This Week’s Highlights:

• Global developments over the next thirty years could erode the historical foundations of the competitive U.S.-Russian relationship, creating opportunities for strategic cooperation, writes Thomas Graham, managing director at Kissinger Associates.
• Even if it does not lead to catastrophic war like in 1914, diverting domestic discontent into external hostility toward Russia, as some of the Western nations are doing, very rarely works because the factors that created the discontent remain unchanged, Professor Anatol Lieven argues,
• Dmitry Gorgenburg, a senior research scientist at CNA Corporation, argues that Russia’s foreign policy goals have remained the same since the early 1990s, focusing on the restoration of Russia’s great power status and maintaining influence in states around its borders to guard against potential security threats.
• As U.S. troops leave Syria, Russia and Iran aren’t left with a win, write Richard Sokolsky and Aaron David Miller, a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program and a vice-president at the Woodrow Wilson Center. Both countries have a greater strategic stake in Syria than the U.S. has and will now struggle with the difficulties of pacifying and reconstructing the war-torn state.
• Sanctions are increasingly shifting the Russian government’s economic path toward revenue-leasing capitalism, writes journalist Alexandra Prokopenko, with Putin’s friends now gaining control over entire industries.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:

“US-Russian Relations in a New Era. Washington and Moscow are on the verge of a confrontation that has not been seen since the early 1980s,” Thomas Graham Jr., The National Interest, 01.06.19: The author, managing director at Kissinger Associates, writes:

• “The post–Cold War period in U.S.-Russian relations ended abruptly in March 2014 with the eruption of the Ukraine crisis. This does not mean … that a new cold war has broken out.”
• “The distribution of power in the world is no longer bipolar as it was during the Cold War. Rather, the contours of an inchoate multipolar system are emerging. … As in the Cold War, however, relations will remain troubled for a considerable period … That has been their prevailing character since the United States emerged as a global power at the end of the nineteenth century. … The reasons for this troubled history are many.”
• “For the near term … U.S.-Russian relations will remain troubled, and they will matter. … This troubled relationship will continue to matter for obvious reasons. … Russia and the United States control some 90 percent of all nuclear weapons in the world. … They each have vast natural resources … and a proven talent for developing the military applications of advanced technologies. … They each wield vetos on the U.N. Security Council. … The United States has acknowledged global reach, while Russia has demonstrated capability to project power along its entire periphery.”
• “Whether the United States remains at the top of the global hierarchy and Russia a key player—and by extension whether U.S.-Russian relations will matter in the global context—will be determined in large part by the relative power potential and political will of both countries.”
• “Global developments during the next three decades could slowly erode the historical foundations of the competitive relationship and create opportunities for strategic cooperation. … Indeed, some U.S.-Russian geopolitical cooperation would be needed to maintain a balance of power, the prerequisite for order and stability in a multipolar world.”

“Western Nations Are Repeating the Mistakes of 1914,” Anatol Lieven, The National Interest, 12.22.18: The author, a professor at Georgetown University in Qatar, writes:

• “I fear that in their enthusiasm for a new cold war against China and Russia, the Western establishments of today are making a mistake comparable to that of their forebears of 1914. … [T]his new cold war is serving … as a distraction from vastly graver threats … Existing Western political elites … are desperately unwilling to address these threats because that would require radical changes to their existing ideological positions.”
• “The historians of the future may also note the multiple ironies involved in … the United States leading a new ‘league of democracies’ against an ‘authoritarian alliance.’”
• “Even if they do not lead to catastrophic war, diverting domestic discontent into external hostility very rarely works because the factors that created the discontent remain unchanged. … [There is an] important link between developments in Russia and the United States, and a far more important contribution to the rise of Putin and Trump: the rising death rate among working class males in Russia in the 1990s and the United States in recent years. This death rate has increased for the same reasons: diseases and addictions fueled by economic, social and cultural insecurity and despair.”
• “This is not to say that there are not real threats from Russia and China … None of them justifies trying once again to restructure the national strategies and institutions of the United States and Europe around the principle of a cold war.”
• “The one [factor] that actually led to war [in 1914], however, was Serbian nationalist claims to Austrian-ruled Bosnia, leading to the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo. It seems highly probable that not one in a hundred of the British soldiers who died in World War I had previously ever heard of Serbia’s claims, or of Sarajevo. In the name of God, let us not make this mistake again.”

