This Week’s Highlights

• According to Prof. Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s U.N. General Assembly speech indicates that he wants to create a role for Russia as the de facto head of a new non-aligned bloc of states that do not want to be forced to either choose between Washington or Beijing—or to have to accept American or Chinese agendas. What is more striking, writes Gvosdev, is Putin's implicit proposal—to the Europeans and to the major powers of the global South—to avoid becoming involved in any emerging U.S.-China cold war. 
• If Russia’s vision of a multipolar world order dominated by a club of great powers with special privileges comes to pass, writes Prof. Robert Person it will have less to do with Russia’s efforts and more to do with United States’ abdication of leadership and China’s rise into the void.  
• Strengthened commercial engagement between Russia and China on Arctic energy ventures is driving a notion that there’s a Sino-Russian alliance in the region, writes Elizabeth Buchanan, a lecturer at Deakin University. The reality is that mutual mistrust, centuries-old territorial tensions over the Russian Far East and hangovers from the Sino-Soviet split in the Cold War are all permanent features of the China–Russia relationship, Buchanan writes, and they’ll continue to shape the strategic outlook, to an extent curtailing the two states’ “axis” potential. 
• Ever since German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced on Sept. 2 that Kremlin critic Alexei Navalny had been poisoned with the nerve agent Novichok, the term “turning point” has been used many times in Russia to describe the implications this will have for Germany’s attitude toward Russia, writes Sabine Fischer of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), but that era ended long ago. Rather than a turning point, Fischer writes, Merkel´s statement was yet another link in a chain of events that have been undermining German trust and willingness to accommodate Russia’s positions and increasingly destructive policies. The astonishment currently being expressed in Russia, she argues, speaks to a lack of understanding of how Russia is seen in Germany, and how this perception has changed over the years.  
• The most likely scenario amid renewed clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan is a battle for small and not particularly important pockets of land, allowing for the symbolic declaration of a victory, according to Sergei Markedonov of the Russian International Affairs Council. But raising the bar in a conflict makes it very difficult to stop as planned, Markedonov warns. What would seem to be a local war over a mountainous land of little strategic value is taking on greater importance because of its potential to draw in bigger powers like Russia and Turkey, according to the New York Times’ Andrew Kramer. 

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

“Trump Needs a Tutorial on How International Agreements Work,” Editorial Board, New York Times, 09.20.20: The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “Two years ago, the Trump administration withdrew from an international agreement that had lifted most sanctions on Iran in exchange for strict limits on Iran’s nuclear program. President Trump called the accord, which had been painstakingly negotiated by the Obama administration and America’s closest European allies, the ‘worst deal ever.’ … In a stunning display of gall, the Trump administration is now arguing that the United States is still part of the Iran deal after all. That’s because it wants to use a provision in the deal to ‘snap back’ global sanctions on Iran to prevent the expiration of an arms embargo.”
• “Even Iran hawks, like John Bolton, find this argument so disingenuous as to be counterproductive. … Nonetheless, U.S. diplomats are pushing ahead. They contend that global sanctions snapped back after a 30-day notification period, which ended Saturday night [Sept. 19].”
• “It is not clear what will happen next. Global sanctions normally require a committee to monitor them. But a committee won’t be set up unless the Security Council makes an official decision to do so. The United States will almost certainly pursue its own low-key measures, like sanctioning Russian or Chinese companies that sell arms to Iran. A bigger worry is that the United States could begin to interdict ships carrying goods to or from Iran, which could potentially lead to a military confrontation in the run-up to the American election in November.”
• “The tragedy of the Trump administration’s approach is that it has alienated European allies who share the common goal of curbing Iran’s most worrisome behavior. The United States once stood shoulder to shoulder with not only France, Germany and Britain, but also with Russia and China—to isolate Iran. Now, it is the United States that is isolated.”
• “Like so much of Mr. Trump’s gamesmanship, there’s no Plan B behind the bluster. Today, Iran is closer to having enough fissile material to build a nuclear bomb than it was when he took office.”

New Cold War/saber rattling:

“Avangard and Transatlantic Security,” Spenser Warren, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 09.23.20: The author, a political science Ph.D. student at Indiana University Bloomington, writes:

• “On Dec. 27, 2019, the Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu announced that the Russian military had successfully deployed the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV). … Avangard does not change the strategic status quo between the United States and Russia and does not increase the insecurity of the United States. It does have an impact on escalation management and crisis stability in the event of a Russia-NATO conflict in eastern Europe, but this impact does little to change the status quo in Europe at the operational level. I derive three policy implications based on this argument.”
• “First, the United States should not invest in technologies that defend against Avangard. If the United States was able to defend against an attack from the small number of Russian hypersonic glide vehicles, it would still be vulnerable to a Russian nuclear attack.”
• “Second, the United States should not perceive the development of Avangard as aggressive or destabilizing. The primary purpose of Avangard is to increase the survivability of the Russian strategic deterrent and to ensure that Russia can maintain a secure second-strike capability.”
• “Finally, the United States should consider limits to hypersonic weapons, but should not make it a major goal of U.S. arms control strategy. The United States should focus on more important arms control issues, such as maintaining current limits on the level of strategic nuclear weapons by extending New START, reducing those levels through future agreements, reestablishing limits on intermediate-range nuclear forces and bringing China into the arms control regime.”

