This Week’s Highlights:

• With his parliamentary majority obviating the need to form a coalition, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has been handed a unique mandate by his public that could be used to achieve two breakthroughs: An economic one and an end to the war in the east. Bershidsky argues that if the economy improves, and if the millions who have left Ukraine to look for work in Europe start to return, Zelenskiy will likely be forgiven for failing to resolve the semi-frozen conflict with Russia.
• When it comes to the Ukraine conflict, Russia has the luxury of time: The Kremlin’s international isolation is weakening—and things would be the same if Petro Poroshenko had won Ukraine’s presidential election, argues Balázs Jarábik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
• Given its trajectory and authoritarian model, China, not Russia, represents by far the greater challenge to American objectives over the long term, the New York Times editorial board writes. They argue that U.S. President Donald Trump is correct to try to establish a sounder relationship with Russia and peel it away from China, and suggest that the U.S. and Russia could expand their cooperation in space and in the Artic.
• Withdrawing from the INF Treaty, which has served the U.S. and its European allies well for decades risks an arms race that is destabilizing and unwinnable, and the same is true for New START, writes Ivo Daalder, president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. It will no doubt take time, and real effort, to decide on a new negotiating framework beyond the U.S. and Russia, and until such time, both Washington and Moscow will be much better off if the nuclear framework they have developed over the past 50 years remains in place, Daalder argues.
• A heavy set of U.S. sanctions on Turkey in response to Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 missile system may have the unintended consequence of making Turkey even more dependent on Russia, writes Galip Dalay of Brookings. In this scenario, this deal will further turn into a choice of geopolitical realignment for Turkey, away from the West and closer to Russia, Dalay argues.
• Western governments could create civilian digital fire departments using the structure currently used for military reserves: Experts sign up to join the organization, participate in exercises and are called up for defensive and offensive crisis response duty, writes Elisabeth Braw, director of the Modern Deterrence project at the Royal United Services Institute. While the West’s adversaries involve private citizens in cyberattacks, they use them as proxies to which attacks can be farmed out, rather than an organized defense force, writes Braw.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/saber rattling:

“Countering Missiles With Missiles: US Military Posture After the INF Treaty,” Thomas G. Mahnken, War on the Rocks, 07.16.19: The author, president and chief executive officer of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, writes:

• “The United States should field new ground units armed with intermediate-range land-based missiles on U.S. and allied territory along the Western Pacific archipelagos. … Such weapons, capable of denying China the use of littoral waters, would be a powerful deterrent to Chinese aggression.”
• “Chinese and Russian land-based missiles undercut American strengths. Trucks can relocate some of these missiles so they evade aircraft and satellite detection.”
• “Washington should capitalize on the INF Treaty’s end to field conventionally armed, land-based maritime strike- and land-attack missiles that saddle America’s great power competitors with the same dilemmas they have imposed on the United States for years.”

NATO-Russia relations:

“Kicking Turkey Out of NATO Would Be a Gift to Putin,” James Stavridis, Bloomberg/The Moscow Times, 07.19.19: The author, a columnist for Bloomberg, writes:

• “The Trump administration and the Europeans need to recognize how high the stakes are in this dispute. … Turkey has long been a valuable operational member of the alliance … It would also set a terrible precedent to see a nation feel it was driven out by sanctions. So the West needs to work toward an outcome that, at a minimum, keeps Turkey a functioning, contributing member of NATO.”
• “A second key is to shift the debate away from its current context of a U.S.-Turkish dispute, and center the conversation in Brussels at NATO headquarters. … Third, NATO allies should be thinking more creatively about how to address the specific concerns about the system. For example, there may be technical solutions to ‘wall off’ the S-400 from the rest of NATO’s air-defense system.”
• “Finally, it wouldn’t hurt to increase the level of engagement on other key fronts—from very senior exchanges of delegations to encouraging larger Turkish contributions in other NATO missions to personal conversations.”
• “If Turkey chooses to go forward with the entire S-400 purchase, both sides in this dispute must work to create an acceptable outcome that doesn’t shatter alliance unity but also maintains the integrity of NATO air defenses and the stealth technology of the F-35.  It can be done, but it will take a lot of work and willingness to compromise.”