“The Eroding Balance of Terror. The Decline of Deterrence,” Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., Foreign Affairs, January/February 2019 issue. 

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant commentary.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

“Is There a Glimmer of Hope for the INF Treaty?” Steven Pifer, Brookings Institution, 12.27.18: The author, a nonresident senior fellow at Brookings, writes:

• “On Dec. 14, Reuters reported that a Russian foreign ministry official had said Moscow envisaged the possibility of mutual inspections to resolve the sides’ compliance concerns. The next day, the Associated Press and TASS said Defense Minister Shoygu had sent Secretary of Defense Mattis a message proposing ‘open and specific’ talks on compliance issues.”
• “There is a small chance that the Russians seek a settlement. U.S. officials should explore this … a failure to do so would increase the prospects that Washington bears the responsibility for the agreement’s collapse in the eyes of publics and allies.”

“The Fourth Wave,” Michael Krepon, Arms Control Wonk, 01.07.18: The author, co-founder of the Stimson Center, writes:

• “We are now being carried forward and lending propulsion to a fourth wave of popular and expert opposition to rising nuclear dangers. This wave has gained strength from the Trump administration’s announcement of its intent to withdraw from a treaty banning intermediate-range missiles.”
• “The Fourth Wave is different in other important respects. Eminent persons from … [previous] administrations who were instrumental in validating previous waves are now mostly gone now. The shoes of outsized figures on Capitol Hill that helped greatly to realize previous achievements will be hard to fill, but incoming House Armed Services Chairman Adam Smith and others will do their level best.”
• “This wave unlike previous ones, is focused on opposition without the likelihood of meaningful gains. … No matter: It’s time to man and woman up. Even small victories can still be important if they prolong existing constraints and cooperative verification measures while a new strategy and better outcomes can be achieved. Two big questions remain unanswered: What are we for? And what do we call it? The strength of the fourth wave depends, in part, on finding persuasive answers to these questions.”

“Arms Control and the Aging Process,” Michael Krepon Arms Control Wonk, 12.24.18: The author, co-founder of the Stimson Center, writes:

• “Nuclear arms control hasn’t aged gracefully … and it will be up to younger hands to find prescriptions. … John Bolton enjoys meeting with Russian leaders to clarify presidential decisions to withdraw from arms control treaties. … [H]e relished being back in Moscow … to hammer nails in the coffin of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Next up on the chopping block is the 2010 “New” Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.”
• “The odds of injuring ourselves badly in the fall grow with every treaty that is trashed by Moscow and Washington. These treaties are the strongest strands of the nuclear safety net; cutting one weakens others.”
• “Bolton has one thing right: ‘Arms control’ no longer fits the temper of the times. The organizing principles behind nuclear arms control in the early 1960s — rough equality and national vulnerability — no longer resonate. … A new central organizing principle to replace “arms control” hasn’t been developed, let alone agreed upon. There isn’t much time to do so. The goal of ‘abolition’ doesn’t work as a substitute for ‘arms control.’ Yes, it’s the right idealistic goal, but the current state of major power relations stands in the way.”

Counter-terrorism:

“The New Face of Terrorism in 2019. Forget the Middle East—it’s time to prepare for attacks from the former Soviet Union,” Vera Mironova, Foreign Policy, 01.01.19: The author, a visiting scholar at Harvard University’s economics department, writes:

• “The way Westerners think about Islamist terrorism has grown dangerously outdated. … Today … the real threat increasingly comes from further east. In the former Soviet states and beyond, militants … are turning their attention to the West.”
• “In the coming years, the terrorist threat from Russia and beyond will only increase. With the fall of the Islamic State, Russian-speaking terrorists were mostly able to flee Iraq and Syria with more ease than Middle Eastern foreign fighters and are now back in hiding in the former Soviet sphere or in Europe.”
• “Government neglect and outright repression have made religious Muslims in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan attractive targets for radicals looking for new recruits. … The United States and its allies need to recognize that future attacks are more likely to come from the East than the Middle East and that there is no other option than to cooperate with Russia and its neighbors to stop them. If the United States fails to do so, it could soon see the effects in either a surge of attacks on the United States or the rise of a new post-Soviet-dominated terrorist group in one of the world’s many war zones.”

