This Week’s Highlights

• U.S.-Russia relations will remain frosty for years, but even Cold Wars eventually thaw, write Carnegie’s Richard Sokolsky and Eugene Rumer. The United States should prepare now to act decisively when this one finally does. Changing global trends and domestic political dynamics could pry open the door to greater possibilities for cooperation. Whether these opportunities can be exploited will depend on the leaders in both countries, who must overcome a wall of mutual mistrust and the resistance of publics, politicians and parliaments, write Sokolsky and Rumer. It is not too early to ask what the United States and Russia should want from each other over the next decade, what kind of bilateral relationship the countries would like to have in 2030, and how they could get from where they are today to the U.S. preferred end state should circumstances permit.
• Whatever Trump and his acolytes might tell themselves, a nuclear test blast by the United States would do nothing to rein in Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals or improve the environment for negotiations, write Professor Emeritus Michael Klare and Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association. Rather, a nuclear test would raise tensions, Klare and Kimball write, and probably trigger an outbreak of nuclear testing by other nuclear actors, leading to an all-out global arms race in which everyone would come out a loser.
• For Europe and Canada, Russia’s continued membership in the Open Skies Treaty is crucial since most of their flights take place over Russian territory, writes diplomatic correspondent Stephanie Liechtenstein. In turn, Russia—even if it loses the ability to fly over the United States—would still retain the right to fly over European states and Canada, which together account for more than 87 percent of its flights. Moscow has also invested financially in new Open Skies planes and will want to make use of them, writes Liechtenstein. Keeping the treaty alive is in their shared interest as it constitutes the last viable multilateral option of avoiding conflict and military tensions between Russia and the West—even without U.S. participation.
• The very forces that made U.S. hegemony so durable before are today driving its dissolution, write professors Alexander Cooley and Daniel H. Nexon. A vicious cycle that erodes U.S. power has replaced the virtuous cycles that once reinforced it. With the rise of great powers such as China and Russia, autocratic and illiberal projects rival the U.S.-led liberal international system. Developing countries—and even many developed ones—can seek alternative patrons rather than remain dependent on Western largess and support. In short, U.S. global leadership is not simply in retreat; it is unraveling. And the decline, according to Cooley and Nexon, is not cyclical but permanent.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

New Cold War/saber rattling:

“Why a New Yalta Wouldn’t End the Malaise Between the West and Russia,” Nicu Popescu, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 06.09.20: The author, director of the Wider Europe program at ECFR, writes:

• “[S]everal states are on a … quest to end the malaise between the West and Russia. US President Donald Trump’s recent decision to invite his Russian counterpart to a G7 meeting, and French attempts to re-engage with Russia, are part of this quest. Even if the G7 summit won’t to take place in the next few weeks, the initiative might still result in a separate U.S.-Russia summit—perhaps around the U.N. General Assembly in September.”
• “The last time Russian President Vladimir Putin attended the U.N. General Assembly, in 2015, ‘Yalta’ was on his mind. At the time, he forcefully praised the Yalta system for helping ‘humankind pass through turbulent, and at times dramatic, events of the last seven decades. It saved the world from large-scale upheavals.’”
• “The ‘new Yalta’ elixir could follow a strong or a weak recipe. The strong version … is an implicit recognition of a Russian sphere of influence in some post-Soviet countries. The weaker version is a form of non-alignment or neutrality in several post-Soviet states, primarily Ukraine.”
• “On the surface, talk of a new Yalta appears to come at a propitious moment. The European Union and NATO have little appetite for further enlargement, especially outside the Balkans. Trump reportedly said that he does not care about Ukraine.”