“Why Did Turkey Buy Russian S-400s?” Selim Sazak, The Washington Post, 07.17.19: The author, a PhD candidate in political science at Brown University's Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, writes:

• “There is no wonder why Russia would want to sell to Turkey, but why would Turkey, a NATO ally, want to buy from it?”
• “First, [Turkish President] Erdogan and his administration cannibalized institutions—including the foreign service—as they turned into their family business … It makes groupthink all the more likely, erodes competence by putting political loyalty above professional merit and makes many enemies.”
• “Second, the new regime's revanche against its secular rivals upended Turkey's existing networks with the West. … Third, a recklessly overconfident foreign policy under a naïve and incompetent team plunged Turkey into a geopolitical quicksand.”
• “Facing the prospect of a Kurdish mini-state on its border, Turkey was forced to act. With the U.S. neither able nor willing to help, its only option was to deal with Russia, which could not have come cheap as Turkey shot down a Russian jet, saw a Russian ambassador killed in its soil and caused much trouble for Bashar al-Assad. The S-400s are likely to have been that price—or maybe just its first installment.”

“Why Is Turkey Betting on Russia?” Galip Dalay, Brookings Institution, 07.15.19: The author, a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Doha Center, writes:

• “Turkey’s newly found partnership with Russia is still fragile and evolving. The Russian-backed Syrian regime’s recent offensive on Idlib province in Syria glaringly illustrated the limits of Russian-Turkish cooperation in the Middle East and beyond.”
• “Their relationship is no match for Turkey’s historical and institutional ties to the West. Yet these ties are fraying. A heavy set of U.S. sanctions on Turkey in response to Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 missile system may have the unintended consequence of making Turkey even more dependent on Russia. In this scenario, this deal will further turn into a choice of geopolitical realignment for Turkey, away from the West and closer to Russia.”

“Don't Let Turkey Defect to Russia,” Walter Russell Mead, Wall Street Journal, 07.16.19: The author, a professor of foreign affairs, writes:

• “The potential defection of a major ally like Turkey poses a significant challenge to NATO, not least because the alliance has no legal means to expel members that default on their obligations. While Mr. Erdogan's purchase of the Russian system requires a serious response, and the delivery of F-35s must be put on hold, Washington should move cautiously.”
• “Washington should remember that Turkey is bigger than one man and focus on the long term.”

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

“Abandoning Our Nuclear Arms Treaties With Russia Is a Bad Idea,” Ivo Daalder, Chicago Tribune, 07.18.19: The author, the president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, writes:

• “After more than 50 years of U.S.-Russian arms control negotiations and agreements, there is scope for thinking anew about how best to reduce nuclear dangers. But abandoning long-standing agreements and conditioning any new negotiations on including China are not the best way to do that.”
• “U.S.-Russian arms control has worked … to reduce the chance of war, especially nuclear war. That is why the decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty next month is a mistake. … [W]ithdrawing from a treaty that has served the United States and its European allies well for decades risks an arms race that is destabilizing and unwinnable.”
• “The same is true for New START. Russia has indicated it is willing to extend its terms for five years. The United States has nothing to lose by agreeing to its extension.”
• “There is a case to be made for including China in future nuclear negotiations, though its nuclear deployments of some 200 weapons is but a small fraction of what the United States and Russia still possess. Russia, moreover, will no doubt also insist on including the similarly-sized French and British nuclear forces in such a multilateral negotiation, a prospect that neither Paris nor London is likely to welcome.”
• “It will no doubt take time, and real effort, to decide on a new negotiating framework beyond the two major nuclear powers. Until such time, both Washington and Moscow will be much better off if the nuclear framework they have developed over the past 50 years remains in place.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

“A Russian-American Deal Can Bring Stability to Syria, Weaken Iran,” Ram Yavne, Bloomberg, 07.22.19: The author, former head of strategic planning in the Israeli Defense Forces, writes:

• “Despite the sometimes toxic relations between the U.S. and Russia, the door is not closed for a deal over Syria that serves the strategic interests of both players. The compromises required are within the realm of acceptability for both states. What would a Russo-American deal look like?”
• “[I]t would recognize Assad’s regime for now and delay the United Nations-mandated political transition process in Syria. … The signatories would agree to fund Syria’s economic rehabilitation process, providing Assad a major incentive to accept.”
• “In return, they would insist on the withdrawal of all Iranian military components from Syria and cut off the supply of illegal arms to the country. … They would also agree on the preservation of the autonomous rights of the anti-Assad Syrian Democratic Forces as well as the Kurdish and Sunni communities in east and north Syria as a bulwark against any resurgence in Islamic State.”

