprise attack. In practice, however, cyber warfare has been a failure.”
• “Our research shows that cyber operations have remained irrelevant on the battlefield, while standalone operations to weaken Ukraine through election interference, critical infrastructure sabotage, and economic disruption largely failed to contribute to Russia’s strategic goals of making Ukraine abandon its pro-European Union and pro-NATO foreign policy. Consequently, current fears of cyber warfare defy not only Russia’s track record in Ukraine, but also strategic logic. Given that Russia’s cyber operations have failed to produce significant strategic value to date, why would we expect this to suddenly change now? Or, to put it more pointedly: If cyber operations offer such effective and potent instruments, why did Russia go through the trouble (and costs) to mobilize its troops? Current predictions of cyber onslaught do not offer a persuasive answer.”

"The Russian hackers are coming. Are we ready?," Editorial Board, The Boston Globe, 02.11.22. The newspaper’s editorial board writes:

• “While there is a strong likelihood Russia will use targeted attacks on critical infrastructure and other systems inside of Ukraine in an effort to destabilize that nation ahead of an incursion, Putin is not likely to take that approach in the United States. Such a move would be seen as a declaration of a war Russia knows it can’t win. But Russia will almost certainly turn to what has become a signature tool of cyber warfare when it comes to the United States: disinformation campaigns.”
• “How and when to respond to cyberattacks is an evolving challenge for the United States and other countries, since the line where a cyberattack crosses into an act of aggression under international law is hazy. America has its own cyberweapons, and no consensus on what rules should govern them either.”
• “As lawmakers rush to finalize a bill that would impose strict sanctions on Russia for any incursion into Ukraine, some … want pre-invasion cyberattacks aimed at Ukraine to be included among the triggers. … That’s a good start. But lawmakers must go further. Any sanctions bill must also spell out that Russia will pay a price for any US-focused digital disruption campaigns.”
• “Lawmakers must make clear that if Russia instead chooses massive disinformation campaigns, that too will be met with a US response. That’s not to say that American citizens don’t have the right to oppose American foreign policy; indeed they should be free to do so without being demonized as Russian stooges. But the government has a responsibility to deter covert manipulation efforts by the Russian government and expose them if they occur.”
• “Russia must know now that it can’t afford to pay the price for a cyberattack against Americans, regardless of the form that attack takes. Lawmakers must state that clearly in [the] sanctions bill. Nobody on Capitol Hill knows if and when Putin might invade Ukraine, but every indication is that he could launch an attack at almost any moment. The United States must be ready.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant developments.

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

"George Shultz and Uncovering Underlying Interests," Danny Stoian and Nora Cyra, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, 02.07.22. The authors, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Legislative Affairs Bureau at the U.S. Department of State and a graduate student at Harvard University, write:

• “From the territorial integrity of Ukraine to rule of law promotion in Central Asia, the United States and Russia have declared uncompromising positions from which negotiations seem unlikely. How can we resolve these intractable conflicts that jeopardize our well-being and stability? We consider the experience of late Secretary of State George Shultz to be a helpful guide in our current challenges. Given Secretary Shultz’s effective advancement of bilateral arms control and help in ending the Cold War, we would be wise to apply his tactics to achieve much-needed, and ever elusive, breakthroughs today.”
• “Shultz utilized a concept we refer to as ‘interest-based negotiation.’ This strategy shifts focus beyond what each side declares they want — their position — to probe why they actually want it — their interest. By understanding the Soviets’ underlying security concerns and domestic political constraints, Shultz proposed solutions that both sides could agree to and successfully implement.”
• “Most negotiations are stalled by parties clinging desperately to their positions, which are often approved and delivered to them by their superiors. Negotiations are then reduced to attempts to batter the other side into accepting these pre-approved positions, which ironically, neither side is usually authorized to accept. What results is a frustrating dance defined by impressive oratories but little creativity.”
• “By employing ‘interest-based negotiation,’ Shultz thus avoided this obstacle not by manipulating his counterparts, but by genuinely seeking to understand their perspective. He reminded us to lead with ‘why’ and truly care about the underlying needs and motivations of the other side if there is to be any hope to move beyond their positions.”
• “Amidst the current Ukraine crisis, cyberattacks, and election interference, it is challenging to interpret Russian aggression with empathy. However, focusing on a genuine desire to understand Russia’s needs and motivations, as Secretary Shultz advocated, can help us shift towards interest-based negotiations and achieve the peace and security the world needs.”