“Countering Russian Disinformation,” Joseph Robbins, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 09.23.20: The author, political science department head at Valdosta State University, writes:

• “Disinformation is a tool commonly used by a number of states to sow discord, undermine faith in governing institutions, stoke fear and anxiety and ultimately achieve certain policy goals.”
• “Over the past several years, Russia, its government agencies and affiliated groups have used a combination of social media savvy and disinformation strategies to further Russian influence largely by weakening its foes. This use of disinformation to weaken the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), cast doubt on the European Union and undermine countries throughout the world has prompted countries to develop countermeasures to stymy these efforts.”
• “[There are] a few effective methods to counter disinformation operations at both the national and international levels. Estonia’s use of real-time volunteer forces along with the Czech Republic’s BIS and think tanks are useful in naming and shaming Russia’s digital active measures. Meanwhile, Estonia’s use of government-sanctioned programming can help shape the broadcast conversation, thus countering channels like RT, which further harmful narratives.”
• “The NATO and EU responses to Russia’s ongoing efforts to sow discord offer some useful suggestions for moving forward. These organizations have created task forces and organizations that, collectively, reveal a holistic framework that can help uncover subversive efforts, coordinate a cogent response, and promote multilateral collaboration in response. With additional buy-in from EU and NATO members, these efforts will evolve and strengthen the response to disinformation operations.”

“The Hunt for Mobile Missiles: Nuclear Weapons, AI and the New Arms Race,” Paul Bracken, Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), September 2020: The author, an FPRI senior fellow and a member of its board of advisors as well a professor of management and political science at Yale University, writes:

• “This report examines the increasing ability of major powers to destroy moving targets, in particular, land-based mobile missiles.”
• “Absent a broader, more sober view of the hunt for mobile missiles, one that goes beyond narrow measures of performance, the world is going to see more dangerous nuclear crises, and arm races that go beyond what is necessary for prudent national security. This arises because mobile missiles have unique crisis management implications, most of which have not been studied before.”
• “The United States, China and Russia are sharply increasing their investment in the hunt for mobile missiles. … Major powers (U.S., China, Russia) are [also] using the hunt for mobile missiles as an ‘exemplar’ for integrating AI, cyber, data analytics and other technologies into their kill chains.”
• “None of the major or secondary powers, have seriously analyzed the long-term consequences of the hunt for mobile missiles beyond the operational level. The longer-term impact on nuclear stability, arms control, escalation, early warning and accidental war have gone largely unexamined. The present focus is on ‘not falling behind.’”
• “The arms control regime created during the Cold War can no longer guarantee strategic stability. Advanced technologies, such as cyber, AI and hypersonic missiles, will alter the global nuclear balance from what it is today.”

“Kill ’Em All? Denial Strategies, Defense Planning and Deterrence Failure,” Evan Montgomery, War on the Rocks, 09.24.20: The author, director of research and studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, writes:

• “Should the United States be ready to destroy hundreds of Chinese vessels or thousands Russian armored vehicles in just a few days during a conflict? Could these clear-cut yet ambitious operational objectives spur innovation within the Department of Defense? Would threats to inflict mass attrition on high-value military assets in a short span of time dissuade Beijing and Moscow from attacking their neighbors? These questions are moving to the forefront of the U.S. defense policy debate as the difficulties of preparing for great-power rivalry become more apparent.”
• “Yet a closer look reveals how efforts to encourage outside-the-box thinking and enhance conventional deterrence have the potential to backfire without the right guidelines in place. A narrow focus on the operational problems associated with a Chinese assault on Taiwan or a Russian invasion of the Baltics, for example, along with a corresponding emphasis on denying aggression via rapid attrition as the solution to those problems, could actually weaken deterrence in several different ways, especially if planners and policymakers do not take unintended consequences into account. Specifically, these efforts could heighten doubts about America’s willingness to intervene in the moment, raise the costs of sustaining a denial strategy over time and leave Washington ill-prepared if adversaries adjust their offensive tactics.”
• “Efforts to devise new versions of denial should pursue solutions that are scalable enough to give policymakers flexibility when tensions are high. This could entail, for example, collaborating even more closely with allies and partners to improve their resilience and ensure the United States has the option of graduated escalation in the event of a conflict … These efforts should also prioritize solutions that are sustainable over time. … Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, these efforts should emphasize approaches that are fungible enough to enhance deterrence across a range of scenarios. That means avoiding point solutions that cannot easily be adapted to address alternative forms of aggression.”

“In Search of a Clear-Eyed U.S. Strategy on Russia,” Matthew Sussex, The National Interest, 09.23.20: The author, an associate professor at the Australian National University’s National Security College, writes:

• “An open letter signed by 103 experts recently called for the U.S. to re-embrace its Cold War strategy for dealing with Russia. It argued that competition should be balanced with diplomacy and identified arenas for U.S.–Russia cooperation: countering nuclear proliferation, protecting the environment and stabilizing regional flashpoints. Above all, it advocated combining deterrence with détente. That’s a laudable goal, but it’s also deeply flawed.”
• “First, Russia has shown no signs whatsoever of being deterred by U.S. policy. … Second, the Kremlin has no real interest in long-term détente with the U.S., mainly because Moscow’s price to assure its security—a privileged zone of influence in the former Soviet space—isn’t something that the U.S. will agree to or be supported by Washington’s NATO allies. … Third, the rules that helped underpin Cold War stability no longer apply.”
• “Instead of advocating a Russia policy based on old solutions or half-measures, the U.S. needs a more comprehensive Russia strategy that responds to new strategic, economic and transnational realities. What might such a strategy look like?”
• “Where the U.S. is strong relative to Russia, it can engage in denial activities. … The second layer of the U.S.’s Russia strategy should be based on disruption. … As the third layer of U.S. strategy, dilution should seek to mitigate Russian influence where Moscow already has an advantage.”