Cyber security:

“Cyber Deterrence Needs People, Not Weapons,” Elisabeth Braw, Foreign Policy, 07.19.19: The author, director of the Modern Deterrence project at the Royal United Services Institute, writes:

• “Western governments could create Eliasson-style civilian digital fire departments—call them High-Tech Emergency Corps—using the structure that is currently used for military reserves: Experts sign up to join the organization, participate in exercises and are called up for defensive and offensive crisis response duty.”
• “While the West’s adversaries, including China, North Korea and Russia, involve private citizens in cyberattacks, they use them as proxies to which attacks can be farmed out, rather than an organized defense force.”
• “Why should tech experts sign up for service in a cyber-reserve rather than use their spare time for personal hobbies? Because uninterrupted access to daily goods such as electricity, internet, and food is in everybody’s interest, including that of cyberspecialists.”

Elections interference:

“Populist Voters Don’t Mind Putin’s Help,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg/The Moscow Times, 07.15.19: The author, a columnist and veteran Russia watcher, writes:

• “Italian Interior Minister Matteo Salvini, leader of the nationalist-populist League party, is having a hard time waving off accusations that one of his close aides plotted to get Kremlin funding for the political force. It should be clear by now that such aid is readily available to European populist parties.”
• “It has long been clear that legal forms of aid, such as French nationalist Marine Le Pen’s Russian bank loans, are fine with such politicians’ supporters. The Brexit Party’s voters have also brushed off concerns about Russian interference in the 2016 referendum. Ultimately, if voters keep showing they don’t mind politicians’ Kremlin links, all the politicians need to do is set up legal structures to receive Putin’s aid with a minimum of risk. That may not be straightforward, but it’s more a technical task rather than a political one.”
• “So far, the European establishment has failed to impress on a significant number of voters the idea that Putin is a threat. That’s part of its general vulnerability. Whether or not the Kremlin … becomes an agenda-setting player in European politics, the record so far suggests it will continue to look for open doors and increasingly find them.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“How the Soviets Won the Space Race for Equality,” Sophie Pinkham, New York Times, 07.16.19: The author, a literary non-fiction writer, explains:

• “‘We cannot allow the first woman in space to be American. This would be an insult to the patriotic feelings of Soviet women,’ Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev [said], and the search for candidates began.”
• “[Valentina] Tereshkova, who was born the daughter of a tractor driver in a village on the Volga River, became a Soviet poster-woman, and eventually retired as a major general in the Russian Air Force. The first American woman in space, Sally Ride, didn’t go up until 1983.”
• “Cosmonaut diversity was key for the Soviet message to the rest of the globe: Under socialism, a person of even the humblest origins could make it all the way up.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Russia’s Changing Identity: In Search of a Role in the 21st Century,” Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 07.18.19: The author, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “Russia’s brand of exceptionalism is not messianic. It is rooted in the isolation of an Orthodox country and its belief that it possesses the gift of a true religious faith. It has been strengthened by Russia’s successful—if costly—defense of its state sovereignty, and confirmed by Russia’s status as a major global player that refuses to take orders from anyone.”
• “What is emerging almost three decades since the end of the USSR is a Russia that for the first time is largely Russian, not only ethnically and religiously, but also geopolitically. It has no empire to maintain or win back. It no longer seeks to become ‘part of Europe’ … Rather than standing, as before, facing Europe and America while turning its back on Asia, Russia may imagine itself sitting in a swivel chair, addressing the opportunities and challenges as they emerge along its 60,000 km perimeter of borders and shoreline.”
• “Moscow’s policies in the Middle East may become a crucible for the emerging pattern of Russia’s twenty-first-century foreign policy. Moscow does not have formal permanent allies there, but is ready to cooperate with those whose interests in a given area and for a given period of time coincide with those of the Russian Federation.”
• “Probably the most important task for Moscow’s foreign policy is to successfully manage, in the long term, the increasingly asymmetrical relationship with Beijing.”
• “[T]he Western dimension of Russia’s foreign policy is likely to remain fundamentally strained. The hybrid war confrontation with the United States is likely to continue and intensify. The only real item on the U.S.-Russia agenda for the foreseeable future is preventing a direct military collision between the two powers, and an escalation of conflicts in which they are backing opposing sides, e.g., in Ukraine and Syria.”

