The Russia-Ukraine War Report Card, Feb. 5, 2025

The Russia-Ukraine War Report Card, Feb. 5, 2025

Find past issues in the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card archive
 

Feb. 4 update: Russia gained 130 square miles of Ukraine’s territory (nearly 6 Manhattan islands) in the past month, and is now within the city limits of the vital logistics hub of Pokrovsk. There were no significant gains or losses in Kursk Oblast, where Ukraine still hangs on to 171 square miles as DPRK troops are reportedly withdrawn from the frontlines in this western Russian region.

Who’s Gaining and Who’s Losing What?

Territorial Control (figures as of Feb. 4, 2025)

maindonbaskurskpokrovsk

Report Card*

Change in Russia’s control of Ukrainian territory.1

(Based on data from the Institute for the Study of War.)

  • Since Feb. 24, 2022:
    • Russia: +27,005 square miles. 12% of Ukraine. (Area roughly equivalent to the U.S. states of Massachusetts, Vermont and New Hampshire combined).
  • Total area of all Ukrainian territory Russia presently controls, including Crimea and parts of Donbas Russia had seized prior to the full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022.
    • Russia: +43,630 square miles. 19% of Ukraine. (Area roughly equivalent to the state of Ohio).2
  • In past month (Jan. 8–Feb. 4, 2025): Russia gained 130 square miles. Area roughly equivalent to nearly 6 Manhattan islands.3
  • In past week: Russia gained 42 square miles, nearly the equivalent area of 2 Manhattan islands.

Russian net territorial control in Ukraine by month: February 2022–January 2025.(Also based on data from the Institute for the Study of War.) 
 wrc monthly jan

Russian aerial attacks and Ukrainian interceptions4

Since September 2022:

  • Russia launched
    • 17,883 drones
    • 341 ballistic missiles
    • 3,294 cruise missiles
  • Ukraine intercepted
    • 13,301 drones
    • 54 ballistic missiles
    • 2,339 cruise missiles

In January 2025:

  • Russia launched
    • 2,158 drones
    • 20 ballistic missiles
    • 54 cruise missiles
  • Ukraine intercepted
    • 1,372 drones
    • 3 ballistic missiles
    • 40 cruise missiles
dronesballistic missiles graph

Military casualties

  • Russia: More than 700,000 killed or injured, according to a January 2025 estimate by  Lloyd Austin and Antony Blinken.5 48,000 missing.
  • Ukraine: 400,000 killed or injured, according to the January 2025 estimate by Austin and Blinken.6 35,000 missing.

Civilian fatalities

Military vehicles and equipment7

  • Russia: 20,171 lost. 
    • Tanks and armored vehicles: 11,710.
    • Aircraft: 286.
    • Naval vessels: 22.8
  • Ukraine: 7,708 lost. 
    • Tanks and armored vehicles: 3,849.
    • Aircraft: 173.
    • Naval vessels: 35.9

Citizens displaced

  • Russia: 800,000 emigrated for economic or political reasons, 0.6% of Russian population.
  • Ukraine: 10.2 million displaced Ukrainians, 23% of Ukrainian pre-invasion population of 44 million.
    • Internally displaced: 3.7 million.
    • International refugees: 6.5 million.

Economic impact10

  • Russia’s economic growth: 5.6% GDP since 2022 (through 2024)
    • 1.4% GDP growth forecast for 2025.
    • Budget deficit in 2024: 1.7%  of GDP.
    • Russian ruble: 0.01003 U.S. dollars. -15% since invasion.
    • 3-year bond yield: 17.42%11
  • Ukraine’s negative economic growth: -22.6% GDP since 2022 (through 2024)
    • 2.5% GDP growth forecast for 2025.
    • Budget deficit in 2024: 20.4% of GDP, excluding grants.
    • Ukrainian hryvnia:  0.02413 U.S. dollars. -27% since invasion.
    • 3-year bond yield: 24.8%

Infrastructure

  • Russia: A journalistic investigation estimated in March 2024 that Ukrainian strikes had rendered facilities which accounted for 1/6th of the production of gasoline and diesel fuels in Russia non-operational.
  • Ukraine: 64%, or 36 out of 56 GW electricity generating capacity destroyed or occupied, Ukraine relies for 2/3rds of its electricity generation on three functioning Soviet-era NPPs, which it still controls.