“The Retrenchment Syndrome. A Response to ‘Come Home, America?’” H. R. McMaster, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2020:

NATO-Russia relations:

“Russia’s New Rhetorical Deterrence,” Marek Menkiszak, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 06.10.20: The author, head of the Russian department at the Center for Eastern Studies in Warsaw, writes:

• “Russian President Vladimir Putin endorsed a new nuclear deterrent policy which allows him to use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional strike targeting the country's critical state and military infrastructure. But the document is more about effect than substance.”
• “It is hardly a coincidence that the publication comes during a period of increasingly heated debates over several important European and global security issues, such as the future fate of … New START … the future of nuclear sharing in NATO or, indeed, NATO's response to the violation of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty by Russia and its termination by the U.S. … The publication of the new Russian document may be seen, therefore, as Russia’s attempt to influence those debates—a peculiar form of ‘negotiation enforcement.’”
• “One should treat the new nuclear policy document as another form of Russia’s rhetorical deterrence. And we should keep calm and carry on with what we believe is right for security in Europe. For the Russians are not mad; they know their weaknesses and always calculate the potential benefits and costs of their actions. And they are not eager to start World War III.”

“Russia’s Nuclear Deterrence Principles: What They Imply, and What They Do Not,” Gustav Gressel, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 06.12.20: The author, a senior policy fellow with the Wider Europe Program at ECFR, writes:

• “With Trump also unilaterally reducing America’s military presence in Europe (in Germany in particular), transatlantic relations have reached a new low. However, the new Russian policy principles on nuclear deterrence also underpin the existential role the U.S. plays to counterbalance the Russian military in Europe, and in particular, nuclear capabilities. For the foreseeable future, France will be neither able or willing to replace the United States’ nuclear balancing role, contrary to occasional wishful thinking about this in Germany. For now, Europeans hope that the November 2020 election will relieve them of their troubles with Trump. But there is no plan B if that election does not deliver their much hoped-for anticipated result.”

“Threat to Cut US Troops Damages the Western Alliance,” Editorial Board, Financial Times, 06.15.20: The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “Donald Trump’s former ambassador to Berlin has confirmed that the U.S. plans to withdraw some troops from Germany. If the Trump administration were to carry out its threat, it would be a triple blow—to US-European relations, NATO and the wider idea of the West as an alliance of democracies committed to upholding shared values. No one would benefit from such a move except the west’s rivals and competitors, notably Russia and China.”
• “The bottom line is that a majority of NATO’s European members, including Germany, are not fulfilling their promise to raise annual defense spending to 2 percent of gross domestic product. Too many display no real urgency about making defense policy a cornerstone of a more integrated Europe. Unless they up their game, the U.S.-European alliance will doubtless come under further unwelcome strain.”

“Why Cutting American Forces in Germany Will Harm This Alliance,” Michael E. O’Hanlon, Brookings Institution/The Hill, 06.15.20: The author, a senior fellow at Brookings, writes:

• “President Trump has approved a plan, hatched more by his ambassador in Berlin than by the Pentagon, to further downsize the United States military presence in Germany, according to some recent reports. The change was disturbingly motivated out of his spite at Chancellor Angela Merkel.”
• “The 35,000 American troops in Germany would be reduced by 10,000, as some would come home and some would possibly head to Poland. While there is nothing wrong with increasing the modest United States military presence in Poland, this must not be at the expense of a strong foothold in Germany, where American forces stood in the hundreds of thousands amid the Cold War and have been reduced in the last few decades.”
• “Germany could remain a crucial hub even if the plan to downsize, the details of which have not been released, moves forward. But if Trump keeps up the vindictiveness that seems to drive big decisions toward allies, can these all key relationships survive another four years?”

“NATO Needs a Coherent Approach to Defending its Eastern Flank,” Ben Hodges, Janusz Bugajski, Ray Wojcik and Carsten Schmiedl, War on the Rocks, 06.12.20: The authors, affiliates of the Center for European Policy Analysis, write:

• “Russia’s ambitions, capabilities and actions along NATO’s eastern flank threaten the vital interests of the most vulnerable members of the alliance and its closest partners. This danger is not necessarily confined to low-intensity or non-military conflict. Moscow calculates that its forces can exploit uncertainties and internal political cleavages within NATO to conduct a wide range of offensives, including low-threshold probing and a variety of military incursions. Such a destabilizing strategy necessitates that the alliance remove any asymmetries in its eastern flank posture, and prepare for rapid political and military responses to Moscow’s provocations.”
• “NATO wins when it operates as a cohesive team of allies and partners. The readiness and resolve of NATO allies to respond effectively when challenged by an expansionist, authoritarian adversary can be encapsulated in the rallying cry ‘one flank, one threat, one presence.’”

