The Russia-Ukraine War Report Card, Jan. 15, 2025

Find past issues in the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card archive. 

Jan. 15 update: Net territorial change in the past month: Russia +172 square miles. (Area roughly equivalent to 7 1/2 Manhattan islands.)

Who’s Gaining and Who’s Losing What?

Territorial Control

Report Card*

Change in Russia’s control of Ukrainian territory.¹

(Based on data from the Institute for the Study of War.)

• Since Feb. 24, 2022:
  • Russia: +26,899 square miles. 12% of Ukraine. (Area roughly equivalent to the U.S. states of Massachusetts, Vermont and New Hampshire combined).
• Total area of all Ukrainian territory Russia presently controls, including Crimea and parts of Donbas Russia had seized prior to the full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022:
  • Russia: +43,524 square miles. 19% of Ukraine. (Area roughly equivalent to the state of Ohio).
• In past month (Dec. 11, 2024–Jan. 15, 2025): Russia gained 172 square miles. Area roughly equivalent to 7 1/2 Manhattan islands.
• In past week: Russia gained 24 square miles, the equivalent of a bit more than 1 Manhattan island.

Russian net territorial control in Ukraine by month: February 2022–December 2024.(Also based on data from the Institute for the Study of War.)

Military casualties

• Russia: More than 700,000 killed or injured. 48,000 missing.
• Ukraine: 400,000 killed or injured. 35,000 missing.

Civilian fatalities

• Russia: 368 killed.
• Ukraine: 12,162 killed.

Military vehicles and equipment²

• Russia: 19,932 lost. 
  • Tanks and armored vehicles: 11,540.
  • Aircraft: 286.
  • Naval vessels: 22.
• Ukraine: 7,546 lost. 
  • Tanks and armored vehicles: 3,741.
  • Aircraft: 173.
  • Naval vessels: 35.

Citizens displaced

• Russia: 800,000 emigrated for economic or political reasons, 0.6% of Russian population.
• Ukraine: 10.2 million displaced Ukrainians, 23% of Ukrainian pre-invasion population of 44 million.
  • Internally displaced: 3.7 million.
  • International refugees: 6.5 million.

Economic impact³

• Russia’s economic growth: 5.6% GDP since 2022 (through 2024)
  • 1.6% GDP growth forecast for 2025.
  • Budget deficit: 2.1% of GDP.
  • Russian ruble: 0.008792 U.S. dollars. -26% since invasion.
  • 3-year bond yield: 17.42%
• Ukraine’s negative economic growth: -22.6% GDP since 2022 (through 2024)
  • 2% GDP growth forecast for 2025.
  • Budget deficit: 20.4% of GDP, excluding grants.
  • Ukrainian hryvnia: 0.0237 U.S. dollars. -28% since invasion.
  • 3-year bond yield: 23.1%

Infrastructure

• Russia: A journalistic investigation estimated in March 2024 that Ukrainian strikes had rendered facilities which accounted for 1/6^th of the production of gasoline and diesel fuels in Russia non-operational.
• Ukraine: 64%, or 36 out of 56 GW electricity generating capacity destroyed or occupied, Ukraine relies for 2/3rds of its electricity generation on three functioning Soviet-era NPPs, which it still controls.

Popular support⁴

• Russia: 54% support peace negotiations.
• Ukraine: 35% support peace negotiations.

Other criteria which may be even more important (about which we continue to search for reliable indicators):

• Ammunition supply
• Foreign military aid
• Force generation
• Military leadership
• Training
• Morale
• Control of strategic locations
• Information war: with U.S./Europe; with world.

Footnotes

1. This issue of the war report card has been amended to specify that our measurements of changes in Russia's territorial control include Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia's armed forces and its proxies since 2014.
2. Oryx, “Attack On Europe: Documenting Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” Oryx (blog), https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html; “The Military Balance 2022,” IISS, https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2022; Oryx, “List Of Aircraft Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-aircraft-losses-during-2022.html; Oryx, “List Of Naval Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-naval-losses-during-2022.html. 
3. International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Russian estimates. “Russia and Ukraine 3-Year Bond Yield,” Investing.com, https://www.investing.com/rates-bonds/russia-3-year-bond-yield; World Bank Group, “Europe and Central Asia Economic Update,” https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/94bdc078-9c64-4833-992a-fda7b3d1a640/content; World Bank, “Russian Federation MPO,” https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/d5f32ef28464d01f195827b7e020a3e8-0500022021/related/mpo-rus.pdf; Investing.com, “Russia 3-Year Bond Yield,” https://www.investing.com/rates-bonds/russia-3-year-bond-yield; World Bank, “The World Bank in Ukraine,” https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ukraine/overview#3; https://www.exchange-rates.org/exchange-rate-history/rub-usd-2024-11-01.
4. Levada Center, “Conflict with Ukraine in November 2024,” Dec. 4, 2022, https://www.levada.ru/2024/12/04/konflikt-s-ukrainoj-v-noyabre-2024-goda-vnimanie-podderzhka-otnoshenie-k-peregovoram-trudnosti-i-uspehi-svo-stolknovenie-rossii-i-nato-primenenie-yadernogo-oruzhiya/; Razumkov Center, “Support among citizens for Ukraine's accession to the EU and NATO. Attitude to foreign countries. Attitude to peace talks (September, 2024),” https://razumkov.org.ua/en/sociology/press-releases/support-among-citizens-for-ukraine-s-accession-to-the-eu-and-nato-attitude-to-foreign-countries-attitude-to-peace-talks-september-2024.

*Originally produced by Kate Davidson, a researcher with the Avoiding Great Power War Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Since December 2024 produced by RM staff and researcher with Belfer Center’s Avoiding Great Power War Project Quinn Urich.