“Russia's Embrace of Lukashenko Puts the West on Alert; NATO worries Putin's push for military bases on Belarus's territory could pressure the alliance's weak northeast corner,” James Marson and Thomas Grove, Wall Street Journal, 09.28.20: The authors, the European security correspondent and a reporter for the news outlet, write:

• “Russia's tightening embrace of embattled Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko is raising concerns at NATO that the balance of military power in the alliance's weak northeast corner could tip further in the Kremlin's favor.”
• “Russian President Vladimir Putin is using Belarus's crisis to press Mr. Lukashenko—who has long tried to use the EU as a hedge against Moscow's overwhelming influence—to accede to Russian demands for greater sway, which have long included putting military bases on Belarusian territory. That could position Russian forces as a pincer on either side of the 60-mile Polish-Lithuanian border, which is the only land route between the Baltic states and the rest of North Atlantic Treaty Organization territory. Dubbed the Suwalki Gap after the small Polish city in its middle, it is seen as the alliance's weak point.”
• “‘Suwalki is much less of a concern if you don't have Russian troops in Belarus,’ said retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, former commander of U.S. Army Europe. ‘If you do, it's a different calculation in terms of the time, speed and power they can bring.’ … ‘The cohesion of NATO and the EU, the unmistakable U.S. commitment to Europe—that's why Russia hasn't attacked,’ he said. When that is less evident, ‘the risk goes up,’ he said.”

NATO-Russia relations:

“It Will Take More Than a Biden Victory to Solve NATO’s Strategic Malaise,” Sara Bjerg Moller, War on the Rocks, 09.25.20: The author, an assistant professor in the School of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall University, writes:

• “A Biden victory is widely expected to bring about, if not a complete restoration of the postwar order championed by previous U.S. presidents, then a ‘quiet reformation’ still familiar to the ‘blob.’ Rather than seeking a return to the status quo … a potential Biden presidency should use this moment to move away from America’s ambitious post-Cold War strategy of global activism toward a leaner grand strategy focused on deterring and defending against potential existential challengers.”
• “Instead of seeking to tackle every new security challenge … NATO leaders should work to preserve NATO’s core assets and capabilities for the task that it is uniquely suited for: deterring state-based adversaries and defending the territorial integrity of its members.”
• “To remain useful, the alliance must choose which threats to prioritize. … [N]ot every security issue rises to the level of an existential threat to the alliance. … While neither Russia nor China as yet represents a threat on par with the Soviet Union, NATO should prepare for the possibility that the latter (either alone or in combination with Moscow) could pose an existential challenge to the Atlantic community in the coming decades.”
• “Jettisoning the collective security responsibilities the NATO alliance has assumed over the past three decades won’t be easy. Nor does freeing NATO from responsibility for tackling issues like counter-terrorism … mean that such threats are not deserving of international cooperative efforts … It simply means that going forward, countries committed to these kinds of activities will have to look to organizations and venues other than NATO to address them.”
• “[A] Biden administration should … reorient the alliance’s strategic focus toward the more pressing task of adjusting to China’s rise. Not doing so risks turning NATO into nothing more than a glorified discussion club. To avoid this fate, the Biden team will have to move quickly. At stake is not just alliance unity but NATO’s future utility.”

Missile defense:

“Why Does Missile Defense Still Enjoy Bipartisan Support in Congress?” Subrata Ghoshroy, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 09.24.20: The author, a research affiliate at MIT’s Program in Science, Technology and Society, writes:

• “The program to develop a missile defense system to protect the United States mainland has existed in one form or another for nearly six decades. … [I]t has enjoyed bipartisan support and continued funding in Congress for more than 20 years. In July, both the House of Representatives and the Senate passed their own versions of a defense authorization bill for 2021. By a wide majority, both chambers authorized more than $740 billion for defense spending next year. Tucked away in the Senate bill was $20.3 billion for missile defense.”
• “U.S. taxpayers have invested nearly $200 billion on missile defense in the past two decades and another $100 billion in the decade before, with little to show for it. Even under artificially easy tests conditions, the most modern missile defense system meant to protect the United States mainland has failed more times than it has succeeded. … All told, the United States has spent more than $300 billion for missile defense research and design over a period of about three decades.”
• “Today, support in Congress for missile defense is so strong that only a wave of intense public pressure could alter the situation. But the time is ripe for just such a wave. … [T]here will simply be not enough money, if defense remains a sacred cow, to fund urgent social needs without creating huge deficits.”
• “The place to start is the missile defense programs … [T]he system currently deployed to protect the continental United States from an incoming ballistic missile attack has failed nine out of its 18 tests over the last 20 years. More worrying is that it has not improved over time … [E]ven if it had a better testing record, experts have long recognized that any missile defense system could be easily defeated by decoys and other countermeasures.”
• “In this time of great economic hardship, Congress cannot afford to waste taxpayer money. It is time to end the bipartisan consensus on missile defense.”

Nuclear arms control:

“Rearming Arms Control Should Start with New START Extension,” Jim Golby, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 09.23.20: The author, a senior fellow at the Clements Center for National Security at the University of Texas at Austin, writes:

• “Regardless of whether the Trump administration or a future Biden administration extends New START for five years in February 2021, New START will expire no later than 2026. If the United States is serious about creating a more expansive arms control regime that includes China, it would be in a much more favorable position to do so by extending New START immediately and using the next five years to take the necessary steps to compete in a post-New START environment.”
• “At a minimum, this time would allow the United States to make progress on modernization and recapitalization of nuclear infrastructure as well as developing additional technical means and analysts to offset intelligence collection that could be necessary beyond 2026.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security:

“Rank and File Corrupted: Uncertain Attribution and Corruption in Russia’s Military Cyber Units,” Teylore Ring, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 09.22.20: The author, a threat intelligence program manager, writes:

• “What might corruption look like if it infected Russia’s elite military cyber units? It is important to understand this because of its implications for how victims of cyber-attacks ought to respond: whereas officially sanctioned acts engender a governmental response, corruption is a private act that instead requires a response by law enforcement and lawyers.”
• “[W]ould we be able to identify a cyber-attack attributed to Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) 28—a Russian cyber espionage group—as the act of a single individual or group of individuals acting corruptly, thereby requiring a law enforcement response? Or would the act be seen as instigated by the Russian government, requiring instead a government response?”
• “Corruption in Russia’s military cyber units will be difficult to detect. The same cyber tools and infrastructure built by Russia’s military can be manipulated to create a steady cash flow of fraudulent funds to corrupt individuals. Plausible deniability and conflicting indicators of attribution will make it difficult to identify members of a military cyber unit acting corruptly. The implications of this corruption will extend far beyond Russia. The U.S. government and its allies should work with private sector partners to create a consistent policy response to cyberattacks. The policy must account for a wide range of cyberattacks and include clear guidelines for action to deter cybercriminals.”