Conflict in Syria:

“5 Reasons Why Trump is Right About Getting America Out of Syria,” Richard Sokolsky,  Aaron David Miller, Los Angeles Times/Carnegie Endowment, 01.03.18: The authors, a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program and a vice-president at the Woodrow Wilson Center, write:

• “1. The Islamic State ‘caliphate’ isn’t going to return. … 2. Israel and the Kurds can survive without U.S. troops in Syria. … 3. Vital U.S. interests won’t be sacrificed when the troops are withdrawn. The United States doesn’t have vital interests in Syria.
• “4. As U.S. troops depart, Russia and Iran aren’t left with a win. Iran and Russia will dominate Syria as they have done for years. Both countries have always had a greater strategic stake in Syria than the U.S. and thus were more willing to accept a high price to protect their interests there. Now both will struggle with the difficulties of pacifying and reconstructing a war-torn state.”
• “5. American credibility hasn’t been destroyed. Any damage to the U.S. stems from our own reckless rhetoric and confused policy in Syria.”
• “Keeping U.S. military forces in place with no serious, long-term strategy or attainable objectives to guide them would not make the situation significantly better. Syria was never America’s to win or lose, and getting out now is not a catastrophe.”

“Trump abandons a mission that was working,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 12.19.18: The author writes: “President Trump’s abrupt decision to pull American troops from Syria is riskier than it looks. It ends a low-cost, high-impact mission and creates a vacuum that will be filled by one of a series of bad actors — Iran, Russia, Turkey, Islamic extremists, the Syrian regime.” The campaign, “a small-footprint, low-visibility war carried out by U.S. Special Operations forces, in partnership with a Kurdish-led militia,” had “destroyed the Islamic State; it stabilized northeast Syria; it blocked Iranian expansion; it checked Russian hegemony.” “None of that evidently mattered in the end to Trump.” The decision, “opposed, near as I can tell, by the Pentagon, the State Department and key regional allies,” was made because “he was determined to fulfill his campaign promises, consequences be damned.” “Every war must end,” and “now it’s time for a rebalancing.” But the author warns, “not now, not when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was threatening an invasion.” The move, he writes, “ceded power in northern Syria to Turkey and its proxies, which have made a ruinous mess everywhere in Syria they’ve tried to control.” “This kind of bullying shouldn’t work against a superpower. But sadly, it just did.” Officials claimed, “this will be a measured, step-by-step withdrawal,” but “I doubt it will convince many people in Tehran, Moscow or Ankara.” 

“What Trump's Syria decision means on the front lines,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 12.23.18: The author writes: “This was something we never expected,” said Gen. Mazloum Abdi, the U.S.-backed Kurdish commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces. “We were surprised and confused. We were not ready for a decision like this.” Trump’s withdrawal “created a high level of morale,” but “after a short period, the opposite happened.” Abdi warned that “Islamic State communications last week showed new hope they can restore their caliphate,” and that without coalition support, “those deadly fighters may eventually escape.” “What are people going to say about America? All the credibility and trust that was built, we have lost.” In response, Abdi is now “scrambling to open channels with Russia and the Syrian regime, to fill this vacuum left by America.” 

Cyber security:

• No significant commentary.

Elections interference:

“Mueller's Report Will Be a Bore,” Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Wall Street Journal, 01.01.19: The author, a member of the media outlet’s editorial board, writes:

The author writes: “The thread that runs through the matters Robert Mueller is examining is the band of reprobates and marginal characters who gathered around the chief reprobate, Donald Trump.” But “the thread that runs through the matters Mr. Mueller is ignoring concerns the actions of official agencies, the FBI and CIA.” He argues: “We now know the multiple intercessions of FBI Director James Comey were set in motion by captured Russian intelligence.” Comey insisted the information was “false” and “legitimate.” But, the author contends, “a handful of U.S. intelligence officials, with Mr. Comey out front, meddled in the presidential race, potentially altering its outcome.” Rep. Adam Schiff acknowledged that “if Mr. Comey’s latest account of his actions is true, it represents the most ‘measurable’ and ‘significant’ Russian influence on the race.” Ultimately, the author concludes: “Before there was the Steele dossier or the warrant to eavesdrop on Carter Page, there was the Hillary email investigation … entwined with anti-Trump motives.” And “in the still-classified appendix … are the beginnings of an untold and important story: how U.S. intelligence agencies, using Russia as an excuse, fiddled ineptly and improperly in our election.”