Impact of the pandemic:

“Blame Game Shatters Putin’s Majority,” Andrey Pertsev, Carnegie Moscow Center, 06.09.20: The author, a journalist with Kommersant, writes:

• “[Russia’s] presidential administration is faced with the difficult task of remolding a loyal majority that will support the Kremlin’s plans for constitutional reform—including changing the law to allow Putin to run for the presidency again in 2024—during a nationwide vote on the issue. The previous unity was formed during a time of economic growth and high ratings. The situation now is quite different.”
• “Financial handouts won’t be enough to patch up the tears: there isn’t enough money for everyone, and offering support to some groups over others could deepen the divisions.”
• “Worse still, the mood of anger against the authorities is proving to be a more effective unifying factor. The sharp decline in the economy, the selective nature of compensation and problems obtaining it and the inconsistent and illogical introduction and then lifting of lockdown measures could all help to unite the most diverse social groups in their unhappiness.”
• “The remaining fragments of the former pro-Putin majority don’t correspond to the parts used to assemble that majority twenty years ago. The jigsaw puzzle of Russian society could be put back together by opponents of the current regime, but society has apparently forgotten how to come together on its own.”

“As Putin’s Regime Stifles the State, the Pandemic Shows the Cost,” Nathaniel Reynolds, Carnegie Moscow Center, 06.08.20: The author, a nonresident scholar in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes:

• “Putin’s refusal to take charge in the crisis yielded predictable results. Most of Russia’s regional governors are little more than his yes-men. They keep their jobs and access to rents not because they respond to local demands but because they deliver election results and manage to keep the public quiescent. However, without orders from the top, they have nothing to say yes to, leaving them to decide how to please the boss. Some local officials apparently went too far in shutting down regional and municipal borders, forcing the Kremlin to push back. Others acted too late or pushed to lift restrictions too soon. Meanwhile, Putin threatened regional leaders with jail time for failing to act. This is governing at the barrel of a gun.”
• “Regime infighting has also intensified. Sobyanin was quick to recognize the coronavirus threat to the capital and demanded that people stay home. In response, users on Telegram—a social media app that elites rely on to share information and smear one another anonymously—launched a barrage of criticism against him. One channel, which a previous investigation linked to a top Kremlin official, claimed Sobyanin was trying to sabotage Putin. The mayor’s reward for demonstrating leadership and taking initiative was the ire of fellow elites.”
• “Russia is far from the only country to struggle with the pandemic, and the regime may yet rise to the challenges of this crisis. But the pandemic has already undermined the Kremlin’s carefully cultivated image of Russia as a strong state. Meanwhile, the regime remains more formidable, keeping Putin in power but leaving his eventual successor a state ill-prepared to confront Russia’s problems.”

“Postviral Complications: What Next for the Russian Regime?” Tatiana Stanovaya, Carnegie Moscow Center, 06.15.20: The author, a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “The current perfect storm will end in the virus being defeated, but Russian society might find itself defeated alongside it. The state sees support for it as its dues, and protests as the result of manipulation. This will lead to more authoritarian administration: even more direct control over political processes, elections and all forms of civil activity, causing social irritation to look for an outlet.”