Elections interference:

“A Divided America Is a National Security Threat,” Susan E. Rice, New York Times, 09.24.20: The author, a former national security adviser, writes:

• “Stoked by leaders who profit from divisive politics, our polarization prevents us from effectively confronting vital challenges, from the pandemic and its economic consequences to climate change; from the rise of white supremacist groups, which account for the bulk of domestic terrorism, to reforming our immigration system.”
• “Our own fissures also create easy openings for Russia to inflame Americans’ fears of one another and to erode our faith in democracy by using social media to spread disinformation and sow distrust. Further, Russian electoral interference flourishes when the American president and members of his party invite foreign assistance for their political advantage, while thwarting intelligence community efforts to illuminate and deter external involvement.”

“The Real Hacking Threat: It doesn’t matter if Russia actually sways the vote. What matters is whether Americans think it did,” Elisabeth Braw, Foreign Policy, 09.25.20: The author, director of the Modern Deterrence project at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), writes:

• “An American threat of revenge against the government of Russia or China would not frighten Moscow or Beijing because they know that the United States wouldn’t risk serious escalation. But individual hackers may be keen to avoid being banned from visiting New York or maintaining U.S. bank accounts.”
• “Just as ordinary Swedes did their part for national defense during the Cold War by lending their cars and tractors to the armed forces, Americans themselves must play more active civic roles. In turn, they will realize that the sanctity of their elections truly is in their hands, whether the president uses his office to communicate to the public that the vote is unassailable—or not.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Vladimir Putin's U.N. Speech: Will Russia Head A New Nonaligned Movement?” Nikolas K. Gvosdev, The National Interest, 09.22.20: The author, professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, writes:

• “[Russian President Vladimir Putin’s U.N. General Assembly] speech remains important for understanding Putin's state of mind as he considers the global system and the role he expects Russia to play in the 2020s—as well as the implicit warnings to the United States.”
• “What is more striking is Putin's implicit proposal—to the Europeans and to the major powers of the global South—to avoid becoming involved in any emerging U.S.-China cold war. His proposals for secure, sanctions-free trade corridors, his resurrection of the idea of a greater Eurasian partnership and for placing limits on cyberwar and other disruptive actions which could upset international trade and prosperity (including the U.S. use of sanctions), are all designed to create a role for Russia as the de facto head of a new non-aligned bloc of states that do not want to be forced to either choose between Washington or Beijing—or to have to accept American or Chinese agendas.”
• “Putin seems to be hoping that the growing ascendancy of China hawks in both parties in the United States will create concerns—even among U.S. allies—about being drawn into a Washington-Beijing cold war, and that they, in turn, will buy into Russian proposals—and be incentivized to keep Russian economic power intact rather than accede to U.S. sanctions pressures.”
• “Of course, Putin has made these statements before and has never found enthusiastic takers. Neither Donald Trump nor Joe Biden, but also Xi Jinping as well, seem that interested in transitioning to a true ‘concert of powers’ system, while European leaders … seem interested in strengthening the bonds of the ‘democratic community’ rather than joining with Russia to balance both Washington and Beijing. We'll see if any of these proposals have any legs when Saudi Arabia hosts the G20 summit in November.”

“Trump's Foreign Policy Legacy,” Daniel W. Drezner, The Washington Post, 09.22.20: The author, a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, writes:

• “It is worth asking which policies will be likely to endure but to think about it in a more conceptual way. The first cut is to divide Trump's foreign policies into actions that would be easy or difficult to reverse.”
• “The U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, for example, is now law—that ain't changing. Reversing the embassy move in Israel would also probably be too costly. … On the other hand, a Biden administration would reverse almost all of Trump's actions on both climate change and nuclear nonproliferation. Rejoining the Paris climate change accords would be easy. So would extending New START with Russia. The Iran deal is now a complete mess, but it is possible to envisage a way for the other members of the P5+1 to walk the United States and Iran back into the contours of the deal.”
• “Those are the easy calls. The more interesting portions of the Trump legacy are areas where the administration might have contributed a strategic insight but implemented a disastrous policy in response.”
• “For example, Biden might very well be more hawkish on China than he has sounded in the past. There are national security dimensions that will permanently intrude on the bilateral economic relationship. … [Will a] Biden administration continue with the steel and aluminum tariffs or threatening sanctions unless NATO members spend more on defense? No, but they will probably be less averse to brandishing coercive pressure than they would have in an Obama administration.”
• “One former Obama administration official told the Financial Times that a Biden administration would be likely to ‘revisit and potentially reformulate the entire approach to the Gulf.’ Biden advisers told the FT that ‘the region would be a low priority.’ … The region I would expect to benefit the most would be Latin America. To the extent that Trump cared about the Western hemisphere, it was about immigration and sanctioning Cuba/Venezuela.”