“Russia's Information Warfare,” Renee DiResta, New York Times, 12.17.18: The author, director of research at a cybersecurity company that monitors disinformation, writes: “Russian interference through social media … is a chronic, widespread and identifiable condition that we must now aggressively manage.” The Internet Research Agency “was able to masquerade successfully as a collection of American media entities … building influence over a period of years and using it to manipulate and exploit existing political and societal divisions.” “This was not a small-scale problem fixable by tweaking a platform’s advertising purchase policy.” For targeted groups like African Americans, “the messaging was perhaps ubiquitous.” Disinformation, the author notes, “spreads exponentially through the broader population, ultimately enabling the infection to ‘jump’ into entirely different populations.” “Russia did create such content.” It “propagated lies about voting rules and processes, attempted to steer voters toward third-party candidates and created stories that advocated not voting.” The operation’s success reflects “the troubling absence of adequate structures for collaboration among multiple stakeholders.” Still, “there is some cause for hope.” With new data, “we now have a far more complete picture of what happened with Russian disinformation efforts from 2014 to 2017.”

“Why Russia sees the NRA as key to manipulating American politics,” Laura Ellyn Smith, The Washington Post, 12.18.18: The author, a graduate instructor at the University of Mississippi, writes: "Russian national Maria Butina recently pleaded guilty to acting as an unregistered agent for her government … revealing how well Russia knows the fault lines of U.S. politics and culture.” The NRA, the author notes, “represents the zenith of discord and dysfunction in U.S. politics.” Russia targeted the organization because “it is ripe for misinformation that can further polarize Americans, even when Americans agree more than they disagree.” “Russia’s infiltration of the NRA represents an ingenious maneuver to sow greater disunity among U.S. voters.” It exploited “a special interest that contorts democracy, making it the perfect tool for Russia.” The author concludes: “Russia understands that the NRA’s ability to polarize Americans are part of a self-destructive tendency … It’s past time Americans understand it, as well.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“A better approach to 'America First',” Antony J. Blinken and Robert Kagan, The Washington Post, 01.01.19: The authors, a former U.S. deputy secretary of state and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, write: “Trump's recent decision to withdraw all troops from Syria and 7,000 from Afghanistan has been condemned by Democrats and Republicans alike in Washington. But it is not at all clear that Americans beyond the Beltway are equally outraged.” Still, “whatever tolerance most Americans had for the global role the United States embraced after World War II began to fade with the collapse of the Soviet Union and was shattered by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the 2008 financial crisis.” They ask: “Can we find a foreign policy of responsible global engagement that most Americans support, that draws the right lessons from our past mistakes, that steers between the equally dangerous shoals of confrontation and abdication, and that understands the difference between self-interest and selfishness?” “Such a policy would rest on four pillars: Preventive diplomacy and deterrence: As geopolitical competition intensifies, we must supplement diplomacy with deterrence. Words alone will not dissuade the Vladimir Putins and Xi Jinpings of this world. … Trade and technology … Allies and institutions … Immigration and refugees.” Otherwise, “if the United States abdicates its leading role in shaping international rules and institutions … the world will descend into chaos and conflict, and the jungle will overtake us, as it did in the 1930s.”

“Time to Get Out of Afghanistan,” Robert Kaplan, New York Times, 01.01.19: The author, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a senior adviser at Eurasia Group, writes: “The decision by President Trump to withdraw 7,000 of the roughly 14,000 American troops left in Afghanistan … has raised new concerns about his impulsive behavior.” But, he notes, “the downsizing of the Afghan mission was probably inevitable.” Afghanistan now “symbolizes the decline of the American empire.” “There is virtually no possibility of a military victory over the Taliban and little chance of leaving behind a self-sustaining democracy.” The U.S. remains “out of fear of even worse outcomes, rather than in the expectation of better ones.” Meanwhile, “the Chinese, Pakistanis, Russians, Indians and Iranians may all be benefiting more from America’s military operations in Afghanistan than the United States is.” The U.S. presence “may provide just enough security to allow their energy and transport corridors to take shape, while also helping the Russians guard against Islamic terrorism on their southern border.”

“Afghanistan is like the huge and hugely expensive aircraft carriers we continue to build, increasingly obsolete … It is a vestigial limb of empire, and it is time to let it go.”