“The Pandemic and Political Order,” Francis Fukuyama, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2020

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Arms control:

“Keep Nuclear Testing off the Table,” Michael T. Klare and Daryl G. Kimball, The Boston Globe, 06.13.20: The authors, a professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and the executive director of the Arms Control Association, write:

• “Our nation and the world face a daunting array of challenges. Surely, this is not the time to ignite a new arms race with Russia and China—let alone to begin testing nuclear weapons again, as senior officials at the White House have been considering.”
• “Whatever Trump and his acolytes might tell themselves, a nuclear test blast by the United States would do nothing to rein in Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals or improve the environment for negotiations. Rather, it would raise tensions and probably trigger an outbreak of nuclear testing by other nuclear actors, leading to an all-out global arms race in which everyone would come out a loser.”
• “Unfortunately, President Trump could order a simple demonstration nuclear test explosion underground at the former Nevada Test Site outside Las Vegas in as little as six months. Congress can and should step in to prevent such recklessness. Republicans and Democrats should join Sens. Ed Markey and Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts, Charles Schumer of New York and others who have proposed a prohibition on the use of taxpayers' funds to resume nuclear weapons testing. Parallel efforts are being led by Rep. Jim McGovern, a Massachusetts Democrat, and others in the House.”

“Trilateral Negotiations to Count Every Warhead,” Michael Krepon, Arms Control Wonk, 06.12.20: The author, co-founder of the Stimson Center, writes:

• “Those who played key roles in the ‘count every Russian and Chinese warhead’ proposal—Tom Cotton, John Bolton and Tim Morrison, among them—are not to be confused with George Shultz and Paul Nitze. Nor is Trump to be confused with Reagan or any of the other Presidents who built the edifice that Trump is tearing down.”
• “Given Trump’s track record, and given the prior handiwork of Sen. Cotton, Bolton and Morrison, it’s reasonable to assume that their definition of success is failure. Failure would buy time, time to get U.S. production lines as warm as they are in Russia and China.”
• “A worthwhile goal that will take a long time to reach fruition becomes a scam when it is used to exit a treaty that makes us safer. If Trump walks away from New START or agrees to only a short extension, then we’ll know that his idea of a better deal is no deal at all. We’ll know it’s another scam because progress toward his worthwhile goal will be even harder to negotiate if New START dies.”

“Want to Avoid US-Russian Conflict? Keep the Lines Open,” Stephanie Liechtenstein, Foreign Policy, 06.10.20: The author, a diplomatic correspondent, writes:

• “With little fanfare, U.S. President Donald Trump last month delivered another dangerous blow to keeping international peace when he announced the United States would leave the Open Skies Treaty (OST).”
• “Withdrawing from the treaty further erodes the conventional arms control regime and significantly increases the risks of conflict in Europe and beyond.”
• “For Europe and Canada, Russia’s continued membership is crucial since most of their flights take place over Russian territory, as research by the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg shows.”
• “In turn, Russia—even if it loses the ability to fly over the United States—would still retain the right to fly over European states and Canada, which together account for more than 87 percent of its flights. Moscow has also invested financially in new Open Skies planes and will want to make use of them.”
• “Keeping the treaty alive is in their shared interest as it constitutes the last viable multilateral option of avoiding conflict and military tensions between Russia and the West—even without U.S. participation.”

“Attack on the Open Skies Treaty,” Wolfgang Richter, SWP, June 2020: The author, a senior associate in the International Security Division at SWP, writes:

• “If Moscow reacts to a possible withdrawal of Washington by leaving the treaty, Europeans should nevertheless continue to implement it for reasons of principle. This would leave the option open for the United States and Russia to rejoin it if political circumstances change.”
• “If the Open Skies Treaty is to be saved, now is the right time—and probably the last chance. Germany has a political and conceptual role to play in mediating and preserving the treaty as an instrument of military transparency and confidence-building.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security:

• No significant developments.

Elections interference:

• No significant developments.