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Identity Politics and the Reality of Pandemic-Era Russia: A Clash in the Making,” Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, NYU’s Jordan Center, 09.28.20: The author, a reader at the Russia Institute at King’s College London, writes:

• “In my upcoming book, ‘The Red Mirror: Putin’s Leadership and Russia’s Insecure Identity’ (Oxford University Press, October 2020), I explore the roots of the Kremlin’s success in shaping public opinion in Russia after Crimea.”
• “In contrast to other commentators highlighting the lies and manipulations disseminated by the Kremlin’s formidable propaganda machine, my book also looks into the frames and meanings that provide the Kremlin-controlled media machine with potency, resilience and resonance among the Russian public.”
• “I argue that many Russians are not simply duped by the propaganda emanating from the Kremlin, but that the consensus is first founded around the deeper issues of ‘collective trauma’ associated with the 1990s transition and the assertion and assumption that things have improved since that traumatic decade on all fronts: economic, geopolitical, cultural, etc. It is this socially-shared representation of the 1990s that is endorsed and promoted by the Kremlin and that resonates in a society that enables the Russian authorities to promote fabricated and packaged news that paint a picture of Russia surrounded by enemies, taking the moral high ground in tumultuous times.”

“The Return of the Berlin Patient,” Andrei Kolesnikov, The Moscow Times, 09.28.20: The author, a senior associate and the chair of the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “When Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny returns to Russia, he will find his apartment and bank account under government arrest. In fact, Kremlin leaders do not want him to return at all. … The attempt to silence Navalny failed, and President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to ‘cover his tracks’ have only succeeded in causing a near-fatal breakdown in Russia’s relations with the West.”
• “Navalny will emerge from this dramatic incident an even stronger figure, only underscoring for domestic, and especially overseas audiences, that Russian politics is a binary construction consisting of ‘Navalny vs. Putin.’”
• “The Kremlin and its inner circle come out of this episode with a double toxicity, both political and chemical. This toxic authoritarian government is poisoning its opponents. It is unclear just how to communicate with a leadership that covers up murders and has degenerated into permanently trolling its now former ‘Western partners.’ The situation is worse now than it was during the Cold War. Then, at least, there were certain rules. Now, none exist.”
• “Putin’s Russia, which has consistently flirted with distancing itself from what it claimed was an inferior or unfair West, now finds itself in a very real state of self-induced isolation, its political radioactivity scaring everyone else away. Kremlinology is gradually becoming toxicology. The problem is that rulers who have become this isolated from the world are not bound by the usual rules of decency and no longer care if decent people respect them. This could be dangerous for Navalny, even with global public opinion behind him. But Navalny will return to Russia—and the Kremlin authorities will just have to live with it.”

 

“Global Trends in the Russian Context,” Sinikukka Saari and Stanislav Secrieru, ISS, 09.22.20: The authors, both senior analysts at EUISS, write:

• “The myth of Russian exceptionalism is widespread both within Russia and outside of the country. … This chapter … posits that Russia is not any less or more distinctive than any other country in the international system that is facing global challenges and opportunities from its own unique perspective.”
• “Digitalization may make Russian citizens’ lives more comfortable, but also empower their government to enhance and fine-tune mechanisms of social and political control. … Urbanization may lead to deepening social divisions but also plant seeds of greater civic engagement and activism in Russia.”
• “Energy transition may imperil Russia’s resource-based economy and undermine social stability, but at the same time, offer Russia an incentive to reform and innovate.”
• “The decay of the liberal global order elevates Russia’s standing on the international stage, but the emerging new multipolarity may prove more dangerous for Russia’s great power ambitions.”
• “The future is rarely just a linear extension of the present. With or without Vladimir Putin in power, in ten years’ time Russia will be a different kind of place than it is today.”

 

“The Russian State and Society at a Crossroads,” Tatiana Stanovaya, ISS, 09.22.20: The author, a non-resident scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “The future of Russia’s political regime and its interaction with society will be shaped by four drivers: the erosion of the regime’s legitimacy; the ideologization of the political regime; a crisis in the country’s political institutions; and the ‘depersonalization’ of power and of the political system.”
• “Elites will have to learn to manage conflicts in new circumstances themselves, which will lead the regime to become more polycentric and hence less coherent. Sooner or later Putin’s increasing disengagement will pose the question—who is best placed to lead Russia into the future?”
• “The most intriguing issue here is whether and when one of Putin’s heirs apparent will dare to challenge Putin himself, questioning his policy and demanding changes. The need for more convincing leadership combined with popular demand for social change may completely reshape Russian politics in the coming years.”

 

“Russia’s Economy: From Dusk till Dawn?” Janis Kluge, ISS, 09.22.20: The author, a senior Associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, writes:

• “Russia’s economy is commonly seen as its weak point, casting a shadow over any assessment of the country’s future prospects. While booming oil prices led to fast economic growth in the 2000s despite a lack of structural reforms, Russia’s economy lost its impetus when energy revenues began to stagnate in the 2010s.”
• “The oil price will continue to be a key factor in Russia’s economic fortunes and, by extension, its political stability. … The ‘Singapore of steel’ scenario assumes an economy that is run by daytime rulers who are oriented towards development based.”
• “The ‘Russia’s big hangover’ scenario assumes a decline in the role of the daytime rulers, while the Russian economy still remains open. … The ‘Bleak solitude’ scenario posits a combination of strong night rulers and a Kremlin that strictly prioritizes economic security over openness. All three scenarios build on trends that to some degree exist in Russia’s political economy today.”