“Europe Risks Irrelevance in the Age of Great Power Competition,” Carl Bildt, Financial Times, 07.19.19: The author, former prime minister of Sweden, writes:

• “The past half-decade or so has been particularly difficult for the EU. The Arab spring collapsed into brutal repression, triggering massive inward refugee flows. After its unlawful aggression against Ukraine, Russia went from prospective strategic partner to obvious strategic adversary.”
• “China rapidly turned from being a benevolent trading partner to an assertive promoter of its own global ambitions. … And with the election of Donald Trump as U.S. president, Europe was confronted with an administration that barely disguised its contempt for the principles and policies of the EU. … The conflict in eastern Ukraine remains more open than frozen, while Brussels plays virtually no role in attempts to seek a resolution.”
• “The EU needs to find a system for setting foreign policy that can better protect its strategic sovereignty. It should establish a political process at the European level that develops the ability to act independently and, at the same time, forges new mechanisms for encouraging unity among member states.”

China:

“What’s America’s Winning Hand if Russia Plays the China Card?” Editorial Board, New York Times, 07.22.19: The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “One of the striking warnings in a recent Pentagon white paper on the growing strategic threat from Russia is that its president, Vladimir Putin, could pull a 'reverse Nixon' and play his own version of the 'China card' with the United States, a reference to the former president's strategy of playing those two adversaries against each other.”
• “Until recently, any relationship between Russia and China could largely be dismissed as a marriage of convenience with limited impact on American interests. But since Western nations imposed sanctions on Russia after it invaded Ukraine in 2014, Chinese and Russian authorities have increasingly found common cause … Now China and Russia are growing even closer, suggesting a more permanent arrangement that could pose a complex challenge to the United States.”
• “Given its economic, military and technological trajectory, together with its authoritarian model, China, not Russia, represents by far the greater challenge to American objectives over the long term. That means President Trump is correct to try to establish a sounder relationship with Russia and peel it away from China.”
• “Even during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union often made progress in one facet of their relationship while they remained in conflict over other aspects. … The United States and Russia could expand their cooperation in space. … They could also continue to work closely in the Arctic … And they could revive cooperation on arms control.”
• “Given their history, China and Russia may never reach a formal alliance. The two have been divided by war and ideological rivalries … Their contrasting trajectories would also make an alliance difficult. … Still, their shared objectives could increase, further threatening Western interests. America needs to rally its democratic allies … and project a more confident vision of its own political and economic model.”

“A Weak Europe: Would It Suit Russia and China?” Timofei Bordachev, Valdai Discussion Club, 07.17.19: The author, program director of the Valdai Discussion Club, writes:

• “In the next five years, Europe will be vulnerable and emotionally unstable because of the election of top EU leaders from among openly incompetent politicians or respected leaders with limited access to the necessary resources.”
• “The current state of the EU is a chance, especially for Russia, to overcome its centuries-long intellectual dependence on Europe and to revise its policy toward the West that focused on the resources and interests of its partners … Strategically, this could even help stabilize relations with Europe.”
• “Russia and China should start developing their bilateral relations and cooperation in Europe irrespective of their individual ties with Europe. They should try to serve above all their own interests and to coordinate bilateral actions that could reflect these interests. And lastly, they should not make the formats offered to them by Europe a factor in bilateral relations.”

“Are Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin Partners? Interpreting the Russia-China Rapprochement,” Hilary Appel, PONARS Eurasia, 07.22.19: The author, a professor of government, writes:

• “The Kremlin seems willing to look past certain hurdles or challenges that deterred warmer relations with China in the past. For example, not only has Moscow moved beyond the issue of China copying Russian military technology, it has also downplayed other issues, such as sensitivities related to its 4,200 km border … Russia is showing greater flexibility toward China regarding the development of Arctic sea routes … Perhaps the most striking area where Russia has yielded to Chinese interests is in Central Asian development.”
• “For now, the time is ripe for a Sino-Russian rapprochement. Both Russia and China share a desire to push back on a unipolar, U.S.-dominated world order. Both have demonstrated a growing desire to project power in their neighborhoods and beyond, and both are asserting their strength after a period of weakness.”
• “Putin has gained popularity and legitimacy at home by defending Russian interests in the near abroad, thwarting U.S. foreign policy aims. In a similar vein, under Xi, China has sought to project more power abroad and augment China’s global prestige.”
• “The leaders of China and Russia approach governance at home similarly. … Putin and Xi’s personal relationship is likely to deepen … These shared values are becoming more significant as both countries cope with continued deteriorating relations with the United States.”