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Would Russians Embrace War? Why an Attack on Ukraine Might Erode Putin’s Support,"  Andrei Kolesnikov, Foreign Affairs, 02.09.22.

"Putin's Goal in Destroying Memorial: One More Step in Dismantling Russia’s Civil Society," Sergey Parkhomenko, Kennan Institute, The Russia File, 02.08.22. The author, a Russian journalist, publisher, and founder of several projects aimed at developing civic activism and promoting liberal values in Russia, writes:

• “Over the course of many years, Memorial’s preeminent role was as a research and data-collecting institution. The principal focal point has been Memorial’s legendary archive, which constitutes a vast collection of judicial and investigative documents from the time of mass political repression in the Soviet Union.”
• “Memorial succeeded in creating a one-of-a-kind complex for storing these valuable objects: the state-of-the-art equipment installed in the basement of Memorial’s headquarters not only has ensured the safekeeping of its collections but also has kept them ‘alive,’ that is, easily accessible to scholars.”
• “This has been a uniquely rare and valuable feature, for researchers find it extremely hard to gain access to Russian state archives, especially the federal and regional archives of the special services and the Ministry of Interior. Furthermore, after a brief period of openness in the early and mid-1990s, archives in Russia have become increasingly closed off, with a regime of secrecy and tightened restrictions in place. … After the shameful ruling on Memorial’s liquidation, these archives face the threat of confiscation.”
• “Let us note that the ‘memory war’ waged by Putin’s regime enhances the value of the documents from Memorial’s archives and collections. It is especially important that these documents are the paper originals and thus are very tangible. The state propaganda employs historical arguments to promote the newest version of imperial ideology, and historical knowledge becomes the object of political manipulation, time after time.”
• “Russian leaders, including President Putin himself, follow the propaganda media and assign the labels of ‘falsification’ and ‘ideological diversion’ to scientific knowledge about even the best-known episodes of Soviet repression. Under these circumstances, an electronic copy of an archival document can be easily declared a fake. But the old-fashioned paper archives of Memorial turn out to be the irreplaceable frontier of resistance to this state policy of enforced memory loss.”

Defense and aerospace:

“Breaking Ranks? Signs of Unease in Russian Military Circles,” Peter Rutland, PONARS Eurasia, 02.14.22. The author, Professor of Global Issues and Democratic Thought at Wesleyan University, writes:

• “With Russian forces poised to invade Ukraine, there are signs of possible dissent amongst Russia’s upper echelons. Early February saw two publications by retired Russian military officers that are highly critical of plans for military action against Ukraine. These dissenting voices attracted attention in the mainstream Western and Russian press.”
• “Western analysts are unsure what to make of the surfacing of dissenting voices on the periphery of the Russian military community. The consensus view is that these figures are far removed from the center of power and cannot be taken as representative of the views of the officer corps as a whole. Surveys suggest that there is strong support for President Vladimir Putin across all sections of the Russian elite—for his assertive foreign policy and the military in particular. However, it is highly unusual to see such critical commentary from retired senior officials who still have close ties to the military establishment.”
• “Is it a sign of important stirrings in the attitudes of the Russian officer corps? It is plausible that their ideas could gain traction in Russian military circles should a war in Ukraine go poorly. Further, these could be the early signs of more forthright political opposition in Russia.”
• “The nature of Putin’s relations with the military remains rather opaque. Neither Putin nor Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu themselves served in the Soviet Army. … Most of the civilian policy establishment in the Kremlin-friendly think tanks in Moscow have stuck loyally to the party line in the confrontation with the West over Ukraine. However, some of them have given hints of unease about the escalating crisis.”
• “A full-scale war would be a tremendous political risk for Putin—and he is known to be risk-averse. So hopefully, he will heed the warnings from the military and civilian skeptics, step back from the brink, and be content with a modest gain, such as declaring formal recognition of the separatist republics of Donetsk and Luhansk.”