 

“Nuclear Shades of Red Racism,” Mariana Budjeryn and Togzhan Kassenova, Inkstick, 09.24.20: The authors, a researcher at the Harvard Kennedy School and a senior fellow at the Center for Policy Research at the University at Albany, SUNY, write:

• “Often overlooked by academics and activists have been the racial dynamics in the Soviet Union. Embedded in the broader hierarchy that had ordered its 200 plus nationalities, these dynamics are still playing out in the post-Soviet space.”
• “Those shades of racism provided an undertone to the heavy brunt of the Soviet nuclear program that Kazakhstan and its people were forced to bear.”
• “For forty years, over the course of 400-something nuclear tests conducted on the Kazakh soil, the locals were not only disregarded but often dehumanized.”
• “Today, festering leftovers of this unrecognized and untreated Soviet racism are playing out forcefully on the streets of Moscow and other major Russian cities, where guest workers and visitors from Central Asia and the Caucasus are constantly and brutally harassed.”
• “[T]here’s something patronizing and discriminatory in the very assumption that the Russians … have a lesser moral, cultural, and societal capacity to grasp and grapple with racial injustice, that it’s less offensive when discrimination happens in ‘dysfunctional’ geographies outside of the Western contexts.”

Defense and aerospace:

“Russia’s Military Power: Fast and furious – or failing?” András Rácz , ISS, 09.22.20: The author, a senior fellow of the Robert Bosch Center for Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia of the German Council on Foreign Relations, writes:

• “Military power plays a key role both in Russia’s claim for great power status and in the country’s self-perception.”
• “The analysis builds on four drivers of potential change: two key ones and another two secondary ones. The first key driver is the Kremlin’s political will and readiness to use military force for political purposes… The second key driver is the availability of financial and other resources that can be allocated for military purposes … one of the secondary drivers concerns the actual level of success with which the military is used ... The other secondary driver is the reaction of the outside world to Russia’s use of its military.”
• “If a fundamental change takes place in any of the primary drivers, Russia’s overall approach to the use of its military force may change.”
• “Although it is unlikely that either of the secondary drivers alone would induce a  fundamental change in the Kremlin’s use of military force, a secondary driver may gradually create changes in the primary drivers.”

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Four Myths about Russian Grand Strategy,” Robert Person, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 09.22.20: The author, an associate professor of international relations at the United States Military Academy, writes:

• “Myth #1: Russia’s grand strategy is driven by ideology: Rather than ideology, the foundations of Russia’s grand strategy can be found in the more universal, if mundane, condition of geopolitical insecurity that informs the realist school of thought.”
• “Myth #2: Russia seeks to reconstruct the Soviet Union or Russian Empire: Instead of a formal territorial empire under direct rule, Russia endeavors to establish a privileged and exclusive sphere of influence across former Soviet territory.”
• “Myth #3: Russia seeks to restore a bygone world order: The reality is that the world order Russia seeks to establish—a multipolar system where great powers manage the rest of the world and coordinate to guarantee their own national interests—cannot be restored because it has never existed.”
• “Myth #4:  Putin is an opportunist, not a strategist: We should recognize that he is a strategic opportunist: he will continue to seize unexpected opportunities to advance Russia’s national interests when and where they arise.”

• “There is little doubt that Russia has a grand strategy, regardless of whether it is reflected in foundational national security documents. … Russia has notched some notable strategic successes. And yet one could rightly ask whether their asymmetric toolkit of disruptive tactics … is truly up to the task of bringing about the kind of multipolar world order Russia seeks. … If Russia’s vision of a multipolar world order dominated by a club of great powers with special privileges comes to pass, it will have less to do with Russia’s efforts and more to do with United States’ abdication of leadership and China’s rise into the void. And yet, as the Kremlin’s machinations in recent years have shown, Moscow can cause a great deal of trouble along the way.”

“What Russia Doesn’t Get About Germany,” Sabine Fischer, Carnegie Moscow Center, 09.23.20: The author, a senior fellow in the research division on Eastern Europe and Eurasia at the German Stiffen Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) think tank, writes:

• “Ever since German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced on Sept. 2 that Kremlin critic Alexei Navalny had been poisoned with the nerve agent Novichok, the term ‘turning point’ has been used many times in Russia to describe the implications this will have for Germany’s attitude toward Russia.”
• “But that era ended long ago. Rather than a turning point, Merkel’s statement was yet another link in a chain of events that have been undermining German trust and willingness to accommodate Russia’s positions and increasingly destructive policies. The astonishment currently being expressed in Russia speaks to a lack of understanding of how Russia is seen in Germany.”
• “For years, Berlin has been trying to strike a balance between punitive action to fend off Russian transgressions, and attempts to preserve dialogue even under the most trying circumstances. It faced a lot of criticism over this, internally, from EU partners and, increasingly, from Washington. This was never grasped or appreciated by the Russian side.”
• “This does not mean that German discourse about Russia is monolithic. Relations with Russia remain a controversial issue. … But the mood in the political center has changed considerably over the past ten years—and not to Russia’s advantage.”
• “The question remains: why do decision makers in Moscow not get it? There are three possible explanations: … They don’t know. … They don’t understand. …They don’t care.” Most likely, there are elements of all of these explanations at play. And Germany will likely not (yet) give up on dialogue with Russia, even after this most recent blow. But Berlin has lost faith and will invest less and less in preserving a functioning relationship. Perhaps it is time for decision makers in Moscow to understand that this has a lot to do with their own actions.”