Ukraine:

“A Comedian's Triumph Is a Test for Benevolent Populism,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 07.22.19: The author, a columnist and veteran Russia watcher, writes:

• “Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has achieved something none of his predecessors managed: Winning a parliamentary majority, obviating the need to form a coalition … According to preliminary results from Sunday’s snap election, Zelenskiy’s Servant of the People grouping looks set to not only win 122 seats under the party list system, but a further 125 seats under the first-past-the-post system, giving him control of the country’s 450-seat legislature.”
• “Ukrainians have handed their ex-comedian president a unique mandate that could be used to achieve two much-needed breakthroughs: An economic one, based on privatization and deregulation, and an end to the war in the east.”
• “Action on the first depends on Zelenskiy’s cabinet picks, especially on the next prime minister. … Among this lineup, Vladyslav Rashkovan, an alternate executive director at the International Monetary Fund and Yuriy Vitrenko, executive from the state oil and gas company, appear to best fit Zelenskiy’s description of an ideal candidate. … To make any economic headway, though, Zelenskiy will need to move fast on reforming Ukraine’s woefully corrupt justice system.”
• “Ending the war in the east will be an even tougher proposition … Putin is unlikely to feel like helping Zelenskiy as long as the Ukrainian president sticks to his predecessor’s implacable policy of calling Russia an aggressor and leading his country into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. … Going beyond a prisoner exchange and a resumption of communications with the Kremlin will be difficult. Most Ukrainians want closer ties with the EU than with Russia. A populist president can’t ignore this … Moscow, for its part, wants rapprochement on its terms.”
• “If the economy improves, and if the millions who have left the country to look for work in Europe start to return, Zelenskiy will likely be forgiven for failing to resolve the semi-frozen conflict with Russia.”

“In Search of a Compromise: Zelenskiy’s Emerging Donbass Policy,” Balázs Jarábik, Emerging Europe, 07.16.19: The author, a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes:

• “Two months after Volodymyr Zelenskiy was elected as president of Ukraine, a change in Kiev’s policy toward Donbass is evident. … The Donbass strategy of … Petro Poroshenko rested on preventing Moscow from conquering more territory and mobilizing international support for Ukraine, emphasizing Russian aggression. Poroshenko’s staggering loss at the presidential elections, as well as Russia’s return to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, were signs of the obvious limits of this policy.”
• “Zelenskiy continues to rely on Western diplomacy to mobilize support. … But … Zelenskiy is focusing on steps Kiev is capable of taking without (appearing to) make concessions to Russia, which would cost him political capital at home. … The new policy’s key focus is humanitarian, and includes steps such as ensuring access to water, focusing on wages and pensions, repairing key infrastructure and connecting the region with the rest of Ukraine. It is also informational, about winning hearts and minds, but falls short of reintegrating of the territory not controlled by the government.”
• “No breakthrough is on the horizon though. Even though 51 percent of Ukrainians would support autonomy for Donbass, the majority of Ukrainians oppose the rapid reintegration of the region for a number of reasons … As such, the Zelenskiy team is in search of a compromise.”
• “Russia has the luxury of time. The Kremlin’s international isolation is weakening—and it would be the same if Poroshenko had won the presidential election. As Ukrainians are fed up with the war … they also displayed a significant increase in public sympathy towards Russians.”
• “A coalition government that would include patriotic forces may further complicate Zelenskiy’s search for compromise despite the majority of Ukrainians considering peace in Donbass as an absolute policy priority. Don’t expect a breakthrough in relations with Russia, but Ukraine’s new policy toward Donbass is emerging.”

“Rebels Without a Cause: Russia’s Proxies in Eastern Ukraine,” International Crisis Group, 07.16.19: The organization writes:

• “Russia’s gradual retreat from any plans to annex parts of eastern Ukraine has opened schisms between Moscow and its separatist proxies in the region. For Kiev, these divides could create opportunities to restart dialogue with the people of the east. Such contacts … could help lay the groundwork for Ukraine’s unification.”
• “The rift between Moscow and its proxies should inform new Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s policies. Kiev should look to rebuild relations with the inhabitants of separatist-held areas, by easing the economic blockade on the east and increasing outreach to the population there.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Shunned by West and Wary of Russia, Belarus Gets Help From China,” Andrew Higgins, New York Times, 07.22.19: The author, a Moscow correspondent for the news outlet, writes:

• “‘They have made a huge leap forward. This is an example for us,’ said Aliaksandr Yarashenka, the head of administration at a Chinese-funded industrial park now rising from what used to be a wasteland of pine trees and swamp near … Minsk. The industrial park is the biggest such overseas venture financed by China.”
• “Mostly shunned by European investors and wary of becoming too dependent on Russia, which has a record of trying to grab its prize assets, Belarus has eagerly turned to China. Beijing makes no demands on … [Belarusian President Alexander] Lukashenko to ease repression or surrender companies like Belaruskali, a leading potash manufacturer over which Moscow has sought to gain control.”
• “Belarus’s official news agency, BelTA, reported recently that the country was close to securing a loan of more than $500 million from China. It quoted the deputy finance minister, Andrei Belkovets, as saying that ‘we initially counted on a loan from the Russian Federation’ but that Russia had stalled on providing funds, so ‘as an alternative we’ve come to terms with Chinese creditors.’”