“A look into the crystal ball for Jan. 1, 2020,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 01.01.19: The author, a veteran foreign correspondent-turned-columnist, writes: “[P]erhaps readers will enjoy speculating about what might animate the President’s Daily Brief a year hence, on Jan. 1, 2020. Remember, your guesses [on this quiz] are as good as mine (and those of any sources who may have wandered my way).” On Saudi Arabia: “2. By the end of 2019, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman will: … (d) hold a secret meeting with Iranian leaders in Oman — with Russian sponsorship — to discuss terms for regional stability.” On military competition: “5. By 2020, the United States will be locked in a global arms race featuring: … (e) all of the above.” And as Brexit unfolds: “6. As a result of the continuing Brexit mess, in 2019: … (c) Russia exploits European chaos by attacking Ukraine and creating a breakaway ministate in the east.” The author’s final picks? “My answers: … (2) d; … (5) e; (6) b and d.”

“How Russian Money Helped Save Trump’s Business. After his financial disasters two decades ago, no U.S. bank would touch him. Then foreign money began flowing in,” Michael Hirsh, Foreign Policy, 12.21.18: The author, a senior correspondent at Foreign Policy, writes:

The author writes: “Trump was on the Titanic heading down. Everyone’s drowning around him. … Suddenly he gets saved. It’s almost like a spaceship landed right next to where he was in the water,” said biographer Gwenda Blair. According to Alan Lapidus, Trump’s former architect: “It was all coming out of Russia. His involvement with Russia was deeper than he’s acknowledged.” Donald Trump Jr. said in 2008: “Russians make up a pretty disproportionate cross-section of a lot of our assets.” And Eric Trump, in 2014 (per sportswriter James Dodson): “We have all the funding we need out of Russia.” A former Trump real-estate partner recalled: “The only people who were willing to buy it were tasteless Russians … You’re not going to sell that brand to blue bloods in Greenwich, Connecticut.” A former Bayrock official said the firm was “the loyal soldier bringing him deals.” Another Bayrock executive reportedly insisted they had to accept FL Group’s money because it was “closer to Putin.” And Felix Sater, Bayrock executive and Trump associate, wrote: “Our boy can become president of the USA and we can engineer it. I will get Putin on this program and we will get Donald elected.”

“How to Hit Russia Where It Hurts. A Long-Term Strategy to Ramp Up Economic Pressure,” Peter Harrell, Foreign Affairs, 01.03.19. 

“Trump's Cracked Afghan History; His falsehoods about allies and the Soviets reach a new low,” Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal, 01.03.19: The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

The article quotes President Trump as saying: “They tell me a hundred times, ‘Oh, we sent you soldiers. We sent you soldiers.’” The board responds: “This mockery is a slander against every ally that has supported the U.S. effort in Afghanistan.” The UK alone, they note, “has had more than 450 killed fighting in Afghanistan.” More sharply, Trump said: “The reason Russia was in Afghanistan was because terrorists were going into Russia. They were right to be there.” The board writes: “Right to be there? We cannot recall a more absurd misstatement of history by an American President.” “The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan … to prop up a fellow communist government.” The invasion, they note, “was condemned throughout the non-communist world” and “was a defining event in the Cold War.” Trump’s version, they conclude, “can’t alter that reality.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Circumstances Have Changed Since 1991, but Russia’s Core Foreign Policy Goals Have Not,” Dmitry Gorenburg, PONARS Eurasia, January 2019: The author, a senior research scientist at CNA Corporation, writes:

• “Since the Ukraine crisis, the dominant Western perspective on Russian foreign policy has come to emphasize its increasingly confrontational, even revanchist, nature. Experts have focused on discontinuities in Russian foreign policy either between the ostensibly more pro-Western Yeltsin presidency and the anti-Western Putin presidency or between the more cooperatively inclined early Putin period (2000-2008) and the more confrontational late Putin period (2012-present).”
• “I argue that Russian foreign policy preferences and activities have been largely continuous since the early 1990s. These preferences have focused on the quest to restore Russia’s great power status and maintain a zone of influence in states around its borders as a buffer against potential security threats.”
• “Russian foreign policy has been neither revanchist nor expansionist in nature. Instead, it has been focused on first stopping and then reversing the decline of Russian power in the late 1980s and the 1990s and on ensuring that Russia was protected against encroachment by the Western alliance … However, perceptions of Russian foreign policy during the post-Soviet period among other powers and outside observers have changed markedly as a consequence of a gradual increase in the extent of Russian relative power vis-à-vis its neighbors and especially vis-à-vis Western powers.”