Popular support12

  • Russia: 54% support peace negotiations.
  • Ukraine: 51% support peace negotiations.13

Other criteria which may be even more important (about which we continue to search for reliable indicators):

  • Ammunition supply
  • Foreign military aid
  • Force generation
  • Military leadership
  • Training
  • Morale
  • Control of strategic locations
  • Information war: with U.S./Europe; with world.

 

Footnotes

  1. This issue of the war report card has been amended to specify that our measurements of changes in Russia's territorial control include Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia's armed forces and its proxies since 2014.
  2. As of 02.04.25 Russian forces occupied 112,164 square km (43,307 square miles), which constituted 18.58% of Ukrainian territory and which is roughly equivalent to the state of Virginia, according to Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group’s map.
  3. In the past 30 days, Russian forces made a gain of 190 square miles (493 square km), the equivalent to some 8 Manhattan Islands, in Ukraine, according to a 02.03.25 estimate by the Economist.
  4. Jensen, Benjamin and Yasir Atalan, “Russian Firepower Strike Tracker: Analyzing Missile Attacks in Ukraine,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 17, 2024, https://www.csis.org/programs/futures-lab/projects/russian-firepower-strike-tracker-analyzing-missile-attacks-ukraine?f%5B0%5D=content_type%3Aarticle&f%5B1%5D=content_type%3Areport Note that due to limitations associated with refreshing of attack  and intercept data, this section of the scorecard is updated once a month.
  5. According to Donald Trump’s January 2025 estimate, 1 million Russian soldiers have been killed.
  6. According to Trump’s January 2025 estimate, 700,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed.
  7. Oryx, “Attack On Europe: Documenting Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” Oryx (blog), https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html; “The Military Balance 2022,” IISS, https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2022; Oryx, “List Of Aircraft Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-aircraft-losses-during-2022.html; Oryx, “List Of Naval Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-naval-losses-during-2022.html
  8. Not being updated as of 2025.
  9. Not being updated as of 2025.
  10. International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Russian estimates. “Russia and Ukraine 3-Year Bond Yield,” Investing.com, https://www.investing.com/rates-bonds/russia-3-year-bond-yield; World Bank Group, “Europe and Central Asia Economic Update,” https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/94bdc078-9c64-4833-992a-fda7b3d1a640/content; World Bank, “Russian Federation MPO,” https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/d5f32ef28464d01f195827b7e020a3e8-0500022021/related/mpo-rus.pdf; Investing.com, “Russia 3-Year Bond Yield,” https://www.investing.com/rates-bonds/russia-3-year-bond-yield; World Bank, “The World Bank in Ukraine,” https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ukraine/overview#3https://www.exchange-rates.org/exchange-rate-history/rub-usd-2024-11-01.
  11. Not being updated as of 2024.
  12. Levada Center, “Conflict with Ukraine in November 2024,” Dec. 4, 2022, https://www.levada.ru/2024/12/04/konflikt-s-ukrainoj-v-noyabre-2024-goda-vnimanie-podderzhka-otnoshenie-k-peregovoram-trudnosti-i-uspehi-svo-stolknovenie-rossii-i-nato-primenenie-yadernogo-oruzhiya/; Razumkov Center, “Support among citizens for Ukraine's accession to the EU and NATO. Attitude to foreign countries. Attitude to peace talks (September, 2024),” https://razumkov.org.ua/en/sociology/press-releases/support-among-citizens-for-ukraine-s-accession-to-the-eu-and-nato-attitude-to-foreign-countries-attitude-to-peace-talks-september-2024.
  13. A December 2024 poll by Ukraine’s Socis research firm shows 51% of Ukrainians favor a compromise solution to the conflict with participation of foreign leaders. Another 20% of Ukrainians agree to temporary freezing of the conflict along the current line of contact.

*This card is being produced by RM staff and researcher with Belfer Center’s Avoiding Great Power War Project Quinn Urich.