The Russia-Ukraine War Report Card, June 11, 2025
Find past issues in the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card archive.
June 10 update: In the past week, Russian forces gained 62 square miles of Ukrainian territory (about 3 Manhattan islands), an increase in pace over the previous week’s gain of 54 square miles. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s armed forces maintained a foothold of 6 square miles total across Russia’s Kursk and Belgorod regions as a record high share of Russians (64%) support peace negotiations.
Who’s Gaining and Who’s Losing What?
Territorial Control (figures as of June 10, 2025)

Report Card*
Change in Russia’s control of Ukrainian territory and changes in Ukraine’s control of Russian territory
(Based on data from the Institute for the Study of War.)
- Since Feb. 24, 2022:
- Russia: +27,666 square miles. 12% of Ukraine. (Area roughly equivalent to half the size of New York state).1
- Total area of all Ukrainian territory Russia presently controls, including Crimea and parts of Donbas Russia had seized prior to the full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022:
- Russia: +44,291 square miles. 19% of Ukraine. (Area roughly equivalent to the U.S. state of Ohio.)
- In past month (May 13–June 10, 2025): Russia gained 223 square miles. (Area about the equivalent of 2 Nantucket islands.)2
- In past week: Russia gained 62 square miles (about 3 Manhattan islands)—an increase in pace from the 54 square miles it gained the previous week. In Russia, Ukraine maintained a foothold of 6 square miles total across Russia’s Kursk and Belgorod regions.
Russian net territorial control in Ukraine by month: February 2022–May 2025. (Based on data from the Institute for the Study of War.)

Military casualties
- Russia: More than 790,000 killed or injured, according to an April 2025 estimate by Cavoli.3 48,000 missing.4
- Ukraine: 400,000 killed or injured, according to a January 2025 estimate by Zelenskyy.5 35,000 missing.
Civilian fatalities
Military vehicles and equipment7
Citizens displaced
- Russia:
- 800,000 left Russia for economic or political reasons, 0.6% of Russian population.
- 112,000 were displaced in Russia’s Kursk region during Ukraine’s incursion in August 2024–March 2025. Many of them reportedly remained unable to return to their homes as of June 2025.
- Ukraine: 10.7 million displaced Ukrainians as of February 2025, 24% of Ukraine’s pre-invasion population of 44 million.
Economic impact12
- Russia’s economic growth: 5.6% GDP since 2022 (through 2024)
- 1.5% GDP growth forecast for 2025.
- Budget deficit in 2024: 1.7% of GDP.
- Russian ruble: 0.01274 U.S. dollars. +7% since the invasion.
- 3-year bond yield: 15.6%.
- Ukraine’s economic growth (negative): -22.6% GDP since 2022 (through 2024)
- 2% GDP growth forecast for 2025.
- Budget deficit in 2024: 20.4% of GDP, excluding grants.
- Ukrainian hryvnia: 0.02409 U.S. dollars. -27% since the invasion.
- 3-year bond yield: 25.8%
Infrastructure
- Russia:
- A journalistic investigation estimated in March 2024 that Ukrainian strikes had rendered facilities which accounted for 1/6th of the production of gasoline and diesel fuels in Russia non-operational.
- A journalistic investigation estimated in March 2025 that Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s energy sector have caused at least 60 billion rubles ($714 million) in damage.
- Ukraine:
- Ukraine's extensive transmission infrastructure has suffered severe damage in the war, with capacity falling from 56 GW to an estimated 9 GW by the end of 2024.
- Some 64%, or 36 out of Ukraine’s 25 GW electricity generating capacity destroyed or occupied as of 2024.
- Ukraine had lost 80% of its thermal capacity due to Russian attacks as of September 2024.
- Ukraine relied for 2/3rds of its electricity generation on three functioning Soviet-era NPPs, which it still controls, as of 2024.
Popular support
- Russia: 64% support peace negotiations (record high-level in May 2025)
- Ukraine: 51% support peace negotiations (48% of Ukrainians would support de facto recognition of Russian control of the occupied territories without de jure recognition of that control.)
Other criteria which may be even more important (about which we continue to search for reliable indicators):
- Ammunition supply
- Foreign military aid
- Force generation
- Military leadership
- Training
- Morale
- Control of strategic locations
- Information war: with U.S./Europe; with world.