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

"Germany is in Urgent Need of a Courageous New Ostpolitik," Timothy Garton Ash, Financial Times, 02.09.22. The author, Professor of European Studies at the University of Oxford's St. Antony's College, writes:

• “German chancellor Olaf Scholz often and rightly praises the Ostpolitik of his great Social Democratic predecessor, Willy Brandt, who was chancellor of the Federal Republic a half-century ago.”
  • “In 1969, when Brandt launched what was then called his ‘new’ Ostpolitik, West Germany was a revisionist power, ultimately seeking unification with East Germany, and the Soviet Union was a defensive status quo power. Today, united Germany is the defensive status quo power and Vladimir Putin’s Russia is the revisionist power, prepared to use all available means to restore its hegemony over Ukraine and other parts of eastern Europe.”
  • “Back then, West Germany’s economic relations with Russia were put at the service of the country’s innovative variant of the detente also being pursued by the US, France and the UK. … The long-term results of that systematic promotion of economic ties include Germany’s current energy dependence on Russia. The boot is on the other foot. That may help to explain Scholz’s refusal, at this week’s news conference with President Joe Biden, to say plainly that if Putin invades Ukraine, the Nord Stream 2 pipeline becomes instant industrial archaeology.”
  • “The underlying Ostpolitik gambit of Egon Bahr, Brandt’s adviser, was a judo throw: entice your heavy, slow-moving opponent, the Soviet Union, to lean so far into your embrace that with a skillful twist you can throw him over your shoulder. Now it is Putin, a judo black belt, who is trying to throw heavy, slow-moving Germany over his shoulder.”
• “Now for the good news. All these points are being made eloquently in German media, think tanks and political debate.”
• “Had it not been for the Ukraine crisis landing on Scholz’s desk within hours of his becoming chancellor, the tanker of Ostpolitik could gradually have turned, in the slow consensual fashion characteristic of contemporary German democracy, while his government’s green transformation policies gradually weaned it off Russian carbon. But history, that cruel taskmaster, has not left him the luxury of time. The new course has to be set right now.”

"Monsieur Fixit The Perils of Macron’s Shuttle Diplomacy," Celia Belin, Foreign Affairs, 02.10.22. 

Ukraine:

“In Ukraine, Political Infighting Could Complicate War with Russia,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 02.10.22. The author, a columnist for the newspaper, writes:

• “On the eve of what could be a Russian invasion, Ukrainians appear united against the threat from Moscow — but also battling among themselves for political advantage in Kyiv. The political infighting is one more liability for a disorganized democracy up against a ruthless authoritarian state.”
• “Concern about Ukraine's fractious internal politics prompted a delegation of American diplomats to visit Kyiv late last month to show support for Ukraine — and appeal to President Volodymyr Zelensky to meet with opposition politicians and form a unity front. He refused, at least for the time being, apparently worried that his rivals might exploit his concessions.”
• “If Zelensky and other Ukrainians appear less agitated about the Russian invasion threat than U.S. officials, it's partly because Kremlin pressure has been a chronic condition — something people have learned to live with.”
• “It falls to Zelensky, the former comedian, to confront the stone-cold menace of Putin. But Zelensky isn't strong enough to do this alone. He needs help, and he can get it at home and abroad if he's willing to put national unity first. In the real-life version, as in the TV show, people want the good guy to win.”

“Ukraine’s President Beset on All Sides Amid Fears of Russian Attack,” Konstantin Skorkin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 02.09.22. The author, an independent journalist based in Moscow, writes:

• “The longer the international tension over Ukraine goes on for, the shakier the country’s political system becomes. Faced with a foreign threat, the Ukrainian elites have shown themselves to be unwilling to overcome their differences. Instead, they are making use of this critical moment to settle old scores.”
• “It’s a Ukrainian tradition that the battle for power never stops. For both the pro-Western and pro-Russian opposition, any confrontation linked to a geopolitical choice — never mind one this high profile — creates the perfect opportunity to boost their popularity and score points against President Volodymyr Zelensky.”
• “The biggest beneficiaries of the standoff against Russia are those known as the ‘national patriots.’ Amid the current fears of a Russian invasion, former president Petro Poroshenko is once again becoming the most influential figure on the right of Ukrainian politics — as well as Zelensky’s main opponent. … The international escalation over Ukraine has also activated the pro-Russian wing of the country’s opposition. … The only politician not benefitting from the current crisis is Dmytro Razumkov, the former parliamentary speaker.”
• “Yet again, Zelensky is faced with a crisis even worse than all the previous ones. Every day that the standoff continues, and every report of another Russian plan to attack Ukraine are blows to its economy, weakening the hryvnia, pushing up interest rates on loans, and sowing panic among the public. Confronted with all of this, Zelensky has decided not to leave Ukraine’s fate in the hands of its Western allies by meekly awaiting help, but criticizes them constantly, reproaches them for inaction, and asks for concrete measures.”
• “Zelensky does not have many options. He can either stick to his guns in the hope of a change of fortune and the return of his popularity (or at least the failure of the opposition), or he can hold a new referendum of trust in the form of snap parliamentary or presidential elections. Either way, the Ukrainian leader cannot be written off just yet.”

"What is Zelensky afraid of?," Leonid Ragozin, bne IntelliNews, 02.08.22. The author, an independent journalist based in Riga, writes:

• “Despite having more than 100,000 Russian troops massed near its border since last April, Ukraine’s perception of the Russian threat has been notably diverging from that of the US ever since the White House started ringing the alarm about the ‘imminent Russian invasion’ last autumn.”
• “While downplaying the risk of a Russian offensive and even reprimanding the West for sowing panic, the Ukrainian leadership appears preoccupied with a different threat – that of a coup. Ukrainian officials have spoken about it on numerous occasions, starting with Volodymyr Zelensky’s memorable press conference at the end of November, when the Ukrainian president startled Western allies by largely ignoring the invasion scare and instead talking about the perceived threat emerging from within Ukraine.”
• “Since Russia is the aggressor, the natural instinct of all Ukrainian politicians is to try and label their rival as Russian stooges, as when Poroshenko – despite all of his nationalist credentials  – is tied to Putin’s ally Medvedchuk. But that doesn’t mean that President Zelensky necessarily sees the threat as emerging from Russia, especially now that Medvedchuk is neutralized.”
• “The fact that his government's line is now radically diverging from the White House’s ‘imminent invasion’ narrative may reflect the doubts he might harbor about American intentions with regards to Ukraine and himself specifically. Zelensky was clearly not America’s preferred choice in the 2019 election. His political rivals from Poroshenko’s camp remain the darlings of the DC blob. Meanwhile Akhmetov is one of the main sponsors of the Atlantic Council, the hawkish think-tank, which appears to have the greatest influence on Joe Biden’s Ukrainian policy.”
• “As Zelensky embarks on another attempt to negotiate peace with Russia, he is well aware that no matter what kind of compromise he might reach, his rivals will make an attempt at ousting him in a Maidan-like event. He has reasons to doubt whether America will stand by him at that moment.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“What the CSTO’s Intervention in Kazakhstan Really Means,” Siheon Nathaniel Choi, Filippo Costa Buranelli and Matteo Fumagalli, The National Interest, 02.13.21. The authors, respectively a Ph.D. candidate and two senior lecturers at the University of St. Andrews' School of International relations, write:

• “The Collective Security Treaty Organization’s intervention in Kazakhstan and restoration of stability in relatively short order was a great showcase of its abilities.”
• “Contrary to some who view the organization as a frozen and unchanging Soviet-style apparatus, the CSTO has been steadily evolving for years. What was originally a security treaty, signed in Tashkent in 1992, became an organization. Deeper and complex institutionalization efforts then took place in 2002 and in 2010, when the CSTO created the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF), a military branch that can be authorized by the CSTO Collective Security Council for any contingencies.”
• “The organization’s new ‘turn’ in 2022 is part of the CSTO’s natural evolution as a regional organization, rather than a sudden change. The organization states as much, as General Secretariat Stanislav Zas signaled the new and more active functions of the CSTO, while rejecting claims that the organization needs a substantial change in its framework.”
• “In sum, we see the commentaries regarding the organization as ‘frozen’ stemming from a lack of attention and general unawareness of the last two decades of developments.”