“Russia and Europe: Stuck on Autopilot,” Andrew S. Weiss, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 09.24.20: The author, the James Family Chair and vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment, writes:

• “Throughout the coronavirus pandemic, Russia’s policy toward core Europe has appeared to be stuck on autopilot. Instead of nimbly trying to exploit Europe’s obvious internal divisions and ongoing tensions with the United States, the Kremlin has simply followed time-worn patterns, acting as though its most important goals could be accomplished simply by sticking to its guns and waiting for Europe to fall apart under the weight of the pandemic and other burdens.”
• “What is missing from the Kremlin’s analysis of the current state of affairs is much self-awareness about how its recent behavior is potentially creating an epochal moment comparable to the events of 2014 in Ukraine. The Navalny attack and the crisis in Belarus have stripped away, practically overnight, the credibility of voices in Europe that traditionally advocate on behalf of preserving the status quo.
• “In Germany, for example, the greatest pressure will not be faced by increasingly marginal constituencies like the Putinversteher but rather by Christian Democrat stalwarts like Merkel and Economy Minister Peter Altmaier who call for finding ways to continue cooperation with Russia. … In France, these events are greatly complicating Macron’s strategic dialogue with the Kremlin. … At best, Russia’s relations with Germany, France, and the United Kingdom will stay as they are now regardless of whether or not large-scale projects like Nord Stream 2 are frozen.”
• “The real question for Western policymakers is how best to devise a proportionate and sustainable response to the threat posed by Russia and to manage ongoing tensions skillfully while preserving the unity of purpose that has served previous generations of Western leaders so well.”

“Populists and Kleptocrats Are a Perfect Match,” Martin Sandbu, Financial Times, 09.22.20: The author, the European economics contributor for the Financial Times, writes:

• “In Russia, Ukraine and several post-Soviet central Asian countries, oligarchic networks have privatized the state for their own benefit. In the U.S., there is a long list of former Trump associates who have been charged with crimes linked to people mostly from those very same countries. In my mind, this leaves little doubt about the kleptocratic impulse behind Mr. Trump’s attacks on independent institutions.”
• “In Europe too, the kleptocratic alarm bells should be ringing. The use of public funds for private benefit is rife across the region. Lucrative state contracts are handed out to leaders’ personal associates from Hungary to the U.K. Journalists Daphne Caruana-Galizia and Jan Kuciak were allegedly murdered for their efforts to expose self-dealing by Maltese and Slovak politicians.”
• “Then there is the opposite problem: the use of dirty money to manipulate democratic politics. The U.K. parliament has highlighted how Russian oligarchs buy influence across the British establishment. Russian money has similarly come to the rescue of France’s far-right and allegedly Italy’s League.”
• “If Europe unhesitatingly takes their money, no actual or would-be dictators will be impressed by political statements of condemnation. And if it easy to launder money into Europe, it can also be used to corrupt leaders there. In short, Europe’s liberals can only hope to keep autocracy at bay if they are committed to fighting kleptocracy at home and abroad.”

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

“Expectation vs. Reality: The Sino-Russian Partnership in the Arctic. Moscow and Beijing have both learned that nations don’t have allies, or partners,” Elizabeth Buchanan, The National Interest/Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 09.28.20: The author, a lecturer in strategic studies at Deakin University, in evidence to the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, writes:

• “Strengthened commercial engagement between Russia and China on Arctic energy ventures is driving a notion that there’s a Sino-Russian alliance in the region. The reality is that mutual mistrust, centuries-old territorial tensions over the Russian Far East and hangovers from the Sino-Soviet split in the Cold War are all permanent features of the China–Russia relationship.”
• “Moscow and Beijing have both learned that nations don’t have allies, or partners. Secure, successful states seek merely mutually beneficial relationships. That sentiment frames Sino-Russian engagement in the Russian Arctic.”
• “Another assumption, that Russia has an expansionist agenda in the Arctic, is generational but strategically incapacitating. … Securitizing economic interests and increasing activity on the Arctic border fall short of an expansionist agenda. Peel back the posturing and the Arctic ‘arms race’, and Russia’s Arctic priority remains stability.”
• “Russia’s territorial and maritime disputes—notably with Norway in the Barents Sea and the US in the Bering Strait—have long been resolved. So, where in the Arctic is Moscow looking to expand? It’s well within Russia’s interests to uphold the international legal architecture of the Arctic, particularly UNCLOS, as agreed by stakeholders. This is a simple case of revenge of geography.”
• “A final assumption is that Russia has fallen into Beijing’s debt-trap diplomacy and that it is over-reliant on Chinese capital and ownership in joint ventures for energy projects in the Arctic. In reality, Russia has worked to offset Chinese investment and the risk of overreliance in energy ventures. … Moscow is unlikely to plunge into conflict the region it holds the largest stake in, and which it has tied its future economic and social security to. Any Arctic tensions will come from a misreading of Russian interests or a misunderstanding of basic geography or of how international law applies in the region.”

 

“The Future of Chinese Russian Relations: The Next Round of Go.” Marcin Kaczmarski ISS, 09.22.20: The author, a lecturer in Security Studies in the School of Social and Political Sciences of the University of Glasgow, writes:

• “This chapter begins by proposing three scenarios representing Russia’s relationship with China in 2030: first, ‘Russia’s Suez moment’, in which Russia’s interests are subordinated to those of China; second, ‘People vs. China’, describing a domestically-driven Russian backlash against China; and third, the ‘Authoritarian Internationale’, where the two states come together in a fully-fledged alliance.”
• “For China, Russia is useful but, in many respects, a secondary partner. … An amelioration of Russia’s relations with the West could make Russian-Chinese relations more interdependent and thus more equal.”
• “Sino-American rivalry provides a window of opportunity for Moscow to improve its position vis-àvis Beijing.”
• “Domestic politics in Russia has created conditions conducive for rapprochement with China and continues to mitigate the potentially negative repercussions of the asymmetry between the two states.”

