Find past issues in the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card archive. 

March 18 update: Although Russian gains again slowed—to 92 square miles of Ukraine’s territory (about 1 Martha’s Vineyard island)—in the past month, in Russia’s Kursk Oblast, Ukraine lost 48 square miles in the past week: it’s down to controlling just 31 square miles, or 4%, of the 470 square miles it controlled in early autumn 2024. We assess that Ukraine’s forces are no longer contesting the Kursk region, but are instead focused on withdrawing from this western Russian province in good order. On March 18, Putin refused to back a proposed full 30-day ceasefire with Ukraine, but agreed to a mutual halt to attacks on energy infrastructure in a phone call with Trump, of which the Kremlin and White House offered competing accounts. Trump then held a phone call with Zelenskyy the following day “to align both Russia and Ukraine in terms of their requests and needs.”

Who’s Gaining and Who’s Losing What?

Territorial Control (figures as of March 18, 2025)

For a higher-resolution image, click here (full screen button in top right).

Report Card*

Change in Russia’s control of Ukrainian territory. 

(Based on data from the Institute for the Study of War.)

• Since Feb. 24, 2022:
  • Russia: +27,181 square miles. 12% of Ukraine. (Area roughly equivalent to half the size of New York state).¹
• Total area of all Ukrainian territory Russia presently controls, including Crimea and parts of Donbas Russia had seized prior to the full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022:
  • Russia: +43,806 square miles. 19% of Ukraine. (Area roughly equivalent to the U.S. state of Ohio.)
• In past month (Feb. 18–March 18, 2025): Russia gained 92 square miles. Area roughly equivalent to about 1 Martha’s Vineyard island.²
• In past week: Russia gained 21 square miles, the equivalent of slightly less than 1 Manhattan island. 
  • Ukraine lost 48 square miles of the 79 square miles it had controlled last week in Russia’s Kursk Oblast; that’s a nearly 50% loss for the second week in a row.

Russian net territorial control in Ukraine by month: February 2022–February 2025.(Also based on data from the Institute for the Study of War.) 

Military casualties  

• Russia: More than 700,000 killed or injured, according to a January 2025 estimate.³ 48,000 missing.
• Ukraine: 400,000 killed or injured, according to a January 2025 estimate.⁴ 35,000 missing.

Civilian fatalities

• Russia: 387 killed.⁵ 
• Ukraine:  12,654 killed.

Military vehicles and equipment⁶

• Russia: 20,577 lost.⁷
  • Tanks and armored vehicles: 11,951.⁸
  • Aircraft: 305.⁹
  • Naval vessels: 22.¹⁰
• Ukraine: 7,965 lost.¹¹ 
  • Tanks and armored vehicles: 4,003.¹²
  • Aircraft: 183.
  • Naval vessels: 35.¹³

Citizens displaced

• Russia:
  • 800,000 left Russia for economic or political reasons, 0.6% of Russian population. 
  • 112,000 were displaced in Russia’s Kursk region during Ukraine’s incursion in 2024-2025.
• Ukraine: 10.2 million displaced Ukrainians, 23% of Ukrainian pre-invasion population of 44 million.
  • Internally displaced: 3.7 million.
  • International refugees: 6.5 million.

Economic impact¹⁴

• Russia’s economic growth: 5.6% GDP since 2022 (through 2024)
  • 1.6% GDP growth forecast for 2025.
  • Budget deficit in 2024: 1.7%   of GDP.
  • Russian ruble: 0.012223 U.S. dollars. +3% since invasion.
  • 3-year bond yield: 15.07%.
• Ukraine’s economic growth (negative): -22.6% GDP since 2022 (through 2024)
  • 2.5% GDP growth forecast for 2025.
  • Budget deficit in 2024: 20.4% of GDP, excluding grants.
  • Ukrainian hryvnia:  0.02405 U.S. dollars. -27% since invasion.
  • 3-year bond yield: 23.6%

Infrastructure

• Russia: A journalistic investigation estimated in March 2024 that Ukrainian strikes had rendered facilities which accounted for 1/6^th of the production of gasoline and diesel fuels in Russia non-operational.
• Ukraine: 64%, or 36 out of 56 GW electricity generating capacity destroyed or occupied, Ukraine relies for 2/3rds of its electricity generation on three functioning Soviet-era NPPs, which it still controls.

Popular support

• Russia: 59% support peace negotiations.
• Ukraine: 51% support peace negotiations.

Other criteria which may be even more important (about which we continue to search for reliable indicators):

• Ammunition supply
• Foreign military aid
• Force generation
• Military leadership
• Training
• Morale
• Control of strategic locations
• Information war: with U.S./Europe; with world.

Footnotes

1. According to Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group’s map, as of March 18, 2025, Russian forces occupied 112,408 square kilometers of Ukrainian land (43,400 square miles), which constituted 18.6% of Ukrainian territory, and which is roughly equivalent in area to the U.S. state of Virginia. 
2. In the past 30 days, Russian forces made a gain of 258 square kilometers (100 square miles) in Ukraine, according to a March 18, 2025 estimate by the Economist.
3. According to Donald Trump’s January 2025 estimate, 1 million Russian soldiers have been killed.
4. According to Trump’s January 2025 estimate, 700,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed.
5. These are estimates by independent observers cited in Western press. Russian authorities estimated in March 2025 the number of Russian civilians killed in the course of the war to total more than 650.
6. Oryx, “Attack On Europe: Documenting Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” Oryx (blog), https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html; “The Military Balance 2022,” IISS, https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2022; Oryx, “List Of Aircraft Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-aircraft-losses-during-2022.html; Oryx, “List Of Naval Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-naval-losses-during-2022.html. 
7. Not updated since at least March 5, 2025.
8. Not updated since at least March 5, 2025.
9. Not updated since at least March 5, 2025.
10. Not being updated as of 2025.
11. Not updated since at least March 5, 2025.
12. Not updated since at least March 5, 2025.
13. Not being updated as of 2025.
14. International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Russian estimates. “Russia and Ukraine 3-Year Bond Yield,” Investing.com, https://www.investing.com/rates-bonds/russia-3-year-bond-yield; World Bank Group, “Europe and Central Asia Economic Update,” https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/94bdc078-9c64-4833-992a-fda7b3d1a640/content; World Bank, “Russian Federation MPO,” https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/d5f32ef28464d01f195827b7e020a3e8-0500022021/related/mpo-rus.pdf; Trading Economics, “Russia 3-Year Bond Yield,”  https://tradingeconomics.com/ruge3y:gov ; World Bank, “The World Bank in Ukraine,” https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ukraine/overview#3; https://www.exchange-rates.org/exchange-rate-history/rub-usd-2024-11-01.

*This card is being produced by RM staff.