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“US-Russian Relations in 2030,” Richard Sokolsky and Eugene Rumer, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 06.15.20: The authors, a nonresident senior fellow and the director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, write:

• “U.S.-Russia relations will remain frosty for years, but even Cold Wars eventually thaw. The United States should prepare now to act decisively when this one finally does … Changing global trends and domestic political dynamics could pry open the door to greater possibilities for cooperation. … It is not too early to ask what the United States and Russia should want from each other over the next decade, what kind of bilateral relationship the countries would like to have in 2030 and how they could get from where they are today to the U.S. preferred end state.”
• “Avoiding a conflict between the United States and Russia, and especially nuclear war, should be the paramount U.S. priority in the bilateral relationship. … The United States and Russia share a common interest in maintaining strategic stability and eliminating all incentives for the use of any nuclear weapons—a goal that will become increasingly difficult to achieve in the face of emerging weapons systems and technologies that could destabilize the nuclear relationship. … It is worth exploring with Russian interlocutors how they can envision a breakdown of the long period of stability that has prevailed across Europe … as well as their preferred vision for the continent.”
• “Russia is poised to become increasingly dependent on China as a source of technology and investments. At a minimum, Washington should avoid policies that drive the two countries closer together … In the Middle East, there may be opportunities for U.S.-Russian cooperation in the Persian Gulf.”

“Pinning Down Putin. How a Confident America Should Deal With Russia,” Victoria Nuland, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2020

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Why Putin’s Rating Is at a Record Low,” Andrei Kolesnikov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 06.11.20: The author, a senior fellow and the chair of the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “Data collated by the independent Levada Center pollster reveal that the president’s approval ratings slumped to a historical low of 59 percent in April, and stayed there in May. This may be a new plateau.”
• “Since 2017, the authorities’ approval ratings have depended less and less on symbolic greatness and a multitude of victories over enemies at home and abroad. The state of the economy and social well-being have eclipsed national pride, and the effect of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea—which initially sent Putin’s ratings soaring to over 80 percent—has worn off and lost its potential to mobilize.”
• “The fact is that symbolic greatness won’t feed hungry stomachs. The post-Crimea stagnation in economic growth and real incomes has clearly started to influence the attitudes of ordinary Russians to the state.”
• “The pandemic completely changed the agenda. … The change in agenda and disappearance of tools for political mobilization have combined with a sharp decline in the economy and decreased budget revenues as a result of low oil prices, plus the shuttering of businesses due to the lockdown. This has all been exacerbated by the government’s sluggish reaction to the crisis.”

“Putin’s System Has Run Out of Ideas,” Tatiana Stanovaya, Carnegie Moscow Center, 06.09.20: The author, a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “The once-popular idea of ‘Putin’s path’ has dropped out of use. It referred to an integrated vision of the future, and disappeared as soon as Putin became a hostage of the past.”
• “What is Putin’s plan right now? It revolves almost entirely around the geopolitical standoff with the West, the goal of forcing the West to respect Russia. That plan has nothing to do with the domestic agenda.”
• “At home, there are two things that matter to Putin. The first is economic growth. The second is political calm. The president is not interested in who manages the daily routine at either a regional or federal level (or how), the relationship between business and government, or who is jailed for protesting. What’s important to Putin is that all of this should keep ticking along without any unnecessary fuss, because that’s what irritates him the most: the protests last summer, or the arrest of the journalist Ivan Golunov.”

“Vladimir Putin's Latest Trick for Making Russia Look Like a Democracy,” Vladimir Kara-Murza, The Washington Post, 06.11.20: The author, the vice-chairman of Open Russia, writes:

• “Last month, Russia's Justice Ministry registered four new political parties, giving them the right to take part in scheduled regional elections in September and potentially in next year's national parliamentary vote as well.”
• “As reported in Russian media, the new parties—like most of the nearly 50 political parties now on the register—were created with the political blessing of the government. As the 2021 parliamentary election draws closer, the Kremlin is increasingly concerned about the prospect that the ruling United Russia party might suffer the same kind of humiliation it did last year in Moscow, when many pro-regime lawmakers lost to technical shadow boxers even after disqualifying opposition candidates. Kremlin strategists are reportedly planning to flood the 2021 ballot with dozens of different-sounding parties to dilute the opposition vote—a classic ‘spoiler’ tactic that is sometimes used even in developed democracies.”
• “Last year, after most opposition leaders were barred from the Moscow legislative election, voters followed Navalny's call to send a message to the Kremlin by backing technical candidates from smaller registered parties against government-supported lawmakers. These ‘accidental opponents’— including spoilers put up by the authorities themselves—ended up winning in nearly half the districts, and actually beat the official candidates in the vote totals. It should be difficult to lose an election when your opponents are not on the ballot—but Putin's regime has managed this, at least in the capital city. Next year, this experience could well be repeated nationally. Where there's a will, there is always a way—and Russians' growing will for change after two decades of single-man rule is becoming increasingly difficult to hide.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant developments.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

• No significant developments.

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

“How Hegemony Ends: The Unraveling of American Power,” Alexander Cooley and Daniel H. Nexon, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2020:

“The Next Liberal Order,” G. John Ikenberry, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2020

Ukraine:

“Resilient Ukraine: Safeguarding Society from Russian Aggression,” Mathieu Boulègue and Orysia Lutsevych, Chatham House, 06.12.20: The authors of the report write:

• “Despite military conflict and an increasingly adversarial relationship with Russia, Ukraine has largely maintained its democratic reforms thanks to its resilience and determination to decide its own future. The country is gradually developing the capacity of its state institutions and civil society to address the political and social consequences of Russian aggression.”
• “Russia’s three main levers of influence in Ukraine include the ongoing armed conflict, corruption, and the poor quality of the political sphere. The Kremlin seeks to exploit these vulnerabilities to promote polarization and encourage a clash between Ukraine’s citizens and its governing elite by taking military action, manipulating the corruption narrative, supporting pro-Russia parties, and fuelling religious tensions through the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC).”
• “With no clear way to end the armed conflict, there is a growing risk of societal polarization. This could have negative consequences for any prospective peace agreement. Conflict resolution particularly requires engagement with Ukrainians in the non-government-controlled areas (NGCA). Safe and inclusive reintegration of Donbas into Ukraine is about more than just territory, it is about people.”

“The Rise of Strategic Corruption. How States Weaponize Graft,” Philip Zelikow, Eric Edelman, Kristofer Harrison and Celeste Ward Gventer, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2020

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Belarus Reshuffle Produces ‘Wartime Cabinet,’” Artyom Shraibman, Carnegie Moscow Center, 06.12.20: The author, a journalist and political commentator, writes:

• “Two months ahead of Belarus’s presidential election, as opposition candidates cultivate a political activity long unseen in the country, President Alexander Lukashenko has replaced his prime minister and reshuffled his Council of Ministers.”
• “[New PM] Golovchenko’s last job was head of the State Military-Industrial Committee. Before that, he was ambassador to the Gulf countries: one of the main markets for Belarusian arms exports, making it a position that requires the president’s complete trust. People in the know describe Golovchenko not as a hardliner, but more as an efficient manager from the military sector.”
• “For Lukashenko, the current crisis is a time for mobilization. What’s needed is not experiments but discipline: preferably military, hence the choice of new prime minister.”
• “Lukashenko’s entire election campaign has consisted of attempts to convince the Belarusian public and nomenclature of the existence of dangerous threats from which he personally is saving the country. Even as he appointed the new government, he decided to remind ‘some who had forgotten’ how former Uzbek president Islam Karimov brutally suppressed an uprising in Andijan, leaving several hundred dead, and how Tajik President Emomali Rahmon took the country’s capital Dushanbe by storm ‘with rows of machine guns.’”
• “Whether or not Lukashenko actually believes such scenarios are possible in Belarus, in this situation he needs a wartime cabinet. Yet the steep economic downturn, increased influence of the siloviki, pre-election repression, and doubts over the loyalty of officials are not the most favorable backdrop for his reelection. It’s not entirely clear what resources, other than force, Lukashenko plans to rely on for his sixth presidential term.”