Ukraine:

“Rebuttal: Ukraine Is Emerging as Critical Node for White-Supremacy Extremists,” Mollie Saltskog and Colin P. Clarke, Russia Matters, 09.24.20: The authors, a senior intelligence analyst and a senior research fellow at The Soufan Center, write:

• “In his recent article ‘Is Ukraine a Hub for International White Supremacist Fighters?’ Huseyn Aliyev argues that the phenomenon of foreigners traveling to join the conflict in eastern Ukraine has died down since late 2014, largely due to Ukraine’s process of disbanding paramilitary groups and integrating them into the country’s official security forces. He strongly suggests that the threat posed by neo-Nazis and others with far-right views who have connections to Ukraine is overblown. The Soufan Center’s research, to which both authors of this rebuttal have contributed, suggests the opposite.”
• “We find that foreigners are still networking, training and fighting on both sides of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, cultivating skills and connections that strengthen the transnational white-supremacy extremist networks of today—which, though far from monolithic, are more violent, more organized and more capable than even five years ago.”
• “By focusing on the waning number of foreign ultranationalist fighters present in Ukraine, Aliyev downplays both the immediate dangers posed by radicals with battlefield experience and the threat that comes from Ukraine's new significance as what we believe to be a hub for far-right groups to network and exchange expertise. Just as Salafi-jihadists have used conflicts in Afghanistan, the Balkans, Chechnya, Iraq and Syria to gain combat experience, so too do white supremacists use Ukraine as a battlefield laboratory in the present day. And as the conflict in Afghanistan gave birth to a transnational Salafi-jihadist organization, al-Qaeda, with members of different nationalities, so too could the dynamics of the Ukraine conflict enable a right-wing equivalent, in our view.”

Belarus

“Vladimir Putin Has Alexander Lukashenko Right Where He Wants Him,” Christopher Hartwell, The National Interest, 09.21.20: The author, professor of financial systems resilience at Bournemouth University, writes:

• “Unlike many countries that were part of the Soviet Union, Belarus under Lukashenko has stood firm against any form of freedom or economic liberalization. This stance, while providing a stagnant stability for Belarusians, has undermined the economy and made it highly susceptible to external shocks and internal disruption. With Lukashenko’s social contract—social benefits for political acquiescence—irrevocably torn up, the structural weakness of Belarus has been exposed.”
• “Given Lukashenko’s adamant refusal to yield to the opposition, he’s had to rely on Russia for moral and economic support, a choice he (and the rest of Belarus) may soon regret. Belarus may find that its move towards integration without liberalization may also lead to integration without representation as well.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Nagorno-Karabakh: A Flare-Up, or All-Out War?” Sergei Markedonov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 09.28.20: The author, an associate professor of Russian State University for the Humanities, and an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council, writes:

• “The current flare-up that broke out over the weekend between Azerbaijan and Armenia in their long-running territorial dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh goes far beyond the usual skirmishes. … There has not been such a violent escalation of the conflict there since April 2016. … At the same time, current events can hardly be described as coming out of the blue.”
• “The ‘Karabakh pendulum’—when military escalation swings back to rounds of negotiations—seems to have become stuck this time. … There are other nuances to the current drastic escalation, too, including increased Turkish involvement. … Another important factor is changes to Baku’s diplomatic lineup. Elmar Mammadyarov, Azerbaijan’s long-serving foreign minister, retired during the July border clashes. … For the last two years, he was the chief optimist over what concessions the new Armenian government might be prepared to make under Nikol Pashinyan.”
• “In reality, however, the position of Armenia’s new prime minister on Nagorno-Karabakh was tougher than ever. … These actions could not fail to reinforce the position of hawks in Baku.”
• “There are several possible outcomes to the current situation. The most likely is a battle for small and not particularly important pockets of land, allowing for the symbolic declaration of a ‘victory,’ and a more concrete PR victory at home. … Whatever reasoning is behind the armed clashes, one thing is clear: the importance of military force in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process is growing with every day. The absence of talks is becoming critical.”

“Fighting Between Armenia and Azerbaijan Risks Drawing in Bigger Powers,” Andrew E. Kramer, The New York Times, 09.28.20: The author, a reporter based in the Moscow bureau of the New York Times, writes:

• “A long-simmering territorial dispute in the Caucasus region that reignited in recent days, with tanks, artillery helicopters and infantry engaged in combat, suggests that the two sides—Azerbaijan and Armenia—are girding for an extended conflict rather than the border skirmishes that they have engaged in over the years.”
• “And what would seem to be a local war over a mountainous land of little strategic value is taking on greater importance because of its potential to draw in bigger powers like Russia and Turkey.”
• “The fighting over the territory, known as the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, escalated on Monday after breaking out over the weekend, with reports on both sides of rising numbers of wounded and dead.”
• “Over the years, the major powers—particularly Russia, which supplies the militaries of both sides and helps lead an international peace effort called the Minsk Process—have intervened to quell flare-ups. Distracted by other issues like the pandemic, however—and a popular uprising in Belarus, another former Soviet state—international mediators missed warning signs in the Caucasus conflict, analysts say. Foreign leaders have since called for a quick cease-fire, but both sides seem to be settling in for a long fight.”

“Russia and its Post-Soviet ‘Frenemies’: Breaking Free From the post-Soviet loop?” Andrew Wilson, ISS, 09.22.20: The author, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, writes:

• “The first scenario, ‘Downward spiral’, describes how economic dependence on Russia and the post-Soviet patronal networks increases, in particular in Ukraine – partly as a result of the failure of the old/new elite to break free from traditional informal politics and pursue meaningful reforms, partially as a result of the failure of Western policies. In this scenario Russian coercion plays a less significant role.”
• “[T]he second scenario, ‘Belarus is ours!’, is based on the strengthening of Russia’s coercive power in the region – not only in military terms but even more in terms of increased economic and civilizational dependency – primarily in Belarus, but also in Georgia, Moldova and in Ukraine.”
• “The third scenario – the most positive one – is called ‘Grandmother’s footsteps’ (after the children’s game) where Ukraine first, but also other EaP states, make staccato progress economically and politically away from a temporarily distracted Russia. Elite renewal and sustainable reforms