“Europe Should Woo Russia When Putin's Gone,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 12.28.18: The author, a columnist and veteran Russia watcher, writes:

• “The question to ask as a bad political year ends for Putin is to what degree his militaristic worldview should survive his leadership. That doesn’t only depend on Russians; once Putin is gone, the West—but largely Europe—will have another chance to tempt Russia with different prospects. … Whenever and however Putin may leave, any successor will need to revise Russia’s geopolitical choice.”
• “Drawing Russia in could solve some of the European Union’s fundamental problems. With its massive natural-gas reserves, Russia could propel Europe faster toward hard-to-reach environmental goals. With its untapped economic potential and need for immigrants to develop its vast territory, it could be a big help in resolving migration issues. With its recent investment in agile, modern military power … it could provide a backbone for a joint European military. Establishing a vast European common market including Russia wouldn’t be impossible.”
• “In the absence of such interest from Europe, any Putin successor will be tempted to continue the superpower game to the bitter economic end, with China waiting to get access to Russia’s natural resources on the most favorable terms it can get. The option of continuing as China’s junior partner, the least preferable for Russia, could end up choosing itself.”

“Russia sees opportunity in ailing Venezuela.” Anthony Faiola and Karen DeYoung, The Washington Post, 12.25.18: The authors, correspondents for the news outlet, write:

The authors write: “In exchange for modest loans and bailouts … Russia now owns significant parts of at least five oil fields in Venezuela,” and “49.9 percent of Citgo … as collateral to Russia’s state-owned Rosneft.” Eric Farnsworth, vice president of the Council of the Americas, called this “a strategic win.” He added: “The end is to project power, bust out of sanctions the West has imposed and cause difficulties for the United States.” In December, “two nuclear-capable, long-range Russian Tu-160 bombers arrived” in Venezuela and participated in joint exercises. Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino said: “This we are going to do with our friends.” President Vladimir Putin warned: “We condemn any actions that are clearly terrorist in nature, any attempts to change the situation by force.” His adviser Igor Sechin declared: “We will never leave, and no one will be able to kick us out.” Moisés Naím, a former Venezuelan trade minister, explained: “It was no longer the Russian arms salesmen and warlords but the financiers.” And Russ Dallen, managing partner at Caracas Capital Markets, noted: “The Russians had managed to lay claim to almost half of a major U.S. oil giant.”

China:

“US-China-Russia ties will shape the future,” Hu Yumin, The Straits Times 01.04.19: The author, vice-secretary general and a senior research fellow at the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, writes:

• “The U.S.' national strategic objective is to prevent any country or group of countries across Eurasia to challenge its supremacy. The U.S. target now seems to be China, although Russia remains very much on its radar. And the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy is still the promotion of collective defense and regional security through cooperation with its allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific.”
• “China … is entering a period of adjustments, not economic recession or geopolitical concessions … China has made it clear time and again that it is not a major threat to the U.S. Instead, as a beneficiary of the existing world order, China prefers to be a cooperative partner or stakeholder in regional and international affairs.”
• “There should be no doubt that Russia remains a big global power because of its unique strategic and military capability. But despite that, Russia doesn't believe in a confrontation with the West, because its fundamental national objective in the foreseeable future is to remain a respected power in Europe and beyond.”
• “The possibility of a ‘new Cold War’ seems remote. It is more likely that the new period will be one ‘Cold Peace’ between the U.S. and Russia, and between the U.S. and China … The spectrum of cooperation between or among the U.S., Russia and China will be driven by their common interests as well as parallel interests … Therefore, protecting the nonproliferation regime, fighting terrorism and combating drugs and arms trafficking will remain significant parts of bilateral and multilateral cooperation, as global and regional governance seem to worsen.”