Footnotes
- According to Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group’s map, as of June 10, 2025, Russian forces occupied a total 113,326 square kilometers of Ukrainian land (43,755 square miles), which constituted 18.8% of Ukrainian territory.
- In the preceding 30 days, Russian forces made a gain of 590 square kilometers (228 square miles), according to a June 10, 2025, estimate by The Economist.
- Here are more estimates of Russian servicemen killed and wounded [in chronological order]:
- 600,000 killed or injured, according to Trump’s December 2024 estimate.
- 1,000,000 killed, according to Trump’s January 2025 estimate.
- More than 750,000 killed or injured, according to a March 2025 estimate by DNI/U.S. intelligence community.
- 900,000 killed or injured, according to the U.K. Defense Ministry’s March 2025 estimate.
- 950,000 killed or injured, according to CSIS’s June 2025 estimate, including 250,000 killed and 700,000 injured.
- Ukraine’s “Want to Find” project set to count number of Russian MIAs has 84,000 entries as of early 2025.
- Here are more estimates of Ukrainian servicemen killed and wounded [in chronological order]:
- 400,000 killed or injured, according to Trump’s December 2024 estimate.
- 43,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed and 370,000 wounded, according to Zelenskyy’s December 2024 estimate.
- 700,000 killed, according to Trump’s January 2025 estimate.
- More than 700,000, according to a May 2025 estimate by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency.
- 400,000 killed or injured, according to CSIS’s June 2025 estimate, including somewhere between 60,000 and 100,000 killed and 300,000-340,000 wounded.
- “Millions” killed in the war, according to Trump’s April 2025 estimate.
- This estimate was given by Russia’s Investigative Committee in March 2025. In May 2025, this committee put the number of civilians killed and injured on Russian territories by Ukrainian fire since the beginning of the war at 620 and 3,271, respectively.
- Oryx, “Attack On Europe: Documenting Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” Oryx (blog), https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html; “The Military Balance 2022,” IISS, https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2022; Oryx, “List Of Aircraft Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-aircraft-losses-during-2022.html; Oryx, “List Of Naval Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-naval-losses-during-2022.html. According to a June 2025 study by CSIS, Russia has lost roughly 1,149 armored fighting vehicles, 3,098 infantry fighting vehicles, 300 self-propelled artillery, and 1,865 tanks since January 2024.
- Oryx is not updating its estimates of aircraft losses as of 2025. In May 2025, Ukraine claimed to have shot down two Russian Su-30s by missiles launched from drone boats. On June 1 2025, Ukraine destroyed an estimated total of 11 to 12 Russian strategic bombers. On June 7 Ukraine said that its forces shot down a Russian Su-35 fighter jet over the Kursk region, according to MT.
- Oryx is not updating losses of warships as of 2025. According to a May 2025 estimate by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, since the war’s start, Russia has lost at least 10,000 ground combat vehicles, including more than 3,000 tanks, as well as nearly 250 aircraft and helicopters and more than 10 naval vessels.
- Oryx is not updating its estimates of aircraft losses as of 2025. Ukraine was reported to have lost 3 F-16s as of May 2025.
- Oryx is not updating losses of warships as of 2025.
- International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Russian estimates. “Russia and Ukraine 3-Year Bond Yield,” Investing.com, https://www.investing.com/rates-bonds/russia-3-year-bond-yield; World Bank Group, “Europe and Central Asia Economic Update,” https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/94bdc078-9c64-4833-992a-fda7b3d1a640/content; World Bank, “Russian Federation MPO,” https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/d5f32ef28464d01f195827b7e020a3e8-0500022021/related/mpo-rus.pdf; Trading Economics, “Russia 3-Year Bond Yield,” https://tradingeconomics.com/ruge3y:gov ; World Bank, “The World Bank in Ukraine,” https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ukraine/overview#3; https://www.exchange-rates.org/exchange-rate-history/rub-usd-2024-11-01.
* This card was produced by RM staff and Belfer Center Avoiding Great Power War Project’s research assistant Maryana Shnitser.