“Hard Man Putin May Be Showing Softer Side to Russia’s Neighbors,” Marc Champion, Helena Bedwell and Henry Meyer, Bloomberg, 07.19.19: The authors, reporting for the news outlet, write:

• “The stage was prepared last week for Russian President Vladimir Putin to hammer tiny Georgia with new economic sanctions after parliament called on him to punish anti-Kremlin protests. Instead, Putin refused ‘because I respect the Georgians.’”
• “The uncharacteristic reaction left some wondering if the Kremlin is beginning to rethink its traditionally tough approach to neighboring states by turning to soft-power tools. Putin recently also joined with the European Union to endorse a coalition government in Moldova led by pro-Westerners, and has at least considered the return of captured sailors to Ukraine.”
• “It’s about time for a change, according to Georgia’s President Salome Zourabichvili. A policy of war, territorial occupation and punitive sanctions is ‘only confirming Georgia in its Western course,’ said Zourabichvili.”
• “Russia still has significant resources of language, economy and people-to-people goodwill to draw upon, if it chooses to switch to soft power in dealing with Georgia, according to Zourabichvili.”

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Putin’s Fourth Term: The Phantom Breakthrough,” Brian Taylor, PONARS Eurasia, July 2019: The author, a professor of political science, writes:

• “Russian President Vladimir Putin promised a ‘decisive leap forward in development’ in his fourth term (2018-2024), claiming that Russia will create a ‘modern system of effective governance.’ The prospects of a developmental breakthrough, however, are extremely slim.”
• “The economy remains sluggish and the political system is resistant to major institutional reforms. … Over the last two decades, Putin has shown no appetite for creating new rules of the game that would rein in arbitrary state power, subject his close acquaintances and friends to fair business competition or limit his own authority.”
• “Late Putinism is incompatible with good governance and highly compatible with economic and political stagnation.”

“Kremlin’s Rejection of United Russia Is Rejection of Politics Itself,” Andrey Pertsev, Carnegie Moscow Center, 07.16.19: The author, a journalist for Kommersant, writes:

• “Candidates backed by the authorities are increasingly declining to be nominated by United Russia. The ruling party doesn’t fit well into the technocratic-apolitical worldview of the presidential administration’s domestic policy bloc: after all, corporations don’t need parties. United Russia is approaching the role long played by the All-Russia People’s Front, the aborted party of power from the era of Vyacheslav Volodin.”
• “In turning its back on its party and transforming it into an ill-defined movement, the Kremlin is turning its back on politics itself. The place for a unified structure is occupied by a set of loyal deputies chosen on an ad hoc basis (as in Moscow) and deliberately apolitical governors.”

“Ten Years After Her Murder, We're Still Seeking Justice for Natalia Estemirova,” By 13 women journalists and human rights defenders, The Washington Post, 07.21.19: The authors of the letter write:

• “This week we observe the 10th anniversary of the murder of Chechen human rights activist and freelance journalist Natalia Estemirova, who worked in Chechnya for Memorial, Russia's most important human rights organization.”
• “She was a close friend and colleague of the slain Russian investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya, and was Politkovskaya's most frequent companion during travel and investigations in Chechnya. They uncovered a number of cases together, about which Politkovskaya wrote for ‘Novaya Gazeta’ and Estemirova wrote for Memorial's website and for local newspapers.”
• “On July 15, 2009, Estemirova was kidnapped in Grozny in front of her apartment block. Her body was found in neighboring Ingushetia a few hours later; she had been shot dead execution-style. The Chechen government faced huge criticism over its failure to properly investigate her death, and allegations of an official coverup … soon began to circulate.”
• “Ten years on, no adequate investigation … has taken place, nor has anyone been brought to justice for her murder. Today we repeat the call for the Russian government and the Chechen authorities to bring to justice those who murdered and those who ordered the murder of Natalia Estemirova.”
• “We call on the world's leaders to demand justice for her and to do everything in their power to protect journalists and human rights defenders. … We owe it to the memory of Estemirova and Politkovskaya to protect the very few who still speak out on behalf of those to whom nobody wants to listen.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.