Ukraine:

“Is a Russian military operation against Ukraine likely in the near future?” Michael Kofman, Russia Military Analysis blog, 12.26.18: The author, a Senior Research Scientist at CNA Corporation, writes:

• “Following the Nov. 25 Kerch Strait naval skirmish … Ukrainian leadership has issued warnings of a Russian buildup near Ukraine’s borders. … The more problematic element in all of this has been senior official Russian statements, which suggest a change in Moscow’s stance on dealing with Ukraine is afoot. Sergey Lavrov, Maria Zakharova, and Sergey Naryshkin, have issued statements expecting a possible Ukrainian ‘provocation’ and or ‘attack’ which could be interpreted as indications and warnings of Moscow … setting expectations of renewed violence in the coming weeks. … The Russian narrative offers cause for concern, because it is a form of signaling not dissimilar from official statements in the run up to the Russian conflict with Georgia in 2008.”
• “Almost every year there is a sizable artillery duel that takes place after the holiday truce … and so a notable escalation in violence is likely in January, but there is no evidence of Russian preparations for a major assault in Ukraine, certainly not in Crimea. It is possible, but highly improbable.”
• “Most of the information available reflects planned modernization, expected force structure changes and troop movements on the Russian side not indicative of unusual activity or preparations for an assault.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“‘Old Armenia’ Meets the ‘Armenia of the Future’: The Old Ruling Elite Under Pashinyan,” Hayk Khalatyan and Kirill Krivosheev, Carnegie Moscow Center, 12.20.18: The authors, a political analyst based in Yerevan and a journalist with Kommersant, write:

• “In post-revolutionary Armenia, the old ruling elite has had to come to terms with new realities. Chief among these is the power of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, whose electoral bloc and allies now control parliament. Those who deny or challenge Pashinyan’s dominance risk having their companies audited and their homes searched, and even being arrested … Hence the decision of many Republican Party figures to acquiesce to or join Pashinyan.”
• “Pashinyan is a hostage of his extreme popularity and the public’s inflated expectations. For now, the crowd that worships him protects him from the vestiges of what he calls ‘old Armenia.’ However, if Pashinyan fails to realize his vision of the ‘Armenia of the future’—one with no corruption, a thriving middle class and good relations with both Russia and the West—he risks being left at the mercy of none other than the old ruling elite.”

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Putin’s Courtiers: How Sanctions Have Changed Russia’s Economic Policy,” Alexandra Prokopenko, Carnegie Moscow Center, 12.20.18: The author, an independent journalist, writes:

• “At an official level, Russia denies that sanctions are impacting its domestic economic policy in any way. But in reality, the external restrictions are increasingly shifting the government’s economic path toward revenue-leasing capitalism: … the president’s cronies … are now gaining control over entire industries.”
• “The move to consolidate state spending announced in 2016 is now yielding results, and the treasury is bursting at the seams. The first budget surplus since 2011 was 4.4 times higher than the projected amount … Inflation and unemployment are at historic lows, as is the national debt … The government has announced ambitious plans to develop social and digital infrastructure.”
• “[A]ll the necessary conditions are in place for an investment boom of the capital that is supposedly returning to Russia. But that boom isn’t happening. Foreign investors fear follow-up sanctions, and Russian companies … are not rushing to invest.”
• “[O]ther factors that encourage loyalty and affect group cohesion … are financial resources handed out by the government, or the president’s attention. The economic crisis and sanctions have significantly reduced the former, while Putin’s focus on geopolitical issues has curtailed the latter. As a result, Putin’s courtiers have been forced to carve out institutional status for themselves … This allows them to gain control over the resource distribution process.”
• “Perhaps the reluctance of investors to spend surplus revenues inside the country comes … from the fear … that their money will ultimately end up in the pockets of state capitalists.”

“Putin’s Public Enemy. The Kremlin is going after Russian rappers, but the government can't control a culture it doesn't understand,” Georgy Birger, Foreign Policy, 01.03.19: The author, digital director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

“If [rap music] is impossible to stop, then we need to lead and direct it,” said President Vladimir Putin on Dec. 15. But “his unfortunate choice of words backfired, underlining the great gulf between Russia’s rulers and a younger generation raised on mobile phones and YouTube videos.” As rap grew into a dominant internet-driven subculture, “the authorities have completely ignored it.” But by 2019, “Russia finds itself home to a healthy independent music scene.” When the rapper Husky was arrested and concerts blocked, “the rap community reacted decisively, organizing a protest concert called ‘I Will Perform My Music.’” Roma Jigan, speaking at a bizarre parliament roundtable, said: “This talk leads nowhere, bro.” The crackdown was partly linked to “the tragedy in the Crimean city of Kerch,” when violent attackers had “listed the same musicians among their interests.” Yet, Gleb Lisichkin, an indie manager, noted: “It almost looks like some big police guy checked out his daughter’s social media page … and immediately decided to ban everything.” Despite some artists’ pro-Kremlin leanings, like Husky co-writing a song with Zakhar Prilepin in 2014, many were still censored. Meanwhile, Putin warned: “Rap and other modern [culture] rests on three pillars: sex, drugs, and protest. I am most worried about drugs, of course.”Birger concludes: “The Kremlin has nothing to offer to new celebrities.” And “they can’t, as Putin has said, direct it and make the youth behave the way they want them to.” The result: “Their culture will merely outlive the president and all of the official culture promoted during his reign.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, intelligence, law-enforcement and justice:

“3 big questions about the curious Paul Whelan ‘spy’ case,” Samuel Greene, The Washington Post, 01.06.18: The author, director of the Russia Institute at King’s College London, writes: Greene writes: “Just days into the new year, foreign policy analysts are already rerunning a decades-old show: ‘What’s Russia thinking?’” The arrest of Paul Whelan, “an ex-Marine with four passports and a professed love for Russia,” has sparked theories of a retaliatory swap for Maria Butina — but “the evidence behind this theory is thin.” He notes: “The most glaring fact about the Whelan case is how little noise it is making in Russia.” Unlike past spy scandals, “Whelan hardly made the television news in Russia … None of this suggests a well-prepared operation.” Greene questions the spy swap narrative: “A Whelan-for-Butina swap … would be heavily out of whack, and thus out of keeping with Russian diplomatic practice.” Instead, he suggests: “Russia’s security agencies and even ambitious individual officers have evidently climbed over one another to prove their value.” But ultimately, “All of this is speculation. Spy stories always are.”

“Putin’s Keystone Spies,” Yulia Latynina , New York Times, 12.17.18: The author, a Russian journalist, writes: Latynina writes: “In Vladimir Putin’s Russia, this grandiose image of the Great Evil was forever destroyed in a Chernobyl-scale meltdown” after the failed Skripal poisoning exposed the G.R.U. as “murderous, for sure. But clowns nevertheless.” She recalls: “Rather than carefully disposing of a bottle of Novichok … they threw the evidence into a charity collection bin.” And the trend is long-running: “Some 305 supersecret James Bond wannabes were outed … They all registered their vehicles to the address of their supersecret operating base.” So why tolerate the incompetence? “An efficient military could stage a coup against him. So inefficiency is a price Mr. Putin will pay.” Latynina traces the pattern back to 2004: “The timing hints at the motivation … the Yushchenko poisoning occurred on Sept. 5, 2004. The attacks on Georgia started a week later.” She argues: “We need to understand that in the Kremlin’s warped worldview, the Yushchenko poisoning or the Georgian explosions were not attacks, but payback.” And finally: “He thinks he has no other choice — that Americans, not Russians, are the aggressors, and he’s just striking back.”

“How Russia’s military intelligence agency became the covert muscle in Putin’s duels with the West,” Anton Troianovski and Ellen Nakashima, The Washington Post, 12.28.18: The authors, the news outlet’s Moscow bureau chief and national security reporter, write:

The authors write: “The country’s military intelligence agency … is emerging as one of [Putin’s] most powerful tools.” Historian Nikita Petrov explained: “A military intelligence agency that used to be strictly military has now become, if you will, universal.” In schools, “the GRU itself … is now involved in promoting the intelligence services in public schools.” At Moscow School 1101, Nina Loguntsova, a cadet student, said: “Russia is our motherland. We will defend it.” Her mother added: “We can’t love our motherland and not respect these same organizations.” Documents show that “Unit 26165 has helped design the curriculum” at multiple Moscow schools. The unit’s commander, Viktor Netyksho, signed a cooperation agreement; he was later “accused of leading the GRU’s effort to hack the email accounts of Democratic and Clinton campaign officials.” The GRU’s psychological warfare unit, “Unit 54777 … is the center of the Russian military’s psychological-warfare capability,” said a Western intelligence officer. The unit targeted U.S. senators with a 2015 fake email campaign and “sought to stoke divisions” in Ukraine through fabricated online personas. Daniel Fried, former senior U.S. diplomat, commented: “Ukraine is to 21st-century hybrid warfare what Spain was in the 1930s for battlefield blitzkrieg techniques.”Despite exposure and Western indictments, “Putin arrived at its headquarters for the [GRU's] 100th anniversary celebration and offered only praise.”